George McClellan: Problematic U.S. Civil War Commander

Major General George McClellan was one of the central figures of the Civil War. He served as commander of the Department of Ohio, the Army of the Potomac, and was Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army for 5 months. Historically, his command decisions have been criticized and his personal qualities are examined minutely. He represents a paradox: a superbly prepared and highly intelligent man who, during his moment on the world stage, failed in almost every task he performed.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

George B. McClellan. Portrait by Mathew Brady.

Background

McClellan came from a wealthy, elite Philadelphia family.  His father was Dr George McClellan, a foremost surgeon of his day and the founder of Jefferson Medical College. A great grandfather was a brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. After attending the University of Pennsylvania for two years, he left to enroll at West Point, where he graduated second in his class at age 19 in 1846, losing the top spot because of weaker drawing skills. He was friends with aristocratic southerners including George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and AP Hill.

He was breveted a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War he served as an engineer building bridges for Winfield Scott’s army. He was frequently under fire and was breveted to first lieutenant and captain. Since his father was friends with General Scott, he received a coveted spot to perform reconnaissance for the general.

He returned to West Point as an engineering instructor after the war. He was given charge of various engineering projects. He was also sent on a secret mission to Santo Domingo by the Secretary of State to scout its military preparedness. In 1852 he helped to translate a manual on bayonet tactics from French. In 1853, he participated in land surveys to scout a transcontinental railroad route. The route he advised through the Cascade Mountains, Yakima Pass, was known to be impassable during the winter snow. The Governor of Washington territory, himself a top of the class graduate of West Point and a mathematics whiz, had made his own survey. He knew that McClellan hadn’t studied the situation carefully. Time has shown that he missed three greatly superior passes in the near vicinity, which were eventually used for railroads and interstate highways.

He was then appointed By Secretary of War Jefferson Davis as captain of the new First Cavalry Regiment, one of two that would be the proving grounds for the Civil War. Because he spoke French fluently, he was sent to be an observer during the Crimean War. There he conferred with military leaders and the royal families on both sides. He observed the siege of Sebastopol first-hand. His report was hailed for its brilliance. McClellan's observations and insights from the Crimean War played a role in shaping his views on military organization, logistics, and the importance of proper training. He was particularly impressed by the Allied forces' well-organized supply lines, medical services, and use of siege warfare. However, he totally missed the significance of how rifled weapons had changed military strategy, an error that would have substantial repercussions in the conflict ahead. McClellan wrote a cavalry manual and designed a saddle, called the McClellan saddle, which is still in use for ceremonies. This was a promising young man with a great future.

But the fact is, promotion in the small pre-war army was very slow, and McClellan was an ambitious man. At age 31, he resigned to become Chief Engineer of Illinois Central Railroad, a position with a huge increase in salary. There he would be promoted to Vice President and work with an obscure railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.

McClellan was, frankly, bored with railroad management. He served as chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and then became president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. McClellan supported the presidential campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 election. He also married Mary Ellen Marcy, a woman who had fielded 8 prior proposals, rejecting 7 of them, including a prior one from McClellan; the man she had accepted was not liked by her family, so he withdrew. Finally McClellan asked again, and they were married in New York City in May 1860.

Start of the Civil War & Rapid Promotion

The firing at Fort Sumter changed the trajectory of a lot of people’s lives. For McClellan, it was transformative: he found himself a highly regarded and sought after authority on large scale war and tactics, having written two volumes on the subject. He was wanted by the Governors of 3 states to lead their militias, and he settled on Ohio. He was commissioned a major general in the regular army on Amy 14, 1861, outranking everyone except Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator. Once again, political connections moved him rapidly to the top.

After losing First Manassas, Lincoln needed a military leader who could win battles. McClellan had several victories in western Virginia including Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain, and was being hailed as the “Young Napoleon” and “Napoleon of the Present War” in the press. But the fact is, McClellan’s actions there showed a number of disturbing features that in retrospect were prescient. McClellan failed to attack at Cheat Mountain several times despite action being underway. Colonel Rosecrans was promised reinforcements but McClellan didn’t send them, forcing him to achieve victory on his own; McClellan’s report gave him no credit.  Another subordinate was warned to follow cautiously but then criticized in the report for moving slowly.

Positive Attributes

There can be no doubt that he was a fabulous administrator and logistician. He excelled in organizing and training the Union Army at the start of the war, preparing them for the battles ahead. His meticulous attention to detail and emphasis on discipline contributed to a well-structured and efficient force. Additionally, he implemented effective supply and transportation systems to support his troops. His skills in these administrative tasks were superb and are appropriately admired by all.

Criticisms as Commander in Chief

Throughout his tenure as a commander, McClellan consistently exhibited a tendency to overestimate the strength of his opponents and to be overly cautious in his decision-making, often erring on the side of preserving his own forces rather than aggressively engaging the enemy. McClellan was reluctant to begin his offensives, routinely delayed attacking, demanded an impossible number of reinforcements even though his army greatly outnumbered the enemy, displayed insubordination to the President and civilian leaders, allowed the enemy to escape repeatedly, and retreated several times despite not having lost a battle. He had an inability to create original or innovative ideas, despite being tremendously smart and a quick study. His cautious approach to battle and reluctance to take decisive offensive actions limited his overall success as a military leader.

Over-Cautiousness

Several instances highlight McClellan's consistent pattern of over-cautiousness, which led to missed opportunities and strategic setbacks:

• Peninsula Campaign: McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was marked by his excessive caution. Despite having a numerical advantage over Confederate General Robert E. Lee, McClellan moved slowly and hesitated to press his advantage, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces and ultimately repel McClellan's advances.

• Seven Days' Battles: During the Seven Days' Battles, McClellan's caution led him to withdraw his forces in the face of Lee's attacks, despite having numerical superiority. This retreat allowed Lee to successfully defend Richmond and avoid being decisively defeated.

• Maryland Campaign: After discovering Special Order #191, McClellan has been criticized traditionally as moving slowly. Even though McClellan had gained intelligence indicating that Lee's forces were divided, he still proceeded cautiously. However, recent scholarship has questioned the accuracy of this conclusion.

• Battle of Antietam: This battle became the single bloodiest day in American history, and McClellan's failure to exploit his opportunities to defeat Lee's army decisively was attributed to his caution.

• Following the Battle of Antietam, McClellan was slow to pursue Lee's retreating army, allowing them to escape across the Potomac River into Confederate territory. His hesitation to pursue and engage the enemy hindered the Union's success in taking advantage of its tactical success.

Repeated Inflated Estimates of Enemy Strength

McClellan’s propensity to inflate enemy troop numbers occurred so routinely that it’s beyond possibility that it wasn’t intentional, and perhaps psychologically motivated.

The pattern of inflating enemy troop numbers was a recurring theme that marked McClellan's career. McClellan doubled the number of troops he had defeated at Rich Mountain, making his victory appear spectacular. He tripled the number of actual troops facing him across the Potomac, leading to a crisis sense and elevation to commander in chief. In the Peninsula Campaign, the process reached its zenith: hyper-inflate the numbers of the enemy, lament about what was necessary to win, when it was impossible to provide that number to reluctantly proceed anyway, and blame superiors if victory wasn’t achieved.

Procrastination

McClellan’s fatal flaw as general was that he was viewed as a procrastinator. His continual delays and refusal to move against the Confederates allowed them to call in reinforcements and win key battles with less than half the manpower.  McClellan had a long history of delaying attacks. Maybe he thought that he had to plan in great detail before launching them. But these delays were never beneficial and never justifiable. His delay to initiate the battle at Antietam cost him a decisive victory and ultimately led to his dismissal.

He was an excellent administrative general, but as a tactician he was incapable of taking chances, and war is all about chances. Strategically he really wasn’t bad: Peninsula was an interesting idea but he did not follow through tactically. He wanted to cross the James, as Grant would do 2 years later, but was denied. He had a great advantage at Antietam and won, but he failed to pursue the enemy. He might have been incapable of responding creatively to the real time exigencies of battle.  He could not creatively adjust his plan. Thus, at Antietam, when his plan of assault did not unfold like a predetermined Napoleonic success, he was unable to develop any new concepts on the spot to adapt to the changed circumstances.

It is also possible that there were cynical benefits to General McClellan's exaggerated reports of the enemy's size. By consistently overestimating the enemy's strength, McClellan could have positioned himself as the savior of the Union, creating a narrative that he was the only one capable of defending against such a formidable foe. This could have enhanced his political stature and potentially garnered more support from certain factions. McClellan's tendency to exaggerate the enemy's strength could have provided him with a convenient excuse for his reluctance to engage in battle or take more aggressive actions. This allowed him to avoid the risks associated with decisive battles, while placing the blame on the perceived overwhelming enemy forces .And, by portraying the enemy as stronger than they actually were, McClellan might have been able to secure additional resources, troops, and supplies for his own forces. This could have allowed him to build up a larger and more well-equipped army, potentially boosting his own reputation in the process. Finally, the exaggerated reports could have been a way for McClellan to deflect blame for any failures or setbacks onto the supposedly formidable enemy forces. By doing so, he could have avoided taking responsibility for any missteps in his own strategy or decision-making.

Psychological Profile

Psychological profiling of historical figure is fraught with hazard. Nevertheless, historians have found McClellan to be an excellent subject for this kind of analysis. McClellan has been portrayed as “… proud, sensitive, overwrought, tentative, quick to exult and to despair”. He was a competent administrator and engineer who had no skill at winning battles. McClellan's actions and exaggerations might have been influenced not only by strategic considerations but also by his own ambitions and self-preservation. His reluctance to engage in battle can be attributed in part to his fear of failure. His job was to lead, he was supposed to be a great leader, but he was afraid to be wrong. McClellan was more concerned with not losing than with winning. In his mind, as the fate of the Union rested on his shoulders, he could not allow a defeat.

Stephen Sears wrote: “There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision.”

A fragile ego covered by conceit was reflected in many of his letters to his wife.

He had to build himself up because in fact he lacked self-confidence. McClellan often suggested that divine intervention had chosen him to save the Union. McClellan frequently thanked God for allowing him to be the deliverer of the nation. His letters to Ellen Marcy, his wife, have been widely quoted in this regard (see Table). Many of the letters were intentionally destroyed or burned in a fire after the war, and there is a great deal of speculation as to exactly why the ones that remained still exist. Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses” in his memoirs.

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Some well-known quotes from his letters to his wife:

“I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land … I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator. . . . But nothing of that kind would please me. Therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self denial!”

“Half a dozen of the oldest made the remark . . . ‘Why how young you look — yet an old soldier!! ... It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?”

“The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever. What a specimen to be at the head of our affairs now.”

““It may be that at some distant day I too shall totter away from” Washington, “a worn out old soldier. . . . Should I ever become vainglorious & ambitious remind me of that spectacle.”

“I ought to take good care of these men. I believe they love me from the bottom of their hearts. I can see it in their faces when I pass among them.”

