General Benjamin Butler and Runaway Slaves During the US Civil War

In late May 1861, slaves began fleeing to the Union outpost of Fortress Monroe, Virginia. When arriving, they were given sanctuary by the post’s commander, Major General Benjamin Butler. Richard Bluttal explains.

General Benjamin Butler during the US Civil War.

Newly arrived at Fortress Monroe, on May 23, 1861, Butler was confronted by the arrival of three fugitive slaves from the Confederate defensive works project across Hampton Roads. Faced with the looming prospect of being shipped to North Carolina to work on fortifications, Goodheart writes “the three slaves decided to leave the Confederacy and try their luck, just across the water, with the Union.”

As Civil War Emancipation has chronicled, they were they were not the first slaves to seek sanctuary in a Union military post. Soon after Lincoln’s inauguration in early March, slaves in separate incidents had presented themselves at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Consistent with the Fugitive Slave Act the slaves in both instances had been rebuffed and turned over to local authorities. The post commanders at Sumter and Pickens took this action on their own initiative and it was accepted by the Lincoln administration, still hopeful at that point for reconciliation with the slave states.

However, by the end of May the situation was very different. Confederate forces had attacked Fort Sumter on April 12 and forced its surrender. In response, Lincoln called for volunteers to restore federal authority in the South. Lincoln’s actions led four of the remaining eight slaves in the Union to secede, including Virginia. On the same day the three slaves appeared at Fortress Monroe, May 23, the Commonwealth’s voters had ratified secession.

Taking action

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Benjamin Butler had to decide what action to take. His hand was forced by the arrival of a Confederate officer at Fortress Monroe under flag of truce demanding the slaves return. Adam Goodheart relates the encounter between Butler and the Virginian, Major John Baytop Cary.

Cary got Cary got down to business. “I am informed,” he said, “that three Negroes belonging to Colonel Mallory have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel Mallory’s agent and have charge of his property. What do you mean to do with those Negroes?”“I intend to hold them,” Butler said. “Do you mean, then, to set aside your constitutional obligation to return them?”Even the dour Butler must have found it hard to suppress a smile. This was, of course, a question he had expected. And he had prepared what he thought was a fairly clever answer.“I mean to take Virginia at her word,” he said. “I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.”“But you say we cannot secede,” Cary retorted, “and so you cannot consistently detain the Negroes.”“But you say you have seceded,” Butler said, “so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these Negroes as contraband of war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery and are claimed as your property.”

If anyone was qualified to devise, on short notice, a solid justification to hold slaves who had escaped Confederate custody, it was Benjamin Butler. A crafty litigator and politician from Massachusetts, Butler was a recently commissioned Major General who owed his appointment to Lincoln’s desire to solidify the support of Democrats like him that favored military action against the South. Butler would prove a dismal battlefield commander, but in this incident showed him to be a gifted administrator.

By declaring the three slaves “contraband of war,” Benjamin Butler did not challenge their status as property and by extension call into question of slavery’s legality. At this stage of the conflict, most political leaders in the North were eager to depict the developing conflict merely as a rebellion against legitimate government authority which had nothing to do with slavery. However, officers on the ground like Butler quickly realized the slaves were a significant military asset to the Confederacy, acting not only as laborers, teamsters, and in other support roles for the army, but also by keeping southern agriculture functioning allowing a much larger portion of the white male population to be available for military service than might otherwise have been the case. Hence, as property being used in support of a rebellion against the government, Butler’s “contraband of war” formulation legally justified the seizure of the slaves without immediately undermining their status as property. The Lincoln administration quickly acquiesced to Butler’s policy and Congress gave it the force of law in early August through the Confiscation Act of 1861.

Impact

What neither Butler nor leaders in Washington, D.C., reckoned on was the slaves’ response to his contraband policy. Soon other slaves began seeking sanctuary with Union forces, over 500 at Fortress Monroe alone by June 1861. The northern press soon dubbed these escaped slaves as “contraband,” a name initially resisted by some black leaders and abolitionists, but which even they eventually accepted.

But if the episode at Fortress Monroe demonstrated anything it was the fierce determination of the slaves to be free. A few slaves seeking sanctuary quickly became hundreds and then even more. As Adam Goodheart writes:

Within weeks Within weeks after the first contrabands’ arrival at Fort Monroe, slaves were reported flocking to the Union lines just about anywhere there were Union lines: in Northern Virginia, on the Mississippi, in Florida. It is unclear how many of these escapees knew of Butler’s decision, but probably quite a few did. Edward Pierce, a Union soldier who worked closely with the contrabands, marveled at “the mysterious spiritual telegraph which runs through the slave population,” though he most likely exaggerated just a bit when he continued, “Proclaim an edict of emancipation in the hearing of a single slave on the Potomac, and in a few days it will be known by his brethren on the gulf.”Within little more than a year, the stream of a few hundred contrabands at Fort Monroe became a river of tens — probably even hundreds — of thousands. They “flocked in vast numbers — an army in themselves — to the camps of the Yankees,” a Union chaplain wrote. “The arrival among us of these hordes was like the oncoming of cities.”

Undermining slavery

So the arrival of Union forces in a locality in the South, or even the prospect of their arrival, quickly began to undermine the institution of slavery, as slaves now had a place to escape from slavery with little fear of recapture. Yet without the initiative of the slaves this situation likely would have never arisen. Certainly, the slaves could not gain freedom on their own, but they determinedly pried at the tiniest fissure in the slave system made by the arrival of northern troops and the peculiar institution began to crumble under the weight of countless individual slaves fleeing it.

As Adam Goodheart relates, Lincoln administration policy about the contrabands quickly began to lag behind the reality on the ground. So much so, that the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which was announced in September 1862, in many ways was merely playing catch up. Goodheart ends his story with an anecdote that captures that situation well. He writes:

On the On the September day of Lincoln’s edict, a Union colonel ran into William Seward, the president’s canny secretary of state, on the street in Washington and took the opportunity to congratulate him on the administration’s epochal act.Seward snorted. “Yes,” he said, “we have let off a puff of wind over an accomplished fact.”“What do you mean, Mr. Seward?” the officer asked.“I mean,” the secretary replied, “that the Emancipation Proclamation was uttered in the first gun fired at Sumter, and we have been the last to hear it.”

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What if Abraham Lincoln had not been Assassinated?

Few figures loom as large as Abraham Lincoln, the 16th President of the United States. His leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, and his enduring legacy of unity and equality have solidified his place as an icon of American democracy.

What if history had taken a different turn on that fateful April evening in 1865? What if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated?

Terry Bailey considers.

An 1860s painting of President Abraham Lincoln. By George Peter Alexander Healy,

To ponder such a scenario is to delve into the realm of historical conjecture. However, by examining the political landscape of the time and Lincoln's own aspirations, it is possible to glean insight into what might have transpired had his life not been cut short by events.

Firstly, it's essential to consider Lincoln's vision for post-Civil War America. He was deeply committed to the principles of reconciliation and reconstruction, aiming to heal the nation's wounds and forge a path towards unity. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Lincoln sought to reintegrate the Southern states into the Union with leniency and compassion, prioritizing national healing over punitive measures.

Had Lincoln survived, it's plausible that his approach to reconstruction would have been markedly different from that of his successor, Andrew Johnson. Lincoln's conciliatory stance toward the South may have led to a smoother and more inclusive reconstruction process, potentially mitigating some of the deep-seated animosities that lingered in the aftermath of the war and potentially still do today.

Moreover, Lincoln's leadership style and political acumen would likely have played a pivotal role in shaping the post-Civil War era. His ability to navigate complex political terrain and build consensus across ideological divides could have paved the way for a more stable and harmonious transition from war to peace.

Race relations

One of the most intriguing questions surrounding a hypothetical continuation of Lincoln's presidency is its impact on the trajectory of race relations in America. As a staunch advocate for the abolition of slavery, Lincoln recognized the need for fundamental changes in the status of African Americans in society. While his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 marked a significant step forward, Lincoln understood that true equality would require sustained effort and political will.

Had Lincoln lived to see the fruition of reconstruction, it's conceivable that his administration would have prioritized the advancement of civil rights for African Americans. He may have championed policies aimed at ensuring their full participation in the social, economic, and political life of the nation, laying the groundwork for a more equitable society.

Furthermore, Lincoln's continued presence on the national stage could have influenced the course of American politics in subsequent decades. His leadership and moral authority might have shaped the direction of the Republican Party, steering it towards a more progressive stance on issues of racial justice and equality.

Post-war Period

However, it's essential to acknowledge the challenges and obstacles that Lincoln would have faced had he survived. The post-Civil War period was fraught with complexities and tensions, and the path to reconciliation was far from straightforward. Lincoln's ability to navigate these challenges would have been tested, and the outcome remains uncertain.

Moreover, the specter of assassination would have loomed large over Lincoln's presidency, casting a shadow of fear and uncertainty over the nation. The five earlier failed attempts on his life served as a stark reminder of the continued dangers inherent in political leadership, therefore, Lincoln would have to contend with the constant threat of violence.

In considering the hypothetical scenario of Lincoln's continued presidency, it's impossible to predict with certainty the course of history. Countless variables and contingencies would have influenced the trajectory of events, and the outcomes could have been vastly different from those we know today.

However, what remains clear is the enduring legacy of Abraham Lincoln and the profound impact of his presidency on the course of American history. Whether through his leadership during the Civil War, his commitment to the abolition of slavery, or his vision for a more perfect union, Lincoln's contributions to the fabric of American democracy are indelible.

In the final analysis, the question of what if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated invites the reflection of not only on the past but also on the present and future of the United States. It prompts the consideration of pivotal moments and decisions that shape the course of history and contemplate the enduring legacy of leadership, courage, and conviction. While it is impossible to ever know with certainty what might have been, it is possible to draw inspiration from Lincoln's example and strive to uphold the values that he held dear: freedom, equality, and the pursuit of a more perfect union.

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 3: July 2, Day 2

When the fighting ended on the evening of July 1, Gen. Robert E. Lee was uncertain of the position of the Army of the Potomac. It was ambiguous how far south along Cemetery Ridge the Union line extended. Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton had conducted a reconnaissance on the evening of July 1 to locate artillery positions on the northern part of Seminary Ridge but did not observe infantry positions. Meanwhile, General George Meade arrived at midnight, received reports, and agreed to defend the position the next day rather than retreat.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened on day 2.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, and part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here.

A depiction of Jubal Early's attack on East Cemetery Hill on July 2, 1863. From The Century Magazine, 1884.

The Reconnaissance Mission

In the early hours of July 2nd, General Lee determined that before he could devise a battle strategy for the day, he needed accurate intelligence as to the left flank of the Union line. Longstreet’s Chief Engineer, Maj. John C. Clarke joined Captain Samuel R. Johnston, one of Lee’s aides, on a nighttime mission. They set out at 4 am to locate the Union left. Johnston claimed he took a route very close to Longstreet’s countermarch later that day and made it to the top of Little Round Top (LRT), and saw no Union troops there at all.

Although the exact route taken by Johnston remains a matter of speculation, determining it precisely holds significant importance in comprehending the events that unfolded during the battle on July 2. It is likely that he departed from Lee's headquarters near the Lutheran Theological Seminary and proceeded south along the western slope of Seminary Ridge, eventually entering the Willoughby Run valley. Along this path, he would have passed by the Samuel Pitzer farm and the Pitzer Schoolhouse. Subsequently, he probably turned east, ascending the western slope of Warfield Ridge, near the location where McLaws later positioned his troops that afternoon. Johnston himself mentioned that he continued along the ridge towards the round top, crossing the Emmitsburg road, until he reached the slope of LRT, providing him with a commanding view. This sequence of movements would have placed him on LRT around 5:30 a.m.

Following his reconnaissance, Johnston reported to General Lee that there existed a concealed route that could not be detected from the Union lines. Crucially, he noted that the large hill in the distance, “with a commanding view”, which was LRT, was unoccupied. General Lee formulated his attack plan for July 2 based on the intelligence provided by Johnston's mission.

The problem with his information is that historical records indicate the presence of numerous Union troops on the hill that night. Buford's cavalry and Geary's division were encamped in front of LRT, with two regiments stationed there along with skirmishers. At 7 a.m., Major General David B. Birney of the Third Corps relieved General Geary, who had spent the entire night at that location. It has been estimated that approximately 18,000 Union troops were positioned between the Emmitsburg Road and the Taneytown Road, as well as between LRT and the George Weikert Farm, precisely when Johnston claimed to have been on Little Roundtop. Given these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that Johnston could have conducted his scouting mission without being detected. Additionally, Captain Lemuel B. Norton, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac, reported the establishment of a signal station on Little Roundtop by 11 P.M. on July 1.

