The Reconnaissance Mission
In the early hours of July 2nd, General Lee determined that before he could devise a battle strategy for the day, he needed accurate intelligence as to the left flank of the Union line. Longstreet’s Chief Engineer, Maj. John C. Clarke joined Captain Samuel R. Johnston, one of Lee’s aides, on a nighttime mission. They set out at 4 am to locate the Union left. Johnston claimed he took a route very close to Longstreet’s countermarch later that day and made it to the top of Little Round Top (LRT), and saw no Union troops there at all.
Although the exact route taken by Johnston remains a matter of speculation, determining it precisely holds significant importance in comprehending the events that unfolded during the battle on July 2. It is likely that he departed from Lee's headquarters near the Lutheran Theological Seminary and proceeded south along the western slope of Seminary Ridge, eventually entering the Willoughby Run valley. Along this path, he would have passed by the Samuel Pitzer farm and the Pitzer Schoolhouse. Subsequently, he probably turned east, ascending the western slope of Warfield Ridge, near the location where McLaws later positioned his troops that afternoon. Johnston himself mentioned that he continued along the ridge towards the round top, crossing the Emmitsburg road, until he reached the slope of LRT, providing him with a commanding view. This sequence of movements would have placed him on LRT around 5:30 a.m.
Following his reconnaissance, Johnston reported to General Lee that there existed a concealed route that could not be detected from the Union lines. Crucially, he noted that the large hill in the distance, “with a commanding view”, which was LRT, was unoccupied. General Lee formulated his attack plan for July 2 based on the intelligence provided by Johnston's mission.
The problem with his information is that historical records indicate the presence of numerous Union troops on the hill that night. Buford's cavalry and Geary's division were encamped in front of LRT, with two regiments stationed there along with skirmishers. At 7 a.m., Major General David B. Birney of the Third Corps relieved General Geary, who had spent the entire night at that location. It has been estimated that approximately 18,000 Union troops were positioned between the Emmitsburg Road and the Taneytown Road, as well as between LRT and the George Weikert Farm, precisely when Johnston claimed to have been on Little Roundtop. Given these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that Johnston could have conducted his scouting mission without being detected. Additionally, Captain Lemuel B. Norton, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac, reported the establishment of a signal station on Little Roundtop by 11 P.M. on July 1.
So what could have transpired? One possibility is that Johnston may have been on Big Round Top, as during that period, there was no clear distinction between the two peaks. Another hypothesis put forth by Wittenberg suggests that Johnston might have been disoriented in the darkness and mistakenly believed he was on Bushman's Hill. Others have suggested that he got as far as Houck’s Ridge. Johnston had previously carried out similar successful services at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, so the reason behind the inaccurate information he provided to General Lee before 8 a.m. remains unresolved. Nevertheless, based on this intelligence, General Lee formulated a plan.
Lee’s Plan
Lee initiated preparations assuming that the Union left was positioned on Cemetery Ridge, and he instructed Longstreet to make the necessary arrangements. Lee desired this assault to catch the enemy off guard, so Longstreet was tasked with taking a concealed route along Seminary Ridge, descending to the Emmitsburg Pike without attracting attention, and then launching the attack. However, the First Corps had not yet fully arrived. They had been delayed during their movement behind South Mountain, and to reach the battlefield, they had to pass through Cashtown and cover a distance of 10 miles to Gettysburg. Longstreet insisted on having all his men present for the attack. Unfortunately, when they finally set off, they were led on a roundabout path that exposed their presence, resulting in a significant delay to their assault, which occurred well into the afternoon.
The Myth of the Sunrise Attack
July 2, 1863, was the true High Water Mark of the Confederacy. The narrative that Longstreet could have launched an attack that morning, altering the course of history, was a notion perpetuated by Jubal Early in the post-war era. General Pendleton's insistence on this theory only added to the tension between him and Longstreet.
