The First Great Battle of the U.S. Civil War’s Western Theater: Shiloh Part 2

The Battle of Shiloh (April 6–7, 1862) almost ended Generals Grant and Sherman's careers. Instead, it is considered their first great victory, a testament to their tenacity and determination.

During the chaotic first day, several Union generals played critical roles in holding defensive positions or delaying the Confederate advance. These efforts helped prevent a total collapse of the Union army and bought time for General Ulysses S. Grant to establish a stronger defensive line near Pittsburg Landing.

Lloyd W Klein here looks at how the battle ended in the final part of the series. Part 1 is here.

Ulysses S. Grant.

Important Union Contributions:

·       Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss who commanded the 6th Division in the Union center. He was a critical first responder given that his was the most forward division. He would then move to the Hornet’s Nest.

·       Major General John A. McClernand who commanded the 1st Division on the Union right flank. McClernand’s division faced some of the heaviest fighting early in the day as the Confederates launched their surprise attack. Despite being pushed back, McClernand’s forces fought stubbornly, slowing the Confederate advance and preventing an early collapse of the Union right flank.

·       Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut, who commanded the 4th Division.

Hurlbut’s division held a defensive position near the Union left flank, covering the approach to Pittsburg Landing.. His troops absorbed significant Confederate pressure and played a key role in protecting the Union army’s retreat and regrouping efforts.

Important Confederate Contributions:

·       Major General Braxton Bragg, commander of a Confederate corps, whose aggressive leadership helped drive the Confederate advance early in the battle. He coordinated several assaults on key Union positions, including the Hornet’s Nest, which was crucial in breaking Union resistance in the center. Bragg’s relentless pressure contributed to the Union army’s retreat toward Pittsburg Landing.

·       Major General William J. Hardee, who commanded the lead Confederate corps.

Hardee’s corps spearheaded the initial Confederate assault at dawn, achieving significant success in surprising and overwhelming the Union front lines. His leadership was instrumental in the early Confederate momentum, driving Union forces back several miles.

·       Major General Leonidas Polk who commanded of a Confederate corps. Polk’s corps provided critical support during the Confederate attacks on the Union right flank. While his contributions were solid, Polk’s performance was less decisive compared to Bragg and Hardee. who were instrumental in executing the Confederate attacks, particularly in the early phases of the battle, and their actions shaped the battlefield dynamics.

Hornet’s Nest

A key defensive stand occurred at an area later known as the Hornet’s Nest, where Union forces under Prentiss and Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace held off repeated Confederate assaults for several hours. This resistance bought critical time for Grant to organize a defensive line near Pittsburg Landing. The Hornet’s Nest was a name given to the area of the Shiloh battlefield where Confederate troops made repeated attacks against Union positions along a small, little-used farm road.. Southern soldiers said the zipping bullets sounded like angry hornets; according to tradition, one man said, "It’s a hornet’s nest in there."

The narrow farm road ambles generally southeast from its junction with the Eastern Corinth Road (Corinth-Pittsburgh Road). Fairly level toward its northwest end, it makes a rather sharp climb up a hill near its center, descending again near the William Manse George cabin and the Peach Orchard. That hill, where Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss commanded an ad hoc group of regiments, comprises the area of the Hornet’s Nest. To Wallace’s right was a division of Federals under Brig. Gen. W.H. L. Wallace, and to his left was another division under Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut. Wallace held a position stretching along the farm road from the Eastern Cornith Road and up the slope to where Prentiss’s line began. Wallace’s men were in a deep ravine on the east side of the farm road; that area is now known as the Sunken Road. Often, but erroneously, the positions of Wallace and Prentiss are lumped together as the Hornet’s Nest. Confusing matters further is the fact that as the farm road passes over the hill where Prentiss had his command, it is sunken for a portion of its 600-yard length there.

Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace commanded the 2nd Division. An Illinois volunteer soldier who was a lawyer in his civilian life, I believe a law partner at one time of Abraham Lincoln (they were friends, at least). Coolness under fire leading a brigade as a colonel at Fort Donelson had earned him a promotion to Brigadier General Wallace’s division also played a central role in defending the Hornet’s Nest, fighting alongside Prentiss’s men. Wallace was mortally wounded during the battle, but his leadership and the determination of his troops were crucial in holding the line for much of the day. Charles Ferguson Smith had been the division commander but developed a leg infection just prior to the battle. In fact, he died of it a couple of weeks later. General William HL Wallace took command, and ended up defending the Hornet’s Nest for 6 hours, eventually being killed there.

Wallace commanded the 2nd Division of the Army of the Tennessee. His division formed a critical part of the Union line, holding off repeated Confederate assaults. During the intense fighting in the late afternoon, Wallace was mortally wounded. A bullet struck him in the head as his troops were withdrawing from the Hornet’s Nest. He was left on the battlefield during the Union retreat but was later found alive by Union forces. Wallace was taken to a field hospital, but his injuries were too severe. He died on April 10, 1862, four days after the battle. His death was a significant loss to the Union army, as he was a respected and capable commander.

Benjamin Prentiss commanded the 6th Division of the Army of the Tennessee. Early on Day 1, his division bore the brunt of the Confederate surprise attack. Despite being initially driven back, Prentiss regrouped his forces and established a strong defensive position in the Hornet’s Nest, a dense thicket that became a focal point of the battle. Alongside W.H.L. Wallace, Prentiss held this position for hours, slowing the Confederate advance and buying time for Union forces to reorganize near Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss took full command of the position after Wallace was fatally wounded.  Late in the afternoon, after being surrounded and running low on ammunition, Prentiss and his remaining troops were forced to surrender. Prentiss was taken prisoner along with about 2,200 Union soldiers. Prentiss was held as a prisoner of war until he was exchanged in October 1862. His leadership at the Hornet’s Nest earned him recognition for his bravery, despite his capture.

The defense of the Hornet’s Nest by Prentiss and Wallace delayed the Confederate advance, preventing them from reaching Pittsburg Landing and potentially destroying the Union army on Day 1. While both men suffered tragic outcomes—Prentiss as a prisoner and Wallace from mortal wounds—their actions contributed significantly to the Union’s ability to regroup and ultimately win the battle on Day 2. The Confederate forces launched repeated attacks on this strong Union defensive position, but it took hours and significant effort to overcome it.  General Beauregard has been criticized for his conduct of this aspect of the battle because of the time delay it caused. He could have bypassed the Hornet’s Nest entirely and gone straight for Pittsburg Landing.

