Was Portugal Really Neutral in World War II?

Portugal was officially neutral in World War Two, but did its behaviour show that it was neutral? Here, Stefan Morrone considers this by looking at the Portuguese leader’s beliefs, the long-standing treaty between Portugal and Britain, the wolfram question, and the Azores.

A British Royal Air Force plane in the Portuguese Azores during World War II.

When discussing the roles played by various countries in conflicts throughout history, the term “neutrality” implies impartiality and a lack of bias towards any belligerent side. However, as we have seen with other countries during the Second World War, declaring neutrality was often much more complex than simply avoiding taking sides.

When the Second World War broke out in the autumn of 1939, Portugal was one of various European countries to declare its neutrality.  Portugal was in quite a delicate position at the opening of the conflict, meaning that a declaration of neutrality was in the country’s best interests - at least for the moment. This declaration of neutrality would allow Portugal to preserve her own foreign policy and take advantage of various opportunities that the war provided to prosper.

Rise of the Estado Novo

Antonio Salazar was born in 1899 in Beira Alto, Portugal. Salazar’s parents sent him to a seminary for his education when he was 9 years old. However, after spending several years at the seminary, he decided he wanted to further his education, and entered Portugal’s most prestigious university, the University of Coimbra, in 1910 at the age of 21. He graduated four years later with a degree in economics and his performance merited an appointment at the university as a professor, where he became known for his speeches and articles on political economics. His popularity continued to grow, and he was elected to Portugal’s national legislature in 1921. [1]

In 1926 there was a coup d’état and the leaders offered Salazar the position of finance minister, which he accepted with the stipulation that he receive almost total control of the government. This was declined and he resigned five days later to return to teaching. Two years later, in 1928, the leader of the government again asked Salazar to become the finance minister and met the stipulations that Salazar had initially demanded.

As finance minister, he quickly managed to balance the country’s budget and brought financial success to the Portuguese government. Salazar’s position strengthened further when he became the president of Portugal’s ruling Council of Ministries in 1932.

A year later, he formally created the Estado Novo, or “New State”, a corporatist state with a fascist orientation. Although it has often been compared with the contemporary regimes of Italy, Spain, and Germany, Salazar’s Portugal differed through its comparatively moderate use of state-sponsored violence.  Salazar was a Catholic traditionalist who strongly believed in using economic modernisation to defend Portugal’s Catholic and rural values.

Conflicted Loyalties

The outbreak of the Second World War put Portugal in a tenuous position. Since signing the Treaty of Windsor in 1386, Portugal had always maintained close ties with Britain. However, during this era, Portugal also maintained close ties with its large neighbour, Francoist Spain. Salazar had backed Franco’s regime during the Spanish Civil War, and this, combined with his government’s Fascist qualities, earned him the respect of Hitler and Mussolini. [2] 

Upon the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, Salazar issued a declaration of Portugal’s neutrality. He also declared that Portugal’s old treaty of alliance with England did not automatically mean that Portugal had to go to war in support of the Allies. This was discussed with Britain beforehand, and the British indicated that they did not need Portuguese assistance. [3]

Salazar’s reasoning for neutrality was that he feared invasions by Germany or a potential German-allied Spain if the country entered the war; German troops were stationed roughly 260 km from the Portuguese borders. As a result, Salazar decided to stay out of the conflict, but decided he could use it to his country’s economic advantage, maintaining open trade with members of both the Allied and Axis camp throughout the war years. However, when considering the question of Portugal’s neutrality, it is important to examine two key factors that came into play with Portugal’s relationships with belligerent countries.

The Wolfram Question

One of the biggest issues with Portuguese neutrality was the prevalence of the mineral wolfram in the country. [4] This powerful resource quickly became Portugal’s ticket to maintaining neutrality throughout the conflict. 

Wolfram is a major source of tungsten, a metal used in steel hardening processes used in producing important items such as machine tools, armor-piercing shells, tank and airplane parts, and engine parts.  Outside Portugal, the Allied powers did not want Germany to have access to this incredibly valuable resource, while inside, Salazar viewed it as a matter of Portugal’s sovereignty since the mineral belonged to the country. He decided to satisfy both parties, Allied and Axis, preferring not to alienate either camp to maintain Portugal’s neutrality. 

However, the so-called “Wolfram War” seriously damaged Portugal’s claim to neutrality, since it was a definite expression of pro-Axis sentiment within the country - the Germans received approximately 75% of Portugal’s wolfram exports, while Britain received only 25%, despite the alliance and loud protestations. [5] Britain did enjoy one advantage in this situation - due to their long-standing relationship, Britain was able to pay in credit, while Germany had to pay cash. This allowed Britain to obtain a valuable resource while being short on cash.