Glenn Tucker's thorough examination in the 1960s discredited the myth of the sunrise attack, further supported by Longstreet's memoirs. The reality was that only a fraction of Longstreet's forces were in position at 7 am, with the majority still miles away. The impracticality of organizing such an attack, coupled with the overwhelming Union presence, makes it clear that Longstreet's alleged failure to act at that specific time did not determine the outcome of the battle or the war. Only McLaws, the artillery, and a part of Hood’s division were even up at 7 am, about 10,000 men, and that was after an all-night march. Had they attacked, they might have been met by 60,000 Union troops. The rest of the Corps were at Chambersburg and south of Cashtown. He moved up as quickly as possible, but most of his men were miles from Seminary Ridge at 7 am.
Even an 11 am start was not feasible due to various delays faced by his corps reaching the battlefield, resulting in a later arrival time. Alexander and his artillery didn’t even arrive until 9 am. Lee's vision of simultaneous flank offensives was hindered by Longstreet's need to wait for Law's brigade to arrive; the delay in Law's arrival further postponed the attack, with three brigades still in march columns when Longstreet finally began his movement at noon. Witness reports of Lee's frustration at 11 am that the attack had not started highlight the challenges faced in coordinating the attack, with delays caused by traffic jams. But Longstreet's attack was delayed because he first had to wait for his final brigade (Evander M. Law's & Hood's division) to arrive, and then he was forced to march on a long, circuitous route that could not be seen by Union Army Signal Corps observers on LRT. Longstreet received permission from Lee to wait for Law's brigade to reach the field before advancing. Law marched his men quickly, covering 28 miles in 11 hours, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march columns when he set off. In retrospect, Lee & Longstreet should have kept these men closer to the front, not at the tail end of the order of march.
Longstreet intended to place his men across from the Emmitsburg Pike facing east, toward the enemy lines directly facing them. Lee's strategic vision called for a different approach - he wanted the troops to face north and advance towards Cemetery Ridge and Hill. This shift in direction was crucial, as Lee aimed for a concentrated attack on the Union center on both Day 2 and Day 3 of the battle.
As Longstreet's men approached the area near Blackhorse Tavern, the presence of Union signalmen on LRT posed a risk of detection. In response, the decision was made to countermarch back to the starting point, to keep the lines in the correct order for the attack. This resulted in a delay of at least one hour, and Longstreet did not reach the appropriate zone until 4 pm. Whether the countermarch was necessary or not is a matter of contention. However, the countermarch took longer than expected, and by the time Longstreet's troops were ready to launch their attack, valuable time had been lost. The delay allowed the Union Army to reinforce their position, and for additional troops to march toward the battlefield.
Maj Gen Daniel Sickles and III Corps
At this moment, arguably the most crucial hour of the entire war, an unauthorized troop movement changed the course of the battle and history. Ordered to hold the line on the ground between LRT and Cemetery Ridge, Maj Gen Sickles instead, on his own initiative, decided that this was a poor position for his III Corps, and instead moved them forward (west) about a half mile to the Sherfy Peach Orchard, on the Emmitsburg Pike. The consequences of this unauthorized movement reverberate through the ages
Sickles perceived, correctly, that the ground in his front was about 10 to 15 feet higher than the ground he was supposed to defend. He believed therefore that his line was in a vulnerable position for enemy artillery to destroy him. A very similar situation had happened at Chancellorsville when he was ordered by General Hooker to give up Hazel Crest, which then became the key to Confederate artillery destroying the army on day 2 of that battle. Sickles hadn’t forgotten that experience, so he asked Meade for permission to move up at least twice. Meade thought that the area was not in a good position and was in a no-man’s land. Famously when General Meade saw this right before the battle opened, he told Sickles that he was out of position and knew a disaster was in store. Hancock made a similar famous observation.
General Sickles decided at 11 AM to not defend the line General Meade assigned him between Top and Cemetery Ridge but rather to advance to the Peach Orchard. This unauthorized move must count as one of the most fateful decisions of the entire war. Certainly, it led to the destruction of his III Corps, and it threatened the entire left flank of the Union defense, but paradoxically, it might have saved the battle. By leaving uncovered both of his flanks, leaving (LRT) Top uncovered, and not telling anyone what he was up to, he put Meade at a serious disadvantage.