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Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote that a review of his personal correspondence during the war, especially with his wife, reveals “a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.” McClellan thought of himself as the only man who could save the union, and was willing to sacrifice anything and anyone—mentors, colleagues, his own men—to further his ambition.  In that sense, George McClellan's memoirs and letters provide some indications of his personality and mindset, and a narcissistic tendency is suggested. But drawing definitive conclusions about his psychological condition, such as labeling him as a narcissist, solely based on these sources can be misleading.

In contradistinction, Lincoln had failed in life before; he made himself a success by hard work and careful thought, and wasn’t afraid of risk. McClellan had been handed everything, had always come out on top, and was afraid to fail. In war, as in much of life, fortune favors the bold. McClellan’s fear of failure and routine promotions on the basis of political connections would be his downfall.

Relationship with President Lincoln

The personal and professional conflict between General McClellan and President Lincoln that manifest in 1862, and continued into the election of 1864, is one of the fascinating subthemes of Lincoln’s presidency. Lincoln and General McClellan didn’t like one another and didn’t get along well. McClellan believed he had a superior education and family background; Lincoln knew he was being looked down upon, but with his superior emotional quotient, he knew that what was important was getting victories, and if this man could, then he would put up with him.

They originally met before the war: Lincoln was an attorney for the Illinois railroad and the two spent time together between cases. He saw Lincoln as socially inferior and intellectually not nearly on his level. He found the country stories Lincoln told to be below him.

Once the war began, Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan clashed repeatedly. McClellan constantly ignored Lincoln’s orders, and did not share his plans with anyone including the president. McClellan let it be known that he had contempt for Lincoln. He called him the ‘original gorilla’ in public. On November 13, 1861, Lincoln Seward and Hay stopped at McClellan’s home to visit with him. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan’s retirement to bed.

Historian William C. Davis wrote that in 1861, “believing what the press and an admiring circle of sycophants on his staff and high command said about him, Little Mac bristled at being subordinate to the civil authority, and especially to Lincoln, of whom he almost instantly developed a condescending and patronizing opinion. He not only regarded the president as his intellectual and social inferior, but also passed on that attitude to those around him – or even fostered it.”

Famously, President Lincoln came to visit General McClellan on October 3rd. As you can see from the photo by Alexander Gardner, the temperature of the meeting was frosty.  Abraham Lincoln spent four days travelling over the field, just two weeks after the guns fell silent. He met with McClellan, trying to prod his young Napoleon into action, met with other generals, and with thousands of wounded soldiers, Including both Union and Confederate. His trip was well-documented, and the photos of his visit are among the most famous of the entire war.

Lincoln expected McClellan to pursue Lee and engage him in a decisive battle as soon as possible. Although the Union outnumbered the Confederate army by almost three to one, McClellan did not move his army for over a month. McClellan overestimated the size of Lee’s force, suggesting that 100,000 troops were in his command, when he likely had just more than half that number. McClellan also noted that his requisitions for supplies had not been filled. Although traditionally these complaints are dismissed as a manufactured excuse, substantial documentation suggests that McClellan had a genuine supply crisis.

It may be that top Lincoln administration officials ruined his reputation intentionally for political reasons. Knowing that he was popular with the troops and a Democrat, they could see where 1864 was leading. That is not to say that McClellan wasn’t slow at times, but it may have been exaggerated in retrospect when he became Lincoln’s opponent.

What were McClellan’s political opinions about slavery, defeating the South, and his post bellum vision?

McClellan’s view on how the war should be prosecuted differed significantly from Mr. Lincoln’s views. McClellan was a Democrat. He was anti-emancipation. He made clear also his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a war tactic, which put him at odds with the executive branch and some of his subordinates. He had a set of political beliefs almost completely at odds with the Republican Party, the party in power. Most of the officers in the United States Army were Democrats. The army was a conservative institution and many of these officers didn’t agree with the vision for the United States that many of the Republicans had, especially the radical Republicans in Congress, who even departed more radically from Lincoln.

What McClellan wanted to do was to restore the Union to what it had been. He was very happy with that Union. And that was not going to be possible during the war once it had gone past a certain point. McClellan was very clear about what kind of war he wanted. He wanted to beat the Rebels just enough to persuade them to come back under the Union. He didn’t want to slaughter their armies. He didn’t want to overturn their civilization, and he wanted to keep emancipation out of the picture.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then we do today and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain.

As he wrote to one influential Northern Democratic friend, and I’m quoting him here, “Help me to dodge the n____. I’m fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union.” That’s McClellan’s take on the war. He was not fighting to free the slaves, and he was not alone. McClellan almost never spoke of African Americans, and when he did it was always in disparaging terms. McClellan was a quiet racist, one who wanted to ensure that the Civil War ended soon so that the question of black emancipation would not become the leading element.

Now, it must be emphasized that up to that stage of the war, Lincoln was also highlighting union and not slavery. He downplayed emancipation because he thought it would alienate the border states, and he wanted to make sure that they stayed in line. After Antietam, Lincoln thought the North was ready for emancipation, but McClellan never changed his attitude.

Quotes from President Lincoln’s Letters to General McClellan

“After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington, and Manassas Junction … My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected– It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell– … I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mannassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied…”

“There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War, a statement, taken as he said, from your own returns, making 108.000 then with you, and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85.000, when all en route to you shall have reached you– How can the discrepancy of 23.000 be accounted for?” (April 7, 1862)

“And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow– I am powerless to help this– You will do me the justice to remember that I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty — that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place– The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated–“

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?” (October 13, 1862)

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.” You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.”

“I have just read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?”

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The 1864 Presidential election

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln  were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and famously, Lincoln thought that too.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Clement  Vallandigham calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant. He did not run on a platform of surrender, as is often alleged.

To get the nomination, McClellan had to defeat his opponents Horatio Seymour, New York Governor, and Thomas Seymour, Connecticut governor. Both were real “peace” candidates. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign floundered as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked discord.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over 90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a population that was northern, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation. Moreover, McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey.

What do you think of George McClellan? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

• https://www.historynet.com/george-mcclellan/#:~:text=He%20graduated%20second%20in%20his,through%20often%20rugged%2C%20inhospitable%20terrain.

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=etd#:~:text=McClellan%20loved%20his%20troops%20and%20they%2C%20in%20turn%2C,of%20the%20relationships%20he%20developed%20while%20in%20command

• https://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy/

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/civil-war-gen-george-mcclellan-deemed-a-savior-then-a-failure/2011/09/21/gIQAfpF6SL_story.html

• https://www.wondriumdaily.com/american-civil-war-the-fault-lines-in-the-lincoln-mcclellan-relationship/   

• https://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincolns-contemporaries/abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.

• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X.

• Bonekemper, Edward H. McClellan and failure. McFarland & Co, 2007

• Waugh, John C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Book Review: World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein

We don’t usually do book reviews on the site, but we made an exception for regular contributor Roy Williams. Here, he reviews World Systems Analysis by Emmanuel Wallerstein.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

The core-periphery model. Source: Mirkyton, available here.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet significant analysis of the interactions of global market capitalism. Wallerstein divides the world into 3 different categories of economic output and exchange, the core, periphery, and semi periphery. This division essentially describes the western world and certain westernized countries as existing within the core of economic output, with countries like Brazil and India taking the place of the semi-periphery and the rest of the developing world within the peripheral sphere of economic output. This model is coupled with Wallerstein’s analysis of the unequal exchange involved in capitalism which keeps certain nations within the core and others in the periphery and semi-periphery.

Wallerstein asserts that this world system had its origins in 16th century Europe as the western world began to conquer and colonize new territory and bring the process of capitalism to the larger world. Through the process of colonialism, the beginning of a global system of capitalist interaction began. Wallerstein also describes the monumental change of the French Revolution which brought about the normalization and institution of liberalism as a political ideology associated with the global world system. However, Wallerstein also asserts that the global system of capitalism was thrown into crisis with the world revolution of 1968. This leads to Wallerstein’s final chapter and larger argument for the eventual dissolution of the world system and its potential replacement with a new system.

World Systems Analysis provides a general yet beneficial analysis of the world system of capitalism in unifying fields such as history, sociology, and economics. The problems of World Systems analysis rests in its inherent eurocentrism which discounts the reality that the system of European hegemony was built upon the empires of Asia and the Middle East during the 13th and 14th centuries. Janet Abu-Lughod provides a detailed criticism of Wallerstein’s Eurocentric assertions in Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 by describing the world system which preceded European hegemony and the world system we recognize today.

The other problem of Wallerstein’s World Systems Analysis rests in its final argument that capitalism and the global order are in crisis and therefore on the brink of replacement. Capitalism is always in a state of crisis as it constantly evolves. Products and commodities are constantly shifting from the core to the periphery and nations constantly move on the pendulum of development. Wallerstein’s final argument while moving to a degree, is not necessarily based in reality. The importance of World Systems Analysis is not in its direct accuracy or prophetic notions of a changing future but in its understanding of the movement of capitalism and the understanding of global economic and political interactions. This book stands as a great opening to a global dialectic but it does not necessarily present the final or most compelling word on analyzing the world system.

Book available: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Please let us know your thoughts below if you’ve read the book.

Bibliography

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. World-Systems Analysis An Introduction. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. Before European Hegemony The World System A.D. 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

The 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet, Florida

Overlooking the popular seaside city of Saint Augustine, Florida is the Castillo de San Marcos, an imposing 17th century fortress constructed by early Spanish Colonials to project power and defend their settlements in Florida and surrounding environs. The role of the fortress had transitioned from that of a military stronghold to a delightful tourist attraction, enticing a multitude of tourists from around the world each year to visit. Not far from Castillo de San Marcos stand in scenic solitude a rather underwhelming fortified watchtower called Fort Matanzas. This peculiar structure was built near the site of one of early North America’s most grisly massacres, indicated by the name of the watchtower and inlet Matanzas, meaning massacre or slaughter in Spanish. It was here on this panoramic beach in September of 1565 that close to 250 French Protestants or Huguenots were slain per the orders of Admiral Pedro Menendez de Aviles, acting on behalf of his Sovereign Philip the Second of Spain. At this time Europe was plagued by a multitude of religious wars and conflicts stemming from the inception of the Protestant Reformation. The turmoil would spill out of Europe and manifest itself in the New World leading to dire consequences.

Brian Hughes explains.

A depiction of the massacre.

Following the Protestant Reformation in 1517 Europe swiftly spiraled into religious conflict in which unparalleled levels of violence, destruction, and horrors would not be replicated or surpassed until the Napoleonic and World Wars of later centuries. The impetus for religious reform is beyond the scope of this article but the results gnawed at the very foundational socio-political foundations of Europe and would persist for centuries. Certain regions were more embroiled in conflict than others, particularly the states of Central and Western Europe such as the Holy Roman Empire, France and Spain.

Coinciding with these horrific events was the further discovery and exploration of North and South America following the successful exploits of Christopher Columbus decades before. Shortly thereafter Europeans began to exploit these lands and transform them into new geopolitical fronts. The Spanish, staunch Catholics who spearheaded the initial discoveries quickly achieved dominance and gained the most influence in the whole of the Caribbean region as they established settlements and military outposts on islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and a large Peninsula which jutted from the north which the Spanish named La Florida. But the Spanish would not be the only Europeans with ambitions of overseas Empire.

