In 1936, Germany and Japan created the Anti-Comintern Pact agreement. This was an alliance that promised that the two countries would commit themselves to contain the threat of communist expansion presented by the USSR, a country perceived by dictatorships and democracies alike as a major threat. The ensuing propaganda presented Germany and Japan in a flamboyant fashion as a “sword-wielding, winged champion” ready to take on this challenge and step up to the task. It looked formidable, and for Britain and France in particular, at least someone else was providing that bulwark against the USSR rather than themselves.
However, this Pact proved to be all fanfare and nothing more than an empty statement. This fact would become all too apparent by August 1939 when, within three short years, Japan distanced herself from Germany and had agreed to a separate non-aggression alliance with the Soviet Union in April 1941.
What was the story behind this pact to have caused this reversal from these two Axis partners? To explain this from the Japanese perspective, it is necessary to start at the beginning of the twentieth century and consider the events that took place between the Soviet Union and Japan.
Steve Prout explains.
Germany’s Joachim von Ribbentrop signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in November,ber 1936.
The Japanese–Soviet Relations 1900–1939
The Russo-Japanese War
Japan and the USSR shared a troubled relationship ever since the beginning of the 1900s. They both were competing for their own spheres of influence in East Asia. Japan sought Russian recognition for control over the Korean Peninsula, and in return, Japan would recognise Russian influence in Manchuria. The Russians refused Japan’s request, and therefore the two sides could not reach any agreement. The result led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. The Japanese emerged victorious, leaving Russia decisively beaten and humiliated, thus affecting the balance of power in the Far East. This outcome had ramifications in Europe as well for Russia’s prestige. The imperial powers now viewed Russia’s strength in a weaker light due to her defeat by what the Great Powers viewed as an inferior Asian nation.
Japan fought on the Allied side during the First World War. Her participation in the war was limited to East Asia and not the European theatre, where she swiftly annexed the German overseas territories in the region, such as the Marshall Islands. Comparatively, this was a sideshow compared to the main fighting in Europe and had an insignificant effect on the German war effort. It did, however, give an early indication of Japanese plans to expand their empire into East Asia, but few noticed or cared from the Allied camp at the time as their priority was to defeat Germany and her allies.
After the end of the First World War, whilst Russia was in the grip of revolution, the Japanese then contributed heavily to the Allied intervention forces. They saw this intervention as a chance, and Russia’s vulnerability as an opportunity to permanently occupy and add Siberia to their growing empire.
The Russian War of Intervention 1919–1922
In 1918, Russia arranged a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, which meant that her part in the war was over. Peace, however, eluded her troubled nation because she now faced civil war fuelled by the emergence of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Communism now was the new enemy, now that Germany and her allies were defeated. The Allies swiftly deployed military detachments into Russia to counter and suppress the Bolshevik threat.
At first, Japan sent just a small marine battalion in the spring of 1918 to Vladivostok. The pretext was retaliation for the death of three Japanese civilians caught up in the civil war violence. It was the perfect opportunity to begin control of the area, and they already had additional troops ready for action in neighbouring Korea. The Japanese commitment would increase; at its highest, they provided over seventy thousand soldiers. These troops supported the Russian White Armies under the command of Kerensky, who were also fighting the Bolsheviks. Other troops also aided the Czech Legion led by Kolchak by helping them escape Siberian captivity. The Japanese would then enlist their assistance around Vladivostok to augment their own dominance in the region. Within Allied circles, US Ambassador Roland Morris suspected Japan’s true intentions, but Japan was not making their intentions hard to notice.
Morris noted that “the Japanese presence in the area was excessive compared to other nations”; however, the British alone had over fifty thousand personnel deployed in Russia, so it did not spark widespread concern. The British, on the other hand, unlike Japan, had no other interest than removing communism. Morris also noted that the Japanese “seemed generally to be pursuing a policy to prevent the establishment of any kind of united orderly government in Siberia.” The USA appeared to express the most concern within the Allied alliance. Britain and Japan still had a formal alliance between them, and for Britain and France, Japanese strength was a bonus in the region because it selfishly and indirectly served imperial interests by containing communist influence locally and indirectly serving their own imperial interests in Asia.
