The Battle of Chancellorsville took place April 27-May 6, 1863. It is traditionally described as Lee’s most impressive victory.  General Robert E Lee gambled on dividing his Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) several times in the face of a larger enemy and transported troops back and forth along internal lines to meet each anticipated threat. His victory turned on his audacity and his opponent’s timidity, and is almost always described from that perspective.  In this analysis, we will evaluate the command decisions General Hooker made, the choices he had, and how he contributed to his own defeat. Typically, his self-analysis that he lost confidence in himself is taken at face value, but on deeper reflection that isn’t an accurate analysis.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Battle of Chancellorsville, by Kurz and Allison, from 1889.

Hooker Takes Command

After the fiasco of the Battle of Fredericksburg and the humiliation of the Mud March, Major General Ambrose Burnside tried to purge the army of weak generals, something only Congress could do. He offered to resign from the army, but Lincoln chose to put him command of IX Corps in the Virginia Peninsula, and in March they were transferred to the Army of Ohio. Although not recognized at the time, it turned out that this was a critical aspect of the battle.

General Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac (AoP) on January 26, 1863. He was the obvious choice given his reputation as a tough and aggressive fighter. Almost immediately, two division commanders resigned (William Franklin refused to serve under Hooker; Edwin Sumner had poor health) and Daniel Butterfield became chief of staff. Hooker created the Bureau of Military Information, appointing Colonel George Sharpe to command, who utilized cavalry reconnaissance, spies, scouts and aerial balloons. Consequently, Hooker knew that Lee had covered all of the crossings of the Rappahannock.

Hooker had an excellent plan for the upcoming campaign. He designed a double envelopment of the ANV, having the cavalry cross far west, while his infantry crossed the Rappahannock and then the Rapidan rivers at Kelly’s Ford,  and then converge at  Ely’s and Germanna fords. Where the two rivers converge provided Hooker cover and opportunity. The second branch of the attack was to have General Sedgwick cross below Fredericksburg, flanking Jackson’s Corps. Thanks to Sharpe, Hooker knew that Lee was covering the fords facing north and east, and that he had to cover Richmond to his south. Therefore, Hooker sensed an opening in the west.

“My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.”  General Hooker was a very tough battlefield commander, but was he the right man for army command? This quote shows that was ready to battle directly with Lee and that he had full faith in his plan. But that was his fatal flaw.

 

Lee’s Divided Army

General Robert E Lee did not expect an attack except by way of Fredericksburg.  For this reason, Longstreet’s corps wasn’t involved in this battle, as they had been detached from Lee to find provisions. Most books say Lee divided his army in 3, but really, he would eventually be divided in 4 parts. Lee detached Longstreet with two divisions (Pickett’s and Hood’s) to southeastern Virginia on a foraging and supply mission and to threaten Union positions around Suffolk, Virginia.

As a result, Lee faced Hooker at Chancellorsville without Longstreet, meaning he fought the battle with only Jackson’s corps, and was well outnumbered. Had Burnside been there, in Longstreet’s absence, Lee would have been markedly outnumbered.

Battle of Chancellorsville, Situation Late 30 April 1863 and Movements since 27 April.


The Battle Begins

On April 27-28, the Union army began crossing the fords and concentrated at Chancellorsville, an obscure crossroads in the Wilderness with just a single brick mansion standing on the north side of an intersection. It was an old inn that was owned by a family named Chancellor located at the junction of 3 roads: Ely’s Ford Road, Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road.  Its location was crucial to Hooker’s plan: it was actually in Lee’s west rear.

Hooker arrived there April 30. By May 1, he had 70,000 troops at this location and there was no sign that Lee knew where he was. In fact, although Jeb Stuart had been cut off by Stoneman’s advance but had informed Lee by April 30 of this movement. And Lee knew that Sedgwick would threaten his right flank. He understood exactly the problem. With both wings of the enemy across the Rappahannock, on both his east and west flanks, Lee faced a serious dilemma.

Conventional military wisdom dictated that the outnumbered ANV retreat south and escape Hooker's trap. Lee opted to meet the Federal challenge head-on and not retreat. Lee intuited that Sedgwick was not going to be a real threat but rather a demonstration and that the real threat was in his rear. He also recognized that retreating with the enemy in his rear would create other difficulties.

Correctly deducing that Hooker's primary threat lay to the west, Lee assigned 10,000 troops under Major General Jubal A. Early to man the old Fredericksburg entrenchments. The balance of the army would turn toward the tangled Wilderness to confront Hooker's flanking column. Thus, he sent 80% of his army in the opposite direction of the front line. He didn’t think Hooker would allow Sedgwick to command the major attack force. Sedgwick’s division had lost half its men at Antietam, and he himself had been wounded 3 times. He hadn’t been in command at the battle of Fredericksburg and had just taken over for Sumner.

The Federals had encountered virtually no opposition to this point. Moreover, they could now press eastward, break clear of the Wilderness, and uncover Banks Ford downstream, thus significantly shortening the distance between their two wings. Having dropped into Lee’s rear, an aggressive attack might have caught Lee in a bad position forcing him to retreat with the Union army chasing him. But Hooker stopped and waited for Lee to attack him, ceding the initiative to Lee. 

Chancellorsville, May 1. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

 

Analysis

At this critical moment, Hooker decided to halt at Chancellorsville and await the arrival of additional Union troops. This fateful decision changed the battle. When General Couch protested, Hooker famously said, “"It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground." Hooker’s lack of imagination as to the various options available to his opponent, a wily old fox, would prove to be his fatal flaw.

Hooker had stopped his forward motion when Lee was caught in between his wings. Had Hooker advanced, he would have kept the initiative and limited Lee’s options.

Hooker instead set up a defensive line to his east and the high ground, Hazel Grove, to the southwest.

Here is one great example of why Lee was a great battlefield commander: his comprehension of how his enemy would analyze the situation. Dividing his army was a gamble; but the real gamble was following his intuition and not hesitating or playing it safe. His instinct about Sedgwick was brilliant.

We hear this battle usually summarized, as Hooker himself did, as a loss of self- confidence. But that isn’t really the case, as his exclamation to Couch shows. He believed either Lee must retreat, with the Union army in his rear, or attack him frontally. Hooker expected Lee to retreat, after all that was the safe thing to do and exactly what Hooker would have done. There is evidence that Hooker was looking to put himself in a position where he would be attacked, and not repeat the Fredericksburg fiasco. He himself suggested that he was concerned that all of his army be up on the battlefield before advancing, and that may also have been part of the decision. It may well also have been  that it was his first time maneuvering an entire army.

 

The “Surprise Attack”

The “surprise flank attack” of Stonewall Jackson using an unmapped road to attack the  rear of the AoP highlights Jackson’s military genius and of course, his ultimately mortal wounding soon thereafter is one of the great American legends. The fact is, that movement was not a surprise nor was it the mortal blow retelling suggests. In fact, his wounding occurred because Jackson understood that he hadn’t defeated a major portion of the Union army, was dangerously separated, and so was looking for an opportunity to take further advantage. On May 2, Jackson devised a daring plan that divided the numerically inferior southern army and then marched Jackson’s men far around the Union army to strike unsuspecting Union troops on their extreme right flank.

The Union army was positioned north of the Turnpike and also at Hazel Grove. Lee understood very well that his army was divided and that he is outnumbered everywhere. He knew that Hooker expected him to either retreat – and be forced to defend his rear – or attack his line. Instead, Lee looked for an alternative.

Hotchkiss’ hand drawn map of the battlefield at Chancellorsville, including the Jackson Flank Attack. Library of Congress.

It must be emphasized that Jackson didn’t actually find the road, his cartographer did. A brilliant confederate cartographer named Jedidiah Hotchkiss found the road. Stonewall Jackson had asked him to draw maps of this battlefield, and he made the discovery of a hidden road not on any maps of the time. The road that Hotchkiss found begins at an iron foundry called Catharine Furnace not far from Hazel Grove and leads south – the opposite direction – and then after a wide swing, goes north. The road then crosses the turnpike and fortuitously leads directly to the Union right flank. Investigations of a route to be used to reach the flank were made by Hotchkiss and Reverend Beverly Tucker Lacy, Jackson’s “chaplain general”. Lacy introduced Hotchkiss to the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford, who showed Hotchkiss, Jackson's cartographer, a recently constructed road through the forest that would shield marchers from the observation of Union pickets.

Stonewall Jackson knew that taking this very roundabout route would lead him to the Union right flank, but how did he know that it wasn’t covered and unentrenched? Recall that the union cavalry was off making a wide right flank maneuver, so it wasn’t around to screen the reserve corps from confederate cavalry. About midnight, Jeb Stuart told Jackson that his reconnaissance had showed that the right flank wasn’t entrenched.  Jackson dispatched Hotchkiss to explore the roads to the west. Although Hooker's left flank was firmly anchored by Meade's V Corps on the Rappahannock, and his center was strongly fortified, his right flank was "in the air." Howard's XI Corps was camped on the Orange Turnpike, extending past Wilderness Church, and was vulnerable to a flanking attack.

At dawn, Lee and Jackson studied Hotchkiss’s hastily drawn map and decided to undertake one of the biggest gambles in American military history. Jackson's corps, about 30,000 troops, would follow a series of country roads and woods paths to reach the Union right. Lee, with the remaining 14,000 infantry, would occupy a position more than three miles long and divert Hooker's attention during Jackson's dangerous trek. Lee therefore divided his small army once again: he is now in 3 parts, all of them facing larger forces.

 

Analysis

Hooker was expecting to be attacked frontally, but Jackson had developed a different plan. Once again we see General Lee making the right decision. Unlike Hooker, Lee knew his opponent. He judged Hooker to be a tough fighter but not the most imaginative strategist. And Lee was a clever tactician; he looked for an opportunity and here one presents itself.