French presence

A small band of French colonists led by Jean Ribault and Rene de Laudonniere established a settlement at the mouth of the St. Johns River which the French named the River of May near the present-day city of Jacksonville. There they hastily constructed a small fort naming it Fort Caroline after the French Monarch King Charles IX. Most of the French Colonists were Huguenots an influential Protestant minority who fled their native France as a means to escape religious persecution, not entirely dissimilar reasons in which the Pilgrims fled England decades later.

The French presence to the north was troublesome to the Spanish as not only was Florida land claimed by Spain, but the majority of the French colonists were Huguenots, sworn enemies of the devout Catholics of Spain. This did not sit well with King of Spain, Philip the Second. Philip dispatched Admiral Pedro Menéndez de Aviles to establish a permanent settlement in Florida and simultaneously root the French interlopers out. Menendez departed span with 800 soldiers, sailors, artisans, and would be colonists, successfully reaching Florida in August of 1565. Landing first near Cape Canaveral Menendez turned northward finding good anchorage and deciding to make landfall. The Spanish would christen their new settlement “San Augustine” which remains to this day the oldest continuously inhabited city in the United States.

The French understood the vulnerability of their situation and Florida. Admiral of France and Huguenot leader Gaspard de Coligny ordered French Admiral Jean Ribault with 600 personnel to defend the fledgling fort. Ribault was able to catch up with Menendez off the coast of Florida and a brief, but inconclusive naval engagement followed. The French fleet withdrew allowing Menendez valuable time to regroup.

Bad luck would soon befall the French squadron as a hurricane swept the French fleet away from the coast granting valuable time for Menendez and his retinue.

Spanish attack

Menendez then led his body of troops overland to attack Fort Caroline. To this day the terrain of Florida, although flat, can be some of the most difficult to traverse. The Spaniards, burdened by cumbersome armor, gear, and weapons trudged through swamps, impenetrable forests all in the midst of the tropical heat of late summer in Florida. Much of these hardships were compounded by the fact that the same hurricane which swept Ribault's fleet away lingered to pour torrential rains upon the Spanish column.

In spite of these difficulties the Spaniards successfully reached Fort Caroline confirming Menendez’s suspicions that the fort was virtually undefended. The Spanish then launched a successful surprise attack capturing the fort and its surrounding outposts much to the shock and horror of the unsuspecting French colonists. The Spanish killed and captured the majority of the Huguenots who comprised mostly of artisans and various other laborers. Of the 240 occupants 132 were slain. Menendez decided to spare most of the woman and children from the initial slaughter as the Spanish quickly consolidated their position knowing that Ribault was still somewhere off the coast.

Miraculously, Ribault survived the hurricane and subsequent shipwreck along with a handful of his men. They began their trek northward hoping still to arrive at Fort Caroline in time. Menendez received word of this via local indigenous tribes and quickly gathered most of his men and marched south back towards Saint Augustine to intercept the Ribault and other French survivors.

Menendez successfully enveloped Ribault on the inlet that would soon bear the name of what was to occur. The Huguenot prisoners were given one final meal before being bound and brutally massacred on the beach. Only 16 prisoners would be spared, a mix of professed Catholics and artisans necessary for the survival of the new settlement.

The Religious Wars of Europe would only escalate and worsen over the coming decades, with the pendulums of power shifting for both Catholics and Protestants alike. But on a desolate inlet on the East Coast of Florida Huguenot ambitions of overseas Empire would perish forever.

What do you think of the 1565 Massacre at Matanzas Inlet? Let us know below.

Winston Churchill’s Anti-Appeasement Views in the 1930s

British politician Winston Churchill was famously against the appeasement of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in the 1930s. However, a public who still remembered World War One, were not altogether sympathetic towards these arguments. Here, Bilal Junejo looks at this period.

Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain in 1935.

“Appeasement” refers to “the response of British foreign policy makers in the 1930s to the rise of the dictator powers, especially Nazi Germany … it is seen as a policy of making one-sided concessions, often at the expense of third parties and with nothing offered in return except promises of better behaviour in the future, in a vain attempt to satisfy the aspirations of the aggressor states (Dutton, 2007).”

Appeasement arose as “an attempt to adjust the balance between the victorious and vanquished powers of the peace settlement of 1919 by concessions based on the widely held feeling that the terms of that peace had been unacceptably harsh (Dutton, 2007).” It would also be helpful to remember what is meant linguistically by the word “appease” — “to pacify or placate someone by acceding to their demands”, as per the Oxford English Dictionary. The meaning implies the presence of a choice for the appeaser. One does not “accede” to a demand when one does not have a choice in resisting it — one simply acquiesces therein! Since the application of the word “appeasement” to British foreign policy in the 1930s implies that there was nothing inevitable about that policy — that it could have been different, had its makers so chosen — we must consider the reasoning which was propounded at the time (i.e. without the benefit of hindsight) in favour of that policy, if we are to be at all able to determine just how realistic, in the sense of being practicable, were the arguments which Churchill put forward against it.

The doctrine of collective security, which was laid down in Article 16 of the League of Nations’ Covenant, stipulated that the League must present a united front in the face of unprovoked aggression against any member. However, “the basic premise of collective security was that all nations would view every threat to security in the same way and be prepared to run the same risks in resisting it (Kissinger, 1994, page 52).” In an organisation which boasted 60 different members from around the world at its greatest extent in the mid-thirties, this was never likely to be the case, least of all after the Great Depression’s advent in 1929, when the economic woes of Great Britain, one of the League’s principal ‘policemen’, not only precluded the imposition of meaningful economic sanctions by her upon an aggressor, but also necessitated the reduction of expenditure upon defence to the barest minimum required for national and imperial security. The League was only as strong as the collective will of its members, and since collective security, by definition, did not envisage unilateral action by a member, the stage was set for Great Britain, already riddled with moral doubts as to the peace settlement of 1919 and weakened by the Depression, to embark upon appeasement.

Japan - 1930s

First came Japan, in 1931. Then Italy, in 1935. Churchill, however, was selective in his opposition to appeasement. Whilst he adamantly opposed any manner of compromise with Hitler’s Germany to the last, he exuded no similar sentiment when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, “[remaining] out of the country during the autumn of 1935 so as to avoid having to pronounce for or against Italy (Taylor, 1964, page 123).” Even after Mussolini’s assault upon Albania in April 1939, Churchill was able to say that the invasion was “not necessarily a final test … [since it appeared], like so many other episodes at these times, in an ambiguous guise (The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 1939, page 14).” In believing that Italy should be appeased, so as to retain her crucial goodwill in dealing firmly with Germany, Churchill was not alone, his views finding harmonious echoes in the thinking of men such as Robert Vansittart, who was permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930-8. Churchill had two reasons for singling out Germany — her inherent economic and military strength, and the advent of Adolf Hitler.

Hitler’s rise

Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933. In October, Germany walked out of not only the otiose Disarmament Conference, but also the League of Nations, of which she had been a member since 1926! That she was able to do so with complete impunity was in itself a harbinger of what was to come — from the Anglo-German naval agreement of June 1935, to the Munich agreement of September 1938. In an early speech which, significantly, he delivered to his constituents at a fête in Theydon Bois, Essex — almost as though he were testing the mood of the people before he delivered the same remarks in the House of Commons and committed himself more palpably to the cause of anti-appeasement — Churchill warned that “at present Germany is only partly armed and most of her fury is turned upon herself. But already her smaller neighbours … feel a deep disquietude. There is grave reason to believe that Germany is arming herself … I have always opposed … all this foolish talk of placing [Germany] upon some kind of [military] equality with France … Britain’s hour of weakness is Europe’s hour of danger. I look to the League of Nations to rally the forces which make for the peace of the civilised world and not in any way to weaken them (The Times, 14 August 1933, page 12).” In other words, Germany could not be treated as an equal without resurrecting the military imbalance which had haunted Europe since 1871. There was no need for Great Britain either to ignore her own rearmament or to appease Germany by tolerating hers, least of all at the expense of France. Churchill’s principal apprehension was that a rearmed Germany would attack in the west — a fear which the British Government did not come to share until after the Nazi-Soviet Pact’s conclusion in August 1939, which explains why they reacted in the manner that they did to the subsequent invasion of Poland. But the fact remains that after remilitarising the Rhineland in March 1936, Hitler only moved eastwards. Would he have turned westwards after dismantling Poland, an Anglo-French ally, with Soviet help? In retrospect, Operation Barbarossa makes that seem somewhat unlikely.

If, as the appeasers believed, Hitler’s advent was only the culmination of German resentment at the invidious Treaty of Versailles, then the sooner that settlement was dismantled in favour of a more congenial one, the sooner would the wind be taken out of the Nazi sail, and stability return to Europe. But there was also the risk that alleviation of that resentment during the existence of the Nazi regime could actually fortify its national appeal. As a contemporary would eventually put it, “three main factors have militated against the growth of active opposition to the regime. In order of importance they are the success of German foreign policy, the absence of any apparent alternative to Hitlerism, and the success of the Government in combating unemployment (The Times, 2 January 1939, page 15).” As it was a catch-22 situation, Churchill saw no merit in strengthening a brutal regime with needless concessions, and was correct in fearing that appeasement would only send the wrong signal to Hitler.

Foresight

Churchill’s foresight, however, was not commonly appreciated. “It was partly Churchill’s extremely dangerous time on the Afghan-Pakistan border in 1896 and 1897, and in the Sudan in 1898, which had brought him up close to militant Islamic fundamentalism, that allowed him to spot the fanatical nature of Nazism that so many of his fellow politicians missed in the 1930s (Roberts, 2020, page 56).” As late as 1938, Anthony Eden, who had already resigned as Foreign Secretary over diplomatic differences with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, was arguing that “a settlement of the Sudeten German problem by conciliation is of the utmost urgency in view of the growing realisation of the far-reaching consequences of any resort to a decision by armed force in Central Europe (The Times, 12 September 1938, page 13)” — a settlement which was decried by Churchill as “a total and unmitigated defeat” on the floor of the House on 5 October 1938. The fact was that the appeasers not only believed that Nazi Germany would help counter what they considered was a bigger threat from Soviet Russia, but also remembered the horrors of the Great War — too vividly to recognise the import of caving in to Nazi bellicosity.

Conclusion

To conclude, acting upon Churchill’s counsel, the realism of which depended entirely upon the goals of its recipient, would have required rapid rearmament. Rearmament presupposed economic stability, which was already precarious at the time. But if the Government still believed, even in an era of Jarrow Marchers and an increasingly turbulent empire, that preserving a country which only (re)appeared on the map when both Germany and Russia were down and out in 1919 was vital to their own interests, then, with hindsight, it can be reasonably said that they should have issued an ultimatum when an infant regime committed its first act of overt “aggression” in March 1936 (Taylor, 1964, page 134). It might have averted another world war.

