How the U.S. Civil War Made Christmas a National Holiday

We take for granted that the Christmas Season entails children are home from school, festive meals are being prepared, airports are crowded as people rush home to their families and parties are in full swing, all in anticipation of the jolly old elf Santa Claus’s arrival. Not many people realize though that all of those traditions have their origins in the Civil War.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The religious nature of the holiday season upon us aside, this time of year has been a time of celebration and gift giving for centuries. The Twelve Days of Christmas and many other traditional songs, as well as Dickens’s Christmas Carol, show that this is a celebration time that goes way back in the European culture. This week we are going to trace how the Civil War led to the making of Christmas as a secular, national holiday.

Unsurprisingly, the story is at base a political one. On Christmas Day 1861, President Lincoln chose to host a party at the White House. It was a crucial political moment because Mr Lincoln had a brewing international crisis that he had to stop before it got out of hand.

On Christmas Day 1862, the country was in a national panic. Setbacks in the war had made it anything but a happy season. On this day, Mr and Mrs Lincoln did something that seems so much a part of the responsibility of the POTUS on this holiday that its astounding that it hasn’t always been traditional. And on Christmas in 1863, the Lincoln’s made yet another gesture of good will to the soldiers in the field.

In 1861 President Lincoln sought to limit an international crisis by throwing a Christmas Party at the White House. The Trent Affair had led to the capture of the appointed Confederate representatives to Britain and France, John Slidell and James Murray Mason. War clouds had started to collect as the British Prime Minister insisted that the US had no right to capture these men on open seas. The capture occurred on November 8 and had become an international scandal after November 18. By Christmastime, there were rumors of British preparations for war and also significant diplomatic efforts were in progress. There were rumors of an invasion from Canada .So, there was a lot for Lincoln to “soft shoe” that day.

In 1862, the Lincoln Family began a tradition to counter the public effects of The Battle of Fredericksburg, which had been a military disaster that spawned a political and public relations catastrophe. “What will the country say?” Lincoln asked. But the POTUS was a political mastermind, and he turned crisis into opportunity, The Lincolns pointedly went the various hospitals around Washington and visited and spoke with the wounded. No president had ever done this before. It showed that Lincoln the commander in chief was a sensitive leader who felt the people’s pain.

The hospital visits were so popular, and so necessary, that Lincoln continued them. He brought his son Tad with him on many such days. Tad was deeply moved by the soldiers. So on Xmas 1863, wounded soldiers received gifts of books and clothing from the White House, with a covering note that said, “From Tad Lincoln”.

And in 1864, General Sherman telegrammed Lincoln on December 22, 1864 announcing the capture of Savanah. By 1865, as the image above shows, Christmas was a celebration of victory in. the war.

The soldiers on the battlefield were far away from home, many had never been outside their county in their lives let alone their state. Union soldiers used salt pork and hardtack to decorate Christmas trees. Others were treated to special meals; a captain from Massachusetts treated his soldiers to foods such as turkey, oysters, pies, and apples; Singing carols was popular, ones that remain popular today, but Christmas cards would not become popular until the 1870s.

When we fly or drive home to Grandmothers House for Christmas, the origin of that tradition is the Civil War Fathers on both sides of the war were often given furloughs to return home for the holiday.

Christmas originates with a significant religious meaning and yet it has become secular in its celebration. Almost no one knows that this trend began in the Civil War. And even more surprising to many, without Thomas Nast, Christmas as we know it probably wouldn’t exist. But Nast wasn’t interested so much in Christmas. He was interested in a much bigger issue.

Nast was a cartoonist for Harper’s Weekly during the Civil War. If Nast wasn’t so interested in Christmas, why the recurrent theme? The 2 Nast cartoons depict Christmas experiences during the war. Identify the subjects of each and what was groundbreaking about them.

The fact is that Nast was a first class political cartoonist who was a Union sympathizing propagandist using Christmas to draw on the emotions of the season to bring the country together.

In the top cartoon, "Christmas Eve" (1862), a wreath frames a scene of a soldier's praying wife and sleeping children at home; a second wreath frames the soldier seated by a campfire, gazing longingly at small pictures of his loved ones.

Another illustration features Santa in his sleigh, then going down a chimney, in the top left of the cartoon. Somber scenes below remind of a grimmer reality--an army marching through snow and a row of frozen graves that refers to the Union's recent failure to take Fredericksburg. But there is hope: Santa is coming!

the January 3, 1863 issue of Harper's Weekly, Nast has an early caricature of Santa dressed in an American flag, with a puppet with the name "Jeff" written on it, Nast was inspired by the Belsnickel, part of the folklore in southwestern Germany, You’ll notice his sleigh is drawn by 2 scrawny reindeer.

Nast’s 1864 Christmas cartoon in Harper’s. You can clearly see Lincoln beckoning men outside the door into the Christmas feast. But once again, he is making a political point. . Lincoln is seen ushering in the Confederates to re-join the US in a celebratory setting. of a holiday held in common. It is, of course, pure propaganda, but consistent with the war goal of reunification.

Nast’s Christmas cartoons were so successful that he essentially created much of the holiday we know. Nast was not the only one to use Christmas as a propaganda tool. On the Union side, The New York Herald also engaged in propaganda. One illustration published in the paper included Santa Claus fuming that he could not reach southern children, due to the northern blockade. On the Confederate side, The Richmond Examiner described Santa to its young readers as "a Dutch toy monger" who was a New York/New England "scrub" and Hottentot that had nothing to do with traditional Virginian celebrations of Christmas. Nast had successfully made Christmas a Union holiday, and that is propaganda at a very high level.

“In these two drawings, Christmas became a Union holiday and Santa a Union local deity,” writes Adam Gopnik in a 1997 issue of the New Yorker. “It gave Christmas to the North—gave to the Union cause an aura of domestic sentiment, and even sentimentality.” Nast’s 1863 Christmas cartoon showed the couple shown in 1862 reunited.

Use of a Santa-like figure for propaganda purposes would eventually lead after the war to the elf myth of the jolly old Saint Nick. Between 1862 and 1886, Nast created thirty-three Santa Claus drawings. The iconic version of Santa Claus as a jolly man in red with a white beard and a sack of toys was immortalized in 1881, depicted by Nast in the cartoon attached, But he also gave the definitive appearance to Uncle Sam, America personified. Notice how they both have white beards, but one is tall and thin and the other short and plump. Nast didn’t invent Uncle Sam, as many people believe, but he did standardize his appearance and affect. Santa Claus derives from Sinterklaas, the Dutch rendering of St Nicholas, which was popularized in the 1823 poem “A Visit From St. Nicholas”.

DGCC: Notice that the Santa in the 1881 cartoon is smoking an old-style Dutch clay pipe and has a Civil War saber (?toy) hanging from his waistband. He is carrying a knapsack on his back, not filled with clothes and war supplies anymore, but with toys. These details are deliberate; Nast is immortalizing a new personification: the former Union soldier is now older, happily smoking an old pipe, and raising a family 16 years after the war’s end. But the old soldier is still in him. Nast knew his business.

It was also Thomas Nast who decided that Santa and his reindeer lived at the North Pole. After the war Nast purposely made the North Pole the home of Saint Nick so that no one else could use him for nationalistic propaganda like Nast himself did.

It’s hard to imagine today, but Christmas was not always considered a “national” holiday.

Because of the recognition that soldiers on both sides of the war, and of all religious backgrounds, found end of the year celebrations as fostering community and country, that view began to change. Politicians started to recognize in the post war period that if they wanted to bring the country together and heal wounds, Xmas was a natural solution.

Puritans and Lutherans viewed non-sectarian celebrations of Christmas during the war as sacrilegious. They believed the day should be dedicated to fasting and prayer, and looked askance at such practices.  In Massachusetts, such parties were considered a waste of money and could be fined.

The legal recognition of Christmas as a national holiday occurred when Representative Burton Chauncey Cook of Illinois introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress after the war. It passed in both houses of Congress, and President Ulysses S. Grant signed it on June 28, 1870. On June 26, 1870, Congress — led by Northern legislators — passed a law that made Christmas (along with New Year’s Day, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving) a federal holiday for federal employees in Washington, D.C. This was later extended nationwide. Ulysses S. Grant signed the law, partly as a gesture of reconciliation between North and South during Reconstruction.

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David Livingstone - An Inspiring Victorian

David Livingstone stands as one of the most celebrated figures of the Victorian age, a missionary, explorer, and abolitionist whose name became synonymous with Africa's vast, unmapped interior. Born on the 19th of March, 1813, in Blantyre, Scotland, Livingstone's early life was one of humble beginnings. The second of seven children, he grew up in a small tenement room above a cotton mill where his father worked as a tea salesman and Sunday school teacher. From the age of ten, Livingstone himself worked twelve-hour shifts at the mill, his small wages helping to support the family. Yet even amid such hardship, he displayed an unrelenting thirst for learning, studying Latin and theology late into the night with the aid of a single flickering candle. His self-discipline and curiosity earned him a place at Anderson's University in Glasgow, where he trained in both medicine and theology. It was during this time that he became inspired by the writings and appeals of the London Missionary Society (LMS), whose vision of combining medical work with Christian mission would become the cornerstone of his life's endeavor.

Terry Bailey explains.

David Livingstone in 1864.

In 1840, Livingstone was ordained as a missionary doctor under the LMS and sailed for Africa, a continent largely unknown to Europeans beyond the coastal regions. His first posting was in the Bechuana country (modern-day Botswana), where he worked alongside the veteran missionary Robert Moffat. There, Livingstone quickly distinguished himself not only for his medical skills and fluency in local languages but also for his belief in establishing missions far inland, away from European colonial influences. His early travels introduced him to the harsh realities of African geography and the challenges of crossing vast deserts such as the Kalahari. Livingstone's marriage to Moffat's daughter, Mary, in 1845 marked the beginning of a partnership often tested by the dangers of exploration and illness.

Livingstone's first great achievement came in 1849 when he crossed the Kalahari Desert to reach Lake Ngami, a body of water previously unknown to Europeans. His reports of this journey captured the imagination of the British public, eager for tales of adventure and discovery. Determined to find new routes for legitimate trade as an alternative to the brutal slave routes that scarred the continent, Livingstone pushed further north. Between 1851 and 1856, he traversed thousands of miles, becoming the first European to cross the African continent from west to east. His expedition from Luanda on the Atlantic coast to Quelimane on the Indian Ocean was a feat of endurance that won him worldwide fame.

It was during these years that Livingstone made one of his most famous discoveries: the great waterfall on the Zambezi River, which he named Victoria Falls in honor of Queen Victoria. The native name, Mosi-oa-Tunya—"The Smoke That Thunders"—he preserved in his writings, noting its grandeur and spiritual significance to local peoples. His detailed journals and maps from this period were meticulously kept, later forming the basis for his book Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (1857), a major publication that enthralled readers and established his reputation as both a scientist and a man of faith. The Royal Geographical Society awarded him its gold medal, and his observations contributed significantly to the European understanding of African geography, geology, and ethnography.

Livingstone's later expeditions, particularly the Zambezi Expedition (1858–1864), were less successful but no less ambitious. Appointed by the British government to explore the navigability of the Zambezi River and its tributaries, he hoped to open up routes for trade and Christian missions that would undermine the slave trade. However, the journey was plagued by disease, logistical failure, and tragedy, including the death of his wife Mary from malaria in 1862. Despite these setbacks, his scientific work remained meticulous. He recorded flora, fauna, and mineral deposits, and his notebooks, many of which survive in archives such as the National Library of Scotland bear witness to a disciplined observer driven by both humanitarian and scientific motives.