We know that this is an accurate summary of events because Hotchkiss wrote a book, The Battlefields of Virginia, Chancellorsville. The famous description is from his book:

“With a map before him, General Jackson suggested an entire circuit of the right of the opposing army, and that the attack be made on its rear. Lee inquired with what force he would do this. Jackson replied, “With my whole corps, present.” Lee then asked what would be left to him with which to resist an advance of the enemy towards Fredericksburg. “The divisions of Anderson and McLaws,” said Jackson. For a moment Lee reflected on the audacity of this plan in the face of Hooker’s superior numbers. With less than forty-two thousand muskets, he was in the presence of sixty thousand. To divide his army into two parts, and place the whole Federal force between them, was extremely hazardous.”

Chancellorsville, May 2. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 2: The Flank Attack

By the morning of May 2, Hooker realized that Lee was not fooled by Sedgwick at Fredericksburg. Recognizing that he needed to modify his plan, he made two decisions.

First, he tried to bring General Reynolds and the I Corps to Chancellorsville. Hooker had a good plan for positioning Reynolds. However, he thought Reynolds was across the Rappahannock but in fact, he was still with Sedgwick. This required Reynolds to make a prolonged day march.

Second, he did the math finally and realized that if most of Lee’s army is now in his front, that the Fredericksburg line must be weak. Hooker surmised that Early was vastly undermanned. He therefore ordered Sedgwick to make a full attack at Fredericksburg. Proving that Lee was right about Sedgwick all along, the attack never materialized on May 2. His attack was delayed until May 3, making all of the difference.

Reynolds was supposed to be  positioned further to the right beyond Howard to anchor that flank on the Rappahannock. The myth that Hooker didn’t know his right flank was in the air is wrong. He merely saw it as his rear.

It was also a myth that the attack was a surprise, except perhaps to General Hooker. Numerous Union forces had in fact detected Jackson’s movement, and Colonel Sharpe himself had warned Hooker that Jackson’s corps wasn’t in his front. But Hooker believed that Jackson was in retreat, not advancing on his flank.

Scouts on Hazel Grove informed Hooker that they saw and heard Jackson’s men to their west. Sharpe had deployed aerial balloons and spotted the movement. When Hooker received these reports about the Confederate movement, he thought that Lee might be starting a retreat, but he also realized that a flanking march might be in progress. He took two actions. First, he sent a message at 9:30 a.m. to the commander of the XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on his right flank: "We have good reason to suppose the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach." He did not order entrenchment and Howard never considered it.

As the morning progressed, however, Hooker grew to believe that Lee was actually withdrawing; this was the course of events Hooker most preferred. He became less concerned about his right. Instead, he ordered Third Corps to harass the tail end of Lee's "retreating" army. General Sickles advanced from Hazel Grove towards Catharine Furnace and attacked Jackson’s men in the rear guard. This movement guaranteed that Sickles could not come to Howard’s reinforcement when attacked. Jackson’s main force continued onto Brock Road where it meets the Orange Plank Road – directly into the Union right flank. Sickles informed Hooker, to no avail, that Jackson wasn’t retreating but was on the move.

Northern soldiers were caught almost completely unawares and quickly succumbed to panic and rout, resulting in one of the most striking tactical defeats of the war.

 

Analysis

Obviously, this was an awful judgment; it changed Hooker’s life and his reputation forever after. Most narratives say that Hooker lost his confidence; but that cannot explain his not listening to all of the reports being given. In fact, these actions demonstrate irrational overconfidence. Hooker didn’t have the imagination to plan what he would do if he were in Lees’ situation. Therefore, he could not anticipate what Lee would do. Knowing your enemy is crucial. He himself would do the safe thing, retreat, and he never considered other alternatives. This was his undoing. Lee was never, ever about the safe thing.

Lee and Jackson had made yet another gamble. They deduced that 4 conditions would apply that might make this risky plan a success: a) Jackson had to make a 12-mile march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. b) Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive. c) Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there. d) When Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.

Why didn’t the Union cavalry show Hooker where Jackson’s corps was moving? Stoneman’s cavalry was carrying out its long distance raid against the Confederate supply lines, so they weren’t there. Hooker had sent the cavalry off to cut Lee's line of supply by tearing up the railroad in Lee's rear. Unfortunately, the mission failed.

It was thought that the Wilderness woods was impenetrable and so there was temporary protection especially as the front was in the east.

Why wasn’t Howard entrenched? He perceived his position to be in the rear of the army, and thus not likely to become involved in the days fighting.

Stonewall Jackson's victory on May 2 did not result in a significant military advantage for the Army of Northern Virginia. Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and in fact were in excellent position for May 3. This is one of the least understood facets of this battle. Jackson deserves great credit for this attack, but he recognized in the moment that nothing really had been accomplished.

Chancellorsville, May 3 morning. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 3: Hazel Grove

Even after the May 2 surprise attack, Lee was still in a difficult position. Jackson realized that the Union army in his front remained formidable. That evening, he considered a night attack to continue the great rout his surprise attack had created, but not completed: that is why he was out there that night.  Jackson and Hill were wounded by their own men performing a reconnaissance and JEB Stuart was given temporary command of Jackson’s Corps.

By the morning of May 3, Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and Reynolds's I Corps had arrived overnight, which replaced Howard's losses. About 76,000 Union men faced 43,000 Confederate at the Chancellorsville front. The two halves of Lee's army at Chancellorsville were separated by Sickles’ III Corps, which occupied a strong position on high ground at Hazel Grove.

And, the ANV was divided all over the battlefield. Sickles’ troops at Hazel Grove were right in between. Hooker could have attacked either part of Lee’s army, moving in any direction, and destroyed it. Stuart was completely aware of this predicament. He was not in a position for a defensive battle. So instead, he prepared an attack at dawn on Hazel Grove rather than await one.

And then Hooker, who continually made the wrong decisions in this battle, then made his most disastrous decision. He ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove at the very instant when that high ground became critical to the position.

The Union position at Hazel Grove was separated from the main army position with tentative connection and support. Hooker pulled Sickles back for its survival. Hooker was thinking defensively not offensively. Hooker ordered Sickles off that high ground and instead to another area much lower called Fairview. Hooker felt he was losing and he couldn’t see the advantage of his position so he retreated to what he erroneously thought was a safe fallback position. As previously noted, Hooker was unimaginative; if you are losing, you fall back.

Stuart had been ready to fight for that ground and now it had been given to him. He took control of the high ground and blasted Sickles at Fairview, where he was a sitting duck for Stuart’s artillery.

Recognizing that his forces were divided and lower numbers, and that Hooker expected him to retreat, instead Lee launched multiple attacks against the Union position at Chancellorsville, resulting in heavy losses on both sides.  The army that ended up pulling back was Hooker's main army. Lee had taken the initiative from Hooker, who sensed he was losing – because it wasn’t going according to his plans, not because of what was happening on the field.

 

Analysis

At Chancellorsville, the Union army had 106,000 engaged suffering 12,000 casualties and the Confederate army of 60,000 had almost 13,000 casualties. Lee lost over 1/5 of his army in a win – obviously this casualty rate could not be sustained, and definitely not for only a minimal strategic advantage. Lee and the ANV had lost more men, but Hooker didn’t realize it.

But wait! What about Hooker being conked in the head? We often hear this as an excuse for Hooker’s poor decisions, but it is an implausible one. Hooker suffered an injury on May 3 when at 9:15 a.m. a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. This occurred during the main battle from the bombardment from Hazel Grove. He later wrote that half of the pillar "violently [struck me] ... in an erect position from my head to my feet." He suffered a concussion, which caused him to be unconscious for over an hour. He did not give up command, but General Couch reported that he was in a daze most of that day. No significant orders were made in that time period. Yet another myth is that Hooker lost the battle because of this injury, but it wasn’t true: he made poor decisions both before and afterwards.

Chancellorsville, May 3 during the day. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

Salem Church

Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to attack the morning of May 2. Sedgwick didn’t receive this order until late in the day, and even then Sedgwick was slow to take action.  But eventually he crossed the Rappahannock River on May 3. Interestingly, had he attacked on May 2, he would have found Jubal Early entirely unprepared.

On May 3 Sedgwick and Early fought the Second Battle of Fredericksburg. The idea was to move west to join forces with Hooker and trap Lee between the halves of the Union army. Sedgwick joined with Gibbons and attacked Marye’s Heights, yet again. Barksdale’s brigade again held back the Union. A truce was called to allow the Union army to clear the field of its dead and wounded.

Then finally, fortune smiled on the Union army. On May 1, Lee had given Early provisional orders to retreat in case he was defeated at Chancellorsville. Early misunderstood orders and retreated anyway. Fredericksburg was open that afternoon, but Sedgwick never knew it. That night, Lee corrected the error and Early was in place the morning of May 3.

During the attack, a halt was called for the removal of the dead and wounded. It was noticed during the truce that Barksdale’s left flank was unprotected. Sedgwick re-directed the attack, drove Barksdale off the heights, and then again past the road and Lee’s Hill. Early withdrew south and Wilcox west, holding the road from further Union advance. Early had clearly lost his position. He also sustained 700 casualties of 12000 troops, vs 1100 union casualties of 27,000 troops.

After occupying Marye's Heights on May 3, following the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick's VI Corps marched out on the Orange Plank Road with the objective of reaching Hooker's force at Chancellorsville. He was delayed by Wilcox's brigade of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's force during the afternoon of May 3 before halting at Salem Church. Gibbon was left to defend the town. The next morning, thinking there was only Wilcox in his front, he renewed the attack. Once again, the Union command did not anticipate that Lee would respond to events.

After receiving word of Sedgwick's breakthrough at Fredericksburg, Lee detached the division of Lafayette McLaws from the Chancellorsville lines and marched them to Salem Church. McLaws's division arrived at Wilcox's position shortly after noon, reinforced by William Mahone's brigade of Richard H. Anderson's division. he was stopped by elements of Lee's Second Corps (under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, following the wounding of Jackson) at the Battle of Salem Church, forcing his eventual retreat back over the Rappahannock.

