How Parts of the U.S. Almost went to War in the 1830s: The Toledo War of 1835-36

In the winter of 1835, two US states (one a territory, actually) almost went to war over the city of Toledo, Ohio.

The Toledo War of 1835-36 was a bizarre and largely forgotten footnote of American history over control of the ‘Toledo Strip,’ a 468 square mile band of land between the borders of the state of Ohio and the then Michigan Territory.

Randy Griffin explains.

Former Ohio governor and US Surveyor General Edward Tiffin.

Where is Lake Michigan?

What was to become known as the Toledo War had its beginnings before the country itself.

In 1787, the Congress of the Confederation (the legislative body created from the Articles of Confederation that governed from March 1, 1781, to March 3, 1789) enacted the Northwest Ordinance.

The Northwest Ordinance specified that the Northwest Territory, the 260,000 square miles surrounding the Great Lakes, would be divided into ‘not less than three nor more than five’ states, with one of the boundaries being ‘an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan.’

The Enabling Act of 1802 gave Ohio permission to begin the process of statehood, stating that the border of the new state would be ‘an east and west line drawn through the southerly extreme of Lake Michigan, running east...until it shall intersect Lake Erie or the territorial line [with British North America], and thence with the same through Lake Erie to the Pennsylvania line aforesaid.’

Surveyor John Mitchell’s map, called the ‘Mitchell Map,’ considered the best map of the time, showed the southern extreme of Lake Michigan north of the mouth of the Detroit River. By mistakenly placing Lake Michigan’s southern tip several miles north of its true location, the Mitchell Map made it seem like the east-west line would not meet Lake Erie at all, the original border placed at the mouth of the Manumee River and Toledo in northern Ohio rather than in southern Michigan Territory.

When Ohio drew up its constitution of 1802, it was with the assumption that Congress intended that the northern Ohio boundary would be north of the Maumee River, maybe even the Detroit River. Ohio claimed most of the shoreline west of Pennsylvania, leaving future states with access to only Lakes Michigan, Huron, or Superior.

All well and good for Ohio. But when a fur trapper (whose name is lost to history) reported that Lake Michigan actually lay significantly further south than believed, Ohio delegates realized they might not only lose out on prime shore front, but could be denied the entire shoreline west of Pennsylvania.

With this in mind, the constitutional delegates hedged their bet, inserting a provision into the Ohio constitution that if the fur trapper was correct, the state’s boundary line would be adjusted to meet with Lake Erie at the ‘most northerly cape of the Miami [Maumee] Bay,’ guaranteeing that most of the southern shore of Lake Erie west of Pennsylvania would go to Ohio.

The draft constitution was sent to Congress and referred to a committee, where politicians do what politicians best (namely, kick the can down then road) deciding that since the exact whereabouts of Lake Michigan were yet to be determined the members ‘thought it unnecessary to take it [the provision], at the time, into consideration,’ and on March 1, 1803 Ohio became the 17th state, the first formed from the Northwest Ordnance.

In 1805, Congress created the Michigan Territory, again using the Northwest Ordinance’s definition to define the territory’s southern boundary, ambiguity and all. And although the Ohio legislature spent the early part of the 19th century repeatedly asking Congress to resolve the issue, differences with Ohio’s border version went unresolved for 30 years.

In 1812, Congress finally got around to approving a survey, but the War of 1812 delayed it. Only after the admission of Indiana in 1816 was the survey started. The results led Congress to move the border between the Michigan Territory and Indiana ten miles north to give Indiana access to Lake Michigan.

Former Ohio governor and US Surveyor General Edward Tiffin tapped William Harris to perform another survey, one that didn’t use the Northwest Ordinance line but the one specified in the Ohio constitution.

When the results of the Harris survey, which obviously favored Ohio’s claims, was made public, Michigan Territory Governor Cass cried foul, saying the survey favored Ohio and that it ‘is only adding strength to the strong, and making the weak still weaker.’

Of course, the Michigan Territory commissioned its own survey, led by John A. Fulton, one based on the Northwest Ordinance Line. His survey found the boundary ending just southeast of the Maumee River.

This discrepancy between the Harris and Fulton survey lines was eight miles apart at Lake Erie and five miles apart at the Indiana border, resulting in a 468-mile piece of land known as the ‘Toledo Strip.’

Taking the initiative, Michigan quietly occupied the strip, setting up a local government, infrastructure and, most importantly, collecting taxes.

By the early 1820s, Michigan had reached the 60,000 population threshold to become a state. Here politics became involved, as the Ohio Congressional delegation flexed its political muscle in Washington to block Michigan’s admission to statehood, resulting in Congress denying their right to hold a state constitutional convention in 1833 because of the Toledo Strip controversy.

In January 1835, 27-year-old Michigan Territorial Governor Stevens T. Mason (nicknamed the ‘Boy Governor’) took matters into his own hands, calling for a constitutional convention in May, regardless of what Ohio and Washington wanted.

In February 1835, Ohio began setting up a county government in the Strip, naming the county where Toledo would be as Lucas County, after Ohio governor Robert Lucas.

Michigan Territorial Governor Mason responded by signing the Pains and Penalties Act six days later. According to Michigan law, it was now a criminal offense for Ohio to perform government actions in the strip. The Ohioan offenders could be arrested and face up to a $1000 fine ($30,000 in 2024 money) and up to five years of hard labor, or both, without benefit of trial.

Governor Mason appointed Brigadier General Joseph W. Brown of the Third US Brigade to command the state militia, with orders to be ready to act against trespassers.

Escalation

On March 31, 1835, Ohio Governor Lucas, along with General John Bell and approximately 600 militiamen, made their to Perrysburg, Ohio, ten miles southwest of Toledo.

A few days later, Governor Mason, General Brown, and 1,000 men arrived in Toledo to stop Ohio from moving further into the area and marking the border in their favor.

By now, the border dispute had the full attention of Washington. President Jackson consulted his Attorney General Benjamin Butler, who believed that until Congress deemed otherwise, the strip was a part of the Michigan Territory.

But by now it was a political, not legal, issue.

Ohio at the time had 19 representatives and two senators, while Michigan, as a territory, had just one non-voting delegate. Then, as now, Ohio was considered a swing state, and the Democratic Party simply couldn’t afford to lose Ohio’s electoral votes.

Therefore, Jackson decided that the Toledo Strip would be part of Ohio.

Jackson sent two representatives, Richard Rush of Pennsylvania and Benjamin Chew Howard of Maryland, to Toledo to mediate the conflict and offer a compromise: another survey to mark the ‘Harris Line,’ and that the residents of the region could decide for themselves which state or territorial government they wanted to live in.

Governor Lucas reluctantly agreed and began sending his militia home. Governor Mason refused the compromise and kept his militia together and ready for conflict.

During the elections, Ohio officials found themselves harassed by Michigan officials, the residents threatened with arrest if they went along with Ohio authority.

Battle of Philips Corners

Two days after the April Michigan election, Ohio Governor Lucas sent out a team of surveyors led by Uri Seely of Geauga County, Jonathan Taylor of Licking County, and John Patterson of Adams County, to mark the Harris Line.

On Sunday, April 26 April 1835, Michigan General Joseph Brown and 60 militiamen surprised the survey party. In the only armed incident of the war, the militia reportedly fired shots over the surveyor’s heads. The surveyors scattered, with General Brown’s militia arresting nine, charging them with violation of the Pains and Penalties Act. The authorities brought the nine to Tecumseh, Michigan, where six paid bail for release, and two were acquitted. Only one man, who went by the name of Feltcher, who stubbornly refused to pay his bail, remained in custody.

Three of the escaped surveyors made their way back to Governor Lucas at Perrysburg, where they reported that ‘nine of our men, who did not leave the ground in time after being fired upon by the enemy, from thirty to fifty shots, were taken prisoners and carried away into Tecumseh, Michigan.

Lucas called a special session, and on June 8 passed a series of laws, including making Toledo the county seat of Lucas County, the establishment of a Court of Common Pleas, a law to prevent ‘forcible abduction’ of Ohio citizens, and $300,000 ($9.6 million in 2024) to fund it.

Michigan responded with $315,000 in funding for its militia.

We are the weaker party, it is true, but we are on the side of justice...we cannot fail to maintain our rights against the encroachments of a powerful neighboring state.

While the Michigan Territory spent May and June 1835 drafting its state constitution, Congress and President Jackson were still unwilling to make Michigan a state until the border issue was resolved.

In June, Governor Lucas sent US Attorney Noah Haynes Swaye, former Ohio Governor and Congressman William Allen, and David T. Disney to Washington to plead their case to Jackson.

Throughout the middle of 1835 saw lawsuits, skirmishes, arrests, and spying on both sides to keep track of the sheriffs of Wood County, Ohio, and Monroe County, Michigan.

On July 15, 1835, Monroe County Michigan Deputy Sheriff Joseph Wood made his way to Toledo to arrest either Major Benjamin Stickney or his son Two, who were aligned with Ohio’s claim on the Strip, but ended up arresting the whole family when they resisted.

During the arrest, a scuffle broke out where Two Stickney pulled out a small penknife and stabbed Marshall Wood in the arm, the first, and only, recorded incident of bloodshed in the Toledo War. Wood survived the minor injury, and Two fled into Ohio.

Mason demanded Two Stickney be handed over to Michigan, but of course Lucas refused. Mason wrote to Jackson asking for Supreme Court intervention, but Jackson declined.

Lucas again put pressure on the Ohio delegation, and they convinced the President that the hot-headed young Michigan Territorial Governor had to go.

Jackson had appointed Mason territorial secretary at age 19. When he returned to Detroit at the end of August, Mason learned Jackson had fired him.

In one of his last acts as governor, Mason sent 1,000 militia into the Toledo Strip to prevent the first session of the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, which planned to hold court on the first Monday of September 1835. But the Ohioans wisely held a midnight session and promptly left town for Ohio.

Twenty-one-year-old J. Wilkie Moore, a part of the Michigan militia, wrote that “they had a vast amount of fun,” and that farmers along the way “welcomed us enthusiastically because we were fighting for Michigan.”

In Mason’s place, Jackson appointed John S. (‘Little Jack’) Horner, who, upon his arrival in the Territory, was pelted with vegetables, burned in effigy, and generally made to feel unwelcome in his new role.

In October, Michigan held elections, approved its draft constitution, reelected Mason governor, and sent Isaac E. Crary as the first US Representative. Congress refused to accept his credentials, and he became a non-voting delegate. The two US senators chosen by the legislature in November, Lucius Lyon and John Norvell, upon their arrival in Washington, could only sit in the spectators’ seat in the Senate gallery.

The ‘Frostbitten Convention’

Because of slavery, the Union admitted states in pairs: one slave state and one free state. Arkansas joined the Union as a slave state in 1836. Jackson wanted Michigan to offset Arkansas and signed the bill admitting Michigan as a free state if they would give up their claim to the Toledo Strip. In return, they would grant Michigan the rest of the Upper Peninsula.

Michigan held a special convention in 1837 in Ann Arbor and flatly rejected the offer. But in reality, they had little choice.

Michigan was in a terrible financial state, spending itself almost to insolvency by the funding of their militia. The US Treasury at the time gave surplus monies to the states. Washington was ready to disperse some $400,000 ($12 million in 2024 money) to the states; but territories got nothing.

So Michigan relented and held a second convention again at Ann Arbor on December 14, 1836. Known as the ‘Frostbitten Convention,’ Michigan accepted Congress’ terms, and on January 26, 1837, Michigan was admitted as the 26th state.

Afterwards

At the time, the newly minted Michiganders felt themselves sorely used, losing the prime Toledo Strip for the 9,000 square miles of the Upper Peninsula, an area described by the Detroit Free Press at the time as a ‘barren wasteland of perpetual snows.’

But things have a way of working out, and it certainly did for Michigan. In the 1840s, copper was discovered on the Keweenaw Peninsula and iron found in the Central Upper Peninsula, spurring a mining boom that lasted well into the 20th century.

The borders between Michigan and Ohio changed over the years, and another survey in 1915 altered the line slightly, which both sides accepted.