After the battle he was considered a hero, having held off the Confederate States Army long enough to allow General Grant to organize a counterattack and win the battle. Grant later played down Prentiss's role in the victory, possibly because of mutual dislike between the two generals. He was exchanged in October 1862.  Prentiss was promoted to major general and served on the court-martial board that convicted Fitz John Porter. His dissenting voice in the final vote damaged his political clout in the Army, and he resigned in 1863.

Colonel Randall L. Gibson commanded a brigade under Bragg. Gibson’s brigade launched multiple assaults on the Hornet’s Nest but was repelled repeatedly with heavy losses. His inability to break the Union line underscored the strength of the Union position and the difficulty of the Confederate task. While Gibson would go on to become a long-serving brigade commander with a solid service record, Braxton Bragg (the man who ordered the repeated charges) would fault him and bring him up on charges after the battle. He had graduated Yale as valedictorian, a member of Skull and Crossbones, and the son of a wealthy plantation owner.  An interesting factoid about Gibson is that his great-great-grandfather was a free man of color whose descendants were able to integrate into Louisiana's white society. He would go on to be the US Senator from Louisiana who was instrumental in ending Reconstruction.

An artillery barrage organized by the Ruggles Brigade ultimately caused the Union line to break and the Union line was broken with units heading to the rear. Ruggles' Battery, not an actual unit but a Napoleonic style Grand Battery collecting numerous artillery units under the direction of Confederate division commander Daniel Ruggles. Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles lined up eleven batteries of cannon (62 in all according to Ruggles, 53 according to other sources) and bombed the hell out of the Union troops for nearly an hour beginning at 4:30 PM on April 6th. At the time, this was the greatest concentration of artillery pieces on a North American battlefield.

An uncoordinated double envelopment was in progress. The Confederates eventually surrounded and overwhelmed the Hornet’s Nest, capturing Prentiss and many of his men. However, the delay proved crucial for the Union. Although Prentiss and most of his men were eventually surrounded and captured, their stubborn defense significantly delayed the Confederate advance, allowing Grant to organize a stronger line closer to Pittsburg Landing.

The Death of Albert Sidney Johnston

Johnston  personally led a critical charge during the afternoon, inspiring his troops and helping to push Union forces back. A bullet to the back of his knee killed Johnston, where the popliteal artery is located. This wound should not have resulted in death; a simple tourniquet would have been lifesaving. Unfortunately, the wound went unnoticed until too late.

The death of Albert Sidney Johnston of course was a major event in the war; the Confederate western theater never really found its general. Johnston was shot while leading a charge. Why the commanding general was doing this has been speculated about ever since. His losses at Fort Donelson and Henry, and the criticism following his abandoning Nashville certainly occupied his mind. Johnston was killed by a bullet to the back of his knee, where the popliteal artery is located. Unfortunately, the wound went unnoticed until too late because Johnston had received a wound to that leg in the Mexican War, decreasing his sensation. Meanwhile, the bleeding became severe and filled his boot with blood. Essentially he exsanguinated on the field from what ought to have been a non-fatal wound. This wound should not have resulted in death; a simple tourniquet would have been lifesaving.

Lew Wallace

A casualty of a different kind was the Union general Lew Wallace. Wallace took a road that was correct if the lines were where they had been at the start of the day but by the time he arrived, those lines were pushed back and so Wallace was behind enemy lines. Thus, he had to countermarch. He never did arrive on day 1 but he was very effective on day 2. Grant never really forgave him; only in his autobiography, after Wallace died, did Grant recognize that he had misinterpreted the situation. Wallace spent years trying to make up for the supposed error, a theme he used in his famous novel Ben Hur.

Lew Wallace is one of the most interesting men who came out of the war, and we have done extensive challenges on almost every aspect of his life. The nature of the misunderstanding that would change his life forever occurred in a flash: at Crump’s Landing, Grant verbally ordered Wallace to the battlefield but didn’t clearly specify what road to take. Wallace ended up on the wrong one (see map). He never did arrive on day 1 (until 7 pm) and Grant never really forgave him. I have read Wallace’s autobiography, and Grant’s Battles and Leaders article and of course his Memoirs.  It all seems like a mix-up of the kind the fog of war will inevitably produce, and way too complicated to review here. Unquestionably, Grant tried to blame Wallace for his day 1 mishaps for many years. Only in his autobiography, after Wallace died, after the wife of the other General Wallace, Mrs. WHL Wallace, sent Grant information that bore out Lew Wallace’s explanation, did Grant recognize that he had misinterpreted the situation. Wallace spent years trying to make up for the supposed error, which was not really his fault, a theme he used in his famous novel Ben Hur. In the interim, Wallace saved Washington DC at the Battle of Monocacy, served as governor of New Mexico territory, and diplomat to the Ottoman Empire. Ben Hur became one of the best sellers of the century, making Wallace a wealthy man, so he did quite well for himself despite it all. He is one of my favorite Civil War characters. And we are not done with him here either.

Evening

Grant’s back was to the river; he could have been entirely destroyed. His defense at Pittsburg Landing in the afternoon of day 1 saved his army. By evening, Grant had established a strong defensive line near Pittsburg Landing, supported by artillery and the Tennessee River. The presence of Union gunboats added firepower, repelling further Confederate advances.  Generals Hurlbut and McClernand contributed to this final defensive stand, ensuring the Union army survived the first day of battle.

General Beauregard, confident in the day’s success, decided to halt the attack for the night, believing the Union army was on the verge of collapse. However, this decision allowed Grant to regroup and prepare for a counterattack.

The first day of Shiloh was chaotic and bloody, with heavy casualties on both sides.

The Confederates had pushed the Union forces back significantly but failed to achieve total victory.  The ferocity of the fighting on Day 1 shocked both sides and marked Shiloh as one of the war’s most brutal battles.

That night, reinforcements from Buell’s Army of the Ohio began arriving, giving Grant the strength to launch a counteroffensive on April 7.