US Colonel William B. Donovan in December 1919 also commented that the Japanese had “dreams of militaristic authority” and were “erecting economic barriers in Manchuria and Siberia.” The Japanese did not make any attempt to conceal these ambitions. They declared openly in their own Vladivostok-based newspaper Vladvivo-Nippo that in extending their military involvement further east to the Urals, it would not only help bring the civil war to an end, but in doing so they would “secure their exceptional rights in Siberia and the Far East.” The phrase “exceptional rights” caused concern not just to the Americans but also the Chinese and, of course, the Russians. The latter could not accept the prospect of a long occupation or potential loss of Siberia to Japan. Russia had previously suffered huge territorial losses to her western territories at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 to the former Central Powers and shortly after in the war against Poland.
A certain Captain Yamamoto in 1919 said during the Russian War of Intervention that “the world would be speaking Japanese within ten or fifteen years.” At the time, this was more than likely seen by the Great Powers as an empty boast and was not taken seriously. The Japanese were deadly serious, maybe not about world domination but certainly about domination of East Asia and the Pacific theatre. After the victory of the 1904–5 war, their part in the Great War, and their sizeable participation in the Russian War of Intervention, Japan had without a doubt been left with the impression that she was now a great world power on an equal footing with Great Britain, France, and the USA. They were becoming not only a force to be reckoned with internationally but also a worry for Russia.
In 1922, after a four-year occupation, Japan withdrew from Siberia. The uneasy co-existence between the two powers continued and escalated in the following decade. The Japanese had not given up their intentions of expanding into the East Asian mainland because it was essential to their nation’s survival. It had few natural resources and an expanding population; much like Germany, she sought her own version of lebensraum, or living space. This is supported by a quote recorded early in 1919 where the Japanese openly stated in the Yamato Shimbum newspaper that “Japan has no way out, save that of sending her surplus population to Manchuria and Siberia.” The opportunity that Siberia presented to Japan was now lost, and so they turned their attention to China. However, the Soviet Union also would soon be expressing interest and establishing herself in that region, and the two sides would clash.
The 1930s – Manchuria, the League and fighting in East Asia
Between 1931 and 1939, the Japanese and Soviet forces frequently clashed along the Mongolian border. The tensions were not helped because the remote frontier with Manchuria was uncharted and ambiguous to both sides. The USSR and Japan had their own commercial and political agendas in China. They both intended to exploit the raw materials that were plentiful in the region, and the USSR were acting as advisors to the Chinese Army with their own control over the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Trouble in the region began in 1931 during the Mukden Incident. The Japanese claimed that Chinese nationalists were committing acts of sabotage on the South Manchurian Railway, which Japan controlled. It was discovered to be a spurious claim perpetrated by the Japanese to exert further control of the area as they moved more troops inland and seized further territory to secure their rights.
An investigation was ordered by the League of Nations into the matter in 1932, and the publication of the Lytton Report followed. The report concluded that the Japanese orchestrated the entire affair themselves. It damningly exposed the Japanese motives and the deceitful attempts to frame the Chinese nationalists as the aggressors. It did not make any difference to the Japanese, who were now entrenched in Manchuria and had no plans to leave, but it also placed Japanese forces closer to Soviet forces on the Mongolian border. This is when the instability in the region intensified.
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in protest after a failed attempt to deflect the truthful findings of the Lytton Report. This action had numerous ramifications, not least for world peace, when Italy and Germany realised that the League was powerless against the more powerful states like themselves. They realised that they could further their own ambitions with relative impunity as they watched the Japanese, now unchecked by the other great powers, pursue an expansionist policy in China. However, in doing so, these actions would soon bring her into conflict with the Soviet Union and further instability to the region arose.
At first, the Soviet Union was eager to avoid war with Japan. In 1929, they did not possess the military capability to conduct any form of protracted war. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and occupied the Soviet sphere of influence, the Soviet Union was still not strong enough in the East to oppose the Japanese. In order to avoid war, Stalin went so far as to adopt a policy of neutrality as far as Japanese actions in the region were concerned. In addition, the Soviet Union sold its rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Manchukuo government on 23 March 1935, removing any interests they possessed in China. It would all be in vain; meanwhile, Japanese forces were now moving closer to the Mongolian border.
The first reported incident between the Soviet and Japanese forces occurred during January and February 1935. It was, by comparison, a small affair called the Halhamiao Incident, which broke out on the Manchurian-Mongolian border. This would not be the last, as similar events of varying severity erupted on a regular basis. The situation was not helped by the geographical problems, where ownership of frontier boundaries was ambiguous. Consequently, with no resolution or sensible dialogue, the two sides engaged in over one hundred intentional and unintentional territorial clashes.