By 11 a.m. on May 4 General Sedgwick was facing three directions; west towards Lee's main body and Salem Church, south towards Anderson's division, and East towards Early's division. When General Sedgwick heard rumors that reinforcements from Richmond had arrived he felt his situation was becoming more difficult. He already had a six mile long line held by 20,000 troops with only a bridgehead to retreat upon in failure, with more Confederates possibly arriving.  He had sustained 5,000 casualties in the fighting and he was concerned if he could hold on against the horde he felt was arriving soon. He reported his difficult situation to General Hooker and requested the main army assist him. General Hooker, however, replied not to attack unless the main army did the same.

Meanwhile, General Lee arrived at McLaws' headquarters at 11 a.m. and McLaws informed him that he did not feel strong enough to launch an attack and asked for reinforcements. There were no reinforcements coming and he had 10,000 men. Anderson was ordered to bring the other three brigades of his division and position them between McLaws and Early; he then launched additional attacks, which were also defeated.

 

Analysis

Both sides in this battle thought they were outnumbered. But the Union in fact had a 23,000 to 10,000 advantage. Why did Sedgwick misunderstand his situation? Sedgwick was covering a wider area so he had the illusion of fewer troops. The act is, once again, all he had to do was gather everyone together and fight one or the other divided confederate divisions. Both sides had about 5000 casualties, again a much higher rate in the Confederate army. Sedgwick was in a great position to attack.

Imagine if Hooker had just attacked Lee on May 4 after Lee sent McLaws to Salem Church? By licking his wounds instead of acting aggressively, Hooker lost the battle he could have won.

Chancellorsville, May 4-6. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

The Retreat

After dark, Sedgwick sent Hooker a message recommending that the VI Corps retreat across the river. After Hooker sent his approval at 1 a.m., Sedgwick withdrew across two pontoon bridges at Banks' Ford, completing the retreat about 4 a.m. Hearing that Sedgwick had been repulsed, Hooker abandoned the entire campaign, recrossing the main body of the Union army on the night of May 5 into May 6 to the north bank of the Rappahannock River.

Hooker retreated when Sedgwick did. Some think that this was the biggest blunder of the battle.  Hooker no longer posed the original threat to attack Lee on both his flanks. He never considered that he still outnumbered Lee in each section of the battlefield. Lee's impending assault on May 6 might have failed and completely reversed the outcome of the battle.

 

Final Analysis

Hooker never lost any day’s battle except for Jackson’s surprise attack. Although Hooker suffered more than 17,000 casualties, those losses accounted for only 13% of his total strength. Lee's 13,000 casualties amounted to 22% of his army.

Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the response Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations.

Did he lose self-confidence as he himself said later? Sure; but the reason was that by the time he retreated to find safety, Lee had already figured out how to counter that move. Hooker was playing one step at a time strictly by the book while Lee was thinking several steps ahead and knew he had to take calculated risks.

But most importantly Lee then bet all of his chips on his judgment. He didn’t hold back in case he was wrong. Why was he so confident?  He knew his opponent, and basically, he had no other realistic chance to win. This is how winners win in making decisions.

Did the Confederate Army win the battle?  It is traditionally interpreted that way, with Hooker leaving the field in defeat. Lee did a masterful job despite Hooker stealing a march on him. But the casualties don’t bear that out. It is often called a Pyrrhic victory. But really, the only difference between Hooker at Chancellorsville and Grant at Wilderness a year later was that Grant moved forward. If Hooker moved forward, then it would have been considered a draw. But Hooker retreated because he did what was the expected, usual thing.

Meanwhile, Lee had 22% fewer soldiers to invade Pennsylvania in 1 month. The Pennsylvania campaign could well have turned out differently with that many additional men at the right moments.

The truth is that General Hooker defeated himself.  Lee didn’t so much win the battle as Hooker lost it. Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the responses Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations. When things went wrong, or unplanned things happened, he was unable to adapt.

 

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References

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/reverend-beverly-tucker-lacy

Stephen W Sears, Chancellorsville. Mariner Books, 1996.

James K Bryan II, The Chancellorsville Campaign. The History Press, Civil War Sesquicentennial Series. 2009.

James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

Here, Paul H. Yarbrough has a unique take on slavery and America’s 13th amendment.

A February 1865 Harper's Weekly image showing celebrations in the U.S. House of Representatives after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.

There is probably nothing as unrecognized and consequently misunderstood as the concept of slavery, at least as to the presentation by modernity media and so-called historical presenters.

Slavery has been around since the beginning of man’s history and has been a force in commerce as well as crime throughout the known and explored world.

Globally different parts of the planet had a hand in the concept and exercise of slavery. Whether or not one has been involved more than the other is of little importance since most of the so-called “experts” in the modern world have little understanding beyond some sort of non-historiography, notwithstanding their histrionic comic book knowledge of it.

This brief introduction is to fend off the usual rockets launched at the American South, its people having never enslaved any people, though they had ownership of the same. The South, of course, has the biggest bullseye painted on them for being the villainous culprits of slavery.  Fraudulent bullseye or not, it is there.

Never enslaved,” regarding the American South as stated above, means, of course, that no slave ship ever sailed from a Southern port. All slave ships were either Northern (mostly New England) or European registry. The South, in fact, purchased slaves (becoming owners) but did not enslave them.  As a matter of fact, the South ameliorated the slaves’ condition from Africa to the west by purchasing them in and for the colonies (subsequent states) rather than watch them be delivered and sold to the West Indies or Brazil where they were more than frequently worked to death.

And, of course, the South as an agrarian people needed labor.

In fact, those self-righteous Yankee slavers (I can see your giant signature, John Hancock) could do themselves a service with a political truth if they would point out within their political blather that they (Yankees), in fact, were actually non-enslavers for the most part as they purchased Africans on the west coast of Africa from Africans who had enslaved those of other tribes.  Slave traders these Yankees were, enslavers not as much, though, a bit.

 

Blame

But political affiliations in today’s modern west insist that all parties blame the American South for every aspect of slavery to the point of amending God’s authoritarian direction that the actual sin was “manstealing” and subsequent ownership became a responsibility of the owner to properly care for slaves (servants according to Christ and the Apostles).

And, as it was to be, cruelty came more on slave ships and far less on farms and plantations.

The so-called American version of slavery, often referred to as the “peculiar institution,” fared how among other racial groups throughout God’s planet? For example, the various Mongol empires swept through large swaths of Asia with slavery a common commerce and currency to use and be used.

Emigrating Mongolians immigrated to the east (to the western hemisphere) and developed ultimately, over time, a monstrously cruel slavery system among what became multitudes of American Indian tribes that easily denigrated themselves among their same race (Mongoloid) as slavers, enslavers and owners with descriptions quite uneven as to their monikers as “noble savages”. ( For a choice example by a 5-star historian, T.R. Fehrenbach’s Comanches: The History of a People is hard to put down when reading about such so-called nobility)

After the great American war between (and among) the states of Northern slavers, occasional enslavers and that modicum of slave owners, began against the states of Southern slave owners, then subsequently ending, the great fiction was and continues that the war was both a “Civil War” and a War to free the slaves in the South.  Neither was true. However, the lie remains in the teeth of the American Yankee empire’s mendacious mastication, often an outright lie, often historical disobedience.  But chew they do!

 

Falsehood

And the truth is that the same falsehood has prevailed via the contemporary political biosphere of two major political parties, either of which will say (and frequently do) anything for votes: The Democrats, who have mutated into 21st century Marxists and the Republican into anti-Constitutional national oligarchs—or nationalists of the anti-Jeffersonian pro-Hamiltonian stripe.

Both constantly have cried out that “we” had a civil war to end slavery.

Who the hell is WE?

Nationalists (Republicans) or Marxists (Democrats), as one famous Southerner, George Wallace, once said: “There ain’t a dime’s worth of difference.”

Subsequently, at the “War’s” conclusion the first and greatest change was the 13th amendment.  Glory, slavery had ended in the now “National State of America.”

The secessionists states of 1861 were brought back into the national fold free of slavery and/or involuntary servitude. Praise the Lord, for some. Praise the state for others.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.[1]

Celebrations, joy, parties, cheers all in the paths of a supposed cause of a new “Nation” rising above its blood-torn and raped, “Union,” abounded. The confederation of 1787 born of the 1776 secession was now the Lincoln-styled (though erroneous) “four score and seven” nation with new consolidated and gunpoint powers by a government that had ended slavery. Now, all of us–all of us– were truly free at last, free at last! Thank God (the new national government) almighty we were free at last.

However, especially for those who praised the state:

Within two generations, for the first time a constitutional amendment to repeal (though it was not called a repeal) a previous amendment was entered as an edict (states could no longer secede, so amendments became edicts) to amend the 13th amendment.   The date was February 3, 1913.

 

Edict

The edict? The 16th amendment.  The now-called nation (former union) government owns all labor and profit of the people and will return that amount that its edict allows via its spending managers.

Involuntary servitude not back? Wanna bet?

A war over slavery in 1861-65? Only fools believe they are free from such a victorious government then or now that make such claims. Because this government will claim anything it chooses, including by the involuntary servitude and sweat of the people’s brow, the edict that the people owe an involuntary servitude chunk of almost 40 trillion dollars to somebody else. Somebody from whom the people never voluntarily borrowed a cent.

But, if the people don’t pay “their fair share,” any number of the people can and perhaps will go to jail.

Again, with the “four score and seven” nation nonsense; although Lincoln and his Yankee soldiers said they were saving the union.

But about that 13th Amendment? What happened to it?  What do you say, Honest Abe?

“The South was right.”

But, Yankees, like maggots eating out the innards of a dead skunk, prepare, now, to reenter new soil, once again down south, ready to recycle and feast again.

Deo Vindice.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones
Categories19th century

Here, Jeb Smith provides his take on a a book about immigration to America. He looks at Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration by Harold Holzer.

Carl Schurz was the first German born US Senator and later he was the US Secretary of the Interior.

Harold Holzer is considered one of the top Lincoln scholars, a winner of many awards, including the Lincoln Prize, the Lincoln Medal of Honor, the National Humanities Medal, the Barondess/Lincoln Award, and the Lincoln Group of New York’s Richard Nelson Current Award of Achievement. From 2010 to 2016 he served as chairman of the Lincoln Bicentennial Foundation. He is a lover, great admirer, and fan of the 16th president. He has authored, edited or co-authored over 40 books on Lincoln, of which the latest is Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration, glowingly endorsed by McPherson, Foner, and the usual suspects. In this book, Holzer’s focus is on Lincoln, immigration, and its influence on politics and the military.