In 1973, the Supreme Court, with Michigan v. Ohio, adjusted the border in Lake Erie slightly to the northeast, making Turtle Island, just outside Maumee Bay and originally solely Michigan’s, split between Michigan and Ohio.

Steven Mason was elected the first governor of Michigan in 1840. At 24, he holds the record as the youngest state governor in American history.

In 1841, he moved to New York City, where his wealthy father-in-law, Thaddeus Phelps, lived. There he tried to establish himself as a lawyer, but found little luck.

He caught pneumonia and died on January 4, 1842, at the age of 31.

Robert Lucas served as the 12th governor of Ohio from 1832 to 1836. From Ohio, he moved on to the Iowa Territory, where he was its first governor from 1838 to 1841. Here he was involved in another bloodless border dispute between the Iowa Territory and Missouri, remembered as the Honey War of 1839.

He died in Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, on February 7, 1853, and is buried there.

Two Stickney had had a sister named Indiana Stickney, named for where her father, Major Stickney, had served as an Indian Agent.

Two Stickney’s older brother, the aptly named One Stickney, died in 1883, and was buried in Forrest Cemetery that runs along part of Stickney Avenue in North Toledo, once part of the Stickney farm. Major Stickney and Two, who died in 1862 at age 52, are also buried there.

At some point, One Stickney was dug up by grave robbers, his body eventually making it to the Toledo Medical College. One or two doctors were charged with grave robbing, but not much came of it, history not remembering how it turned out.

Replacing the popular Mason put John Horner in a hard position, but he made the best of it by persuading both sides to remain calm until Congress could settle the border dispute.

After the crisis, Horner left Michigan for the Wisconsin Territory, serving as the territory's secretary from 1836 to 1837.

There he stayed, becoming one of the original settlers of present-day Ripon, Wisconsin, and establishing Ripon College in 1851.

He died on February 3, 1883, in Ripon at the age of 80, and is buried in the local Hillside Cemetery.

His home, known as the John Scott Horner House, is on the National Register of Historic Places.

It is alleged that there was one fatality of the Toledo War, that being a horse belonging to Lewis E. Bailey of Michigan. 

Much like the Toledo War, the particulars of how the horse met its end, history has forgotten. 

You can read more from Randy here.

Sectionalism: Understanding the Divisions that Led to the U.S. Civil War

The American Civil War still fascinates the public mind for its timeless reminder of when our politics were truly at their nadir. Despite some contemporary warnings about a national separation, fortunately no such moment has come to pass since the cannons ceased and the muskets were put down in 1865. Intense vitriol and hatred over the state of this country is something no specific to the war period. Whether it be 1860, 1828, or the 1800 election that saw friends become bitter rivals in outgoing President John Adams and incoming President Thomas Jefferson cease communicate for several years, national politics endures as a nasty business.

Yet, in our memory of the Civil War and its causes, we tend to let the latter fall by the wayside, consequently forgetting how unique those divisions were in the 1850s, culminating in southern secession in December 1860 after President Abraham Lincoln’s victory. Slavery was the cause as evidenced by the declarations from the southern states[i], but how many grasp slavery as the sectional issue that it was? Where does sectionalism fit into our memory? Without a more holistic understanding of the war through the sectional crisis that preceded it, we let more simplistic interpretations of why it started take over.

Sam Short explains.

John C. Breckinridge in 1860 by Jules-Émile Saintin

Defining Sectionalism

What is sectionalism and why is the period preceding the war defined as the Sectional Crisis? To answer that question, it is important first to define a section. As Professor Richard Bensel puts it, a section is a, “major geographic region.”[1] In this context, the sections that fought would be the North and South. Sectionalism, then, is the unique culture and economic tendencies emerging in those regions that create a politics of their own. A sectional politics does not have a national vision – one for the country as a whole – in mind, but whatever agenda best serves this cluster of states. The Civil War is a war between North and South, but just as accurately, a war of sections. It was not so simple as to say Republicans  and Democrats fought with the former looking to limit slavery’s spread and the latter seeking to keep it.

The Sectionally Divided Democrats

The Democrats themselves were divided over the issue of slavery. In 1860, Southern Democrats did not feel enough assurance was given by candidate and Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas that their institution would be defended. They opted to nominate their own candidate, Vice President John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky. The electoral map speaks to this division with the southern states going for him.[2] When looking at a breakdown of the popular vote, the University of Richmond does not record a single vote for Douglas in the southern state of Texas.[3]

Looking further back, divisions among Democrats over slavery preceded the Sectional Crisis as is exemplified by the Wilmot Proviso. Democratic Pennsylvania Representative David Wilmot introduced a proviso to President James K Polk’s $2 million appropriations bill allocating funds to negotiations with Mexico. This was August 8, 1846 during the Mexican-American War. In that proviso, Wilmot proposed,

as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.[4]

This was effectively Northern Democrats telling their southern colleagues they would not tow a line for slavery only for the sake of party unity.[5] Democrats did not have a pro or anti-slavery platform. They struggled to unify under one position towards the issue.

Geography and Politics

To be sure, from its inception, the Republican Party was northern-based. Multiple southern states did not cast a single vote for their candidate John C Fremont in the party’s first national election, the Election of 1856.[6] The North was not entirely Republican, but the Republicans were – almost – entirely in the North. In the modern era, parties have their strongholds. Democrats do better in New England, other coastal areas, and urban centers while Republicans capture the South and Midwest. Geography does correlate to politics on the electoral map and that observation largely holds true in our elections, but the question during the sectional crisis was not one of partisanship, but of sectional allegiances. For Southern Democrats, never mind where their northern brethren were heading, as they assessed the situation, they needed to make their own way.

An emphasis on the sectional dimension of this conflict dispels later assertions that the Democratic Party was the party of slavery. Southern Democrats supported it, but sectional divisions fly in the face of an argument for party unity. Studying sectionalism leaves us with a complex web of geopolitically motivated behaviors and allegiances that historians strive to make sense of in forming a metanarrative for the war’s causes. Studies are made more complicated when considering examples out of the South that push back against the conclusion of consensus being for slavery and against Lincoln. How are we to regard President Andrew Johnson, who, as a congressman from Tennessee – and Democrat –, was the only senator from a seceding state to remain in the Union? This is a man who historians studying his life have admitted it is hard to arrive at any definitive statements about when looking at his character.[7] More broadly, estimates say 100,000 men living in the Confederate states served the Union during the war.[8] Among them, Virginia-born Union General George Thomas, a slave owner before the war, alienated his family who refused to speak to him for fighting against the South.[9]

In history or contemporary politics, neat and tidy conclusions about politics, allegiances, or where one falls of the political spectrum for their views on divisive issues are few and far between. If we are to understand political history, we must understand in our analyses that single-dimension modes of thought with the left against the right or Democrats against Republicans runs the risk of obfuscating more intricate fissures that account for, in the case of the Civil War, sectionalism. In its only through the study sectional divisions that we see the clearer picture.

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[i] See “Avalon Project - Confederate States of America -   Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina From the Federal Union,” n.d. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp.

[1] Richard F. Bensel “Sectional Stress & Ideology in the United States House of Representatives.” Polity 14, no. 4 (1982): 657–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/3234469.

[2] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1860.

[3] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1860/TX.

[4] “Wilmot Proviso, 1846,” 1846. https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1846WilmotProviso.pdf.

[5] David Wilmot et al., “Wilmot Proviso,” n.d., https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mex-war/wilmot-proviso.pdf.

[6] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1856.

[7] Rable, George C. “Anatomy of a Unionist: Andrew Johnson in Tne [sic] Secession Crisis.” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1973): 332–54.

[8] Carole E. Scott, “Southerner Vs. Southerner: Union Supporters Below the Mason-Dixon Line - Warfare History Network,” July 12, 2022, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/southerner-vs-southerner-union-supporters-below-the-mason-dixon-line/.

[9] Christopher J. Einolf,  “George Thomas,” June 2012, https://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/assets/files/pdf/ECWCTOPICThomasGeorgeHEssay.pdf.

U.S. Civil War Hero of Gettysburg: Lawrence Chamberlain CMH

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain stands as one of the most compelling figures of the American Civil War, not because he was a professional soldier forged in a lifetime of military service, but because he was an intellectual and educator who rose to extraordinary leadership when history demanded it. Born on the 8th of September, 1828 in Brewer, Maine, Chamberlain grew up in a deeply religious and disciplined household. His father, a stern militia officer and shipbuilder, instilled in him a sense of duty and moral responsibility, while his mother encouraged learning and faith. Chamberlain excelled academically, displaying a gift for languages and scholarship that would define his early life. He attended Bowdoin College, where he studied theology and the classics, eventually becoming fluent in multiple ancient and modern languages. By the late 1850s, he was a professor of rhetoric at Bowdoin, seemingly destined for a quiet life of scholarship rather than war.

Terry Bailey explains.

Joshua Chamberlain.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 profoundly unsettled Chamberlain. Though opposed to slavery and deeply committed to the Union, he initially remained at Bowdoin, torn between his academic responsibilities and what he saw as a moral obligation to serve. In 1862, he resolved the conflict decisively. Despite lacking formal military training, he requested a leave of absence to join the army, telling Bowdoin's president that the war represented a struggle for the soul of the nation. He was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry, a regiment composed largely of lumbermen and farmers, many of whom were older and physically tougher than their scholarly officer. Chamberlain won their respect not through bluster or harsh discipline, but through fairness, shared hardship, and a willingness to listen, qualities that would later prove critical under fire.

By the summer of 1863, Chamberlain had risen to command the 20th Maine, and his regiment found itself marching into history at Gettysburg. On the 2nd of July, 1863, the second day of the battle, the Union Army hastily extended its left flank to anchor on a rocky hill known as Little Round Top. The position was vital; if Confederate forces seized it, they could roll up the Union line and potentially decide the battle in their favor. The 20th Maine was placed at the extreme left of the Union position, with orders that could not have been clearer or more ominous: "Hold this ground at all hazards." There would be no reinforcements. If the regiment broke, the Union flank would collapse.

Throughout the afternoon, Chamberlain's men endured repeated assaults by the 15th Alabama and other Confederate units under Colonel William C. Oates. The fighting was close, chaotic, and brutal, conducted over boulders and through dense woods in sweltering heat. Each Confederate attack pushed closer to breaking the Union line, and Chamberlain was forced to stretch his regiment dangerously thin, bending his line back like a door hinge to prevent being flanked. Ammunition ran dangerously low. Men collapsed from exhaustion and heat. Chamberlain himself was everywhere along the line, steadying his soldiers, issuing calm orders, and absorbing the terror of combat without losing command of the situation.

As the final Confederate assault loomed, Chamberlain faced a grim reality. His regiment was nearly out of ammunition, and another attack would almost certainly overwhelm them. In that moment, he made one of the most audacious tactical decisions of the war. Rather than waiting passively to be overrun, Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge. With a sweeping wheel to the left, the 20th Maine surged downhill, shouting and driving their bayonets into stunned Confederate troops who expected no such move from an exhausted and depleted enemy. The sudden offensive shattered the momentum of the Confederate attack. Many Southern soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured, and the rest fled. Little Round Top was held, the Union flank was saved, and the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg and arguably the war itself tilted decisively in favor of the Union.

Chamberlain's actions at Gettysburg would later earn him the Congressional Medal of Honor, awarded in 1893. The citation recognized his "daring heroism and great tenacity" in holding Little Round Top against overwhelming odds. Yet the significance of his conduct lay not only in bravery, but in leadership and judgment under extreme pressure. Chamberlain demonstrated an intuitive understanding of morale, terrain, and timing, proving that decisive leadership could compensate for material disadvantage. His conduct became a textbook example of initiative at the tactical level, studied by soldiers long after the war. Chamberlain's wartime service did not end at Gettysburg, and the war would exact a terrible physical toll on him. He was promoted to brigadier general and continued to serve with distinction in the Overland Campaign of 1864. At the Battle of Petersburg, he was shot through the hip and groin, a wound so severe that he was expected to die. Grant promoted him on the battlefield as a final honor, but Chamberlain survived after months of agony and recovery. He returned to duty despite chronic pain and lasting disability, embodying the same determination that had defined his stand on Little Round Top.

