Major General James Harrison Wilson served as a Union officer whose impact was felt in various capacities, particularly as an engineer, staff officer, and later as a skilled cavalry leader during the latter stages of the Civil War. His contributions often go unnoticed, despite his involvement in several pivotal roles that exemplify the capabilities of high-ranking Union officers.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major General James Wilson.

Born on September 2, 1837, in Illinois, Wilson graduated sixth in his class from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1860. He began his military career as a second lieutenant in the Topographical Engineers, receiving his initial assignment in the Department of Oregon.

 

Corps of Topographical Engineers

To fully appreciate Wilson's career shifts and achievements across seemingly unrelated positions, it is crucial to understand the role of topographical engineers. Upon graduating from West Point, he joined a prestigious and select army service. Being chosen for this Corps indicated a high level of skill and promise. Topographical engineers were tasked with producing intricate maps of battlefields and terrain, providing vital information for troop movements and strategic planning. Their responsibilities included surveying land to pinpoint advantageous locations for artillery and defensive structures, as well as overseeing the construction of fortifications and military roads. The maps they generated were essential for organizing supply routes and transportation, significantly influencing the strategies and outcomes of numerous battles by guiding commanders' decisions.

In times of peace, this specialized group was engaged in various critical infrastructure projects, such as building bridges, supervising lighthouse construction, maintaining harbors, and managing fortifications. With the onset of the Civil War, many members transitioned into combat roles, focusing on the development of entrenchments and fortifications while also creating essential maps. Their extensive experience in construction provided them with a solid foundation for making strategic decisions in the heat of battle. Notable Army Engineers from this era included figures such as George Meade, George McClellan, Andrew Humphreys, Robert E. Lee, P.G.T. Beauregard, and Gouverneur Warren.

The expertise of topographical engineers was not only vital during peacetime but became even more pronounced during wartime, as their skills directly contributed to military effectiveness. Their ability to assess and manipulate the landscape for military advantage played a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of engagements. As they adapted to the demands of combat, their contributions to both engineering and military strategy underscored the importance of their work in the broader context of the war. This unique blend of skills and experiences allowed individuals like Wilson to navigate diverse roles throughout their careers successfully.

 

Civil War 1861-Early 1864

As the Civil War began, he advanced to the rank of first lieutenant and took on the role of topographical engineer for the Port Royal Expeditionary Force. His involvement in the Battle of Fort Pulaski led to his promotion to major. Subsequently, he was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, where he served as aide de camp to Major General George McClellan while also fulfilling engineering duties. In this capacity, he participated in significant battles, including South Mountain and Antietam.

 Following McClellan's dismissal, he was reassigned to the Western Theater, joining Grant's Army of the Tennessee as a lieutenant colonel and engineer. During the Vicksburg Campaign, he held the crucial position of inspector general, overseeing the army's inventory and supplies. Given Grant's limited logistical expertise, he relied heavily on officers like Wilson to ensure that the campaign was well-supplied with food, ammunition, and equipment. The extensive supply line stretching from Jackson across the Mississippi River to St. Louis underscored the significant responsibilities entrusted to Wilson.

After the successful siege of Vicksburg, he was elevated to the rank of brigadier general of volunteers and continued to serve in staff roles during the Battle of Chattanooga. He was later appointed as the chief engineer for the forces dispatched to support Knoxville under Major General William T. Sherman. Throughout these various non-combat roles, it is evident that he was entrusted with substantial administrative responsibilities that were vital to military command and strategic planning. In 1864, he became the chief of the Cavalry Bureau, demonstrating his exceptional skills as an administrator.

In mid-January 1864, Wilson was appointed as the head of the newly established Cavalry Bureau, following a recommendation from Grant. He took on the challenge of transforming this previously ineffective and disorganized administrative office, which had been burdened by bureaucratic inefficiencies and outdated practices, into a well-functioning, resourceful, and reputable agency. Wilson dedicated himself fully to this role, maintaining a rigorous schedule from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. daily, and often utilized his free time to ride along the capital’s defensive lines, engaging in discussions about enhancing cavalry administration with Assistant Secretary Dana, who was residing in the same boarding house.