In the later years of his life, Livingstone became increasingly preoccupied with finding the source of the Nile, a mystery that had fascinated explorers for centuries. His travels took him deep into Central Africa, where he lost contact with the outside world for several years. Rumors of his death circulated widely in Europe until, in 1871, the Welsh-born American journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley was dispatched by the New York Herald to find him. Stanley's long and arduous search ended in the town of Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, where he greeted the weary, bearded missionary with the now-legendary words, "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?"

The meeting between Livingstone and Stanley became one of the most famous encounters in exploration history. Livingstone, though weakened by illness and years of hardship, was still resolute in his mission. Stanley, impressed by the older man's determination and moral conviction, provided supplies and encouragement. The two men explored parts of Lake Tanganyika together before Stanley returned to the coast with news that Livingstone was alive. Stanley's own life, though often overshadowed by this single encounter, was remarkable. Born John Rowlands in Denbigh, Wales, in 1841, he endured a harsh childhood before emigrating to the United States, where he served as a soldier, sailor, and journalist. His transformation into Henry Morton Stanley came after being adopted by a wealthy merchant of that name. His later explorations, including the charting of the Congo River, would establish him as one of the most controversial and driven explorers of the 19th century.

David Livingstone, however, never returned home. His final years were spent in relentless pursuit of the Nile's source, often under conditions of extreme suffering. His final journals, preserved on fragile paper and sometimes written in berry juice when ink ran out, reveal both his physical decline and his enduring spiritual faith. On the 1st of May, 1873, he died in the village of Chitambo (in present-day Zambia), likely from malaria and dysentery. His African attendants, loyal to the end, buried his heart beneath a tree at the site and carried his embalmed body over a thousand miles to the coast. From there, his remains were returned to Britain and interred in Westminster Abbey, where he was honored as both a national hero and a symbol of humanitarian courage.

The documents, letters, and diaries Livingstone left behind remain invaluable to historians. They not only chronicle a vast and challenging period of exploration but also offer rare insight into the cultural, geographical, and ethical dimensions of 19th-century Africa. Modern projects such as the "Livingstone Online" digital archive have preserved and analyzed these records, revealing details of his linguistic studies, medical observations, and even his evolving views on imperialism and slavery.

David Livingstone's legacy endures not simply as that of a man who charted rivers and crossed continents, but as one who sought to bring moral reform to a world divided by greed and ignorance. His life's work combined faith, science, and compassion, leaving a mark that transcended geography. The image of Livingstone emaciated, resolute, and holding fast to his ideals in the heart of Africa became a powerful emblem of the Victorian spirit of exploration and remains an enduring chapter in the intertwined histories of Britain and Africa.

David Livingstone's life formed a remarkable reflection of the transformative power of perseverance, conviction, and moral purpose. Emerging from poverty in industrial Scotland, he fashioned himself through relentless study and unyielding discipline into one of the most influential figures of the 19th century. His journeys across Africa created some of the most significant geographical and scientific records of his age, expanding European understanding of a continent too often approached with ignorance or prejudice. Yet Livingstone's work was never solely about mapping rivers or tracing mountain chains. It was underpinned by a profound humanitarian mission: to challenge the slave trade, to encourage what he called "legitimate commerce," and to foster cross-cultural understanding at a time when imperial attitudes frequently bred exploitation rather than empathy.

Though his later expeditions were marked by hardship, loss, and controversy, Livingstone's commitment to his principles never wavered. His meticulous notes, journals, and correspondence reveal a man constantly searching for knowledge, for justice, for the elusive headwaters of the Nile, and for ways to improve the lives of the people he encountered. These documents, preserved today in archives and digital collections, allow modern readers to glimpse the complexity of his character: a scientist shaped by faith, a missionary shaped by science, and an explorer shaped by an abiding respect for the African landscapes and communities that defined his career.

His celebrated meeting with Henry Morton Stanley, and the deeply human story behind it, further cemented his image in the Victorian imagination but it was Livingstone's death, and the extraordinary devotion of his African companions who carried his body across vast distances that most clearly demonstrated the depth of the relationships he forged. In life and in death, he crossed boundaries of culture and geography that few Europeans of his era attempted to bridge.

Ultimately, David Livingstone stands not only as a pioneer of exploration but as a symbol of a broader moral struggle. His efforts against the slave trade, his insistence on recording African voices and customs with respect, and his belief that knowledge could serve humanitarian ends distinguish him from many of his contemporaries. While modern interpretations rightly place his achievements within the wider context of imperial history, his intentions and contributions remain significant and enduring. His story continues to resonate because it speaks to universal themes: resilience in the face of adversity, integrity in purpose, and the pursuit of understanding across cultural divides. In this way, Livingstone's legacy extends far beyond the maps he drew or the rivers he traced, it endures as a reminder of the profound impact one determined individual can have on the course of history.

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Can the Treatment of the Native Americans be Considered Genocide?

During the movement of settlers west across America, a number of bloody and violent encounters took place with Native Americans. Here Shubh Samant considers whether such actions can be considered genocide.

Native American prisoners from the Red River War. In Fort Marion, Florida in 1875.

The Indian Wars were a tragic and violent period in American history, filled with death, suffering, and forced displacements of many Native American people. However, according to the United Nations definition of genocide, which requires intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group”, I would argue that the actions of the US government during these wars cannot be considered a genocide. While many military campaigns caused significant losses to Native communities, most evidence suggests that the government’s primary intent was territorial expansion and economic growth, rather than a complete destruction of the Native American people.  This distinction between intent and outcome is crucial when analyzing historical atrocities. While the consequences of these wars were undeniably devastating, the legal classification of genocide hinges on deliberate, documented intent.

The Sand Creek Massacre in Colorado from the year 1864 CE is regarded as one of the most famous atrocities during the Indian Wars. On November 29, 1864, Colonel Chivington led militia forces in an attack on a peaceful camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho people, killing over 150 non-combatants. The brutality of this event, including the mutilation of bodies, fits a part of the UN definition - “killing members of the group.” However, to meet the legal threshold of genocide, such acts must be part of a wider, intentional policy aimed at the group’s destruction. This massacre was not ordered by the Federal government as part of a national anti-Native American movement, but was rather done by a small local force. The US Congress later condemned the attack themselves, calling it a ‘massacre’. Thus, while the event was undeniably horrific and anti-human, the absence of a federal order or coordination to intently eliminate the Cheyenne and Arapaho group weakens its classification as genocide under international law. The Sand Creek Massacre remains a haunting reminder of how local actions, driven by prejudice and fear, can result in catastrophic violence. It also highlights the importance of accountability, as Congress’s condemnation set a precedent for recognizing and denouncing such acts.

The Red River War was a series of US army campaigns against several Southern Plains tribes. The army destroyed villages, food supplies, and horses. Such acts could relate to another part of the UN definition - “inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction.” Yet, the destruction was strategically aimed at forcing surrender, not extermination. Rather, the purpose of these military actions was to force the Native tribes to surrender and relocate to reservations, not their extermination. Once these tribes relocated to the reservations, the government continued to provide them with ration supplies, in complete contrast to extermination, as defined in the UN definition. This provision of aid, however inadequate, suggests a policy of containment and assimilation rather than extermination.

It’s important to note that while these campaigns were tactically designed to break resistance, they also dismantled centuries-old ways of life. The loss of horses, food stores, and mobility had long-term cultural impacts that extended beyond physical survival.

Wounded Knee Massacre

The Indian Wars, just as violent and horrific they had been, ended in a similar tone. On December 29, 1890, the US 7th cavalry surrounded a Lakota camp near Wounded Knee Creek, and opened fire. This led to the deaths of roughly 300 Natives. Yet again, in contrast with the UN definition, this violence was not a result of an intentional plan to destroy the Lakotas. It rather erupted from a misunderstanding surrounding the Ghost Dance movement, which the soldiers misinterpreted as a rebellion. While the scale and indiscriminate killings can clearly be considered crimes against humanity, the lack of any documented intent by the US federal government to eliminate the Lakota as a group weakens the claim of genocide.

The Wounded Knee Massacre has since become a symbol of Native resistance and remembrance. Annual commemorations and historical reinterpretations continue to challenge the narrative of “misunderstanding,” urging deeper reflection on the militarization of fear and prejudice.

The UN definition emphasizes intent, a deliberate goal to destroy/exterminate a group. Although the US government engaged in destructive practices throughout the Indian Wars, there is little evidence that there was an official policy intending to annihilate Native Americans. Historical records and military correspondence show the goals were primarily land expansion and assimilation, not extermination. While these goals caused immense suffering and destruction, they differ from the genocidal intent defined by the UN. 

This distinction has legal implications, but it doesn’t absolve the moral responsibility. The legacy of these wars continues to shape Native American communities today, from land rights battles to cultural preservation efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the Sand Creek Massacre, the Red River War, and the Wounded Knee Massacre were horribly violent/had terrible consequences, they do not fully meet the United Nations definition of genocide, which requires proven intent to destroy a group of people. The US government actions during the Indian Wars were driven more by expansionism, forced relocation, and assimilation than by a systematic/official effort to exterminate Native Americans as a race. Therefore, these actions can be considered as genocidal by effects, but not by the legal criteria.

Understanding this nuance is essential, not to diminish the suffering, but to accurately frame the historical record. As we continue to confront the past, we must also amplify Native voices, support reparative justice, and ensure that such tragedies are never repeated.

All quotations in this article have been taken from https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition.

Article dedicated to Mr. Kopitar.

Nathan Bedford Forrest - The Wizard of the Saddle?

Perhaps the most fascinating Civil War general to Jeb Smith is Nathan Bedford Forest. Many think he is not just the best cavalry general of the American Civil War but among the greatest to ever live. He acquired more confirmed kills in war than any America has ever achieved. No general as high a rank as Forrest killed as many men since the medieval period. He had 29 horses shot from under him and said, “I ended the war a horse up.” He was one of the most feared individuals of the war and was said to be a “Superhuman warrior.” One friend who knew him before the war said he looked unrecognizable in battle. His face and eyes would change.

A natural military genius, Forrest rose from the rank of private to lieutenant general. His willingness to mix personally in combat led to him receiving multiple wounds doctors feared would be fatal, all of which he survived. The famed Civil War author Shelby Foote opined that the Civil War produced two geniuses: Abraham Lincoln and Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Pre-war

Born into poverty in Tennessee, Forrest received little formal education and no military training. By 1860, he owned two plantations, traded extensively in slaves, and was one of the wealthiest men in Memphis. He was tall, muscular, and powerful even for his size. An adamant believer in states’ rights and secession, the war was not the first violence he engaged in. Before it even began, he had killed several people.

In 1845, in Mississippi, his uncle was killed in a street fight; in retaliation, Forrest then killed two of his uncle’s murderers with a pistol and wounded two more with a knife someone in the crowd threw to him. There are unconfirmed reports that he killed others on two more occasions, including being severely wounded himself during one such engagement and recovering from what had seemed mortal wounds, as he would do more than once later in his career.

The Civil War

Forrest survived and was involved in some truly miraculous combat situations and multiple brushes with death, earning him an immense reputation as a warrior. When the war began, Forrest raised his own regiment, paid for their equipment, and advertised for recruits in Memphis, writing, “Come on, boys, if you want a heap of fun and to kill some Yankees.” Forrest had no trouble gaining men, as his reputation for toughness, aggression, and bravery had already spread widely. The general once told his men, “I have never, on the field of battle, sent you where I was unwilling to go myself.” And he quickly proved his fearlessness and tactical skill to them.

Early on in the war, Forrest led a cavalry charge against a Union line and single-handedly engaged multiple troops despite receiving wounds. A similar situation occurred later in the war when Forrest was mounted on his horse and attacked by four federals at once, receiving horrific wounds to his head and arm. He was able to retaliate and kill one of his ambushers, stating later, “No damn man kills me and lives.” Yet the situation became even worse for him as three more federals came shooting and stabbing at him. He was now surrounded, and on top of that, his horse was then shot [would eventually prove mortal], but riding on his injured horse, Forrest then jumped a wagon that was blocking his retreat. Thirty paces down the road, he was attacked by yet another federal with a saber. Forrest ended his attacker's life soon after.