The decision to defend the Sherfy Peach Orchard, adjacent to the Emmitsburg Pike, rather than the assigned position on the descending limb of LRT attached to Cemetery Ridge, not only resulted in a vulnerable and easily attacked position but also left the flanks exposed. The left flank, consisting of LRT, Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield, had to be hastily covered as troops entered the battle. As units arrived on the field, they were immediately dispatched to critical locations to save Sickles' III Corps and the entire front. The success of Day 2 of Gettysburg relied heavily on the bravery and valor displayed by numerous men and their regiments, who are now remembered as heroes. It is important to acknowledge that Sickles' unconventional decision does not absolve him of the fact that he acted without proper knowledge, displayed insubordination, endangered the Union line, and caused the loss of many lives. However, it should also be noted that he was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions and was regarded as a great hero during his time.
Longstreet Attacks
At 4 pm, Longstreet finally prepared to launch his attack, only to realize that circumstances had changed in the interim. His original battle plan involved a left wheel followed by an en echelon attack. However, it became immediately apparent that this plan was no longer feasible due to the III Corps' position at the eastern edge of the Emmitsburg Pike, specifically at the Peach Orchard. Upon seeing Sickles' chosen position, it became clear that Lee's intended plan was no longer viable. Attacking northwards while the Peach Orchard remained under Union control was no longer an option. Instead, Longstreet's attack had to be redirected eastward, crossing the turnpike and landing further south than initially intended by Lee. The original objective of attacking the Union center had now shifted to targeting its left flank.
Hood repeatedly questioned Longstreet about whether the attack should be called off or if the plan needed to be altered due to the changed position of the Union line. Despite these inquiries, Longstreet insisted on proceeding with the attack as ordered. When told to attack as ordered, he reportedly told the colonel of a TX regiment something along the lines of "When we get under fire, I will have a digression." We don’t know if he said this, but the digression is often assumed to be the attack on LRT. His pep talk to the troops before the attack stepped off included a reference to taking those heights, also widely assumed to refer to LRT.
The assault on LRT occurred due to General Law's movement eastward, leading his 15th and 47th Alabama regiments to pursue US Sharpshooters up Big Round Top. As the Sharpshooters retreated down the slope, the Alabama regiments found themselves without a clear target, prompting them to be directed northward until they eventually reached LRT.
Following this, a crucial period unfolded where the fate of the battle, and potentially the entire war, teetered on the edge for several hours. Major General John Bell Hood launched an attack on LRT and Devil's Den, while Major General Lafayette McLaws attacked the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. Although neither side emerged victorious, the Union III Corps suffered significant losses.
The echelon attack strategy employed that day is often misconstrued, necessitating clarification on which plan is being referenced: the original strategy where McLaws' division would have taken the lead, or the revised plan and actual sequence of events after Union troops were spotted on Sickles' advanced line, resulting in Hood's division leading the charge. Under the initial plan, McLaws would have advanced alongside the Emmitsburg Road towards a Union flank presumed to be further north, with Hood's division providing support, likely by advancing to his rear or right rear. The ultimate goal was for the attack, with support from AP Hill’s Corps, to culminate on Cemetery Ridge and potentially Cemetery Hill.
Under the original plan, McLaws would have advanced astride the Emmitsburg Road, across the Peach Orchard, toward a Union flank believed to be located further north. Hood's division would have supported McLaws. Exactly how is unclear, but probably advancing to his rear or right rear. At some point, McLaws would have probably shifted entirely east of the road, because continuing to advance astride it would have missed most of the Union position. With support from AP Hill’s Corps, the idea was that ultimately the attack would end up on Cemetery Ridge and hopefully Cemetery Hill.