So what could have transpired? One possibility is that Johnston may have been on Big Round Top, as during that period, there was no clear distinction between the two peaks. Another hypothesis put forth by Wittenberg suggests that Johnston might have been disoriented in the darkness and mistakenly believed he was on Bushman's Hill. Others have suggested that he got as far as Houck’s Ridge. Johnston had previously carried out similar successful services at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, so the reason behind the inaccurate information he provided to General Lee before 8 a.m. remains unresolved. Nevertheless, based on this intelligence, General Lee formulated a plan.

Lee’s Plan

Lee initiated preparations assuming that the Union left was positioned on Cemetery Ridge, and he instructed Longstreet to make the necessary arrangements. Lee desired this assault to catch the enemy off guard, so Longstreet was tasked with taking a concealed route along Seminary Ridge, descending to the Emmitsburg Pike without attracting attention, and then launching the attack. However, the First Corps had not yet fully arrived. They had been delayed during their movement behind South Mountain, and to reach the battlefield, they had to pass through Cashtown and cover a distance of 10 miles to Gettysburg. Longstreet insisted on having all his men present for the attack. Unfortunately, when they finally set off, they were led on a roundabout path that exposed their presence, resulting in a significant delay to their assault, which occurred well into the afternoon.

The Myth of the Sunrise Attack

July 2, 1863, was the true High Water Mark of the Confederacy. The narrative that Longstreet could have launched an attack that morning, altering the course of history, was a notion perpetuated by Jubal Early in the post-war era. General Pendleton's insistence on this theory only added to the tension between him and Longstreet.

Glenn Tucker's thorough examination in the 1960s discredited the myth of the sunrise attack, further supported by Longstreet's memoirs. The reality was that only a fraction of Longstreet's forces were in position at 7 am, with the majority still miles away. The impracticality of organizing such an attack, coupled with the overwhelming Union presence, makes it clear that Longstreet's alleged failure to act at that specific time did not determine the outcome of the battle or the war. Only McLaws, the artillery, and a part of Hood’s division were even up at 7 am, about 10,000 men, and that was after an all-night march. Had they attacked, they might have been met by 60,000 Union troops. The rest of the Corps were at Chambersburg and south of Cashtown. He moved up as quickly as possible, but most of his men were miles from Seminary Ridge at 7 am.

Even an 11 am start was not feasible due to various delays faced by his corps reaching the battlefield, resulting in a later arrival time. Alexander and his artillery didn’t even arrive until 9 am. Lee's vision of simultaneous flank offensives was hindered by Longstreet's need to wait for Law's brigade to arrive; the delay in Law's arrival further postponed the attack, with three brigades still in march columns when Longstreet finally began his movement at noon. Witness reports of Lee's frustration at 11 am that the attack had not started highlight the challenges faced in coordinating the attack, with delays caused by traffic jams. But Longstreet's attack was delayed because he first had to wait for his final brigade (Evander M. Law's & Hood's division) to arrive, and then he was forced to march on a long, circuitous route that could not be seen by Union Army Signal Corps observers on LRT. Longstreet received permission from Lee to wait for Law's brigade to reach the field before advancing. Law marched his men quickly, covering 28 miles in 11 hours, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march columns when he set off. In retrospect, Lee & Longstreet should have kept these men closer to the front, not at the tail end of the order of march.

Longstreet intended to place his men across from the Emmitsburg Pike facing east, toward the enemy lines directly facing them. Lee's strategic vision called for a different approach - he wanted the troops to face north and advance towards Cemetery Ridge and Hill. This shift in direction was crucial, as Lee aimed for a concentrated attack on the Union center on both Day 2 and Day 3 of the battle.

As Longstreet's men approached the area near Blackhorse Tavern, the presence of Union signalmen on LRT posed a risk of detection. In response, the decision was made to countermarch back to the starting point, to keep the lines in the correct order for the attack. This resulted in a delay of at least one hour, and Longstreet did not reach the appropriate zone until 4 pm.  Whether the countermarch was necessary or not is a matter of contention. However, the countermarch took longer than expected, and by the time Longstreet's troops were ready to launch their attack, valuable time had been lost. The delay allowed the Union Army to reinforce their position, and for additional troops to march toward the battlefield.

Maj Gen Daniel Sickles and III Corps

At this moment, arguably the most crucial hour of the entire war, an unauthorized troop movement changed the course of the battle and history. Ordered to hold the line on the ground between LRT and Cemetery Ridge, Maj Gen Sickles instead, on his own initiative, decided that this was a poor position for his III Corps, and instead moved them forward (west) about a half mile to the Sherfy Peach Orchard, on the Emmitsburg Pike. The consequences of this unauthorized movement reverberate through the ages

Sickles perceived, correctly, that the ground in his front was about 10 to 15 feet higher than the ground he was supposed to defend. He believed therefore that his line was in a vulnerable position for enemy artillery to destroy him. A very similar situation had happened at Chancellorsville when he was ordered by General Hooker to give up Hazel Crest, which then became the key to Confederate artillery destroying the army on day 2 of that battle. Sickles hadn’t forgotten that experience, so he asked Meade for permission to move up at least twice. Meade thought that the area was not in a good position and was in a no-man’s land. Famously when General Meade saw this right before the battle opened, he told Sickles that he was out of position and knew a disaster was in store. Hancock made a similar famous observation.

General Sickles decided at 11 AM to not defend the line General Meade assigned him between   Top and Cemetery Ridge but rather to advance to the Peach Orchard. This unauthorized move must count as one of the most fateful decisions of the entire war. Certainly, it led to the destruction of his III Corps, and it threatened the entire left flank of the Union defense, but paradoxically, it might have saved the battle. By leaving uncovered both of his flanks, leaving   (LRT) Top uncovered, and not telling anyone what he was up to, he put Meade at a serious disadvantage.

The decision to defend the Sherfy Peach Orchard, adjacent to the Emmitsburg Pike, rather than the assigned position on the descending limb of LRT attached to Cemetery Ridge, not only resulted in a vulnerable and easily attacked position but also left the flanks exposed. The left flank, consisting of LRT, Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield, had to be hastily covered as troops entered the battle. As units arrived on the field, they were immediately dispatched to critical locations to save Sickles' III Corps and the entire front. The success of Day 2 of Gettysburg relied heavily on the bravery and valor displayed by numerous men and their regiments, who are now remembered as heroes. It is important to acknowledge that Sickles' unconventional decision does not absolve him of the fact that he acted without proper knowledge, displayed insubordination, endangered the Union line, and caused the loss of many lives. However, it should also be noted that he was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions and was regarded as a great hero during his time.

Longstreet Attacks

At 4 pm, Longstreet finally prepared to launch his attack, only to realize that circumstances had changed in the interim. His original battle plan involved a left wheel followed by an en echelon attack. However, it became immediately apparent that this plan was no longer feasible due to the III Corps' position at the eastern edge of the Emmitsburg Pike, specifically at the Peach Orchard. Upon seeing Sickles' chosen position, it became clear that Lee's intended plan was no longer viable. Attacking northwards while the Peach Orchard remained under Union control was no longer an option. Instead, Longstreet's attack had to be redirected eastward, crossing the turnpike and landing further south than initially intended by Lee. The original objective of attacking the Union center had now shifted to targeting its left flank.

Hood repeatedly questioned Longstreet about whether the attack should be called off or if the plan needed to be altered due to the changed position of the Union line. Despite these inquiries, Longstreet insisted on proceeding with the attack as ordered. When told to attack as ordered, he reportedly told the colonel of a TX regiment something along the lines of "When we get under fire, I will have a digression." We don’t know if he said this, but the digression is often assumed to be the attack on LRT. His pep talk to the troops before the attack stepped off included a reference to taking those heights, also widely assumed to refer to LRT.

The assault on LRT occurred due to General Law's movement eastward, leading his 15th and 47th Alabama regiments to pursue US Sharpshooters up Big Round Top. As the Sharpshooters retreated down the slope, the Alabama regiments found themselves without a clear target, prompting them to be directed northward until they eventually reached LRT.

Following this, a crucial period unfolded where the fate of the battle, and potentially the entire war, teetered on the edge for several hours. Major General John Bell Hood launched an attack on LRT and Devil's Den, while Major General Lafayette McLaws attacked the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. Although neither side emerged victorious, the Union III Corps suffered significant losses.

The echelon attack strategy employed that day is often misconstrued, necessitating clarification on which plan is being referenced: the original strategy where McLaws' division would have taken the lead, or the revised plan and actual sequence of events after Union troops were spotted on Sickles' advanced line, resulting in Hood's division leading the charge. Under the initial plan, McLaws would have advanced alongside the Emmitsburg Road towards a Union flank presumed to be further north, with Hood's division providing support, likely by advancing to his rear or right rear. The ultimate goal was for the attack, with support from AP Hill’s Corps, to culminate on Cemetery Ridge and potentially Cemetery Hill.

Under the original plan, McLaws would have advanced astride the Emmitsburg Road, across the Peach Orchard, toward a Union flank believed to be located further north.  Hood's division would have supported McLaws.  Exactly how is unclear, but probably advancing to his rear or right rear.  At some point, McLaws would have probably shifted entirely east of the road, because continuing to advance astride it would have missed most of the Union position.  With support from AP Hill’s Corps, the idea was that ultimately the attack would end up on Cemetery Ridge and hopefully Cemetery Hill.

In the actual unfolding of events, Hood's division took the lead, but it underwent significant revisions on the spot. The plan was for the division to advance "up the Emmitsburg Road," but not directly on it. It's important to note that this was not meant to be an en echelon attack, where units are arranged diagonally. Instead, the division would advance in a column formation, with two brigades side by side in the first line (Law and Robertson), followed by Benning and Anderson in the same manner. The en echelon aspect would come later, but it never actually materialized. The plan was for Robertson to align his left flank with the Emmitsburg Road and his right flank with Law's position. However, Law veered to the east, making it impossible for Robertson to maintain both alignments. He chose to hold on to Law's left flank instead. As a result, Lee's original concept of advancing "up the Emmitsburg Road" was abandoned once the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield turned into deadly battlegrounds.

The phrase "en echelon attack" often carries a sense of awe, as if it is an unstoppable and overwhelming force. An en echelon formation is a diagonal arrangement of units, with each unit positioned at an oblique angle to a specific direction. The name of this formation comes from the French word "échelon," which means a rung of a ladder, describing the ladder-like shape when viewed from above or below. This formation is favored due to the enhanced visibility it provides to each unit.

However, as the events of July 2 demonstrated, an en echelon attack can also become disjointed and ineffective. By launching attacks in a sequential manner, the initial attack draws the enemy's attention, potentially leaving subsequent parts of the formation under-defended. Timing is crucial, and any delay at the start can significantly impact the later stages. On the second day of the battle, Hood and McLaws deviated from their intended northward direction and instead moved east, as the enemy had shifted in that direction. This created a weak point at the top of the formation. Despite this setback, the attack almost succeeded due to Sickles' exposed position, but the change in direction ultimately diminished the impact of the latter stages, falling short of Lee's expectations.

Unlike Hood's division, McLaws division did attack en echelon in two lines, with Kershaw and Barksdale in the front line, followed by Semmes and Wofford in the second line. While Barksdale attempted to drive north along the road into Humphreys' left flank, most of McLaws' efforts were directed east, towards Wheatfield Road and Plum Run Swale. Wofford's brigade, for instance, ended up moving down Wheatfield Road instead of supporting Barksdale.

The idea of Hood turning right to flank the Union left was not a straightforward option due to various factors. No suitable roads were running east/west for Hood to take his division on a flanking attack. Additionally, the presence of the Union VI Corps in the area would have made any movement slow and risky. Lee already had an extended front line, making it challenging to shift the whole army to support Hood's potential maneuver. Without proper intelligence on the terrain and Federal positions, Hood's division would have been vulnerable without infantry or artillery support. The lack of such information is directly attributable to the reality that Stuart was nowhere to be seen. Finally, once Anderson's division is committed. any movement in that direction would have been too small to make a difference.