 

Promotion to Combat Duty

Perhaps unexpectedly, General Grant elevated Wilson to command a cavalry division under Sheridan. This promotion was particularly remarkable given that Wilson had no prior experience in combat or in leading troops. However, Grant's decision proved to be astute, as it allowed Wilson to apply his administrative skills in a new and challenging context.

He played a significant role in both the Overland Campaign and the Valley Campaign of 1864.  Although Wilson encountered significant challenges in his early combat assignments, such as at the Wilderness and Third Winchester, his enthusiasm, determination, and innovative ideas shone through. Despite making notable mistakes, his energetic approach and confidence played a crucial role in his development as a leader in the field.

 

The Chickahominy River Crossing

His cavalry division did not accompany Sheridan during the raid on Trevilian Station. Instead, he took the lead in crossing the Chickahominy River as part of the march towards the James River, aiming to create a diversion within the broader Union strategy. This maneuver was designed to facilitate a crossing of the James River and allow Union forces to position themselves south of Lee’s army. By coordinating with the V Corps, he launched an offensive towards Richmond, targeting areas north of the James River near McClellan's previous battlefields. This tactic misled Lee into believing that Grant's primary assault would occur there, ultimately granting Grant additional time to finalize the crossing and initiate the offensive on Petersburg.

Wilson’s cavalry division was assigned the critical role of probing the Confederate defenses, collecting intelligence, and disrupting their supply chains. This mission involved securing vital crossings along the Chickahominy River and providing support for Union infantry movements. Wilson’s troops played a significant role in securing essential fords and river crossings, which was crucial for the Union's ability to navigate the difficult terrain. The Chickahominy was notorious for its flooding and marshy surroundings, presenting unique challenges for cavalry operations.

 

The Wilson-Kautz Raid

The Wilson-Kautz Raid was a Union cavalry operation conducted during the Civil War from June 22 to July 1, 1864, as part of the Petersburg Campaign. The raid was led by Brigadier General James H. Wilson and Brigadier General August V. Kautz. Its primary goal was to disrupt Confederate supply lines by targeting key railroads supplying Petersburg and Richmond.

The Union army, under General Ulysses S. Grant, was besieging Petersburg, Virginia. The railroads supplying Confederate forces in Petersburg and Richmond were vital for their survival. The raid aimed to destroy sections of these railroads to sever supply routes and weaken Confederate resistance. The primary targets were the:

·      South Side Railroad

·      Richmond and Danville Railroad

·      Weldon Railroad

.These raids were integral to the overarching Union strategy, designed to undermine the logistical capabilities of the Confederacy. By disrupting these supply lines, Wilson's actions contributed to the Union's efforts to weaken the Confederate war effort significantly. Initially the raid was successful: They successfully destroyed large sections of the South Side Railroad and Richmond and Danville Railroad, burning bridges, tearing up tracks, and destroying supplies.:

The chief action in this raid was a pivotal confrontation near the Staunton River. This engagement was marked by strategic maneuvers and the involvement of various forces, highlighting the intensity of the conflict during that period. On June 22, 1864, Wilson initiated a cavalry raid aimed at crippling the South Side and Richmond & Danville railroads, with a particular focus on destroying the vital railroad bridge spanning the Staunton River. Over the course of the first three days, his cavalry successfully dismantled 60 miles of track, set fire to two trains, and destroyed several railroad stations. Despite the efforts of Confederate General W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee to pursue the Union forces, he was unable to effectively counter their actions.

The battle saw Captain Benjamin Farinholt rallying nearly 1,000 local volunteers, including older men and boys, to confront Wilson's 5,000 well-equipped troops. Although Wilson's cavalry engaged in the fight dismounted, they ultimately faced defeat as "Rooney" Lee's cavalry arrived towards the end of the skirmish, forcing Wilson's troops to retreat.

On their return, Wilson and Kautz’s forces were intercepted by Confederate forces at the Battle of Sappony Church (June 28) and the Battle of Ream’s Station (June 29). At Ream’s Station, the Union cavalry suffered heavy losses as they were cut off and forced to abandon many of their men, horses, and artillery.