In the actual unfolding of events, Hood's division took the lead, but it underwent significant revisions on the spot. The plan was for the division to advance "up the Emmitsburg Road," but not directly on it. It's important to note that this was not meant to be an en echelon attack, where units are arranged diagonally. Instead, the division would advance in a column formation, with two brigades side by side in the first line (Law and Robertson), followed by Benning and Anderson in the same manner. The en echelon aspect would come later, but it never actually materialized. The plan was for Robertson to align his left flank with the Emmitsburg Road and his right flank with Law's position. However, Law veered to the east, making it impossible for Robertson to maintain both alignments. He chose to hold on to Law's left flank instead. As a result, Lee's original concept of advancing "up the Emmitsburg Road" was abandoned once the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield turned into deadly battlegrounds.
The phrase "en echelon attack" often carries a sense of awe, as if it is an unstoppable and overwhelming force. An en echelon formation is a diagonal arrangement of units, with each unit positioned at an oblique angle to a specific direction. The name of this formation comes from the French word "échelon," which means a rung of a ladder, describing the ladder-like shape when viewed from above or below. This formation is favored due to the enhanced visibility it provides to each unit.
However, as the events of July 2 demonstrated, an en echelon attack can also become disjointed and ineffective. By launching attacks in a sequential manner, the initial attack draws the enemy's attention, potentially leaving subsequent parts of the formation under-defended. Timing is crucial, and any delay at the start can significantly impact the later stages. On the second day of the battle, Hood and McLaws deviated from their intended northward direction and instead moved east, as the enemy had shifted in that direction. This created a weak point at the top of the formation. Despite this setback, the attack almost succeeded due to Sickles' exposed position, but the change in direction ultimately diminished the impact of the latter stages, falling short of Lee's expectations.
Unlike Hood's division, McLaws division did attack en echelon in two lines, with Kershaw and Barksdale in the front line, followed by Semmes and Wofford in the second line. While Barksdale attempted to drive north along the road into Humphreys' left flank, most of McLaws' efforts were directed east, towards Wheatfield Road and Plum Run Swale. Wofford's brigade, for instance, ended up moving down Wheatfield Road instead of supporting Barksdale.
The idea of Hood turning right to flank the Union left was not a straightforward option due to various factors. No suitable roads were running east/west for Hood to take his division on a flanking attack. Additionally, the presence of the Union VI Corps in the area would have made any movement slow and risky. Lee already had an extended front line, making it challenging to shift the whole army to support Hood's potential maneuver. Without proper intelligence on the terrain and Federal positions, Hood's division would have been vulnerable without infantry or artillery support. The lack of such information is directly attributable to the reality that Stuart was nowhere to be seen. Finally, once Anderson's division is committed. any movement in that direction would have been too small to make a difference.
Laws made a tactical decision of immense consequence. Hood organized his division into two lines, with Jerome B. Robertson’s Brigade and Evander M. Law’s Brigade forming the first attacking line, followed by George T. Anderson’s Brigade and Henry L. Benning’s Brigade in support. Law’s Brigade held a significant position as the right brigade not only in Hood’s Division but also in the entire Army of Northern Virginia. As Law’s Brigade advanced, it faced artillery fire from Captain James Smith’s battery near Devil’s Den.
Law had several options to consider as his brigade moved forward: continue moving eastward; incline his entire brigade toward Devil’s Den; or send part of his brigade to attack Smith’s guns and continue forward with the remainder of his force. Law decided to direct the right two regiments, the 44th Alabama and the 48th Alabama, to flank left and attack north towards the Union battery. The 15th Alabama, which had been in the center, now found itself on the far right of the brigade, moving towards the valley between Big Round Top and LRT, with the 47th Alabama on its left. This decision led to unexpected fighting near LRT and Devil’s Den, deviating from Lee’s original plan, with Benning’s Brigade ultimately ending up in Devil’s Den instead of advancing north on Emmitsburg Road.
The Defense of LRT
There was a scarcity of Union troops along LRT during that period. Conversely, there was a significant presence of Union troops and artillery positioned on Houck's Ridge. The left flank of the Union forces was not situated on LRT by 4 pm, but rather at Devil's Den. The outcome of Day 2 at Gettysburg hinged upon the valor and bravery displayed by numerous men, who are now revered as heroes alongside their regiments. Additionally, credit must be attributed to Meade for effectively mobilizing over 20,000 reinforcements to secure the salient that had not been part of his initial plan.
The chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren was considered the "Savior of Little Round Top" for his quick reaction to get troops to the summit before the approaching Confederates arrived on the afternoon of July 2. His statue on what is now known as Warren Rock immortalizes the moment that he saw the long line of Rebel soldiers approaching from the south. It depicts the moment when he looked out with binoculars, saw the Rebels moving his way, and realized that he needed to get troops and batteries up there as soon as he could. General Warren recognized that LRT dominated the Union position and had been left undefended, and the tactical importance of the hill. He urgently sought Union troops to occupy it before the Confederates could, but where would these troops come from? A New Yorker who had taught mathematics at West Point, he had no time to get authorization: he immediately, on his own initiative, constructed a defense of the Union left flank.
Warren encountered Strong Vincent's brigade nearby and asked for immediate assistance. Vincent, without consulting his superior officers, decided, "I will take the responsibility to take my brigade there." Vincent ordered one of his regiments to face southwards, positioned on the left flank of the brigade, while he handled the right flank, facing west. The regiment he so ordered was the 20th Maine and its commander was Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, who would become one of the greatest heroes of the war and governor of Maine. Vincent made it clear to Chamberlain that he was the far left flank regiment of the entire Union line, and that he must hold it no matter what. Vincent went back to his right flank, where the 16th Michigan was beginning to falter; at that moment he was mortally wounded. He would receive a battlefield promotion to general from Meade; that portion of LRT is called Vincent’s Spur.
Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade was discovered by a staff officer nearby. Recognizing the strategic advantage of his brigade's position, Vincent took it upon himself to deploy them where they would be most effective. Disregarding the need for approval from his superiors, he made the decision independently. Pvt. Oliver Willcox Norton, Vincent's brigade standard bearer and bugler, together with Vincent, made a reconnaissance of the Confederate forces as the brigade was moving into position, "While our line was forming on the hill at Gettysburg I came out with him in full view of the rebel lines. They opened two batteries on us instantly, firing at the colors. Colonel Vincent looked to see what was drawing the fire and yelled at me, "Down with the flag, Norton! Damn it, go behind the rocks with it."
Standing atop a large boulder, he brandished a riding crop and shouted for his troops to hold their ground. Tragically, he was struck by a bullet and fell. However, the resolute efforts of his brigades and the individual regiments within it, such as the 20th Maine, the 44th New York, the 83rd Pennsylvania, and the 16th Michigan Infantry, ultimately secured the position. Vincent was transported from the hill to a nearby farm, where he succumbed to his injuries five days later. Vincent received a promotion to brigadier general by General Meade before he died. LRT could not have been held without his leadership.
Vincent's 20th Maine regiment, under the command of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, gained significant renown for their defense of LRT. Upon their arrival in the late afternoon of July 2, Chamberlain's regiment was directed by Colonel Vincent to secure the far left position of the Union lines and to hold it at any cost. Recognizing the crucial importance of this position, Vincent emphasized its significance to Chamberlain while he attended to the right flank of the brigade. Chamberlain's regiment stood as the final line of defense on the left flank, understanding that if they were to falter, the entire Union position could collapse.
The 15th Regiment Alabama Infantry, commanded by Col. William C. Oates, charged up the hill multiple times attempting to flank the Union position. The line of the 20th Maine was doubled back upon itself, with a squad well off to the left. Despite multiple casualties and ammunition almost gone, Chamberlain recognized the dire circumstance and ordered his left wing to initiate a bayonet charge. The resulting action, with the left wing wheeling to make the charging line swing like a hinge, created a simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver. Chamberlain's decisive action against Oates' Alabama brigade, risking their lives in a suicidal bayonet charge when they were nearly overwhelmed, successfully safeguarded the flank of the army on LRT. 101 of the Confederate soldiers were captured and the charge saved the flank. Chamberlain sustained one slight wound in the battle when a shot hit his sword scabbard and bruised his thigh. After initiating the maneuver, a Confederate officer wielding a revolver fired, narrowly missing his face. Chamberlain put his saber at the officer's throat and accepted the man's surrender. He received the Medal of Honor for this action.