On the other hand, Portugal also allowed the Axis powers to incur sizable debts in their clearing agreements, even advancing them significant amounts of private and government contracts.  In addition, Portuguese merchants were an important source of vital smuggled commodities such as diamonds and platinum to the Axis.

Portugal negotiated secret agreements with Germany to send an average of over 2,000 metric tons of wolfram annually between 1941 and mid-1944, which was roughly 60 percent of Germany's minimum industrial requirement. [6] The intense competition for wolfram boosted the Portuguese economy and generated huge profits for banks and businesses. Portugal profited so much from the sale of wolfram trade that it continued to do so despite threats from the Allies.

In January 1944, the Allies tried to pressure Portugal to embargo all wolfram sales, but this was resisted - Portugal defended its right as a neutral country to sell to anyone they saw fit, while also fearing a German attack should they stop. The wolfram trade debacle finally ended on the eve of the D-Day invasion in June 1944, when Portugal imposed a total embargo on shipments to both sides of the war after the Allies threatened heavy economic sanctions. 

Despite this, Portugal was able to profit massively from the wolfram trade and gain a major economic boost.

The Azores

In addition to wolfram, Portugal had another resource coveted by both the Allied and Axis powers: the strategically important Azores islands. Located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, the islands made a perfect base for launching offensive operations. For the Allies, possession of the Azores was important for protecting the convoy supply routes of the central Atlantic. Failing to control them left a gap in defenses for convoys in which they might get caught in pitched battles between Allied and Axis ships. In addition, controlling the Azores would prove vital to the Allies’ potential plan of an invasion of Europe, since they could be used as an air base to provide cover for the invading armies. [7]

For the Axis, the Azores meant an ideal U-boat base plus air bases needed for Projekt Amerika, a Luftwaffe bombing campaign of the East Coast of the US. An Azores base in the middle of the Atlantic would greatly improve the operational efficiency of German U-boats by cutting out the time needed to return to ports in France to refuel, meaning they could spend much more time out in the field. [7]

Again, Salazar was torn - should he give up control of the Azores to the Allies, he feared a German invasion of Portugal through Spain. Despite Salazar’s refusal to give up the islands, Churchill and Roosevelt jointly decided to occupy the islands in 1943 but agreed that it would have to be done delicately. Churchill favored a diplomatic approach, and invoked the Treaty of Windsor, which Salazar approved. One airfield was quickly constructed in secret, with the British entering first, followed by the Americans, with plans for more airfields to follow. However, Salazar stipulated that while the British were welcome under the Treaty, the Americans were not - and if pressed by the Germans, he could not use the excuse of diplomatic necessity, as with the British. Salazar threatened to forcefully resist the landing of American troops in the islands but reneged at the eleventh hour. 

The Azores airfields were used to transfer bombers to the Pacific theatre and played a key role in winning the war in the Atlantic for the Allies. It allowed more planes to launch than from any aircraft carrier group, punched a hole in German U-boat supply lines and put Allied convoy lines within reach of land-based bomber protection, allowing for crucial shipments of provisions to reach their destinations unscathed.

Conclusion

The question of whether Portugal was truly neutral is a complex one. A nation can only be considered truly neutral if it exhibits no biases to other belligerent nations. Examining Portugal’s relationships with the Axis and Allied powers, Portugal in fact did express bias, although in different ways to each of the warring sides. It sold a far higher percentage of the valuable wolfram mineral to the Axis powers, making a vital contribution to their war effort, yet also contributed to the Axis’ defeat by allowing air bases to be constructed on the Azores islands and fell back on its traditional relationship to Britain.

Ultimately, Portugal can be considered neutral during the Second World War. In fitting with the traditional definition of neutrality, Portugal did not clearly favor a particular side in the conflict, instead preferring to play both sides against each other, seeking to benefit itself economically above all. Portugal’s neutrality remained useful to both sides throughout the war, and thus, by rendering different services to both sides, Salazar was able to effectively buy his country’s ability to remain out of the Second World War.

What do you think of Portugal’s role in World War Two? Let us know below.

Now, you can read about whether Spain was neutral or a Nazi ally in World War Two here.

Sources

[1] Watkins, Thayer. Antonio Salazar De Oliveira of Portugal and His Estado Novo, www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/salazar.htm.

[2] Gayer, Gary. “Political Neutrality in World War 2.” California Polytechnic State University, 2013.

[3] Leite, Joaquim da Costa. "Neutrality by Agreement: Portugal and the British Alliance in World War II." American University International Law Review 14, no. 1 (1998): 185-199. Accessed February 26,2021

[4] Wheeler, Douglas L. “The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II.” Source: Luso-Brazilian Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1986) Accessed February 26 2021 https://www.jstor.org/stable/3513391?seq=1

[5] Packard, Jerrold Michael, "The European neutrals in World War II" (1989). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 3984. Accessed February 26. 2021 https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5866

[6] RG 84: Portugal.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed February 26, 2020 www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-84-portugal.html.

