The Battle of Shiloh (April 6–7, 1862) almost ended Generals Grant and Sherman's careers. Instead, it is considered their first great victory, a testament to their tenacity and determination.
During the chaotic first day, several Union generals played critical roles in holding defensive positions or delaying the Confederate advance. These efforts helped prevent a total collapse of the Union army and bought time for General Ulysses S. Grant to establish a stronger defensive line near Pittsburg Landing.
Lloyd W Klein here looks at how the battle ended in the final part of the series. Part 1 is here.
Ulysses S. Grant.
Important Union Contributions:
· Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss who commanded the 6th Division in the Union center. He was a critical first responder given that his was the most forward division. He would then move to the Hornet’s Nest.
· Major General John A. McClernand who commanded the 1st Division on the Union right flank. McClernand’s division faced some of the heaviest fighting early in the day as the Confederates launched their surprise attack. Despite being pushed back, McClernand’s forces fought stubbornly, slowing the Confederate advance and preventing an early collapse of the Union right flank.
· Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut, who commanded the 4th Division.
Hurlbut’s division held a defensive position near the Union left flank, covering the approach to Pittsburg Landing.. His troops absorbed significant Confederate pressure and played a key role in protecting the Union army’s retreat and regrouping efforts.
Important Confederate Contributions:
· Major General Braxton Bragg, commander of a Confederate corps, whose aggressive leadership helped drive the Confederate advance early in the battle. He coordinated several assaults on key Union positions, including the Hornet’s Nest, which was crucial in breaking Union resistance in the center. Bragg’s relentless pressure contributed to the Union army’s retreat toward Pittsburg Landing.
· Major General William J. Hardee, who commanded the lead Confederate corps.
Hardee’s corps spearheaded the initial Confederate assault at dawn, achieving significant success in surprising and overwhelming the Union front lines. His leadership was instrumental in the early Confederate momentum, driving Union forces back several miles.
· Major General Leonidas Polk who commanded of a Confederate corps. Polk’s corps provided critical support during the Confederate attacks on the Union right flank. While his contributions were solid, Polk’s performance was less decisive compared to Bragg and Hardee. who were instrumental in executing the Confederate attacks, particularly in the early phases of the battle, and their actions shaped the battlefield dynamics.
Hornet’s Nest
A key defensive stand occurred at an area later known as the Hornet’s Nest, where Union forces under Prentiss and Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace held off repeated Confederate assaults for several hours. This resistance bought critical time for Grant to organize a defensive line near Pittsburg Landing. The Hornet’s Nest was a name given to the area of the Shiloh battlefield where Confederate troops made repeated attacks against Union positions along a small, little-used farm road.. Southern soldiers said the zipping bullets sounded like angry hornets; according to tradition, one man said, "It’s a hornet’s nest in there."
The narrow farm road ambles generally southeast from its junction with the Eastern Corinth Road (Corinth-Pittsburgh Road). Fairly level toward its northwest end, it makes a rather sharp climb up a hill near its center, descending again near the William Manse George cabin and the Peach Orchard. That hill, where Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss commanded an ad hoc group of regiments, comprises the area of the Hornet’s Nest. To Wallace’s right was a division of Federals under Brig. Gen. W.H. L. Wallace, and to his left was another division under Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut. Wallace held a position stretching along the farm road from the Eastern Cornith Road and up the slope to where Prentiss’s line began. Wallace’s men were in a deep ravine on the east side of the farm road; that area is now known as the Sunken Road. Often, but erroneously, the positions of Wallace and Prentiss are lumped together as the Hornet’s Nest. Confusing matters further is the fact that as the farm road passes over the hill where Prentiss had his command, it is sunken for a portion of its 600-yard length there.
Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace commanded the 2nd Division. An Illinois volunteer soldier who was a lawyer in his civilian life, I believe a law partner at one time of Abraham Lincoln (they were friends, at least). Coolness under fire leading a brigade as a colonel at Fort Donelson had earned him a promotion to Brigadier General Wallace’s division also played a central role in defending the Hornet’s Nest, fighting alongside Prentiss’s men. Wallace was mortally wounded during the battle, but his leadership and the determination of his troops were crucial in holding the line for much of the day. Charles Ferguson Smith had been the division commander but developed a leg infection just prior to the battle. In fact, he died of it a couple of weeks later. General William HL Wallace took command, and ended up defending the Hornet’s Nest for 6 hours, eventually being killed there.