Laws made a tactical decision of immense consequence. Hood organized his division into two lines, with Jerome B. Robertson’s Brigade and Evander M. Law’s Brigade forming the first attacking line, followed by George T. Anderson’s Brigade and Henry L. Benning’s Brigade in support. Law’s Brigade held a significant position as the right brigade not only in Hood’s Division but also in the entire Army of Northern Virginia. As Law’s Brigade advanced, it faced artillery fire from Captain James Smith’s battery near Devil’s Den.

Law had several options to consider as his brigade moved forward: continue moving eastward; incline his entire brigade toward Devil’s Den; or send part of his brigade to attack Smith’s guns and continue forward with the remainder of his force. Law decided to direct the right two regiments, the 44th Alabama and the 48th Alabama, to flank left and attack north towards the Union battery. The 15th Alabama, which had been in the center, now found itself on the far right of the brigade, moving towards the valley between Big Round Top and LRT, with the 47th Alabama on its left. This decision led to unexpected fighting near LRT and Devil’s Den, deviating from Lee’s original plan, with Benning’s Brigade ultimately ending up in Devil’s Den instead of advancing north on Emmitsburg Road.

The Defense of LRT

There was a scarcity of Union troops along LRT during that period. Conversely, there was a significant presence of Union troops and artillery positioned on Houck's Ridge. The left flank of the Union forces was not situated on LRT by 4 pm, but rather at Devil's Den. The outcome of Day 2 at Gettysburg hinged upon the valor and bravery displayed by numerous men, who are now revered as heroes alongside their regiments. Additionally, credit must be attributed to Meade for effectively mobilizing over 20,000 reinforcements to secure the salient that had not been part of his initial plan.

The chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren was considered the "Savior of Little Round Top" for his quick reaction to get troops to the summit before the approaching Confederates arrived on the afternoon of July 2.  His statue on what is now known as Warren Rock immortalizes the moment that he saw the long line of Rebel soldiers approaching from the south. It depicts the moment when he looked out with binoculars, saw the Rebels moving his way, and realized that he needed to get troops and batteries up there as soon as he could. General Warren recognized that LRT dominated the Union position and had been left undefended, and the tactical importance of the hill. He urgently sought Union troops to occupy it before the Confederates could,  but where would these troops come from? A New Yorker who had taught mathematics at West Point, he had no time to get authorization: he immediately, on his own initiative, constructed a defense of the Union left flank.

Warren encountered Strong Vincent's brigade nearby and asked for immediate assistance. Vincent, without consulting his superior officers, decided, "I will take the responsibility to take my brigade there." Vincent ordered one of his regiments to face southwards, positioned on the left flank of the brigade, while he handled the right flank, facing west. The regiment he so ordered was the 20th Maine and its commander was Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, who would become one of the greatest heroes of the war and governor of Maine. Vincent made it clear to Chamberlain that he was the far left flank regiment of the entire Union line, and that he must hold it no matter what. Vincent went back to his right flank, where the 16th Michigan was beginning to falter; at that moment he was mortally wounded. He would receive a battlefield promotion to general from Meade; that portion of LRT is called Vincent’s Spur.

Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade was discovered by a staff officer nearby. Recognizing the strategic advantage of his brigade's position, Vincent took it upon himself to deploy them where they would be most effective. Disregarding the need for approval from his superiors, he made the decision independently. Pvt. Oliver Willcox Norton, Vincent's brigade standard bearer and bugler, together with Vincent, made a reconnaissance of the Confederate forces as the brigade was moving into position, "While our line was forming on the hill at Gettysburg I came out with him in full view of the rebel lines. They opened two batteries on us instantly, firing at the colors. Colonel Vincent looked to see what was drawing the fire and yelled at me, "Down with the flag, Norton! Damn it, go behind the rocks with it."

Standing atop a large boulder, he brandished a riding crop and shouted for his troops to hold their ground. Tragically, he was struck by a bullet and fell. However, the resolute efforts of his brigades and the individual regiments within it, such as the 20th Maine, the 44th New York, the 83rd Pennsylvania, and the 16th Michigan Infantry, ultimately secured the position. Vincent was transported from the hill to a nearby farm, where he succumbed to his injuries five days later. Vincent received a promotion to brigadier general by General Meade before he died. LRT could not have been held without his leadership.

Vincent's 20th Maine regiment, under the command of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, gained significant renown for their defense of LRT. Upon their arrival in the late afternoon of July 2, Chamberlain's regiment was directed by Colonel Vincent to secure the far left position of the Union lines and to hold it at any cost. Recognizing the crucial importance of this position, Vincent emphasized its significance to Chamberlain while he attended to the right flank of the brigade. Chamberlain's regiment stood as the final line of defense on the left flank, understanding that if they were to falter, the entire Union position could collapse.

The 15th Regiment Alabama Infantry, commanded by Col. William C. Oates, charged up the hill multiple times attempting to flank the Union position. The line of the 20th Maine was doubled back upon itself, with a squad well off to the left. Despite multiple casualties and ammunition almost gone, Chamberlain recognized the dire circumstance and ordered his left wing to initiate a bayonet charge. The resulting action, with the left wing wheeling to make the charging line swing like a hinge, created a simultaneous frontal assault and flanking maneuver. Chamberlain's decisive action against Oates' Alabama brigade, risking their lives in a suicidal bayonet charge when they were nearly overwhelmed, successfully safeguarded the flank of the army on LRT.  101 of the Confederate soldiers were captured and the charge saved the flank. Chamberlain sustained one slight wound in the battle when a shot hit his sword scabbard and bruised his thigh. After initiating the maneuver, a Confederate officer wielding a revolver fired, narrowly missing his face. Chamberlain put his saber at the officer's throat and accepted the man's surrender. He received the Medal of Honor for this action.

Warren encountered Patrick “Paddy” O’Rorke, a former student and fellow New Yorker. Despite being ordered to follow his brigade commander, Steven Weed.. Warren knew O’Rorke from West Point, having been his Mathematics instructor.  Warren rode up to O’Rorke and ordered him to reinforce Little Round Top; “Never mind (your Brigade Orders), Paddy. Bring them up on the double-quick and don’t stop for aligning. I’ll take the responsibility.”

O’Rorke did not hesitate.  Warren’s aide was George Washington Roebling, who would later build the Brooklyn Bridge.  He guided O’Rorke and his men to the correct position on the hill. Reaching the top, O’Rorke saw the line of 16th Michigan holding tentatively. O’Rorke drew his sword shouting: “Down this way, boys!” The 140th “advanced, following their Colonel.  Despite a devastating volley in which men fell the men exhausted from their march nevertheless moved up. O’Rorke retrieved the regimental flag and urged his men forward.   Then a bullet hit him in the neck and he fell mortally wounded. This courageous action led to O’Rorke being killed, but he is remembered as one of the bravest American military figures, with his likeness being the focal point of the 140th NY monument on LRT today.

Weed then followed, and brought up his artillery commanded by Lt Charles Hazlett. Both were killed in a memorable moment, and the rock they were killed on remains a huge attraction.

General Sykes in his report on the action stated: “Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, chiefs lamented throughout the corps and army, sealed with their lives the spot intrusted to their keeping, and on which so much depended.... General Weed and Colonel Vincent, officers of rare promise, gave their lives to their country.”

The Attack Continues

The unsuccessful assault by the Third Corps division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge was the final chapter. Anderson's brigades attacked en echelon, or at least, most of them.  But unlike Hood and McLaws, Anderson's division had no support line.  It had not been intended to make a main effort.  Instead, its brigades were to advance in sequence, as McLaws moved north into its sector.  It would have supported what was already a success. Instead, with Hood's and McLaws' attacks going elsewhere, Anderson was essentially forced to make a primary effort, which his deployment was not suited to.  With no secondary lines, his brigades couldn't exploit any success they might attain.  Once they encountered resistance, they had to withdraw.

The fighting continued into the looming dusk. The sun was sinking, and with it, Confederate hopes of a breakthrough. Intense fighting raged on Culps Hill, Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and Cemetery Ridge. The killing fields were covered with soldiers, and horses, and burned and destroyed farms and artillery. The “lines” at this point were hypothetical in some places, as the enemy approached at unexpected angles and from above and below. The scenes were those of almost complete chaos. The bodies of the dead were everywhere.

Devil’s Den:

Devil's Den, located at the extreme left of the III Corps salient under Birney's Division, holds significant geological importance as it is a southern extension of Houck's Ridge and is characterized by its massive boulders. This area proved to be a strategic position for Confederate sharpshooters who took cover behind these boulders and engaged in long-range firing. The Union left flank faced a threat from two regiments of Law's brigade, followed by an attack from Benning and Anderson's brigades of Hood's Division, which exploited a gap in the defense. Despite reinforcements, the Confederate forces outnumbered the Union by a ratio of 5000 to 2500, resulting in a forced retreat. The casualties suffered by both sides amounted to approximately one-third of their respective forces.

Wheatfield:

The Wheatfield was a triangular-shaped field situated at the base of LRT. It was a crucial battleground with road connections spanning the entire fighting zone. Combatants from both sides entered this 20-acre field and launched attacks, only to face unexpected counterattacks from various angles. Owned by John Rose, the Wheatfield was bordered by Rose Woods to the west and Stony Hill, a slight elevation. Houck's Ridge lay to the southeast, while Devil's Den stood to the south. Although elements of the III Corps primarily defended this area, General Meade recognized the vulnerability of Sickles' salient and ordered Caldwell's division from the II Corps, under the command of Hancock, to assist. Notably, the leadership of Samuel Zook, Patrick Kelly (the Irish Brigade), and Edward Cross, who led three brigades, emerged as heroes. The Confederate brigades of Semmes, Anderson, and Kershaw confronted a total of six Federal brigades, resulting in casualties amounting to approximately 30% of all engaged forces.

Colonel Regis de Trobriand, commanding the 38th NY, played a pivotal role in the Wheatfield. His brigade displayed unwavering determination against the relentless assaults launched by Hood's division, particularly the Georgia brigade led by Brigadier General George T. Anderson and the South Carolina brigade commanded by Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw. Despite facing overwhelming odds, de Trobriand's brigade valiantly held their ground until they were relieved by units from Major General John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps. But there was a terrible price—every third man in Trobriand's brigade was a casualty. Despite a personal commendation by his commander, General Birney, he was not promoted for two more years, nor given a medal, likely because he was French, older, and not from West Point. He had a distinguished military career after the war and was an artist and author.

Col. Edward E Cross, 2nd Corps, 1st Division brigade commander.  Positioned on the left of the division's battle line as it entered the Wheatfield, Cross led his brigade with valor and determination. During the fighting, Cross was mortally wounded while at the left of his line near the Rose Woods. He died the next day at a field hospital.  He normally wore a red bandana into battle but having had a premonition of his death wore a black one this day instead which he was wearing when he was cut down leading his brigade into the Wheatfield leading Caldwell's division to support the advanced position of the under attack 3rd Corps. Hancock told him he would be promoted to Brigadier General after that battle, which is when he announced his premonition. 

Samuel Zook: On July 2, 1863, the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division, including Zook's brigade, was sent to reinforce the crumbling III Corps line that was being assaulted by the Confederate corps of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Zook was directed by one of the III Corps staff officers toward the Wheatfield to reinforce the brigade of Col. Régis de Trobriand and to fill a gap near Stony Hill. Zook, on horseback, led his men up the hill, which attracted the attention of men from the advancing 3rd and 7th South Carolina Infantry regiments, of Joseph B. Kershaw's brigade. He was struck by rifle fire in the shoulder, chest, and abdomen, and taken behind the lines for medical treatment at a toll house on the Baltimore Pike. He died from his wounds on July 3.

Cemetery Ridge:

At the top of the “ladder” was Richard Anderson's division of AP Hill's 3rd Corps, which along with Confederate brigades under Cadmus Wilcox, David Lang, and Ambrose Wright made a final attempt at Cemetery Ridge. The brigades of Carnot Posey and William Mahone did not attack, for reasons that remain obscure and controversial.

The Wilcox and Lang attacks drove Humphrey’s line, at the left of the Sickles salient, back toward Cemetery Ridge. Fighting an intense retreat, Humphreys’ resistance gave Meade and Hancock a chance to find reinforcements for the onslaught that was gathering, which was Lee’s idea all along. They had to bring XII Corps from Culps Hill, as we discussed previously.