Holzer writes of the massive influx of immigrants from Europe in the decades leading to the Civil War “forever upending the demography, culture, and voting patterns of the nation, especially in the teeming urban centers.”[1] These groups caused “overwhelming change” and “redefined” what it is to be American.[2] Nine out of ten immigrants lived in the North! And without their votes and military effort, the North would likely not have won the war, nor would Lincoln have been elected, as he won with only 39% of the vote. Holzer wrote, “In total, half a million of the two million white men who served in the Union armed forces were born overseas.”[3]

 

Veterans of revolutions

Many of their leaders were veterans of the socialist, communist and democratic revolutions of 1848 in Europe. These foreign revolutionaries formed German units and named them after Lincoln. Lincoln “trusted they would fight to sustain democracy in America as courageously as they once had rebelled against monarchical oppression in Europe.”[4]

Holzer says Lincoln’s views on immigration “evolved,” like his views on slavery and race, as he began to endorse immigration, something he previously, as a Whig, was against; though he seems to have desired immigration but refrained from saying so publicly while a Whig, and was one of the first in his party to push for immigration. The Whigs and later Republicans often despised Catholic immigrants, most notably because they unanimously voted Democrat.

Lincoln seems to have used immigrants in something of the way the South used slaves, encouraging them to migrate to the U.S. to help the war effort and also on the field of battle to take bullets and save others. For these purposes, he sought to use federal funds to promote and relocate immigrants to areas useful to the war effort and to provide cheaper labor for his industrial allies. He used humans as tools for his own gain.

However, as Holzer admits, Lincoln never contemplated immigration from anywhere but Europe, never desiring Latin Americans, blacks, or Asians to come here. Holzer points out the irony of Lincoln supporting white immigrants, but at the same time attempting to deport blacks out of the country, and removing Native Americans from Minnesota to make room for white immigrants. Further he did not include “Mexican Greasers”[5] in his vision of America. What Lincoln really wanted in anti-slavery western territories was an “outlet for free white people everywhere.”[6] Yet this does not stop this top Lincoln scholar from repeatedly describing Lincoln as a fighter for equality for all!

 

In support of immigration

Receiving support as he did from Northern industrialists, Lincoln supported massive immigration to provide cheap labor for industry. Especially during the war, the draft was taking people from positions the North needed occupied so as to maintain its war effort; thus, immigrants filled the gaps left by soldiers. Lincoln pushed for and approved the first federal policy that encouraged immigration.

While it seems Lincoln always was personally for immigration, keeping it private for political reasons due to Whig policy, he changed his public stance on immigration for the same reason he changed his stance on other issues; political advantage. When socialist and democratic immigrants arrived, for political purposes and seeking to centralize power he advocated for immigration policies that encouraged them. The same way modern Democrats would switch if it were white conservative Christians pouring over the borders of America today.

As Holzer mentions, unlike the earlier decades of Irish, German, and Swedish immigration that were for economic reasons, or the potato famine, or religious freedom, the 48’ers were politically motivated. He wrote that the “suppressed 1848 democratic revolutions on the continent motivated thousands of liberals to flee oppression… the exodus was largely political.”[7] These immigrants began a revolution in America, starting newspapers, becoming politically active, and pushing for government education and more.

America received more immigrants in the late 1840s and 1850s than it had in its entire history before then. And a large segment of these immigrants came from failed socialist, communist, and democratic revolutions in Europe. The failed revolutions sent these politically motivated ideologues to attempt the revolution elsewhere, and they brought their radical progressive ideas with them to America. And so, naturally, sided with the centralizing powers of the North.

In 1852, with America very much under the spell of the recently-arrived Hungarian revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth, a committee of prominent Springfield citizens including Lincoln met to formalize views on the failed Hungarian and other revolts. The first clause of the agreed resolution drafted by Lincoln, stated “That it is the right of any people, sufficiently numerous for national independence, to throw off, to revolutionize, their existing form of government, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose.” A stance, Holzer points out, he later would reject during the Southern states’ secession. Perhaps because while he endorsed a liberal democratic revolution, he despised a libertarian, decentralized, aristocratic one, like the Confederacy!

Lincoln worked with and helped fund German immigrants in publishing Republican propaganda newspapers in Illinois. These German immigrants and socialists were among the most enthusiastic and dedicated supporters of Lincoln’s 1860 campaign, helping flip various states Republican, like Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Famed Republican abolitionist Horace Greeley credited German revolutionary Carl Schurz for Lincoln’s presidential election more than any other individual for his speaking and campaigning.

The influence of their radical agenda was immense; one prominent Republican complained of the “complete Dutchification (Germanization) of the Republican party.” Unlike Southerners, who saw themselves as citizens of their state, these German nationalists took the idea of a single nation with them and were now “American citizens.” And nationalism was above politics. Further, men like Schurz helped revise and provide feedback for Lincoln’s nationalistic inaugural address that caused a panic in the decentralized South.

 

Cause of victory?

Prominent Republicans credited the Germans and Scandinavians for Lincoln’s victory. Rewarding their efforts, Lincoln placed many of his German campaigners into governmental positions, especially foreign diplomatic positions.

Holzer said Lincoln, ever the politician, was “addicted to the newspaper.” Politics was his life, it was his interest and passion. He placed national party victory over local self-governance, and political victory above the local desires of the people in his party. It was national-level victory and party success he desired, and thought above various local distinctions, even within the party. He criticized Massachusetts Republicans for passing the state law mentioned previously since it could harm the party nationally, saying that “Massachusetts Republicans should have looked beyond their noses, and then they could not have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole Northwest.”[8]

Some information revealed that Lincoln admirers might find uncomfortable is that he was known for both his racist and sexist jokes. Interestingly, in 1859 Lincoln referred to the state of Massachusetts, which had passed a law he disapproved of, as “A sovereign and independent State.”[9] During the Civil War, Federal General Fremont abolished slavery in the area under his military command. Lincoln rescinded Fremont’s order, and further removed and replaced the general for his progressive action, upsetting many German immigrant abolitionists who turned against the president for it. Lincoln worked with the well-known brilliant but extremely racist scientist Louis Agassiz to found the National Academy of Sciences.[10] Also, Lincoln stated he would “suffer death” before interfering or allowing others to interfere with slavery in the existing slave states. Lincoln’s many equivocal statements and actions concerning black people and slavery contrast sharply with the welcome and support he showed for the influx of European whites during his lifetime. The latter is of course far more the subject of Harold Holzer’s book than is the former.

 

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.


[1] (Holzer 2)

[2] (Holzer 3)

[3] (Holzer 204)

[4] (Holzer 204)

[5] (Holzer 116)

[6] (Holzer 105)

[7] (Holzer 56)

[8] (Holzer 112)

[9] (Holzer 105)

[10] (Holzer 240, 8)

The Victoria Cross stands as one of the most revered and instantly recognizable military decorations in the world. Awarded "for most conspicuous bravery … in the presence of the enemy," it has come to symbolize the highest ideal of personal courage across the British and Commonwealth armed forces. Yet its creation was not inevitable. The medal was born out of a moment of national self-reflection, forged during a war that exposed the deficiencies of Britain's honors system and the heroism of ordinary soldiers in equal measure. Its conception, minting, and enduring legacy form one of the most compelling stories in military history.

Terry Bailey explains.

The front and back of Edward James Gibson Holland's Victoria Cross. Source: Royal Canadian Dragoons Archives and Collection, available here.

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 fundamentally reshaped Britain's approach to honoring gallantry. Prior to this conflict, no universal British award existed to recognize personal bravery on the battlefield. Instead, recognition tended to be tied to rank or social position, leaving countless acts of courage by common soldiers formally unacknowledged. The Crimean War changed this. Journalists, for the first time reporting directly from the front lines, brought stories of extraordinary heroism into Victorian homes. Reports of the Charge of the Light Brigade, the defense of the Alma, and the brutal conditions at Sevastopol stirred the public and embarrassed the government, highlighting the lack of a decoration that transcended class.

The idea for a new medal quickly took hold. Prince Albert, the Prince Consort, became one of the strongest advocates for the creation of a simple, egalitarian award. He envisioned a decoration that could be bestowed upon any serviceman—private or general—solely based on merit and bravery. Queen Victoria herself approved his vision, favoring a design that was dignified yet unpretentious. The result was a Royal Warrant issued on the 29th of January 1856, instituting a new honor: the Victoria Cross. It would be awarded sparingly and only for the most exceptional acts of valor performed in the presence of the enemy, making it a truly rare and exceptional distinction.

The first Victoria Crosses were minted in 1856, and the story of their material origin has become a key part of the medal's mystique. Tradition holds that they were made from the bronze of two Russian cannon captured during the Siege of Sevastopol. These heavy guns, relics of one of the fiercest battles of the war were transported to Woolwich, where they were broken down and melted to provide the raw material for the decoration. While later metallurgical examinations have raised questions about whether all the metal truly came from Russian guns, the symbolism of forging gallantry from captured weaponry has endured. The bronze was cast into small ingots, each used to create the distinctive cross pattée that has become synonymous with supreme bravery.

The raw material for the Victoria Cross remains a subject of fascination. A small supply of bronze, approximately 358 kilograms, has been safeguarded for more than a century and a half at the Ministry of Defence's base at Donnington. This stock is used exclusively for the casting of new medals, ensuring that each Victoria Cross shares a tangible connection to its Crimean War origins. Only a few ounces of bronze are needed for each medal, meaning the reserve is expected to last for many more generations of awards. The process of casting, finishing, and engraving each medal remains highly specialized and is carried out with deep respect for its historical lineage, preserving the continuity of tradition that began in the 1850s.