Wallace commanded the 2nd Division of the Army of the Tennessee. His division formed a critical part of the Union line, holding off repeated Confederate assaults. During the intense fighting in the late afternoon, Wallace was mortally wounded. A bullet struck him in the head as his troops were withdrawing from the Hornet’s Nest. He was left on the battlefield during the Union retreat but was later found alive by Union forces. Wallace was taken to a field hospital, but his injuries were too severe. He died on April 10, 1862, four days after the battle. His death was a significant loss to the Union army, as he was a respected and capable commander.
Benjamin Prentiss commanded the 6th Division of the Army of the Tennessee. Early on Day 1, his division bore the brunt of the Confederate surprise attack. Despite being initially driven back, Prentiss regrouped his forces and established a strong defensive position in the Hornet’s Nest, a dense thicket that became a focal point of the battle. Alongside W.H.L. Wallace, Prentiss held this position for hours, slowing the Confederate advance and buying time for Union forces to reorganize near Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss took full command of the position after Wallace was fatally wounded. Late in the afternoon, after being surrounded and running low on ammunition, Prentiss and his remaining troops were forced to surrender. Prentiss was taken prisoner along with about 2,200 Union soldiers. Prentiss was held as a prisoner of war until he was exchanged in October 1862. His leadership at the Hornet’s Nest earned him recognition for his bravery, despite his capture.
The defense of the Hornet’s Nest by Prentiss and Wallace delayed the Confederate advance, preventing them from reaching Pittsburg Landing and potentially destroying the Union army on Day 1. While both men suffered tragic outcomes—Prentiss as a prisoner and Wallace from mortal wounds—their actions contributed significantly to the Union’s ability to regroup and ultimately win the battle on Day 2. The Confederate forces launched repeated attacks on this strong Union defensive position, but it took hours and significant effort to overcome it. General Beauregard has been criticized for his conduct of this aspect of the battle because of the time delay it caused. He could have bypassed the Hornet’s Nest entirely and gone straight for Pittsburg Landing.
After the battle he was considered a hero, having held off the Confederate States Army long enough to allow General Grant to organize a counterattack and win the battle. Grant later played down Prentiss's role in the victory, possibly because of mutual dislike between the two generals. He was exchanged in October 1862. Prentiss was promoted to major general and served on the court-martial board that convicted Fitz John Porter. His dissenting voice in the final vote damaged his political clout in the Army, and he resigned in 1863.
Colonel Randall L. Gibson commanded a brigade under Bragg. Gibson’s brigade launched multiple assaults on the Hornet’s Nest but was repelled repeatedly with heavy losses. His inability to break the Union line underscored the strength of the Union position and the difficulty of the Confederate task. While Gibson would go on to become a long-serving brigade commander with a solid service record, Braxton Bragg (the man who ordered the repeated charges) would fault him and bring him up on charges after the battle. He had graduated Yale as valedictorian, a member of Skull and Crossbones, and the son of a wealthy plantation owner. An interesting factoid about Gibson is that his great-great-grandfather was a free man of color whose descendants were able to integrate into Louisiana's white society. He would go on to be the US Senator from Louisiana who was instrumental in ending Reconstruction.
An artillery barrage organized by the Ruggles Brigade ultimately caused the Union line to break and the Union line was broken with units heading to the rear. Ruggles' Battery, not an actual unit but a Napoleonic style Grand Battery collecting numerous artillery units under the direction of Confederate division commander Daniel Ruggles. Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles lined up eleven batteries of cannon (62 in all according to Ruggles, 53 according to other sources) and bombed the hell out of the Union troops for nearly an hour beginning at 4:30 PM on April 6th. At the time, this was the greatest concentration of artillery pieces on a North American battlefield.
An uncoordinated double envelopment was in progress. The Confederates eventually surrounded and overwhelmed the Hornet’s Nest, capturing Prentiss and many of his men. However, the delay proved crucial for the Union. Although Prentiss and most of his men were eventually surrounded and captured, their stubborn defense significantly delayed the Confederate advance, allowing Grant to organize a stronger line closer to Pittsburg Landing.
The Death of Albert Sidney Johnston
Johnston personally led a critical charge during the afternoon, inspiring his troops and helping to push Union forces back. A bullet to the back of his knee killed Johnston, where the popliteal artery is located. This wound should not have resulted in death; a simple tourniquet would have been lifesaving. Unfortunately, the wound went unnoticed until too late.