[7] Gnam, Carl. “Portugal during WW2: Covering the Azores Gap.” Warfare History Network, 3 Dec. 2020. Accessed February 26, 2021  warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/01/25/covering-the-azores-gap-in-world-war-ii/

Bibliography

Gayer, Gary. “Political Neutrality in World War 2.” California Polytechnic State University, 2013. 

Gnam, Carl. “Portugal during WW2: Covering the Azores Gap.” Warfare History Network, 3 Dec. 2020, warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/01/25/covering-the-azores-gap-in-world-war-ii/.

Leite, Joaquim da Costa. "Neutrality by Agreement: Portugal and the British Alliance in World War II." American University International Law Review 14, no. 1 (1998): 185-199.

Packard, Jerrold Michael, "The European neutrals in World War II" (1989). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 3984. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5866 

 “RG 84: Portugal.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/civilian/rg-84-portugal.html.

Watkins, Thayer. Antonio Salazar De Oliveira of Portugal and His Estado Novo, www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/salazar.htm.

Wheeler, Douglas L. “The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II.” Source: Luso-Brazilian Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1986)

Was Sweden really neutral in World War Two?

Whether Sweden was truly neutral in World War Two has been the subject of much debate over the years. Following past articles on the role of Spain (here) and Switzerland (here) in World War Two, Kaiya Rai presents the arguments for both sides – how Sweden assisted both Nazi Germany and the Allied Powers.

A Swedish soldier during World War Two.

Sweden, during the Second World War, declared an official policy of ‘non-belligerency,’ meaning that the nation itself was unattached to either the Allied Powers or the Axis Powers. Since the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden had attempted to maintain this policy of neutrality. In those wars, over a third of Sweden’s land was lost, including new Russian control of Finland, and these losses, alongside a coup d’état against Gustav IV, former King of Sweden, meant a new foreign policy of non-belligerency was formed, namely the Policy of 1812. Whether the Swedes, and even the government themselves, steadfastly adhered to this policy is questionable, however, especially in the years 1939 to 1945.

One key feature of Sweden’s lack of neutrality in the Second World War is closely linked with its long history with Finland. Finland was a ‘co-belligerent’ with Germany, meaning that it engaged in the war as support for Germany, due to its nations’ alliance. Evidence points to Finland under Swedish rule from the late thirteenth century, starting with Swedish crusades to Western Finland, securing Swedish rule over the nation and creating a Swedish province. Their rule collapsed on September 17, 1809 as a result of the Finnish War, where, under the conditions of the Treaty of Fredrikshavn, Finland became a semi-independent Grand Duchy under Russian rule with the Tsar as Grand Duke. But, even with the lack of rule over Finland, Sweden still supported the nation, and managed to indirectly help its cause a number of times during the course of the Second World War, undeniably leading to support for Nazi Germany and its allies in the process.

Support for Axis Powers

As opposed to its official government policy, when called to fight in Finland, as many as 8,000 Swedes volunteered, and in response to German pleas for volunteers against the Soviet Union, around 180 Swedes joined the German Waffen-SS. It was always the individuals’ choice to enlist; however, the government also helped in ways such as sending food, ammunition, weapons and medicine to Finland during conflict. While the number of Swedish volunteers was comparatively small compared to some other nations, the country’s willingness to help in the war effort surely points to its obvious lack of neutrality. Even if official government policy stated the country was in a non-belligerent position, the actions of people in a nation are what ultimately reveal the true nature of the attitudes, and these undeniably show Swedish refusal to sit on the sidelines and do nothing.

Another concern for Sweden during the war was trade. At the beginning of WW2, an agreement had been signed by Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany, in order to sustain vital trade, but Swedish shipping began to be attacked. As a result, trade with Britain reduced by about 70%, and it increased with Germany, culminating in 37% of Swedish exports being to Germany alone. The battle of the Atlantic was what caused Swedish trade to be blocked, but a few vessels, known as ‘lejdtrafiken’ or ‘the safe conduct traffic,’ were allowed through to the United States (until their entrance into the war), and some neutral nations in Latin America.

