Modern-day China differs greatly from its days of imperial monarchy. The origins of this change are rooted in the events of the 19th century. Here, Chris Galbicsek explains how Empress Dowager Cixi played a key role in resisting internal attempts at Westernization in 19th century China.

Empress Dowager Cixi  by Katharine Carl. 1904.

Empress Dowager Cixi by Katharine Carl. 1904.

Today, we know China as a modern communist colossus, and yet we also know China as a nation steeped in a long history of imperial monarchy. In our busy lives, most of us carry around these two images of China without really thinking much about the connection. But how and why did the Chinese monarchy fall in the first place, prior to taking its modern form? Given that China looms so large on the world stage, and given that the Chinese political transformation occurred so recently in history, this lack of public awareness is striking. A closer look reveals some important insight into the ideological and political forces at play in the world around us, as well as a fascinating chapter in the human story.

By the eighteenth century, China had been a remarkably insular empire for hundreds of years. The British had long tried to gain access to the Chinese market by reaching out to the Manchu dynasty, but had little success. However, British merchants eventually did find an effective entry point with the illicit sale of opium. As the Chinese addiction to opium grew to staggering proportions, so did the British addiction to the profits.

By the time Chinese officials finally got around to enforcing its opium prohibition with more seriousness, British merchants were not cooperative. When the Chinese then seized huge stockpiles of opium contraband, this only prompted an indignant British response. As the British demanded reimbursement for their seized property, conflict quickly escalated into violence, and then came war.

 

The Opium Wars Changed China

The industrialized British military quickly pounded China into submission. Various unfavorable trade agreements were forced upon China, including the formalized legalization of the opium scourge, with all of its terrible effects.

As a result, the Chinese empire, which had long considered itself to be the center of the world, was now brought to humbly bear witness to a very different geopolitical reality. No longer could China deny the wide margin of military superiority in the hands of the Western "barbarians". Nor did China any longer have the luxury of choosing its preferred level of economic involvement vis-à-vis the West. If China had indeed been the center of the Earth, then the Earth seemed to have shifted overnight.

The situation represented a critical precipice for China, and the nature of the Chinese response was to be enormously consequential. Japan, coming to grips with similar geopolitical revelations, chose to steam headlong directly into this new phenomenon of "Westernization".

 

The Response

The Chinese leadership, in contrast to Japan, did not proceed with nearly as much solidarity. While there were some voices that did urge immediate adoption of Western technology and institutions, many others insisted instead on a stringent conservatism, and were deeply reluctant to abandon any part of their Confucian worldview, which had proven so enduring.

When the Chinese emperor died in 1861, he left only a four-year-old son to take the dragon throne. The resulting power vacuum only magnified the challenges for an imperial court which already lacked a unified voice.

Nevertheless, in 1861, Prince Gong managed to spearhead an initiative known as the "Self Strengthening Movement", in an ambitious effort to bring about Western reforms. For the first time, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, modern schools were formed, and the study of foreign languages was promoted. Additionally, Western arms and shipbuilding projects were set in motion, along with railroads and telegraph lines. Initially, the program seemed to be creating meaningful change in China.

 

What Went Wrong?

But Prince Gong's voice, and pro-Western voices like his, were soon drowned out by others, and most notably by the young emperor's mother: the Empress Dowager Cixi. Virulently anti-Western, the empress soon demonstrated an uncommon level of political shrewdness, and managed to thoroughly consolidate power around herself within the royal leadership. It has been reasonably presumed that part of the motivation behind Cixi's strong ideological stance, resulted from her calculation that Western governmental reforms would only serve to reduce her influence. In the endCixi would prove so politically irrepressible, that she would go on to profoundly influence China for an astonishing forty-seven years.

While the "Self Strengthening Movement" officially continued, Cixi (pronounced "tsuh-shee") and her cohorts steadily undermined (and even outright sabotaged) various aspects of the project, and set out to marginalize its proponents. As a result, critical momentum was stymied.

On one occasion, Cixi refused to approve construction for an important railway line from Beijing, and when the project finally did move forward, she insisted that the train cars be pulled by horses, so as not to disturb the souls resting in nearby tombs with engine noise. On another occasion, Cixi sent for seven de-commissioned British warships, but then for seemingly trivial reasons, ordered the ships to turn around and head back to England upon their arrival.