The death of Albert Sidney Johnston of course was a major event in the war; the Confederate western theater never really found its general. Johnston was shot while leading a charge. Why the commanding general was doing this has been speculated about ever since. His losses at Fort Donelson and Henry, and the criticism following his abandoning Nashville certainly occupied his mind. Johnston was killed by a bullet to the back of his knee, where the popliteal artery is located. Unfortunately, the wound went unnoticed until too late because Johnston had received a wound to that leg in the Mexican War, decreasing his sensation. Meanwhile, the bleeding became severe and filled his boot with blood. Essentially he exsanguinated on the field from what ought to have been a non-fatal wound. This wound should not have resulted in death; a simple tourniquet would have been lifesaving.
Lew Wallace
A casualty of a different kind was the Union general Lew Wallace. Wallace took a road that was correct if the lines were where they had been at the start of the day but by the time he arrived, those lines were pushed back and so Wallace was behind enemy lines. Thus, he had to countermarch. He never did arrive on day 1 but he was very effective on day 2. Grant never really forgave him; only in his autobiography, after Wallace died, did Grant recognize that he had misinterpreted the situation. Wallace spent years trying to make up for the supposed error, a theme he used in his famous novel Ben Hur.
Lew Wallace is one of the most interesting men who came out of the war, and we have done extensive challenges on almost every aspect of his life. The nature of the misunderstanding that would change his life forever occurred in a flash: at Crump’s Landing, Grant verbally ordered Wallace to the battlefield but didn’t clearly specify what road to take. Wallace ended up on the wrong one (see map). He never did arrive on day 1 (until 7 pm) and Grant never really forgave him. I have read Wallace’s autobiography, and Grant’s Battles and Leaders article and of course his Memoirs. It all seems like a mix-up of the kind the fog of war will inevitably produce, and way too complicated to review here. Unquestionably, Grant tried to blame Wallace for his day 1 mishaps for many years. Only in his autobiography, after Wallace died, after the wife of the other General Wallace, Mrs. WHL Wallace, sent Grant information that bore out Lew Wallace’s explanation, did Grant recognize that he had misinterpreted the situation. Wallace spent years trying to make up for the supposed error, which was not really his fault, a theme he used in his famous novel Ben Hur. In the interim, Wallace saved Washington DC at the Battle of Monocacy, served as governor of New Mexico territory, and diplomat to the Ottoman Empire. Ben Hur became one of the best sellers of the century, making Wallace a wealthy man, so he did quite well for himself despite it all. He is one of my favorite Civil War characters. And we are not done with him here either.
Evening
Grant’s back was to the river; he could have been entirely destroyed. His defense at Pittsburg Landing in the afternoon of day 1 saved his army. By evening, Grant had established a strong defensive line near Pittsburg Landing, supported by artillery and the Tennessee River. The presence of Union gunboats added firepower, repelling further Confederate advances. Generals Hurlbut and McClernand contributed to this final defensive stand, ensuring the Union army survived the first day of battle.
General Beauregard, confident in the day’s success, decided to halt the attack for the night, believing the Union army was on the verge of collapse. However, this decision allowed Grant to regroup and prepare for a counterattack.
The first day of Shiloh was chaotic and bloody, with heavy casualties on both sides.
The Confederates had pushed the Union forces back significantly but failed to achieve total victory. The ferocity of the fighting on Day 1 shocked both sides and marked Shiloh as one of the war’s most brutal battles.
That night, reinforcements from Buell’s Army of the Ohio began arriving, giving Grant the strength to launch a counteroffensive on April 7.
Sherman commanded 5th Division, which was stationed at Shiloh Church on the Union right flank. His division was among the first to face the Confederate onslaught. Despite being surprised and initially overwhelmed, Sherman quickly rallied his troops and organized a defense to slow the Confederate advance. His division absorbed significant pressure, buying time for other Union units to organize and retreat toward Pittsburg Landing.