Sherman commanded 5th Division, which was stationed at Shiloh Church on the Union right flank. His division was among the first to face the Confederate onslaught.  Despite being surprised and initially overwhelmed, Sherman quickly rallied his troops and organized a defense to slow the Confederate advance. His division absorbed significant pressure, buying time for other Union units to organize and retreat toward Pittsburg Landing.

Shiloh was quite possibly Sherman's best day of combat command during the war.  After being wounded in Rea Field, he galloped back to his camps and got his brigades in line (some were already up and forming) along a ridge overlooking a creek (variously know as Shiloh Branch, Rhea Creek, or Rea Creek).  He was able to hang on here (joined by one brigade from McClernand on his left) from 7 a.m. until 9:30 or so, repelling a series of uncoordinated single-brigade attacks from four Confederate brigades.  Eventually the position was flanked on the left, and Sherman and McClernand fell back to the Hamburg-Purdy Road.  Between 10:30 and 11:30, this position was attacked by a force that one source characterized as "two-thirds of the Confederate army" and driven back to Jones Field.  Sherman and McClernand then carried out the only Federal counterattack of the day, driving the enemy back before losing steam and retiring back to Jones Field in the early afternoon.  In the middle of the afternoon they retired further, across Tilghman Branch..

Sherman demonstrated remarkable composure under fire, personally leading counterattacks and encouraging his men despite being wounded in the hand and shoulder. His ability to maintain discipline and inspire confidence among his troops helped prevent a total rout of the Union right flank. Sherman worked closely with McClernand, whose division was positioned near his own, to establish a series of defensive lines as they fell back under Confederate pressure. Their combined efforts helped slow the Confederate advance and delayed a complete Union collapse.

As the Union forces were pushed back toward Pittsburg Landing, Sherman played a key role in organizing the final defensive line. His leadership ensured that his battered division held its position, contributing to the Union army’s survival at the end of the first day.

Sherman’s ability to rally his troops under chaotic and dire circumstances demonstrated his leadership skills and earned him forever the trust of General Grant. His actions at Shiloh marked a turning point in his career, proving his capability as a battlefield commander. Grant later praised Sherman’s performance, calling him one of the key figures in preventing the Union army from being destroyed on the first day of the battle.

When Sherman arrived at Grant’s headquarters later that evening, he found the general chewing on a soggy cigar in the rain, which had begun soaking the battlefield. ‘Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?’ ‘Yes,’ replied Grant, ‘lick ’em tomorrow, though.’

After making a brief attempt to assail Grant's line behind Dill Creek Branch they retired to the Federal camps for the night.  Polk took his Corps back to their own camps of the previous night; which did not help the Confederate effort on the 7th. They slept on their arms. All of the brigades were entangled and exhausted. Command and control had become weak during the afternoon for this reason. Beauregard had thrown in all of his men, there were no reserve units now. He expected the next morning to be a mop-up operation. He did not anticipate Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio arrival, nor Lew Wallace’s division., which was now on the field. The Confederate lines had become confused and now they were outnumbered. A dispatch from Colonel Benjamin Hardin Helm led Beauregard to believe that Buell was en route to Decatur, Ala., away from Grant’s army. The report was entirely inaccurate, but Beauregard believed it. Cavalry Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest had observed Buell’s men crossing the river by ferry. He frantically tried to warn Beauregard, but was unable to locate the Confederate commander.

Lew Wallace arrived on the right between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.  On the left, Nelson's Division of Buell's Army was just beginning to cross as the Confederates made their final effort, and finished by 9:00 p.m.  Crittenden was in place by 1:00 a.m., and McCook followed after that. Buell arrived that same evening with nearly 20,000 men. Wallace’s division, consisting of about 5,800 men, was well-rested and unscathed from the previous day’s fighting. These reinforcements completely changed the balance of forces, but Beauregard didn’t know it was happening.

The Battle – Day 2

The fortunes of Day 2 went the opposite way. Beauregard’s men were entangled and exhausted. Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio arrived. But so did Lew Wallace’s division.

General P.G.T. Beauregard had effectively managed the Confederate forces after Johnston’s death, but his decision to halt the attack on the evening of April 6 had significant consequences. He believed the Union army was defeated and delayed further attacks until the next day, giving Grant time to regroup and receive reinforcements.

Overnight, Union reinforcements under General Don Carlos Buell and Lew Wallace arrived, significantly bolstering Union forces. Early on April 7, Union forces launched a coordinated counterattack against the Confederate army, which had been exhausted from the previous day’s fighting. Confederate troops, under General P.G.T. Beauregard (put up stiff resistance but were gradually pushed back.

After failing to reach the battlefield in time on Day 1 due to miscommunication and delays, Wallace’s troops arrived fully intact and ready for action, making a significant contribution to the Union counteroffensive.  His troops were positioned on the Union right flank, where they attacked the Confederate left, putting additional pressure on the exhausted Southern forces. Wallace’s division executed a coordinated attack with other Union forces, pushing the Confederate left flank back. This disrupted the Confederate defensive lines and contributed to their eventual retreat. His troops were instrumental in recapturing ground lost on Day 1, helping secure Union control of the battlefield. Wallace’s arrival helped General Ulysses S. Grant execute a unified counteroffensive across the entire front. Wallace’s division worked in conjunction with Buell’s reinforcements and other Union divisions to overwhelm the Confederates.

The Union counterattacked the morning of day 2. Sherman’s division participated in the Union counteroffensive, helping to drive the Confederate forces back. His troops, though exhausted and bloodied from the previous day’s fighting, played a significant role in regaining lost ground and securing a Union victory. The Union army recaptured lost ground, including areas around Pittsburg Landing. .By afternoon, the Confederate forces, realizing they were outnumbered and outmaneuvered, began retreating toward Corinth, Mississippi.

The Confederate lines had become confused the day before and now they were outnumbered. The Union now had the advantage and pushed the lines back completely beyond where the battle lines had been before the fighting began.