In 1893, Cixi continued to frustrate national affairs when she allegedly embezzled thirty million taels of silver, which had been set aside for naval shipbuilding. Instead, Cixi redirected the badly needed funds toward the restoration of the imperial summer palace. Significantly, it was the case that no new Chinese naval ships were put into service from that point forward.

But the tactics of the empress included more ruthless measures as well. Historians widely believe that Cixi was responsible for the poisoning of her own emperor son in 1875. Likewise, she pushed Prince Gong (the architect of the Self Strengthening Movement) into semi-retirement in 1884. And when the subsequently installed emperor (who had replaced her son) later attempted another sweeping national reform movement (known as the "Hundred Days' Reform") in 1898, the empress again intervened. This time Cixi led a coup to overthrow the young reformist emperor, banishing him to house arrest on an island for the remainder of his life.

As might be expected, with all of this internal resistance, China did not fare well when tested militarily during this period. In 1885, China was badly beaten by the French in Indochina. In 1895, China was again beaten badly by the Japanese, losing its hold on Korea and Taiwan, and revealing just how much more industrial progress Japan had managed to achieve.

After orchestrating the coup against the emperor in 1898, reactionary conservatism, atavism and xenophobia were ratcheted up by the Manchu government. Soon Cixi was cracking down on reformist-minded intellectuals, and even blaming natural disasters on Westerners.

When the empress openly endorsed the "Boxer Rebellion" at the turn of the century, the Manchu dynasty further alienated itself. Believing themselves to be invulnerable to Western weapons, over ten thousand “boxers” rampaged throughout the country against anyone and anything pro-Western. After great loss of life, the rebellion was soon put down, and the resulting war reparations exacted by the West left the Manchu royalty desperately in debt. Not long after, with the dynasty barely hanging on and the situation now increasingly precarious, the mighty Cixi died in 1908.

 

Revolution

Within three years of her death, the spark of revolution caught fire, and spread across China. Province after province began to declare independence. Having been continually rebuffed, the impulse toward reform gave way to revolution. The weakened dynasty was now powerless to defend against the wave of resistance, and the monarchy was soon toppled. In 1911, the two hundred and sixty-eight year Manchu dynasty had come to an end.

What followed for China was nothing short of disaster for most of the twentieth century. After a valiant attempt at republicanism failed, China fractured and fell into a chaotic decade of rule by warlords, followed by a bloody national civil war, and then by the now infamous (though not infamous enough) communist reign of Mao Zedong. The result for the Chinese people was more death and destruction than perhaps any other single nation in history over a similar span of time.

 

Hindsight

Looking back, it is hard not to wonder how much longer the Chinese monarchy might have lasted, had pro-Western technology and political institutions been more fully embraced within the royal court. Even after the British shamefully imposed the scourge of opium upon China, the Manchu dynasty was left standing for another half century. And while it may not be fair to lay responsibility for the fall of the monarchy directly at the feet of any one individual, the outsized nature of Cixi's direct and decades-long personal anti-Western impact certainly was a key contribution which invites attention, and begs questions. Under different guidance, how much longer might the monarchy have lasted? How much of the political turmoil and human suffering in the century that followed might have been mitigated? How much differently things might have turned out for China and the world, both in the twentieth century and today.

  

Chris Galbicsek studied Philosophy at Colgate University. He came to intensely appreciate history in the time since, and has recently launched a historically-themed t-shirt site, Exoteric Apparel, which aims to raise historical awareness through fashion.

 

Bibliography

Baum, Richard. University of California, Los Angeles. The Fall and Rise of China. The Great Courses, 2010.

Chang, Jung. Empress Dowager Cixi: The Concubine Who Launched Modern China. Knopf Publishing, 2013.

One of the most important events of the early twentieth century was the collapse of the Chinese Qing Dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution from 1911-12. But what was it and why did this monumental event happen? And was it inevitable? Scarlett Zhu returns to the site and explains all (PS – you can read Scarlett’s earlier article here.)

A battle outside Hankow in the 1911 Chinese Xinhai Revolution. Source: Wellcome Trust, available  here .

A battle outside Hankow in the 1911 Chinese Xinhai Revolution. Source: Wellcome Trust, available here.