In one of the war's most symbolic moments, Chamberlain played a prominent role at its conclusion. On the 12th of April, 1865, he was selected to command the Union troops receiving the formal surrender of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. In a gesture of reconciliation rather than triumph, Chamberlain ordered his men to salute the defeated Confederates as they laid down their arms. The act reflected his belief that the war had been fought to preserve the Union, not to humiliate the South, and it earned respect from former enemies, including Confederate General John B. Gordon.

After the war, Chamberlain returned to civilian life but never escaped the shadow of his service. He became president of Bowdoin College, guiding the institution through a period of reform and expansion, and later served four terms as governor of Maine. His postwar years were marked by public service, writing, and continued reflection on the meaning of the war. He authored several books and essays, offering thoughtful and often philosophical interpretations of the conflict and its moral dimensions. Though plagued by pain from his wartime wounds for the rest of his life, he remained active and engaged well into old age. Joshua Chamberlain died in 1914, one of the last prominent Civil War generals, and was the final veteran to die from wounds received in that conflict. His legacy endures not merely because of a single dramatic charge, but because his life embodied the idea of citizen-soldiership at its finest. A scholar who became a warrior, a leader who combined compassion with resolve, Chamberlain's stand at Little Round Top remains a powerful reminder of how individual courage and judgment can shape the course of history at its most critical moments.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's life and legacy ultimately transcend the dramatic moments for which he is most famous. His story is not merely one of battlefield heroism, but of moral conviction carried into action, of intellect fused with courage, and of leadership rooted in principle rather than ambition. At Little Round Top, Chamberlain did more than save a tactical position; he exemplified the capacity of an ordinary citizen to rise to extraordinary responsibility when the fate of a nation hung in the balance. His decisions were shaped not by rigid military doctrine, but by empathy for his men, clarity of purpose, and a profound sense of duty to something larger than himself.

What distinguishes Chamberlain from many of his contemporaries is the continuity between his wartime conduct and his postwar life. The values that guided him in combat—discipline tempered by humanity, firmness balanced with reconciliation—were the same values he carried into education, politics, and public service. His salute to the defeated Confederates at Appomattox symbolized his belief that the war's true victory lay not in vengeance, but in the restoration of a fractured nation. This act, quiet yet powerful, reflected a deeper understanding of what lasting peace required and underscored his lifelong commitment to unity and moral responsibility.

Chamberlain's enduring significance lies in the way his life challenges simple definitions of heroism. He was not born a soldier, nor did he seek glory, yet he became one of the war's most respected leaders through resolve, adaptability, and an unwavering ethical compass. His physical suffering after the war, borne without bitterness, further reinforces the depth of his character. Even as his wounds shaped his final decades, he continued to serve, teach, write, and reflect, determined that the sacrifices of the Civil War should be understood and remembered with honesty and purpose.

In the final measure, Joshua Chamberlain represents the highest ideals of citizen leadership. His stand at Little Round Top remains a defining moment in American history, but it gains its full meaning only when viewed within the broader arc of his life, a life devoted to learning, service, reconciliation, and moral courage. Through his actions in war and peace alike, Chamberlain left a legacy that speaks not only to the past, but to the enduring power of individual conscience and leadership in shaping the course of history.

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Notes:

The wounds Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain received during the Civil War had a profound and lasting impact on his health, shaping the remainder of his life and ultimately contributing to his death. On the 18th of June 1864, during the Battle of Petersburg, Chamberlain was struck by a Minie ball that passed through his right hip and groin, exiting near the bladder and urethra. The injury was considered mortal at the time; blood loss was severe, infection was likely, and the medical practices of the era offered little hope of recovery. He survived only through extraordinary resilience and prolonged medical care, but the damage inflicted by the wound could never be fully healed.

In the years that followed, Chamberlain endured chronic pain, recurring infections, and serious urological complications as a direct result of the injury. The wound left him with long-term damage to his urinary system, including fistulas and strictures that caused frequent obstruction, inflammation, and bleeding. These conditions required repeated medical interventions throughout his life and often left him weak, feverish, and exhausted. Periods of relative health were frequently interrupted by painful relapses, making daily activity unpredictable and physically taxing. Despite this, Chamberlain persisted in public life, masking the severity of his condition behind an outward appearance of energy and resolve.

As he aged, the cumulative effects of the wound worsened. Recurrent infections increasingly taxed his immune system, while chronic inflammation and impaired urinary function led to progressive organ stress. By the early twentieth century, his body was less able to recover from the complications that had plagued him since the war. In 1914, nearly fifty years after being wounded, Chamberlain succumbed to complications directly linked to his Petersburg injury, making him the last Civil War veteran to die from wounds sustained in that conflict. His death served as a stark reminder that the suffering of war often extends far beyond the battlefield, lingering silently for decades after the guns have fallen silent.

Chamberlain's long struggle with his wounds adds a deeper dimension to his legacy. His postwar achievements in education, governance, and public life were accomplished not in spite of discomfort, but in the midst of persistent physical suffering. That he continued to serve with dignity and determination, even as his health steadily declined, underscores the extraordinary endurance that defined him as both a soldier and a citizen. His life stands as a testament to the hidden, lifelong costs of war and the resilience required to bear them.

Just How did Settlers to the West and Midwest Survive?

The promise of a better life pledged by advertisements created after mid-1800s events in the United States such as the Homestead Act of 1862 – which offered 160 acres of government-owned land in the Midwest and West for free with the possibility of eventually owning the land outright – did not always become the reality. 

Those who took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the act to head to the largely rural Midwest and West faced multiple, likely unexpected obstacles, making survival much more difficult than many of them probably imagined. How did those who made the trek survive? Janel Miller offers some answers in this short piece. 

American Progress by John Gast, 1872. In the image settlers are moving west, guided and protected by Columbia.

The saying “Necessity is the mother of invention” is attributed to Plato in 380 B.C. However, it was just as relevant after 1862 when many left their homes in the East to pursue the promise of a better life in the West. 

These settlers faced dry and arid conditions that were previously unknown to them. They responded by using newly developed windmills, irrigation systems and drought-resistant crops. Others found ways to enhance existing techniques, such as manufacturing plows with steel and assembling grain into easy-to-transport bundles.  

Still other settlers aggressively sought to have the railroad, then in its infancy, come through their town. Those who succeeded in this endeavor gained easier access to food, animals and other goods necessary to endure.

In addition, many settlers worked with their peers to establish organizations, such as Granges, that succeeded in adding agriculture into school curricula, establishing rural mail delivery and the parcel post system.

In Context

The time period covered by this essay has long since passed, but there are still people who desire rural living.  The reasons newer generations cite for leaving urban life for a more rural one include a desire for recreational areas and a more affordable cost of living.

Most parts of the United States today offer their residents luxuries such as cell phones, computers and vehicles that the settlers of the American West could likely never have imagined. All the more reason those living today should be in awe of how settlers found ways to survive when they moved to the Midwest and the West.

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References

Griffin, Sean. Chnm.gmu.edu. “What Brought Settlers to the Midwest?” https://chnm.gmu.edu/tah-loudoun/blog/lessons/what-brought-settlers-to-the-midwest/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Library of Congress Editors. Loc.gov. “Rural Life in the Late 19th Century | Rise of Industrial America. https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/rural-life-in-late-19th-century/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Writing Explained Editors. Writingexplained.com. “Necessity is the Mother of Invention.” https://writingexplained.org/idiom-dictionary/necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Friedman, Jordan. History.com. “The Rugged Trades that Drew Settlers to the American West.” https://www.history.com/articles/settler-jobs-american-west-mining-ranching-trapping. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Slatta, Richard W. Chass.ncsu.edu. “Western Frontier Life in America.” https://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/slatta/cowboys/essays/front_life2.htm#. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Friedman, Jordan. History.com. “The Rugged Trades that Drew Settlers to the American West.” https://www.history.com/articles/settler-jobs-american-west-mining-ranching-trapping. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Library of Congress Editors. Loc.gov. “Rural Life in the Late 19th Century | Rise of Industrial America. https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/rural-life-in-late-19th-century/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Gulliver, Katrina. Daily.jstor.org. “The Gift of the Grange.” https://daily.jstor.org/the-gift-of-the-grange/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Cromartie, John. USDA.gov. “Net Migration Spurs Renewed Growth in Rural Areas of the United States.” https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2024/february/net-migration-spurs-renewed-growth-in-rural-areas-of-the-united-states. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Farberov, Snejana. NYpost.com “Why Young Adults Are Moving to Small Towns at the Highest Rate in a Decade.” https://nypost.com/2025/03/14/real-estate/young-adults-are-moving-to-small-towns-at-the-highest-rate-in-a-decade/. Accessed January 17, 2026.  

Hughes, Keagan. WAVY.com. “Young Adults Leaving Hampton Roads for Rural Areas Amid Rising Costs.” https://www.wavy.com/news/local-news/young-adults-leaving-hampton-roads-for-rural-areas-amid-rising-costs/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Northernmost Land Action of the American Civil War: The Confederate Raid on St. Albans, Vermont

The northernmost land action of the American Civil War did not occur during the Confederacy’s twice ill-fated invasions of the north but rather happened in the small city of St. Albans, Vermont, less than twenty miles from the Canadian border. Perpetrated by a small band of Confederate raiders, this was more reminiscent of a wild west style attack than a tactical cavalry raid.

Brian Hughes explains.

A woodcut illustration of the St. Albans Raid. In the image, at the bank, the raiders forced those present to take an oath to the Confederacy.

Introduction

As 1864 was coming to an end the outlook for the Confederacy appeared bleak. The south was under relentless Union pressure from east and west, on land and at sea. In Georgia, General Sherman was leaving a path of destruction in his wake and had captured Atlanta, the second most important city in the South. Simultaneously in Virginia, General Robert E. Lee was endlessly preoccupied with attempting to stymie Ulysses S. Grant during the Peninsula Campaign, inflicting heavy casualties in cataclysmic battles but unable to effectively achieve any substantial strategic objective. Union forces were also devastating the Shenandoah Valley and tightening the noose around the south with their naval blockade.

The increasing demoralization of southern troops and populace manifested itself politically. Becoming increasingly distressed, certain figures began to think outside the box for solutions, even if they were only short term. Twenty one year old Kentuckian and Confederate soldier Bennet H. Young came forth with an unorthodox yet bold proposal. Having taken part in several battles in and around the Midwest, Young had fled a Union prison camp where reaching Canada and returning home via a Confederate blockade runner operating out of Halifax. Young believed he could mount a series of forays into the meagerly defended northern New England states from Canada. Despite the small scale nature of the raids, any amount of fiscal gains would be sufficient to assist the cash strapped Confederate government and act as a sort of monetary life support, extending the conflict just long enough until a more ideal political outcome could be agreed upon for the Confederacy. Similarly, Confederate operations in the far north could potentially divert Union troops away from more active fronts, relieving pressure on the hard pressed farms and plantations necessary to sustain the southern war effort.

Canada

Although officially neutral in the conflict, Canada, then still a disunited British colony, harbored great sympathy for the Confederate cause. Heavily reliant on southern cotton and historic enmity with neighboring states (mainly New England) contributed to these sentiments. A multitude of Confederate agents, spies, and fundraisers would operate out of cities such as Montreal and St. Johns some of which were aware of the tactical potential Canada offered geographically. Young made extensive use of these contacts which he garnered throughout his time there.

Why St. Albans

St. Albans was selected for a variety of reasons. Located a mere fifteen miles from the border with Canada, St. Albans was home to several banks. The city was easily accessible with several roads leading in and out of the downtown area, being just close enough to Vermont’s largest city, Burlington. In addition, the town was meagerly defended with no substantial military force in and around the region.

Raid, October 19th, 1864

The original date of the operation was scheduled for the 18th of October, but the Franklin County Farmers Market thwarted these plans with the increase in population and presence of authorities. Delaying the attack by a day or two would similarly ensure the banks were more laden with money following market day.