This leads onto arguably the biggest point concerning Swedish support for the Axis Powers, and why historians are still debating Swedish neutrality during WW2: the iron ore trade. Germany used this ore in its weapon production, and trade form Sweden to Germany eventually became so large that ten million tons of iron ore per year was shipped to the Third Reich. The government did not interfere with the trade because of its official policy of neutrality. British intelligence had identified German dependency on this production of ore, and estimated that Germany’s preparations for war could end in disaster if there were to be a delay in exports. Therefore, the Allies planned to seize the iron ore deposits by using the Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939 as a cover. They planned to gain Norwegian (the ore was shipped through harbors in Norway to reach Germany) and Swedish permission to send expeditionary forces to Finland, under the pretense of helping the Finnish, and once there, they would take control of the northern cities to gain access to the ore and deny German access to it. However, the Norwegians and Swedes realized the danger of allowing an expeditionary force to be sent across their nations and so refused to allow it. Sir Ralph Glyn had even claimed that if iron ore exports were stopped, an end to the war would have been imminent, showing the Allies’ belief in the importance of Swedish trade to Germany, and so eluding to the lack of neutrality of Sweden during the Second World War.

A final point regarding support for the Axis Powers in WW2 concerns Operation Barbarossa, the German plan to invade the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. The Germans asked the Swedes to allow German armed forces to be transported by train through Swedish land, from Norway to Finland. There was huge controversy surrounding what the government should do, and the political debates around the issue became known as the ‘Midsummer Crisis.’ This was the first point in the war where the Swedish government itself, as opposed to simply the people, was asked to reject its foreign policy of six hundred years. The four party coalition that ruled Sweden was in disagreement, with the Conservative and Agrarian parties, the Swedish Foreign Office and Gustaf V all wanting to grant Germany permission. In opposition, the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party wanted to adhere to their foreign policy. In the end, permission was granted to Germany, and thus, the Swedish government showed opposition to its country’s long-held foreign policy.

Support for the Allies and opponents of Germany

Firstly, intelligence played a huge part in Swedish support for the Allies, as military intelligence was shared between them. Due to its ‘neutral’ stance, Sweden was able to gain physical access to Germany, which was useful for both Swedish and Allied intelligence, and the Polish resistance was assisted as employees at factories acted as couriers for messages. Moreover, German telegrams passed through Swedish-leased cables, allowing the Swedes to intercept them, and due to Arne Beurling breaking the cypher code in summer 1940, the messages were understood and the Polish resistance movement conveyed these to the Allies. Another example is when the German battleship Bismarck set off to attack the Atlantic convoys, Swedish intelligence informed the British. In addition, Swedish businessmen, diplomats and emissaries actively spied for the Allies in cities such as Berlin.

Secondly, militarily, Sweden assisted the Allies. They helped to train soldiers, originally refugees from other European nations, and allowed Swedish airbases to be used in the last two years of the war. On June 13, 1944, a V2 rocket being tested by the Germans crashed in Sweden and they exchanged its wreckage with Britain for Supermarine Spitfires. In another instance, the Swedish merchant navy, totaling around 8,000 seamen, found itself outside the Baltic and from May 1940, was loaned to Britain. The Allies began preparing to liberate Denmark and Norway in 1945, and they wanted Sweden involved and so the nation began preparing for ‘Operation Save Denmark,’ where they were to invade Zealand from Scania. Sweden then planned to assist the Allies in the invasion of Norway, and whilst this was not necessary in the end, US planes used Swedish military bases during the eventual liberation.

Finally, an integral part of what creates doubt around Sweden’s policy of ‘non-belligerency,’ was its part in hosting and assisting refugees and Jews who were being persecuted by Hitler and the policy of the Final Solution. Sweden became a place of refuge for these people, and nearly all of Denmark’s 8,000 Jews were brought to Sweden after the order to deport all Danish Jews in 1943. Norwegian and Finnish Jews also fled to Sweden and many stayed there after the war, too. While this shows a lack of neutrality, with its open defiance to Germany’s cause, ironically, it was Sweden’s policy of neutrality that allowed Jews to seek refuge there, as Germany wouldn’t invade the country. Alongside this, many were working to try and persuade German leaders to treat the Jews more humanely, such as King Gustav V of Sweden. Moreover, diplomats such as Count Folke Bernadotte, who contributed to saving over 15,000 prisoners from concentration camps, Raoul Wallenberg, who saved up to 100,000 Hungarian Jews, and Werner Dankwort, who secretly helped Jewish children to escape to Sweden inside wooden crates, were able to use their statuses to communicate with the German government and pass information back to Sweden.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think it is safe to state that Sweden was only in name, a neutral country during the course of the Second World War. It did aide both sides, however, which is perhaps what has led to the debate surrounding the reality of its neutrality. Arne Ruth argues that “Sweden was not neutral, Sweden was weak,” and Winston Churchill believed that Sweden “ignored the greater moral issues of the war and played both sides for profit,” although this could perhaps be discredited due to the evidence that points to the country’s immense help in saving so many victims of the Nazi regime. We must also consider that WW2 was indeed a ‘Total War,’ and so was there ever any real possibility of any nation within Europe being completely neutral during the period?

Do you think Sweden was neutral in World War 2? Let us know below…