The imperial court in the last days of the Qing Dynasty was a shadow of its former self.[1] Pressurized by the 1911 Chinese Revolution, on February 12, 1912, the Empress Dowager Longyu, with her young adopted son, the last emperor of China, Pu Yi, signed the abdication papers forcing the young emperor from the Dragon Throne. The act not only ended the Qing Dynasty at its last gasp, but also China’s millennia-long feudal rule. The reasons for the dynasty’s decline are fairly straightforward, but there has been a prolonged debate as to the relative weighting between them. It all boils down to the question of whether the nature of one event was the product of historical inevitability or a once preventable choice, whether the Qing Dynasty was destined to fall or whether it could have been saved. Some scholars argued the decisive turning point was its initial alienated identity, or Emperor Qian Long’s legacy; its internal socio-economic problems towards its final years or invasions from foreign powers. However, the more compelling case seems to be that the influence from Western societies and culture, which turned the once preventable choice into historical inevitability. Inevitability, in a historical context and in this case, would be the moment when the Qing Dynasty was incapable of avoiding the consequences of being overthrown. An assessment on inevitability and various turning points would be the best way to weigh up the importance of these factors.

 

An ethnic minority

It could be argued that the Qing Dynasty’s identity as a regime established by ethnic minorities determined its fate being “doomed from the beginning”. The Qing Dynasty was an empire established by the Manchus, a tribal minority which conquered Beijing in 1644. As Hsu puts it, in the end, "the very fact that the Qing was an alien dynasty continuously evoked Chinese protest in the form of secret society activities and nationalistic racial revolt and revolution."[2] The Qings did spend effort on trying to mitigate the discontent such as keeping the system of rule of the Ming government, promoting Neo Confucianism, which was a popular religion in China at the time, and allowing Han Chinese into its bureaucracy. But most of the time, it did much to show that the Manchus were separate and superior, with the prime example of prohibiting intermarriages between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. In this sense, because the majority Han Chinese would never have been content with being ruled by foreigners, internal discontent and rebellion was guaranteed. This was illustrated by the Revolt of the Three Feudatories by Han Chinese army officers in 1673. This also falls in line with Marxist historians’ view, as they see the historical process characterized by endless class struggles. In this case, it would be the oppressed Han Chinese against the oppressive Manchus, which indicated a struggle to overcome alienation successfully and thus the fall of the dynasty.

In short, the long-term resentment of the Han Chinese at being ruled by “foreigners” triggered a snowballing growth of opposition to the regime as it went on, such that it could be argued that the dynasty’s collapse became inevitable. However, this turning point was not the most decisive. This was due to the strength, assertiveness and high centralization enforced by its early founders and the fact that they all understood that the empire could only be held together by talking in political and religious idioms of their Han Chinese subjects. It meant the possibility of a submissive and marginal Han Chinese opposition and implied the survival of the dynasty was still open to them - a possibility that some argued was soon diminished when Qianlong came to power in1735.

 

A corrupt emperor

Emperor Qian Long’s legacy was another turning point which many argued that contributed the most to the inevitability. Despite the prosperity and peace Qian Long maintained throughout the empire, he, like many past emperors, became incompetent as a leader towards the end of his years. As the great Emperor aged, he began to adopt a series of measures which, with hindsight, planted the seeds for the inevitable downfall of the Manchus. The corruption was the most evident feature as untrustworthy officials and their needy relatives pocketed public funds. But Qianlong turned a blind eye to it, since the architect behind all this large-scale corruption and nepotism was his court favorite, He Shen. By the end of Qianlong's reign in 1796, the once-prospering treasury was “nearly depleted”[3]. In addition to this strain in the empire’s income, the untrained and ill equipped Bannerman and the Chinese Green Standard Army led by those corrupt generals was equally detrimental. This resulted in the failure to put down the famous White Lotus Rebellion in 1794 efficiently and quickly, and encouraged foreign invasions in the long term. The rebellion was significant as this was the first sign of the politicization of the general public. This was also the first peasant-led open rebellion against the extortion of tax collectors, which would eventually become a common feature towards the end of the dynasty. Furthermore, his dealings with the Europeans were also argued to encourage later aggressive foreign invasions as he adopted an isolationist approach. It could be argued that Qianlong’s reluctance to tackle corruption and to improve the quality of the military and his foreign policies made the collapse inevitable. However, the collapse at this point was not envisaged. The Qing Empire maintained goodwill from the West through trade and commerce. Alongside this, there was not a systematic breakdown within the government despite its ongoing corruption. Both factors ironically settled disputes and criticisms of the emperor, as people, whether rich or poor, high or low, were provided with great economic security, or at least from the surface it seemed this way - thus the possibility of the dynasty’s survival was still conceivable.