Young had about twenty men at his disposal, which he split up in subunits of five or six each tasked with striking one of three banks. The raiders dressed in plain civilian clothes and initially disguised their southern accents upon making entry into the city for the purpose of reconnaissance. At around three pm, Young stood on the steps of local hotel unsheathed his pistol and with great braggadocio exclaimed “This city is now in the possession of the Confederate States of America!” This was the signal for the attack as the Confederate operatives sprung forth and furiously rode through the streets toward their objectives.

Their three targets were the St. Albans Bank, The Franklin County Bank, and First National Bank were all situated within a block and a half of one another. The rebels took the locals by complete surprise and quickly rampaged through the three banks, robbing them and forcing civilians with their arms raised to “solemnly swear to obey and respect the Constitution of the Confederate States of America.” Treasury notes and bonds were taken in addition to cash, but the banks were intentionally not thoroughly looted the banks of all their contents given the necessity of the rebels to flee the city swiftly.

Some of the southern raiders took advantage of the ensuing pandemonium to steal horses to better facilitate their escape. The raid was over in less than half an hour but not before the southerners shot one local civilian, Elinus Morrison, mortally wounding him. Morrison attempted to confront the raiders who then shot him in the abdomen. One Southern raider had been wounded during the flight as the Confederates unsuccessfully tried to set fire to the town.

Pursuit

The perpetrators set off with stolen horses in addition to their loot from the banks, this incumbered them slightly. A Union army veteran and St. Albans resident Captain George Conger rapidly organized a posse and gave chase. The Confederates again attempted to light fire to several bridges to better ensure their escape but once again the flames were quickly doused by the pursuers. Eventually the marauders parted in to separate groups and continued, northward, Vermont authorities alerted their counter parts in Canada hoping they would apprehend the intruders. The Canadian authorities decided to cooperate with the Vermonters, capturing a handful of the raiders once across the border, they quickly confiscating their weapons and cash, and called on the militia to further patrol the border. The Canadians confiscated eighty seven thousand dollars in money, roughly equivalent to two million in today’s currency. By wars end in April 1865 the banks of St. Albans had been reimbursed and the remaining captives released.

The St. Albans raid was a revealing act of Confederate desperation in the war’s final months. Though militarily insignificant, it displayed how far the southern operatives were willing to go-violating borders and testing neutrality. The raid temporarily shocked the north and exposed geographical vulnerabilities. In the end the raid failed to divert significant resources, thus ensuring the Confederacy’s inevitable collapse.

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The Kellogg Brothers: Health and Wellness Pioneers?

The Kellogg Brothers founded a powerful and impactful cereal company in 1906. They were also innovators in the health and wellness fields and were members of organizations that were ahead of their time - and fought against what was then considered a healthy lifestyle. The Kellogg Brothers left a lasting positive legacy on the health and wellness industry.

Daniel Boustead explains.

John Harvey Kellogg.

William Keith Kellogg.

The Kellogg brothers’ longest-lasting contribution to the Health industry is their product, Kellogg’s Cornflakes.  Dr. John Harvey Kellogg’s (1852-1943) trek towards Kellogg’s Cornflakes began as a search for a breakfast substitute to help treat his patients at the Battle Creek Sanitarium who were suffering from stomach problems.[1]  This was a consistent complaint of his patients. A disabled gastrointestinal system caused the patient’s stomach problems. Dr. Kellogg discovered that the half-baked breakfast mush he had previously been serving patients was causing dyspepsia. He also felt that the replacement should also be “pre-cooked”. The creation of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes involves conflicting accounts, in which, in the end, Dr. Kellogg, his wife, Ella, and Dr. Kellogg’s brother, Will (1860-1951), should receive some credit for its creation.[2]

Dr. John Harvey Kellogg applied to the U.S. Patent Office for his patent on “Flaked Cereal and Process for Preparing the Same”(No.558,399) on May 31st, 1895.[3] The U.S. Patent Office granted Dr. Kellogg this patent on April 14th, 1896.  In the patent itself, Dr. Kellogg included flakes made of oats, corn, barley, and other grains in addition to wheat flakes to protect his patent.

In the summer of 1895, Will and Dr. Kellogg introduced the Corn Flakes at the General Conference of the Seventh-Day Adventists at the Battle Creek Sanitarium.[4] The dish became a hit with conference attendees, who would add milk, cream, or yogurt to it.

Company formed

In 1906, Will Kellogg founded the Battle Creek Toasted Corn Flake Company.[5] In 1907, he changed the company’s name to the Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Company.[6] In the late summer to early fall of 1907, Kellogg’s Cornflakes made its official debut to the American public.[7] It was under Will Kellogg’s leadership that, during the Great Depression in 1933, the Kellogg company made a gross profit of $6 million (about $110 million in today’s money).[8] This was at a time when many companies were going bankrupt or struggling to maintain a profit.  In 1939, Will Kellogg retired as the company's head.

Dr. Kellogg was also a trailblazer in other ways in the field of health and wellness. The Battle Creek Sanitarium began in 1866 as the Health Reform Institute.[9] “Sister” White presented her ideas about Christian biblical healthy living at the Seventh-day Adventist General Conference on May 20th, 1866. The  General Conference approved the creation of an institute for health reform.[10] It was the governing body of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. The organization opened its doors for business as The Western Health Reform Institution on September 5th, 1867.[11] On October 1st, 1876, Dr. Kellogg became the medical director of the Western Health Reform Institute.[12] The Western Health Reform Institute became the Battle Creek Sanatorium on September 15th, 1910.[13] On the same date, Dr. Kellogg told this audience how the new institution should be called Sanitarium or San, because he felt it better suited the mission. From 1876 to 1943, Dr. Kellogg was at the head of the Western Health Reform Institute, later known as the Battle Creek Sanitarium.[14] Several years before his death, Dr. Kellogg estimated that his work at the Sanitarium brought him into contact with approximately 250,000 persons.[15]

At the Battle Creek Sanitarium, if a patient were suffering from the “blues,” they would be placed under an electric light cabinet to help them get sunlight. There was not much natural sunlight in southeastern Michigan during the Fall.[16] In this field, Dr. Kellogg was years ahead of his time in terms of medical treatment for seasonal affective disorder or SAD.  

In 1916, at the Battle Creek Sanitarium, patient meals were also served with a card attached that specified the proper ratio of calories, proteins, carbohydrates, and fats to be consumed at the meal.[17] An example of this document is dated from May 19th, 1916. This was unheard of in the field of dieting and nutrition at the time.

Also at the Battle Creek Sanitarium, Dr. Kellogg would lead aerobics and calisthenics with the patients, backed by a brass band.[18] This was so popular that, in 1923, the Columbia Gramophone Company released 10 78-RPM shellac discs of Dr. Kellogg’s class, complete with a booklet. The album was entitled “John Harvey Kellogg’s HEALTH LADDER”.  In the booklet, there were exercises for the back, abdomen, legs, and arms that Dr. Kellogg recommended for his patients at the Battle Creek Sanitarium. This was decades ahead of the exercise craze led by Jack Lalanne, Richard Simmons, and other such international figures.

Although Dr. Kellogg never received credit for this, he encouraged his patients at the Battle Creek Sanitarium,  after surgery, to get up, move, and perform graded, deep-breathing exercises. [19] This was in stark contrast to the standard procedure of the day, which was to have patients confined to hospital beds for several days to weeks at a time. In the present day, medical procedures, early ambulation, and breathing exercises are the backbone of most recovery protocols after surgery.

Patents & Pioneers

In 1934, Dr. Kellogg received a patent for his “Soy Acidophilus Milk”.[20]  Dr. Kellogg devised this concoction to deal with babies who couldn’t deal with cow’s milk-based formulae, as well as his patients at the San who were suffering colitis, duodenal or gastric ulcers, babies who rejected their mom’s breast milk, constipation, and excessive flatulence. This was a step forward in addressing digestive and gastric health compared to the treatments of the day. By 1935, patients at the Battle Creek Sanitarium were consuming over 200 gallons a week of  Dr.Kellogg’s “Soy Acidophilus Milk”. The Battle Creek Sanitarium’s patients’ favorite way to enjoy Dr. Kellogg’s “Soy Acidophilus Milk” was with ripe bananas and a side of soy milk.  This predated the soy milk craze that you see today all over the world.

Dr. Kellogg and Will Kellogg were pioneers in the fight against tobacco and its harmful effects. Dr. Kellogg had discovered through increasing medical evidence that tobacco smoke caused heart disease, lung disease, digestive disorders, infections, and neurological problems.[21] In 1922, Dr. Kellogg published a successful book entitled Tobaccoism, or How Tobacco Kills. Along with Henry Ford’s book, The White Slaver, these books became a cornerstone of the progressive movement’s failed anti-smoking campaign.  Will Kellogg considered smoking to be so dangerous that he demanded that his workers at his factory either quit or he would fire them. He thought tobacco was more dangerous than drinking alcohol.[22]

Dr. Kellogg also thought that tobacco products interfered with proper muscular and growth development, caused gastric ulcers, unduly taxed the liver and kidney systems, injured the brain and nervous systems, and also impaired judgment and moral sensibility.[23] All of Dr. Kellogg’s claims have subsequently been supported by medical science, medical doctors, and research studies, except for the moral sensibility claim.

In the aftermath of World War I, Dr. Kellogg was the president of the Michigan Anti-Cigarette Society and the Committee of Fifty to Study the Tobacco Problem.[24]  Henry Ford was also a prominent member of the Committee of Fifty to Study the Tobacco Problem. Dr. Kellogg, with the help of this group, also produced the very first motion picture to address the dangers of tobacco smoking. He and his brother Will were pioneers in their opposition to tobacco products at a time when the tobacco companies were powerful and used their influence to suppress knowledge about the dangers of their products.

In the USA, the dangers of tobacco products did not reach the Federal level until January 11th, 1964, when the Surgeon General issued the 1964 Report on Smoking and Health.[25] In this report, it linked smoking to the cause of emphysema, chronic bronchitis, coronary heart disease, and increased statistical risk of lung cancer. The effects of this report were featured in television and radio reports in the USA and in foreign countries. The Kellogg Brothers knew about the dangers of smoking long before the US government did.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Kellogg Brothers founded an important cereal company that shaped  America’s idea of breakfast. They were also innovators in medical science and wellness. Dr. Kellogg and his brother Will’s opposition to tobacco products was well ahead of its time. The Kellogg Brothers' beliefs also went against the American and foreign understanding of tobacco and its adverse effects. This was a time when the tobacco Industry held a stranglehold on the public consciousness in America and elsewhere. The Kellogg Brothers’ courage in publicizing their findings left a legacy on health and wellness concepts that are still felt today.

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Works Cited Page

Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.

National Library of Medicine: Profiles in Science, Reports of the Surgeon General, The 1964 Report on Smoking and Health. Accessed on November 26th, 2025, https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/spotlight/nn/feature/smoking.

Schwartz, Richard W. John Harvey Kellogg: Pioneering Health Reformer. Hagerstown: Maryland. Review and Hearld Publishing Association.2006.

Wilson, Brian C. Dr. John Harvey Kellogg: And the Religion of Biologic Living. Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press. 2014.

[1] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.  20 and 112.

[2] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.  20 and 129 to 133.

[3] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 133.

[4] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 134.

[5] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.XIV.

[6] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.279.

[7] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 280.

[8] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 264.

[9] Schwartz, Richard W. John Harvey Kellogg: Pioneering Health Reformer. Hagerstown: Maryland. Review and Hearld Publishing Association.2006.62.

[10] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 89.

[11] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 90.

[12] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 92.

[13] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 95.

[14] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 95; Wilson, Brian C. Dr. John Harvey Kellogg: And the Religion of Biologic Living. Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press. 2014. XI.

[15] Schwartz, Richard W. John Harvey Kellogg: Pioneering Health Reformer. Hagerstown: Maryland. Review and Hearld Publishing Association.2006.62.

[16] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 187.