Buell met with Sherman at sunset, and learned that Grant planned to attack at sunrise. An understanding was made that Grant would have the west side of the line, while Buell would plan his own attack on the east side. General Don Carlos Buell’s troops made a critical contribution, no doubt. His added reinforcements helped ensure a Union victory on the battle’s second day when a massive Union counterattack routed Confederate forces. Buell’s soldiers played a key role in the Union counterattack. They attacked the Confederate right flank, forcing the Confederates to stretch their already exhausted lines. This pressure, combined with attacks from other Union forces, gradually drove the Confederates back. Buell’s troops helped stabilize the Union’s left flank, which had been vulnerable on Day 1.Their presence allowed Grant to organize a coordinated assault across the entire line, rather than focusing solely on defense. The fresh energy and discipline of Buell’s troops were instrumental in breaking the Confederate resistance. By mid-afternoon, their efforts contributed to forcing the Confederates into a full retreat, ensuring a Union victory. Buell’s timely arrival and the effectiveness of his troops underscored the importance of reinforcements in Civil War battles, where exhaustion and attrition often determined the outcome. General Buell would later insist that he deserved credit for turning the tide at Shiloh, while others—in particular Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman—argued that his troops ultimately had little effect on the outcome. In summary, both Grant’s and Buell’s armies made important contributions on day 2.

Could Beauregard have won day 2 if he had prepared differently? For many years, this was the conclusion of many historians. Modern historians, such as Cunningham and Daniel, disagree with that assessment. Cunningham wrote that Beauregard's critics ignore "the existing situation on the Shiloh battlefield"—including Confederate disorganization, time before sunset, and Grant's strong position augmented by gunboats. Daniel wrote that the thought that "the Confederates could have permanently breached or pulverized the Federal line in an additional hour or so of piecemeal night assaults simply lacks plausibility." He mentions that it took the Confederates six hours to conquer the Hornet's Nest, and Grant's Last Line was a stronger position. He also cites exhaustion, and low ammunition. Dill Creek Branch would have been a formidable position to capture by tired troops. On April 7, Beauregard attempted to continue offensive operations, but his troops were outnumbered, exhausted, and lacked reinforcements. Recognizing the arrival of Union reinforcements, Beauregard could have shifted to a defensive posture, fortifying positions and conserving his forces for a controlled retreat. This might have minimized casualties and preserved his army for future campaigns. On day 2, the Confederates were outnumbered but had they entrenched and set up a defensive perimeter, they might well have held off the Union counterattack. Beauregard could have ordered a relentless night attack to exploit the disarray in the Union lines. While risky due to exhaustion and poor visibility, this might have prevented Union reinforcements (Buell’s and Wallace’s troops) from stabilizing the Union position overnight. Confederate cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest was underutilized during the battle, particularly for reconnaissance and disrupting Union reinforcements. Beauregard could have deployed cavalry more aggressively to harass Buell’s approaching forces or cut off the Union supply lines to Pittsburg Landing. This could have delayed or weakened the Union counteroffensive on Day 2. He could have anticipated Buell’s arrival and adjusted his strategy accordingly, perhaps by retreating under cover of darkness on April 6 to avoid being outflanked and overwhelmed. Finally, his single road route from Corinth was problematic logistically, as ammunition would become depleted.

The Aftermath

Beauregard retreated from the field in the late afternoon and returned to Corinth. The Union Army had recovered all of the ground it had lost on day 1 and swept the field on day 2. Grant did not pursue, in part because his own army was in disarray but also because General Halleck would not allow it. Both sides suffered significant losses, with over 23,000 combined casualties, making Shiloh one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War up to that point. The Union army claimed victory, though at a heavy cost.

The Union had 63,000 men engaged, with 13,000 casualties (1754 killed, 8400 wounded, 2900 captured vs. the Confederates with 40-45,000 men with 10,700 casualties (1728 killed, 8000 wounded, 1000 captured). The Union therefore had more casualties, but on a percentage basis, a slightly lower rate of casualties. The battle demonstrated the brutality of the war and marked a turning point in the Western Theater, giving the Union control of key regions in Tennessee. “Scareder than I was at Shiloh” The battle remains famous for the brutal fighting, the high casualties on both sides, and the evidence that the war was going to be a long one. At that time, this battle had more American casualties than every prior war combined! Yet by the end of the war, this battle barely made the top ten list.

General Grant initially was the recipient of an outpouring of public support at first, hailed as a hero of a great battle. The perception of Grant as a drunkard was utilized to explain the horrific losses suffered at the Battle of Shiloh by officers jealous of Grant’s rapid rise. Newspaper reports critical of Grant’s command were intended to increase sales, if not influence the political debate, after the shocking casualties of that bloody battle. Shocked by the casualties of what, up to that point, was the war’s bloodiest battle, newspaper reporters wrote articles critical of Grant’s command. These criticisms fed the rumors that Grant, who many believed had been forced out of the pre-war Army because of alcohol consumption, had been caught drunk and off guard by Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston’s surprise attack. The losses suffered by both sides at Shiloh had more to do with the nature of nineteenth-century warfare than the nature of Grant’s relationship with liquor, but rumors of his affection for spirits now became generally accepted.

Whitelaw Reid, Cincinnati Gazette, reported the events of the battle incorrectly, stating that Grant had been taken by surprise at Shiloh and that soldiers had been bayonetted in their tents. This myth persists to this day.  The high casualty rate at Shiloh was related to the intensity of the battle, not the nature of Grant’s problems with liquor, but rumors of his drinking increased.

Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing on April 11 and took personal command—as he had planned earlier. On April 30, he named Grant as his second-in-command. This was a meaningless position, but Halleck's solution to the Grant criticism was a de facto suspension that satisfied the critics. Some of the more "savage denunciations" of Grant came from politicians representing Ohio and Iowa. One politician complained to Lincoln, saying Grant was an incompetent drunk that was a political liability. Lincoln's response was "I can't spare this man; he fights."

On April 8, Confederate President Jefferson Davis reported to the Confederate congress that Johnston had gained a complete victory. A last-minute addition to his speech mentioned Johnston's death. Before the battle, the public had wanted Johnston removed because of the loss of most of Tennessee. Now he was a hero. Over the next few days, more information about the battle became available. The initial perception was that only "untoward events" had saved the Union army from destruction, and the withdrawal to Corinth was part of a strategic plan. Eventually, critics began to blame Beauregard for the defeat, citing the lack of a twilight attack on the first day of the battle.