Shiloh was quite possibly Sherman's best day of combat command during the war. After being wounded in Rea Field, he galloped back to his camps and got his brigades in line (some were already up and forming) along a ridge overlooking a creek (variously know as Shiloh Branch, Rhea Creek, or Rea Creek). He was able to hang on here (joined by one brigade from McClernand on his left) from 7 a.m. until 9:30 or so, repelling a series of uncoordinated single-brigade attacks from four Confederate brigades. Eventually the position was flanked on the left, and Sherman and McClernand fell back to the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Between 10:30 and 11:30, this position was attacked by a force that one source characterized as "two-thirds of the Confederate army" and driven back to Jones Field. Sherman and McClernand then carried out the only Federal counterattack of the day, driving the enemy back before losing steam and retiring back to Jones Field in the early afternoon. In the middle of the afternoon they retired further, across Tilghman Branch..
Sherman demonstrated remarkable composure under fire, personally leading counterattacks and encouraging his men despite being wounded in the hand and shoulder. His ability to maintain discipline and inspire confidence among his troops helped prevent a total rout of the Union right flank. Sherman worked closely with McClernand, whose division was positioned near his own, to establish a series of defensive lines as they fell back under Confederate pressure. Their combined efforts helped slow the Confederate advance and delayed a complete Union collapse.
As the Union forces were pushed back toward Pittsburg Landing, Sherman played a key role in organizing the final defensive line. His leadership ensured that his battered division held its position, contributing to the Union army’s survival at the end of the first day.
Sherman’s ability to rally his troops under chaotic and dire circumstances demonstrated his leadership skills and earned him forever the trust of General Grant. His actions at Shiloh marked a turning point in his career, proving his capability as a battlefield commander. Grant later praised Sherman’s performance, calling him one of the key figures in preventing the Union army from being destroyed on the first day of the battle.
When Sherman arrived at Grant’s headquarters later that evening, he found the general chewing on a soggy cigar in the rain, which had begun soaking the battlefield. ‘Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?’ ‘Yes,’ replied Grant, ‘lick ’em tomorrow, though.’
After making a brief attempt to assail Grant's line behind Dill Creek Branch they retired to the Federal camps for the night. Polk took his Corps back to their own camps of the previous night; which did not help the Confederate effort on the 7th. They slept on their arms. All of the brigades were entangled and exhausted. Command and control had become weak during the afternoon for this reason. Beauregard had thrown in all of his men, there were no reserve units now. He expected the next morning to be a mop-up operation. He did not anticipate Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio arrival, nor Lew Wallace’s division., which was now on the field. The Confederate lines had become confused and now they were outnumbered. A dispatch from Colonel Benjamin Hardin Helm led Beauregard to believe that Buell was en route to Decatur, Ala., away from Grant’s army. The report was entirely inaccurate, but Beauregard believed it. Cavalry Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest had observed Buell’s men crossing the river by ferry. He frantically tried to warn Beauregard, but was unable to locate the Confederate commander.
Lew Wallace arrived on the right between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. On the left, Nelson's Division of Buell's Army was just beginning to cross as the Confederates made their final effort, and finished by 9:00 p.m. Crittenden was in place by 1:00 a.m., and McCook followed after that. Buell arrived that same evening with nearly 20,000 men. Wallace’s division, consisting of about 5,800 men, was well-rested and unscathed from the previous day’s fighting. These reinforcements completely changed the balance of forces, but Beauregard didn’t know it was happening.
The Battle – Day 2
The fortunes of Day 2 went the opposite way. Beauregard’s men were entangled and exhausted. Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio arrived. But so did Lew Wallace’s division.
General P.G.T. Beauregard had effectively managed the Confederate forces after Johnston’s death, but his decision to halt the attack on the evening of April 6 had significant consequences. He believed the Union army was defeated and delayed further attacks until the next day, giving Grant time to regroup and receive reinforcements.
Overnight, Union reinforcements under General Don Carlos Buell and Lew Wallace arrived, significantly bolstering Union forces. Early on April 7, Union forces launched a coordinated counterattack against the Confederate army, which had been exhausted from the previous day’s fighting. Confederate troops, under General P.G.T. Beauregard (put up stiff resistance but were gradually pushed back.
After failing to reach the battlefield in time on Day 1 due to miscommunication and delays, Wallace’s troops arrived fully intact and ready for action, making a significant contribution to the Union counteroffensive. His troops were positioned on the Union right flank, where they attacked the Confederate left, putting additional pressure on the exhausted Southern forces. Wallace’s division executed a coordinated attack with other Union forces, pushing the Confederate left flank back. This disrupted the Confederate defensive lines and contributed to their eventual retreat. His troops were instrumental in recapturing ground lost on Day 1, helping secure Union control of the battlefield. Wallace’s arrival helped General Ulysses S. Grant execute a unified counteroffensive across the entire front. Wallace’s division worked in conjunction with Buell’s reinforcements and other Union divisions to overwhelm the Confederates.