[17] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 187 to 188.

[18] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.  190 to 191.

[19] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 195 and 200.

[20] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017.   330 to 331.

[21] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 224.

[22] Markel, Howard. The Kelloggs: The Battling Brothers of Battle Creek. New York: New York. Vintage Books. 2017. 224 to 225.

[23] Schwartz, Richard W. John Harvey Kellogg: Pioneering Health Reformer. Hagerstown: Maryland. Review and Hearld Publishing Association.2006. 59.

[24] Schwartz, Richard W. John Harvey Kellogg: Pioneering Health Reformer. Hagerstown: Maryland. Review and Hearld Publishing Association.2006. 107.

[25] National Library of Medicine: Profiles in Science, Reports of the Surgeon General, The 1964 Report on Smoking and Health. Accessed on November 26th, 2025, https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/spotlight/nn/feature/smoking.

What Really Drove the European Scramble for Africa?

The European scramble for Africa, the period of imperial expansion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was motivated by a variety of reasons. An examination of different sources reveals that the driving force behind the colonization of Africa was mainly economic, fueled by the need for raw materials and new markets. Political rivalries, technological advances, and cultural ideologies were contributory factors, but they were ultimately secondary to the overarching economic imperative.  To understand this expansion, one must look at the convergence of the Industrial Revolution’s demands and the geopolitical climate of the era. 

Shubh Samant explains.

A 1906 Marseille Colonial Exhibition poster. It demonstrates European colonial achievements.

A 1906 Colonial Exhibition poster in Marseille, France.

The Berlin Conference

The term “Scramble for Africa” itself reflects the speed, intensity, and competitive nature of this imperial race. Between roughly 1880 and 1914, European powers carved up nearly the entire continent, often with little regard for existing African societies, cultures, or political boundaries. The Berlin Conference of November 15, 1884 to February 26, 1885, convened by Otto Von Bismarck, symbolized this process, as European nations sat around a table in Berlin and drew borders on maps that would later become the foundations of modern African states. This conference was not about African voices or African agency; it was about European powers negotiating among themselves to avoid conflict while maximizing their territorial and economic gains. The General Act of the Berlin Conference established the principles of "effective occupation," which required powers to demonstrate physical presence and administration to claim sovereignty, further accelerating the rush to the interior.

The Economic Engine

The Industrial Revolution was the force that created an economic push, since it had established an unprecedented need for raw materials. Some examples of natural resources present in Africa included cotton, palm oil, rubber, and minerals. These resources were important to the industries of Europe, and gaining access to them was of the utmost importance. There were economic motivations which pushed the European powers to colonize and tap the wealth of Africa. With the need for new markets in rise, the majority of Africans were perceived as a wonderful opportunity for new markets for European-made manufactured goods. By 1870, industrial output in Europe had reached a point where domestic markets were becoming saturated, leading to a "Long Depression" that made overseas expansion look like a financial necessity.

The economic logic was straightforward: industrial economies in Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium required steady supplies of inputs to sustain production. African rubber fed the tire industry, palm oil was used in soaps and lubricants, cotton supplied textile mills, and gold and diamonds enriched European treasuries. Beyond raw materials, Africa also represented a potential consumer base. Even though most Africans had limited purchasing power, imperialists imagined vast markets where European goods could be sold. This vision of Africa as both a warehouse of resources and a marketplace for manufactured products was central to the imperial project. The discovery of the Witwatersrand gold reef in 1886 transformed South Africa into a focal point of global finance, drawing in billions in European capital and cementing the economic priority of the region.

Political Rivalry and the Rise of Nationalism

While economic reasons were the most significant driver, political rivalry also provoked the scramble for Africa. The extent of European control by 1914 was overwhelming, leaving just two nations (Ethiopia and Liberia) independent. This is indicative of the fierce competition among European nations, each searching for more power and prestige, National pride and the desire to retain power were strong incentives for colonization, as suggested by Freidrich Fabri. Even these political incentives, though, were intertwined with economic ones, as colonies also symbolized a source of wealth and power. Fabri argued in 1879 that for a new nation like Germany, colonial expansion was a vital necessity to maintain its standing among older powers.

Nationalism was a powerful force in late 19th-century Europe. Countries like Germany and Italy had only recently unified, and their leaders sought colonies as a way to demonstrate strength and legitimacy on the global stage. France, still reeling from defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, looked to Africa to restore its prestige. Britain, already the world’s leading imperial power, sought to maintain its dominance by controlling strategic territories such as Egypt and South Africa. Colonies became symbols of national greatness, and losing ground to rivals was seen as a humiliation. Thus, political rivalry was inseparable from the economic quest, as each empire measured its success not only in wealth but also in the size of its colonial holdings. The "Great Game" was no longer confined to Asia; it had moved to the African continent, where every square mile gained was seen as a blow to a neighbor.

Technological Advancements and Military Dominance

Technological innovations greatly aided European imperialism. Steamships, railroads, etc. allowed Europeans to penetrate into the African interior and overcome the logistical challenges. The invention of the Maxim gun further enhanced European military superiority. These technological innovations were ultimately tools to achieve the economic goals. Without these advancements, the "Dark Continent" would have remained largely inaccessible to large-scale European administration.

The role of technology cannot be overstated. Prior to the late 19th century, much of Africa remained inaccessible to Europeans due to disease, geography, and logistical difficulties. The discovery of quinine as a treatment for malaria reduced mortality rates among Europeans and made deeper incursions possible. Railroads allowed for the rapid transport of goods from the interior to coastal ports, while steamships shortened travel times between Europe and Africa. The Maxim gun, the first fully automatic machine gun, gave European armies overwhelming military superiority over African forces armed with spears, muskets, or outdated rifles. These innovations created the infrastructure and military dominance necessary to sustain imperial control, ensuring that economic exploitation could proceed with minimal resistance. At the Battle of Omdurman in September 02, 1898, British forces used Maxim guns to kill roughly 11,000 Mahdist warriors while losing only 47 of their own men, illustrating the terrifying disparity in power.

Cultural Justifications and Social Darwinism

There were cultural beliefs, such as “The White Man’s Burden” philosophy, that gave a moral reason for European imperialism. These cultural beliefs were used to cover up economic reasons for it. Although there were some Europeans who sincerely believed they were there to civilize the native Africans, they were largely motivated by a desire to acquire wealth and minerals. In general, while the scramble for Africa had a variety of reasons, it was the economic ones which were primary. It was the need for raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities that propelled the rush of the colonization of Africa. Political rivalries, technological changes, and cultural mentality served as underlying factors, but were complementary to the strong economic factors. Social Darwinism provided a pseudo-scientific framework that ranked races, suggesting that the "survival of the fittest" applied to nations and justified the domination of the "weaker" by the "stronger."

The cultural dimension of imperialism was deeply intertwined with notions of racial superiority and paternalism. Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem “The White Man’s Burden” encapsulated the idea that Europeans had a moral duty to “civilize” non-European peoples. Missionaries traveled to Africa to spread Christianity, often believing they were saving souls, but their efforts also paved the way for colonial administrations. Education systems were introduced that emphasized European values, languages, and histories, while African traditions were marginalized or dismissed as primitive. This cultural justification provided a veneer of morality to what was essentially economic exploitation. By framing imperialism as a benevolent mission, European powers could present themselves as altruistic actors, even while extracting immense wealth from African lands. However, the "civilizing mission" often translated into the dismantling of local governance and the imposition of European legal codes that prioritized property rights for settlers over indigenous land use.

African Resistance

As Europeans entered the lands of Africa, so did the Africans resist. African resistance was not a monolith; it ranged from diplomatic negotiation and tactical alliances to full-scale guerrilla warfare and religious uprisings. One of the most significant examples of sustained military resistance was led by Samori Touré, the founder of the Wassoulou Empire. Between 1882 and 1898, Touré utilized a sophisticated "scorched earth" policy and moved his entire empire eastward to evade French forces. His ability to manufacture and repair his own firearms locally allowed him to resist for sixteen years, proving that African states were capable of high-level military organization.

In East Africa, the Maji Maji Rebellion (July 1905 to July 1907) demonstrated the power of spiritual unity. Diverse ethnic groups in German East Africa (modern-day Tanzania) united against forced cotton cultivation. Rebels believed that a sacred water (maji) would turn German bullets into water. While the Germans eventually suppressed the uprising through a manufactured famine that killed hundreds of thousands, the rebellion forced the colonial administration to reform its more brutal labor policies, showing that even "failed" resistance could alter the colonial trajectory.

Perhaps the most striking exception to European dominance was the Ethiopian Empire under Emperor Menelik II. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Menelik II recognized the importance of modernizing his military early. He played European powers against one another to purchase modern rifles and artillery. When Italy attempted to impose a protectorate, the Ethiopian army decisively defeated the Italian forces at the Battle of Adwa on March 01, 1896. This victory ensured Ethiopia remained the only indigenous African state to maintain its independence throughout the Scramble, providing a powerful symbol of hope for future Pan-African movements.

Furthermore, resistance often took place within the colonial system itself. In West Africa, the "Aba Women's War" of November 1929 saw thousands of Igbo women in Nigeria organize mass protests against the British "Warrant Chiefs" and the imposition of new taxes. Through "sitting on" the chiefs, a traditional form of shaming, the women successfully forced the colonial government to drop the tax plans and reform the local administration. These examples illustrate that while the Scramble was a period of intense European aggression, African agency was never extinguished; rather, it adapted to the new realities of imperial rule.

Conclusion

By 1914, Africa was almost entirely under European control, and the continent’s political, economic, and cultural landscapes had been dramatically reshaped. The legacy of this period continues to affect Africa today, as many post-independence states inherited borders, institutions, and economic structures created during colonial rule. The scramble for Africa was not merely a historical episode of conquest; it was a transformative moment that altered global power dynamics, enriched European nations, and imposed lasting challenges on African societies. The transition to independence in the mid-20th century was frequently complicated by these extractive colonial structures, which were not designed for democratic self-governance.

In conclusion, the scramble for Africa was driven primarily by economic imperatives, but it was reinforced by political rivalries, technological innovations, and cultural ideologies. The industrial revolution created the demand for raw materials and markets, nationalism fueled competition among European powers, technology enabled conquest and control, and cultural beliefs provided moral justification. Together, these factors produced one of the most dramatic episodes of imperial expansion in world history. Yet beneath the rhetoric of civilization and progress lay the fundamental reality: Europe’s hunger for wealth and resources was the true engine of colonization. The scramble for Africa was, at its core, an economic enterprise cloaked in the language of politics, technology, and morality. By the time the dust settled, the continent was irrevocably tied to the global capitalist system, a tie that persists in the modern era's neo-colonial economic relationships.

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References

• Fabri, Friedrich. (1879). Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien? (Does Germany Need Colonies?).

• Headrick, Daniel R. (1981). The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century

• Hobson, John A. (1902). Imperialism: A Study.

• Hochschild, Adam. (1998). King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa.

• Kipling, Rudyard. (1899). The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands.

• Pakenham, Thomas. (1991). The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912.

• Said, Edward W. (1993). Culture and Imperialism.

The 1863 Battle of Chancellorsville in the U.S. Civil War

The Battle of Chancellorsville took place April 27-May 6, 1863. It is traditionally described as Lee’s most impressive victory.  General Robert E Lee gambled on dividing his Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) several times in the face of a larger enemy and transported troops back and forth along internal lines to meet each anticipated threat. His victory turned on his audacity and his opponent’s timidity, and is almost always described from that perspective.  In this analysis, we will evaluate the command decisions General Hooker made, the choices he had, and how he contributed to his own defeat. Typically, his self-analysis that he lost confidence in himself is taken at face value, but on deeper reflection that isn’t an accurate analysis.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Battle of Chancellorsville, by Kurz and Allison, from 1889.

Hooker Takes Command

After the fiasco of the Battle of Fredericksburg and the humiliation of the Mud March, Major General Ambrose Burnside tried to purge the army of weak generals, something only Congress could do. He offered to resign from the army, but Lincoln chose to put him command of IX Corps in the Virginia Peninsula, and in March they were transferred to the Army of Ohio. Although not recognized at the time, it turned out that this was a critical aspect of the battle.

General Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac (AoP) on January 26, 1863. He was the obvious choice given his reputation as a tough and aggressive fighter. Almost immediately, two division commanders resigned (William Franklin refused to serve under Hooker; Edwin Sumner had poor health) and Daniel Butterfield became chief of staff. Hooker created the Bureau of Military Information, appointing Colonel George Sharpe to command, who utilized cavalry reconnaissance, spies, scouts and aerial balloons. Consequently, Hooker knew that Lee had covered all of the crossings of the Rappahannock.

Hooker had an excellent plan for the upcoming campaign. He designed a double envelopment of the ANV, having the cavalry cross far west, while his infantry crossed the Rappahannock and then the Rapidan rivers at Kelly’s Ford,  and then converge at  Ely’s and Germanna fords. Where the two rivers converge provided Hooker cover and opportunity. The second branch of the attack was to have General Sedgwick cross below Fredericksburg, flanking Jackson’s Corps. Thanks to Sharpe, Hooker knew that Lee was covering the fords facing north and east, and that he had to cover Richmond to his south. Therefore, Hooker sensed an opening in the west.

“My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.”  General Hooker was a very tough battlefield commander, but was he the right man for army command? This quote shows that was ready to battle directly with Lee and that he had full faith in his plan. But that was his fatal flaw.

Lee’s Divided Army

General Robert E Lee did not expect an attack except by way of Fredericksburg.  For this reason, Longstreet’s corps wasn’t involved in this battle, as they had been detached from Lee to find provisions. Most books say Lee divided his army in 3, but really, he would eventually be divided in 4 parts. Lee detached Longstreet with two divisions (Pickett’s and Hood’s) to southeastern Virginia on a foraging and supply mission and to threaten Union positions around Suffolk, Virginia.

As a result, Lee faced Hooker at Chancellorsville without Longstreet, meaning he fought the battle with only Jackson’s corps, and was well outnumbered. Had Burnside been there, in Longstreet’s absence, Lee would have been markedly outnumbered.

Battle of Chancellorsville, Situation Late 30 April 1863 and Movements since 27 April.

The Battle Begins

On April 27-28, the Union army began crossing the fords and concentrated at Chancellorsville, an obscure crossroads in the Wilderness with just a single brick mansion standing on the north side of an intersection. It was an old inn that was owned by a family named Chancellor located at the junction of 3 roads: Ely’s Ford Road, Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road.  Its location was crucial to Hooker’s plan: it was actually in Lee’s west rear.

Hooker arrived there April 30. By May 1, he had 70,000 troops at this location and there was no sign that Lee knew where he was. In fact, although Jeb Stuart had been cut off by Stoneman’s advance but had informed Lee by April 30 of this movement. And Lee knew that Sedgwick would threaten his right flank. He understood exactly the problem. With both wings of the enemy across the Rappahannock, on both his east and west flanks, Lee faced a serious dilemma.

Conventional military wisdom dictated that the outnumbered ANV retreat south and escape Hooker's trap. Lee opted to meet the Federal challenge head-on and not retreat. Lee intuited that Sedgwick was not going to be a real threat but rather a demonstration and that the real threat was in his rear. He also recognized that retreating with the enemy in his rear would create other difficulties.

Correctly deducing that Hooker's primary threat lay to the west, Lee assigned 10,000 troops under Major General Jubal A. Early to man the old Fredericksburg entrenchments. The balance of the army would turn toward the tangled Wilderness to confront Hooker's flanking column. Thus, he sent 80% of his army in the opposite direction of the front line. He didn’t think Hooker would allow Sedgwick to command the major attack force. Sedgwick’s division had lost half its men at Antietam, and he himself had been wounded 3 times. He hadn’t been in command at the battle of Fredericksburg and had just taken over for Sumner.

The Federals had encountered virtually no opposition to this point. Moreover, they could now press eastward, break clear of the Wilderness, and uncover Banks Ford downstream, thus significantly shortening the distance between their two wings. Having dropped into Lee’s rear, an aggressive attack might have caught Lee in a bad position forcing him to retreat with the Union army chasing him. But Hooker stopped and waited for Lee to attack him, ceding the initiative to Lee. 

Chancellorsville, May 1. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

Analysis

At this critical moment, Hooker decided to halt at Chancellorsville and await the arrival of additional Union troops. This fateful decision changed the battle. When General Couch protested, Hooker famously said, “"It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground." Hooker’s lack of imagination as to the various options available to his opponent, a wily old fox, would prove to be his fatal flaw.

Hooker had stopped his forward motion when Lee was caught in between his wings. Had Hooker advanced, he would have kept the initiative and limited Lee’s options.

Hooker instead set up a defensive line to his east and the high ground, Hazel Grove, to the southwest.

Here is one great example of why Lee was a great battlefield commander: his comprehension of how his enemy would analyze the situation. Dividing his army was a gamble; but the real gamble was following his intuition and not hesitating or playing it safe. His instinct about Sedgwick was brilliant.

We hear this battle usually summarized, as Hooker himself did, as a loss of self- confidence. But that isn’t really the case, as his exclamation to Couch shows. He believed either Lee must retreat, with the Union army in his rear, or attack him frontally. Hooker expected Lee to retreat, after all that was the safe thing to do and exactly what Hooker would have done. There is evidence that Hooker was looking to put himself in a position where he would be attacked, and not repeat the Fredericksburg fiasco. He himself suggested that he was concerned that all of his army be up on the battlefield before advancing, and that may also have been part of the decision. It may well also have been  that it was his first time maneuvering an entire army.

The “Surprise Attack”

The “surprise flank attack” of Stonewall Jackson using an unmapped road to attack the  rear of the AoP highlights Jackson’s military genius and of course, his ultimately mortal wounding soon thereafter is one of the great American legends. The fact is, that movement was not a surprise nor was it the mortal blow retelling suggests. In fact, his wounding occurred because Jackson understood that he hadn’t defeated a major portion of the Union army, was dangerously separated, and so was looking for an opportunity to take further advantage. On May 2, Jackson devised a daring plan that divided the numerically inferior southern army and then marched Jackson’s men far around the Union army to strike unsuspecting Union troops on their extreme right flank.

The Union army was positioned north of the Turnpike and also at Hazel Grove. Lee understood very well that his army was divided and that he is outnumbered everywhere. He knew that Hooker expected him to either retreat – and be forced to defend his rear – or attack his line. Instead, Lee looked for an alternative.

Hotchkiss’ hand drawn map of the battlefield at Chancellorsville, including the Jackson Flank Attack. Library of Congress.

It must be emphasized that Jackson didn’t actually find the road, his cartographer did. A brilliant confederate cartographer named Jedidiah Hotchkiss found the road. Stonewall Jackson had asked him to draw maps of this battlefield, and he made the discovery of a hidden road not on any maps of the time. The road that Hotchkiss found begins at an iron foundry called Catharine Furnace not far from Hazel Grove and leads south – the opposite direction – and then after a wide swing, goes north. The road then crosses the turnpike and fortuitously leads directly to the Union right flank. Investigations of a route to be used to reach the flank were made by Hotchkiss and Reverend Beverly Tucker Lacy, Jackson’s “chaplain general”. Lacy introduced Hotchkiss to the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford, who showed Hotchkiss, Jackson's cartographer, a recently constructed road through the forest that would shield marchers from the observation of Union pickets.

Stonewall Jackson knew that taking this very roundabout route would lead him to the Union right flank, but how did he know that it wasn’t covered and unentrenched? Recall that the union cavalry was off making a wide right flank maneuver, so it wasn’t around to screen the reserve corps from confederate cavalry. About midnight, Jeb Stuart told Jackson that his reconnaissance had showed that the right flank wasn’t entrenched.  Jackson dispatched Hotchkiss to explore the roads to the west. Although Hooker's left flank was firmly anchored by Meade's V Corps on the Rappahannock, and his center was strongly fortified, his right flank was "in the air." Howard's XI Corps was camped on the Orange Turnpike, extending past Wilderness Church, and was vulnerable to a flanking attack.

At dawn, Lee and Jackson studied Hotchkiss’s hastily drawn map and decided to undertake one of the biggest gambles in American military history. Jackson's corps, about 30,000 troops, would follow a series of country roads and woods paths to reach the Union right. Lee, with the remaining 14,000 infantry, would occupy a position more than three miles long and divert Hooker's attention during Jackson's dangerous trek. Lee therefore divided his small army once again: he is now in 3 parts, all of them facing larger forces.

Analysis

Hooker was expecting to be attacked frontally, but Jackson had developed a different plan. Once again we see General Lee making the right decision. Unlike Hooker, Lee knew his opponent. He judged Hooker to be a tough fighter but not the most imaginative strategist. And Lee was a clever tactician; he looked for an opportunity and here one presents itself.

We know that this is an accurate summary of events because Hotchkiss wrote a book, The Battlefields of Virginia, Chancellorsville. The famous description is from his book:

“With a map before him, General Jackson suggested an entire circuit of the right of the opposing army, and that the attack be made on its rear. Lee inquired with what force he would do this. Jackson replied, “With my whole corps, present.” Lee then asked what would be left to him with which to resist an advance of the enemy towards Fredericksburg. “The divisions of Anderson and McLaws,” said Jackson. For a moment Lee reflected on the audacity of this plan in the face of Hooker’s superior numbers. With less than forty-two thousand muskets, he was in the presence of sixty thousand. To divide his army into two parts, and place the whole Federal force between them, was extremely hazardous.”

Chancellorsville, May 2. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 2: The Flank Attack

By the morning of May 2, Hooker realized that Lee was not fooled by Sedgwick at Fredericksburg. Recognizing that he needed to modify his plan, he made two decisions.

First, he tried to bring General Reynolds and the I Corps to Chancellorsville. Hooker had a good plan for positioning Reynolds. However, he thought Reynolds was across the Rappahannock but in fact, he was still with Sedgwick. This required Reynolds to make a prolonged day march.

Second, he did the math finally and realized that if most of Lee’s army is now in his front, that the Fredericksburg line must be weak. Hooker surmised that Early was vastly undermanned. He therefore ordered Sedgwick to make a full attack at Fredericksburg. Proving that Lee was right about Sedgwick all along, the attack never materialized on May 2. His attack was delayed until May 3, making all of the difference.

Reynolds was supposed to be  positioned further to the right beyond Howard to anchor that flank on the Rappahannock. The myth that Hooker didn’t know his right flank was in the air is wrong. He merely saw it as his rear.

It was also a myth that the attack was a surprise, except perhaps to General Hooker. Numerous Union forces had in fact detected Jackson’s movement, and Colonel Sharpe himself had warned Hooker that Jackson’s corps wasn’t in his front. But Hooker believed that Jackson was in retreat, not advancing on his flank.

Scouts on Hazel Grove informed Hooker that they saw and heard Jackson’s men to their west. Sharpe had deployed aerial balloons and spotted the movement. When Hooker received these reports about the Confederate movement, he thought that Lee might be starting a retreat, but he also realized that a flanking march might be in progress. He took two actions. First, he sent a message at 9:30 a.m. to the commander of the XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on his right flank: "We have good reason to suppose the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach." He did not order entrenchment and Howard never considered it.

As the morning progressed, however, Hooker grew to believe that Lee was actually withdrawing; this was the course of events Hooker most preferred. He became less concerned about his right. Instead, he ordered Third Corps to harass the tail end of Lee's "retreating" army. General Sickles advanced from Hazel Grove towards Catharine Furnace and attacked Jackson’s men in the rear guard. This movement guaranteed that Sickles could not come to Howard’s reinforcement when attacked. Jackson’s main force continued onto Brock Road where it meets the Orange Plank Road – directly into the Union right flank. Sickles informed Hooker, to no avail, that Jackson wasn’t retreating but was on the move.

Northern soldiers were caught almost completely unawares and quickly succumbed to panic and rout, resulting in one of the most striking tactical defeats of the war.