One particularly unusual feature of the first Victoria Crosses lies in their retrospective nature. Although the medal was formally instituted in 1856, the first awards recognized acts of bravery performed as far back as 1854. This meant that the earliest medals minted were created to honor deeds predating the very existence of the decoration. The inaugural investiture took place on the 26th of June 1857 in London's Hyde Park. Before a crowd of thousands, Queen Victoria herself presented sixty-two medals, many of which commemorated actions that had already become legendary in popular imagination. These first recipients set the tone for a decoration defined by humility, sacrifice, and the recognition of courage wherever it was found.

Throughout its history, the Victoria Cross has been awarded a total of 1,358 times since the medal's inception in 1856. This includes 1,355 individual recipients and three bars (second awards) for an additional act of valor. These three men, were Arthur Martin-Leake, Noel Chavasse, and Charles Upham, who all received the medal twice, earning a rare Bar for a second act of extraordinary valor. Their stories represent the pinnacle of human courage, each a testament to unwavering resolve in the face of overwhelming danger. From the trenches of the First World War, to the skies of the Second World War, to modern conflicts in the Falklands, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the medal has remained a constant, awarded sparingly to ensure its prestige and significance remain undiminished.

Today, the Victoria Cross occupies a unique place in the military culture of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations. Its design has remained almost unchanged since the first medal was cast. The obverse features a lion standing on the royal crown, above a scroll bearing the simple yet powerful inscription "For Valour." The crimson ribbon was selected by Queen Victoria herself, and its deep color has become iconic in its own right. The reverse of each medal is engraved with the name, rank, and unit of the recipient, as well as the date of the action for which it was awarded, personalizing each decoration as a permanent reminder of individual sacrifice.

The significance of the Victoria Cross extends far beyond its material form. It stands as a monument to the idea that bravery is not confined to rank, status, or background. Conceived at a time when society was rigidly hierarchical, the medal offered unprecedented recognition to ordinary soldiers whose courage would otherwise have gone unrecorded. Its survival into the twenty-first century speaks to the enduring relevance of its core principle: that exceptional valor deserves the highest honor a nation can bestow.

In tracing the history and conception of the Victoria Cross, from the battlefields of Crimea to the secure vaults of Donnington, a story is uncovered, not only of military decoration but of evolving national values. The medal remains a powerful symbol of courage, integrity, and humanity. It is a reminder that in the most desperate moments of conflict, individuals continue to demonstrate a level of bravery that transcends time, forging their place in history and inspiring generations to come.

The Victoria Cross endures because it represents far more than an award for bravery; it embodies a moral ideal that has remained remarkably constant despite profound changes in warfare, society, and the nature of conflict itself. From its origins in the aftermath of the Crimean War to its continued presence in modern campaigns, the medal has consistently affirmed that courage under fire is a universal human quality, worthy of the highest recognition regardless of rank, background, or circumstance. Its careful design, its symbolic material origins, and its deliberately restrictive criteria have ensured that the Victoria Cross has never been diminished by overuse or ceremony, but instead retains an almost sacred authority.

What ultimately distinguishes the Victoria Cross is its unbroken continuity. Each new award draws a direct line back to the first acts of valor recognized in the mid-nineteenth century, both materially through the bronze from which it is cast and philosophically through the values it represents. In an age where military technology and doctrine have evolved beyond anything its founders could have imagined, the essence of the medal remains unchanged: the recognition of selfless courage in the face of mortal danger. This continuity reinforces the Victoria Cross not as a relic of imperial history, but as a living tradition that continues to define the very highest standard of service and sacrifice.

In this sense, the Victoria Cross serves as a bridge between generations. It links the soldiers of Crimea with those of the world wars and the conflicts of the present day, uniting them in a shared narrative of extraordinary human resolve. Each recipient adds a new chapter to this story, yet none diminishes those that came before. Instead, the collective weight of these individual acts strengthens the medal's meaning, ensuring that it remains both a personal honor and a national symbol.

As long as courage is demanded in the service of others, the Victoria Cross will continue to hold its unique place in history. It stands as a quiet yet enduring testament to the capacity for bravery under the most extreme conditions, reminding society that while the circumstances of war may change, the values of courage, sacrifice, and integrity remain timeless.

 

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Note:

The ribbon of the Victoria Cross varies by service branch, with dark crimson traditionally used for the British Army and Royal Marines, (today Royal Marine Commandos, while a deep blue ribbon was originally designated for awards to the Royal Navy. In practice, the crimson ribbon has become standard across all branches since the First World War, reflecting the unification of service distinctions while preserving the medal's historic origins.

The Lincoln-Douglas Debates were a series of 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln of the Republican Party and Stephen Douglas of the Democratic Party. Laureen Vernon explains.

An 1958 postage stamp commemorating the debates. 


Now, as in then there can be but one supreme issue, that between right and wrong. In our country there are no ruling classes. The right to direct public affairs, according to his might and influence and conscious belongs to the humblest as well as the greatest… But it is times of danger, crucial moments, which bring into action the high moral quality of the citizenship of America. The people are always true. They are always right, and I have the abiding faith that they will remain so Robert Todd, Lincoln, speaking at the Galesburg, celebration 1896. (A, 314)

 

The weather was so extremely dusty due to the preceding drought that the streets resemble the vast smoke houses because of the dust picked up by the thousands of spectators, economic recession, deflated land values brought railroad construction to a halt as Illinois Central and Michigan Central Railroad; and reduced the money supply of the banknotes from $215 million to $115 million. Money grew suddenly so scarce with us that a man possessing $10 in coins or in notes of a solvent bank might call himself a capitalist, Carl Scharz, a German, immigrant (a,XI) When considering the series of 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln of the Republican Party and Stephen Douglas of the Democratic Party I think of civility and decorum. In reality the discussions were quite the opposite. They both used a lot of sarcasm did a lot of name calling to the degree that it most likely would be unable to be aired on network television. Until 1913, senators were elected not by popular vote, but by the General Assembly made up of their Representatives. Lincoln and Douglas were trying to win the votes of the State Legislator of the two chambers of the Illinois General Assembly. This was the first time debates were held between Senate candidates (B).

Debates

Originally, Lincoln proposed a series of 50 debates. Douglas agreed to 7 “joint discussions” because there were nine congressional districts in Illinois (B).    He was frustrated that in the two districts he already spoke in, Lincoln would arrive two days after he left and defend his views. This left Douglas unable to rebuke. With crowds ranging from 1,000 to 20,000 spectators, it was a huge media story. Two rival newspapers in the Chicago area hired shorthand stenographers to capture every word of the candidate’s debates. From the articles published, Lincoln prepared scrapbooks that he had published by an Ohio printer to assist in his later bid for the Presidency of the United States.

While their primary focus was on slavery, they also debated popular sovereignty, the implication of the Dred Scott decision, the morality of enslavement, and the potential of a fractured union. Douglas chose to speak first in four of the seven debates. He was allowed sixty minutes to present his point with the challenger being (Lincoln) given a ninety-minute response followed by thirty-minute rejoinder by the first candidate. Douglas argued his belief that residents should decide if the state is free or not (Popular Sovereignty), and that the Supreme Court ruled in the Dred Scott case the slaves aren't people and could be brought into a free state and remain slaves. He was worried about the possibility of a fractured union.  However, he believed that Popular Sovereignty would solve that.

 

Slavery

Lincoln argued against slavery on moral grounds. He avoided stating that the races are equal, he just argued that slavery shouldn't be expanded into new territories. If the territory already had slaves, they would be able to keep them. He felt that the Dred Scott decision had critical implications on the expansion of slavery, and he too was concerned about the division of the union, but felt only keeping slavery where it existed while not expanding into new territories would solve it. He spoke of the “eternal struggle’ between right and wrong when speaking of slavery, he mentioned “two principles that stood face to face since the beginning of time. The one of the common rights of humanity and the other the divine right of kings.” Lincoln used the house divided metaphor as early as 1843. He shared the biblical phrase “a house divided cannot stand” as a warning to unify the members of his political party.  The names of parties are the same, but their principals and positions have flipped in the last one hundred fifty years.

As the debates drew to a close, an observer noted that Douglas had lost his voice when Lincoln's voice and spirit were intact.  Lincoln won the popular vote, but lost the vote in in the General Assembly, Lincoln was confident even though he had lost because he had won the popular vote. Lincoln had gained notoriety and used the debates to help propel him into the White House. Lincoln and Douglas had disagreed for many years. However, Douglas supported Lincoln during the war.

 

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References

A.  Lincoln and Douglas, the debates, define America, Allen C.  Guelza, Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, 2008

B. The Lincoln Douglas debate of 1858, nps.gov, February 16, 2017, https://www.nps.gov/liho/learn/historyculture/debates.htm

C.  Lincoln Douglas Debates, britannica.com, October 27, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/event/Lincoln-Douglas-debates

Jeb Smith recently read Larry Allen McCluney, Jr.’s book, The Paradox of Freedom: A History of Black Slaveholders in America. Here, he discusses his views of the book.

City of New Orleans, 5 March 1818. Order from the Mayor's office to the City Treasury to reimburse Rosette Montreuil, a free woman of color, for the work of her slave, Michel, "mulatto". Signed by mayor Augustin Macarty.

An Instructor of American History at Mississippi Delta Community College and an American Civil War Living Historian since 1995, Larry Allen McCluney received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history at Mississippi State University, and his research into original data for this book is extensive (he even utilized a History Is Now article). He cites and quotes many historians, as well as original sources, to bring to life a fact of American history: African Americans were slave owners too.

A mix of various “free peoples of color”—various mixed race and African Americans —owned people of their own race from colonial times up until after the Civil War. In some extreme cases slaves owned slaves. Some free African Americans even engaged in slave trading. This should not surprise us, as Africa has always been the center of slavery, where just as every other race in the world has been enslaved, and continues to enslave their own people. In fact, it was outside pressure from European nations that forced abolitionism on Africa.

African American slaveowners in America at times became some of the wealthiest planters and businessmen in the entire South. McCluney writes they became one with “the upper crust of the economic level in the pre-war South.” They entered into and at times mingled, intermarried, and associated with the white southern aristocratic class. These wealthy included many African American women.