The Union counterattacked the morning of day 2. Sherman’s division participated in the Union counteroffensive, helping to drive the Confederate forces back. His troops, though exhausted and bloodied from the previous day’s fighting, played a significant role in regaining lost ground and securing a Union victory. The Union army recaptured lost ground, including areas around Pittsburg Landing. .By afternoon, the Confederate forces, realizing they were outnumbered and outmaneuvered, began retreating toward Corinth, Mississippi.
The Confederate lines had become confused the day before and now they were outnumbered. The Union now had the advantage and pushed the lines back completely beyond where the battle lines had been before the fighting began.
Buell met with Sherman at sunset, and learned that Grant planned to attack at sunrise. An understanding was made that Grant would have the west side of the line, while Buell would plan his own attack on the east side. General Don Carlos Buell’s troops made a critical contribution, no doubt. His added reinforcements helped ensure a Union victory on the battle’s second day when a massive Union counterattack routed Confederate forces. Buell’s soldiers played a key role in the Union counterattack. They attacked the Confederate right flank, forcing the Confederates to stretch their already exhausted lines. This pressure, combined with attacks from other Union forces, gradually drove the Confederates back. Buell’s troops helped stabilize the Union’s left flank, which had been vulnerable on Day 1.Their presence allowed Grant to organize a coordinated assault across the entire line, rather than focusing solely on defense. The fresh energy and discipline of Buell’s troops were instrumental in breaking the Confederate resistance. By mid-afternoon, their efforts contributed to forcing the Confederates into a full retreat, ensuring a Union victory. Buell’s timely arrival and the effectiveness of his troops underscored the importance of reinforcements in Civil War battles, where exhaustion and attrition often determined the outcome. General Buell would later insist that he deserved credit for turning the tide at Shiloh, while others—in particular Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman—argued that his troops ultimately had little effect on the outcome. In summary, both Grant’s and Buell’s armies made important contributions on day 2.
Could Beauregard have won day 2 if he had prepared differently? For many years, this was the conclusion of many historians. Modern historians, such as Cunningham and Daniel, disagree with that assessment. Cunningham wrote that Beauregard's critics ignore "the existing situation on the Shiloh battlefield"—including Confederate disorganization, time before sunset, and Grant's strong position augmented by gunboats. Daniel wrote that the thought that "the Confederates could have permanently breached or pulverized the Federal line in an additional hour or so of piecemeal night assaults simply lacks plausibility." He mentions that it took the Confederates six hours to conquer the Hornet's Nest, and Grant's Last Line was a stronger position. He also cites exhaustion, and low ammunition. Dill Creek Branch would have been a formidable position to capture by tired troops. On April 7, Beauregard attempted to continue offensive operations, but his troops were outnumbered, exhausted, and lacked reinforcements. Recognizing the arrival of Union reinforcements, Beauregard could have shifted to a defensive posture, fortifying positions and conserving his forces for a controlled retreat. This might have minimized casualties and preserved his army for future campaigns. On day 2, the Confederates were outnumbered but had they entrenched and set up a defensive perimeter, they might well have held off the Union counterattack. Beauregard could have ordered a relentless night attack to exploit the disarray in the Union lines. While risky due to exhaustion and poor visibility, this might have prevented Union reinforcements (Buell’s and Wallace’s troops) from stabilizing the Union position overnight. Confederate cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest was underutilized during the battle, particularly for reconnaissance and disrupting Union reinforcements. Beauregard could have deployed cavalry more aggressively to harass Buell’s approaching forces or cut off the Union supply lines to Pittsburg Landing. This could have delayed or weakened the Union counteroffensive on Day 2. He could have anticipated Buell’s arrival and adjusted his strategy accordingly, perhaps by retreating under cover of darkness on April 6 to avoid being outflanked and overwhelmed. Finally, his single road route from Corinth was problematic logistically, as ammunition would become depleted.
The Aftermath
Beauregard retreated from the field in the late afternoon and returned to Corinth. The Union Army had recovered all of the ground it had lost on day 1 and swept the field on day 2. Grant did not pursue, in part because his own army was in disarray but also because General Halleck would not allow it. Both sides suffered significant losses, with over 23,000 combined casualties, making Shiloh one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War up to that point. The Union army claimed victory, though at a heavy cost.