 

Weaknesses in society

The exposure of the structural socio-economic weaknesses of China in Qing’s later years, a third turning point, cannot be understated. Agriculture dominated 90 to 95 per cent of the Qing Dynasty’s rural economy[4], wealth distribution was unequal and there was significant population growth with its population exceeding 100 million, the largest hitherto in China’s history.[5] This made the economy and society incredibly weak when external shocks hit, like natural disasters and diseases. As far as Wu argued, two of the biggest floods in world history, the Yellow River flood in 1898 and the Yangtze River flood in 1911, helped to end the Qing Dynasty.[6]This pressure would ultimately tilt the balance of economic power[7] and lead to the collapse of the socio-economic system. A subsequent array of social unrest and discontent towards the Qing Dynasty was created, thus making the uneducated public more receptive to the idea of revolution. This was perhaps best illustrated by the outbreak of one of the bloodiest civil wars, the Taiping Rebellion led by the poor and the unemployed in 1850. Thus, the fact that economic and social practices, which were seen to be the backbone of the dynasty, were unsustainable meant that the fall was inevitable. However, this may not be the most convincing case. The peasants’ rebellions in response to socio-economic issues were short-lived (Dungan Revolt 1895–96) and were failures (Nian, Du Wenxiu, Dungan rebellions). Their reactions were also, to a large extent, controllable as long as Qing maintained the loyalty of the army and imposed a strong degree of force and terror. This turning point did not necessarily mean the outright fall of the Qing Dynasty, for peasants’ rebellions and the empire’s assertive suppression in response was a mode that had remained relatively unchanged for 2,000 years since the Han Dynasty[8], which ensured political stability and re-established state authority.

 

Foreign powers

The First Opium War in 1839 was argued to be another crucial turning point towards the inevitability of the fall, as Trotsky once described war as “a locomotive of history”[9]. It was the product of the collapse of negotiations between the British and the Chinese to open up trade barriers and soon turned China into “a drug-crazed nation”[10]. Qing’s army may have had the capacity to put down internal strikes, but they were no match for external artillery and naval strength. The event is significant in signaling the beginning of “unequal treaties” (Treaty of Nanjing, Treaty of Bogue) and a chain of foreign invasions and interference (The Invasion of the Eight-Nation Alliance). This meant that the Chinese lost confidence in the once-invincible army and the Imperial political system. In turn, this led to even more unrest in the Chinese society, with patriots enraged at the weakness of their country and forming revolutionary movements. One of the most notable was the Boxer Rebellion, which initially was against both the Qing government and the foreign spheres of influence. China’s defeats, the exacerbation of the socio-economic problems by the wars and the protests that followed did mean the empire’s future looked incredibly bleak. It seems that the collapse was highly possible. However, this turning point was not the most important one. Firstly, it is important to note that the Western powers generally had no intention to overthrow the Qing Dynasty, but rather desired to turn it into a subordinate. Secondly, the Qing government was clever enough to manipulate the patriotism in their favor. They managed to mobilize the protestors against the foreign powers, as demonstrated by the change of the peasants’ aims in the Boxer Rebellion.

 

Western ideas

An accomplice of foreign invasions, Western influence and culture, was argued to have a profound impact on the inevitable downfall. It reflected the great sense of crisis and highlighted the need of a change. Western modernistic literature, religion and political ideologies promised a liberal and capitalist utopia, a promotion of love and peace by Christianity and the subsequent economic prosperity following industrialization. This made the political repression of Qing seem remarkably backward and thus hugely appealed to the public. People were more educated, receptive and sensitive toward revolutionary ideas, with the example of the wave of students travelling abroad to study being radicalized, one of which became the leader in the 1911 Revolution, the “Father of Modern China”, Sun Yat-sen.

Arguably Emperor Guang Xu’s last attempt to save the country based on Western culture, the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898, made the collapse inevitable. The example set by Western powers provided the Manchus with a route to ensure their survival. The reform consisted of numerous progressive ideas such as capitalism, constitutional monarchy, and industrialization. Despite the reform ending within 103 days, it opened up expectations which the traditional ruling elites of Qing would never be able to satisfy, particularly given their deeply rooted backward imperialism and reluctance to change. Great impetus was given to revolutionary forces within China and such sentiments directly contributed to the success of the Chinese Revolution barely a decade later, which ultimately brought down the hundred-year-old rule of the Qing Dynasty.