In another instance, as the Confederates were chasing retraining federals, Forest found he outpaced his men and was surrounded by dozens of retreating federals; he was shot multiple times, and his horse was once more wounded mortally. But before his steed departed, and among a hail of bullets, he escaped, utilizing his revolver to cut a way clear.

In a dangerous and fortunate battle, where Forrest was riddled with 15 bullet holes in his uniform, and his horse fell dead after sustaining seven bullet wounds. Later that day, he had another horse die from under him. Soon after, he received what doctors initially believed to be yet another mortal wound during a confrontation with a subordinate. However, he would heal and return to command.

Forrest led by example. He would not order his men to do anything he would not do. He often would do a mission when no volunteers would offer. He himself would go on dangerous scouting missions and once crossed a frozen river when none of his men would. In Six Armies in Tennessee, historian Steven E. Woodworth wrote that Forest “would fight anyone, anytime.” Perhaps that was no truer than when Forrest and his command were surprised and surrounded by federal forces. The general commanded his men to “charge em both ways,” and his men did, and many escaped. Forrest also stated, “Never stand and take a charge… charge them too.”

Battle Results

A gifted military genius...he was the prophet of mobile warfare. His campaigns [allegedly] studied by German proponents of the blitzkrieg...His operations are more reminiscent of a 20th century panzer leader, such as Heinz Guderian or Erwin Rommel, than of any commander of his age.

-Barry C Jacobsen The ten Best Generals of the Civil war

Likie Jackson, Forrest always attempted to “Get their first with the most,” and his fast cavalry, adaptability, strategy, ambushing tactics, and fearless leadership led to some remarkable results, especially while raiding. He would conduct swift but decisive assaults on the enemy, often utilizing a cavalry charge. In The Civil War, Bruce Catton wrote,  “Forrest ... used his horsemen as a modern general would use motorized infantry. He liked horses because he liked fast movements.”

Forest sought to outflank his enemy and create chaos; he was vicious and efficient in attacking any weakness in his adversary’s defenses while also being unpredictable. Attacking the weak spot of the enemy mercilessly, Forest stated, “Get ’em skeered, and keep the skeer on ’em.” He would throw his entire force on the enemy, rarely keeping reserves. He led his men as a warrior of old; he did not hang back but showed courage, leading in charges. He was excited about warfare, observers saying he changed physical features and would “come alive.”

Forrest was one of the few Cavalry commanders who could consistently and successfully utilize the Cavalry charge in the Civil War. In part, because he kept somewhat of a bodyguard made up of about 100 of his best soldiers around him at all times, and would use this elite force to strike the enemy at the right place and time to turn the battle in his favor. Some of his remarkable lopsided battle results are as follows.

Due to the massive trouble Forrest was causing to Union supply lines, and his raiding ability and devastation he was causing on isolated units, General Sherman had had enough, and so decided to make no mistakes about it, to hunt Forest down with a vastly superior force, and take him out of the war. Sherman sent Samuel Sturgis, with a command of 3,300 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, along with 22 guns, to "bag" Forrest's command of 3,200 men. Instead, Forrest drove the Federals 58 miles, captured 19 of the guns, all the Federals' baggage and supplies, 200 wagons, 30 ambulances, 161 mules, 20 horses, took 2,000 prisoners, caused 300 killed, 400 wounded, and the destruction/disorganization of the more significant Union force. Confederate casualties were under 500.

One raid in Tennessee caused 3,500 federal casualties, eight artillery captured, 400 horses and mules, 100 wagons, 100 cattle, 3,000 arms stores, destroyed rail, six bridges, two locomotives, 50 freight cars, and captured/destroyed 50 blockhouses. During the raid, Forrest gained 1,000 men from recruitment and from men who had deserted Confederate general Joe Johnston army to join a commander who would fight, General Forrest. Forrest's losses were 300; he returned stronger than he left.

Of another raid, also in Tennessee, a federal newspaper wrote, “Forrest with less than 4,000 men has moved right through the 96th army corps, has passed within 9 miles of Memphis, carried off 100 wagons, 100 beef cattle 3,000 conscripts, innumerable stores, tore up railroad track, cut telephone wire, burned and sacked towns ran over picket lines. Again, with 1,800 in command, Forrest captured 150 federals, killed 25, wounded another 50, captured 200 horses, a few wagons, and 2 artillery, tore up the railroad, and captured rail cars. He rearmed his entire force with better-captured weapons than when they went into the raid. Forrest Lost 3 killed 5 wounded.

In one of his renowned assaults, with only 1,800 men, he captured 2,200 federals (not including killed and wounded), and he lost only 30 men, 150 wounded. In another battle, the Federal losses were 500 prisoners, 10 killed [ 230 soon after], 16 wagons, and three ambulances. Forrest lost only one killed and two wounded. Another time with just 300, Forrest led an attack on a depot. The results were 400 prisoners and the capture of 1,000 horses, 15 wagons, 600,000 rounds of ammo, 100,000 rations, clothes, etc., and $500,000 worth overall.

 In a month-long campaign that destroyed rail, 2,500 federals were killed or taken as prisoners, and once more, his command came back stronger and better equipped than he left. During the four minor skirmishes, he lost 200 men but killed 350, captured 2,000 prisoners, and captured artillery and wagon. Forrest had to release prisoners on many occasions as he had too many to control, often larger than his own force. Forrest once had prisoners help move artillery wagons through rough roads to be set free.

In a particularly daring attack, Forrest charged his command up a hill against a force twice his size, supported by artillery. Remarkably victorious, he took 75 prisoners, recaptured 60 Confederate prisoners, and captured the artillery. These events were just a few of the kinds of lopsided victories and successes Forest achieved.

Deception

Forrest excelled at scouting, ambushing, and deception. He kept the enemy uncertain of his movements and could cross bridges or “impassable” streams when he was “trapped.” He could also be creative; he once used captured Union infantry drums to make his Cavalry force appear more numerous, thereby preventing an attack by the Union. He once used some of the older men in his command to dress as civilians and give false information to the upcoming federals on the whereabouts of his men. Another time he had his men wear captured federal uniforms to gain information from them. Once, while trying to convince a Union commander to surrender, he made his force of 4,500 appear to be 10,000 to the Federal commander, convincing the general to surrender his command. He did things like have his artillery brought up over and over in circles to appear like he had more guns than he did whilst negotiating with his adversary.

Feared by Many

Follow Forrest to the death if it costs 10,000 lives and breaks the treasury. There will never be peace in Tennessee till Forrest is dead.

-William T Sherman

Few, perhaps none would hesitate to call Forrest the most feared individual soiler of the war, the last man you would not to fight to the death against on the field of battle, but also The Civil War Trust's article on Forest reads, "the most feared commander of the war... no Union commander was able to effectively come to grips with Forrest's cavalry during the war." In 10 Best Generals in American History, Barry C Jacobsen referred to him as "Perhaps the most feared general in American history."

Because of Forrest's fighting ability, fearlessness, aggressiveness, unpredictable and lightning-fast raids and assaults, and great success, he became widely seen as the most feared commander on either side of the war. In one instance, an enthusiastic and confident federal cavalry command was prepared to attack the much smaller Confederate cavalry command. Upon receiving notice that it was, in fact, under the direction of General Forrest, the Union officer called off the attack despite the significant manpower advantage.

Where Does Forrest Rank in Civil War Generals?

Having him [Forrest] in an army was something like operating in concert with a band of formidable but unpredictable barbarians allies...could be an excellent cavalryman for practicality any purpose if he could be convinced to pursue his commanders wishes.

-Steven E Woodworth Six Armies in Tennessee the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns University of Nebraska press

If you were to rank Civil War soldiers just as fighting men, I think Forest would come out on top; if you were to rank the best cavalry commander, he could well be your first choice. Perhaps even If you were to rank generals with a division or less, he might come out on top. However, he was not always reliable enough to work as part of a larger command and perhaps not as great as others with larger groups of men and thus his impact was not as outstanding as a Grant, Jackson, or Lee. So, where does he rank? That, of course, would depend on personal opinion. He is widely regarded as the best Cavalry commander of the war and is usually ranked around 5th overall commander. He excelled in a limited area, such as a division or less, or when allowed to conduct raids. At this, he had no peers. However, he did not have the impact of generals in the regular army on the major battlefields.

Forrest was hard to control and did his own thing. He once threatened to kill Braxton Bragg, the army commander, and so was shipped to Mississippi. This, in part, made it so Forrest could not do what many thought should have been done: work on Sherman's supply during his invasion of Atlanta and turn him back like he did Grant in his first attempt on Vicksburg. Forrest stated in 1864 “There is no doubt we could soon wipe old Sherman off the face of the earth, John, if they'd give me enough men and you enough guns.”

In the end, Forrest is for me tough to gauge. Compared to other great generals of the war. I think with a division to command he would have been as feared as Stonewall, perhaps even more so. But he was more a berserker type general, one you are glad he is on your side and can achieve remarkable outcomes if you let him loose on the enemy, but perhaps not as versatile as a Stonewall Jackson or Robert E. Lee. I think someone like Grant had a larger influence on an entire army than Forest could achieve.

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

Texas Independence – Was it About Sovereignty or Slavery?

Texan independence was. Significant issue in the 19th century. Here, Fredrick Wolf looks at how it was  impacted by sovereignty and slavery. He also considers the role of the Alamo.

The Fall of the Alamo (1903) by Robert Jenkins Onderdonk.

“…the institution of slavery is neither an interest to be defended nor an outrage to be denounced, but merely a bygone state of things, through which – as through many another unfortunate conditions of society – the evolution of the human race has carried it; and we can therefore devote ourselves to the investigation of the subject with no prejudice except in favor of historic truth.”

–      Professor Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas

The poster for the movie, The Alamo (1960), celebrates its history with the line, "The Mission That Became a Fortress…The Fortress That Became A Shrine….” The latter is a concise and accurate summary of the story of the structure, but not necessarily the events involved in what has famously become known as -- the Alamo – in downtown San Antonio, Texas.

Some historians believe slavery was the driving issue in the battle at the Alamo, arguing that Mexico’s attempts to end slavery contrasted with the hopes of many white settlers in Texas at the time who moved to the region to farm cotton. Renovations to the Alamo, itself, have recently been stalled due to political issues and discussions over the site’s legacy including the role of slavery in the Texas revolution.”

The rebellion in the northern states of Mexico, historically, has been attributed to a response to President Antonio López de Santa Anna repealing Mexico’s Constitution of 1824, abolishing the state governments and issuing autocratic decrees including the suspension of individual property rights.

This work takes the position of the aforementioned Professor Smith: It argues neither for nor against the institution of slavery being the premise behind the battle of the Alamo. It merely develops a reasoned structure of the era detailing the events, circumstances and status of slavery in Mexico from the first Texas colonization contracts to the Texas Revolution. The reader may then draw his or her own conclusion regarding slavery being a motivating cause behind the siege of the Alamo and the struggle for Texas’s Independence from Mexico.

Settlers in Tejas

When Moses Austin secured his first empresario contract to transport settlers to territory now known as Texas, the territory was the possession of Spain, and slavery was legal under Spanish law. The initial contract of 1821 made with the Spanish government made it clear that property rights of future colonists would be protected, including their right to hold slaves.

