The magnitude of the Patriot disaster at Penobscot Bay was fully realized when the bedraggled survivors staggered back into Boston. An armada of 44 ships carrying Massachusetts militiamen had embarked from Boston on July 19, 1779, to eliminate a small British detachment located 250 miles north on the Bagaduce Peninsula (which jutted into the bay). The expedition was less than successful. As acerbically reported by the Boston Independent Chronicle, “our irregular troops made an irregular retreat … without any loss excepting the whole fleet.”
James F. Byrne Jr explains.
Destruction of the American Fleet at Penobscot Bay, 14 August 1779. By Dominic Serres.
British military efforts had shifted to the mid-Atlantic and southern states following their defeat at Saratoga in October 1777. However, His Majesty’s government needed a naval base on the New England seaboard to protect against American privateers and serve as a loyalist refuge. To support this requirement, seven hundred Redcoats landed on the Bagaduce Peninsula in June 1779 and began constructing fortifications.
Determined to oust the British, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts organized an expedition with 1000 militiamen commanded by General Solomon Lovell. Transporting Lovell’s force was a fleet of 44 ships commanded by Continental Navy Captain Dudley Saltonstall. Neither Saltonstall nor Lovell were given overall command of the campaign – they were instead encouraged to cooperate with each other.
The hastily organized expedition arrived in Penobscot Bay on July 24th and found British fortifications half completed. On July 28th American marines and militiamen successfully landed on the peninsula, and fighting both the British and the steep, forested terrain, drove the defenders back to their partially built fortifications. The fort was ripe for the taking . The British commander certainly thought so, later stating “ I only meant to give them one or two guns so as not to be called a coward, and then strike my colors.” However, with victory within reach, General Lovell, who lost control of his force during the assault, ordered a halt and directed his flabbergasted subordinates (who had a clearer picture of the situation than their general) to initiate a siege.
Deterioration
The situation rapidly deteriorated for the Americans. The militiamen soon tired of siege warfare, and many of them spent their time in the rear skulking in the woods. Saltonstall and Lowell conducted over 10 councils – described by one observer as “more like a meeting in a coffee house than a council of war”. The Commodore insisted he could not engage the three enemy ships in the harbor until the British guns on the peninsula were silenced, and the General responded this was not possible until the British ships were eliminated. While the American commanders dithered, the British strengthened their fortifications and sent for help.
It was soon forthcoming. On August 13th, a seven ship British relief squadron arrived, and the seeds of disaster planted by the ineffective American command structure now came to fruition. Lovell was able to reembark his men on the transports and set sail up the Penobscot, intending to establish a defense upriver. Saltonstall deployed his warships to protect the transports.
However, as the British squadron closed, Saltonstall (without informing Lovell) determined his ad-hoc fleet would be no match for the enemy squadron. Without firing a shot, he ordered his warships to retreat upriver, telling one of his captains, “we must all shift for ourselves.” A John Paul Jones moment it was not.
Hope gone
The troops on the transports initially cheered the rapidly approaching American warships. Cheering stopped when the warships sailed past the transports, leaving them to the tender mercies of the British frigates. Deciding discretion was the better part of valor, the transport captains ran their ships aground, disembarked their passengers, and set their vessels afire. The militia dispersed into the woods – without leadership, discipline, or any inclination to continue hanging around Penobscot. The fleeing warship captains followed the example set by their transport vessel comrades, and the pursuing British marveled as ship after ship went up in flames.
There was to be no defensive stand along the Penobscot River. Summing up the situation, Lovell later said “an attempt to give a description of this terrible day is out of my power.”
The majority of the 3,000 Americans participating in the ill-founded campaign survived the ordeal – over 2,500 of them eventually making it home. The British suffered less than 100 casualties and occupied Penobscot Bay until the end of the war. Commodore Saltonstall was cashiered from the Continental Navy in recognition of his loss of an entire 44 ship fleet – the worst disaster in U.S. Naval history until the 1941 attack at Pearl Harbor.
Lessons Learned:
1) Committees should plan festivals, not military campaigns; the lack of a single overall commander set the stage for failure.
2) Councils of war rarely lead to success in battle; especially when nothing of consequence is discussed or decided.
3) Amphibious operations imply land-sea coordination; unfortunately, Saltonstall and Lovell could not even agree on an overall course of action.
4) Few naval battles are won by sailing out of harm’s way; Saltonstall’s refusal to engage the British relief force sealed his defeat.
5) Coordinated actions require a commander; Saltonstall effectively ceded command during the retreat up the river, allowing the fleet to be exterminated piecemeal.
6) Discipline is a necessity; when the going got tough, the militia got going – home.
7) Quality trumps quantity; the huge American fleet was poorly crewed, badly led, and disintegrated when faced by a smaller, but well trained enemy squadron.
8) Force protection can be carried to extremes; Saltonstall saved most of his personnel but abandoned his mission and sacrificed his fleet.
9) Ad hoc military operations seldom succeed when facing competent professional foes.
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