 

The key factors

Two elements indicate that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 was the decisive turning point for the destiny of the Qing Dynasty. Firstly, it was the first time that such a huge wave of universal discontent rose. It was the outburst of the accumulation of national resentment, unrest and instability. Reasons for the outburst varied, ranging from the failure of Qing to reduce the ethnic alienation, to confront foreign aggression, to solve socio-economic problems, which united a vast number of people with a variety of class, background and interests. Started by the mishandling of the building of a railway, the situation soon escalated into successive and spontaneous uprisings that occurred throughout the year across remarkably different regions. By the end of the year, 14 provinces had declared themselves against the Qing leadership.[11] Debatably the previous rebellions had been motivated by the same factors, but never had the public been so aware of the sharp contrast between the East’s backwardness and the West’s superiority, which brings in the second factor. It was the immense exposure to Western cultural influence and ideologies which heightened the pressure on the regime. China’s issues across all aspects of society were evident and the possibility of their nation pursuing the path of the modern powerhouses like Britain and France seemed achievable. This in turn also gave the leadership the ideas it needed, as it was mainly led by groups of intelligentsia who received profound influence from Western education, such as Sun Yat-sen. Hence when universal discontent met foreign ideologies, the collapse of the imperial Qing Dynasty had finally become inevitable.

 

The end

Thus before the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the dynasty’s collapse has always been a preventable choice. Sun Yat-sen once said that when he first advanced the Principle of Nationalism, he won responses mostly from secret societies but "seldom from the middle-and-above social strata"[12]. This is highly suggestive of the fact that the essential elements and support for the collapse was absent previously. It also indicates the impromptu nature of the 1911 revolution. However, as progressive Western ideas prevailed and nationalism spread at a tremendous pace, penetrating into every stratum of society, almost everyone came to realize the necessity of waging a revolution.[13] By claiming the fall was made inevitable by Qing’s initial identity or Qianlong’s legacy would be a claim largely reliant on hindsight. Its internal socio-economic issues, on the other hand, were persistent and prolonged by the use of fear and terror. The West’s invasions by warfare can be regarded to be far less important than the invasions by culture and ideologies, as foreign powers only envisioned the Qing to be a submissive puppet government. In conclusion, until the Qing Dynasty was highly exposed to the Western ideologies which nurtured a high level of awareness for change and comparison, its downfall was never inevitable.

 

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You can read Scarlett’s article on the burning of the Summer Palace by the British and French here.

 

[1] The Extraordinary Life of The Last Emperor of China, Jia Yinghua, 2012

[2] The Myth of the 'Five Human Relations' of Confucius, Hsu Dau-lin, 1970-71

[3] http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Qianlong_Emperor

[4] A Changing China: Emerging Governance, Economic and Social Trends, Civil Service College, P71

[5] China’s Population Expansion and Its Causes during the Qing Period, 1644–1911, Kent Deng, P6

[6] History of the Qing Dynasty, Annie Wu, 2015

[7] Manslaughter, Markets and Moral Economy, Thomas M. Buoye

[8] A Changing China: Emerging Governance, Economic and Social Trends, Civil Service College, P71

[9] Report on the Communist International, Leon Trotsky, 1922

[10] Pathway to the Stars, DD Rev Ernest a. Steadman, 2007

[11] http://www.britannica.com/event/Chinese-Revolution-1911-1912

[12] Sheng Hu, "Anti-imperialism, democracy and industrialization in the 1911 Revolution," in The 1911 Revolution: A Retrospective After 70 years, 9-25. Beijing: New World Press, 1983.

[13] Shu Li, "A Re-Assessment of Some Questions Concerning the 1911 Revolution."  in The 1911 Revolution: A Retrospective After 70 years, 67-127. Beijing: New World Press, 1983.

In 1860 Western forces burned the Summer Palace, a wonderful and magnificent building to the northwest of Beijing, China. British and French troops pillaged the palace, and then burned it to the ground in a terrifying act during the Second Opium War. Here, Scarlett Zhu explains what happened and responses to the attack.