What do you think of Winston Churchill’s anti-appeasement in the 1930s? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Dutton, D. (2007) Proponents and critics of appeasement. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [Online]. Available at: https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-95646?rskey=aCl7MO&result=1 [Accessed on 22.11.22]

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Roberts, A. (2020) Leadership in War. Penguin Books.

Taylor, A. (1964) The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin Books.

The Times

The Daily Telegraph

The Early History of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Since the founding of the nation, this United States has had a president in office. This fact has not changed over the years, but the campaign leading up to the election has. In the country’s formative years, it was practically unheard of for a presidential candidate to actively campaign for office. However, over the years this changed. Richard Bluttal explains.

American photographer Mathew Brady, 1875.

In the early years of presidential campaigns, it was up to local supporters to organize campaign events and speak on their behalf. Parades, rallies, and stump speeches by surrogates were followed on Election Day by voter drives in taverns and on the streets. Partisan newspapers were another part of the mix aligning themselves with a particular party and openly slanting news coverage to favor allies and excoriate enemies. Commercial publishers quickly realized they could make money by printing and selling broadsides, cards, and prints depicting the candidates of all parties.

In American presidential campaigns from 1789 through the 1820s, Presidential candidates thought it was undignified to campaign. Political parties were embryonic and in flux – nothing like the organizational powerhouses they are today. Before the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 there was no mass electorate. In most states, legislatures, not citizens, chose presidential electors. Enslaved people, free women, and free propertyless men – constituting most of the adult population at the time – were denied the vote. Throughout this period, however, both an electorate and campaign machinery began to develop.

From 1800 onward presidential campaign songs and songbooks filled the air at rallies, parades, and debates. A watershed moment in campaign music history occurred during the 1840 campaign of General William Henry Harrison against incumbent President Martin van Buren. “Tippecanoe and Tyler Too” was the official song supporting Harrison and his running mate, John Tyler. Harrison had defeated American Indians at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 and helped defeat the British in 1812. Like almost every other campaign song in every presidential campaign going forward, this song was a contrafactum: a popular preexisting tune matched to new lyrics. Set to the tune of Yankee Doodle, the chorus declared “Old Zack Taylor! Keep Him up! / Honest, Rough and Ready! / We’ve a voucher in his life / He’s good as he is steady.”

By the early 1830s, cheap newspapers, known as the “penny press,” allied themselves with political parties, and a growing network of roads, canals and railroads began to carry political information nationwide.

1830s

The Democratic Party’s first association with the donkey came about during the 1828 campaign of Democrat Andrew Jackson. Running on a populist platform (by the people, for the people) and using a slogan of “Let the People Rule,” Jackson’s opponents referred to him as a jackass (donkey). Much to their chagrin, Jackson incorporated the jackass into his campaign posters. During Jackson’s presidency the donkey was used to symbolize his stubbornness by his opponents.

By the election of 1860, parades, banners and music were part of the political landscape, as were newspapers that openly supported political parties. Advances in printing technology by the mid-19th century allowed Americans to express their political sympathies through their choice of cigars and stationery. Cigar box labels in 1860 included images of Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln and his democratic opponent, Stephen A. Douglas. For those who might have heard of “Honest Old Abe” and the “Little Giant” but had never seen their likenesses in print, the cigar box label introduced the candidates’ faces to the public. In early March 1860, Abraham Lincoln spoke in Hartford, Connecticut, against the spread of slavery and for the right of workers to strike. Five store clerks, who had started a Republican group called the Wide Awakes, decided to join a parade for Lincoln, who delighted in the torchlight escort back to his hotel provided for him after his speech. Over the ensuing weeks, the Lincoln campaign made plans to develop Wide Awakes throughout the country and to use them to spearhead large voter registration drives, since they knew that new voters and young voters tend to embrace new and young parties.

Members of the Wide Awakes were described by the New York Times as "young men of character and energy, earnest in their Republican convictions and enthusiastic in prosecuting the canvass on which we have entered." In Chicago, on October 3, 1860, 10,000 Wide Awakes marched in a three-mile procession.

Mathew Brady

Mathew Brady was one of the earliest American photographers and the owner of a successful photography studio. He photographed celebrities, presidents, and, most famously, scenes of his country’s Civil War. From 1860 to 1864. Those picturing President Lincoln—in particular a portrait taken on February 27, 1860, after the speech at The Cooper Union, in New York City, which launched his presidential campaign—sold widely. A number of acclaimed historians believe that his portrait of Lincoln that went nation wide was greatly instrumental in Lincoln being elected President.

Political buttons touting presidential candidates increased in popularity during the 19th century. Metal campaign buttons were available in 1860, but the election of 1896 saw the first use of the mass-produced, pin-backed, metal buttons. These became ubiquitous and collectible in 20th-century presidential campaigns and remain so today.

The earliest connection of the elephant to the Republican Party was an illustration in an 1864 Abraham Lincoln presidential campaign newspaper, Father Abraham. It showed an elephant holding a banner and celebrating Union victories. During the Civil War, “seeing the elephant” was slang for engaging in combat so the elephant was a logical choice to represent successful battles.

Thomas Nast, his cartoons, and those by his predecessors and contemporaries, were published in mass market magazines—as well as in newspapers and as separate, sheet prints are credited with widely influencing voters at a time when most would never see or hear their White House candidate in person. Instead, the public read campaign materials, attended barbecues, picnics, parades, mass meetings, and rallies. Campaign songs written about candidates fit right into a culture where singing was popular. Many of these early voter solicitation activities are still staples of presidential campaigns today in one form or another. From the 18th through the 19th centuries, these political cartoons were a popular form of political protest and often depicted rival politicians in satirical or unflattering ways and of course are still in use today.

Gilded Age

The Gilded Age (c.1877-1900) presidential elections split between Democrats and Republicans along mostly sectional lines – a legacy of the Civil War. The imagery on Grant’s poster linking him and his running mate to “common man” themes hearkens back to an earlier era as did his decision not to refrain from actively campaigning. Noting that only presidential candidates who had taken to the trail had lost, he declared: “I am no public speaker and I don’t want to be beaten.” The tradition continued with Grover Cleveland in 1888 whose front-porch talks with visitors were published in newspapers and brochures. Smear campaigns persisted through the 19th century. In 1884, supporters of Republican Party candidate James Blaine coined a jingle that alluded to an illegitimate child that his opponent Grover Cleveland had allegedly fathered:

Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?

Gone to the White House,

Ha, ha, ha!

Cleveland's party responded with a tune of their own:

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,

The Continental Liar from the State of Maine!

Presidential campaigns, however, soon started to shift. Instead of remaining silent, candidates began to give speeches, often referred to as “stump speeches.” William McKinley gave a variant on this during the 1896 campaign when he delivered a speech on his front porch. This became the centerpiece of his so-called “front-porch campaign,” and he continued to deliver speeches from his home. His opponent, William Jennings Bryan, chose instead to conduct a “whistle-stop campaign,” traveling the country by railroad and giving speeches at various train stops.

This 1896 campaign is probably the most famous campaign in U.S. history. It is remembered for Bryan's precedent-shattering speaking tour as well as for the carefully orchestrated and impressive front-porch campaign of William McKinley. An estimated 5 million Americans across 27 states heard one of the 600 passionate and substantive speeches Bryan crave during the campaign. McKinley stayed home but still managed to speak to 750,000 people in the 300 or so speeches he gave. Neither Bryan nor McKinley shied away from issues, the former focusing almost exclusively on free silver while the latter preferred to harp on the virtues of the protective tariff.

McKinley’s 1896 poster shows him as the champion of American capitalism, upholding the gold standard and linking prosperity and American power. Bryan wanted the U.S. on a silver standard which he believed would help workmen and farmers hurt by the depression. Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech, brilliantly delivered at the Democratic convention on July 9, 1896, secured him the nomination. His vivid language still resonates today.

Conclusion

It used to be considered ill-mannered for presidential candidates to openly campaign for themselves. Times have changed. Presidential campaigns are now billion-dollar operations that involve attack ads, social media strategy, and lots of stump speeches.

What do you think of early U.S. presidential campaigns? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

How did Junior Military Officers Push Japan Into World War 2?

Of all of the ways in which Japan’s military was the most dysfunctional fighting force in modern history, Gekokujō was surely the strangest. Its origin is murky. All one Japanese encyclopedia could say was that; “since the medieval period, (mid-12th–14th centuries) writers have used the term to describe a variety of situations in which established authority was being challenged from below.”

Here, Daniel McEwen looks at Gekokujō and three key events in the 1930s that led Japan into war.

Japanese soldiers during the 1931 Mukden Incident.

Gekokujō: [translation; "the lower rules the higher" or "the low overcomes the high"]; someone of a lower position overthrowing someone of a higher position using military or political might.

Japan was an isolated nation of subsistence farmers and fishermen when Portuguese traders landed on its shores in 1540. Although initially welcomed, over the next century, these first Europeans wore out their welcome and were expelled by the shogunate in 1639 who then sealed their country off from the West for two hundred years! Then in the 1850’s, it was the Americans who forced Japan at gunpoint to throw open its doors to the world. The incoming rush of capital and technology transformed it into an industrial and military powerhouse. However, the accompanying influx of foreigners, government corruption, social unrest and widespread poverty left many feeling their country had sold it’s soul to the West. This head-on collision between Western modernity and Confucian tradition culminated in the 1930’s, with three “incidents” of Gekokujō that pushed Japan further down the path to Pearl Harbour.

1] The Mukden Incident [1931]

The most prestigious unit of the Japanese army, the Kwantung Army was the military muscle behind Japanese colonial expansion into Manchuria [present day Korea], China and Mongolia. Its field commanders often went rogue, violating orders from Army HQ in Tokyo without consequences. Most fatefully, in September of 1931, a group of its renegade officers staged-managed the bombing of a Japanese railway station in Mukden [present day Shenyang, China] which it then used as the excuse for occupying all of the Manchurian peninsula – despite specific orders to the contrary from Tokyo!

It is an act without equal among WW2’s combatant nations: rogue officers taking their country to war. A war they could not win. The Russians, also seeking power and influence in the western Pacific, took the occupation as a direct threat and attacked. Skilled only in massacring unarmed civilians, the Kwantung Army would fight several costly, losing battles with Joseph Stalin’s highly-mechanized battalions throughout the 1930’s before being routed decisively in 1939. Six years later, on August 8th, 1945 Red Army tanks stormed back into Manchuria, delivering a final stinging defeat to the Kwantung Army before the A-bombs ended the war.

It is telling that when their army’s treachery at Mukden was publicly revealed in 1933, rather than withdraw from the peninsula, Japan’s political leaders chose to withdraw from the League of Nations, officially endorsing the Kwantung Army’s insubordination. Many contend that the Mukden Incident was indeed the opening shot of WW2.