Warren encountered Patrick “Paddy” O’Rorke, a former student and fellow New Yorker. Despite being ordered to follow his brigade commander, Steven Weed.. Warren knew O’Rorke from West Point, having been his Mathematics instructor. Warren rode up to O’Rorke and ordered him to reinforce Little Round Top; “Never mind (your Brigade Orders), Paddy. Bring them up on the double-quick and don’t stop for aligning. I’ll take the responsibility.”
O’Rorke did not hesitate. Warren’s aide was George Washington Roebling, who would later build the Brooklyn Bridge. He guided O’Rorke and his men to the correct position on the hill. Reaching the top, O’Rorke saw the line of 16th Michigan holding tentatively. O’Rorke drew his sword shouting: “Down this way, boys!” The 140th “advanced, following their Colonel. Despite a devastating volley in which men fell the men exhausted from their march nevertheless moved up. O’Rorke retrieved the regimental flag and urged his men forward. Then a bullet hit him in the neck and he fell mortally wounded. This courageous action led to O’Rorke being killed, but he is remembered as one of the bravest American military figures, with his likeness being the focal point of the 140th NY monument on LRT today.
Weed then followed, and brought up his artillery commanded by Lt Charles Hazlett. Both were killed in a memorable moment, and the rock they were killed on remains a huge attraction.
General Sykes in his report on the action stated: “Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, chiefs lamented throughout the corps and army, sealed with their lives the spot intrusted to their keeping, and on which so much depended.... General Weed and Colonel Vincent, officers of rare promise, gave their lives to their country.”
The Attack Continues
The unsuccessful assault by the Third Corps division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge was the final chapter. Anderson's brigades attacked en echelon, or at least, most of them. But unlike Hood and McLaws, Anderson's division had no support line. It had not been intended to make a main effort. Instead, its brigades were to advance in sequence, as McLaws moved north into its sector. It would have supported what was already a success. Instead, with Hood's and McLaws' attacks going elsewhere, Anderson was essentially forced to make a primary effort, which his deployment was not suited to. With no secondary lines, his brigades couldn't exploit any success they might attain. Once they encountered resistance, they had to withdraw.
The fighting continued into the looming dusk. The sun was sinking, and with it, Confederate hopes of a breakthrough. Intense fighting raged on Culps Hill, Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and Cemetery Ridge. The killing fields were covered with soldiers, and horses, and burned and destroyed farms and artillery. The “lines” at this point were hypothetical in some places, as the enemy approached at unexpected angles and from above and below. The scenes were those of almost complete chaos. The bodies of the dead were everywhere.
Devil’s Den:
Devil's Den, located at the extreme left of the III Corps salient under Birney's Division, holds significant geological importance as it is a southern extension of Houck's Ridge and is characterized by its massive boulders. This area proved to be a strategic position for Confederate sharpshooters who took cover behind these boulders and engaged in long-range firing. The Union left flank faced a threat from two regiments of Law's brigade, followed by an attack from Benning and Anderson's brigades of Hood's Division, which exploited a gap in the defense. Despite reinforcements, the Confederate forces outnumbered the Union by a ratio of 5000 to 2500, resulting in a forced retreat. The casualties suffered by both sides amounted to approximately one-third of their respective forces.
Wheatfield:
The Wheatfield was a triangular-shaped field situated at the base of LRT. It was a crucial battleground with road connections spanning the entire fighting zone. Combatants from both sides entered this 20-acre field and launched attacks, only to face unexpected counterattacks from various angles. Owned by John Rose, the Wheatfield was bordered by Rose Woods to the west and Stony Hill, a slight elevation. Houck's Ridge lay to the southeast, while Devil's Den stood to the south. Although elements of the III Corps primarily defended this area, General Meade recognized the vulnerability of Sickles' salient and ordered Caldwell's division from the II Corps, under the command of Hancock, to assist. Notably, the leadership of Samuel Zook, Patrick Kelly (the Irish Brigade), and Edward Cross, who led three brigades, emerged as heroes. The Confederate brigades of Semmes, Anderson, and Kershaw confronted a total of six Federal brigades, resulting in casualties amounting to approximately 30% of all engaged forces.