The outcome of the raid overall must be considered a tactical loss. While the raid inflicted significant damage on Confederate railroads, much of it was quickly repaired. The Union cavalry suffered heavy casualties, with over 1,500 men killed, wounded, or captured. The raid temporarily disrupted Confederate supply lines and forced them to divert troops to defend railroads. However, it did not achieve its ultimate goal of crippling Confederate logistics.

 

Transfer to the Western Theater

Sherman had no good choices when it came time to select a cavalry leader for the campaign that would go into legend as the March to the Sea. He had decided on a top-to-bottom reorganization of the various mounted corps reporting to him and, characteristically, brought in an outsider, Major General James H. Wilson, for the job. He needed to keep Wilson in Tennessee accomplishing that task, so to command the mounted force that would accompany his foot soldiers, Sherman had to choose from the roster of officers who had already failed him one or more times. He settled on a candidate that most observers would have rated a long shot at best: Brigadier General H. Judson Kilpatrick.

 

Battle of Franklin

At the Battle of Franklin (November 30, 1864), Wilson commanded the Union cavalry, playing a key role in protecting the Union army’s flanks and contributing to the Union victory during this pivotal engagement of the Civil War. Securing the Union flanks during the battle was critical in preventing Confederate cavalry under Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest from outflanking or cutting off the Union forces.

Wilson’s cavalry actively skirmished with Forrest’s forces, keeping them occupied and preventing them from effectively supporting the Confederate infantry assault. Although Forrest was a formidable opponent, Wilson’s well-equipped and disciplined cavalry successfully countered his maneuvers, limiting Confederate mobility. After the Union forces repelled the Confederate frontal assault, Wilson’s cavalry played a crucial role in covering the Union army’s retreat to Nashville, ensuring an orderly withdrawal without significant Confederate interference.

Wilson’s effective cavalry operations helped secure the Union position and contributed to the overall Confederate failure. By neutralizing Forrest’s cavalry, Wilson ensured that the Union army could focus on repelling Hood’s infantry assault without the added threat of encirclement or disruption of supply lines. Wilson’s leadership and the performance of his cavalry at Franklin showcased the increasing effectiveness of Union cavalry forces late in the war, particularly in countering Confederate cavalry operations. Wilson is one of the few Union officers to beat Forrest in battle, and he would do so again near the end of the war.

 

A Different Conception of Cavalry

Brigadier General Emory Upton was elevated to the position of division commander under General Sheridan and tasked with leading the Valley Campaign against General Early. During the course of battle, he sustained a severe injury that nearly resulted in the loss of his leg. Although he received another promotion, he ultimately had to relinquish command of his division. Subsequently, he was reassigned to Nashville, where he collaborated with Major General James Wilson to create a fundamentally different type of military unit. Both Upton and Wilson were innovative and ambitious officers who significantly contributed to the evolution of the Union cavalry into a more formidable fighting force, each recognized for their progressive strategies in warfare. 2. The concept they developed centered around a mobile strike force, consisting of 12,000 infantry equipped with Spencer breech-loading rifles. The strategy involved mounting the infantry on horses to advance into battle, then dismounting to engage in combat as traditional infantry. Upton's approach was to extend his idea of rapid assaults on fortified positions to broader military operations, while Wilson possessed the tactical expertise to implement these strategies effectively. This innovative thinking marked a pivotal transformation in cavalry operations.

Wilson's forces were equipped with breech-loading repeating rifles and employed combined arms tactics effectively. They expanded from a brigade-sized cavalry unit, as utilized by Sheridan at the Battle of Booneville, to a full cavalry corps. This strategy involved a significant number of troops dismounting to engage the enemy while mounted forces executed flanking maneuvers or direct assaults. Sheridan had previously implemented similar tactics, combining infantry and cavalry, at key battles such as the 3rd Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Five Forks. The essence of this approach lay in the integration of horse-mounted soldiers with repeating rifles or carbines, creating an unprecedented combination of mobility and firepower.

In conflicts where cavalry units were often underutilized, combined with infantry, or assigned to logistical roles, Wilson's tactics represented a significant departure from the norm.

Wilson believed that the seven-shot repeater would transform mounted combat, and he anticipated achieving remarkable success in the field with his thousands of Spencer-equipped troopers.