William Colvill. During the intense fighting in the Wheatfield, AP Hill’s Corps made a move towards the Union center. He deployed the 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Division, led by Col. George Willard, to counter the advance of Confederate Brigadier General William Barksdale's Brigade. Meanwhile, as Hancock searched for reinforcements, he spotted Wilcox's brigade positioned near the base of the ridge, targeting a gap in the Union line. With time being of the essence, Hancock made a crucial decision to call upon the 1st Minnesota, Harrow's Brigade, of the 2nd Division of the II Corps, to confront Wilcox's division. Despite being vastly outnumbered, Hancock ordered the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry Regiment to engage in a desperate bayonet charge against the much larger Confederate brigade four times its size. 

Colonel Colville had been arrested on the way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his men to ford a river on logs chasing the Confederate army into Maryland. His regiment arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of July 2 after traveling 14 miles every day for 11 days, finally resting on Cemetery Ridge.

Pointing towards a Confederate flag flying over the advancing enemy line, Hancock urged Col. William Colvill to lead his men in capturing the colors. He shouted to Col. William Colvill, "Advance, Colonel, and take those colors!" The 262 Minnesotans bravely charged the Alabama brigade with fixed bayonets, managing to halt their progress at Plum Run but suffering devastating losses in the process, with 215 casualties (82%), including 40 fatalities or severe injuries. Col. Colville, who had been detained on his way to the Gettysburg battlefield for allowing his troops to cross a river on logs while pursuing the Confederate forces into Maryland, eventually arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 after an arduous journey. The 1st Minnesota became an iconic regiment that survived more casualties percentage-wise than any other during any other single battle. Due to heroic action there, Colvilll was severely wounded, requiring a cane for the rest of his life.

Despite claims that Wright's brigade "pierced the Union line", the best it seems to have done was attain a brief lodgment on its right wing, which it could neither hold nor exploit, and had to relinquish.  The Union veterans of the action disputed even this interpretation. The only reason that part of Wright's Brigade managed to pass towards the top of Cemetery Ridge was that the 22nd Georgia (and part of the 3rd Georgia) struck a hole in Gibbon's line that had been created when part of Hall's Brigade was sent south to stabilize the line as the Third Corps retreated. On his left where he smacked into the face of the Philadelphia Brigade, Wright was stopped cold and never made it closer than 30 yards from the stone wall. Posey and Mahone would have been facing two of Hays' brigades and numerous guns on Cemetery Hill. They would have been running a gauntlet to approach the Union line. They may have seen something like what Pettigrew and Trimble faced on the afternoon of July 3.

Freeman McGilvery. McGilvery identified a vulnerable and unguarded gap in the Union's defensive line situated at the southern part of Cemetery Ridge, just north of LRT. In response to this critical finding, McGilvery skillfully assembled a makeshift artillery line by gathering cannons from different commands to fortify the gap. Although lacking infantry support initially, McGilvery's strategically positioned "Plum Run line" of fieldpieces played a crucial role in thwarting the Confederate forces' final push towards the heart of the Union's position.

Summary

As the battle neared its end, Longstreet's assault had been stopped despite the possibility of breakthroughs in different areas. The question arises: would the addition of more troops have changed the outcome? If Anderson had followed orders and deployed all five brigades instead of just three, in a coordinated and echelon formation, could Cemetery Ridge have been breached? The absence of 3,000 men between Posey and Mahone, as well as the lack of support from Wofford's Georgia Brigade for Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade, impeded the success of the attack. If Anderson's forces had been at full strength with all five brigades engaged, there might have been a chance to secure a foothold on a portion of Cemetery Ridge. However, similar to Pickett's Charge the next day, the lack of reinforcements to maintain the breakthrough would have posed a significant challenge against the inevitable counterattack. There were no reserves or supports prepared to exploit any breakthrough, and the dwindling daylight further complicated the situation.

Most importantly, by 6 pm, the tide had turned. The Union had gained the numerical advantage, with more reinforcements heading towards Cemetery Ridge. The presence of additional Union divisions, fresh brigades, and elements of other corps nearby solidified the Union's position. The remnants of Robinson's and Doubleday's Divisions (including Stannard's fresh brigade) and elements of the Sixth and Twelfth Corps were nearby. Despite the temporary advantage that Lee's forces had initially held, the overwhelming strength of the Union forces, combined with the fading daylight, worked against any potential breakthroughs. The brief advantage that fate had bestowed upon Lee was now gone.

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Further Reading

·       Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day. University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

·       Glenn Tucker, High Tide at Gettysburg. Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.

Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg. MacMillan Publishing Company. 1968.

·       Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·       James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. 2nd edition, Lippincott, 1912. Accessed at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/

·       Richard Moe, The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota Volunteers. HarperCollins Publishers, 1994.

·       https://aoh.com/2019/03/25/patrick-ororke-a-forgotten-hero-of-gettysburg/

·       https://killedatgettysburg.org/patrick-ororke-140th-new-york/

·       Schmidt, Jim. "The Medical Department: A Thorn in the Lion of the Union", Civil War News, October 2000.

·       https://www.civilwarmed.org/chamberlain/

·       https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·       James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

·       Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volumes 1-3. Random House, 1963.

·       Stephen W Sears, Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.

·       Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, A Field Guide to Gettysburg, Second Edition: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People. University of North Carolina Press, 2017.

·       J David Petruzzi, The Complete Gettysburg Guide. SavasBeattie, 2009.

Philadelphia’s Civil War Hero

George E. Stephens was a Civil War hero from Philadelphia. He was outraged at not initially being able to fight as he was an African America, so took other roles until free African Americans could join the war.

The 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regimentat the Second Battle of Fort Wagner in July 1863. By Kurz & Allison.

When It came to the cause of freedom, George E. Stephens was the first to step up.

It’s been 160 years since the last of George E. Stephens correspondence letters were sent to the New York Weekly Anglo-African, and 35 years since the Civil War movie Glory hit movie theaters around the country. The film depicts the formation of the 54th Massachusetts who bravery led the attack on the Confederate defenses at Fort Wagner in Charleston Harbor in July of 1863.

He is even loosely based on a character in the 1989 film.

Stephens was born in Philadelphia in 1832, the son of William Stephens, worked who would eventually become a lay preacher in the First African Baptist Church, which became extremely active in the abolitionist movement and ultimately in the Underground Railroad.

Although we don’t know much about Stephens’ education, it is probable that he received an education through the Quakers and possibly the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.

Honoring African American Mathematician Benjamin Banneker, he joined a group of fifteen to form The Banneker Institute (a literary society.) Ironically, he was nearly enslaved between 1857–1858 around where the 54th Massachusetts would make their galant charge on Fort Wagner in 1863.

During the Civil War, he initially signed on as a cook and began sending war correspondences to the New York Weekly Anglo-African. 

Stephens was a driving force in enlisting men to join the 54th in Philadelphia and would himself signup with the regiment in April 1863 as a Sergeant.

During the brave attack on Fort Wagner on July 18, 1863 the 54th Massachusetts emerged after 7:30 P.M. and advanced up the sandy beach. By the time that the regiment’s charge arrived at the parapet of Wagner, they had withstood immense casualties. Among the 272 men killed from the regiment was commander Colonel Shaw, whose sword was taken from his body after the battle. 

Fellow Sergeant William H. Carney, upon seeing that the United States flag was faltering and about to drift into the sand, grabbed it and moved forward despite being wounded. After being pulled to safety, he refused to let go of the colours saying that he had not let them touch the ground.

Stephens was at the center of the 54th’s advance on Fort Wagner. He was wounded but managed to survive and escape without being captured.

After the Civil War, he spent time as a cabinet maker and upholsterer and also as a sailor and also educated newly freed slaves.

Stephens died in Brooklyn, New York in April 1888.

In 1997, editor Donald Yacovone released “A Voice of Thunder: The Civil War Letters of George E. Stephens.”

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Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington Township, Pennsylvania.

How effective was the 1815 Congress of Vienna?

The Congress of Vienna took place in 1814-15 in the light of the ending of the Napoleonic Wars. It had the aim of creating a revised European political order in the post-war period. Here, Bilal Junejo considers how effective the Congress was.

Klemens von Metternich. 1815 portrait by Thomas Lawrence.

Whenever it is the effectiveness of something which has to be determined, it invariably helps to be clear at the outset about the criteria in light of which such determination is to be made. In the case of the Congress of Vienna, how effective was it in doing what? What was it supposed to do when it convened? And what did it then go on to actually do? Was it able, by dint of the settlement which it drew up on 9 June 1815, to accomplish all that it had set out to? Or did subsequent events prove by their very occurrence that the Treaty of Vienna had been “ineffective” (because it could do nothing to forestall them)? To learn the answers, we must begin our analysis by examining the principal characteristics of a peace conference in the abstract — before turning to consider the extent to which those characteristics may be said to have been borne by the Congress of Vienna.

Ordinarily, a peace conference opens in the wake of an armistice. That is because the foremost purpose of such a conference is to determine what the postwar settlement will look like, and there is no point in discussing such a settlement until hostilities have at least provisionally ceased, for any such discussion presupposes knowledge of the international environment in which any settlement drawn up will have to operate, and no ascertainment of that environment can take place until fighting has stopped, not least because the lineaments of that environment will themselves be determined by the timing of the truce. What necessitates such a conference, though, is not the nature of the losing side’s surrender (which may be conditional or unconditional), but the fact that the winning side comprises not one participant but several. The victors’ initial lack of consensus as to the principal characteristics of the postwar settlement, coupled with the inability of each of them to settle things unilaterally in their own favor, makes them hold a conference in the hope of finding (some) common ground. As it is a peace conference, any acceptable settlement (for what is not acceptable will not be workable either) in which its deliberations eventuate has to ensure, if the conference itself is to be called “effective”, three things at all costs — the minimization of the losing side’s ability (and, if the victors are sufficiently wise, incentive) to resume hostilities; the material satisfaction of each victor in proportion to their losses during the war; and finally, if the first two requirements have been fulfilled, an overall arrangement of affairs that is calculated to maximize the life of the new peace. Given how the views of each victor are bound to be colored by considerations of their national security, none of the three things mentioned above can ever admit of an easy solution; but what occasionally complicates matters for everyone is the awkward situation where some members of the winning side turn out to have been able to have accomplished all or most of their wartime goals before the armistice was concluded, whilst the rest expect to be able to accomplish theirs as a direct result of the postwar settlement. The former, whom one might call the possessive, will consequently find their bargaining power at the conference to be much greater than that of the latter, whom one might call the acquisitive. Under such circumstances, the acquisitive will normally make their gains only if they first accord recognition to the wartime gains of the possessive. However, it should also be remembered that the possessive will have, in spite of their superior bargaining position, a vested interest in satisfying as many demands of the acquisitive as they possibly can, since any alienation of the latter will only result in potential allies for the side that has lost the war, presaging a regrouping of forces and a consequent undermining of the new settlement even before it officially comes into being.

Effectiveness

Having ascertained the raison d’être of a peace conference, as well as the three cumulative requirements for making it “effective”, it should not be too difficult now for us to determine just how well the Congress of Vienna’s chosen means conduced to its own ends. Beginning with the first requirement, namely minimizing the losing side’s ability and incentive to resume hostilities, the Congress performed quite well. Unlike most peace conferences, it had the advantage of having opened (in September 1814) only after a proper treaty of peace (as opposed to a mere armistice) had been concluded with the loser (on 30 May). The Treaty of Paris had confirmed not only the Allies’ recognition of the return of legitimate (i.e. internationally acceptable) Bourbon rule to France, but also the terms upon which France (or at least her new, de facto representatives) had agreed that she should thenceforth peacefully coexist with the rest of Europe. The early advent of this congenial development ensured that the Congress, when it subsequently convened, would remain conscious of the need to draw up no settlement of which the provisions in relation to France would be such as to humiliate the French people, subvert the Bourbons’ shaky hold, incite the return of Bonapartism, and plunge Europe into war anew. And given the decision to exile Napoleon to an island as close to France as Elba, it is likely that nobody foresaw the One Hundred Days in May 1814, as nobody could have known then how quickly the Bourbons, notwithstanding the Charter of Ghent, would resume their traditional misrule (ranging from economic inefficiency to humiliating political opponents) after returning to power (Roberts, 2015: 726-8). But that misrule had nothing to do with the Congress. It could, of course, be argued that since the Bourbons owed their return to Allied military support, the Congress could have ordered them to govern less provocatively than they were doing, but that begs the question of how exactly it was supposed to have realized the provocation prior to Napoleon’s smoothest of returns to power in March 1815. As late as February, Lord Castlereagh’s deputy at the Foreign Office was telling Campbell (the British commissioner guarding Napoleon on Elba) when he met him in Florence that “[w]hen you return to Elba, you may tell Bonaparte that he is quite forgotten in Europe: no one thinks of him now (Roberts, 2015: 730).” This cannot be dismissed as mere hyperbole to dampen Napoleon’s spirits, for the aforementioned proximity of Elba to France and the Allies’ indifference to both that and Bourbon misrule (in spite of Allied forces still being present upon French soil) strongly suggest that such a view was genuinely held at the ongoing Congress. But because Napoleon was soon defeated at Waterloo and exiled to faraway St Helena, the Congress never had to atone for its indifference to Bourbon misgovernment. The Second Treaty of Paris (20 November 1815) — which established a Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia to function principally as a system of collective security for nipping any kind of French aggression in the bud — declared that France was to return to her pre-Revolutionary borders, pay an indemnity of 700 million francs, and have the greater part of her territory occupied by Allied forces for five years. But the French people, notwithstanding the Bourbons’ return, complied; and by 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, reparations had been settled, the occupation was ended after only three years, and the Quadruple Alliance became the Quintuple with the addition of France, which finally restored her to full great power status in Europe. The speed with which France was able to regain equality of status in Europe after 1815 shows how the Congress of Vienna, supplemented by the Second Treaty of Paris, had left her neither desirous of overturning the new settlement nor in a position to do so even if she wanted to.