Analysis

Obviously, this was an awful judgment; it changed Hooker’s life and his reputation forever after. Most narratives say that Hooker lost his confidence; but that cannot explain his not listening to all of the reports being given. In fact, these actions demonstrate irrational overconfidence. Hooker didn’t have the imagination to plan what he would do if he were in Lees’ situation. Therefore, he could not anticipate what Lee would do. Knowing your enemy is crucial. He himself would do the safe thing, retreat, and he never considered other alternatives. This was his undoing. Lee was never, ever about the safe thing.

Lee and Jackson had made yet another gamble. They deduced that 4 conditions would apply that might make this risky plan a success: a) Jackson had to make a 12-mile march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. b) Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive. c) Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there. d) When Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.

Why didn’t the Union cavalry show Hooker where Jackson’s corps was moving? Stoneman’s cavalry was carrying out its long distance raid against the Confederate supply lines, so they weren’t there. Hooker had sent the cavalry off to cut Lee's line of supply by tearing up the railroad in Lee's rear. Unfortunately, the mission failed.

It was thought that the Wilderness woods was impenetrable and so there was temporary protection especially as the front was in the east.

Why wasn’t Howard entrenched? He perceived his position to be in the rear of the army, and thus not likely to become involved in the days fighting.

Stonewall Jackson's victory on May 2 did not result in a significant military advantage for the Army of Northern Virginia. Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and in fact were in excellent position for May 3. This is one of the least understood facets of this battle. Jackson deserves great credit for this attack, but he recognized in the moment that nothing really had been accomplished.

Chancellorsville, May 3 morning. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 3: Hazel Grove

Even after the May 2 surprise attack, Lee was still in a difficult position. Jackson realized that the Union army in his front remained formidable. That evening, he considered a night attack to continue the great rout his surprise attack had created, but not completed: that is why he was out there that night.  Jackson and Hill were wounded by their own men performing a reconnaissance and JEB Stuart was given temporary command of Jackson’s Corps.

By the morning of May 3, Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and Reynolds's I Corps had arrived overnight, which replaced Howard's losses. About 76,000 Union men faced 43,000 Confederate at the Chancellorsville front. The two halves of Lee's army at Chancellorsville were separated by Sickles’ III Corps, which occupied a strong position on high ground at Hazel Grove.

And, the ANV was divided all over the battlefield. Sickles’ troops at Hazel Grove were right in between. Hooker could have attacked either part of Lee’s army, moving in any direction, and destroyed it. Stuart was completely aware of this predicament. He was not in a position for a defensive battle. So instead, he prepared an attack at dawn on Hazel Grove rather than await one.

And then Hooker, who continually made the wrong decisions in this battle, then made his most disastrous decision. He ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove at the very instant when that high ground became critical to the position.

The Union position at Hazel Grove was separated from the main army position with tentative connection and support. Hooker pulled Sickles back for its survival. Hooker was thinking defensively not offensively. Hooker ordered Sickles off that high ground and instead to another area much lower called Fairview. Hooker felt he was losing and he couldn’t see the advantage of his position so he retreated to what he erroneously thought was a safe fallback position. As previously noted, Hooker was unimaginative; if you are losing, you fall back.

Stuart had been ready to fight for that ground and now it had been given to him. He took control of the high ground and blasted Sickles at Fairview, where he was a sitting duck for Stuart’s artillery.

Recognizing that his forces were divided and lower numbers, and that Hooker expected him to retreat, instead Lee launched multiple attacks against the Union position at Chancellorsville, resulting in heavy losses on both sides.  The army that ended up pulling back was Hooker's main army. Lee had taken the initiative from Hooker, who sensed he was losing – because it wasn’t going according to his plans, not because of what was happening on the field.

Analysis

At Chancellorsville, the Union army had 106,000 engaged suffering 12,000 casualties and the Confederate army of 60,000 had almost 13,000 casualties. Lee lost over 1/5 of his army in a win – obviously this casualty rate could not be sustained, and definitely not for only a minimal strategic advantage. Lee and the ANV had lost more men, but Hooker didn’t realize it.

But wait! What about Hooker being conked in the head? We often hear this as an excuse for Hooker’s poor decisions, but it is an implausible one. Hooker suffered an injury on May 3 when at 9:15 a.m. a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. This occurred during the main battle from the bombardment from Hazel Grove. He later wrote that half of the pillar "violently [struck me] ... in an erect position from my head to my feet." He suffered a concussion, which caused him to be unconscious for over an hour. He did not give up command, but General Couch reported that he was in a daze most of that day. No significant orders were made in that time period. Yet another myth is that Hooker lost the battle because of this injury, but it wasn’t true: he made poor decisions both before and afterwards.

Chancellorsville, May 3 during the day. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

Salem Church

Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to attack the morning of May 2. Sedgwick didn’t receive this order until late in the day, and even then Sedgwick was slow to take action.  But eventually he crossed the Rappahannock River on May 3. Interestingly, had he attacked on May 2, he would have found Jubal Early entirely unprepared.

On May 3 Sedgwick and Early fought the Second Battle of Fredericksburg. The idea was to move west to join forces with Hooker and trap Lee between the halves of the Union army. Sedgwick joined with Gibbons and attacked Marye’s Heights, yet again. Barksdale’s brigade again held back the Union. A truce was called to allow the Union army to clear the field of its dead and wounded.

Then finally, fortune smiled on the Union army. On May 1, Lee had given Early provisional orders to retreat in case he was defeated at Chancellorsville. Early misunderstood orders and retreated anyway. Fredericksburg was open that afternoon, but Sedgwick never knew it. That night, Lee corrected the error and Early was in place the morning of May 3.

During the attack, a halt was called for the removal of the dead and wounded. It was noticed during the truce that Barksdale’s left flank was unprotected. Sedgwick re-directed the attack, drove Barksdale off the heights, and then again past the road and Lee’s Hill. Early withdrew south and Wilcox west, holding the road from further Union advance. Early had clearly lost his position. He also sustained 700 casualties of 12000 troops, vs 1100 union casualties of 27,000 troops.

After occupying Marye's Heights on May 3, following the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick's VI Corps marched out on the Orange Plank Road with the objective of reaching Hooker's force at Chancellorsville. He was delayed by Wilcox's brigade of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's force during the afternoon of May 3 before halting at Salem Church. Gibbon was left to defend the town. The next morning, thinking there was only Wilcox in his front, he renewed the attack. Once again, the Union command did not anticipate that Lee would respond to events.

After receiving word of Sedgwick's breakthrough at Fredericksburg, Lee detached the division of Lafayette McLaws from the Chancellorsville lines and marched them to Salem Church. McLaws's division arrived at Wilcox's position shortly after noon, reinforced by William Mahone's brigade of Richard H. Anderson's division. he was stopped by elements of Lee's Second Corps (under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, following the wounding of Jackson) at the Battle of Salem Church, forcing his eventual retreat back over the Rappahannock.

By 11 a.m. on May 4 General Sedgwick was facing three directions; west towards Lee's main body and Salem Church, south towards Anderson's division, and East towards Early's division. When General Sedgwick heard rumors that reinforcements from Richmond had arrived he felt his situation was becoming more difficult. He already had a six mile long line held by 20,000 troops with only a bridgehead to retreat upon in failure, with more Confederates possibly arriving.  He had sustained 5,000 casualties in the fighting and he was concerned if he could hold on against the horde he felt was arriving soon. He reported his difficult situation to General Hooker and requested the main army assist him. General Hooker, however, replied not to attack unless the main army did the same.

Meanwhile, General Lee arrived at McLaws' headquarters at 11 a.m. and McLaws informed him that he did not feel strong enough to launch an attack and asked for reinforcements. There were no reinforcements coming and he had 10,000 men. Anderson was ordered to bring the other three brigades of his division and position them between McLaws and Early; he then launched additional attacks, which were also defeated.

Analysis

Both sides in this battle thought they were outnumbered. But the Union in fact had a 23,000 to 10,000 advantage. Why did Sedgwick misunderstand his situation? Sedgwick was covering a wider area so he had the illusion of fewer troops. The act is, once again, all he had to do was gather everyone together and fight one or the other divided confederate divisions. Both sides had about 5000 casualties, again a much higher rate in the Confederate army. Sedgwick was in a great position to attack.

Imagine if Hooker had just attacked Lee on May 4 after Lee sent McLaws to Salem Church? By licking his wounds instead of acting aggressively, Hooker lost the battle he could have won.

Chancellorsville, May 4-6. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

The Retreat

After dark, Sedgwick sent Hooker a message recommending that the VI Corps retreat across the river. After Hooker sent his approval at 1 a.m., Sedgwick withdrew across two pontoon bridges at Banks' Ford, completing the retreat about 4 a.m. Hearing that Sedgwick had been repulsed, Hooker abandoned the entire campaign, recrossing the main body of the Union army on the night of May 5 into May 6 to the north bank of the Rappahannock River.

Hooker retreated when Sedgwick did. Some think that this was the biggest blunder of the battle.  Hooker no longer posed the original threat to attack Lee on both his flanks. He never considered that he still outnumbered Lee in each section of the battlefield. Lee's impending assault on May 6 might have failed and completely reversed the outcome of the battle.

Final Analysis

Hooker never lost any day’s battle except for Jackson’s surprise attack. Although Hooker suffered more than 17,000 casualties, those losses accounted for only 13% of his total strength. Lee's 13,000 casualties amounted to 22% of his army.

Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the response Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations.

Did he lose self-confidence as he himself said later? Sure; but the reason was that by the time he retreated to find safety, Lee had already figured out how to counter that move. Hooker was playing one step at a time strictly by the book while Lee was thinking several steps ahead and knew he had to take calculated risks.

But most importantly Lee then bet all of his chips on his judgment. He didn’t hold back in case he was wrong. Why was he so confident?  He knew his opponent, and basically, he had no other realistic chance to win. This is how winners win in making decisions.

Did the Confederate Army win the battle?  It is traditionally interpreted that way, with Hooker leaving the field in defeat. Lee did a masterful job despite Hooker stealing a march on him. But the casualties don’t bear that out. It is often called a Pyrrhic victory. But really, the only difference between Hooker at Chancellorsville and Grant at Wilderness a year later was that Grant moved forward. If Hooker moved forward, then it would have been considered a draw. But Hooker retreated because he did what was the expected, usual thing.

Meanwhile, Lee had 22% fewer soldiers to invade Pennsylvania in 1 month. The Pennsylvania campaign could well have turned out differently with that many additional men at the right moments.

The truth is that General Hooker defeated himself.  Lee didn’t so much win the battle as Hooker lost it. Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the responses Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations. When things went wrong, or unplanned things happened, he was unable to adapt.

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References

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/reverend-beverly-tucker-lacy

Stephen W Sears, Chancellorsville. Mariner Books, 1996.

James K Bryan II, The Chancellorsville Campaign. The History Press, Civil War Sesquicentennial Series. 2009.

James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

When They Repealed the 13th Amendment

Here, Paul H. Yarbrough has a unique take on slavery and America’s 13th amendment.

A February 1865 Harper's Weekly image showing celebrations in the U.S. House of Representatives after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.

There is probably nothing as unrecognized and consequently misunderstood as the concept of slavery, at least as to the presentation by modernity media and so-called historical presenters.

Slavery has been around since the beginning of man’s history and has been a force in commerce as well as crime throughout the known and explored world.

Globally different parts of the planet had a hand in the concept and exercise of slavery. Whether or not one has been involved more than the other is of little importance since most of the so-called “experts” in the modern world have little understanding beyond some sort of non-historiography, notwithstanding their histrionic comic book knowledge of it.

This brief introduction is to fend off the usual rockets launched at the American South, its people having never enslaved any people, though they had ownership of the same. The South, of course, has the biggest bullseye painted on them for being the villainous culprits of slavery.  Fraudulent bullseye or not, it is there.

“Never enslaved,” regarding the American South as stated above, means, of course, that no slave ship ever sailed from a Southern port. All slave ships were either Northern (mostly New England) or European registry. The South, in fact, purchased slaves (becoming owners) but did not enslave them.  As a matter of fact, the South ameliorated the slaves’ condition from Africa to the west by purchasing them in and for the colonies (subsequent states) rather than watch them be delivered and sold to the West Indies or Brazil where they were more than frequently worked to death.