This first incident was small and involved a small group comprising eleven Manchukuoan soldiers led by a Japanese officer clashing with a similarly sized Mongolian cavalry force. The Manchukuo Army suffered six casualties and two dead, including the Japanese officer, but the Mongolian opposing side incurred no casualties. Although this affray started on a small scale, it quickly escalated, and in retaliation, the Japanese sent a larger force. This comprised two motorized companies supported by a machine gun company that quickly overran the area and occupied it for three weeks.
The Halhamiao Incident would be the start of many confrontations and skirmishes of varying size. According to Japanese claims, from 1935 to 1939, when the last encounter with the USSR ended, there were over one hundred and fifty border engagements that took place fighting the Soviet Union on the Manchurian-Mongolian border. While it is not possible to discuss all of them, two later incidents at Gol Khashan and Khalkin Gol were particularly significant and stand out. More importantly, they are key events in evaluating the effectiveness of Japan’s future alliance with Germany.
The Anti-Comintern Pact – Germany and Japan Align
Hostilities with the Soviet Union became more frequent; being internationally isolated made Japan recognize that she needed an ally. There was, however, an absence of potential suitors. Her relations with Britain and the USA were already strained, not helped by the way Britain and the USA treated Japan as an inferior and unequal Asian power. The USA and Great Britain had previously placed restrictions on the size of the Japanese Navy. One example that irked the Japanese was the fact that they were restricted in how they were allowed to operate in the Pacific by the Washington Conference in 1922. This gave the USA and Great Britain naval dominance on “Japan’s very doorstep.” This was seen as disrespectful when considering that Japan was still technically, at the time, an ally of these two powers. She had been on the Allied side in the First World War and had assisted heavily in a common cause, fighting in Russia during the War of Intervention. Of course, Japan sought to gain from these engagements, but no more so than any of her wartime allies like Britain and France, who ensured that they would receive their territorial gains from the likes of Turkey and Germany.
After leaving the League of Nations, Japan had become an international pariah. She had only one potential suitor for an ally, and that was the newly emerged Nazi Germany. These ties she sought from Germany were borne out of expediency and, to some extent, a common ground. Germany was also falling out of favour with the international community and therefore became the candidate for Japan’s ally. Furthermore, Germany, like Japan, also had no love for the Soviet Union; therefore, there was common ground on this matter too.
Statistics demonstrate that these battles with the USSR were by no means insignificant. By the time of the final engagement in 1939, these combined clashes between the Soviet Union and Japan amounted to over thirty-three thousand Soviet and Mongolian casualties, three hundred and fifty Soviet tanks, and over two hundred Soviet aircraft destroyed. The Japanese would also suffer casualties of over thirty thousand losses, but fewer in tanks and aircraft, numbering forty-three and one hundred and sixty-two, respectively. Japan’s need for an ally against the Soviets was becoming more urgent. An opportunity presented itself. A resurrected, militaristic, anti-communist Germany was the perfect partner—at least the Japanese thought at the time.
In November 1936 in Berlin, following a month of negotiations and discussions, the two countries announced the arrival of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Its rhetoric made no attempt to disguise the fact that this was aimed purposefully at containing the Soviet Union. The propaganda was presented in true grandiose totalitarian style. It represented the alliance as a solitary sword-wielding, winged champion that would save Europe from the ravages of Bolshevism. Examples of the scare-mongering tactics and justification the pact used included communist involvement in the Civil War in Spain and the political unrest attributed to left-wing destabilising tactics in France. There was, interestingly, no reference to the Soviet action against Japan in East Asia. In 1937, Italy joined; Spain in 1939 (more likely as revenge for Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War) followed, along with Hungary. Although membership grew, it would prove a disappointment to the Japanese. The pact was never properly put into practice (although some could convincingly argue Operation Barbarossa was that very act), and time would prove what little substance it contained.
Soviet Victory in East Asia and the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union
In the two years following the signing of the pact, the Japanese no doubt saw the alliance with Germany as a major disappointment. The Germans took no active part in coming to the aid of the Japanese during their altercations with the Soviet Union after 1936. In fact, within three years of the formal signing of the pact, the Germans forged the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The implications of that enabled the Soviets to expand westward into Poland in 1939 and the Baltic States in 1940—a clear contradiction of the pact’s intentions. The Japanese would endure two final and decisive defeats before making peace with the USSR again without any German support.