Material satisfaction

Vis-à-vis the second requirement — the victors’ material satisfaction — the Congress also did well. Indeed, it must have done so, if “it is possible to say [that the Vienna settlement] contained in none of its provisions the seeds of a future war between the great powers, and must thus be rated a better peace than either Utrecht or Versailles (Seaman, 2003: 8).” A complete list of the powers’ individual territorial gains is not necessary, for all that concerns us is the realization that because no power felt cheated or resentful, the third requirement — ensuring the peace’s longevity — may be considered in conjunction with the second, as any durable postwar peace presupposes the victors’ general satisfaction. It should be remembered that since the Congress had opened only after the Bourbons’ restoration, its task was not to achieve peace, but to ensure that it would continue. But because that peace was going to be principally between hereditary autocrats, the lack of domestic accountability had to be compensated for by an international equilibrium of forces, which necessitated not only the erosion of revolutionary ideas, but also the remedying of those weaknesses in the Continental structure which had tempted and enabled French aggression in the first place. Unsurprisingly, the best antidote to revolution was perceived to lie in the concept of legitimacy, which meant that the established monarchies of Europe alone had the right to rule over their respective people(s) merelybecause they were established. It was a return to the status quo ante, as

“After the two World Wars of the twentieth century there was no question of recreating the situation that had existed before the outbreak of hostilities; the statesmen of 1814, on the other hand, were definitely seeking some sort of return to the eighteenth-century system. It was not merely that their pride had been bruised by the impact of Napoleon's armies; the whole basis of the ancien régime had been challenged by the extension of revolutionary principles in the lands adjoining France, and for the Allies the purpose of victory was to restore the political and social framework that had been so roughly shaken since 1789 (Wood, 1964: 6).”

Weak Legitimacy?

The weakness inherent in choosing legitimacy as the basis of the Vienna settlement was that it was based upon the memory of the French Revolution and Napoleon (Kissinger, 1994: 88). Inevitably, as that memory faded with the passage of time, respect for legitimacy (which had only grown as a result of that memory) would diminish, and conflict erupt anew. But in 1815, there existed no other belief upon which to base a consensus. For the settlement to work, every power had not only to make the territorial gains for which she had fought the protracted Napoleonic Wars (and which would constitute her price for acceding to the settlement), but also to rest assured that those gains would not be subsequently snatched from her by a jealous rival. After decades of war, the decision to uphold legitimacy would mean that the incentive for one autocrat not to encroach upon the territory of another could easily lie in the understanding that the latter would reciprocate such forbearance in kind. Indeed, Russia, Prussia, and Austria went a step further, and developed between themselves what would come to be known as the Holy Alliance, which obliged its members to assist one another in the suppression of insurrectionary activity in each other’s dominions. But if legitimacy could keep the powers from exploiting their respective geopolitical opportunities merely for the sake of reciprocity, it did not eliminate the existence of those opportunities. They would be exploited as soon as anyone felt strong enough to do so (as eventually happened in the Crimean War). The principal achievement of the Treaty of Vienna — or rather of its foremost defender, Metternich, who remained Austrian foreign minister until 1848 — was to keep Prussia and Russia, the foremost Continental powers, convinced for over thirty years that their best interests lay in peace rather than war. It helped, of course, that these countries were autocracies, where Metternich only had to convince the monarch and no one else. But throughout his tenure, Metternich’s task had been to keep them from acting, rather than from reacting. One wonders, therefore, whether even Metternich, had he remained in office, would have been able to stave off conflict after the advent of the ‘illegitimate’ and provocatively domineering Napoleon III in 1852. It was Metternich’s luck that no meaningful challenge to the peace arose until after 1848 — and his accomplishment that he kept both Prussia and Russia from challenging it throughout his time in office. Navarino had not challenged the peace because Russia had fought it in concert with the ‘legitimate’ Bourbons and London — and against a non-Christian power, assisting whom was in no way stipulated by the Holy Alliance. Consequently,

“After the Congress of Vienna, Europe experienced the longest period of peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great Powers for forty years, and after the Crimean War in 1854, no general war for another sixty (Kissinger, 1994: 79).”

Good luck

It was the spirit of Vienna’s good luck that it did not die (in 1856) until the rejuvenation of France under Napoleon III (which was shortly eclipsed by German unification under Bismarck) had taken place, restoring something of a military balance on the Continent to counter the end of legitimacy (which was crucial in postponing the outbreak of a general war until 1914). It had taken the combined forces of Great Britain, France, and eventually Piedmont-Sardinia (plus the decisive ultimatum from Austria) to bring Russia to the negotiating table in 1856!

But for the forty years that it lasted, the post-1815 peace also owed something to the Continental restructuring that had taken place at Vienna, and which the precepts of legitimacy subsequently preserved from unilateral change. In the first place, British determination to prevent the recrudescence of Continental subservience to one state had resulted in the creation of a united kingdom of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg to keep the Low Countries’ ports, which were perilously close to Dover, from falling into a Continental power’s hands. Catholic Belgium was united with Protestant Holland not from lack of foresight, but because it was impossible then to confirm future French docility (Seaman, 2003: 4) — not least because Napoleon had yet to be defeated when the Treaty of Vienna was signed on 9 June. Even after Belgium’s secession from the union in 1830, Great Britain was able to have Belgian sovereignty guaranteed by all the great powers under Article 7 of the Treaty of London of 1839 — with the result that thenceforth, until 1914, she could remain comfortably aloof from all disputes in western Europe (particularly at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870), resulting in their automatic reduction to manageable proportions and preventing the outbreak of a Continental conflagration.

German Confederation & Russia

Another (Austro-) British achievement was the establishment of the German Confederation. An association of thirty-nine German states (including parts of both Prussia and Austria) in the center of Europe with no central administration but under the nominal presidency of Vienna would prove to be too strong to be attacked by a neighboring power, but too weak to attack anyone itself (Kissinger, 1994: 81). Checking both French and Russian expansion, as well as maintaining an equilibrium between Prussia and Austria in central Europe, the Confederation promised to be the cornerstone of the Continental equilibrium for which Lord Castlereagh had been straining every nerve.

The cause of peace was also helped by appeasement of the foremost Continental power in 1815 — Russia (Kissinger, 1994: 140). By acknowledging Russian suzerainty over Poland — which the Tsar had captured from Napoleon in the war’s final stages, making Russia a possessive power in the Polish context — the Allies, and especially acquisitive Austria, won Russia’s crucial support for legitimate rule across the Continent. It was the Congress of Vienna because, among the great powers, Austria’s desire for one had been the greatest (Roberts, 2015: 726). Her military weakness meant that her European wishes could only be fulfilled if they also became international decisions. Winning indispensable Russian support at that decisive hour preserved the peace for nearly forty years.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Congress of Vienna was considerably effective because it ushered in an unprecedentedly long era of (general) peace. But because that peace had been inspired by a common fear, it was bound to be lost once that fear had evaporated. Even so, legitimacy’s survival until 1856 allowed the Continent to regain something of a military balance — which helped to postpone the next European war until 1914.

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Bibliography

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Roberts, A. (2015) Napoleon the Great. Penguin Books.

Seaman, L. (2003) From Vienna to Versailles. Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Wood, A. (1964) Europe 1815-1945. Longmans, Green and Co Ltd.

The Humanitarian Dimension of the 1898 American Occupation of Cuba

The United States went to war against Spain in 1898 to end Spanish colonial rule in Cuba. The United States remained as an occupying power after the expulsion of the Spanish. However, Paul Parobek discovered during his research that there was a humanitarian dimension to the American occupation of Cuba that is often overlooked in the scholarship.

An 1897 cartoon showing how the American people want help Cubans, but the US government not wanting to. Judge Magazine on February 2, 1897.

The United States has a long history of providing humanitarian relief to foreigners suffering from disasters. However, the humanitarian relief provided by the United States to Cuba following the War against Spain in 1898 is often overlooked even though Americans were well-aware of the suffering of the Cubans. American media regularly reported on the Spanish atrocities being committed in Cuba by the Spanish General Weyler who was given the name ‘The Butcher’ by American newspapers. William McKinley made the humanitarian situation in Cuba a prominent cornerstone of his campaign in 1896 and according to Irwin, President McKinley sought to avoid a war with Spain, but he also wanted to alleviate the suffering of the Cubans and “turned to humanitarian assistance” (Irwin, 2013, p. 26).The Spanish-Cuban conflict killed between 200,000 and 400,000 Cubans over the course of the two years from McKinley’s election in 1896 until the War against Spain in 1898 which President McKinley referred to in genocidal terms. Deaths were not just limited to the combatants. The elderly, disabled, women, and children were also affected which Senator Lodge referred to in a Senate speech as being “medieval and barbaric”. American troops immediately began an assessment of the situation in Cuba once the Spanish had been expelled. The devastation varied across the island. Provinces such as Havana were not as devastated while the rural provinces in the eastern part of Cuba were the most devastated. The provinces of Matanzas, Santa Clara, Santiago, and Puerto Principe were particularly devastated as that is where General Weyler initiated the reconcentrado policies. In one province, the United States had only four to six weeks’ worth of food to supply the inhabitants. In another province, the humanitarian plight was so severe that the United States had to prioritize the recipients with the elderly, disabled, women, and children receiving priority status.

Distribution

The American Army expedited the distribution of emergency food rations to the Cubans. Adjutant General H. C. Corbin first ordered the distribution of food rations in General Order Number 110 on 1 August 1898 by orders of the Secretary of War Elihu Root. This order primarily dealt with the commissary of the American troops, however, sections seven and eight specifically called for the distribution of food “to troops of the Cuban army, to Cuban destitutes, and to the prisoners of war” ('General Orders and Circulars: Adjudent General's Office,' 1898, p. 312). Food rations were distributed and their effects were documented in various reports. In one report by General Wilson, the period from 1 January to 30 June 1899 in the provinces of Santa Clara and Matanzas saw “I,930,130 Cuban rations were issued… (and) The number of destitute greatly diminished since last January, and now the distribution of rations is principally confined to hospitals and orphan asylums” (Wilson, 1899, p. 8 in report). In Havana when the orders were made, between 20,000 and 25,000 people, but these were reduced by degree” (Ludlow, 1899, p. 17 in report).

Food rations would later be provided by allocation of funds from the Bureau of Insular Affairs. A report from the Chief Commissary Officer Major A. l. Smith on 12 August 1899, from 11 April and 30 June 1899 saw a total of “1,081,870 pounds of food were transferred to the Cubans” (Smith, 1899, p. 12 in report). The total cost of these food supplies totalled $49,013.37. Males and the able-bodied were given the lowest priority. Those males who were given rations and regained their strength were then required to work to aid in the rebuilding of Cuba. The relief had to be rationed to make it last until. The relief that was provided did not substantially reduce the suffering. It was apparent that the United States military could not handle the humanitarian relief by itself in addition to its other responsibilities including restoring law and order, rebuilding the island’s infrastructure, and creating civil authorities.