Colonel Regis de Trobriand, commanding the 38th NY, played a pivotal role in the Wheatfield. His brigade displayed unwavering determination against the relentless assaults launched by Hood's division, particularly the Georgia brigade led by Brigadier General George T. Anderson and the South Carolina brigade commanded by Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw. Despite facing overwhelming odds, de Trobriand's brigade valiantly held their ground until they were relieved by units from Major General John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps. But there was a terrible price—every third man in Trobriand's brigade was a casualty. Despite a personal commendation by his commander, General Birney, he was not promoted for two more years, nor given a medal, likely because he was French, older, and not from West Point. He had a distinguished military career after the war and was an artist and author.
Col. Edward E Cross, 2nd Corps, 1st Division brigade commander. Positioned on the left of the division's battle line as it entered the Wheatfield, Cross led his brigade with valor and determination. During the fighting, Cross was mortally wounded while at the left of his line near the Rose Woods. He died the next day at a field hospital. He normally wore a red bandana into battle but having had a premonition of his death wore a black one this day instead which he was wearing when he was cut down leading his brigade into the Wheatfield leading Caldwell's division to support the advanced position of the under attack 3rd Corps. Hancock told him he would be promoted to Brigadier General after that battle, which is when he announced his premonition.
Samuel Zook: On July 2, 1863, the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division, including Zook's brigade, was sent to reinforce the crumbling III Corps line that was being assaulted by the Confederate corps of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Zook was directed by one of the III Corps staff officers toward the Wheatfield to reinforce the brigade of Col. Régis de Trobriand and to fill a gap near Stony Hill. Zook, on horseback, led his men up the hill, which attracted the attention of men from the advancing 3rd and 7th South Carolina Infantry regiments, of Joseph B. Kershaw's brigade. He was struck by rifle fire in the shoulder, chest, and abdomen, and taken behind the lines for medical treatment at a toll house on the Baltimore Pike. He died from his wounds on July 3.
Cemetery Ridge:
At the top of the “ladder” was Richard Anderson's division of AP Hill's 3rd Corps, which along with Confederate brigades under Cadmus Wilcox, David Lang, and Ambrose Wright made a final attempt at Cemetery Ridge. The brigades of Carnot Posey and William Mahone did not attack, for reasons that remain obscure and controversial.
The Wilcox and Lang attacks drove Humphrey’s line, at the left of the Sickles salient, back toward Cemetery Ridge. Fighting an intense retreat, Humphreys’ resistance gave Meade and Hancock a chance to find reinforcements for the onslaught that was gathering, which was Lee’s idea all along. They had to bring XII Corps from Culps Hill, as we discussed previously.
William Colvill. During the intense fighting in the Wheatfield, AP Hill’s Corps made a move towards the Union center. He deployed the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Division, led by Col. George Willard, to counter the advance of Confederate Brigadier General William Barksdale's Brigade. Meanwhile, as Hancock searched for reinforcements, he spotted Wilcox's brigade positioned near the base of the ridge, targeting a gap in the Union line. With time being of the essence, Hancock made a crucial decision to call upon the 1st Minnesota, Harrow's Brigade, of the 2nd Division of the II Corps, to confront Wilcox's division. Despite being vastly outnumbered, Hancock ordered the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry Regiment to engage in a desperate bayonet charge against the much larger Confederate brigade four times its size.
Colonel Colville had been arrested on the way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his men to ford a river on logs chasing the Confederate army into Maryland. His regiment arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of July 2 after traveling 14 miles every day for 11 days, finally resting on Cemetery Ridge.