Agustín de Iturbide, a Mexican caudillo (military chieftain), became the leader of the conservative faction in the Mexican independence movement against Spain; as Agustín I, he briefly became the first emperor  of Mexico. The Iturbide government, of newly independent Mexico, reaffirmed in 1823 Moses Austin’s contract, with son, Stephen F. Austin as his lawful heir. This action secured the legal acquiescence of the Mexican national government to permit colonists and their slaves into the Mexican state of Coahuila y Tejas (Coahuila and Texas).

Issue of Slavery

The new Mexican Constitution of 1824 was vague on the issue of slavery, leaving the question to the individual states to determine how slavery would be dealt with. The law declared, generally, that Mexico would prohibit the importation of slaves, reflecting Mexico’s shift away from Spanish policies after gaining independence from Spain. But because the document left the issue of slavery to the states to decide, it was interpreted by Mexican legal authorities as only prohibiting the importation of slaves for resale. As a result, colonists in Texas, as well as native Mexican planters in southern Mexico, continued to import slaves for their own domestic use with the federal government making no effort to contravene such activity.

Coahuila y Tejas

The state of Coahuila y Tejas, officially the Estado Libre y Soberano de Coahuila y Tejas, was one of the constituent states of the newly established United Mexican States under its 1824 Constitution. The newly adopted state constitution of the state of Coahuila y Tejas allowed in 1827 for the importation of slaves from the U.S. for a period not to exceed six months after the document’s ratification. In September of that year, slaves could no longer be brought into Texas.

In May of 1828, the Congress of Coahuila y Tejas passed a law which made contracts of indentured servitude initiated in foreign countries valid within the state. This provided a means through which slaves could be brought into Texas by making them indentured servants for life. It should be noted that the distaste for slavery of many Mexican citizens and politicians was not necessarily due to a principled stand against the idea of slavery per se. It was, rather, the hereditary nature of slavery which was abhorrent to them. This law merely brought black servitude in Texas in line with the already existing form of servitude – the Mexican norm of debt peonage.

Slavery in Mexico

A legislative attempt to proscribe slavery within the country failed in the Mexican Congress in 1829. President Vicente Guerrero, second President of Mexico, and born of parents of African Mexican and Indian descent was granted sweeping powers to thwart Spain’s attempt to retake the country.

Jose Maria Tornel, the equivalent of the U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives, influenced President Guerrero to use his newly granted emergency powers to abolish slavery in Mexico. But a little over two months later, the Governor of Coahuila y Tejas, Jose Maria Viesca, convinced the president to exempt Texas from the proscription. To be fair, it should be noted that even if the ban had taken effect in Texas, it would not have freed those already held under indentured servitude contracts.

Yet, at the time, events were changing rapidly in Mexico. In 1831, roughly eighteen months after Guerrero issued his decree banning slavery, it was annulled by the National Congress, along with most of the short-termed, late president’s emergency decrees. Slavery – involuntary servitude -- was once again the law of the land in all of Mexico. And it remained so until 1837, when the National Congress acted again, this time passing an emancipation bill – banning slavery -- nearly a year after Texas in 1836 had won its independence.

Debt Peonage

A few months after the National Congress had annulled Guerrero’s ban on slavery the state legislature of Coahuila y Tejas acted to limit indentured servitude contracts to ten years. But this did little to benefit those living under existing contracts; they still accumulated debt for food, clothing, housing, and medical care. The debt accrued such that it could never be satisfied and those under the contracts remained in debt to the holders of the contract – essentially -- in perpetuity.

This circumstance converted those under contract into debt peons at the end of their indenture terms. In other words, they were required to remain in service to the holders of the contract until those debts were paid, an eventuation nearly impossible. This was the system of servitude that was practiced throughout Mexico before and after Texas won its independence. It was not atypical for wealthy Mexican landowners to have thousands of debt peons in their service. And their treatment was much the same as slaves on American plantations. It should also be noted that the children of debt peons also accrued debts for their care while they were minors, making peonage functionally hereditary.

Such was the state of African bondage in Texas until independence was declared in 1836. The Texas Declaration of Independence, which lists all grievances set before the Mexican government, fails to mention slavery as a basis for redress.

Did Santa Anna march north to free the slaves, as one U.T. history professor has recently said? Or, was his intention to put down Federalist resistance in the northern Mexican states, of which Coahuila y Tejas was but one?

When Texas settlers rebelled in 1835, Santa Anna was quick to organize an expedition against them in defense of centralism. Texan colonists wanted to uphold federalism, a system that allowed for state sovereignty – freedom of choice. Santa Anna and several other Mexican politicians at the time advocated that a centralist government would better serve to unify their nation, after years of instability under federalism. A centralized authority, of course, could also sustain national privileges for the church and military, two special-interest groups that supported Santa Anna’s government.

As a parting remark, one point should be admitted into this commentary. The majority of Texas slaveholders were members of the Peace Party, an organization which lobbied against independence, at least until Mexican President Santa Anna made clear his intention to subdue them, by any means necessary, along with those of his perceived adversary -- the War Party.

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References

Costeloe, Michael. The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835-1846: Hombres de Bien in the Age of Santa Anna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Fowler, Will. “Santa Anna and His Legacy.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Latin American History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA, 2015.

Fowler, Will. Santa Anna of Mexico. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.

Torget, Andrew J. Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800-1850. University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Smith, Justin H. The Annexation of Texas. New York, NY: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1911.

Burrough, B. and Stanford, J. (2021, June 10). The Myth of Alamo Gets the History All Wrong. The Washington Post. The myth of Alamo gets the history all wrong - The Washington Post

Burrough, B. and Stanford, J. (2021, June 10). We’ve Been Telling the Alamo Story Wrong for Nearly 200 Years. Now It’s Time to Correct the Record. Time.com. It's Time to Correct the Myths About the Battle of Alamo | TIME

Hanna, J. (2025, October 24). The CEO of the Alamo's historic site has resigned after a top Texas Republican criticized her. Associated Press. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ceo-alamos-historic-resigned-top-221630063.html

Webner, R. (2021, May 10). Alamo renovation gets stuck over arguments about slavery. The Texas Tribune. Alamo renovation gets stuck over arguments about slavery - The Texas Tribune

Moses Austin’s Spanish Empresario Contract. Texapedia.info. https://texapedia.info/1821-empresario-contract/

Barker, E. (2020, July 30). The History of Colonization in Texas: From Moses Austin to the National Colonization Law. Texas State Historical Association. Mexican Colonization Laws

McKay, S. (1994, December 1). The Constitution of 1824: Coahuila and Texas. Texas State Historical Association. Constitution of Coahuila and Texas

Coahuila y Tejas: The Mexican State Before Texas Independence. Texapedia.info. Coahuila y Tejas: The Mexican State Before Texas Independence

Joel. (2025, February 6). Rise of Debt Peonage in Mexico. Far Outliers. Rise of Debt Peonage in Mexico | Far Outliers

Anna, T. (Fall 2002). The Legacy of Vicente Guerrero, Mexico's First Black Indian President (review). Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History. Johns Hopkins University Press. Project MUSE - The Legacy of Vicente Guerrero, Mexico's First Black Indian President (review)

Blake, R. (2020, August 2). The Guerrero Decree: Abolishing Slavery in Mexico. Texas State Historical Association. Guerrero Decree

Mexico frees slaves. (2025, September 15). Texas State Historical Association. Texas History Lives Here | Texas State Historical Association

Indentured servitude. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indentured_servitude

Barker, E. Pohl, J. (2025, May 21). The Texas Revolution: Key Events and Impact. Texas State Historical Association. Texas Revolution

Santa Anna and the Texas Revolution. Santa Anna's Role in the Texas Revolution

Dyreson, J. (1995, December 1). The Peace Party in Texas: A Historical Overview. Texas State Historical Association. https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/peace-party

A Scientific Look at the Rifled Musket

In Myths of the Civil War: The Fact, Fiction, and Science Behind the Civil War’s Most Told Stories, Professor Scott Hippensteel brings a unique perspective, applying science and skepticism to common claims about the rifled musket.

Here, Jeb Smith looks at the rifled musket.

Springfield Model 1861 rifled musket.

Scott Hippensteel begins with “snipers,” pointing out that no such unit existed during the Civil War; the term and function came much later. Instead, those in the role were better described as sharpshooters and acted as skirmishers. He challenges the various claims of kills at 500 yards or greater, demonstrating some of the most famous supposed long-range killings to be inconceivable as actually happening, and suggesting they were in all likelihood from friendly fire, artillery shrapnel, or at best, from numerous skirmishers who would aim in a general direction and one happened to get lucky and strike an officer. He writes, “It was hopeless for a Civil War sharpshooter to aim at and attempt to kill a single specific officer at more than a few hundred yards; the exterior ballistics and accuracy of the available weapons made this task nearly impossible, regardless of the shooting talent of the soldier.”

Very few rifles were equipped with scopes, and fewer still were the trained individuals who could accurately hit a long-distance target even in training. Imperfections in powder, bullets, the rifle, the scope, and more made long-distance shots extraordinarily difficult. The weather, moisture in the air, wind (which can change the landing spot by a few feet even if VERY light), and other factors impacted long-range shots. Furthermore, the precision required to estimate the target’s distance and account for the bullet’s trajectory makes it unlikely that genuine long-distance kills occurred. Some sharpshooters needed to aim 14 feet above the target’s head and precisely measure the distance from hundreds of yards using old glass scopes that themselves impeded long-range shots. Hippensteel wrote, “Additionally, the front sight of these muzzleloaders was broader than any human-size target at five hundred yards. Between the required holdover and the width of the front sight, any view of the intended victim of the sharpshooter is completely obscured at this range.” To say it would be a shot in the dark is an understatement.

Conditions

Further, ideal conditions, perfect weather timing, etc., would not be the same as battle conditions with fog, smoke, and imperfect visibility. As a straight shot in the open was usually never beyond 125 yards, the eye could not accurately estimate a single target’s distance so as to calculate the trajectory for long-range shots. The enemy was rarely visible due to obscuring terrain, smoke and more at more than 100-150 yards.  Even under perfect conditions, with no human error, “perfectly aimed” shots still would often miss.

In addition, the number of steps that need to be done correctly to load the rifled musket, in the correct order, and the right way to fire a shot amid the noise, screams, adrenaline rush, shouting, smoke, confusion, fear, death and fatigue made getting off an accurate shot near-impossible and the performance in battle staggeringly poor. The best commanders could do with these citizen volunteers was often to maintain a steady fire aimed in the general direction of the opposing side, in order to cause enough damage to hold their position or push the others back over time, often due to the latter running out of ammo. After Gettysburg, 32-43% of the rifled muskets found were loaded with multiple bullets and discarded. Many soldiers whose gun malfunctioned picked up other random discarded ones, weapons they might never have fired before. Using ammo that was not meant for the new musket, that alone can cause mishaps.

Hippensteel conducted an in-depth analysis of weapons used in the U.S. military from 1770 to 2000, determining the “total firepower” and the overall killing ability, particularly in the range of up to 150 yards, the “killing zone” where the vast majority of kills occur. Evaluating bullet size, velocity, reload time, and other factors, he discovered that the lowest point occurred when the United States Army first adopted the rifled musket, and that the smoothbore actually puts out more firepower than the rifled musket. No wonder many commanders rejected the latter. Hippensteel wrote, “When the army adopted the rifled musket, the hitting power of the US infantrymen hit an all-time low. This seems strange for a weapon that was about to ‘revolutionize’ warfare…compared to its predecessor, the smoothbore musket, the rifled musket is 15-25 percent slower to load and has a muzzle velocity of only 950-1050 feet per second, compared with the 1,400-1,500 feet per second of the smoothbore.” Meaning that within the range of non-skirmishing Civil War combat, the smoothbore outperformed the rifled musket. Almost all fire occurred at under 200 yards, the enemy was often not visible beyond. And beyond 200 yards, special training was required to account for the low velocity of the weapon.

