Major General George G. Meade, a Union general during the American Civil War, has a reputation that has been historically criticized and misunderstood. Despite his important contributions at the Battle of Gettysburg and his cautious approach to warfare, he faced criticism for not aggressively pursuing and defeating Lee's army. Lloyd W Klein explains.
Major General George Gordon Meade.
During the war, Meade’s poor relationships with the press of his time and his secondary role under Grant further damaged his post-war reputation. However, modern appraisals recognize his competence and tactical acumen, including his appreciation for advancements in weapons technology. Meade's campaigns after Gettysburg, such as the Fall 1863 campaigns and the Overland Campaign, showcased his abilities as a general. While Grant's strategy ultimately led to victory, Meade played a crucial role in positioning his army to implement Grant's vision and should be credited for his contributions to the Union's success. It doesn’t help that the Overland Campaign was directed by Grant and that his victory at Gettysburg is typically considered a one-off. The misunderstanding of the Williamsport circumstance will probably never be repaired.
Meade took command of the Union Army just a few days before the Gettysburg battle. General Meade commanded the Union Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Gettysburg, and is regarded as a competent and capable general. Meade's leadership both preparing for and during the Battle of Gettysburg is often praised. He successfully organized his forces and made critical decisions that ultimately led to a Union victory in that significant battle. His strategic positioning and defensive preparations played a crucial role in repelling numerous Confederate attacks.
He faced Lee in two other campaigns in Fall 1863. They did not succeed. For this, given that Grant won the war the year after, he is universally, but unfairly, criticized as another Union general hack. Yet few Civil War aficionados have studied these campaigns in much detail.
Meade was a competent general and a modest man. He was thorough, methodical and cautious; his engineering background had made him someone who planned his maneuvers carefully.
However, Meade's tenure as the overall commander of the Army of the Potomac was not without criticism. Some argue that he missed opportunities for more aggressive action and failed to decisively pursue and defeat General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army after the Gettysburg victory. Additionally, his cautious approach in subsequent campaigns, such as the Mine Run Campaign, drew criticism from his superiors.
Overall, while Meade's leadership at Gettysburg demonstrated his ability as a competent general, opinions on his overall performance during the Civil War vary among historians and military experts. A great deal of the bias we today have against Meade has its origins in the Congressional Investigations after Gettysburg. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt
His post bellum reputation was damaged by his poor relationships with the press of his time, and his secondary role under Grant in 1864. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt. The damaging consequences of the controversy arising from Gettysburg with General Sickles has also been damaging. Modern appraisals recognize Meade’s important contributions at Gettysburg. His tactics in the field were one of the few that showed an appreciation for the improvements in weapons technology in the war: he entrenched when feasible and did not launch frontal assaults on fortified positions.
Gettysburg Aftermath: Williamsport
Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. The retreat required an active rear guard defense and was mainly carried out in the rain. ,Meade was widely criticized for failing to pursue aggressively and defeat Lee's army after Gettysburg. Although Lincoln and Stanton insisted on his following Lee, Meade may have been justified in not attempting a rapid pursuit.
At the three-day battle at Gettysburg, Meade's forces had suffered heavy casualties, and he needed time to regroup, reorganize, and resupply his army. The Army of the Potomac (AoP) had sustained over 20,000 casualties including the loss of many of its best officers, including three corps commanders. Attacking immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on his troops and risked further losses.
Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover, there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Under the direction of Brig Gen John Imboden, during the Confederate retreat, the wagon trains with thousands of wounded soldiers were escorted back to Virginia., Lee had not reached the town until a couple of days after an important cavalry attack that Imboden defended against. Imboden successfully managed to retreat and gather his forces, despite harassment from Union cavalry, to create defensive works against Union assault. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When Lee arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.
Meade chose not to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached. Attacking a well-entrenched enemy in this defensive position across a wide open field would have been a highly risky endeavor, potentially resulting in heavy casualties for Meade's forces.
Thirdly, Meade faced logistical challenges and supply issues. His army relied on a long and stretched supply line, and engaging in a major offensive action immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on the already taxed supply system. Meade needed time to replenish his ammunition, food, and other essential supplies before considering another large-scale attack.
Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover, there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When he arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.
Expecting an attack, Brigadier General John D. Imboden set up defensive positions along the crest of a ridge about one-half mile from Williamsport on July 6. Arriving at Williamsport, Imboden found the pontoon bridge destroyed, and Federal cavalry attacked the wagon train of wounded. On July 6, 1863, the Potomac River flooding at Williamsport, Maryland, trapped Imboden's wagon train. He put together a defensive force that included an artillery battery and as many of the wounded who could operate muskets.
Late in the afternoon of July 6, 1863, Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General John Buford arrived east of Williamsport, flanking the town. Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick took a different route that took him down the main road. At sundown Union Brigadier General George A. Custer and his Michigan "Wolverines" arrived to fight but were quickly withdrawn.
By July 7, Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden stopped Brig. Gen. John Buford's Union cavalry from occupying Williamsport and destroying Confederate trains. On July 6, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division drove two Confederate cavalry brigades through Hagerstown before being forced to retire by the arrival of the rest of Stuart's command.