Pointing towards a Confederate flag flying over the advancing enemy line, Hancock urged Col. William Colvill to lead his men in capturing the colors. He shouted to Col. William Colvill, "Advance, Colonel, and take those colors!" The 262 Minnesotans bravely charged the Alabama brigade with fixed bayonets, managing to halt their progress at Plum Run but suffering devastating losses in the process, with 215 casualties (82%), including 40 fatalities or severe injuries. Col. Colville, who had been detained on his way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his troops to cross a river on logs while pursuing the Confederate forces into Maryland, eventually arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 after an arduous journey. The 1st Minnesota became an iconic regiment that survived more casualties percentage-wise than any other during any other single battle. Due to heroic action there, Colvilll was severely wounded, requiring a cane for the rest of his life.
Despite claims that Wright's brigade "pierced the Union line", the best it seems to have done was attain a brief lodgment on its right wing, which it could neither hold nor exploit, and had to relinquish. The Union veterans of the action disputed even this interpretation. The only reason that part of Wright's Brigade managed to pass towards the top of Cemetery Ridge was that the 22nd Georgia (and part of the 3rd Georgia) struck a hole in Gibbon's line that had been created when part of Hall's Brigade was sent south to stabilize the line as the Third Corps retreated. On his left where he smacked into the face of the Philadelphia Brigade, Wright was stopped cold and never made it closer than 30 yards from the stone wall. Posey and Mahone would have been facing two of Hays' brigades and numerous guns on Cemetery Hill. They would have been running a gauntlet to approach the Union line. They may have seen something like what Pettigrew and Trimble faced on the afternoon of July 3.
Freeman McGilvery. McGilvery identified a vulnerable and unguarded gap in the Union's defensive line situated at the southern part of Cemetery Ridge, just north of LRT. In response to this critical finding, McGilvery skillfully assembled a makeshift artillery line by gathering cannons from different commands to fortify the gap. Although lacking infantry support initially, McGilvery's strategically positioned "Plum Run line" of fieldpieces played a crucial role in thwarting the Confederate forces' final push towards the heart of the Union's position.
Summary
As the battle neared its end, Longstreet's assault had been stopped despite the possibility of breakthroughs in different areas. The question arises: would the addition of more troops have changed the outcome? If Anderson had followed orders and deployed all five brigades instead of just three, in a coordinated and echelon formation, could Cemetery Ridge have been breached? The absence of 3,000 men between Posey and Mahone, as well as the lack of support from Wofford's Georgia Brigade for Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade, impeded the success of the attack. If Anderson's forces had been at full strength with all five brigades engaged, there might have been a chance to secure a foothold on a portion of Cemetery Ridge. However, similar to Pickett's Charge the next day, the lack of reinforcements to maintain the breakthrough would have posed a significant challenge against the inevitable counterattack. There were no reserves or supports prepared to exploit any breakthrough, and the dwindling daylight further complicated the situation.
Most importantly, by 6 pm, the tide had turned. The Union had gained the numerical advantage, with more reinforcements heading towards Cemetery Ridge. The presence of additional Union divisions, fresh brigades, and elements of other corps nearby solidified the Union's position. The remnants of Robinson's and Doubleday's Divisions (including Stannard's fresh brigade) and elements of the Sixth and Twelfth Corps were nearby. Despite the temporary advantage that Lee's forces had initially held, the overwhelming strength of the Union forces, combined with the fading daylight, worked against any potential breakthroughs. The brief advantage that fate had bestowed upon Lee was now gone.
Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.
Further Reading
· Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day. University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
· Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg. Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.
Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg. MacMillan Publishing Company. 1968.
· Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.
· James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/
· Richard Moe, The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota Volunteers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1994.
· https://aoh.com/2019/03/25/patrick-ororke-a-forgotten-hero-of-gettysburg/
· https://killedatgettysburg.org/patrick-ororke-140th-new-york/
· Schmidt, Jim. "The Medical Department: A Thorn in the Lion of the Union", Civil War News, October 2000.
· https://www.civilwarmed.org/chamberlain/
· https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme
· James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.
· Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.
· Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
· Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.
· J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.