It's worth noting that Thomas' cavalry commander James Wilson started the war as a Grant protégé but after working under Thomas during those last few months of the war became a big advocate for Thomas.

Wilson’s Raid

Wilson mobilized his 13,480 cavalrymen independently, launching rapid raids against the economic hubs of the Deep South. Notably, regions from central Mississippi to central Georgia remained largely untouched even as the Civil War progressed. As a result, cities such as Selma and Montgomery in Alabama, along with Columbus in Georgia, continued to function as crucial shipping centers and significant sources of Confederate supplies.

Wilson's strategic objectives were twofold: to dismantle this essential supply chain and to thwart any potential Confederate efforts to establish a final stronghold in the region. He bolstered the Cavalry Corps with a substantial influx of remounts—35,000 since early March—alongside necessary equipment, ammunition, and hundreds of Spencer carbines. Wilson believed that the seven-shot repeater would transform mounted combat, and he anticipated achieving remarkable success in the field with his thousands of Spencer-equipped troopers.

He significantly enhanced the Cavalry Corps by introducing a considerable number of remounts—35,000 since early March—along with essential equipment, ammunition, and hundreds of Spencer carbines. On March 22, 1865, Wilson's forces departed from Tennessee and swiftly advanced through Alabama, systematically dismantling railroads, bridges, and factories along their path. By April 2, they had successfully captured Selma, a crucial industrial hub for the Confederacy, after overcoming Forrest’s troops in a fierce confrontation. This victory against Nathan Bedford Forrest, one of the Confederacy's most adept cavalry leaders, effectively diminished Confederate cavalry strength in the area.

The destruction of Selma's foundries, arsenals, and military supplies marked a significant blow to the Confederate war effort. On April 12, Wilson's troops entered Montgomery, Alabama, the former Confederate capital, encountering little resistance. Following this, on April 16, they launched an assault on Columbus, Georgia, seizing the city and obliterating the naval shipyard along with other war-related industries. They also took control of West Point, Georgia, another vital supply center for the Confederacy. Wilson's forces maintained their aggressive campaign until the Confederate surrender in April 1865, capturing Macon, Georgia, on April 20, shortly after the war's official conclusion.

Wilson's Raid emerged as a crucial military initiative towards the end of the Civil War, designed to undermine Confederate resources significantly. This strategic operation dealt a severe blow to the South's remaining military capabilities by targeting and destroying key factories, railroads, and supplies essential to the Confederate effort. The raid hastened the collapse of the Confederacy in the Western Theater and was instrumental in achieving an overall Union victory. It is recognized as one of the most successful cavalry operations executed by Union forces during the war, highlighting their ability to penetrate deep into enemy territory and demonstrating the effectiveness of well-equipped, mobile cavalry units in dismantling Confederate infrastructure and resistance.

Wilson’s relentless cavalry pursuit was by far the longest pursuit of a defeated enemy of a defeated adversary during the Civil War, both in duration and distance. For twelve days, his forces engaged the Confederate rear guard, including encounters with Forrest's cavalry, as they advanced into Alabama. The pursuit was marked by continuous rear guard skirmishes, often occurring in challenging weather conditions and difficult terrain. It was only when the pursuit became untenable that Wilson's cavalry made the decision to return to Nashville.

By the conclusion of the war, the cavalry units under Wilson's command successfully apprehended key figures, including President Davis during his escape attempt and Captain Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville prison. Additionally, Upton played a significant role in capturing Alexander Stephens, further highlighting the effectiveness of their operations. These actions underscored the strategic importance of cavalry in the final stages of the conflict.

 

Implications

Wilson's Corps emerged as a precursor to the highly mobile armored warfare tactics that would define the Twentieth Century. Troops utilized their horses for mobility but typically engaged in combat dismounted, leveraging the advantages of their repeating carbines to enhance their combat effectiveness. Both Wilson and Upton enjoyed distinguished careers after the war, with Upton becoming a military reformer and theorist, while Wilson transitioned into a general, diplomat, and historian. Their innovative concepts laid the groundwork for modern military strategies, influencing the use of combined arms and mobile strike forces that would be pivotal in future conflicts, including those in Europe, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

After the war, Wilson returned to a career in engineering and railroads. His later career as a division and Corps Commander in the Spanish-American War and the Peking expedition during the Boxer rebellion adds to his very remarkable career.