2] The May 15th Incident [1932]

In an act of cold-blooded treason, eleven young naval officers invaded the home of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and assassinated him before police could stop them. To a man, the eleven were followers of the Kōdōha or Imperial Way Faction, a cabal of influential military officers who envisioned a return to a pre-Westernized Japan in which a military dictatorship dedicated to aggressive expansion would purge the country of the corrupt elites in both government and industry who it blamed for all of Japan’s many ills. But it’s what happened at the officers’ public trial that proved so fateful. Incredibly, a  nation that should have been appalled by the death of their PM instead fell in love with his assassins! The officers’ eloquence in spinning the murder as an act of patriotism aimed at reforming a corrupt government, swayed public opinion in their favour. The court was deluged with over 100,000 petitions demanding clemency and caved in, handing out light sentences that would see the killers serve only a few years behind bars. Critics argue that this leniency weakened Japan’s democracy and made the third incident inevitable.

3] The February 26th Incident [1936]

Emboldened by the navy officers’ success, young army officers launched their attempt to violently purge the government of any and all opponents of Kōdōha. Calling themselves The Righteous Army, some 1,500 young officers and cadets fanned out across the city. Armed to the teeth and carrying Death Lists, they roamed the streets of Tokyo for three days, fighting running gun government troops, storming public buildings, often shooting it out with bodyguards to get at the people on their lists. British news correspondent Hugh Byas described it as "government by assassination".

Several government dignitaries including two former Prime Ministers were gunned down but the coup was too poorly executed and the government too well prepared. Eventually cornered by loyal Imperial soldiers, the rebels surrendered. This time there would be no public trials. All 1,500 were convicted by secret court martials and punished with prison terms and demotions. Only the 17 ringleaders were executed. Kōdōha was dead as a movement and yet surprisingly, its presence would be felt in the next election in that voters elected a more war-like government! Young officers would have one last shot at changing their country’s history.

Despite the American’s use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan’s War Council remained deadlocked on the issue of surrender. Enter Emperor Hirohito who had originally supported the Council’s imperialist ambitions, but now was aghast at the horrific destruction wrought by the A-bombs. He urged the Council to stop the insanity and grudgingly, the hard-liners agreed that he would record a surrender statement admitting only to the “futility of further resistance”, to be broadcast to the country. But a squad of young officers got wind of the plan and occupied the recording studio in an 11th hour attempt to prevent the broadcast. In this too they failed and on August 15th, Hirohito’s voice was heard by his subjects for the first time. They rejoiced that the war was over.

Was Gekokujō ever anything more than thuggery wrapped in a flag, domestic terrorism on     steroids, fascism disguised as patriotism? Too much blood had been spilled, too much pain inflicted to find anything enobling in the “challenge from below” those young officers presented their country.

What do you think of Gekokujō? Let us know below.

You can contact Daniel at danielcmcewen@gmail.com

The Battle of Fort Sumter & the Beginning of the US Civil War

The firing on Fort Sumter was the immediate action that started the Civil War. Once the Confederates under PGT Beauregard fired on US Federal property, a line had been crossed and a rebellion had begun. At issue was whether federal property in a state that seceded was now property of the new government.

Charleston SC was the most important port on the Southeast coast. The harbor was defended by three federal forts: Sumter; Castle Pinckney, one mile off the city’s Battery; and heavily armed Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan’s Island.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War.

The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy.

The Construction and Deed to the Fort

The island in Charleston harbor on which Fort Sumter is built was originally just a sand bar. In 1827, engineers performed measurements of the depths and concluded that it was a suitable location for a fort. Construction began in 1829. Seventy thousand tons of granite was transported from New England to build up an essentially artificial island. By 1834, a timber foundation that was several feet beneath the water had been laid. The fort was built in the center of the channel to dominate the entrance to the harbor. Along with the shore batteries at Forts Moultrie, Wagner, and Gregg, the idea was to cover the harbor from invaders. The brick fort was designed to be five-sided, 170 to 190 feet long, with walls five feet thick, standing 50 feet over the low tide mark, and to house 650 men and 135 guns in three tiers of gun emplacements. The majority of the gun emplacements faced out to sea, to cover the entrance to the harbor (not facing the city). Construction dragged on because of title issues, and then problems arose with funding such a large and technically challenging project. Unpleasant weather and disease made it worse. The exterior was finished but the interior and armaments were never completed. On December 17, 1836, South Carolina officially ceded all "right, title and, claim" to the site of Fort Sumter to the United States Government. For these reasons, at the time of the bombardment, not only was this a federal fort, but also it was legally land ceded by the state of South Carolina.

Fort Sumter was covered by a separate cession of land to the United States by the state of South Carolina, and covered in this resolution, passed by the South Carolina legislature in December of 1836.

Reports and Resolutions of the General assembly, Page 115, here: https://www.carolana.com/SC/Legislators/Documents/Reports_and_Resolutions_of_the_General_Assembly_of_South_Carolina_1836.pdf

This resolution was made in response to a private SC citizen claiming ownership, which was denied. There can be no clearer statement that Fort Sumter had been ceded to the US Government by the state of SC.

https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/who-owned-fort-sumter/comment-page-1/#comments

In 1805, a prior land resolution of the SC legislature turning over all of the forts in the harbor to the US Government was made. Sumter did not exist at that time, so arguably it didn’t apply, although the language would be inclusive. It can be found on pages 501-502 here: https://books.google.com/books?id=S7E4AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

South Carolina had freely ceded property in Charleston Harbor to the federal Government in 1805, upon the express condition that "the United States... within three years... repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein." Failure to comply with this condition on the part of the Government would render "this grant or cession... void and of no effect." Hence, continued development was a condition, which did occur in spurts.

The Crisis Begins

On December 26, 1860, only six days after South Carolina seceded from the Union, Major Robert Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, spiking its large guns, burning its gun carriages, and taking its smaller cannon with him. He secretly relocated companies E and H (127 men, 13 of them musicians) of the 1st U.S. Artillery to Fort Sumter on his own initiative, without orders from his superiors, because it could not be defended from a land invasion. The fort was still only partially built and fewer than half of the cannons that should have been available were in place.

In a letter delivered January 31, 1861, South Carolina Governor Francis W Pickens demanded that President Buchanan surrender Fort Sumter because "I regard that possession is not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina." Over the next few months repeated calls for the evacuation of Fort Sumter from the government of South Carolina were ignored.

In February 1861 South Carolina's Attorney General, Isaac Hayne sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of War, John Holt about their intent to take possession of Fort Sumter and wished to negotiate monetary compensation threatening that if the United States refused to vacate, then force would be used to seize it. Holt responded that the United States' interest in Sumter is not that of a proprietor but that of a sovereign which "has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to 'exercise exclusive legislation' over the property referred to. and said "the President is, however, relieved from the necessity of further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it."

Realizing that the garrison at Fort Sumter was undermanned and undersupplied, General Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief of the US Army, sent the Star of the West to reinforce Anderson. On January 9, 1861, several weeks after South Carolina had seceded from the United States but before other states had done so to form the Confederacy, Star of the West arrived at Charleston Harbor to resupply troops and supplies to the garrison at Fort Sumter. The ship was fired upon by cadets from the Citadel Academy and was hit three times. Although Star of the West suffered no major damage, her captain, John McGowan, considered it to be too dangerous to continue and left the harbor. The mission was abandoned, and Star of the West headed for her home port of New York Harbor.  Even this minimal attempt at strengthening the fort was resisted (Mc266).  President Buchanan had been lukewarm about defending Charleston harbor in the first place and had seriously considered succumbing to southern popular opinion and ordering the defenders back to the indefensible Fort Moultrie.  He had only agreed to this single ship expedition after a cabinet shake-up bringing hardliners Edwin Stanton and Jeremiah Black to his advisory group. Yet in response to this attack on a federal ship, which might itself have triggered the war, he did nothing.

Over the next few months, Jefferson Davis was named president of the Confederacy and Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as US president. Confederate Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard was sent to lead the Confederate forces in Charleston, where his command included several thousand state militia and a few dozen seacoast guns and mortars. Davis sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate transfer of the fort. Anderson prepared the fort for battle as best as possible: remarkably, of the 60 guns placed in the fort, only 6 were capable of being turned around to face the town.

Lincoln searched for a political solution for the next 6 weeks. Most of his cabinet, including Scott, advised that he pull the troops out of Fort Sumter because it was indefensible. William Seward, Secretary of State, Simon P. Cameron, Secretary of War, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy favored withdrawal. Supporting the fort would require a military force comprised of both army and navy units way beyond what existed. But Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury and Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, argued that surrender would diminish morale and would lead to official recognition of the Confederacy. Only Blair opposed the withdrawal firmly because it would convince the rebels that the US administration lacked determination and firmness, would dishearten the Southern Unionists and push the foreign countries to recognize the Confederacy de facto. Moreover, the northern media called on Lincoln to make good his inaugural promise to defend federal property. Lincoln concluded that if the Union troops evacuated Fort Sumter, secession would be a fait accompli.

Lincoln was aware that a large - scale attempt to supply Fort Sumter by firing warships would result in the North as aggressor. It would unite the South and make Lincoln accountable for breaking out a war. Blair provided a person who would find a solution to the problem: Gustavus V. Fox. Fox suggested to supply Fort Sumter via some motorized barges while the US warships, off shore, would intervene only the Confederate guns would fire on the barges. Thus, he sent supplies only, while the warships would be ready to intervene if the Confederate guns had fired on the flotilla. If the Confederates had fired on the unarmed motorized barges hauling supplies only, they would be accountable for having attacked a humanitarian relief mission. At a cabinet meeting on March 28, 1861, the decision was made to send a small flotilla of vessels loaded with supplies. Realizing that Anderson's command would run out of food by April 15, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a fleet of ships, under the command of Gustavus V. Fox, to attempt entry into Charleston Harbor and supply Fort Sumter. It was plainly recognized that this small group of ships could not enter the harbor by surprise and would not be able to reach the fort unless the South Carolina batteries allowed their unfettered passage.  (https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2011/march/sumter-conundrum). Lincoln told Pickens the ships were on their way for re-supply.

Pickens contacted Robert Toombs, the CSA Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, who advised Davis that he was being set up by Lincoln and tricked into starting the war. Nevertheless, a Confederate cabinet meeting on April 9 endorsed Davis’s order to Beauregard to reduce the fort before its arrival. Fearing that a lack of action would revive Southern Unionism, Davis decided the Federal presence had to go, that is, Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was authorized to use the force to surrender Fort Sumter. Retrospectively, Davis would have been wise to have taken Toombs’ advice.  As a fort built to keep out ships, it served no purpose at that moment other than to allow Lincoln to use it as bait to trick the Confederates into starting the war, handing Lincoln reason/pretext and to claim the Confederates fired first.  But Davis  in fact wanted war; it was the only possible way to convince the ambivalent Upper South and border states to secede and join the CSA. Davis had considered attacking Fort Pickens instead, but Braxton Bragg correctly objected because Pickens would have been tough to attack by amphibious warfare and, unlike Sumter, had a secure sea lifeline.