And, of course, the South as an agrarian people needed labor.

In fact, those self-righteous Yankee slavers (I can see your giant signature, John Hancock) could do themselves a service with a political truth if they would point out within their political blather that they (Yankees), in fact, were actually non-enslavers for the most part as they purchased Africans on the west coast of Africa from Africans who had enslaved those of other tribes.  Slave traders these Yankees were, enslavers not as much, though, a bit.

Blame

But political affiliations in today’s modern west insist that all parties blame the American South for every aspect of slavery to the point of amending God’s authoritarian direction that the actual sin was “manstealing” and subsequent ownership became a responsibility of the owner to properly care for slaves (servants according to Christ and the Apostles).

And, as it was to be, cruelty came more on slave ships and far less on farms and plantations.

The so-called American version of slavery, often referred to as the “peculiar institution,” fared how among other racial groups throughout God’s planet? For example, the various Mongol empires swept through large swaths of Asia with slavery a common commerce and currency to use and be used.

Emigrating Mongolians immigrated to the east (to the western hemisphere) and developed ultimately, over time, a monstrously cruel slavery system among what became multitudes of American Indian tribes that easily denigrated themselves among their same race (Mongoloid) as slavers, enslavers and owners with descriptions quite uneven as to their monikers as “noble savages”. ( For a choice example by a 5-star historian, T.R. Fehrenbach’s Comanches: The History of a People is hard to put down when reading about such so-called nobility)

After the great American war between (and among) the states of Northern slavers, occasional enslavers and that modicum of slave owners, began against the states of Southern slave owners, then subsequently ending, the great fiction was and continues that the war was both a “Civil War” and a War to free the slaves in the South.  Neither was true. However, the lie remains in the teeth of the American Yankee empire’s mendacious mastication, often an outright lie, often historical disobedience.  But chew they do!

Falsehood

And the truth is that the same falsehood has prevailed via the contemporary political biosphere of two major political parties, either of which will say (and frequently do) anything for votes: The Democrats, who have mutated into 21st century Marxists and the Republican into anti-Constitutional national oligarchs—or nationalists of the anti-Jeffersonian pro-Hamiltonian stripe.

Both constantly have cried out that “we” had a civil war to end slavery.

Who the hell is WE?

Nationalists (Republicans) or Marxists (Democrats), as one famous Southerner, George Wallace, once said: “There ain’t a dime’s worth of difference.”

Subsequently, at the “War’s” conclusion the first and greatest change was the 13th amendment.  Glory, slavery had ended in the now “National State of America.”

The secessionists states of 1861 were brought back into the national fold free of slavery and/or involuntary servitude. Praise the Lord, for some. Praise the state for others.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.[1]

Celebrations, joy, parties, cheers all in the paths of a supposed cause of a new “Nation” rising above its blood-torn and raped, “Union,” abounded. The confederation of 1787 born of the 1776 secession was now the Lincoln-styled (though erroneous) “four score and seven” nation with new consolidated and gunpoint powers by a government that had ended slavery. Now, all of us–all of us– were truly free at last, free at last! Thank God (the new national government) almighty we were free at last.

However, especially for those who praised the state:

Within two generations, for the first time a constitutional amendment to repeal (though it was not called a repeal) a previous amendment was entered as an edict (states could no longer secede, so amendments became edicts) to amend the 13th amendment.   The date was February 3, 1913.

Edict

The edict? The 16th amendment.  The now-called nation (former union) government owns all labor and profit of the people and will return that amount that its edict allows via its spending managers.

Involuntary servitude not back? Wanna bet?

A war over slavery in 1861-65? Only fools believe they are free from such a victorious government then or now that make such claims. Because this government will claim anything it chooses, including by the involuntary servitude and sweat of the people’s brow, the edict that the people owe an involuntary servitude chunk of almost 40 trillion dollars to somebody else. Somebody from whom the people never voluntarily borrowed a cent.

But, if the people don’t pay “their fair share,” any number of the people can and perhaps will go to jail.

Again, with the “four score and seven” nation nonsense; although Lincoln and his Yankee soldiers said they were saving the union.

But about that 13th Amendment? What happened to it?  What do you say, Honest Abe?

“The South was right.”

But, Yankees, like maggots eating out the innards of a dead skunk, prepare, now, to reenter new soil, once again down south, ready to recycle and feast again.

Deo Vindice.

The Germans’ Conquest of America

Here, Jeb Smith provides his take on a a book about immigration to America. He looks at Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration by Harold Holzer.

Carl Schurz was the first German born US Senator and later he was the US Secretary of the Interior.

Harold Holzer is considered one of the top Lincoln scholars, a winner of many awards, including the Lincoln Prize, the Lincoln Medal of Honor, the National Humanities Medal, the Barondess/Lincoln Award, and the Lincoln Group of New York’s Richard Nelson Current Award of Achievement. From 2010 to 2016 he served as chairman of the Lincoln Bicentennial Foundation. He is a lover, great admirer, and fan of the 16th president. He has authored, edited or co-authored over 40 books on Lincoln, of which the latest is Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration, glowingly endorsed by McPherson, Foner, and the usual suspects. In this book, Holzer’s focus is on Lincoln, immigration, and its influence on politics and the military.

Holzer writes of the massive influx of immigrants from Europe in the decades leading to the Civil War “forever upending the demography, culture, and voting patterns of the nation, especially in the teeming urban centers.”[1] These groups caused “overwhelming change” and “redefined” what it is to be American.[2] Nine out of ten immigrants lived in the North! And without their votes and military effort, the North would likely not have won the war, nor would Lincoln have been elected, as he won with only 39% of the vote. Holzer wrote, “In total, half a million of the two million white men who served in the Union armed forces were born overseas.”[3]

Veterans of revolutions

Many of their leaders were veterans of the socialist, communist and democratic revolutions of 1848 in Europe. These foreign revolutionaries formed German units and named them after Lincoln. Lincoln “trusted they would fight to sustain democracy in America as courageously as they once had rebelled against monarchical oppression in Europe.”[4]

Holzer says Lincoln’s views on immigration “evolved,” like his views on slavery and race, as he began to endorse immigration, something he previously, as a Whig, was against; though he seems to have desired immigration but refrained from saying so publicly while a Whig, and was one of the first in his party to push for immigration. The Whigs and later Republicans often despised Catholic immigrants, most notably because they unanimously voted Democrat.

Lincoln seems to have used immigrants in something of the way the South used slaves, encouraging them to migrate to the U.S. to help the war effort and also on the field of battle to take bullets and save others. For these purposes, he sought to use federal funds to promote and relocate immigrants to areas useful to the war effort and to provide cheaper labor for his industrial allies. He used humans as tools for his own gain.

However, as Holzer admits, Lincoln never contemplated immigration from anywhere but Europe, never desiring Latin Americans, blacks, or Asians to come here. Holzer points out the irony of Lincoln supporting white immigrants, but at the same time attempting to deport blacks out of the country, and removing Native Americans from Minnesota to make room for white immigrants. Further he did not include “Mexican Greasers”[5] in his vision of America. What Lincoln really wanted in anti-slavery western territories was an “outlet for free white people everywhere.”[6] Yet this does not stop this top Lincoln scholar from repeatedly describing Lincoln as a fighter for equality for all!

In support of immigration

Receiving support as he did from Northern industrialists, Lincoln supported massive immigration to provide cheap labor for industry. Especially during the war, the draft was taking people from positions the North needed occupied so as to maintain its war effort; thus, immigrants filled the gaps left by soldiers. Lincoln pushed for and approved the first federal policy that encouraged immigration.

While it seems Lincoln always was personally for immigration, keeping it private for political reasons due to Whig policy, he changed his public stance on immigration for the same reason he changed his stance on other issues; political advantage. When socialist and democratic immigrants arrived, for political purposes and seeking to centralize power he advocated for immigration policies that encouraged them. The same way modern Democrats would switch if it were white conservative Christians pouring over the borders of America today.

As Holzer mentions, unlike the earlier decades of Irish, German, and Swedish immigration that were for economic reasons, or the potato famine, or religious freedom, the 48’ers were politically motivated. He wrote that the “suppressed 1848 democratic revolutions on the continent motivated thousands of liberals to flee oppression… the exodus was largely political.”[7] These immigrants began a revolution in America, starting newspapers, becoming politically active, and pushing for government education and more.

America received more immigrants in the late 1840s and 1850s than it had in its entire history before then. And a large segment of these immigrants came from failed socialist, communist, and democratic revolutions in Europe. The failed revolutions sent these politically motivated ideologues to attempt the revolution elsewhere, and they brought their radical progressive ideas with them to America. And so, naturally, sided with the centralizing powers of the North.

In 1852, with America very much under the spell of the recently-arrived Hungarian revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth, a committee of prominent Springfield citizens including Lincoln met to formalize views on the failed Hungarian and other revolts. The first clause of the agreed resolution drafted by Lincoln, stated “That it is the right of any people, sufficiently numerous for national independence, to throw off, to revolutionize, their existing form of government, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose.” A stance, Holzer points out, he later would reject during the Southern states’ secession. Perhaps because while he endorsed a liberal democratic revolution, he despised a libertarian, decentralized, aristocratic one, like the Confederacy!

Lincoln worked with and helped fund German immigrants in publishing Republican propaganda newspapers in Illinois. These German immigrants and socialists were among the most enthusiastic and dedicated supporters of Lincoln’s 1860 campaign, helping flip various states Republican, like Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Famed Republican abolitionist Horace Greeley credited German revolutionary Carl Schurz for Lincoln’s presidential election more than any other individual for his speaking and campaigning.

The influence of their radical agenda was immense; one prominent Republican complained of the “complete Dutchification (Germanization) of the Republican party.” Unlike Southerners, who saw themselves as citizens of their state, these German nationalists took the idea of a single nation with them and were now “American citizens.” And nationalism was above politics. Further, men like Schurz helped revise and provide feedback for Lincoln’s nationalistic inaugural address that caused a panic in the decentralized South.

Cause of victory?

Prominent Republicans credited the Germans and Scandinavians for Lincoln’s victory. Rewarding their efforts, Lincoln placed many of his German campaigners into governmental positions, especially foreign diplomatic positions.

Holzer said Lincoln, ever the politician, was “addicted to the newspaper.” Politics was his life, it was his interest and passion. He placed national party victory over local self-governance, and political victory above the local desires of the people in his party. It was national-level victory and party success he desired, and thought above various local distinctions, even within the party. He criticized Massachusetts Republicans for passing the state law mentioned previously since it could harm the party nationally, saying that “Massachusetts Republicans should have looked beyond their noses, and then they could not have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole Northwest.”[8]

Some information revealed that Lincoln admirers might find uncomfortable is that he was known for both his racist and sexist jokes. Interestingly, in 1859 Lincoln referred to the state of Massachusetts, which had passed a law he disapproved of, as “A sovereign and independent State.”[9] During the Civil War, Federal General Fremont abolished slavery in the area under his military command. Lincoln rescinded Fremont’s order, and further removed and replaced the general for his progressive action, upsetting many German immigrant abolitionists who turned against the president for it. Lincoln worked with the well-known brilliant but extremely racist scientist Louis Agassiz to found the National Academy of Sciences.[10] Also, Lincoln stated he would “suffer death” before interfering or allowing others to interfere with slavery in the existing slave states. Lincoln’s many equivocal statements and actions concerning black people and slavery contrast sharply with the welcome and support he showed for the influx of European whites during his lifetime. The latter is of course far more the subject of Harold Holzer’s book than is the former.

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

[1] (Holzer 2)

[2] (Holzer 3)

[3] (Holzer 204)

[4] (Holzer 204)

[5] (Holzer 116)

[6] (Holzer 105)

[7] (Holzer 56)

[8] (Holzer 112)

[9] (Holzer 105)

[10] (Holzer 240, 8)