The Union had 63,000 men engaged, with 13,000 casualties (1754 killed, 8400 wounded, 2900 captured vs. the Confederates with 40-45,000 men with 10,700 casualties (1728 killed, 8000 wounded, 1000 captured). The Union therefore had more casualties, but on a percentage basis, a slightly lower rate of casualties. The battle demonstrated the brutality of the war and marked a turning point in the Western Theater, giving the Union control of key regions in Tennessee. “Scareder than I was at Shiloh” The battle remains famous for the brutal fighting, the high casualties on both sides, and the evidence that the war was going to be a long one. At that time, this battle had more American casualties than every prior war combined! Yet by the end of the war, this battle barely made the top ten list.
General Grant initially was the recipient of an outpouring of public support at first, hailed as a hero of a great battle. The perception of Grant as a drunkard was utilized to explain the horrific losses suffered at the Battle of Shiloh by officers jealous of Grant’s rapid rise. Newspaper reports critical of Grant’s command were intended to increase sales, if not influence the political debate, after the shocking casualties of that bloody battle. Shocked by the casualties of what, up to that point, was the war’s bloodiest battle, newspaper reporters wrote articles critical of Grant’s command. These criticisms fed the rumors that Grant, who many believed had been forced out of the pre-war Army because of alcohol consumption, had been caught drunk and off guard by Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston’s surprise attack. The losses suffered by both sides at Shiloh had more to do with the nature of nineteenth-century warfare than the nature of Grant’s relationship with liquor, but rumors of his affection for spirits now became generally accepted.
Whitelaw Reid, Cincinnati Gazette, reported the events of the battle incorrectly, stating that Grant had been taken by surprise at Shiloh and that soldiers had been bayonetted in their tents. This myth persists to this day. The high casualty rate at Shiloh was related to the intensity of the battle, not the nature of Grant’s problems with liquor, but rumors of his drinking increased.
Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing on April 11 and took personal command—as he had planned earlier. On April 30, he named Grant as his second-in-command. This was a meaningless position, but Halleck's solution to the Grant criticism was a de facto suspension that satisfied the critics. Some of the more "savage denunciations" of Grant came from politicians representing Ohio and Iowa. One politician complained to Lincoln, saying Grant was an incompetent drunk that was a political liability. Lincoln's response was "I can't spare this man; he fights."
On April 8, Confederate President Jefferson Davis reported to the Confederate congress that Johnston had gained a complete victory. A last-minute addition to his speech mentioned Johnston's death. Before the battle, the public had wanted Johnston removed because of the loss of most of Tennessee. Now he was a hero. Over the next few days, more information about the battle became available. The initial perception was that only "untoward events" had saved the Union army from destruction, and the withdrawal to Corinth was part of a strategic plan. Eventually, critics began to blame Beauregard for the defeat, citing the lack of a twilight attack on the first day of the battle.
The perception of Grant as a drunkard was utilized to explain the horrific losses suffered at the Battle of Shiloh by officers jealous of Grant’s rapid rise. Newspaper reports critical of Grant’s command were intended to increase sales, if not influence the political debate, after the shocking casualties of that bloody battle. Shocked by the casualties of what up to that point was the war’s bloodiest battle, newspaper reporters wrote articles critical of Grant’s command. These criticisms fed the rumors that Grant, who many believed had been forced out of the pre-war Army because of alcohol consumption, had been caught drunk and off guard by Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnston’s surprise attack. The losses suffered by both sides at Shiloh had more to do with the nature of nineteenth-century warfare than the nature of Grant’s relationship with liquor, but rumors of his affection for spirits now became generally accepted.
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Further Reading
· Daniel, Larry J. (1997). Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. New York City: Simon & Schuster.
· James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.
· Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.
· Ulysses S Grant, The Autobiography of General Ulysses S Grant: Memoirs of the Civil War. Accessed at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4367/4367-h/4367-h.htm
· William T Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. Accessed at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4361/4361-h/4361-h.htm
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/shiloh
· http://www.npshistory.com/publications/civil_war_series/22/sec11.htm
· https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-shiloh-the-devils-own-day/
· https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-shiloh/
· https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/was-general-grant-surprised-by-the-confederate-attack-at-shiloh.htm
· https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/battle-shiloh-shattering-myths