 

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Major General George G. Meade, a Union general during the American Civil War, has a reputation that has been historically criticized and misunderstood. Despite his important contributions at the Battle of Gettysburg and his cautious approach to warfare, he faced criticism for not aggressively pursuing and defeating Lee's army. Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major General George Gordon Meade.

During the war, Meade’s poor relationships with the press of his time and his secondary role under Grant further damaged his post-war reputation. However, modern appraisals recognize his competence and tactical acumen, including his appreciation for advancements in weapons technology. Meade's campaigns after Gettysburg, such as the Fall 1863 campaigns and the Overland Campaign, showcased his abilities as a general. While Grant's strategy ultimately led to victory, Meade played a crucial role in positioning his army to implement Grant's vision and should be credited for his contributions to the Union's success. It doesn’t help that the Overland Campaign was directed by Grant and that his victory at Gettysburg is typically considered a one-off.  The misunderstanding of the Williamsport circumstance will probably never be repaired.

Meade took command of the Union Army just a few days before the Gettysburg battle. General Meade commanded the Union Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Gettysburg, and is regarded as a competent and capable general. Meade's leadership both preparing for and during the Battle of Gettysburg is often praised. He successfully organized his forces and made critical decisions that ultimately led to a Union victory in that significant battle. His strategic positioning and defensive preparations played a crucial role in repelling numerous Confederate attacks.

He faced Lee in two other campaigns in Fall 1863. They did not succeed.  For this, given that Grant won the war the year after, he is universally, but unfairly, criticized as another Union general hack. Yet few Civil War aficionados have studied these campaigns in much detail.

Meade was a competent general and a modest man. He was thorough, methodical and cautious; his engineering background had made him someone who planned his maneuvers carefully.

However, Meade's tenure as the overall commander of the Army of the Potomac was not without criticism. Some argue that he missed opportunities for more aggressive action and failed to decisively pursue and defeat General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army after the Gettysburg victory. Additionally, his cautious approach in subsequent campaigns, such as the Mine Run Campaign, drew criticism from his superiors.

Overall, while Meade's leadership at Gettysburg demonstrated his ability as a competent general, opinions on his overall performance during the Civil War vary among historians and military experts. A great deal of the bias we today have against Meade has its origins in the Congressional Investigations after Gettysburg. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt

His post bellum reputation was damaged by his poor relationships with the press of his time, and his secondary role under Grant in 1864. We today have the impression that Grant was brought east to supervise Meade and we therefore think that Grant held him in contempt. The damaging consequences of the controversy arising from Gettysburg with General Sickles has also been damaging. Modern appraisals recognize Meade’s important contributions at Gettysburg.  His tactics in the field were one of the few that showed an appreciation for the improvements in weapons technology in the war:  he entrenched when feasible and did not launch frontal assaults on fortified positions.

Gettysburg Aftermath: Williamsport

Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. The retreat required an active rear guard defense and was mainly carried out in the rain. ,Meade was widely criticized for failing to pursue aggressively and defeat Lee's army after Gettysburg. Although Lincoln and Stanton insisted on his following Lee, Meade may have been justified in not attempting a rapid pursuit.

At the three-day battle at Gettysburg, Meade's forces had suffered heavy casualties, and he needed time to regroup, reorganize, and resupply his army. The Army of the Potomac  (AoP) had sustained over 20,000 casualties including the loss of many of its best officers, including three corps commanders.  Attacking immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on his troops and risked further losses.

Following the Battle of Gettysburg, the retreating Confederate troops and ambulance train occupied Williamsport. Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover,  there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Under the direction of Brig Gen John Imboden, during the Confederate retreat, the wagon trains with thousands of wounded soldiers were escorted back to Virginia., Lee had not reached the town until a couple of days after an important cavalry attack that Imboden defended against. Imboden successfully managed to retreat and gather his forces, despite harassment from Union cavalry, to create defensive works against Union assault. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When Lee arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.

Meade chose not  to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached. Attacking a well-entrenched enemy in this defensive position across a wide open field would have been a highly risky endeavor, potentially resulting in heavy casualties for Meade's forces.