For example, he quotes Steven J. Niven, who wrote of “Marie-Thérèse Coincoin, who lived for eight decades in Natchitoches Parish, La. She would help to found a family dynasty of Free, Colored planters, the Metoyers, who by 1830 owned over 200 slaves—8 percent of all enslaved people in the parish.” In Charleston City, South Carolina, 123 African American women owned slaves and were the “heads” of households, including Maria Weston, who by 1860 owned 14 slaves and owned property amounting to $40,000; the average white earned around $100. Marie Thérèse Metoyer of New Orleans owned around 11,000 acres of land, manufactured medicine, trapped animals, and grew tobacco.

 

Wealthy slave owners

Many African American slave owners owned hundreds or thousands of acres of land and were wealthier than the vast majority of whites. McCluney writes:

 “In 1860, there were at least six free Blacks who owned 65 or more slaves. The largest number, 152 slaves, was owned by sugar cane planters, the widow C. Richards and her son P.C. Richards. Another slave magnate from Louisiana was Antoine Dubuclet, who owned over 100 slaves. He had an estate worth $264,000 in 1860 dollar value. This was in comparison with the wealth of White men of that time, averaging $3,978."

 

William Ellison Jr. of South Carolina, a free man of color, was one of the wealthiest plantation owners in the state. He was the largest slave owner in his area, with 171 slaves, and over 900 acres of land producing massive amounts of tobacco. He donated large sums of money and foodstuffs to the Confederate Army, offered the military 53 of his slaves, and his mixed race grandson fought in the Confederate Army.

Many of the slave owners were born in bondage but were later freed and, through either inheritance, gifts, or work ethic, improved their situation, eventually moving into the profitable business of slavery. It was not uncommon for free African Americans to own slaves. Thousands did so. According to the 1860 census, only 1.4% white people owned slaves in 4.8% of southern slave states, but 28% of free African Americans in New Orleans owned slaves. McCluney wrote, “In South Carolina, where forty-three percent of the free African American families owned slaves, the average number of slaves held per owner was about six. Similarly, in Louisiana, forty percent of free African American families owned slaves, twenty-six percent of those in Mississippi held slaves, twenty-five percent of those in Alabama, and this was also true for twenty percent of those in Georgia.”

 

Status

Their wealth elevated the status of these slaveowners of color, gaining them status among the highest in the white community, intermingling with, socializing, even marrying (even when it was illegal), and becoming some of the most well-respected people in their community. McCluney wrote of Justus Angel, born a slave in South Carolina but who became “a wealthy Black master who lived in Colleton District, South Carolina, in 1830. Angel was a plantation owner who owned 84 slaves, a staggering number even for a Black master. He was a man of great wealth and influence, which allowed him to amass such a large number of enslaved individuals under his control.” Of this wealthy planter class, he wrote, “These individuals often took steps to associate with the White elite, viewing themselves as an extension of this class. In doing so, the Black slaveowners were able to carve out a place for themselves within the ruling class.” Then there is William Johnson in Mississippi, who:

“Became a successful entrepreneur with a barbershop, bath house, bookstore, and land holdings. Though a former slave, in 1834 he would own three slaves and about 3,000 acres of property and would eventually own sixteen slaves before his death. He even hired out his slaves to haul coal and sand. Throughout his life, the white community in Natchez and Adams County held Johnson in high regard. He associated with and was close to many of Adams County’s most prominent white families. Following Johnson’s untimely death at the hands of a “free black, Baylor Winn, the Natchez Courier was moved to comment that Johnson held a “respected position [in the community] on account of his character, intelligence and deportment.”

 

Further, McCluney argues that it was the common opinion of slaves that African American masters made harsher masters, and they generally preferred white masters to their own color, for example, William Ellison had a reputation for harsh treatment of his slaves. One interviewed slave said, “You might think, master, dat dey would be good to dar own nation; but dey is not. I will tell you the truth, massa; I know I ‘se got to answer; and it’s a fact, they are very bad masters, sar. I’d rather be a servant to any man in de world, dan to a brack man. If I was sold to a brack man, I’d drown myself. I would dat—I’d drown myself! Dough I shouldn’t like to do dat; but I wouldn’t be sold to a coloured master for anything.”

 

Conclusion

Frederick Law Olmsted traveled south and told of the many wealthy African American planters he saw and interviewed a slave who said the African American masters “bought black folks, he said, and had servants of their own. They were very bad masters, very hard and cruel . . . If he had got to be sold, he would like best to have an American master buy him. The French [black Creole] masters were very severe, and ‘dey whip dar n****** most to deff—dey whipe de flesh off of ‘em.”

Far from abolitionists, these rich masters were reluctant to let their slave labor go as many whites had done. McCluney Quotes B. F. Jonas, of New Orleans who said “I have never heard of a case where a free African American owner of slaves voluntarily manumitted his slaves. On the contrary, they were as a rule considered hard task masters, who got out of their slave property all that they could.” And as has been recorded in Defending Dixie's Land, many of these southern masters supported the preservation of slavery and the continuation and protection of the Confederacy, to maintain bondage of their own brothers.

 

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

Gabriele Esposito’s book, Japanese Armies 1868-1877: The Boshin War and Satsuma Rebellion (Osprey Publishing 2020), is an excellent summary of two significant conflicts that forever transformed Japan. A short but informative read, it covers historical events adapted for the famous movie The Last Samurai, starring Tom Cruise and Ken Watanabe.

Jeb Smith explains.

Japanese troops at Yokohama, prior to fighting the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877.

For hundreds of years Japan had been ruled by a mere figurehead —an emperor with a religious function but little genuine authority—with all real power in the hands of the shogun, the hereditary military leader of Japanese society. The shogunate, as the central authority was known, implemented an extreme isolationist policy, keeping Japan religiously and culturally pure from Western barbarian influences.

Maintaining a decentralized feudal society, “Japan” as an institution could barely be said to exist. It was separated into 250 domains ruled almost autonomously by local lords as independent feudal states. Families of daimyo warlords parceled out lands to samurai warriors who could be called upon in times of war or for policing. Feudal Japan was a highly hierarchical society, with peasants as always at the bottom of the pile.

However, Japan was forced to open to Western nations in the 1850s due to American intimidation, bringing in new ideas and new goods. Disagreement and dissent arose within Japan over whether to modernize to protect itself and maintain its independence, or to isolate itself further. Beginning in 1860, isolationists began making moves within Japan to bring down the shogun and place the emperor in full authority. In 1863, the emperor called for the expulsion of all foreigners from Japan, and many Westerners were murdered. The shogunal forces received aid from the West, seeking to modernize their navy and army. Various feudal clans supported either the shogun or the emperor, leading to the Boshin War.

Jules Brunet (played by Tom Cruise in the movie as the American officer Nathan Algren), a western military advisor and trainer, was ordered to return to France but disobeyed, instead fighting with a small contingent for the shogunal forces even after their eventual defeat. The imperial forces led by Saigō Takamori (who later became famous for defending the samurai against the centralized, modernized Japanese government during the Satsuma Rebellion) were victorious, pushing their opponents into northern Japan. Now with modernized weapons, the shogunal forces continued the fight as it raged back and forth, but the feudal clans and Brunet were forced out of Japan’s main and largest island Honshu, fleeing to the northern tribal island of Hokkaido, where all those still loyal to the shogun gathered.

In 1868, Brunet helped form a new government and trained the army on Hokkaido. But the imperial forces' naval supremacy and technological advantages helped capture the island, and Japan became united under the emperor in 1869. Brunet escaped.

Japan became a centralized, unified country and opened to the west (initially, the emperor had been opposed to western intervention) and began dismantling the decentralized local lordships, as well as any remaining elements of hierarchy or inheritance. The military was modernized, and the samurai were left behind. Public education, national tax, industrialization and more transformed Japanese life, while outlawing the samurai weapon of swords.  Class distinction vanished, at least in theory, hierarchy replaced with equality.

Traditionalists were once more outraged, especially the Samurai clans, leading to the secession of the traditionalist Satsuma territory, led by "The Last Samurai," Saigō Takamori, and other dissident samurai. They openly rebelled in 1877. Samurai wore traditional outfits and armor, and used swords as a protest against their being illegal and outlawed. Most fought and died this way.

The imperial, modernized Japanese army greatly outnumbered the rebels and maintained significant technological advantages. Despite this, massive battles raged with heavy losses on both sides, before the samurai and their allies were forced to retreat and engage in guerrilla tactics while hunted down by imperial forces. Eventually, they lost all their gunpowder units and their numbers dwindled, yet they kept fighting for months on end. Then, the final 3,000 or so chose Mount Enodake as a last defensible position. Surrounded and vastly outnumbered, their defeat was inevitable; many committed seppuku (ritual honorable suicide) rather than surrender to their foes.

However, as he had done multiple times before, Saigō escaped, and with the last 500 samurai armed with swords and traditional weapons chose a literal last hill to die on; opposing him was an imperial army of 30,000.

Saigō was among the last 40 or so samurai in the battle who made a final headlong charge at the enemy, was wounded multiple times, and committed seppuku with the help of an aide. All of them died in battle, preferring death to dishonor.

 

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

We take for granted that the Christmas Season entails children are home from school, festive meals are being prepared, airports are crowded as people rush home to their families and parties are in full swing, all in anticipation of the jolly old elf Santa Claus’s arrival. Not many people realize though that all of those traditions have their origins in the Civil War.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

The religious nature of the holiday season upon us aside, this time of year has been a time of celebration and gift giving for centuries. The Twelve Days of Christmas and many other traditional songs, as well as Dickens’s Christmas Carol, show that this is a celebration time that goes way back in the European culture. This week we are going to trace how the Civil War led to the making of Christmas as a secular, national holiday.

Unsurprisingly, the story is at base a political one. On Christmas Day 1861, President Lincoln chose to host a party at the White House. It was a crucial political moment because Mr Lincoln had a brewing international crisis that he had to stop before it got out of hand.