On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.
On July 16, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Meade chose not to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached.
Congressional Investigation of Gettysburg
In a 1961 article, The Strange Reputation of General Meade, Edwin Coddington wrote that Sickles’ attacks on Meade “greatly contributed to an unfavorable opinion of him as a commanding general, which has persisted to this day.” Coddington concluded that, “Sickles’ persistence in continuing his feud long after Meade’s death in 1872 had deep and lasting effects on publicists and historians of the battle,” and that “Sickles achieved a large measure of success” in his campaign to sully Meade’s name.
When Meade denied a request by Sickles to return to command, Sickles sought revenge. In February 1864, he went before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a highly influential committee dominated by Radical Republicans, and gave distorted testimony that Meade had handled the army ineptly at Gettysburg—that the Union army had won a great victory despite Meade. Notably, Sickles alleged that on the battle’s second day Meade had been a coward, eager to retreat rather than fight.
The two most important witnesses against him were:
a) Major General Abner Doubleday supported Sickles’ egregious claims by testifying that Meade had played favorites in command assignments. Doubleday in particular was bitter that Meade had ignored army seniority and not promoted him to command of the 1st Corps after its commander, Maj. Gen. John Reynolds, was killed early on July 1—instead choosing Maj. Gen. John Newton as Reynolds’ replacement.
b) Hooker’s Chief of Staff, Daniel Butterworth, who Meade kept on during the battle of Gettysburg (remember, he had just 3 days to prepare!). Butterfield, a close friend of Sickles’ and Hooker’s, falsely testified about the claimed July 2 order to retreat. Sickles elevated his attack on Meade when he (or a close associate) penned an anonymous article by “Historicus” in the March 12, 1864, edition of The New York Herald, the nation’s largest newspaper. Historicus condemned Meade’s handling of Gettysburg while praising the brave and brilliant Sickles. The article claimed Meade had ordered his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Butterfield, to prepare an order of retreat on July 2, the battle’s second day. The Historicus piece set off a firestorm, and stories of Meade’s alleged inadequacies appeared in papers nationwide.
The Joint Committee’s Radical Republicans wanted “Fighting Joe” Hooker back in command of the Army of the Potomac. The committee’s leaders, Chairman Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, demanded Lincoln dismiss Meade even before he had an opportunity to testify. President Lincoln declined to order a Court of Inquiry. The president wanted Meade fighting Confederates, not a political conflict against a fellow general.
The Fall 1863 Campaigns
After the Battle of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee retreated back across the Potomac River to Virginia and concentrated behind the Rapidan River. Early in September 1863, Lee dispatched two divisions of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's Corps to reinforce the Confederate Army of Tennessee for the Battle of Chickamauga. Meade knew that Lee had been weakened by the departure of Longstreet and wanted to take advantage. Meade advanced his army to the Rappahannock River in August, and on September 13 he moved the AoP forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan. Lee was occupying Culpeper, Virginia, following the Battle of Culpeper Court House. Meade planned to use his numerical superiority in a broad turning movement, similar to the one planned by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker in the Battle of Chancellorsville that spring.
A traditional interpretation of this campaign is that Lee, despite having lost Longstreet’s Corps to the west, nevertheless beat Meade in the Bristoe Campaign. The reality is that on September 24 the Union split its forces as well, sending the XI and XII Corps to the Chattanooga campaign in Tennessee. It is interesting that this critical fact is rarely mentioned. Instead, the importance of Bristoe is nearly always depreciated. Its failure is often portrayed as the reason Grant was brought east, because its shows Meade to be too conservative to win.
In fact, four battles took place: Auburn, Bristoe Station, Buckland Mills, and Rappahannock Station. Every one of these is south of Manassas. Two are not far from Chancellorsville and the location of the Wilderness.
Lee knew of the departing Union corps, and early in October he began an offensive sweep around Cedar Mountain with his remaining two corps, attempting to turn Meade's right flank. Meade, despite having superior numbers, did not wish to give battle in a position that did not offer him the advantage and ordered a withdrawal along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
Lee had been planning to go into winter quarters at Culpepper. Instead, he set up south of the Rapidan. In fact, the AoP occupied Brandy Station and Culpepper that winter. Meade had escaped allowing a major battle in a disadvantageous location and Lee had lost ground. It was certainly inconclusive – because Meade saw the danger.
Lincoln and Stanton weren’t mollified by the lack of progress in the Bristoe Campaign and pressured Meade to do more. Meade responded by planning a march to strike the ANV south of the Rapidan. He had intelligence suggesting that Lee had made a miscalculation in his positioning. But an incredibly incompetent Union general and an outrageously courageous movement by a Confederate general saved the ANV after a brief but deadly conflict few appreciate. Traditional history suggests Meade was incompetent and ignores this action as having any importance, which is completely wrong: he almost had Lee trapped.
Meade actually planned a rapid movement just west of Chancellorsville and where the Wilderness would be the next Spring. In fact, the Union movements were in the same general vicinity.