Thirdly, Meade faced logistical challenges and supply issues. His army relied on a long and stretched supply line, and engaging in a major offensive action immediately after Gettysburg would have put additional strain on the already taxed supply system. Meade needed time to replenish his ammunition, food, and other essential supplies before considering another large-scale attack.

Expecting to cross over the pontoon bridge they had constructed to get to Maryland, Lee had not been informed that a cavalry raid on July 4 had destroyed the bridge. Moreover,  there had been many days of rain after the battle, causing the Potomac River to rise. The Confederate Army was therefore trapped by the impassible Potomac. Imboden was assigned to leading the ambulances, subsistence trains and cattle plundered during the campaign back to Virginia, with the active army in the rear as protection. When he arrived in Williamsport, he found the bridge out, the fords impassable, and no way to get over the river.

Expecting an attack, Brigadier General John D. Imboden set up defensive positions along the crest of a ridge about one-half mile from Williamsport on July 6. Arriving at Williamsport, Imboden found the pontoon bridge destroyed, and Federal cavalry attacked the wagon train of wounded. On July 6, 1863, the Potomac River flooding at Williamsport, Maryland, trapped Imboden's wagon train. He put together a defensive force that included an artillery battery and as many of the wounded who could operate muskets.

Late in the afternoon of July 6, 1863, Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General John Buford arrived east of Williamsport, flanking the town. Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick took a different route that took him down the main road.  At sundown Union Brigadier General George A. Custer and his Michigan "Wolverines" arrived to fight but were quickly withdrawn.

By July 7, Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden stopped Brig. Gen. John Buford's Union cavalry from occupying Williamsport and destroying Confederate trains. On July 6, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division drove two Confederate cavalry brigades through Hagerstown before being forced to retire by the arrival of the rest of Stuart's command.

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick's and Buford's cavalry divisions approached from the north and east respectively. Before allowing Buford to gain a position on the flank and rear, Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, taking more than 500 prisoners. Confederate Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew was mortally wounded in the fight.

On July 16, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry approached Shepherdstown where the brigades of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and John R. Chambliss, supported by Col. Milton J. Ferguson's brigade, held the Potomac River fords against the Union infantry. Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss attacked Gregg, who held out against several attacks and sorties, fighting sporadically until nightfall, when he withdrew. Meade chose not  to attack Lee in his trenches, believing the position could not be successfully breached.

Congressional Investigation of Gettysburg

In a 1961 article, The Strange Reputation of General Meade, Edwin Coddington wrote that Sickles’ attacks on Meade “greatly contributed to an unfavorable opinion of him as a commanding general, which has persisted to this day.” Coddington concluded that, “Sickles’ persistence in continuing his feud long after Meade’s death in 1872 had deep and lasting effects on publicists and historians of the battle,” and that “Sickles achieved a large measure of success” in his campaign to sully Meade’s name.

When Meade denied a request by Sickles to return to command, Sickles sought revenge. In February 1864, he went before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a highly influential committee dominated by Radical Republicans, and gave distorted testimony that Meade had handled the army ineptly at Gettysburg—that the Union army had won a great victory despite Meade. Notably, Sickles alleged that on the battle’s second day Meade had been a coward, eager to retreat rather than fight.

The two most important witnesses against him were:

a) Major General Abner Doubleday supported Sickles’ egregious claims by testifying that Meade had played favorites in command assignments. Doubleday in particular was bitter that Meade had ignored army seniority and not promoted him to command of the 1st Corps after its commander, Maj. Gen. John Reynolds, was killed early on July 1—instead choosing Maj. Gen. John Newton as Reynolds’ replacement.

b) Hooker’s Chief of Staff, Daniel Butterworth, who Meade kept on during the battle of Gettysburg (remember, he had just 3 days to prepare!). Butterfield, a close friend of Sickles’ and Hooker’s, falsely testified about the claimed July 2 order to retreat. Sickles elevated his attack on Meade when he (or a close associate) penned an anonymous article by “Historicus” in the March 12, 1864, edition of The New York Herald, the nation’s largest newspaper. Historicus condemned Meade’s handling of Gettysburg while praising the brave and brilliant Sickles. The article claimed Meade had ordered his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Butterfield, to prepare an order of retreat on July 2, the battle’s second day. The Historicus piece set off a firestorm, and stories of Meade’s alleged inadequacies appeared in papers nationwide.