Differences

Noting the difference between what the rifled musket could do at distance in target practice vs in Civil War battles, he points out that because “Rifled muskets were much more precise …they could produce smaller groups (‘hits’ in target practice within a specific range or distance), because their rifling guided all the bullets to a more localized space downrange. However, this precision did not necessarily make the rifle more accurate in reality, the tight grouping might have been falling short (bullet has a high rate of drop) or long of the intended target because of the difficulty introduced by the parabolic flight path of the bullets.” He continues, “A precision weapon is only useful in combat if it is also accurate, and low muzzle velocity makes accuracy a challenge.” In other words, in actual combat, where you are not simply shooting at an unmoving target, your adjusted total accuracy equals out even if the rifle is more precise in practice. Unless you could allow for the difference, and the vast majority of soldiers could not, you lost the advantages.

In the end, smoothbore is similar overall to rifled for ranges of 75 yards and under, and is even preferred due to the lethality of buck and ball. At ranges of 250 yards or more, rifled is a waste of ammunition, so it is only between 75-250 yards where it has a hypothetical advantage for the typical soldier. But the smoke, terrain, and other effects of battle largely negated that, meaning that most commanders would not have their men fire until 100-150 yards, seeing shooting at longer distances as a waste of ammunition, or attempting to “shock” the enemy with a deadly volley from around 60 yards or under. So very little combat occurred at distances or under conditions to give the rifle musket an edge. Hippensteel summarizes “So the rifled musket had a limited advantage over the smoothbore on some battlegrounds, in some circumstances; it was, for example a better gun for skirmishers.”

Without machine guns or artillery, a company in Vietnam produced the same firepower as a Civil War corps. A brigade in WW1 did the same, also without artillery or machine guns. Further, modern weapons are smokeless and do not decrease visibility as black powder weapons did. The Civil War was not the first modern war. Hippensteel quotes Allen Guelzo: “Whatever the gains bestowed by the technology of the rifled musket…those improvements were only apparent under ideal conditions (which is to say, not in the middle of a firefight).” David Ward wrote, “The rifled musket did not revolutionize civil war operations because the weapon was not used at long range.” Further, diseases were the leading cause of death among Civil War soldiers, not what one considers “modern” weaponry.

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Russian Colonization in Alaska and The Pacific Northwest

Peter the Great, one of the most notable Czars in Russian history and famous for opening Russia’s windows to the West, played a pivotal role in extending Russian borders further east into Siberia. Summoning a Danish Naval Officer in the service of Russia by the name of Vitus Bering, Czar Peter, in one of his final acts, ordered Bering to lead an expedition to the eastern extremity of the continent to the Kamchatka Peninsula in 1725. From there, Russia would move over to the American continent.

Brian Hughes explains.

"Advancement of the Promyshlenniki to the East" by V.G. Vagner. Promyshlenniki translates approximately to hunter-trapper frontiersmen.

Back in 1725, it was unclear whether Czar Peter and Bering had prior knowledge that Asia and North America were not in fact connected, but the impetus for the exploration appears to have been a joint explorative/probing mission to determine how far west other European powers, especially Spain, had explored. After sailing into the sea which now bears his name, Bering initially failed to reach the North American mainland. It would be more than a decade before he embarked on a second expedition this time successfully reaching what is now Alaska in July 1741. Despite the impressive intrepidness and endurance made by the officers and men of the expedition the most immediate impact upon return to St. Petersburg was the procurement of rich furs, mainly sea otters. This later launched a gradual wave of highly enterprising traders, entrepreneurs and adventurers backed mostly by private or individual fortunes to tap into the fur rush, much like what the French and British had already been doing on the opposite side of the American continent.

Russian fur traders known as Promyshlenniki began to island hop eastward via Siberia and into the Alaskan mainland and broader Pacific Northwest. A relentless campaign ensued to harvest the highly sought after furs of sea otters, foxes, and various northern seals. Once one island/area was rapaciously depleted of furs the hunters and trappers merely moved on to the next and continued to exploit and slaughter. This had a horrific impact on the local native populace as they watched in horror and confusion as their abundant food and survival sources were destroyed and threatened with extinction.

1780s

By the 1780s the chaotic free for all operations of independently operating Promyshlenniki steadily gave way as six competing companies arose much like the Hudson’s Bay Company in British North America. Under such companies which were typically named for their founder(s) such as the Sheilikhov-Golikov Company. Competition would increase but took on a more organized fashion as the first permanent Russian settlements soon began to emerge because of coordinated and sustained trapping operations.

Despite some coordination and cooperation with the native populace, mainly Aleuts and Tlingits, relationships began to falter despite the pleadings and alleged interest in Native wellbeing of the distant and all too preoccupied monarch Catherine the Great. The all-too-common clash of cultures kept increasing in intensity and atrocities with several military encounters ensuing. The Natives never could gain a decisive edge given their lack of gunpowder and firearms and became fewer in number.

In 1808 the Russians relocated their erstwhile capital of Russia America from Kodiak Island to Sitka. There they took advantage of secure and deep harbors as they expanded their shipbuilding operations utilizing the abundance of timber in the surrounding area. Consolidating their regional monopoly the Russians virtually controlled much of the Pacific fur trade from the Aleutians to Northern California, providing lucrative furs and pelts to the markets in Asia and North America, even trading consistently with the newly created United States. Russian ships likewise began to sail further south into the Pacific laying anchor at places such as Easter Island and the Hawaiian Archipelago, all at the behest of the Czar who was determined that Russia remain a major player on the global geopolitical stage.

Mid Century

Russia would hold onto its outposts in Alaska ever so tenuously well into the mid-19th century as it faced consistently mounting pressure from the British and American who similarly coveted Alaska and the Pacific Northwest’s strategic and economic potential. The Russian attention eastward would wane however with the emphasis on southern extension into the Caucasus’s and Central Asia would pit Russia and Great Britain against one another in both hot and cold conflicts such as the Crimean War and the so-called Great Game.

In the 1850s, overhunting and trapping coupled with the bevy of conflicts abroad led to the Russian Empire devoting fewer men, material and resources to its outposts in the Pacific Northwest. Cognizant of Russia’s vulnerability from other European powers and prioritization of other regions the Czar decided to entertain and eventually approve a sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 for the price of seven million dollars, roughly two cents per acre. Thus, ending the near century and a half legacy of Russian activity in North America. To this day the Orthodox Church is still a prominent institution in the now State of Alaska. A vestige harkening back to an often-overlooked chapter in American and Russian history.

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Entrenchments in the U.S. Civil War

It seems intuitive that if someone is firing bullets at you, you seek cover, and if no tree or rock or fence is available, to build something protective to hide behind.  Yet, the U.S. Civil War was the first armed conflict in which extensive trenches were created. At the beginning, soldiers lined up and fired at those in the opposing line at point-blank range. But the death toll was outrageous; by the end of the war, picks and shovels became as much a part of fighting as artillery and guns.

Lloyd W Klein MD explains.

Entrenchments (also called field fortifications or earthworks) were widely used during the American Civil War,  becoming increasingly important as the war progressed.. Trench warfare was not as prevalent as in later conflicts. Except for sieges of fortified cities, combat in the past had been of short duration, major battles rarely lasting for more than a day. Early in the Civil War, we don’t see entrenchments at places like Manassas, Shiloh, or Antietam. While fighting behind stone walls and other make-shift barriers was resorted to at various locations, such as Gettysburg, the concept of “digging in” wasn’t prevalent until much later. Nevertheless, the development of trench warfare tactics in the Civil War foreshadowed their extensive use in future conflicts.

In discussing entrenchments, therefore, we are not talking about pre-existing stone walls (e.g., Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg) or terrain features (e.g., the Sunken Road at Antietam or Little Round Top at Gettysburg). A "trench" is a deep, long ditch dug into the ground to provide shelter for soldiers from enemy fire, while a "breastwork" is a temporary fortification typically made of earth, built up to chest height, allowing soldiers to fire over it while remaining partially protected from enemy fire; essentially, a breastwork is a more shallow, elevated defensive structure compared to a trench which is a deeper, dug-out ditch. Trenches are significantly deeper than breastworks, often allowing soldiers to stand upright within them. Trenches are dug into the ground, while breastworks are often built up from loose earth or sandbags, sometimes on top of a shallow ditch. While both offer protection, trenches generally provide better cover against heavy artillery and gunfire due to their depth.

Trench Construction

The construction of trenches during the Civil War was a labor-intensive process that required organization, manpower, and tools. Commanders would first decide on the location and layout of the trench system. This planning involved selecting high ground when possible, avoiding natural obstacles, and creating a network that provided defensive depth and coverage. Engineer officers would generally plan and supervise.  Engineer regiments would assist, if available, but they were limited in number.  Most of the work was performed by detailed infantry, perhaps assisted by black labor, free or enslaved, depending on which side.

Soldiers would begin digging the main trench line, typically starting with a shallow trench and gradually deepening it. The soil removed was piled up to create a parapet (a protective wall) in front of the trench to provide additional cover and protection.

Proper drainage was essential to prevent water from accumulating in the trenches. Soldiers would dig drainage ditches and sometimes line the trench floor with wooden planks (duckboards) to keep it dry and prevent mud.

Trenches were often camouflaged to blend in with the surrounding terrain and reduce their visibility to the enemy. Soldiers would use natural vegetation, earth, and other materials to disguise their positions.

“Saps" would be dug forward from an existing trench line, and the new trench extended laterally from there. In addition to the main front-line trenches, support trenches were dug behind the front lines to serve as secondary defensive positions, supply routes, and communication lines. These trenches were connected by communication trenches, which allowed safe movement of troops and supplies between different parts of the trench system..

A typical rifle trench or field fortification included several features.

·       Parapet: The mound of earth in front, created from the soil dug from the trench. Protected soldiers from enemy fire.

·       Firing step (banquette): A raised step inside the trench allowing soldiers to stand and fire over the parapet.

·       Ditch: The trench itself, usually 4–6 feet deep and wide enough to allow movement.

·       Revetments: Logs, planks, gabions (cylindrical baskets filled with dirt), or sod used to reinforce trench walls.

·       Traverses: Earth barriers placed at intervals inside the trench to reduce the impact of enfilading fire.

Additional features of a sophisticated trench system might include:

·       Bombproofs: Underground shelters made with logs and dirt to protect from artillery.

·       Artillery platforms: Raised areas behind the main trench where cannons were mounted.

·       Communication trenches: Smaller connecting trenches used to move troops and supplies safely.

The construction process was continuous, with soldiers constantly improving and expanding their trench networks to adapt to the evolving battlefield conditions. The resulting trench systems could become extensive and complex, providing significant defensive advantages in the static, attritional warfare that characterized the later stages of the Civil War.

The area surrounding Corinth, Mississippi, was fortified heavily by the Union and Confederate forces who struggled to control the strategically important town. Today, those earthworks are some of the best-preserved in the country. Halleck conceived of Corinth as a quasi-siege, and the concept of building ever-closer lines was a siege stratagem.

Fortifications were made from mounded soil, baskets, timber, and even bales of cotton were very effective. Earth and sod were the primary materials, because they absorbed bullets and shell fragments better than wood or stone. Gabions (wicker baskets filled with earth) were used to reinforce the trenches. To prevent the trench walls from collapsing, soldiers reinforced them with logs, planks, or other materials. In some cases, trenches were lined with sandbags or gabions to stabilize the walls and absorb enemy fire. Trenches were often supplemented with additional fortifications such as earthworks, redoubts (enclosed defensive structures), and gun emplacements. Obstacles like abatis (felled trees with sharpened branches), wire entanglements, and chevaux-de-frise (spiked barriers) were placed in front of the trenches to hinder enemy assaults.