On April 6, 1861, the first ships began to set sail for their rendezvous off the Charleston Bar. The ships assigned were the steam sloops-of-war USS Pawnee and USS Powhatan, transporting motorized launches and about 300 sailors; the USS Pocahontas, Revenue Cutter USRC Harriet Lane, and the steamer Baltic transporting about 200 troops, composed of companies C and D of the 2nd U.S. Artillery; and three hired tugboats with added protection against small arms fire to be used to tow troop and supply barges directly to Fort Sumter. However, the Pocahontas never did make it due to multiple countermanding orders. The first to arrive was Harriet Lane, on the evening of April 11, 1861.

Events Leading to the Bombardment

Also on April 11, Beauregard sent three officers to demand the surrender of the fort: Senator/Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., Captain Stephen D. Lee (later general), and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm. Anderson declined, and the aides returned to report to Beauregard. After Beauregard had consulted the Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, he sent the aides back to the fort and authorized Chesnut to decide whether the fort should be taken by force. Anderson, stalling for time, waited until 3 AM April 12 to tell them he would not leave the fort. They then returned to Fort Johnson where Chesnut ordered the firing to begin. So it was that on April 12, 1861 at 4:30 AM, the Civil War began when Confederate batteries opened on the fort. Although Edmund Ruffin, the noted Virginian agronomist and secessionist, claimed that he fired the first shot on Fort Sumter, and did, in fact, fire a signal shot, Lieutenant Henry S. Farley, commanding a battery of two 10-inch siege mortars on James Island actually fired the first shot at 4:30 a.m. No attempt was made by the Union to return the fire for more than two hours because there were no fuses for their explosive shells, which means that they could not explode. Only solid iron balls could be used. At about 7:00 a.m., Captain Abner Doubleday, the fort's second in command, was given the honor of firing the Union's first shot, in defense of the fort. Although he did not invent baseball as the Mills Commission erroneously concluded, in every other way, his life was eventful and fulfilling.

During the bombardment, according to the diary of Mary Chesnut, the Senator’s wife, and other accounts, Charleston residents along what is now known as The Battery, sat on balconies drinking salutes to the start of the hostilities.

The bombardment lasted for 34 hours. The Union return fire was intentionally slow to conserve its ammunition.  The next morning, the fort was surrendered. During the attack, the Union colors fell. Lt. Norman J. Hall risked his life to put them back up, burning off his eyebrows permanently. A Confederate soldier bled to death having been wounded by a misfiring cannon. One Union soldier died and another was mortally wounded during the 47th shot of a 100-shot salute, given after the surrender. For this reason, the salute was shortened to 50 shots.

PGT Beauregard

PGT Beauregard was the perfect combination of military engineer and charismatic Southern leader needed at that time and place.  It is highly suggestive that a man of Beauregard’s accomplishments was there at Charleston – before a war had started. Its also interesting that the South Carolina militia had been called out and that they had cannonballs with fuses but the US Army in the fort did not. These and other factors demonstrate that the new CSA was prepared for a battle. The South Carolina Militia had been in position for months. They were there when Citadel cadets fired on the Star of the West on January 9, 1861. They were on duty the previous December when Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie for Sumter.

Beauregard was the first Confederate general officer, appointed a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on March 1, 1861.  His brother in law, James Slidell, was instrumental in convincing Davis to make this appointment. To me, the idea that the Union escalated violence to provoke the war is odd considering that the CSA had created an army at least 6 weeks before firing on Sumter. After the Mexican War, during which he contributed at least as much as Captain Robert E Lee did in terms of reconnaissance and strategy, his positions involved engineering in ports so he was the perfect man for this mission. He had recently been named superintendent of West Point January 23 1861, but these orders were revoked by the Federal Government 5 days later when Louisiana seceded. He returned to New Orleans with the hopes of being named commander of the Louisiana state army. On July 21, he was promoted to full general in the Confederate Army, one of only seven appointed to that rank; his date of rank made him the fifth most senior general, behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston. Beauregard was honored in the South for its first victory. He was ordered to direct the troops at Bull Run.

Anderson had been Beauregard’s artillery instructor at West Point in 1837, and Beauregard was serving as superintendent there until secession. Anderson told Washington that Beauregard would guarantee that South Carolina's actions be exercised with "skill and sound judgment." Beauregard wrote to the Confederate government that Anderson was a "most gallant officer". He sent several cases of fine brandy and whiskey and boxes of cigars to Anderson and his officers at Sumter, but Anderson ordered that the gifts be returned.

Aftermath

The state legislature appointed Braxton Bragg on February 20, 1861.Bragg had been a colonel in the Louisiana militia. Aware that Beauregard might resent him, Bragg offered him the rank of colonel. Instead Beauregard enrolled as a private in the "Orleans Guards", a battalion of French Creole aristocrats. At the same time, he communicated with Slidell and the newly chosen President Davis, angling for a senior position in the new Confederate States Army. Rumors that Beauregard would be placed in charge of the entire Army infuriated Bragg.  Their personal animosity was one of the subthemes of the western theater for the next 4 years.

Anderson’s valor and commitment to duty was recognized in the Union.  The Fort Sumter Flag became a popular patriotic symbol after Major Anderson returned North with it. The flag is still displayed in the fort's museum. The Star of the West took all the garrison members to New York City. There they were welcomed and honored with a parade on Broadway.

What do you think of the events at Fort Sumter? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

Was American Revolutionary War General Benedict Arnold a Hero or Traitor?

Benedict Arnold (1740-1801) was an American born Major General during the American Revolutionary War. However, he changed to the British side during the war. Here, Richard Bluttal considers whether Benedict Arnold was a traitor or hero.

A 1776 portrait of Benedict Arnold.

John André had been warned to keep inland, but instead he shifted west until he was riding down the Albany Post Road, which follows the edge of the Hudson. He rode on safely until 9 a.m. on September 23, 1780, when he arrived at the crossing of a stream known as Clark's Kill, which today forms the boundary between Tarrytown, New York, and Sleepy Hollow, New York (and has since been renamed the André River). Here three young men - John Paulding, Isaac Van Wart and David Williams - stopped him.  André believed that these three were Loyalists because Paulding was wearing a Hessian soldier's uniform. Paulding had himself escaped from a British prison only days earlier, aided by a sympathetic Loyalist who provided him with the uniform. "Gentlemen," André said, "I hope you belong to our party." "What party?" asked one of the men. "The lower party", replied André, meaning the British, whose headquarters were to the South. "We do" was their answer. André then declared that he was a British officer who must not be detained. To his surprise, Paulding informed him "We are Americans," and took him prisoner. André then tried to convince the men that he was a US officer by showing them the passport given to him by Mr. Arnold. But the suspicions of his captors were now aroused; they searched him and found papers and the plans for West Point hidden in his stocking that was not meant for Americans.

André later testified at his trial that the men searched his boots for the purpose of robbing him. Whether or not this was true, the laws of New York State at the time permitted the men to keep whatever booty they might find on a Loyalist's person.

British Major John André was one of the most famous prisoners of the Revolutionary War. A favorite of British General Sir Henry Clinton, the handsome young major was also popular with Philadelphia "high society;" intelligent and witty, André was noted for the elaborate entertainments he wrote and designed for parties.

Scheming

Benedict Arnold approached the British with his scheme to help them take control of West Point. André served as the messenger between Arnold and General Clinton. On September 21, 1780, André met with Arnold, and Arnold gave him confidential documents, including a map of West Point. André intended to return to British General Clinton and give him the documents. André was part of American General Benedict Arnold's treasonous plot to surrender the strategic American fortification at West Point to the British. Arnold delivered key information about West Point's weaknesses to General Clinton through André, meeting him on the banks of the Hudson River.

This was long after Benedict Arnold was known as an American hero. The name Benedict Arnold is synonymous in American history with the word traitor. His name is almost a synonym for treasonous behavior so despicable, his many contributions to American Independence before becoming a turncoat are largely forgotten.

Arnold actually built a very impressive military career before his defection to the British army. During the American Revolution, Arnold quickly established himself as one of George Washington’s best generals. Realizing the strategic importance of securing New York, Arnold mustered a group of men and headed toward Fort Ticonderoga. Coordinating with Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, Arnold helped capture the fort for the Patriots.

Arnold believed the Continental Congress insufficiently rewarded his efforts, especially considering his sacrifices. Arnold lived extravagantly in Philadelphia and also engineered a variety of business deals that earned him a reputation for questionable practices in his desperate desire to impress Edward Shippen, a wealthy Philadelphia Loyalist, so that he could marry his 18-year-old daughter, Peggy.  Appointed to brigadier general, Arnold watched as Congress passed him over for promotion to the post of major general five times in favor of his subordinates. Arnold had every intention of resigning from military service following these outrages but not for Washington’s insistence that he stay. He was rewarded in 1777 with a promotion to major general and a post as military commander of Philadelphia. Continental officials could not confirm Arnold’s suspected betrayal until 1780 when hard evidence of his treason was uncovered through his relationship with John Andre. In 1780, Arnold was given command of West Point, an American fort on the Hudson River in New York (and future home of the U.S. military academy, established in 1802).

Complexity

 Arnold contacted Sir Henry Clinton, head of the British forces, and proposed handing over West Point and his men. While Arnold’s betrayal was clear—he offered the British seizure of the military fortress at West Point, NY, in exchange for 10,000 pounds and a British military commission—what led up to that moment of betrayal is more complicated.

Why did Benedict Arnold betray the US? Historians have several theories about why Arnold became a traitor: greed; mounting debt; resentment of other officers; a hatred of the Continental Congress; and a desire for the colonies to remain under British rule.  Eric D. Lehman, author of Homegrown Terror: Benedict Arnold and the Burning of New London, notes that others at the time had similar character issues but they did not betray their country. Lehman spent time looking over Arnold’s letters and other first-hand accounts.

“Some seemed to point to him ‘lacking feeling,’ i.e. sociopathic, but others showed him having too much feeling—he couldn’t control his temper. The number one thing I found across all of them was his selfish ambition, which came from a profound lack of self-esteem as a child and young man,” Lehman says.

Lehman thinks it’s important to remember the whole story of Arnold—his betrayal wasn’t just treason. The British, who had much to gain from Arnold switching sides, found him dishonorable and untrustworthy.

“One thing that has been left out of so many tellings of Arnold’s story is that he didn’t stop after his West Point treason was discovered,” Lehman points out. “He went on to attack Virginia—almost capturing Thomas Jefferson—and then attacking Connecticut, his home state.

“Spying was one thing, but his willingness to switch sides in the middle of an armed conflict, and fight against the men who had a year earlier been fighting by his side, was something that people of that time and maybe ours could simply not understand.”

Conclusion

Arnold would continue to serve in the military, only now he served the British against his former countrymen. In December, he led a force of British troops into Virginia, capturing Richmond and laying waste to the countryside. Arnold would die in 1801, leaving behind him a legacy as America’s most notorious traitor. As for John Andre, he was moved from Headquarters, to West Point, and finally to Tappan, where he was housed in a tavern. There, as the verdict was decided that André was acting as a spy by going behind enemy lines and disguising his uniform, he wrote a courageous letter, dated September 29, 1780, to his Commander, General Henry Clinton.  All the men on both sides were amazed at the turn of events. The American men admired André for his gallantry as much as the British did for his leadership. No one wanted him to die, but Washington had to be firm and did not back down. André was hanged as a spy at Tappan, New York, on October 2, 1780. He was mourned even by his enemies.