The Battle of Khasan in July 1938 was the first of these confrontations, where seven thousand Japanese troops clashed against over twenty thousand Soviet troops. The Japanese viewed the Soviet reinforcement of this area as an incursion into territory they perceived as demarcated to themselves, as agreed in the Treaty of Peking with the USSR. The fact that the area was unclearly charted and ambiguous made it difficult to ascertain which side controlled which area, thus exacerbating the situation and causing most of the border disputes and misunderstandings. The Soviets suffered four thousand killed and injured, and the Japanese fifteen hundred from their Kwantung Army from Manchukuo. Japanese forces were defeated, and the Soviet Union re-occupied the area. Germany looked on as her ally continued to engage Soviet forces.
In 1939, at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese were defeated once again. The two sides were at war for two months, from July to August 1939. Interestingly, in those two months, a Soviet officer named Zhukov (who would later gain prominence) led numerically superior Soviet forces who overcame the Japanese after suffering initial losses themselves. The Japanese would suffer a combination of seventeen thousand dead and wounded compared to ten thousand dead Soviet soldiers. In September, an armistice was declared. This would be the last of the Japanese and Soviet engagements until 1945.
In August 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was announced to a surprised international community, aligning Germany and the Soviet Union. This invalidated the pact they shared with Japan by choosing to sign a deal with the USSR that enabled their expansion westwards, which began with their occupation of Poland and the Baltic states. Both Germany and the USSR (for now at least) had conveniently set aside their differences, forgotten the venomous invectives they had previously exchanged, and made no reference to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan, realizing that her ally’s position had changed, now began to distance herself from Germany and signed the Neutrality Pact of 1941 with the USSR. Both members of the pact had made peace, at separate times, with the very state they originally sought to contain. Germany and Japan would soon both set upon starting their own separate wars.
The pact was inoperable by Germany due to the geographical distance between Germany and Japan, exacerbated by her reduced naval capacity to support her ally. The Germans had no interest in East Asia other than the Japanese military being available to drain British, French, and later American forces during the war. Germany’s aims were clearly expressed early in Hitler’s book Mein Kampf, and that was Lebensraum, or living space, at the expense of the USSR.
Another Unlikely Potential Ally
There are other interesting, and little-known, aspects to this story. Hitler's first choice of an anti-Soviet ally was not Japan; it was Great Britain, who also had little love for communism. Earlier in 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was the first attempt for the Germans to reach out to the British. The Japanese, at this point, viewed this with suspicion, as this would endorse British naval supremacy imposed by the Treaty of Washington, thus threatening her aspirations of dominance in the Pacific.
Conclusion
The pact revealed itself to be no more than a paper treaty as far as Japan was concerned. German resources were used to assist General Franco in battling communist forces backed by the USSR during the civil war in Spain. Japan no doubt was irked by this as she struggled alone in East Asia, but then equally, Japan did not intervene in Spain.
There appeared to be very little substance and only rhetoric, and if no other evidence were available to present, then this can be proved where both parties reversed their anti-Soviet attitudes (at least on the surface) to the Anti-Comintern Pact by arranging separate departures from the pact in 1939 by Germany and Japan in 1941. Japan was the only German ally not to participate in Operation Barbarossa.
What served the Germans also equally served the Japanese. As Germany was secretly using the Japanese in East Asia to distract and contain the USSR, Japan was doing likewise to Germany in Europe. That was not just a tactic used by the totalitarian powers either because their democratic rivals, Britain and France, were in turn also tacitly allowing Germany to serve as the bulwark against communist plans in Europe and, no doubt, in a similar fashion with Japan in East Asia.
As clouds of war approached, Germany and Japan took their own approaches in their relationship with the USSR, which were complete policy reversals. The Japanese Neutrality Pact and the Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed time to form a temporary alliance, which, in that time, enabled the USSR to not only expand her borders westward but also bring peace to the East Asian theatre. The Japanese could now turn to the Pacific and realize her ambitions. This had a devastating effect for the Allies, as the Japanese were now free to attack the European colonies and then challenge the USA. However, the pact would soon be put to deadly effect because, in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa commenced but without the support of Japan.
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References
William Shirer - Rise and Fall of The Third Reich
AJP Taylor - Origins of the Second World War
Goldman, Stuart (2012). Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory that Shaped World War II. Naval Institute Press
A Shared Enmity: Germany, Japan, and the Creation of the Tripartite Pact - Jason Dawsey, PhD
Frank, Richard B. Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937-May 1942. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2020