The looting of the Summer Palace by Anglo-French forces in 1860.

The looting of the Summer Palace by Anglo-French forces in 1860.

"We call ourselves civilized and them barbarians," wrote the outraged author, Victor Hugo. "Here is what Civilization has done to Barbarity."

One of the deepest, unhealed and entrenched historical wounds of China stems from the destruction of the country's most beautiful palace in 1860 - the burning of the Old Summer Palace by the British and French armies. As Charles George Gordon, a soldier of the force, wrote about his experience, one can "scarcely imagine the beauty and magnificence of the places being burnt."

 

The palace that once boasted of possessing the most extensive and invaluable art collection of China, became a site of ruins within 3 days in the face of some 3,500 screaming soldiers and burning torches. Dense smoke and ashes eclipsed the sky, marble arches crumbled, and sacred texts were torn apart.  At the heart of this merciless act stood Lord Elgin, the British High Commissioner to China, a man who preferred revenge and retaliation to peace talks and compromise. He was also a man highly sensitive to any injustices or humiliation suffered by his own country. Thus, the act was a response to the imprisonment and torture of the delegates sent for a negotiation on the Qing dynasty's surrender. However, as modern Chinese historians would argue, this was a far-from-satisfactory excuse to justify this performance of wickedness, as before the imprisonment took place, there had already been extensive looting by the French and British soldiers and the burning was only "the final blow".

The treasures of the Imperial Palace were irresistible and within the reach of the British and French. Officers and men seemed to have been seized with temporary insanity, said one witness; in body and soul they were absorbed in one pursuit: plunder. The British and the French helped themselves to all the porcelain, the silk and the ancient books - there were an estimated 1.5 million ancient Chinese relics taken away. The extent of this rampant abuse was highlighted even more by the burning of the Emperor's courtiers, eunuch servants and maids - many estimates place the death toll in the hundreds. This atrocious indifference towards human life inflamed international opposition, notably illustrated by Hugo's radiant criticisms.

 

The response to the attack

But there was no significant resistance to the looting, even though many Qing soldiers were in the vicinity - perhaps they had already anticipated the reality of colonial oppression or did not bother themselves with the painful loss of the often-distant imperial family. But the Emperor, XianFeng, was not an unreceptive spectator; in fact, he was said to have vomited blood upon hearing the news.

However, there was evidence to suggest that some soldiers did feel that this was "a wretchedly demoralizing work for an army". As James M'Ghee, chaplain to the British forces, writes in his narrative, he shall "ever regret the stern but just necessity which laid them in ashes". He later acknowledged that it was "a sacrifice of all that was most ancient and most beautiful”, yet he could not tear himself away from the palace's vanished glory. Historian Greg M. Thomas went so far as to argue that the French Ambassador and generals refused to participate this destruction as it "exceeded the military aims of their mission", and would be an irreparable damage to an important cultural monument.

Nowadays, what is left of the palace are the gigantic marble and stone blocks, which used to be backdrops of the European-style fountains situated in the distant corner of the Imperial gardens for entertaining the Emperor, since those made out of timber and tile did not survive the fires. The remains acted as a somber reminder of the West's ransack and the East's "century of humiliation".

This is more than a story of patriotism, nationalism and universal discontent. History used to teach us that patriotism isn't history, but rather propaganda in disguise. Yet how could one ignore and omit a historical event so demoralizing and compelling on its own, that it is no longer a matter of morality and dignity, but a matter of seeking the truth, tracing the past and its inseparable link with the present? When considering the savage and blatant destruction of the Old Summer Palace, along with the unspoken hatred of the humiliated and the suppressed, it seems therefore appropriate to end with the cries of the enraged Chinese commoners as they witnessed the worst of mankind's atrocities: “Kill the foreign devils! Kill the foreign devils!”

 

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Bibliography

1. Hugo, Victor. The sack of the summer palace, November 1985

2. Bowlby, Chris. "The palace of shame that makes China angry"

3.  M'Ghee, Robert. How we got to Pekin: A Narrative of the Campaign in China of 1860, pp. 202-216, 1862

4. "The Burning of the Yuan Ming Yuan: 150 Years Later", http://granitestudio.org/2010/10/24/the-burning-of-the-yuanmingyuan-150-years-later

5. "Fine China, but at what cost?”, http://thepolitic.org/fine-china-but-at-what-cost/