What do you think of Benedict Arnold? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

History Will Absolve the Cuban Republic, but Not Fidel Castro

In 1953, following his July 26 assault on the Moncada Barracks in Oriente province, a young lawyer and the mastermind of the attack in which many Cubans perished, named Fidel Castro, appeared in court to face prosecution. Out of as much desperation as revolutionary zeal, he delivered a powerful, hours-long speech in his defense. As of yet, no record of this speech has been found, and Fidel Castro was unsuccessful in avoiding conviction.

Here, Logan M. Williams considers Castro’s speech and looks at the history, successes, and failures of pre-revolutionary Cuba.

Fidel Castro under arrest after the 1953 attack on the Moncada Barracks.

Castro was sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment, of which he only ended up serving less than three, in Cuba’s Presidio Modelo on the Isle of Pines. During his time in prison, he gave newspaper interviews, and continued to participate in the organizing of Cuba’s anti-Batista efforts. While in prison, he also spent a great deal of time reconstructing a “record” – used loosely, because it was not an exact copy or a true record, due to the fact that it contained several embellishments and added phrases – of the speech that he delivered in court on that fateful day. One of the embellishments which he added to the recreated speech is one of the most infamous political phrases of the modern era, and it would become the title of his work: “History Will Absolve Me." The phrase was eerily similar to one used by the German despot, Adolf Hitler, who said when he found himself in a situation much like Castro’s, that the judgement of the “eternal court of history” would exonerate him.

Castro’s recreated speech would eventually transform into a manifesto for his future revolutionary activities and become required reading for militant leftists around the world. In it, Castro expressed the belief that the desperate conditions under which some Cubans suffered, provided justification for the radical nature of his actions. Castro described these conditions as follows: “the people have neither homes nor electricity” and those who were lucky enough to have shelter “live cramped [with their families] into barracks and tenements without even the minimum sanitary requirements.” He stated that “rural children are consumed by parasites which filter through their bare feet from the earth” and that Cuba had “thousands of children who die every year from lack of [medical] facilities.” Castro attributed these social conditions to an indifferent society as well as a corrupt and negligent government. Indeed, denigration of the Cuban Republic period is still a mainstay of Cuban regime propaganda today, which sees this sort of fear-mongering as the only way to justify its increasingly repressive regime.

Pre-Revolutionary Cuba

This propaganda may be effective, as most of today’s world now knows the Cuban Republic of 1902-1959 by its reputation for troubling and potentially neo-colonial relations with the United States or as a period of crime, graft, moral decay, political unrest, and total misery (if they know anything at all). However, this isn’t a complete representation of the era, as Castro himself alluded to in his speech before the court. Of the Cuban Republic, before the inception of the Batista dictatorship in 1952, Castro stated:

“It had its constitution, its laws, its civil rights, a president, a Congress, and law courts. Everyone could assemble, associate, speak and write with complete freedom. The people were not satisfied with the government officials at that time, but [the people] had the power to elect new officials and only a few days remained before they were going to do so! There existed a public opinion both respected and heeded and all problems of common interest were freely discussed. There were political parties, radio and television debates and forums, and public meetings. The whole nation throbbed with enthusiasm.”

He also noted that “the [Cuban] people were proud of their love of liberty and they carried their heads high in the conviction that liberty would be respected as a sacred right.” Within today’s Cuba, Castro’s pamphlet, “History Will Absolve Me,” is not easily found in its entirety.

While certain aspects of Cuban society (particularly the government and political class) may have earned the harrowing reputation presented by Castroist propaganda, the lived experience of the average Cuban who resided on the island in this era – which was actually a period in which Cuba underwent a remarkable transformation and made steadfast progress towards liberal development – tells a vastly different story. Due to the work of a few committed scholars, who have dedicated their time to chronicling the achievements of the Cuban people, we have brought light to the Cuban “Dark Ages.”

Cuban Republic in History

Traditionally, the Cuban Republic is identified as the form of government which existed between the years 1902 and 1959, although this is not entirely accurate, and it doesn’t do justice to the efforts of Cuba’s liberals and independence fighters. The Cuban Republic came into existence for the first time during the second half of the nineteenth century, during the Ten Years War, when the island revolted against Spain. However, it ceased to exist following the defeat of the Cuban separatists, and the complete reimposition of Spanish colonial rule. The Cuban Republic was revived during the Cuban War of Independence, and it experienced several early and remarkable successes in governance, whilst embroiled in a brutally destructive war with Spain. Horatio Rubens, a New York-based attorney who was a personal friend of Jose Martí and who served as a principal advisor to Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party as well as the U.S. provisional government during the brief occupation of the island, describes the accomplishments of this iteration of the Cuban Republic in an 1898 journal article for The North American Review. These revolutionaries, amid a war, had built a modern, representative government, based upon republican principles. This new government included a system for the collection of taxes, as well as significant checks and balances, especially upon military authority. In Eastern Cuba which, at this point, was largely poor as well as underdeveloped, and entirely in the control of the revolutionaries (except for major cities), newspapers were published frequently, which was a positive indicator for free speech as well as other democratic freedoms, and schools were even established. Most notably, the Cuban Republic experienced its first election in 1897, ostensibly free from the corruption and political violence which would plague future such elections.

After a brief period of initial occupation lasting from the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 to 1902, the United States’ provisional government and most of its soldiers departed Cuba; the island nation had finally achieved a measure of autonomy (autonomy is used in this case to indicate the existence of a level of agency and self-government short of complete sovereignty). Most scholars of the Republic during this period in Cuban history stubbornly refuse to refer to it as sovereign Cuba, at least until the 1930s, due to the existence of the Platt Amendment, which formalized the continuation of U.S. dominance over Cuba by restricting the new island nation’s rights in the realm of international relations and by cementing the United States’ right to intervene militarily on the island under certain circumstances. Thus, Cuba’s sovereignty was so constrained until at least 1934, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy – and the persistence of Cuban diplomats – brought about the dismantling of the amendment.

The economy

After 1902, however, regardless of the existence of the Platt Amendment, the Cuban Republic was once again free to pursue liberalization and advancement in a Cuban manner. In spite of the many aforementioned plagues and hurdles faced by Cuba’s newly formed state, the Cuban Republic made extraordinary progress in the economic and social spheres; it was fully engaged in the crucible that is liberalization.

Economic data from this period indicate that the Cuban Republic was a middle-income (likely upper-middle income by modern standards) country, with living conditions comparable to some European countries, or to those in the southern United States (which were the poorest states in the U.S. at this time). Consumption rates at certain points during the Cuban Republic measured as high as 70% of most European economies and exceeded those of almost every other Latin American nation. The Cuban Republic’s income per capita before the Revolution of 1959, was well above the average for Latin America; in fact, it was equidistant from the European and Latin American averages. Several consumption-based economic indicators are especially useful in highlighting Cuba’s prosperity during the republican period, mainly those which relate to private ownership of technology and luxury items, as well as those which relate to food supply and nourishment. The Cuban Republic’s rate of private television ownership (measured by the number of televisions per 1000 persons) was nearly 7 times greater than the average for Latin American states, and approximately equal to the European average. Likewise, Cuban private ownership of radios was well above Latin America’s average, as was the rate of private ownership for passenger vehicles. Additionally, during the Cuban Republic period, Cuba regularly led Latin America in food production, as well as per capita daily caloric consumption; whereas, Cuba following the Revolution of 1959 has often lagged behind other Latin American nations in these regards. Finally, the rapid development of Cuba during the Republic era is evident by the fact that for much of that time period, Cuba led Latin America as the region's largest consumer of cement, a resource which is essential for the construction of new infrastructure. Additionally, Cuba’s investment in technology and mechanization during this period drastically exceeded that of its neighbors. In 1920, a time known as the “Dance of Millions” due to its especially high levels of prosperity, Cuba’s investment in these goods accounted for a quarter of the total investment in machinery for the entirety of Latin America (more of a cultural conception than a geographic region, “Latin America” has ill-defined borders, but for context can be estimated as containing approximately between 20-30 different countries.) After presenting many of the above statistics, and in light of the decidedly positive, albeit one-sided, perspective that they offer, authors of the above-cited paper in the Journal of Economic History, Marriane Ward and John Devereux concluded that “The story of Cuba during the twentieth century is therefore the story of how it has fallen in the world income distribution…. Over the last fifty years, Cuba has replicated the failings of command economies elsewhere albeit in a uniquely Cuban fashion.”

Infrastructure

The Cuban Republic’s remarkable success wasn’t limited to solely economic factors, Cuba also made remarkable progress in improving its transportation infrastructure. This helped the Republic to extend the rule of law, as well as healthcare and education opportunities, into the Eastern (largely rural and poor) portion of the island. During the republican period, railroads were constructed which spanned the entirety of Cuba, with the assistance of at least $60 million (likely over $1 billion in today’s currency) in American investment. The Cuban Republic’s relatively well-developed transportation is credited with facilitating much of the Republic’s incredible progress in healthcare. The same article notes that the Cuban Republic was exceptional by Latin American standards due to its ability to provide “relatively easy access to fairly high-quality healthcare for an unusually large share of the population…,” due partly to the government’s investment in social services, and aided by the government's drastic improvement of sanitation as well as water and sewer infrastructure. Before the Revolution of 1959, Cuba’s infant mortality rate was only 33 per 1000, less than a third of the average for Latin America and functionally identical to that of Europe. Additionally, the ratio of medical personnel to population in the Cuban republic was 2.5 times greater than the average for the region and virtually identical to the European average. Life expectancy in the Cuban Republic was 64 years, a full 14 years greater than the average for Latin America, and just five years below that of the United States. The Cuban Republic was also notably dedicated to matters relating to education, and the Cuban constitution – in its various iterations – always provided for free and compulsory education. As a result of this dedication, in 1955, Cuba’s literacy rate was 79 percent, amongst the highest in Latin America. Taking into account Cuba’s significant rural population, largely unreachable by the government at that time (not an unusual problem for developing nations), these feats in medicine and education are truly remarkable.

Human rights

Finally, and most importantly, the Cuban Republic continually made impressive advancements in human rights and liberalization. In Cuba’s 1940 Constitution, widely considered a bulwark of freedom and social justice, Cuban delegates included language which provided for anti-discrimination protections and other liberal principles. Notably, the constitution included unparalleled protections for Cuban women. The United States had, prior to the end of its provisional occupation in 1902, re-imposed the Spanish Civil Code upon Cuba as a stop-gap alternative to the difficult process of drafting a new body of law for the island. The Spanish Civil Code was heavily Catholicized, and thus, held regressive and prohibitive views of women and their role in society. During the short period of its existence, the Cuban Republic made remarkable progress in removing the religious influences from its body of law, and in elevating the status of women in the Cuban society. In the early 20th century, Cuban women catapulted from a position in which the law afforded them little autonomy and no property rights, to being able to own property, vote, divorce their husbands, and organize politically. Laws were also passed which attempted to abolish all forms of discrimination based upon sex, although their implementation proved difficult.