The perception of Grant as a drunkard was utilized to explain the horrific losses suffered at the Battle of Shiloh by officers jealous of Grant’s rapid rise. Newspaper reports  critical of Grant’s command were intended to increase sales, if not influence the political debate, after the shocking casualties of that bloody battle. Shocked by the casualties of what up to that point was the war’s bloodiest battle, newspaper reporters wrote articles critical of Grant’s command. These criticisms fed the rumors that Grant, who many believed had been forced out of the pre-war Army because of alcohol consumption, had been caught drunk and off guard by Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston’s surprise attack. The losses suffered by both sides at Shiloh had more to do with the nature of nineteenth-century warfare than the nature of Grant’s relationship with liquor, but rumors of his affection for spirits now became generally accepted.

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Further Reading

·       Daniel, Larry J. (1997). Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. New York City: Simon & Schuster.

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       Ulysses S Grant, The Autobiography of General Ulysses S Grant: Memoirs of the Civil War. Accessed at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4367/4367-h/4367-h.htm

·       William T Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. Accessed at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4361/4361-h/4361-h.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/shiloh

·       http://www.npshistory.com/publications/civil_war_series/22/sec11.htm

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-shiloh-the-devils-own-day/

·       https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-shiloh/

·       https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/was-general-grant-surprised-by-the-confederate-attack-at-shiloh.htm

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/battle-shiloh-shattering-myths

What Happened at the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness in the US Civil War?

The first battle of the Overland Campaign, known as The Battle of the Wilderness, occurred from May 5-7, 1864. General Grant devised a strategic plan to have all Union armies attack simultaneously, preventing General Lee from transferring troops and resources between theaters as he had done in 1863.He would also have all of the eastern armies move toward Richmond: General Butler from the southeast, and General Sigel from the west. Grant recognized that President Lincoln needed concrete evidence of a victorious war in order to secure re-election, so he assured him that regardless of the battle's outcome, he would not retreat. Although only General Sherman managed to execute a successful simultaneous offensive campaign, it proved sufficient to achieve the desired outcome of Grant's plan.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major-General Wadsworth fighting in the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness

Situated south of the Rapidan River in Virginia, The Wilderness encompasses parts of Spotsylvania County and Orange County. Its boundaries extend to Spotsylvania Court House in the south and the Mine Run tributary of the Rapidan River in the west. This densely forested region consists of numerous trees and secondary growths, rendering visibility nearly impossible even to this day. Additionally, the dirt roads within the area were particularly treacherous when wet, making it extremely challenging to coordinate command and control as well as large troop movements.

Grant decided to to establish his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Major General George G. Meade. While Grant focused on overall strategy, Meade assumed responsibility for tactical matters. The battle unfolded just a few miles west of the Chancellorsville battle site,

The Strategy

In the early months of 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in a standoff along the Rapidan River in central Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate forces, was well aware of the numerical and technological superiority of the Union army led by General Ulysses S. Grant. In order to mitigate these disadvantages, Lee strategically chose the Wilderness, a densely wooded area, as the battleground. This terrain would limit the effectiveness of Grant's artillery and provide cover for the smaller Confederate force. Lee positioned his troops behind earthworks along the Rapidan River, with the intention of bringing reinforcements from the rear if necessary. Additionally, Lee's cavalry, under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart, patrolled the surrounding countryside to gather intelligence on Grant's movements. 

Grant was fully aware of Lee's defensive strategy and his intention to defend Richmond, the Confederate capital. Rather than attempting to outmaneuver Lee, Grant devised a plan to push his army through the challenging forested terrain and into open ground as quickly as possible. His ultimate objective was to capture Richmond and bring an end to the war. Grant understood that time was of the essence and aimed to advance relentlessly until he reached his goal.

Both generals were keenly aware of each other's intentions and strategies. Lee relied on his scouts and cavalry to provide timely information about Grant's movements, while Grant aimed to swiftly maneuver his army towards Richmond. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation between the Union and Confederate forces in the heart of Virginia.

The Union Army commenced its movement from its base in Culpeper County, where it had concluded its operations at Mine Run the previous fall, and proceeded southward towards the fords of the Rapidan River. At daybreak on May 4, Union cavalry successfully crossed Germanna Ford, dispersing Confederate cavalry pickets and facilitating the construction of two pontoon bridges by Union engineers. Subsequently, General Gouverneur K. Warren's Fifth Corps crossed the ford and ventured into the thick woodland. General Lee had anticipated that General Grant would employ the Germanna and Ely Fords. Grant followed this anticipated course of action relying on speed rather than stealth. However, the advance of some Union units was slow, resulting in the creation of gaps. These occurrences provided Lee with an advantageous position at the outset.

Day 1: May 5

Meade, his commander, instructed Warren to strike the Confederates first, but Warren hesitated due to concerns about attacking the impenetrable thickets. He anticipated difficulties in maintaining a battle line and believed that a piecemeal movement would negate his numerical superiority. While Warren and Meade debated the advantages of an attack along the Orange Turnpike, General Richard S. Ewell's Confederate corps halted three miles west of Wilderness Tavern and constructed formidable earthworks on the western edge of Saunders Field. Reluctantly, Warren positioned his corps astride the turnpike.

Saunders Field, a 50-acre clearing near the Orange Turnpike, stood out amidst the forested surroundings. When Ewell encountered the Union Army, his orders were to engage the enemy and impede their progress, but to avoid a full-scale battle until Longstreet's corps arrived the next day. Ewell positioned his corps across the turnpike along the higher, western edge of the field, providing his troops with a clear field of fire.

As Warren emerged from the woods and entered the field, he was met by Ewell's waiting troops who initially held the advantage. Despite heavy casualties, the Federals managed a momentary breakthrough, but Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade swiftly sealed the breach. The arrival of the Union Sixth Corps expanded the front, resulting in further casualties.

Soon after, Union Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford observed another enemy column at the William Chewning farm headed east on the Orange Plank Road toward its intersection with Brock Road. Due to the limited maneuverability in the area, the crossroads of these two main roads became the focal point of the Union's defensive line. The significance of this intersection is depicted in the accompanying photograph. The potential threat posed by the Confederates was grave, as their occupation of this area could have effectively divided Warren's corps on the turnpike from Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps, which had moved further south after passing Warren. Recognizing the urgency, Meade promptly dispatched Brig. Gen. George W. Getty's Sixth Corps division to seize control of the crossroads. Around 4:00 p.m., Getty's men launched an attack, forcefully advancing through the dense thickets and engaging in close-range combat against Gen. A.P. Hill's corps. Hancock soon arrived to provide support to Getty's forces, and the battle continued until nightfall.