The Joint Committee’s Radical Republicans wanted “Fighting Joe” Hooker back in command of the Army of the Potomac. The committee’s leaders, Chairman Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, demanded Lincoln dismiss Meade even before he had an opportunity to testify. President Lincoln declined to order a Court of Inquiry. The president wanted Meade fighting Confederates, not a political conflict against a fellow general.

The Fall 1863 Campaigns

After the Battle of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee retreated back across the Potomac River to Virginia and concentrated behind the Rapidan River.  Early in September 1863, Lee dispatched two divisions of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's Corps to reinforce the Confederate Army of Tennessee for the Battle of Chickamauga. Meade knew that Lee had been weakened by the departure of Longstreet and wanted to take advantage. Meade advanced his army to the Rappahannock River in August, and on September 13 he moved the AoP forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan. Lee was occupying Culpeper, Virginia, following the Battle of Culpeper Court House. Meade planned to use his numerical superiority in a broad turning movement, similar to the one planned by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker in the Battle of Chancellorsville that spring.

A traditional interpretation of this campaign is that Lee, despite having lost Longstreet’s Corps to the west, nevertheless beat Meade in the Bristoe Campaign. The reality is that on September 24 the Union split its forces as well, sending the XI and XII Corps to the Chattanooga campaign in Tennessee. It is interesting that this critical fact is rarely mentioned. Instead, the importance of Bristoe is nearly always depreciated. Its failure is often portrayed as the reason Grant was brought east, because its shows Meade to be too conservative to win.

In fact, four battles took place: Auburn, Bristoe Station, Buckland Mills, and Rappahannock Station. Every one of these is south of Manassas. Two are not far from Chancellorsville and the location of the Wilderness.

Lee knew of the departing Union corps, and early in October he began an offensive sweep around Cedar Mountain with his remaining two corps, attempting to turn Meade's right flank. Meade, despite having superior numbers, did not wish to give battle in a position that did not offer him the advantage and ordered a withdrawal along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

Lee had been planning to go into winter quarters at Culpepper. Instead, he set up south of the Rapidan. In fact, the AoP occupied  Brandy Station and Culpepper that winter. Meade had escaped allowing a major battle in a disadvantageous location and Lee had lost ground. It was certainly inconclusive – because Meade saw the danger.

Lincoln and Stanton weren’t mollified by the lack of progress in the Bristoe Campaign and pressured Meade to do more. Meade responded by planning a march to strike the ANV south of the Rapidan. He had intelligence suggesting that Lee had made a miscalculation in his positioning. But an incredibly incompetent Union general and an outrageously courageous movement by a Confederate general saved the ANV after a brief but deadly conflict few appreciate. Traditional history suggests Meade was incompetent and ignores this action as having any importance, which is completely wrong: he almost had Lee trapped.

Meade actually planned a rapid movement just west of Chancellorsville and where the Wilderness would be the next Spring. In fact, the Union movements were in the same general vicinity.

Unfortunately, Maj. Gen. William H. French's III Corps got mired in fording the river at Jacob's Ford, causing traffic jams when they moved their artillery to Germanna Ford, where other units were attempting to cross.

Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division was marching along the Raccoon Ford Road to join Early when the head of Gen. French's III Corps made contact in the heavy wooded terrain along the Widow Morris Road. Johnson turned his division about and ordered what can only be described as a reckless double-envelopment assault against a mostly unseen enemy of unknown strength, throwing his 5,500 men against French and John Sedgwick's VI Corps (a combined 32,000).  The fact is, if Johnson had cleared the Widow Morris Road before the arrival of French and Sedgwick, or had been driven away in defeat, the 32,000 Federals could have marched behind Lee's left flank and into his rear.