Partnership

The United States partnered with various relief societies and Church groups in the private sector including the American Red Cross, The Central Cuban Relief Committee, The Women's National Relief Association, and the Hijas de Cuba (the Daughters of Cuba) were other prominent organizations that appealed to the American public for money, food, clothing, and medicine ('Relief for Starving Cubans,' 8 January 1898, p. 1). They were initially placed under the State Department to help provide relief to Cuba. These relief societies were highly successful as the American Consulate-General Fitzhugh Lee stated in a letter to William Day in Havana on 23 November 1897, about their success, writing “under charitable committees, a large number of them (mainly women and children former reconcenrados) have been gathered together in houses, and are now being fed and cared for by private subscriptions” (Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Relative to Affairs in Cuba, Ordered to be Printed April 13, 1898, 1898, p. 552). Leaders of the various relief societies such as Clara Barton made personal visits to Cuba to personally “distribute food and medical supplies to civilians and established orphan asylums” (Irwin, 2013, p. 26). In addition to prominent businessmen including Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Chase, and Sheeran often organized social gatherings with prominent organizations including  the Chamber of Commerce of New York City to raise money for relief efforts ('Relief for Cuban Sufferers,' 11 January 1898, p. 7).

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What Happened During the Assassination of President Abraham Lincoln?

Abraham Lincoln’s assassination on April 14, 1865 had significant consequences, particularly coming as it did shortly before the end of the U.S. Civil War. Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the assassination and Lincoln’s killer, John Wilkes Booth.

A depiction of John Wilkes Booth when he was about to shoot President Abraham Lincoln.

The Assassination

The assassin silently opened the first door to the President’s theater box, fully aware that the bodyguard was not around. He barricaded the door behind him, using a stick that he wedged in between the door and the wall. He then looked through a small peephole he’d previously carved in the second door. The time was shortly after 10 PM. He waited for the particular line in the play he knew was received by the audience with loud laughing and noise, to be spoken by actor Harry Hawk (playing Asa Trenchard). When he heard the line, “Don’t know the manners of good society, eh? Well, I guess I know enough to turn you inside out, old gal; you sockdologizing old man-trap!” and heard the expected audience response, he opened the second door.  He silently moved forward and took one shot at the back of the President’s head, who was laughing. He dropped his derringer, then pulled a knife to fight off the officer accompanying Lincoln that night, who had grabbed his coat to restrain him.

Well aware of the layout of Ford’s Theater, having acted there numerous times, his escape route was to jump from the balcony where the box was located to the stage. When he jumped to the stage, Booth broke the fibula, the small bone in the bottom of his left leg. In his diary, Booth wrote that he said, “Sic semper” although eyewitnesses thought he said “Sic semper tyrannis” and others “The South is avenged”. Only the screams of the ladies from the box suggested this wasn’t a part of the play; the audience began to realize what had happened when the officer yelled, “Stop that man”.

Booth ran out to the alley from backstage, pursued by audience members, where his groom Joseph “Peanuts”  Burroughs was waiting outside, holding Booth’s horse. Booth struck Peanuts in the head with his knife, jumped onto his horse, and rode off.

Booth had gained entrance to the President’s box at the theater without any problem because the assigned bodyguard, John Parker, a Metropolitan Washington DC officer, was not where he was supposed to be: seated just outside in a passageway by the door. From where he sat, the bodyguard couldn’t see the stage, so after Lincoln and his guests settled in, he moved to the first gallery to enjoy the play. Later, he committed an even greater folly: at intermission, he joined the footman and coachman of Lincoln’s carriage for drinks in the Star Saloon next door to Ford’s Theatre. Booth was seated in the Star Saloon, drinking quite heavily. When Booth crept up to the door to Lincoln’s box, he knew there was no one on duty because he saw Parker drinking in the saloon.

Major Henry Rathbone attended the play at Ford’s Theater with the Lincolns and his fiancée, Clara Harris. He was invited only because General and Mrs. Grant turned down the invitation at a late hour. The general’s wife, however, had recently been the victim of Mary Todd Lincoln’s acid tongue and wanted no part of a night on the town with the First Lady. Grant had backed out citing the couple’s desire to travel to New Jersey to see their children. He attempted to stop the assassin but was seriously wounded by Booth, who slashed Rathbone’s left arm from his elbow to his shoulder.

All four of the people in that box would become tragic victims of that night. Major Rathbone married Clara—who also happened to be his stepsister—in 1867, but then he grew increasingly erratic and perhaps suffered from post-traumatic stress. Although they had 3 children, he was mentally anguished forever after by thoughts that he had not done enough to prevent the murder. Although appointed by President Arthur to be the Consul to Hanover, his mental health continued to decline. He threatened divorce frequently. He ultimately fatally shot and stabbed his wife and then stabbed himself five times. He was charged with murder but instead was declared insane and committed to a mental asylum for the remainder of his life. Mary Todd Lincoln, the fourth person present, was herself institutionalized in 1875.

The president had been mortally wounded; He was carried to a lodging house across the street from the theater. At about 7:22 the next morning, he died—the first U.S. president to be assassinated.

Seward

Another segment of the plot was to assassinate William Seward, the Secretary of State. Lewis Powell, a co-conspirator with John Wilkes Booth, forced his way into Seward’s house. Seward had been in a carriage accident 9 days previously, breaking his jaw. He was recuperating from a painful wound that prevented him from eating normally. The accident and Seward’s injuries were widely reported. Powell came to the door dressed well and claimed to be bringing pain medication that Seward’s doctor had prescribed. The servant answering the door was happy to take the medication but would not give the “messenger” entrance to the house. Powell pushed open the door and raced up the stairs to the bedroom, where he stabbed Seward several times before fleeing the scene. Seward was wearing a brace for his jaw injury that deflected the knife slashes. He also rolled over away from the killer and was only minimally injured in the chest and neck.  Besides Seward, 8 people were stabbed and one hit in the head; these included four of Seward's children, a bodyguard, and a messenger. His son Frederick was hit in the head by a pistol when the gun malfunctioned; he spent 2 months in a coma. That night and the next morning, Seward deduced that Lincoln had been murdered. Seward heard church bells tolling; although the people around him tried to deny it, fearing the effect of inflicting emotional pain, Seward said, “Lincoln is dead because if he were alive he would have been the first to come to see me.”

Who was Booth? What was he planning?

John Wilkes Booth was a famous actor, from a very prominent theatrical family. Many considered Booth’s father, Junius Brutus Booth, to be the finest Shakespearean actor of his generation, and Booth’s older brother, Edwin is commonly named among the greatest American actors of all time,  Booth grew up in Baltimore. He was called “the handsomest man in America” by at least one critic.

His interest in politics, and particularly his partiality to slavery, developed at a young age. The rest of his family could not abide his politics, as they were all Union men. Booth became involved with the Knights of the Golden Circle in Baltimore. During the war, he chose to remain in the North despite his political persuasions as there were more options for actors in northern cities.

His anti-Union sentiments were fully displayed on an October 1864 trip to Montreal, a city noted for its southern sympathy and a notorious outpost of Confederate agents. On October 18th he checked into St. Lawrence Hall, an old Hotel known as the Confederacy’s Canadian center. Witnesses would later claim to have seen Booth talking with known agents and openly expressing contempt for Lincoln.

There, money from some source changed hands; a bankbook with $ 455 and three certificates of exchange from The Ontario Bank dated October 27th was found in his possession when he was killed. It is believed that he had already developed a general plan for the kidnapping of Abraham Lincoln at that point. Booth was known to have been in Montreal that day. The origin of these funds remains uncertain, especially regarding whether someone high up in the Confederate government had financed the assassination (Klein).

A witness at the 1865 trial of Booth’s accomplices testified that Patrick C. Martin accompanied Booth to the Montreal branch of the Ontario Bank, where Booth made a deposit and took bills of exchange. Martin was a Baltimore liquor dealer who had established a Confederate Secret Service base in Montreal in the summer of 1862. He had arranged blockade running and financial services benefitting Confederate interests. It is known that Booth tried to arrange the transfer of his theatrical costumes to Jamaica by Martin

Martin gave Booth letters of introduction to two southern Maryland physicians, Dr. William Queen and Dr. Samuel Mudd. These operatives were to assist him in escaping. In November, 1864. Booth deposited $1,500 in the Cooke Bank in Washington. He spent these funds between January 7 and March 16, 1865, to assemble his team.

The Plot

Booth had visited Bryantown MD  in November and December 1864, allegedly to search for real estate investments. Bryantown is located 25 miles from Washington and about 5 miles from Dr. Mudd's farm. Of course, the real estate alibi was a cover; Booth's true purpose was to plan an escape route as part of the plan to kidnap Lincoln. Booth’s original idea was that the federal government would ransom Lincoln by releasing a large number of Confederate prisoners of war.

There, he met with Dr Mudd, an active participant in a confederate spy network. Booth met Mudd at St. Mary's Catholic Church in Bryantown during one of those visits, probably in November. Booth visited Mudd at his farm the next day and stayed there overnight. The following day, Booth purchased a horse from Mudd's neighbor and returned to Washington.

On December 23, 1864, Mudd traveled to Washington. There he met Booth again, where the two men, as well as John Surratt, Jr., and Louis J. Weichmann, had a conversation and drinks. They met first at Booth's hotel and later at Mudd's. According to a statement made by George Atzerodt taken while he was in federal custody on May 1, 1865, Mudd knew in advance about Booth's plans; Atzerodt was sure the doctor knew  because Booth had "sent (as he told me) liquors & provisions... about two weeks before the murder to Dr. Mudd's."

It has been suggested that Booth heard Lincoln speak at his second inaugural address. Some photos appear to show him in the crowd wearing a top hat but perhaps also without. No one knows for certain if this individual is Booth, or even if Booth was present that day.

On March 17, Booth and a group composed of  George Atzerodt, David Herold, and Lewis Powell, met in a Washington bar to plot the abduction of the president three days later. However, the president changed his plans, and the scheme was scuttled. General Robert E. Lee surrendered to the Union on April 9th at Appomattox Court House and the war was essentially over.

On the evening of April 11, the president stood on the White House balcony and delivered a speech outlining some of his ideas about reconstruction and bringing the defeated Confederate states back into the Union. Lincoln indicated a desire to give voting rights to some African Americans, such as those who had fought in the Union ranks during the war. He expressed a desire that the southern states would extend the vote to literate blacks, as well. Booth was in the small audience on the White House lawn listening. , “That means n____ citizenship,” he told Lewis Powell. “Now, by God, I’ll put him through. That is the last speech he will ever make.” Booth’s plot changed to murder at that moment. The conspirators altered their plan; the new plot was to kill Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, and Secretary of State William Seward on the same evening.

While visiting Ford's Theatre around noon to pick up his mail on April 14th, Booth learned that Lincoln and Grant were to visit the theater that evening for a performance of Our American Cousin. Booth had performed there several times, so he knew the theater's layout and was familiar to its staff. Recognizing this was a golden opportunity, Booth went to Mary Surratt's boarding house and asked her to deliver a package to her tavern in Surrattsville, Maryland. He also asked her to tell her tenant Louis J. Weichmann to ready the guns and ammunition that Booth had previously stored at the tavern.

The conspirators met for the final time at 8:45 pm. Booth assigned Powell to kill Secretary of State William H. Seward at his home, Atzerodt to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson at the Kirkwood Hotel, and Herold to guide Powell (who was unfamiliar with Washington) to the Seward house and then to a rendezvous with Booth in Maryland. Atzerodt backed out of his part to kill Johnson.

The Fibula Fracture

Many people believed that Booth broke his leg as a result of jumping from the presidential box onto the theatre stage from the impact of the jump to the stage, where he landed somewhat off balance. Some historians speculate that Booth may have broken his leg when the horse that he was riding, galloping away from the murder scene at a high rate of speed, tripped and fell on its left side. Perhaps his left leg was entangled in the flag that was draped in front.

Fibular fractures can be due to falls when landing incorrectly, but can also occur from a severely twisted ankle.The distance from the theatre box balcony to the stage floor today is approximately 12 feet. Some eyewitness accounts suggested that the original height was closer to 9 feet, and a sketch done soon after the assassination suggests the distance was 10 feet, 7 inches. The distance Booth jumped may never be accurately known since the theatre was renovated in 1866. The original box was completely demolished.

Fibular fractures are painful and often accompanied by ligament or tendon injuries. Swelling, tenderness, inability to bear weight, and numbness are common. This injury would be a serious impediment to one’s ability to walk without a limp or run normally.