The conditions under which the soldiers fought were extraordinarily challenging. Visibility was severely limited, with a range of no more than 50 feet. This made it impossible to effectively communicate and issue commands. Both sides struggled to maintain a coherent line, often breaking up into smaller groups. The dense underbrush and thorny briars caused numerous scratches to the soldiers' faces and tore their clothing. The smoke generated by gunpowder further hindered their vision, while fires ignited by exploding shells rapidly spread through the dry woods, transforming the Wilderness into a blazing inferno for all the trapped troops. The unfavorable terrain greatly hindered the progress of the two-day battle, reducing it to a series of brutal skirmishes. Additionally, fires that started in the woods proved to be particularly devastating, claiming the lives of many wounded soldiers who were unable to be rescued.

Day 2: May 6

Hancock’s Federals resumed the offensive the next morning. A.P. Hill’s tired troops were forced back, and the Confederate line seemed on the verge of collapse. At this critical juncture, Brig. Gen. John Gregg's Texas Brigade from Gen. James Longstreet's corps arrived just in the nick of time. Longstreet's timely entrance onto the battlefield prevented a potential disaster and immediately launched an attack on Hancock's corps. Two flank attacks—by Longstreet south of the Plank Road and by Gordon north of the turnpike –carried the line and forced the Union behind breastworks.

Longstreet's arrival after an arduous 28-mile march in a single day proved to be a pivotal moment for the Confederate army. His counterattack played a crucial role in saving the day. The nature of Longstreet's movement involved executing a flank attack on Hancock's left flank, utilizing an unfinished railroad bed located within a densely wooded forest. This strategic maneuver took advantage of the element of surprise, as the railroad bed was not marked on local maps. Longstreet's attack was meticulously planned and well-prepared, showcasing his tactical brilliance. By exploiting an old roadbed constructed for a defunct railroad, his forces were able to stealthily navigate through the heavily wooded area undetected, ultimately launching a powerful flanking assault.

Longstreet's men advanced along the Orange Plank Road, pursuing the Union II Corps. Within a span of two hours, their persistent assault nearly drove the II Corps from the field. Longstreet devised innovative tactics to overcome the challenging terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades using heavy skirmish lines. This approach allowed his troops to maintain a continuous barrage of fire on the enemy while simultaneously making themselves elusive targets. The effectiveness of Longstreet's flanking maneuver was evident in the words of Hancock himself, who, after the war, acknowledged the impact of Longstreet's tactics by stating, "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."

General Longstreet had returned to the ANV after being deployed the previous autumn in the Western Theater. Although he had hoped for an independent command, Despite his hopes for an independent command, his deployment in the Western Theater had not yielded the desired result. While his crucial attack at Chickamauga had showcased his military prowess, his subsequent failure to defeat Burnside at Knoxville and his ongoing disagreements with General Braxton Bragg had cast a shadow over his future prospects. General Lee had proposed that Longstreet join forces with Johnston and Beauregard for a joint offensive into Kentucky. However, Bragg, who had now assumed the role of Davis’s military advisor, swiftly rejected this proposition. Consequently, Longstreet found himself once again serving as a corps commander in Virginia.

As Lee's plan to utilize his 14,000 men as an attacking force had proven successful thus far, the next crucial step was to deliver a decisive attack. Longstreet attempted to identify the optimal location on a reconnaissance mission. However, his efforts were met with a tragic turn of events. The treacherous terrain posed numerous challenges, and it was amidst this difficult backdrop that Longstreet fell victim to friendly fire, sustaining severe wounds to his neck and shoulder. Despite being cautioned against proceeding further, his unwavering determination to strategize the winning attack propelled him forward. Tragically, this ill-fated mission resulted in the immediate death of General Micah Jenkins, who was struck in the head during the same ambush. Its an astounding coincidence that this happened just 4 miles down the road from where Stonewall Jackson was ambushed; this section of Wilderness is dark and silent, as shown in the photo.

Mahone’s 12th Virginia was returning to the Orange Plank Road when a brush fire caused them to take a different route that led them across the road in a different location than other members of their brigade. Longstreet and his staff, unknowingly, passed in the middle of Mahone’s men. In a tragic turn of events, a section of soldiers, either lying prone or kneeling, mistook the approaching figures for the enemy and opened fire. As a result, Jenkins, one of Longstreet's men, was fatally struck in the head, while two others also lost their lives.

In his memoirs, Longstreet describes the bullet as passing through his throat and right shoulder, causing his right arm to immediately go limp at his side. Despite the excruciating pain and the presence of blood in his mouth and throat, Longstreet managed to issue orders and communicate with a whispery voice. The conventional narrative suggests that the bullet entered from the front as Longstreet was riding towards his troops. However, this explanation fails to account for the long-term loss of movement in his arm and his persistent hoarseness. A more plausible explanation lies in the possibility of a nerve injury originating from his back, caused by the soldiers who were either kneeling or lying prone behind him. The bullet then passed through his throat as it exited, providing a more coherent explanation for the observed medical facts.

The coordination of attacks on the Union line along the Brock Road was hindered by Longstreet's inability to command. Despite advising Lee to continue the attack, Lee chose to delay the movement until his forces could be realigned. Unfortunately, this delay provided the Union defenders with ample time to reorganize and strengthen their position. As the Confederates moved forward through the heavy brush, their lack of cohesion became evident, and they encountered obstructions in front of the Union line. It was at this point that Hancock's experienced troops successfully halted the Confederate advance. Although the Confederates briefly gained a foothold and planted their flags on the burning works, the Union troops swiftly counterattacked and reclaimed their position.  According to General Alexander’s memoirs: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan."