Unfortunately, Maj. Gen. William H. French's III Corps got mired in fording the river at Jacob's Ford, causing traffic jams when they moved their artillery to Germanna Ford, where other units were attempting to cross.
Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division was marching along the Raccoon Ford Road to join Early when the head of Gen. French's III Corps made contact in the heavy wooded terrain along the Widow Morris Road. Johnson turned his division about and ordered what can only be described as a reckless double-envelopment assault against a mostly unseen enemy of unknown strength, throwing his 5,500 men against French and John Sedgwick's VI Corps (a combined 32,000). The fact is, if Johnson had cleared the Widow Morris Road before the arrival of French and Sedgwick, or had been driven away in defeat, the 32,000 Federals could have marched behind Lee's left flank and into his rear.
This battle is called the Battle of Payne’s Farm. Theodore P. Savas, together with Paul Sacra of Richmond, Virginia, set out to locate and map the Payne's Farm battlefield in the early 1990s. Savas believed published articles and books had incorrectly located the fighting area and was determined to test his theory. Armed with extensive primary sources and battle reports, he and Sacra located what they believed was the field and, with the permission from several landowners, used metal detectors to prove it. Within a couple days Savas and Sacra had unearthed hundreds of artifacts, including bullets, a ramrod, bayonet socket, a partial harmonica, belt buckles, buttons, and much more.
Overland Campaign
Often in the telling of Grant’s brilliant strategy of 1864 and the Overland Campaign, one gets the impression that Meade had been so incompetent that he was starting almost from Washington, but the fact is, in early 1864, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia faced each other across the Rapidan River. It was there because Meade had placed it there, and had fought for it to be there.
In the spring of 1864 Meade’s authority was superseded by the appointment of Ulysses S. Grant as general-in-chief of all Union armies. Although he was still technically the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Meade acted as Grant’s subordinate for the rest of the war.
In this capacity, Meade participated in Grant’s aggressive Overland Campaign of 1864, in which the Union army absorbed staggering casualties. Meade took part in in the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. He was also instrumental in the prolonged Siege of Petersburg (June 1864-March 1865), which was launched after Meade’s early assaults on the city resulted in heavy Union casualties.
Meade and Grant
In 1864, Grant was appointed as the overall commander of the Union armies and placed his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Meade. Grant had a high regard for Meade's military abilities and acknowledged his successes, but there were instances where their working dynamics faced challenges.
Grant and Meade had a complex working relationship. Initially, there were some tensions and miscommunications between the two, but over time they developed a professional rapport and worked together effectively.
Meade sometimes felt that Grant did not fully appreciate his contributions and achievements. There were instances where the press assigned to the Army of the Potomac focused more on Grant's role in successes, while downplaying Meade's contributions. This caused frustration for Meade, as he felt he was not given the credit he deserved.
Despite occasional disagreements, Grant and Meade maintained a functional working relationship. They shared the goal of winning the war and coordinated their efforts to achieve military success.
Grant made his headquarters with Meade for the remainder of the war. Following an incident in June 1864, Meade disciplined reporter Edward Cropsey from The Philadelphia Inquirer. He falsely reported that Meade had wanted to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness. All of the press assigned to the AoP agreed to mention Meade only in conjunction with setbacks. Meade apparently knew nothing of this arrangement, and the reporters giving all of the credit to Grant angered Meade.
Meade wrote to his wife:
“I had a visit today from General Grant, who was the first to tell me of the attack in the Times based upon my order expelling two correspondents. Grant expressed himself very much annoyed at the injustice done to me, which he said was glaring, because my order distinctly states that it was by his direction that these men were prohibited from remaining with the army. He acknowledged there was an evident intention to hold me accountable for all that was condemned and to praise him for all that was commendable.”
Nevertheless, Meade is frequently blamed for specific problems in the Overland Campaign. As the fighting reached Cold Harbor and Petersburg, Meade is blamed for not directing his men to scout properly prior to the former battle and failed to coordinate his corps properly in the opening stages of the latter. During the siege of Petersburg, Meade again erred altering the attack plan for the Battle of the Crater for political reasons. But it is known that Grant approved these plans.
Grant issued orders to Meade who in turn issued them to the army.
Meade, despite his aggressive performance in lesser commands in 1862, had become a more cautious general and more concerned about the futility of attacking entrenched positions. Most of the bloody repulses his army suffered in the Overland Campaign were ordered by Grant, although the aggressive maneuvering that eventually cornered Lee in the trenches around Petersburg were Grant's initiative as well.
Without question, Grant’s strategy won the war. Without doubt, Grant made the tough decisions and took the criticism of the heavy casualties. But it was Meade who made Grant’s strategic plan a reality, being the commander who positioned his army to operationalize Grant’s vision.
Conclusion
General Meade was a thorough, methodical man as would be expected of a professional military man and engineer.
What do you think of the General George Meade? Let us know below.
Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.
Suggested Reading
Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Nugent M, Petruzzi JD, Wittenberg EJ. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 - 14, 1863. Savas Beattiem 2011.
Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.
Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.
Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715