Escape Route & Capture

After the assassination, Booth rode to Maryland with David Herold. The first place was Popes Creek on the Potomac River in southern Maryland, and then to the Surratt Tavern to pick up the weapons he had asked to be delivered there earlier. Finally, he went to the home of Dr. Mudd, who placed splints on Booth’s leg. It would have been impossible, as Mudd claimed, that he did not know this man, whom he had met on several occasions. Moreover, while Mudd may not have known about the assassination that night, he certainly did the next morning when he went into town; yet he told no one about his guests. Booth then left and they stayed at the home of Samuel Cox, and then in some woods on the north bank of the Potomac. There, Booth had access to newspapers and food. On April 22nd, they rowed across the river to Virginia, on the south side. They hid in a barn on Richard Garrett’s farm, as thousands of Union troops combed the area looking for them.

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln initiated a massive search to find the killers Secretary of War Stanton sent a telegram to his man, Lafayette Curry Baker, head of the federal intelligence service, called the US Secret Service. Curry was in New York City when Stanton ordered him to come to DC immediately and help find the murderer. The identity of the assassin was well established, but he remained at large. Despite being In a city with thousands of troops at the war’s end, and hundreds of police, Stanton sent out the signal for this particular man to help find him. “Come here immediately and see if you can find the murderer of the President,” Stanton telegraphed him. He took the train the next day.

Within two days he had arrested Mary Surratt, Lewis Paine, George Atzerodt, and Edman Spangler. He also had the names of the fellow conspirators, John Wilkes Booth and David Herold. His investigation method wasn’t to search for anyone. Instead, he planted moles in the ranks of the investigators. From them, he learned that the prime suspects were traveling south through the eastern Maryland counties of Prince George and Charles. Thousands of troops and uncounted civilians were involved in the manhunt. Stanton had put out a reward of $100,000 (about $1.8 million in today’s dollars). Every motivated civilian, detective, policeman, and Union officer hoped to strike it rich.

He happened to be in the offices of the War Department when he learned that two men identified as the fugitives had been seen making the Potomac crossing into Virginia near Mathias Point on April 22nd. He knew a great deal about the routes used by Confederate couriers and spies that operated in the Northern Neck and made an educated guess as to where Booth and Herold might be. He summoned two assistants in his office spread out a map on a small table and pointed to Mathias Point on the Virginia side of the Potomac. “He’s right in there,” pointing to a circle he drew on the map. “I want you to go to this place, search the country thoroughly, and get Booth.”

He sent Lieutenant Edward P. Doherty and twenty-five men from the Sixteenth New York Cavalry to capture Booth in Virginia, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Everton Conger, an intelligence officer.  Several of his men knocked on doors, and asked about two men, one with a broken leg, for 12 hours. Finally, an ex-Confederate soldier named William S Jett was interrogated roughly. The man guided them and a cavalry squad to Richard H Garrett’s farm, where the cavalrymen discovered the fugitives in a tobacco barn on the morning of Wednesday, April 26, 1865.

Around 2:00 am the soldiers surrounded the barn, which was located about 60 miles south of Ford's Theatre near Port Royal, Virginia. Lieutenant Luther Baker yelled, "Surrender, or we'll fire the barn and smoke you out like rats! We'll give you five minutes more to make up your minds." Booth asked for time to decide. Finally, after some more give and take with the soldiers, Booth yelled, "Well, my brave boys, you can prepare a stretcher for me! I will never surrender!" After a short time, Booth said, "Oh, Captain, there's a man in here who wants to surrender awful bad." The barn door rattled, and David Herold's voice was heard saying he wanted to give up. Herold slowly came out and was slammed to the ground by the soldiers. He was hauled to a nearby tree and tied up with rope.

Still, Booth would not come out. Using straw and brush, Conger set the barn on fire. Booth was visible to the soldiers because the barn was full of cracks and knotholes. They could see him moving about the burning barn holding his carbine and crutch. At this moment, Corporal Boston Corbett shot Booth through the neck. Booth was paralyzed and barely alive. With difficulty, Booth was able to speak. He said, "Tell Mother I died for my country." A local doctor, Dr. Charles Urquhart, Jr., who had been a physician in nearby Port Royal since 1821, arrived on the scene and indicated the wound that had punctured Booth's spinal cord was fatal. Sometime around 7:00 A.M. Booth looked at his hands and moaned, "Useless! Useless!" Those were probably the last words Booth spoke before dying.

Booth was pronounced dead at 7:15 A.M. A search of his body turned up a pair of revolvers, a belt and holster, two knives, some cartridges, a file, a war map of the Southern States, a spur, a pipe, the Canadian bills of exchange, a compass with a leather case, a signal whistle, an almost burned up candle, pictures of five women - four actresses (Alice Grey, Helen Western, Effie Germon, and Fanny Brown) and his fiancée, Lucy Hale (the daughter of ex-Senator John P. Hale from New Hampshire), and an 1864 date book kept as a diary. These items found on his person still exist. They are owned by the National Park Service and held at the Ford’s Theater Museum. They have a long history in themselves.

Lt Col Conger brought Booth’s possessions back to Curry, who turned them over to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who used them as trial evidence for the assassins' accomplices. Except for one thing: Booth’s diary. When it reappeared in 1867, it was missing 18 pages. No one knows who cut those out of the book, or why. Stanton claimed it was given to him like that. It might be that the missing pages in Booth’s diary told who Booth was working for, and the whole story of the plot; and may have incriminated very prominent people, such as Andrew Johnson, as part of the kidnapping scheme. Some have speculated that Stanton destroyed the pages because his own name appeared in it. Yet another theory is that the missing pages included the names of people who had financed the conspiracy; it later emerged that  Booth had received a large amount of money from a New York-based firm to which Stanton had connections.

The other conspirators were captured the day after the assassination outside Surratt’s boarding house, except for John Surratt, who fled to Canada. Powell was caught purely by accident, as he approached the boarding house not knowing Union troops were inside; he was missing his hat (found in the Seward home) and had blood stains on his clothes. On July 7, after a military court trial. George Atzerodt, Lewis Powell, David Herold, and John Surratt’s mother, Mary, were hanged in Washington. The execution of Mary Surratt is believed by some to have been a miscarriage of justice. Although there was proof of her involvement in the original abduction conspiracy, it is clear that her deeds were minor compared to those of the others who were executed. John was eventually tracked down in Egypt and brought back to trial, but with the help of clever lawyers, he won an acquittal in a civilian court.

On June 29, 1865, Mudd was found guilty with the others. The testimony of Louis J. Weichmann was crucial in obtaining the convictions. Mudd escaped the death penalty by one vote and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was later pardoned by President Andrew Johnson in 1869.

Some contemporary historians make a case that Dr Mudd should be exonerated. There is no definitive evidence to support that he knew that Lincoln was assassinated nor that Booth had committed a crime. There is evidence that he was involved in the kidnapping plot though. The key issue is that he lied about knowing Booth, and how much he knew about the plot, and delayed reporting Booth's presence. That made him guilty of conspiracy and being an accomplice, but saved him from the death penalty. Interestingly, others also knew about the kidnapping plot who weren't convicted of the murder. Legally his lack of planned involvement in the assassination mitigates any participation after the fact. Then there is his Hippocratic oath, which obligated him to treat Booth's leg, although not to maintain his anonymity. Moreover, although Weichmann tied the acquaintance of Booth to Mudd, he did not claim to know what they discussed.

Baker was promoted to Brigadier General and received all the publicity and the reward for the capture. But several years later he died under mysterious circumstances, further suggesting a conspiracy of profound intrigue.

Was the Booth capture a hoax?

Booth's remains were sewn up in a horse blanket and placed on a wide plank. An old market wagon was obtained nearby, and the body was placed in the wagon. The body was taken to Belle Plain. There it was hoisted up the side and swung upon the deck of a steamer named the John S. Ide and transported up the Potomac River to Alexandria where it was transferred to a government tugboat. The tugboat carried the remains to the Washington Navy Yard, and the corpse was placed aboard the monitor Montauk at 1:45 A.M. on Thursday, April 27. Once aboard the Montauk, Booth's remains were laid out on a rough carpenter's bench. The horse blanket was removed, and a tarpaulin was placed over the body.

Several witnesses were called to identify the body. A sketch that appeared in Harper's Weekly on May 13, 1865, shows the process. Several people who knew Booth personally are known to have identified the body. One of these people was Dr. John Frederick May. Sometime before the assassination, Dr. May had removed a large fibroid tumor from Booth's neck. Dr. May found a scar from his operation on the corpse's neck exactly where it should have been. Charles Dawson, the clerk at the National Hotel where Booth was staying, identified the initials "J.W.B" pricked in India ink on the corpse's hand. As a boy, Booth had his initials indelibly tattooed on the back of his left hand between his thumb and forefinger. Alexander Gardner, the well-known Washington photographer, was also among those who positively identified the remains, as were his assistant Timothy O’Sullivan, and Seaton Munroe, a prominent Washington attorney.

There were five witnesses to the post-mortem: Charles M. Collins, Charles Dawson, Seaton Munroe, John Frederick May, and William Wallach Crowninshield, Surgeon General Joseph K. Barnes, Dr. Joseph Janvier Woodward, and Dr. George Brainard Todd performed the autopsy aboard the Montauk. Booth’s third, fourth, and fifth cervical vertebrae, which were removed during his autopsy, are housed (not on public display) at the National Museum of Health and Medicine at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. An additional fragment from Booth's autopsy (tissue possibly cleaned off the cervical vertebrae) is in a bottle in the Mütter Medical Museum of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia.

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Dr. Barnes wrote the following account of the autopsy to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton:

“Sir,

I have the honor to report that in compliance with your orders, assisted by Dr. Woodward, USA, I made at 2 PM this day, a postmortem examination of the body of J. Wilkes Booth, lying on board the Monitor Montauk off the Navy Yard.

The left leg and foot were encased in an appliance of splints and bandages, upon the removal of which, a fracture of the fibula (small bone of the leg) 3 inches above the ankle joint, accompanied by considerable ecchymosis, was discovered.”

The cause of death was a gunshot wound in the neck - the ball entering just behind the sterno-cleido muscle - 2 1/2 inches above the clavicle - passing through the bony bridge of fourth and fifth cervical vertebrae - severing the spinal chord (sic) and passing out through the body of the sterno-cleido of right side, 3 inches above the clavicle.

Paralysis of the entire body was immediate, and all the horrors of consciousness of suffering and death must have been present to the assassin during the two hours he lingered.”

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Some have suggested that Booth actually was never captured and escaped to Texas, where many years later his “corpse” was a great sideshow hit. This photograph is searchable online, but it is complete nonsense: the Booth autopsy was well attended and documented.

The corpse was again positively identified in February of 1869 when Booth's remains were exhumed and released by the government to the Booth family. At that time an inquest was held at Harvey and Marr's Parlor in Washington. Booth's corpse was taken to Baltimore for burial and was positively identified by many people including John T. Ford, He ry Clay Ford, and Joseph Booth, John's brother.

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References

https://www.thevintagenews.com/2016/01/18/46415/

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/lincolns-missing-bodyguard-12932069/

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/john-wilkes-booth-shoots-abraham-lincoln

https://www.historynet.com/dr-samuel-a-mudd/

https://globalnews.ca/news/1611968/lincoln-assassin-john-wilkes-booths-canadian-connection/

https://lincolnconspirators.com/picture-galleries/found-on-booth/

https://lincolnconspirators.com/2012/05/31/booth-at-lincolns-second-inauguration/

https://www.onthisday.com/photos/john-wilkes-booth-at-lincolns-inauguration,

https://www.nps.gov/foth/learn/historyculture/faq-the-assassin.htm#:~:text=Many%20people%20believed%20that%20John%20Wilkes%20broke%20his,on%20something%20and%20fell%20on%20its%20left%20side.

https://www.fords.org/visit/historic-site/museum/

https://www.militaryimagesmagazine-digital.com/2022/06/05/scoundrel-the-rise-and-fall-of-union-spy-chief-lafayette-curry-baker/

American Brutus by Michael Kauffman On page 348 (first edition hardcover)

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/john-wilkes-booth-shoots-abraham-lincoln

https://columbialawreview.org/.../the-law-of-the-lincoln.../

https://www.rogerjnorton.com/Lincoln83.html

Further Reading

·      https://rogerjnorton.com/Lincoln40.html

·      Michael W Kauffman, American Brutus: John Wilkes Booth and the Lincoln Conspiracies. Random House, 2004

Two Forgotten Aspects of the U.S. Civil War

In the historical novel Rebel Falls, author Tim Wendel focuses on two often forgotten aspects of the US Civil War - how widespread the conflict actually was and the way women played an integral role. He explains more in this piece.