On Christmas Day 1862, the country was in a national panic. Setbacks in the war had made it anything but a happy season. On this day, Mr and Mrs Lincoln did something that seems so much a part of the responsibility of the POTUS on this holiday that its astounding that it hasn’t always been traditional. And on Christmas in 1863, the Lincoln’s made yet another gesture of good will to the soldiers in the field.

In 1861 President Lincoln sought to limit an international crisis by throwing a Christmas Party at the White House. The Trent Affair had led to the capture of the appointed Confederate representatives to Britain and France, John Slidell and James Murray Mason. War clouds had started to collect as the British Prime Minister insisted that the US had no right to capture these men on open seas. The capture occurred on November 8 and had become an international scandal after November 18. By Christmastime, there were rumors of British preparations for war and also significant diplomatic efforts were in progress. There were rumors of an invasion from Canada .So, there was a lot for Lincoln to “soft shoe” that day.

In 1862, the Lincoln Family began a tradition to counter the public effects of The Battle of Fredericksburg, which had been a military disaster that spawned a political and public relations catastrophe. “What will the country say?” Lincoln asked. But the POTUS was a political mastermind, and he turned crisis into opportunity, The Lincolns pointedly went the various hospitals around Washington and visited and spoke with the wounded. No president had ever done this before. It showed that Lincoln the commander in chief was a sensitive leader who felt the people’s pain.

The hospital visits were so popular, and so necessary, that Lincoln continued them. He brought his son Tad with him on many such days. Tad was deeply moved by the soldiers. So on Xmas 1863, wounded soldiers received gifts of books and clothing from the White House, with a covering note that said, “From Tad Lincoln”.

And in 1864, General Sherman telegrammed Lincoln on December 22, 1864 announcing the capture of Savanah. By 1865, as the image above shows, Christmas was a celebration of victory in. the war.

The soldiers on the battlefield were far away from home, many had never been outside their county in their lives let alone their state. Union soldiers used salt pork and hardtack to decorate Christmas trees. Others were treated to special meals; a captain from Massachusetts treated his soldiers to foods such as turkey, oysters, pies, and apples; Singing carols was popular, ones that remain popular today, but Christmas cards would not become popular until the 1870s.

When we fly or drive home to Grandmothers House for Christmas, the origin of that tradition is the Civil War Fathers on both sides of the war were often given furloughs to return home for the holiday.

Christmas originates with a significant religious meaning and yet it has become secular in its celebration. Almost no one knows that this trend began in the Civil War. And even more surprising to many, without Thomas Nast, Christmas as we know it probably wouldn’t exist. But Nast wasn’t interested so much in Christmas. He was interested in a much bigger issue.

Nast was a cartoonist for Harper’s Weekly during the Civil War. If Nast wasn’t so interested in Christmas, why the recurrent theme? The 2 Nast cartoons depict Christmas experiences during the war. Identify the subjects of each and what was groundbreaking about them.

The fact is that Nast was a first class political cartoonist who was a Union sympathizing propagandist using Christmas to draw on the emotions of the season to bring the country together.

In the top cartoon, "Christmas Eve" (1862), a wreath frames a scene of a soldier's praying wife and sleeping children at home; a second wreath frames the soldier seated by a campfire, gazing longingly at small pictures of his loved ones.

Another illustration features Santa in his sleigh, then going down a chimney, in the top left of the cartoon. Somber scenes below remind of a grimmer reality--an army marching through snow and a row of frozen graves that refers to the Union's recent failure to take Fredericksburg. But there is hope: Santa is coming!

the January 3, 1863 issue of Harper's Weekly, Nast has an early caricature of Santa dressed in an American flag, with a puppet with the name "Jeff" written on it, Nast was inspired by the Belsnickel, part of the folklore in southwestern Germany, You’ll notice his sleigh is drawn by 2 scrawny reindeer.

Nast’s 1864 Christmas cartoon in Harper’s. You can clearly see Lincoln beckoning men outside the door into the Christmas feast. But once again, he is making a political point. . Lincoln is seen ushering in the Confederates to re-join the US in a celebratory setting. of a holiday held in common. It is, of course, pure propaganda, but consistent with the war goal of reunification.

Nast’s Christmas cartoons were so successful that he essentially created much of the holiday we know. Nast was not the only one to use Christmas as a propaganda tool. On the Union side, The New York Herald also engaged in propaganda. One illustration published in the paper included Santa Claus fuming that he could not reach southern children, due to the northern blockade. On the Confederate side, The Richmond Examiner described Santa to its young readers as "a Dutch toy monger" who was a New York/New England "scrub" and Hottentot that had nothing to do with traditional Virginian celebrations of Christmas. Nast had successfully made Christmas a Union holiday, and that is propaganda at a very high level.

“In these two drawings, Christmas became a Union holiday and Santa a Union local deity,” writes Adam Gopnik in a 1997 issue of the New Yorker. “It gave Christmas to the North—gave to the Union cause an aura of domestic sentiment, and even sentimentality.” Nast’s 1863 Christmas cartoon showed the couple shown in 1862 reunited.

Use of a Santa-like figure for propaganda purposes would eventually lead after the war to the elf myth of the jolly old Saint Nick. Between 1862 and 1886, Nast created thirty-three Santa Claus drawings. The iconic version of Santa Claus as a jolly man in red with a white beard and a sack of toys was immortalized in 1881, depicted by Nast in the cartoon attached, But he also gave the definitive appearance to Uncle Sam, America personified. Notice how they both have white beards, but one is tall and thin and the other short and plump. Nast didn’t invent Uncle Sam, as many people believe, but he did standardize his appearance and affect. Santa Claus derives from Sinterklaas, the Dutch rendering of St Nicholas, which was popularized in the 1823 poem “A Visit From St. Nicholas”.

DGCC: Notice that the Santa in the 1881 cartoon is smoking an old-style Dutch clay pipe and has a Civil War saber (?toy) hanging from his waistband. He is carrying a knapsack on his back, not filled with clothes and war supplies anymore, but with toys. These details are deliberate; Nast is immortalizing a new personification: the former Union soldier is now older, happily smoking an old pipe, and raising a family 16 years after the war’s end. But the old soldier is still in him. Nast knew his business.

It was also Thomas Nast who decided that Santa and his reindeer lived at the North Pole. After the war Nast purposely made the North Pole the home of Saint Nick so that no one else could use him for nationalistic propaganda like Nast himself did.

It’s hard to imagine today, but Christmas was not always considered a “national” holiday.

Because of the recognition that soldiers on both sides of the war, and of all religious backgrounds, found end of the year celebrations as fostering community and country, that view began to change. Politicians started to recognize in the post war period that if they wanted to bring the country together and heal wounds, Xmas was a natural solution.

Puritans and Lutherans viewed non-sectarian celebrations of Christmas during the war as sacrilegious. They believed the day should be dedicated to fasting and prayer, and looked askance at such practices.  In Massachusetts, such parties were considered a waste of money and could be fined.

The legal recognition of Christmas as a national holiday occurred when Representative Burton Chauncey Cook of Illinois introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress after the war. It passed in both houses of Congress, and President Ulysses S. Grant signed it on June 28, 1870. On June 26, 1870, Congress — led by Northern legislators — passed a law that made Christmas (along with New Year’s Day, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving) a federal holiday for federal employees in Washington, D.C. This was later extended nationwide. Ulysses S. Grant signed the law, partly as a gesture of reconciliation between North and South during Reconstruction.

 

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David Livingstone stands as one of the most celebrated figures of the Victorian age, a missionary, explorer, and abolitionist whose name became synonymous with Africa's vast, unmapped interior. Born on the 19th of March, 1813, in Blantyre, Scotland, Livingstone's early life was one of humble beginnings. The second of seven children, he grew up in a small tenement room above a cotton mill where his father worked as a tea salesman and Sunday school teacher. From the age of ten, Livingstone himself worked twelve-hour shifts at the mill, his small wages helping to support the family. Yet even amid such hardship, he displayed an unrelenting thirst for learning, studying Latin and theology late into the night with the aid of a single flickering candle. His self-discipline and curiosity earned him a place at Anderson's University in Glasgow, where he trained in both medicine and theology. It was during this time that he became inspired by the writings and appeals of the London Missionary Society (LMS), whose vision of combining medical work with Christian mission would become the cornerstone of his life's endeavor.

Terry Bailey explains.

David Livingstone in 1864.

In 1840, Livingstone was ordained as a missionary doctor under the LMS and sailed for Africa, a continent largely unknown to Europeans beyond the coastal regions. His first posting was in the Bechuana country (modern-day Botswana), where he worked alongside the veteran missionary Robert Moffat. There, Livingstone quickly distinguished himself not only for his medical skills and fluency in local languages but also for his belief in establishing missions far inland, away from European colonial influences. His early travels introduced him to the harsh realities of African geography and the challenges of crossing vast deserts such as the Kalahari. Livingstone's marriage to Moffat's daughter, Mary, in 1845 marked the beginning of a partnership often tested by the dangers of exploration and illness.

Livingstone's first great achievement came in 1849 when he crossed the Kalahari Desert to reach Lake Ngami, a body of water previously unknown to Europeans. His reports of this journey captured the imagination of the British public, eager for tales of adventure and discovery. Determined to find new routes for legitimate trade as an alternative to the brutal slave routes that scarred the continent, Livingstone pushed further north. Between 1851 and 1856, he traversed thousands of miles, becoming the first European to cross the African continent from west to east. His expedition from Luanda on the Atlantic coast to Quelimane on the Indian Ocean was a feat of endurance that won him worldwide fame.

It was during these years that Livingstone made one of his most famous discoveries: the great waterfall on the Zambezi River, which he named Victoria Falls in honor of Queen Victoria. The native name, Mosi-oa-Tunya—"The Smoke That Thunders"—he preserved in his writings, noting its grandeur and spiritual significance to local peoples. His detailed journals and maps from this period were meticulously kept, later forming the basis for his book Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (1857), a major publication that enthralled readers and established his reputation as both a scientist and a man of faith. The Royal Geographical Society awarded him its gold medal, and his observations contributed significantly to the European understanding of African geography, geology, and ethnography.