On May 6th, AP Hill's corps, which had borne the brunt of the previous day's fighting, was not prepared for a repeat onslaught at dawn. Despite the advice of Generals Heth and Wilcox, Hill believed that Longstreet's presence on the field was necessary before he could continue the engagement. But Longstreet was late; when Hancock launched another attack, only Lt Col William Poague's artillery was holding the line, but it was beginning to falter. However, the entry of a Texas brigade from Longstreet's corps onto the field provided a glimmer of hope.

Knowing that a counterattack would save the day, Lee himself prepared to lead it but was stopped by the Texas men, who shouted “Lee to the rear”.

The potential destruction of AP Hill's corps might have occurred if General Ambrose Burnside had acted more swiftly upon receiving orders to advance. However, once again, Burnside failed to recognize the significance of the situation and did not launch an attack that could have altered the course of the battle.

Brig Gen John B Gordon's prominence within the Confederate command structure was solidified during this particular battle. On May 5, his brigade effectively counterattacked and repelled a Federal advance at Saunders Field. The following day, Gordon executed a highly successful flank attack, resulting in the capture of numerous Union soldiers and two Union generals. Although Gordon had initially proposed this maneuver at dawn, his superiors dismissed his suggestion. Positioned on the left flank of the Confederate line, Gordon's scouts informed him that his brigade extended well beyond the right end of the Union line. To confirm this report, Gordon personally conducted a reconnaissance. Eventually, Lee granted Gordon permission to launch his attack that afternoon. According to Gordon's memoirs, had he been authorized earlier, a flank attack could have enveloped the Union right flank. However, Generals Early and Ewell delayed due to incorrect intelligence suggesting that the Union IX Corps was reinforcing the area, and they were reluctant to engage with an outnumbered force.

The attack by Gordon gave rise to a couple of intriguing anecdotes of the war.  When a staff officer urged Grant to retreat, claiming that Lee would cut him off from the ford, Grant became angry, telling the officer that he was tired of always hearing what Lee was going to do.  He ordered the man to stop thinking about Lee and start thinking about what they were going to do.  It has also been rumored that the tough day of fighting caused Grant to become emotional that evening alone in his tent.

Day 3: May 7

Both opposing forces entrenched and awaited an attack from the other army. Having come close to breaking each other's lines the previous day, both armies seemed satisfied with adopting a defensive stance. Recognizing the futility of further assaults in the Wilderness, Grant issued orders for Meade's army to withdraw under the cover of darkness. Additionally, Grant instructed Union engineers to dismantle the pontoon bridges at Germanna Ford. Despite enduring heavy casualties over the course of two days of intense fighting, Grant made the decision not to launch another attack or retreat. Instead, he opted to swiftly proceed towards Spotsylvania Court House, effectively positioning himself between Richmond and Lee's army.

Implications

The Union army experienced nearly 18,000 casualties in the Wilderness, almost twice as many as Lee’s army. But Grant’s troops were not dispirited. Previous Union commanders, Hooker and Burnside, had chosen to retreat after sustaining significant losses in battles against Lee. Therefore, the continued advancement of Union troops brought a sense of jubilation among the Federal forces.

Who won the battle? This question is essentially unanswerable. Neither side left the battlefield in retreat. Both armies had a very high rate of casualties in just 48 hours (Union 15.0% with 17,666 (2,246 killed) of 118,00 engaged; Confederate 16.7% with 11,033 (1,477 killed) of 66,140 engaged). Tactically, it was probably a draw. Strategically, Grant was able to advance, but Lee had prevented him from reaching Richmond. Indecisive is probably the best descriptor.

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Further Reading

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/wilderness

·       Gordon C Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904.

·       Stecker, RM BlachleyJD. Arch Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg. 2000;126(3):353-359.https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaotolaryngology/fullarticle/404442

·       Steere  E The Wilderness Campaign.  Mechanicsburg, Pa Stackpole Books1960;

·       Longstreet  J From Manassas to Appomattox. 2nd ed. New York, NY Da Capo Press Inc, 1992.

·       Sorrel  GM Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer.  New York, NY Konecky & Konecky, 1994.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/lee-rear

The Second Battle of Fort Wagner and the 54th Massachusetts Regiment

The 160th anniversary of the Second Battle of Fort Wagner, in the US Civil War took place in July. As we look back, we remember the men who fought and died on Morris Island in South Carolina in this American Civil War engagement in July of 1863. Michael Thomas Leibrandt explains.

The Old Flag Never Touched the Ground by Rick Reeves. For the state of Massachusetts, 1863

Leading the Union attack was the 54th Massachusetts Regiment of Foot, one of the first African American regiments in the United States army; immortalized in a statue still seen today in Boston Common, and in Robert Lowell’s Centennial poem. The 54th was also the subject of the 1989 film “Glory” featuring Denzel Washington, Morgan Freeman, and Matthew Broderick.

The story and legacy of the 54th Massachusetts is one of the most enduring of any Union regiment from the Civil War. Here is why:

The Emancipation Proclamation authorized the formation of the 54th. Its formation was supported by famous Americans such at Frederick Douglass when its recruitment began in February of 1863. One of the men who was appointed to recruit was George Stephens, a military correspondent who assisted with the recruitment of men in Philadelphia and then joined the 54th Massachusetts as the rank of Sergeant.

The 54th was led by a member of a prominent Boston family. Chosen to lead the regiment was twenty-five year old Colonel Robert Gould Shaw.

After studying overseas in Europe, Shaw attended Harvard from 1856–1859. He was married in 1863 and was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in Company H of the 2nd Massachusetts Regiment. He served at the Battle of Antietam among other engagements. In early 1863, Captain Shaw’s father traveled to Virginia with the commission for his son to lead the 54th. The Captain was initially reluctant to take the commission, as he did not wish to leave his regiment.

The attack

The 54th Massachusetts led the Union advance on Fort Wagner. Constructed by the Confederacy in the summer of 1862 and named after Lt. Colonel Thomas M. Wagner, the fort was built to protect the southern end of Charleston Harbor. Fort Wagner was armed by fourteen cannons. Among them was a 10-Inch (250 mm) Columbiad, three 32 lb. Smooth-Bore Breech-Loading Cannons, a 42 lb. Corronade, a 10-inch Coast Mortar, and four 12-Pound Howitzers. Wagner was also protected by land mines buried in the sand dunes, a moat, and rows of abatis.