This battle is called the Battle of Payne’s Farm. Theodore P. Savas, together with Paul Sacra of Richmond, Virginia, set out to locate and map the Payne's Farm battlefield in the early 1990s. Savas believed published articles and books had incorrectly located the fighting area and was determined to test his theory. Armed with extensive primary sources and battle reports, he and Sacra located what they believed was the field and, with the permission from several landowners, used metal detectors to prove it. Within a couple days Savas and Sacra had unearthed hundreds of artifacts, including bullets, a ramrod, bayonet socket, a partial harmonica, belt buckles, buttons, and much more.

Overland Campaign

Often in the telling of Grant’s brilliant strategy of 1864 and the Overland Campaign, one gets the impression that Meade had been so incompetent that he was starting almost from Washington, but the fact is, in early 1864, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia faced each other across the Rapidan River. It was there because Meade had placed it there, and had fought for it to be there.

In the spring of 1864 Meade’s authority was superseded by the appointment of Ulysses S. Grant as general-in-chief of all Union armies. Although he was still technically the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Meade acted as Grant’s subordinate for the rest of the war.

In this capacity, Meade participated in Grant’s aggressive Overland Campaign of 1864, in which the Union army absorbed staggering casualties. Meade took part in in the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. He was also instrumental in the prolonged Siege of Petersburg (June 1864-March 1865), which was launched after Meade’s early assaults on the city resulted in heavy Union casualties.

Meade and Grant

In 1864, Grant was appointed as the overall commander of the Union armies and placed his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Meade. Grant had a high regard for Meade's military abilities and acknowledged his successes, but there were instances where their working dynamics faced challenges.

Grant and Meade had a complex working relationship. Initially, there were some tensions and miscommunications between the two, but over time they developed a professional rapport and worked together effectively.

Meade sometimes felt that Grant did not fully appreciate his contributions and achievements. There were instances where the press assigned to the Army of the Potomac focused more on Grant's role in successes, while downplaying Meade's contributions. This caused frustration for Meade, as he felt he was not given the credit he deserved.

Despite occasional disagreements, Grant and Meade maintained a functional working relationship. They shared the goal of winning the war and coordinated their efforts to achieve military success.

Grant made his headquarters with Meade for the remainder of the war. Following an incident in June 1864, Meade disciplined reporter Edward Cropsey from The Philadelphia Inquirer. He falsely reported that  Meade had wanted to retreat after the Battle of the Wilderness. All of the press assigned to the AoP agreed to mention Meade only in conjunction with setbacks. Meade apparently knew nothing of this arrangement, and the reporters giving all of the credit to Grant angered Meade.

Meade wrote to his wife:

“I had a visit today from General Grant, who was the first to tell me of the attack in the Times based upon my order expelling two correspondents. Grant expressed himself very much annoyed at the injustice done to me, which he said was glaring, because my order distinctly states that it was by his direction that these men were prohibited from remaining with the army. He acknowledged there was an evident intention to hold me accountable for all that was condemned and to praise him for all that was commendable.”

Nevertheless, Meade is frequently blamed for specific problems in the Overland Campaign. As the fighting reached Cold Harbor and Petersburg, Meade is blamed for not directing his men to scout properly prior to the former battle and failed to coordinate his corps properly in the opening stages of the latter. During the siege of Petersburg, Meade again erred altering the attack plan for the Battle of the Crater for political reasons. But it is known that Grant approved these plans.

Grant issued orders to Meade who in turn issued them to the army. 

Meade, despite his aggressive performance in lesser commands in 1862, had become a more cautious general and more concerned about the futility of attacking entrenched positions. Most of the bloody repulses his army suffered in the Overland Campaign were ordered by Grant, although the aggressive maneuvering that eventually cornered Lee in the trenches around Petersburg were Grant's initiative as well.

Without question, Grant’s strategy won the war. Without doubt, Grant made the tough decisions and took the criticism of the heavy casualties.  But it was Meade who made Grant’s strategic plan a reality, being the commander who positioned his army to operationalize Grant’s vision.

Conclusion

General Meade was a thorough, methodical man as would be expected of a professional military man and engineer.

What do you think of the General George Meade? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Suggested Reading

  • Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005.

  • Nugent M, Petruzzi JD, Wittenberg EJ. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 - 14, 1863. Savas Beattiem 2011.

  • Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. Morningside Bookshop, 1979.

  • Sears, Steven W. Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

  • Woodruff, Joshua D. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1083715