Cuba’s contributions to the cause of human rights during the republican period were not limited to the Constitution of 1940, or to Cuban domestic pursuits; Cuba was essential to the progress of the international human rights movement. In the latter years of World War 2, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt communed to discuss the post-war order, and to construct a world order amenable to their respective interests. The notions underpinning the United Nations, as an international organization dominated by the great powers and designed to serve as the arbiter of their new world order, emerged from these discussions. It was the efforts of various Latin American nations which made the United Nations what it is today: not just an organization designed for ensuring security and stability, but a dedicated, efficacious bastion of human rights. More specifically, it was Cuba’s delegation that assumed a leadership role of the Latin American bloc, at that time the largest group of nations in the original 58-state body, and spearheaded an aggressive charge to re-define the nature of the United Nations as a body primarily dedicated to the defense of human dignity. During the first session of the United Nations, the Cuban delegation became the first to submit a proposal that the United Nations consider issuing an authoritative statement demonstrating its commitment to human rights, a suggestion that ran counter to the immediate interests of the United States and other major members of the body. When the original motion failed the Cuban delegation resolved to pursue it with the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council which, due to the Republic of Cuba’s tenacity, established the Commission on Human Rights for the purpose of drafting an “international bill of rights.” Cuba also submitted a draft such declaration, which inspired the final document, serving as a model in both substance and form. If it were not for Cuba’s novel idea that universal human rights should be listed, so that they might be easily understood, attained, and defended by persons of every walk of life, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights might never have come into existence. Throughout most of the modern era, outside of religious doctrine and certain areas of academia, rights were seldom discussed in the context of “humankind,” “international,” or “universal.” Rather, rights were seen as the prerogative of the nation-state and were outlined in national contexts or documents (e.g., state constitutions.) Cuban, and larger Latin American influence over the United Nations assisted in shifting that paradigm, and it is perhaps the most incredible part of the Cuban Republic’s legacy.

Conclusion

It is important that the presentation of these facts not be mistaken as an effort to obscure the serious shortcomings of the Cuban Republic. It is especially critical that the aforementioned economic statistics not be misused to obscure the gross income inequality under which a segment of the Cuban Republic’s poor languished, or to exonerate those responsible for the political instability which plagued the era. Rather, knowledge of this period is crucial for two major reasons. First, the Cuban regime often boasts about spectacular achievements (particularly in the fields of health care and literacy), and these “achievements” form a central pillar of revolution propaganda, but the above data illustrate that most of these regime “successes” were largely achieved by the Republic which came before. Second, and even more important, this story of the Cuban Republic is the story of a brave people who fought for countless years to achieve some measure of freedom and liberalism, only to have it snatched away from them by a revolution – and revolutionaries – steeped in perfidy. Unfortunately, irony abounds in present-day Cuba which, once a key drafter of the original document, now bans the distribution of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the island and severely punished those in possession of the document. Additionally, while Fidel Castro was given the chance to defend himself in open court on July 26, 1953 – in front of relatively fair-minded judges and the press – those who live on the island in the present day are denied that right. While Castro was released from prison after organizing an amnesty campaign from his cell, having served less than 3 years of his 15-year sentence, Cubans are now subjected to draconian prison sentences in medieval prisons. Perhaps this is why many Cubans prefer to refer to the Republican period as “free Cuba,” drawing a powerful juxtaposition with present-day, “un-free Cuba.”

History has yet to absolve Fidel Castro, or the brutally oppressive regime that he left behind, but it seems to be in the process of absolving the principles of the Republic which Castro worked so hard to topple.

What do you think of pre-revolutionary Cuba? Let us know below.

What was the Rhodesian Bush War?

The Rhodesian Bush War raged in the mostly unrecognised African nation of Rhodesia, modern-day Zimbabwe, a nation that had been unilaterally declared independent by the Prime Minister Ian Smith in 1965.

Smith defied calls from the British and international governments to implement a policy known as NIMBAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule). This led to a bloody guerrilla conflict between Smith’s government and militant pro-independence groups known as the Bush War from 1974-79. This was also a proxy battle within the Cold War. The war eventually culminated in the Lancaster House Agreement which reestablished the country as present-day Zimbabwe.

But why did Smith choose to pursue independence?

The origins of Smith’s decision and the Bush War lay within Rhodesia’s complex history.

Matthew Davey explains.

Rhodesian African Rifles on Lake Kariba in December 1976. Source: Ggwallace1954, available here.

Southern Rhodesia

Rhodesia was originally known as “Southern Rhodesia” and was part of a federation of nations which had become colonies of Britain in the 19th century following expeditions by the British South Africa Company. White settlers emigrated to the new colony seeking opportunities in mining and farming and established rooted communities.

Southern Rhodesia was also unique through being granted responsible government status in 1923, allowing colonial politicians to make decisions without deferring to London. This arrangement continued through the Second World War up until the 1960s when European authorities began to relinquish former colonies.

Who was Ian Smith?

Smith was born on April 8, 1919 in the mining township of Selukwe (now Shurugwi) to parents from the United Kingdom. His father was John Douglas Smith and his mother Agnes. John worked variously as a butcher, rancher, miner and a garage owner, but the family were known for their involvement in local politics.

Although Southern Rhodesia had self-governing status, it entered the Second World War by default when Britain declared war on Germany. The war was a turning point for Smith who suspended a place at university to enlist in the Royal Air Force in 1941.

Smith was posted to the Middle East as part of a Hurricane squadron. While performing a flight over Egypt he survived a crash and had plastic surgery performed on his face as a result.

Upon returning to Africa, Smith resumed his studies at Rhodes University in South Africa. It was around this time that his interest in politics began when he became leader of a campus veterans association.

Although Smith was a reluctant politician, preferring to devote himself to a farm he ran with his wife, he decided to run for office and was elected to parliament in 1948 for the Rhodesian Liberal Party.

He later founded the Rhodesian Front which won the 1962 election and Smith became Prime Minister of Rhodesia in 1964.

Declaring UDI

In 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave the “Wind of Change” speech, arguing that Britain should not hinder the process of independence for African nations.

The British were concerned that violence seen in other former European colonies could spill into British colonies while the United States argued communism would expand into Africa through nationalist groups if European governments denied them independence. The British government endorsed the policy of NIMBAR; independence could not be granted unless a majority native government was in place.

This posed complications for Rhodesia.

By this stage, Rhodesia had a significant white population, many of whom feared a repeat of the violence which had targeted Europeans in the Congo and Algeria under native governments. Smith himself believed that the sudden emergence of an unprepared black government would lead to civil war and economic strife. On a personal level, he also felt a sense of betrayal at Britain having fought in the war before being told to give up his position as Prime Minister.

Although white Rhodesians made up a smaller percentage of the population, economic and social disparities between the black and white citizens were significant. Although all racial groups were allowed to vote in elections, most black Rhodesians did not enjoy the same property ownership or financial status which were required for political participation.

Spurred by economic grievances and political exclusion, African nationalist groups called for an uprising against the Rhodesian government and for independence with a majority government.

In 1964, Harold Wilson was elected Prime Minister of Britain and took a firm stance on NIMBAR. Although calls for independence were growing, Smith maintained that an experienced white government was the best way for all Rhodesians to experience security and a path to equal partnership, and claimed the British were too hasty in granting independence to countries that had descended into conflict. Wilson countered that the Rhodesian system was discriminatory and the solution for independence was black participation in a majority government. Smith and Wilson met for a series of negotiations in London but failed to reach an agreement.

Smith decided to call an election in 1965. He campaigned to declare Rhodesia independent with his government in charge. The Rhodesian Front won a majority and Smith issued the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

The UDI was not recognised by the British who imposed sanctions but Smith was determined to continue.

Bush War

A major consequence of the UDI was that militant action by two major groups opposed to the Smith government intensified.

Before the UDI, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed by Joshua Nkomo to oppose the Rhodesian government. The group adhered to socialist and anti-colonial beliefs but saw an ideological split when Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole left in protest at Nkomo’s leadership to form the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

The two groups at first engaged in low-level tactics including arson and sporadic killings of white Rhodesians before the UDI and both were subsequently banned by the government.

Although under sanction, the Rhodesian government received supplies from apartheid South Africa and Portugal. The ZANU and ZAPU factions were divided on tribal lines, with the Shona tribe supporting Mugabe and the Ndebele and Kalanga people rallying for ZAPU. However, tribal rivalry was supplanted by Cold War politics; Mugabe declared himself a Maoist which angered the Soviets who responded by exclusively supporting ZAPU while China backed ZANU. The Bush War escalated into a proxy conflict of the Cold War, although Western governments did not wish to collude with Smith directly and urged him to hold peace talks.

From 1966, the Rhodesian army, ZANU and ZAPU began to engage each other directly in combat. Both ZANU and ZAPU engaged in terrorism and guerrilla tactics while the Rhodesian military responded with cross-border raids into Mozambique and Zambia to destroy their camps.

The war also saw civilians caught in the crossfire; native Africans in rural areas who refused to join either militia groups or were accusing of spying were killed while ZAPU and ZANU fought each other for political dominance with factional Cold War support. In 1977, a Woolworths store was bombed, killing eleven people. In 1978 two Air Rhodesia flights were shot down by ZAPU militants, in the first shootdown surviving passengers were massacred on the ground. The attacks prompted uproar but posed difficulties for international governments who did not want to compromise peace negotiations.

The independence of Mozambique from Portugal complicated matters for Smith as militants could now operate freely across the border. At the same time, the government of South Africa wanted to build credibility as global opposition to apartheid grew and decided supporting Smith was untenable.

By 1978, it was apparent that militants were entering the country faster than the army could intercept them and with lifelines cut off, the Smith government was now forced to compromise.

Compromise

Smith concluded that his best opportunity was an internal settlement with more moderate opposition forces.

In 1978, the country was renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and elections were held in 1979. The first black Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa was elected. However, the election and internal settlement were not recognised by foreign governments.

In December 1979, Muzorewa was persuaded to attend the Lancaster House Agreement. The Agreement nulled the UDI and temporarily returned Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to British rule with the UK and United States agreeing to drop sanctions after fresh elections. The British government re-declared the country independent as free elections were held. ZANU led by Robert Mugabe won the vote.

Conclusion

The war concluded with an estimated 20,000 people killed overall.

Although international governments hoped for reconciliation after the 1980 election, violence continued with Cold War politics leaving its mark. Mugabe initially included white politicians and his former rival Nkomo in government but later fired them after disagreements and consolidated his power.

Mugabe then sought to purge opponents under what was known as the Gukurahundi; members of the Zimbabwean army trained by North Korea carried out bloody pogroms against the Ndebele and Kalanga who had mostly supported ZAPU.

What do you think of the Rhodesian Bush War? Let us know below.