At 7:45 P.M., the 54th Massachusetts emerged and advanced up the beach. By the time that the 54th reached the parapet of Fort Wagner, they had devastating casualties. Among the 272 men lost from the regiment was Colonel Shaw, whose sword was stolen from his body immediately after the battle.

Wagner was never taken by Union forces until it was abandoned in late 1863. Today, much of the original defenses of Fort Wagner are under sea level. Periodically, a hurricane hits Charleston Harbor and unearths some Civil War artifacts or ordinance that sends the odd tourist running for cover. For years, inaccessibility to the island has kept the galant legend of the 54th Massachusetts buried under the sand.

The bravery of the 54th Massachusetts, however lives on today. In 2017, after being thought to be lost several times, Col. Shaw’s sword was discovered in a Boston attic. In 2008, the 54th was reactivated as part of the Massachusetts Army National Guard Ceremonial Unit and participated in President Obama’s 2008 Inauguration. The new unit is called the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment and provides military honors at funerals.

Many famed Union regiments have been chronicled in the Civil War. Few, however have storied histories that still attract interest today and no doubt will in the future like the 54th Massachusetts.

The descendants of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw donated his sword to the Massachusetts Historical Society for all to enjoy. The Confederacy buried Shaw’s body in a mass grave with his soldiers. After the war, the United States Army requested that Shaw’s body be exhumed and returned to his family. Colonel Shaw’s father would not allow it, saying “We can imagine no holier place than that in which he lies,” he wrote, “among his brave and devoted soldiers, nor wish for him better company-what a body-guard he has.”

Adding to the honor, legend, and glory of the 54th Massachusetts.

What do you think of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment? Let us know below.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, PA

A key US Civil War Battle in 1862: The Battle of Shiloh

The Battle of Shiloh in April 1862 is perhaps one of the most overlooked in its overall importance to the outcome of the US Civil War. In this article Curtis J. Smothers explains the battle and how it impacted the war.

The Battle of Shiloh. By Thure de Thulstrup.

The Battle of Shiloh was one of the bloodiest battle ever fought on US soil up to its time, with over 23,000 dead, 13,000 of whom were northerners. But the battle’s outcome had more far-reaching effects:

·       Shiloh nearly ruined the career of Union General U.S. Grant

·       The battle also cost the Confederacy one its best generals, Albert S. Johnston, who was shot in the leg while riding in the thick of battle

However, Shiloh’s importance lies in how it changed Grant's thinking and how it set the stage for Union domination of the Mississippi River, Grant’s going east and the eventual defeat of the Confederacy.

The sobering reality of the war to come

After Shiloh, Grant realized firsthand that the South would not be easily beaten. Before Shiloh, and based on his earlier easy victories at Fort Henry and Donelson, Grant had scant respect for the Confederate fighting spirit and ability. After the carnage and near defeat of his bivouacked, green Union troops, who ran from the hordes of yelling rebels and cowered by the river bluffs, Grant came to know what his subordinate and friend, William Tecumseh Sherman, knew: the war would last for years, and the South would have to be completely crushed.

Grant’s green troops bivouacked, but didn’t dig on

The Battle of Shiloh took place on the western bank of the Tennessee River, where Grant had ferried his nearly 50,000-man army to place called Pittsburg Landing. (Much of the bloodiest fighting took place around a church called "Shiloh," whose name, ironically, is derived from the Hebrew for "peace.") Grant's plans were to wait for reinforcement from General Don Carlos Buell and strike out at the Confederacy with his superior forces with the goal of capturing the major Confederate rail junction at Corinth, Mississippi. Grant, who was not prone to digging in or building entrenchments, figured his raw troops needed to be drilled and shaped up.

Confederates could have won

In the early morning hours of April 6, 1862, Grant was totally surprised by the Confederates, who overran Yankee camps that had failed to even post patrols.

In the ebb and flow of the battlefield on the first day, it was only through the lack of good tactical leadership, experience and good weaponry on the part of the Confederates that prevented a total Yankee defeat at Shiloh. Confederate General Johnston's biggest mistake was going to the battle front. He left orders to his subordinate Beauregard to stay behind and execute the battle plan of cutting off the Yankee retreat to the river, but Beauregard had a different plan, which was to run straight ahead and push the Yankees into the river. As Johnston bled to death after a leg wound, daylight waned and Confederate hopes of victory also died.

Beauregard decided to wait until the next day

The battle of the first day ended after Grant and Sherman rallied to stabilize the Yankee positions. Beauregard, however, figured that he had the better of Grant and would finish off the Yankees the next day. Beauregard also figured that he still outnumbered Grant, but Yankee General Buell's reinforcements arrived the next morning; and Grant's subordinate, General Lew Wallace (the man who wrote the epic Ben-Hur) whose division had taken the wrong road the day before, finally showed up for duty.

Fortunately for the Union, the second day of Shiloh saw a revitalized Yankee force and a massive counterattack that relentlessly pushed the depleted Southerners back towards Corinth, Mississippi.

Grant took a beating in the press, but Lincoln rehabilitated this fighting general

The battle was over, but the recriminations and controversy would continue. Beauregard would be vilified for not pressing his advantage at the end of the first day. Grant would take a beating in the northern press for the massive Union casualties, and would be relieved by General Halleck and demoted to a do-nothing second-in-command position.

In the end, though, Lincoln moved Halleck to Washington, D.C., and gave Grant back command in the West. (Lincoln recognized Grant as a fighter not prone to the "slows" like many other Union generals)

Grant would go on to amass an astonishing record of victories in the west that would culminate in the capture of Vicksburg that would split the Confederacy at the Mississippi. After victories in Tennessee, Grant would come east to eventually end the war. Sherman would go South and due east cutting a swath of destruction that would isolate and cripple the Confederacy. 

Shiloh forged a winning team

The victory of Shiloh solidified the relationship of Grant and Sherman and led them to a more realistic appreciation of the war. Likewise, all the principal victories of the North (out West) in 1863 and 1864 were made possible. If Johnston's Confederate forces won at Shiloh on April 6, the land-naval campaign against Vicksburg, the March to the Sea, and the Siege of Petersburg (below the Confederate capital) might not have occurred at all.

What do you think of the importance of the Battle of Shiloh? Let us know below.