Livingstone's later expeditions, particularly the Zambezi Expedition (1858–1864), were less successful but no less ambitious. Appointed by the British government to explore the navigability of the Zambezi River and its tributaries, he hoped to open up routes for trade and Christian missions that would undermine the slave trade. However, the journey was plagued by disease, logistical failure, and tragedy, including the death of his wife Mary from malaria in 1862. Despite these setbacks, his scientific work remained meticulous. He recorded flora, fauna, and mineral deposits, and his notebooks, many of which survive in archives such as the National Library of Scotland bear witness to a disciplined observer driven by both humanitarian and scientific motives.

In the later years of his life, Livingstone became increasingly preoccupied with finding the source of the Nile, a mystery that had fascinated explorers for centuries. His travels took him deep into Central Africa, where he lost contact with the outside world for several years. Rumors of his death circulated widely in Europe until, in 1871, the Welsh-born American journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley was dispatched by the New York Herald to find him. Stanley's long and arduous search ended in the town of Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, where he greeted the weary, bearded missionary with the now-legendary words, "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?"

The meeting between Livingstone and Stanley became one of the most famous encounters in exploration history. Livingstone, though weakened by illness and years of hardship, was still resolute in his mission. Stanley, impressed by the older man's determination and moral conviction, provided supplies and encouragement. The two men explored parts of Lake Tanganyika together before Stanley returned to the coast with news that Livingstone was alive. Stanley's own life, though often overshadowed by this single encounter, was remarkable. Born John Rowlands in Denbigh, Wales, in 1841, he endured a harsh childhood before emigrating to the United States, where he served as a soldier, sailor, and journalist. His transformation into Henry Morton Stanley came after being adopted by a wealthy merchant of that name. His later explorations, including the charting of the Congo River, would establish him as one of the most controversial and driven explorers of the 19th century.

David Livingstone, however, never returned home. His final years were spent in relentless pursuit of the Nile's source, often under conditions of extreme suffering. His final journals, preserved on fragile paper and sometimes written in berry juice when ink ran out, reveal both his physical decline and his enduring spiritual faith. On the 1st of May, 1873, he died in the village of Chitambo (in present-day Zambia), likely from malaria and dysentery. His African attendants, loyal to the end, buried his heart beneath a tree at the site and carried his embalmed body over a thousand miles to the coast. From there, his remains were returned to Britain and interred in Westminster Abbey, where he was honored as both a national hero and a symbol of humanitarian courage.

The documents, letters, and diaries Livingstone left behind remain invaluable to historians. They not only chronicle a vast and challenging period of exploration but also offer rare insight into the cultural, geographical, and ethical dimensions of 19th-century Africa. Modern projects such as the "Livingstone Online" digital archive have preserved and analyzed these records, revealing details of his linguistic studies, medical observations, and even his evolving views on imperialism and slavery.

David Livingstone's legacy endures not simply as that of a man who charted rivers and crossed continents, but as one who sought to bring moral reform to a world divided by greed and ignorance. His life's work combined faith, science, and compassion, leaving a mark that transcended geography. The image of Livingstone emaciated, resolute, and holding fast to his ideals in the heart of Africa became a powerful emblem of the Victorian spirit of exploration and remains an enduring chapter in the intertwined histories of Britain and Africa.

David Livingstone's life formed a remarkable reflection of the transformative power of perseverance, conviction, and moral purpose. Emerging from poverty in industrial Scotland, he fashioned himself through relentless study and unyielding discipline into one of the most influential figures of the 19th century. His journeys across Africa created some of the most significant geographical and scientific records of his age, expanding European understanding of a continent too often approached with ignorance or prejudice. Yet Livingstone's work was never solely about mapping rivers or tracing mountain chains. It was underpinned by a profound humanitarian mission: to challenge the slave trade, to encourage what he called "legitimate commerce," and to foster cross-cultural understanding at a time when imperial attitudes frequently bred exploitation rather than empathy.

Though his later expeditions were marked by hardship, loss, and controversy, Livingstone's commitment to his principles never wavered. His meticulous notes, journals, and correspondence reveal a man constantly searching for knowledge, for justice, for the elusive headwaters of the Nile, and for ways to improve the lives of the people he encountered. These documents, preserved today in archives and digital collections, allow modern readers to glimpse the complexity of his character: a scientist shaped by faith, a missionary shaped by science, and an explorer shaped by an abiding respect for the African landscapes and communities that defined his career.

His celebrated meeting with Henry Morton Stanley, and the deeply human story behind it, further cemented his image in the Victorian imagination but it was Livingstone's death, and the extraordinary devotion of his African companions who carried his body across vast distances that most clearly demonstrated the depth of the relationships he forged. In life and in death, he crossed boundaries of culture and geography that few Europeans of his era attempted to bridge.

Ultimately, David Livingstone stands not only as a pioneer of exploration but as a symbol of a broader moral struggle. His efforts against the slave trade, his insistence on recording African voices and customs with respect, and his belief that knowledge could serve humanitarian ends distinguish him from many of his contemporaries. While modern interpretations rightly place his achievements within the wider context of imperial history, his intentions and contributions remain significant and enduring. His story continues to resonate because it speaks to universal themes: resilience in the face of adversity, integrity in purpose, and the pursuit of understanding across cultural divides. In this way, Livingstone's legacy extends far beyond the maps he drew or the rivers he traced, it endures as a reminder of the profound impact one determined individual can have on the course of history.

 

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During the movement of settlers west across America, a number of bloody and violent encounters took place with Native Americans. Here Shubh Samant considers whether such actions can be considered genocide.

Native American prisoners from the Red River War. In Fort Marion, Florida in 1875.

The Indian Wars were a tragic and violent period in American history, filled with death, suffering, and forced displacements of many Native American people. However, according to the United Nations definition of genocide, which requires intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group”, I would argue that the actions of the US government during these wars cannot be considered a genocide. While many military campaigns caused significant losses to Native communities, most evidence suggests that the government’s primary intent was territorial expansion and economic growth, rather than a complete destruction of the Native American people.  This distinction between intent and outcome is crucial when analyzing historical atrocities. While the consequences of these wars were undeniably devastating, the legal classification of genocide hinges on deliberate, documented intent.

The Sand Creek Massacre in Colorado from the year 1864 CE is regarded as one of the most famous atrocities during the Indian Wars. On November 29, 1864, Colonel Chivington led militia forces in an attack on a peaceful camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho people, killing over 150 non-combatants. The brutality of this event, including the mutilation of bodies, fits a part of the UN definition - “killing members of the group.” However, to meet the legal threshold of genocide, such acts must be part of a wider, intentional policy aimed at the group’s destruction. This massacre was not ordered by the Federal government as part of a national anti-Native American movement, but was rather done by a small local force. The US Congress later condemned the attack themselves, calling it a ‘massacre’. Thus, while the event was undeniably horrific and anti-human, the absence of a federal order or coordination to intently eliminate the Cheyenne and Arapaho group weakens its classification as genocide under international law. The Sand Creek Massacre remains a haunting reminder of how local actions, driven by prejudice and fear, can result in catastrophic violence. It also highlights the importance of accountability, as Congress’s condemnation set a precedent for recognizing and denouncing such acts.

The Red River War was a series of US army campaigns against several Southern Plains tribes. The army destroyed villages, food supplies, and horses. Such acts could relate to another part of the UN definition - “inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction.” Yet, the destruction was strategically aimed at forcing surrender, not extermination. Rather, the purpose of these military actions was to force the Native tribes to surrender and relocate to reservations, not their extermination. Once these tribes relocated to the reservations, the government continued to provide them with ration supplies, in complete contrast to extermination, as defined in the UN definition. This provision of aid, however inadequate, suggests a policy of containment and assimilation rather than extermination.

It’s important to note that while these campaigns were tactically designed to break resistance, they also dismantled centuries-old ways of life. The loss of horses, food stores, and mobility had long-term cultural impacts that extended beyond physical survival.


Wounded Knee Massacre

The Indian Wars, just as violent and horrific they had been, ended in a similar tone. On December 29, 1890, the US 7th cavalry surrounded a Lakota camp near Wounded Knee Creek, and opened fire. This led to the deaths of roughly 300 Natives. Yet again, in contrast with the UN definition, this violence was not a result of an intentional plan to destroy the Lakotas. It rather erupted from a misunderstanding surrounding the Ghost Dance movement, which the soldiers misinterpreted as a rebellion. While the scale and indiscriminate killings can clearly be considered crimes against humanity, the lack of any documented intent by the US federal government to eliminate the Lakota as a group weakens the claim of genocide.

The Wounded Knee Massacre has since become a symbol of Native resistance and remembrance. Annual commemorations and historical reinterpretations continue to challenge the narrative of “misunderstanding,” urging deeper reflection on the militarization of fear and prejudice.

The UN definition emphasizes intent, a deliberate goal to destroy/exterminate a group. Although the US government engaged in destructive practices throughout the Indian Wars, there is little evidence that there was an official policy intending to annihilate Native Americans. Historical records and military correspondence show the goals were primarily land expansion and assimilation, not extermination. While these goals caused immense suffering and destruction, they differ from the genocidal intent defined by the UN. 

This distinction has legal implications, but it doesn’t absolve the moral responsibility. The legacy of these wars continues to shape Native American communities today, from land rights battles to cultural preservation efforts.


Conclusion

In conclusion, while the Sand Creek Massacre, the Red River War, and the Wounded Knee Massacre were horribly violent/had terrible consequences, they do not fully meet the United Nations definition of genocide, which requires proven intent to destroy a group of people. The US government actions during the Indian Wars were driven more by expansionism, forced relocation, and assimilation than by a systematic/official effort to exterminate Native Americans as a race. Therefore, these actions can be considered as genocidal by effects, but not by the legal criteria.

Understanding this nuance is essential, not to diminish the suffering, but to accurately frame the historical record. As we continue to confront the past, we must also amplify Native voices, support reparative justice, and ensure that such tragedies are never repeated.


All quotations in this article have been taken from https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition.

Article dedicated to Mr. Kopitar.