A  variety of tools were used to dig trenches, including shovels, picks, axes, spades, and occasionally makeshift tools. Soldiers themselves did the digging early on. Over time, both the Union and Confederate armies developed engineering units to supervise and speed up construction.

Increasing Utilization During the War

The underlying reasons for their increasing popularity as the war continued were improved technology, which had intensified firepower, and crippling deficiencies in communication, which technology had not yet solved. Field entrenchments were a response to progress in weapons technology. Rifle muskets, deadly accurate at several hundred yards, and close-order field artillery made previous battle tactics obsolete. The earthworks were designed to protect troops against this increased firepower. When McClellan advanced from Yorktown in the direction of Richmond, his progress was slowed by an outnumbered Confederate rearguard, which gave ground only grudgingly on a wide front. This was possible because no longer did men need to be packed into tight ranks in order to generate sufficient volume of fire to maintain their position against assault. Reciprocally, the thinning out of ranks made them less vulnerable to incoming fire. Such gams were ameliorated further when men took to lying down to shoot or, better still, made a point of firing from trenches or behind cover instead of standing up in the open, as in Napoleonic Wars or other European conflicts. As had been shown in the Crimea and at Solferino, head-on assaults against a well-emplaced enemy were no longer profitable operations of war. Even less viable was cavalry against modern artillery and rifle fire. Although neither army was yet able to apply the full devastating potential of modern weapons, and many old, muzzle-loading rifles were still in service, the Sharps and Spencer rifles were coming into use.

Early War Use (1861–1862)

At the beginning of the war, both Union and Confederate commanders favored offensive tactics and quick, decisive battles. There was a general belief that the war would be short, and both sides sought to achieve swift victories through aggressive maneuvers and direct engagements.

Many of the early commanders and soldiers lacked experience in modern warfare and did not initially appreciate the defensive advantages that entrenchments could provide. They were more accustomed to traditional Napoleonic tactics, which emphasized open-field battles and charges. Early in the war, entrenchments were used sparingly, mainly around forts, strategic river crossings, or defensive cities. The full impact of rifled muskets and artillery was not yet fully understood. As the war progressed, the increased range and accuracy of these weapons made entrenched positions more valuable for defense. Initially, commanders did not see the necessity for extensive fortifications.

At first, the strategic use of trenches was more limited and often makeshift. Trenches were used mainly for protection rather than extended combat. Building extensive entrenchments required significant time, labor, and resources. Early in the war, armies were more mobile and focused on quick movements and engagements rather than static defenses. There was also a psychological aspect to avoiding entrenchments. Many soldiers and commanders viewed digging in as a sign of weakness or lack of courage. They believed that bold offensive actions were more honorable and likely to bring victory.

However, battlefields like Yorktown (Peninsula Campaign, 1862) saw early use of extensive trenches by both Confederate and Union forces. When McClellan advanced from Yorktown in the direction of Richmond, his progress was slowed by an outnumbered Confederate rearguard, which gave ground only grudgingly on a wide front. This was possible because no longer did men need to be packed into tight ranks in order to generate sufficient volume of fire to maintain their position against assault. Reciprocally, the thinning out of ranks made them less vulnerable to incoming fire. Such gams were ameliorated further when men took to lying down to shoot or, better still, made a point of firing from trenches or behind cover instead of standing up in the open.

Battles like Antietam and Shiloh showed that lining up and firing wasn’t a winning tactic. As the war progressed and the brutal realities of modern warfare became apparent, the use of entrenchments increased significantly. The high casualties from direct assaults and the effectiveness of defensive positions in battles like Fredericksburg and Gettysburg led to a greater emphasis on fortifications. By the later stages of the war, trench warfare had become a common feature, culminating in the protracted sieges of Petersburg and other battles. By the end of the war, trench warfare had become the dominant mode of combat. The Union had some success with a new alignment of attacking forces at Spotsylvania Courthouse but in general, it became about how to deal with an entrenched enemy.

Shift to Entrenched Warfare (1863–1864)

Entrenchments became far more common as the war continued. Experience on many battlefields taught generals and soldiers that rifled muskets and artillery made frontal assaults deadly. The increased firepower and longer campaigns took their toll;  armies began digging in to protect themselves during sieges or static operations. Increasingly, it was the best defensive strategy, especially for Rebel armies. Confederates, often outnumbered, used trenches to hold ground more effectively.

Key Examples of Entrenchments

Battle of Vicksburg (May-July 1863): The Siege of Vicksburg involved extensive entrenchments by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army, under General Ulysses S. Grant, besieged the city, and Confederate defenders used fortifications to hold off the attackers for over 40 days before surrendering. The fall of Vicksburg was a turning point in the war, giving the Union control of the Mississippi River.

Chattanooga (1863) – Confederates entrenched on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.

Overland Campaign (1864) –

The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House (May 8-21, 1864) is another significant example where entrenchments played a crucial role. During this battle, which was part of the Overland Campaign, both Union and Confederate forces used extensive entrenchments. The most famous segment of the battle occurred at the "Bloody Angle," a section of the Confederate defensive works. At Spotsylvania, the unique earthworks straddled a ravine located on a hillside that ascends 12 feet over 30 yards. The defense was composed of three sets of trenches. The main line of trenches was composed of 11 steps with a traverse trench running along the side. The traverse trench connected all of the steps leading to the top of the hill. The other sets of trenches, just to the west of the main line, are constructed in the same fashion, but were significantly smaller than those along the mainline. Needless to say, this design was unlike any other fortifications in the Civil War.

Battle of Cold Harbor (May-June 1864): Confederate forces under General Lee were heavily entrenched, and Union forces led by General Grant suffered severe casualties in frontal assaults. The entrenched positions contributed to one of the war's most lopsided battles in terms of casualties. Union troops faced massive casualties assaulting well-dug Confederate lines.

Battle of Petersburg (June 1864-April 1865 – Perhaps the most significant use of trench warfare in the war. A 9-month siege with 30+ miles of trenches anticipated WWI-style warfare. Both sides built elaborate networks of trenches and fortifications. The Union forces, led by General Grant, eventually broke through the Confederate lines, leading to the fall of Richmond and the end of the war. Grant kept trying to swing around Lee's right and left flanks during the siege of Richmond and Petersburg. This eventually forced Lee to abandon his lines because he could not sufficiently man the ever-expanding defensive line that Grant imposed on him. Once dislodged, Grant turned Sheridan loose to cut off Lee's move west while the bulk of his army pushed in on Lee.

Petersburg

The most advanced form of trench warfare was observed in the Petersburg campaign in 1864. The defense of Petersburg by General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard is often regarded as both bold and brilliant. He counterattacked Grant’s forward forces periodically to delude the Union army into believing his thinly spread force was much stronger. Meanwhile, he had his engineers building trenches, so that after 3 days, he was able to fall back into a defendable position. One quick determined rush by a Corps on 15th June 1864 might well have broken through. I can never understand why a man of Beauregard’s genius could not find a more central role in the Confederate army.

By June 18th, the trenches were so sophisticated that an army of 65,000 was insufficient to overcome the 40,000 men Lee had rushed to the spot by rail. Faced at first by an improvised line, the initial Federal assault failed from lack of co-ordination. Detachments advanced independently, inadequately supported by artillery, and were pinned to the ground by fire of only moderate intensity. By the time a set-piece attack could be launched on the 18th, the volume of defensive fire was annihilating, compelling Grant to call a halt and commence probing the city’s southern flank with a view to isolating it.

Keeping pace with each Federal sidestep to their left, the Confederates extended their entrenchment to their right, always in time to meet each assault while fiercely contesting Grant’s further attempts to cut the railroad line to Richmond or the one running westward from Petersburg. Assault was usually of the battering-ram sort – a blasting of the selected point of attack by artillery and mortars (the latter, with their plunging fire, being particularly suitable for striking at the deeper enemy emplacements) followed by a massed infantry charge.

Petersburg is the first instance of the use by the Union Army of the rapid-fire gun, the important precursor to modern-day machine guns. Twelve of the guns were purchased personally by Union commanders. The Gatling gun was a rapid-firing multiple-barrel firearm invented in 1861 by Richard Jordan Gatling. The Gatling gun's operation centered on a cyclic multi-barrel design which featured multiple rotating barrels powered by a hand crank, capable of firing several hundred rounds per minute. This design facilitated cooling and synchronized the firing-reloading sequence. As the hand wheel was cranked, the barrels rotated, and each barrel sequentially loaded a single cartridge from a top mounted magazine, firing the shot when it reached a set position (usually at 4 o'clock), then ejects the spent casing out of the left side at the bottom, after which the barrel is empty and allowed to cool until rotated back to the top position and gravity-fed another new round. This configuration eliminated the need for a single reciprocating bolt design and allowed higher rates of fire to be achieved without the barrels overheating quickly.

The Dimmock Line

The Dimmock Line was a series of Confederate defensive earthworks constructed to protect Petersburg. It was named after Captain Charles H. Dimmock, a Confederate engineer who designed it in 1862. Its length was 10 miles, forming a semicircle around the eastern and southern approaches to Petersburg, and incorporated 55 numbered artillery redans (small forts) connected by infantry trenches with both flanks anchored on the Appomattox River. It was built by enslaved laborers and Confederate soldiers. The Dimmock Line was initially effective in delaying Union forces during the early days of the siege, but Grant’s forces eventually extended around the line. Union troops finally attacked Petersburg directly, and elements of the Dimmock Line fell in mid-June 1864, which began the Petersburg Campaign. The Dimmock Line is historically significant as one of the earliest large-scale uses of entrenched field defenses in modern warfare, showing the transition from open battle to static, fortified lines.

Battle of the Crater

Digging a tunnel under the trenches and blowing it up seems like the most obvious and simple thing in the world. One of the most notable examples is the Battle of the Crater during the Siege of Petersburg (July 30, 1864). The mine built under the Confederate Lines at the Battle of the Crater was anything but simple. Although Grant and Meade were aware of its construction, neither expected any tactical benefit and seemed to have lost interest in it.

The Attack at the Redoubt at Petersburg on July 30th is the “correct” name of what is known as the Battle of the Crater. A mine containing four tons of black powder was detonated beneath the redoubt and its defenders. Placed in a cross shaft at the end of a 511-foot tunnel that a regiment of coal miners secretly dug, it was blown at dawn without warning to the enemy. General Ambrose Burnside, whose four divisions of infantry were to exploit the explosion, seems to have relied too much upon the shock effect of the mine; beyond doubt, the measures he took to ensure that the troops not only occupied the crater but pressed on rapidly beyond were ambiguous and unambitious. As for the troops, so staggered were they by the enormity of the explosion, the air pressure of its blast and the scene of carnage which met their eyes when they poured into the crater, that they lost all sense of purpose and stayed there all morning, poking about among the grisly ruins of dismembered men and equipment.

Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants originated the concept, commanding the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps, Pleasants, a mining engineer from Pennsylvania in civilian life, proposed digging a long mine shaft under the Confederate Army lines and planting explosive charges directly underneath a fort (Elliott's Salient) in the middle of the Confederate First Corps line. If successful, not only would all the defenders in the area be killed, but also a hole in the Confederate defenses would be opened. If enough Union troops filled the breach quickly enough and drove into the Confederate rear area, the Confederates would not be able to muster enough force to drive them out, and Petersburg might fall.

Union forces, under the command of General Ambrose Burnside, devised a plan to break the Confederate lines at Petersburg by digging a mine underneath the Confederate fortifications. A regiment of Pennsylvania coal miners was tasked with digging the tunnel, which extended over 500 feet to a point beneath the Confederate defenses. Burnside, whose reputation had suffered from his 1862 defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg and his poor performance earlier that year at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, was looking for a way to improve his military reputation.

The tunnel ran 510.8 feet. The shaft was dug with an upward incline to ensure water drainage. One-third of the way, the miners struck a vein of unworkable stone, so they further increased the slope to avoid it. Fresh air was drawn in by an ingenious air-exchange mechanism near the entrance. A canvas partition isolated the miners' air supply from outside air and allowed miners to enter and exit the work area easily. The miners had constructed a vertical exhaust shaft located well behind Union lines. At the vertical shaft's base, a fire was kept continuously burning. A wooden duct ran the entire length of the tunnel and protruded into the outside air. The fire heated stale air inside of the tunnel, drawing it up the exhaust shaft and out of the mine by the chimney effect. The resulting vacuum then sucked fresh air in from the mine entrance via the wooden duct, which carried it down the length of the tunnel to the place in which the miners were working. That avoided the need for additional ventilation shafts, which could have been observed by the enemy, and it also easily disguised the diggers' progress.

Lee had intelligence of my construction but made no reaction for 2 weeks. Finally, he initiated some minimal attempts to identify its location, but never did. Shafts were sunk but never found.

The mine was “T” shaped. Its entrance was narrow and 50 feet below the Confederate line. At the end was a 75-foot perpendicular shaft into which the explosives were placed.

Union soldiers filled the mine with 320 kegs of black (gun) powder, totaling 8,000 pounds. The explosives were approximately 20 feet under the Confederate works, and the T-gap was packed shut with 11 feet of earth in the side galleries. A further 32 feet of packed earth was placed in the main gallery to prevent the explosion from blasting out the mouth of the mine.

The mine was detonated on the morning of July 30, 1864. The explosion created a massive crater, killing or wounding hundreds of Confederate soldiers and creating a breach in their lines. Despite the initial success of the explosion, the follow-up assault by Union troops was poorly executed. Confusion, miscommunication, and ineffective leadership led to a chaotic and ultimately failed attack. Confederate forces regrouped and launched counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties on the Union troops who had entered the crater. The Union assault ended in disaster, and the Confederate lines held.

The reasons for the limited Use of mines included:

·       Technical Challenges: Digging mines required specialized skills and knowledge, which were not always available in sufficient quantities. The process was labor-intensive and time-consuming, making it difficult to employ on a large scale.

·       Strategic Focus: Early in the war, both sides focused on traditional offensive and defensive tactics rather than siege warfare. As the war progressed and trench warfare became more common, the use of mining techniques increased, but it never reached the scale seen in World War I.

·       Resource Constraints: Mining operations required significant resources, including labor, explosives, and time. Both Union and Confederate forces often faced logistical challenges that limited their ability to conduct large-scale mining operations.

·       Effectiveness: While mines could create breaches in enemy lines, the effectiveness of such tactics depended on the ability to exploit the breach quickly and effectively. As seen in the Battle of the Crater, poor execution of follow-up attacks could negate the initial success of the mine explosion.

Overall, while mines were used during the Civil War, their employment was limited by technical, logistical, and strategic factors. The Battle of the Crater stands out as a significant example of mining in the Civil War, highlighting both the potential and the challenges of this tactic.

Impact and Legacy

Entrenchments slowed campaigns, turning mobile warfare into grinding, attritional battles.

They foreshadowed trench warfare in World War I, especially the siege at Petersburg.

They reflected how military technology had advanced faster than tactics, forcing adaptation.

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Further Reading

·       https://gettysburgcompiler.org/2020/12/09/unsolved-mystery-of-the-galleries-sixth-corps-trenches-at-spotsylvania-court-house/

·       https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/trench-warfare

·       http://www.petersburgproject.org/trench-warfare-in-civil-war-history.html

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/something-new-art-war-civil-war-earthworks-and-trenches

·       https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2019/01/08/trench-warfare-in-the-american-civil-war/

The Importance of Virginia in the U.S. Civil War

One of the most vital statistics to discover regarding contributions to the U.S. Civil War effort by states is the total number of troops each state provided. From that, Jeb Smith looks at the importance of Virginia to the Civil War.

General William Tecumseh Sherman.

Finding statistics for each Confederate state regarding troop numbers is an uncertain and inconclusive process, with wildly varying estimates encountered; a situation not helped by Confederate forces’ destruction of records prior to the fall of Richmond. However, according to historian James M. McPherson in his book For Cause and Comrades, the following statistics represent the percentage contribution of each state[1] to the total forces of the Confederacy:

N. Carolina 15%

S. Carolina 6%

Virginia 14%

Texas 6%

Tennessee 12%

Kentucky 5%

Georgia 11%

Arkansas 3%

Alabama 9%

Missouri 3%

Mississippi 7%

Florida 2%

Louisiana 6%

Maryland 2%

However, according to Randolph H. McKim in his book The Numerical Strength of the Confederate Army, contemporary figures (of which he is highly skeptical, considering them wildly inflated) placed Virginia as the leader providing 175,000 troops, followed by North Carolina with 129,000, Tennessee at 115,000, Georgia 120,000, Alabama 90,000, South Carolina 75,000, Mississippi 70,000, and Florida 15,000. And according to the website Civil War Talk, the following is the number of troops supplied to the Confederacy by each state, with Virginia leading the way:

Virginia 160,875

S. Carolina 76,783

Tennessee 141,728

Louisiana 69,840

Georgia 135,774

Arkansas 58,000

Alabama 106,803

Missouri 39,750

N. Carolina 103,145

Kentucky 28,038

Mississippi 95,301

Florida 17,535

Texas 86,702    

Maryland 3,324

And the National Park Service’s (inflated but never corrected) numbers put Virginia as the leader at 282,432, followed by Tennessee at 277,183, Georgia at 244,142, and North Carolina at 202,009.

If any state were to challenge Virginia in total troop contribution to the Confederate armies, it appears that state is North Carolina. Clearly, no agreement is in place, as one has North Carolina slightly above Virginia while the other three show Virginia in the lead, and one puts North Carolina as low as fifth on the Confederate list of troops. And it does appear that Virginia contributed the most troops to the defense of the South. Not surprisingly, as according to the 1860 census, it had the South’s largest population, with 1,596,318 total, and a free population of 1,105,453. Tennessee (split loyalty) followed with a total population of 1,109,801, and Georgia with 1,057,286, including a significant slave percentage in each case. Then comes North Carolina, with a total population of 992,622, of which only 661,563 were free, as it had a higher percentage of slaves compared to Old Virginia (though lower than in Georgia).

This indicates that Virginia had a significantly larger population than North Carolina and a slightly higher percentage of free whites able to contribute in more ways than the typical slave. So we would expect, especially with war at the door, that Virginia, proud in its heritage and prestige, would muster the most men of all the Southern states. Further, North Carolina was strongly pro-Union before Lincoln's call for volunteers, more so than Virginia, and thus the loyalty to the South would likely not be as fervent. During General Sherman's famous (and infamous) March to the Sea, which involved burning and looting South Carolina and Georgia, his men's passage into North Carolina prompted a reminder by their commander of the state's loyalty to the Union, leading to a significant decrease in pillaging and overall bad behavior.

It is well known that Virginia led the seceding states in industrial production. With factories like the Richmond Armory and the renowned Tredegar Iron Works, which alone produced half the artillery pieces for the Confederacy (along with substantial navy ironclad material), Richmond was the center of industrial production in the Confederacy. Iron, coal, salt, and various agricultural materials were found within the state. A large amount of rail was laid in Virginia, utilized during the war not just to ship supplies but men to battle in and out of the state. And, of course, Virginia housed the Confederate government. North Carolina though was never considered among the most productive Southern states, with Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee also mentioned behind Virginia.

However, the most compelling argument for Virginia’s status as the most influential state in the Confederacy is the exceptional Confederate generals it produced. A Google search of “top ten” Civil War generals will reveal that Virginia supplied many of the best commanders. It can at least be argued that they provided the top three generals of the war in Lee, Jackson, and George Thomas, who I believe to be the Union’s best commander, and all three regularly make the top five on historians’ lists. Others that often or occasionally make the top ten who hailed from Virginia are Jeb Stuart, Jubal Early, John Mosby, A.P. Hill, Joseph E. Johnston, and Richard Ewell. Added to that was the large population, trained militia, various military schools, and industrial production that Virginia contributed to the war. It makes me think Virginia had the most to contribute to the war of any of the states in the Confederacy, and perhaps the Union. In contrast, North Carolina was remarkably underproductive in its gifted generals.

Greatest in the Confederacy, or Union?

I believe few would disagree with my assessment that Virginia made more contributions to the Confederate war effort than any other Southern state. However, many might contest the claim that Virginia's contributions surpassed those of any Northern state.

In 1860, four states had larger populations than Virginia, with New York being the largest. New York not only contributed by far the most soldiers to the Union but was also an industrial powerhouse, and thus the leading contender from the North (Pennsylvania and Ohio might object).

A 24/7 Wall Street article, which used most likely inflated numbers (for all of the states – the National Park Service had even greater numbers for New York) claimed New York produced the most men of any state, with 448,850 soldiers, followed by Pennsylvania and Ohio, respectively providing 337,936 and 313,180. At the same time, Virginia was fourth (first among the Confederates) with 282,432. Obviously, the South mobilized a greater percentage of the population than the North, as seen in the comparison between Virginia's and New York's total output. Even so, New York has a significant advantage in manpower, 448,000 to 282,000. So how could I argue that Virginia was the leading state?

First, we must look at the statistics another way. According to the American Battlefield Trust, 31,000 Virginians were casualties in battle, and only 39,000 New Yorkers. The same numbers can be found in other locations. But why such a vast discrepancy in the percentage of casualties? And what does it tell us?

A substantial portion of troops from New York were recent immigrants, many of them essentially mercenaries who lacked the commitment to the cause of the native-born Americans. They thus were less willing to make the greatest sacrifice. Many were drafted, yet they opposed the war. New York City Mayor Fernando Wood advocated secession after Lincoln's election due to tariffs.  The city had large-scale riots opposing the draft and Lincoln in 1863, which then morphed into some of the worst race riots in American history. Lincoln won the 1864 election in the state by a small margin of 6,749, which included known intimidation and voter fraud in NYC aimed at swaying and intimidating Peace Democrats. In other words, the typical New Yorker lacked the dedication and commitment that the typical Virginian had. Thus, the two are not equal and cannot be judged by numbers alone.

Further, slaves in the South helped maximize the white population’s contribution. They worked the fields, fed the armies, built fortifications, repaired bridges, constructed railroads, and performed labor work, enabling a larger percentage of whites to participate in combat. General Beauregard noted that the slaves' construction of defensive works provided the soldiers with rest and time to train more effectively. And to a much greater extent than the South the North would lose production when men went to war, leaving farms and jobs vacant across the various states. There were also thousands of slaves and free blacks who would fight for the South or would be medics, cooks, musicians, etc, in the Confederate army.

But more than this, Southerners were, generally, better soldiers. State militias had a greater impact in the South, as did pre-war training, and the vast majority of military colleges (outside of West Point, where many attendees were Southerners) were located in the South. The South had quality generalship from the bottom up, and more talent to spread around. And the size of the Union Army depleted the quality of the commanders they did have. The South also produced many great generals with no military training, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, Wade Hampton III and others.

Industry

Many historians, instead of only decrying the lack of industry in the South, will tell of the benefits of agrarian life regarding the military, especially the familiarity with weapons among the rural Southern population, where gun ownership was nearly universal. They had fewer police and thus often relied on armed citizens. A priority for them was dueling. They were more commonly hunters and farmers, needing to provide food and protect livestock, as well as engage in target practice or serve in a local militia. Even today, if you take 100 citizens in a rural area and put them with 100 urban, you can guess where the money would go if you bet who was more familiar with guns and could shoot better.

Another massive advantage that historians regularly admit is the Southern advantage of cavalry. The Southern agrarian lifestyle and lack of rail, urban life, and mass transit meant Southerners relied on horses for travel and were more accustomed to equestrianism than the Northern soldier. Southerner David Hundley wrote before the war that Southerners, if not racing horses, were hunting, shooting, fishing or swimming. He stated, “Whether for fox hunting like the old English or horse racing, horses were the beloved animal of the South.” Northerner Joseph Ingraham visited the South and wrote, “At the North, few ride except in gigs. But here all are horsemen; horsemen, and it is unusual to see a gentleman in a gig or carriage…cavalier bearing is thereby imperceptibly acquired, more congenial with the wild, free spirit of the Middle Ages than the refinement of modern times.” James Everitt, a plantation owner in North Carolina, said of the Southern gentleman, “From his very cradledom, he was made familiar with his horse.” So the typical Southern soldier was a far more experienced rider and also brought his horse with him, and thus could literally jump right into the war, while Northern cavalry had the horses provided for them by the army and needed to train.

Both North and South viewed Southern cavalry as far superior. Union General William Tecumseh Sherman described the Confederate cavalry in 1863 as “splendid riders, shots, and utterly reckless... the best Cavalry in the world.”. General Sherman noted how General Forrest’s cavalry could “Travel one hundred miles in less time than it takes our troops to travel ten.” A Union officer said of the cavalry in Virginia led by Ashby, “I can’t catch them, sir; they leap fences and walls like deer, neither our men nor horses are so trained.” Southern generals, especially early in the war, consistently demonstrated their superior riding skills and horsemanship by riding around entire Union armies, and in the case of J.O. Shelby, entire states, thereby boosting Southern morale. A song was written early in the war because of the dominance of the Southern cavalry under General Stuart in Virginia, who ran around the entire Union army on multiple occasions. Some of the lyrics go like this:

“If you want to have a good time, jine [Join] the cavalry!

Join the cavalry! Jine the cavalry!

If you want to catch the Devil, if you want to have fun,

If you want to smell Hell, jine the cavalry!”

Cavalry

Such was the dominance of the Virginia cavalry that warfare became a game, a confident, fun, certainty of victory.

The South effectively utilized cavalry from the onset to its full potential, and had many more trained cavalry officers. They had great cavalry commanders like Nathan Bedford Forrest, J.O. Shelby, Joseph Wheeler, John Mosby, Jeb Stuart, John Wharton, Wade Hampton III, Fitzhugh Lee, William Quantrill, the Native American leader Stand Watie, William Anderson, Turner Ashby, and more. The North lacked great cavalry generals, with Phil Sheridan being the only notable exception.

Now, there is no question that New York was an industrial giant, outperforming Virginia; however, when we look at Virginia, it could arm its soldiers with rifles and, as stated, produced half the Confederacy's artillery pieces from one factory alone. The North’s industrial output was only marginally over three times that of the South, and if Virginia produced at least half of the entire South’s manufactures, New York likely did not far outpace Virginia. Also, the majority of Confederate artillery was captured! They didn't have to produce as much due to on-field acquisition. Both sides really produced all they needed or could use. Due to a lack of proper lines of fire or suitable terrain and time to maneuver into position, neither army deployed all its artillery. Many battles were fought in the woods of Virginia to negate the advantage of manpower and artillery. Further, the use of artillery was not as vital as commonly believed; it only contributed to 5% of casualties during the war. And it was the South that first massed artillery. It was not until Gettysburg that the North began to do so.

Virginia provided its people with great defensive terrain, including many mountains, hills, rivers, and dense woods, to combat Northern advantages. The comparisons of Virginia generals and those from New York reveal an irreconcilable difference between the two. Virginia, ‘Our great Virginia’ as the state song says, was the most potent state during the war.

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

Links:

Defending Dixie's Land — Shotwell Publishing

Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty: Smith, Jeb J, Hedberg Jr., Lloyd R.: 9798327712362: Amazon.com: Books

[1] None of Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri were members of the Confederacy. They nevertheless appear in the statistics, since large numbers of citizens of each of these states served in the Southern forces. Note also that due to rounding the table does not add up to exactly 100%.

The American Civil War - Born of Compromise

Was the politics of compromise a politics of appeasement?

More than 150 years after the Civil War ended, Americans continue to debate the circumstances that led to the bloodiest conflict on US soil and whether that struggle could have been avoided. The controversy typically centers around the issue of whether sufficient effort was made to arrive at a compromise, thereby precluding the deaths of over 600,000 Americans at the hands of other Americans.

But the real question should be:

Was there too much compromise?

The conflict was, indeed, not based on any failure to compromise; rather, if there was failure, it was in not dealing early on with the contrasting socioeconomics of the northern and southern states. But, of course, at the time there was a perceived need to, at almost any cost, bind the fledgling nation together in the face of great disparity between two economic systems. And this felt need was driven by a fear of losing what the founders had just sacrificed so much to achieve and institute – an independent republic with a democratic form of governance.

F. Andrew Wolf explains.

President James Monroe, the president who signed the Missouri Compromise.

US Constitution - the “three-fifths” compromise

The compromises regarding the two vastly different forms of socioeconomics began with the inception of the United States, itself. America’s Constitution famously declared that the institution of slavery would enjoy the status of official recognition in order to secure agreement with the southern states for a binding document.

The socioeconomics between the North and South (land, capital, population, industry, agrarian vs urban interests, types of labor force) were so vastly different that neither was willing to trust the other without a well-delineated form of equitable representation in the Constitution. This was to ensure that the voice of each was fairly heard in the law-making body that dealt with taxation and the subsequent disposition of that revenue. The result was the “Three-Fifths Compromise” for apportionment of representatives regarding the bonded servants in the South. It was agreed that each bondsman (slave) would count as three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation and taxation. Moreover, in rather euphemistic language, Congress was authorized to ban the international slave trade -- but not for another 20 years.

The immediate effect of this “formula” was to inflate the power of the Southern states in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College. These were the states in which the vast majority of enslaved persons lived.

The first Census, taken in 1790 after the Constitution’s ratification, is illustrative. 25.5% of North Carolina’s population was enslaved, as were 35.4% of Georgia’s, 39.1% of Virginia’s, and 43% of South Carolina’s. To offer context to the situation, the 1800 Census showed Pennsylvania's free population was 10% larger than Virginia’s but received 20% fewer electoral votes, because Virginia’s population was augmented by the Three-Fifths Compromise. 

In fact, counting enslaved persons under the compromise added an additional 13 members from “slave states” to the House and eighteen additional electors to the “College.” Is it a coincidence that for 32 of the first 36 years after the Constitution’s ratification, a white slaveholder from Virginia held the presidency?  

The situation was further compounded by the fact that the framers of America’s founding document failed to mention the issue of slavery as an institution even once. David Waldstreicher, professor emeritus in history at the City University of New York and author of Slavery’s Constitution, holds that this failure created ambiguity about the framers’ intentions as well as the constitutionality of both proslavery and antislavery legislation which was to follow.

It can be argued that the Civil War had its genesis in the incipient stages of the founding of America by the early compromises made in the Constitution over the issue of agrarian economics driven by the institution of slavery in the southern states.

This acquiescence to the perceived needs of the South -- to keep the nation bound together -- informed not only the evolution of slavery in America but gave rise to much of the dysfunction in national politics and issues of inequality, still with us today. It makes little sense to talk of a failure to compromise, except insofar as every war or political conflict is a failure to achieve agreement. The original compromises enshrined in 1787 would ultimately touch everything in America from that point on.

Nineteenth century compromises

Through the early to mid-nineteenth century, several agreements between the North and South were hammered out.

The Missouri Compromise of 1820 permitted Missouri to join the Union as a slave state in exchange for Maine entering as a free state. There was the Compromise of 1850 which allowed California’s admission as a free state but also enacted the Fugitive Slave Act, allowing for the kidnapping and re-enslavement of people in free states who had escaped slavery. And the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 allowed western territories to decide for themselves if slavery was to be permitted.

The “Tariff of Abominations,” enacted in 1828 by representatives of the northern states, was a protective tariff aimed at supporting northern manufacturers by taxing imported goods, which worked against and angered southern states. This led to the Nullification Crisis, where South Carolina attempted, unsuccessfully arguing states’ rights, to nullify the tariff, further escalating tensions between the two regions.

Lincoln - the great compromiser

As slavery spread, so did the zeal of the antislavery cause. Abolitionists at the time were often depicted from various sources as suspicious, even dangerous fanatics. But in truth the antislavery movement comprised numerous efforts to compromise when it came to liberating those from the forced labor of involuntary servitude. One idea was that of colonization, which advocated resettling former slaves to South America or Africa (e.g., Liberia), derived from the jaundiced belief that they could never coexist with whites?

One of those advocates of colonization was Abraham Lincoln, offering support for the idea as late as 1862, as Daniel Biddle & Murray Dubin attest in a 2013 article in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.

Even as a presidential candidate in the run-up to his election in 1860, Lincoln and his Republican Party colleagues were amenable to any number of compromises to keep the slaveholding South in the Union. One such proposal was the never-ratified Corwin amendment to the Constitution -- permitting the institution of slavery to continue (without federal interference) where it already existed -- but prohibit its establishment in new territories.

Yet, it was the slaveholding states of the South that refused to compromise on this offer, notes Manisha Sinha, historian at the University of Connecticut and author of The Slave’s Cause: A History of Abolition.

There was really only one aspect of the slavery issue where Lincoln could likely have circumvented the war between the states. “Lincoln could have avoided the Civil War if he had agreed to compromise on the non-extension of slavery, but that was one thing Lincoln refused to compromise on…” Sinha asserts.

“When it comes to the Civil War,” she added, “we still can’t seem to understand that the politics of compromise was a politics of appeasement that at many times sacrificed black freedom and rights.”

A culture war

At the center of the disagreement between northern and southern states was also the issue of “class differences” among white-male property owners.

A culture war was brewing between North and South. The North viewed their neighbors as somewhat backwards with little education, little in the way of industry and an aging infrastructure. The South felt denigrated and besieged economically.

Both regions had different visions of what constituted a moral society; yet, both were denominated by Christians who believed in democracy, capitalism and shared a history dating from America’s inception. Where they parted ways was on economics – and that meant slavery.

President Lincoln's election of 1860 was the final blow to the South. Most of his support came from north of the Mason-Dixon line, which put in jeopardy the South's clout in the Union. Southern states viewed the situation as an existential threat to their socioeconomic lifestyle and reacted to preserve it. 

This marked, for years to come, the beginning of the South’s decline in political power in Washington – a poignant footnote to the compromises embedded in the Constitution of the United States some 74 years earlier – ostensibly to keep the South in and the Union intact. But it would take a war between the states and the assassination of a president to finally achieve those ends.

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References 

Nittle, N. (2020, October 30). The History of the Three-Fifths Compromise. ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/three-fifths-compromise-4588466

National Park Service. The Constitutional Convention: A Day-by-Day Account for August 16 to 31, 1787. Independence National Historical Park. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/constitutionalconvention-august25.htm

Census.gov. Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1790/number-of-persons.pdf

Amar, A. The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists. Time.com. https://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-slavery/

Monroe, Dan. The Missouri Compromise. Bill of Rights Institute.  https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-missouri-compromise

Mark, H. (2025, June 9). Compromise of 1850. World History Encyclopedia. https://www.worldhistory.org/Compromise_of_1850/

Garrison, Z. Kansas-Nebraska Act. Civil War on the Western Border. https://civilwaronthewesternborder.org/encyclopedia/kansas-nebraska-act

McNamara, R. (2019, July 19). The Tariff of Abominations of 1828. ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/tariff-of-abominations-1773349

Longley, R. (2021, October 6). The Corwin Amendment, Enslavement, and Abraham Lincoln. ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/corwin-amendment-slavery-and-lincoln-4160928