Tim’s book is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Sarah Emma Edmonds (married name Seelye), a woman who who fought as a man during the US Civil War.

In schools and class textbooks, the Civil War is usually taught as strictly a southern struggle. Certainly, major battles like Vicksburg, Bull Run, the siege of Petersburg and others occurred below the Mason-Dixon line. But we forget that when major conflicts erupt, the struggle and damage can extend well beyond borders and the lines on a map.

Widespread

Few realize that the Civil War nearly ignited an international conflict because of the keen interest of Great Britain and other European powers. In the last months of the war, the South was desperate to ignite an incident that would draw England and other countries into the fray.

The Confederacy sent spies to the northern border with British Canada, from Halifax to Detroit. The most audacious of such plans was to seize the U.S.S. Michigan, the lone Union warship left on the Great Lakes in 1864. (Similar vessels were utilized to blockade the South.)

An unlikely pair – John Yates Beall and Bennet Burley – headed the rebel effort to capture the Michigan. Born in Jefferson County, West Virginia, Beall was a loyal Southerner and had studied law at the University of Virginia. Along the way, he appears to have crossed paths with John Wilkes Booth, who, of course, would later assassinate President Abraham Lincoln.

Burley was Beall’s partner in the so-called Northwest Conspiracy. From Glasgow, Scotland, Burley was a soldier of fortune -- joining the fight for the thrill of it. Unlike Beall, he would survive the war, escaping back to the United Kingdom and become a celebrated foreign correspondent for The Daily Telegraph in London.

(Beall and Burley are mentioned briefly in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals and Carl Sandburg’s Abraham Lincoln: The War Years.)

And what would have happened if Beall and Burley had seized the iron-hulled Michigan, with its 30-pounder parrot rifle, half-dozen howitzers and additional firepower? They first planned to free Confederate prisoners on Johnson’s Island near Sandusky, Ohio. These POWs included more than 20 rebel generals.

From there, with no opposing warships in the region, it would have been easy to bombard Cleveland, Buffalo, and other targets along the southern shore of Lake Erie. All of this was planned to unfold shortly before the presidential election. Even though Lincoln handily regained office (212-21 in the electoral college), in the weeks before the vote a Republican victory was far from a foregone conclusion. The nation had been at war since spring of 1861, and many were tired of the long struggle. Lincoln and members of his cabinet feared that he might lose to challenger George McClellan due to war fatigue. This result could have led to the formation of a separate nation, the Confederate States of America.

The role of women

Though often overlooked, women played important roles on both sides of the Civil War, especially when it came to espionage. Elizabeth Van Lew was a member of Richmond high society and appeared to be a loyal Confederate. Yet she gathered information from the rebel capital and sent it across the lines to Ulysses Grant and the Union command by using her servants as couriers.

Actress Pauline Cushman was a Union spy and was in uniform by the end of the war. She was buried with full military honors at the Presidio National Cemetery in San Francisco in 1893. “Union Spy,” reads her simple gravestone.

In function and treachery, Rose O’Neal Greenhow was the mirror image of Richmond’s Van Lew. A longtime fixture in Washington, she was a staunch supporter of the Confederacy and stayed in D.C. when the war broke out, sending valuable information to the rebels. Confederate President Jefferson Davis credited information she supplied for the South winning the first Battle of Bull Run.

Then there’s Belle Boyd, nicknamed the “Cleopatra of the Secession.” She was arrested a half-dozen times for sending military secrets to the south. Eventually, Boyd was banished to Canada and became a well-known actress after the war.

While both sides forbade women from serving in the combat units, that didn’t stop many on both sides from joining combat units in disguise. According to the National Archives, for example, Sarah Edmonds Seelye (originally Sarah Emma Edmonds) served two years in the Second Michigan Infantry under the pseudonym Franklin Thompson. She eventually earned a military pension.

When we reach the fringes of public record, novels can sometimes lead us to a better understanding of what happened and what was at stake. When I began Rebel Falls, I decided I wanted my protagonist, the one who would seek to outwit the rebel spies Beall and Burley, to be a woman. This was partly because I needed a strong connection with the Seward Family. During the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward was the most powerful man in the North after President Lincoln. Seward’s daughter, Fanny, was one of his closest confidants. So how to move inside that family circle? How about with a character named Rory Chase, a childhood friend of Fanny’s?

Rory is a composite of women who knew Fanny in Auburn, New York, where the family home still stands, as well as in Washington, where the Sewards were center stage during the war years.

Here again, the historical record can be a great starting point. After the war, Fanny Seward died of tuberculosis and was buried with other family members at Auburn’s Fort Hill Cemetery. Soon afterward family friend Olive Risley began to accompany Secretary Seward on his travels. To quell gossip (there was a 43-year difference in their ages), the politician eventually adopted her. A statue of Olive Risley Seward was erected near Capitol Hill in Washington in 1971. My goal with Rebel Falls was to have Rory Chase be emblematic of the resourceful, ambitious women who fought and spied for both sides during the Civil War.

Conclusion

Place and participants. Even with a conflict that has been written about as much as the war between the North and South, such important factors and characters can be overlooked. No wonder Ken Burns calls this clash “our most complicated of wars.”

In focusing upon what took place along our northern border and how women played a key role, I’ve not only tried to tell a forgotten story, but deliver a bit more clarity as well. Only by considering more factors of our nation’s history, hearing about all the factors of the Civil War, can we better understand what occurred and determine how best to move forward.

Tim Wendel is the author 16 books, most recently the novel ‘Rebel Falls’ (Three Hills/Cornell University Press):

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How did the US Cope with Empire After the Spanish-American War?

The 1898 Spanish-American War led the loss of the last significant remnants of Spain’s empire, with the transfer of Cuba, cedes Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. Here, Peter Deane considers the impact of the war and whether America was ready for an empire.

The last stand of the Spanish forces in Cuba. An 1898 depiction by Murat Halstead.

Four years ago we stood on the brink of war without the people knowing it and without preparation or effort at preparation…. I did all that could be done with honor to avert the war, but without avail…. It came. The result was signally favorable to American arms and in the highest degree honorable to the Government. It imposed upon us obligations from which we cannot escape and from which it would be dishonorable to seek escape.

--William McKinley, Second Inaugural Address (1901)

May 1, 1898, Manila Bay

“You may fire when ready, Gridley.” Commodore George Dewey said to firing officer Charles Gridley, quietly. In moments, nothing was quiet as the American fleet’s guns fired to devastating effect. The Spanish fleet was destroyed without a single American death. This would be widely celebrated back home–it was the first American fleet naval battle and had ended victoriously. The United States now had strategic, but by no means complete, control of the Philippines. Dewey ordered his men to seize Cavite, the port for Manila. Dewey had cut the cable from Hong Kong to Manila to isolate further the Spanish garrison in the city of Manila. He sent news of his victory back to Washington, which would take days to arrive formally. He also asked for 5,000 Army troops, enough to defeat the Spanish garrison and occupy the area. Then he settled down to wait. He had no instructions on what to do if he won.

Now what? 

The American Republic ante bellum

The United States in early 1898 was a large, prosperous nation. Its economy was growing rapidly and the nation was confident and optimistic. For the most part it was content to keep to itself. The only “overseas” possession of the U. S. was Alaska, on the same continent. The last foreign war had been fifty years before.

But for several years now, a group of influential men had formed a loose affiliation of those seeking to expand the U. S. beyond its continental boundaries. Their leader came to be Theodore Roosevelt. Manifest Destiny need not stop at the West coast. The U. S. could span the Pacific; trade and greater prosperity would follow. The U. S. could expand into the Caribbean too.

Their first goal was the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Grover Cleveland, in line with popular opinion, would have none of this and refused to pursue it. He did commit to expansion of the U. S. Navy, such that it became comparable to Germany’s. When Republican William McKinley came to power in 1897, Roosevelt became Assistant Secretary of the Navy. From this position he acted to increase the size and readiness of the Navy. He later drafted secret orders that, in the event of war with Spain, Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron should proceed directly to the Philippines to engage the Spanish fleet. To satisfy the growing and influential expansionist wing of his party, McKinley signed the long-delayed treaty of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, but the Senate would not consider it—in 1897–and he knew this.

McKinley liked to keep his options open. He has often been seen as unintelligent and indecisive. He listened more than he spoke. But when he decided, he was committed to it. As one aide said, “The President had his way as usual.” This applied in Congress too.

If the U. S. Navy was in fighting shape, the Army was in no state of readiness for war or expansion. (When the war began, Roosevelt would remark, “If the Army were one tenth as ready as the Navy, we would fix that whole business in six weeks.”) The U. S. Army consisted of 25,000 regulars scattered mostly in the interior of the country. With the Indian Wars over, it was underfunded and below what the Army Chief calculated to be the needed number, at least 38,000 regulars.

The War

The Spanish-American War, when it commenced in April 1898, was felt in Congress and by the public to be about the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny. People North and South rallied to the flag; the nation was united behind the liberation of Cuba. McKinley had hoped a foreign war would bind the nation together. The Congress was united behind appropriation for the war. The Army hoped for 60,000 volunteers with two-year enlistments; McKinley called for and received funding for 125,000 plus 62,527 total regulars for the duration of the war. In May, to prepare for any eventuality, he called for and had funded 75,000 more volunteers. Now the U. S. had a Great Power-size army.

The tenfold increase in size overwhelmed the Army. Scandals about the amount and quality of food and supplies blossomed after the War. In April, the Army Chief complained he had not enough munitions “to last an army of 70,000 men in one hour’s serious battle.” The Army had essentially no infrastructure along the Eastern or Gulf coasts. Tampa, Florida was chosen as the staging area. Tens of thousands of new recruits converged there. Roosevelt: “...a welter of confusion…an almost inextricable tangle.” But by Summer they had enough trained and supplied soldiers for the Cuban campaign.

The Army created the Department of the Pacific, in which to put Pacific Ocean possessions. The Army gathered the first of 15,000 (thrice Dewey’s request) troops with much disorganization at the Presidio in San Francisco for transport to the Philippines. Thousands more were to come over the next few years.

Neither the Army nor the Navy had any ships to transport troops overseas. Suitable ships were therefore mostly purchased–103–and a few chartered, in a matter of weeks. These were added to the Navy. Munitions and supplies were shipped as well.

When the first contingent of troops sailed for Manila, they detoured along the way to seize Guam. This was done without casualty. The other Ladrones islands were left to Spain. Then they sailed on.

It was in June that the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. The treaty was suddenly approved–by acclamation. One reason this finally passed is that the Japanese Empire had indicated strong interest in acquiring the Islands, which had a large Japanese population.

Also that Summer, the Russian Empire upgraded its representative from minister to ambassador, the same rank as other Great Powers.

The Fate of the Philippines

In May, Dewey’s fleet in Manila Bay was visited by naval contingents from a number of Great Powers, to congratulate him on his victory. With the status of the Islands unclear and not under American control, others were interested. It was known that the Japanese Empire was interested in acquiring the islands. The German admiral went so far as to indicate that if the U. S. did not want the Philippines for a colony, then Germany would gladly step in. This infuriated Dewey and influenced McKinley toward annexation in his indecision about the future of the islands.

Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico were widely seen as strategic necessities. There was no real debate over their future status. McKinley said that the status of the Philippines would be decided by the peace treaty conference, in neutral Paris, France. But peace commissioners rely on their instructions for guidance. At first he issued no clear instructions. But as the months wore on, he sensed that popular opinion favored not only Cuban independence, but also American annexation of the entire Philippines. He instructed his commissioners accordingly and Spain had to acquiesce.

The peace treaty signed late that year aroused tremendous national debate. Was it right or even constitutional for the U. S. to have colonies? Men such as Grover Cleveland, Mark Twain and Charles Francis Adams Jr. opposed annexation. (“Men of a bygone era,” Roosevelt called them.) Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge were among those in favor. The debate, in public society and in Congress, was sometimes acrimonious. A narrow majority of senators approved the treaty in February 1899.

The one group without a voice in this debate were the Filipinos. They for years had staged an insurrection against Spanish rule with the goal of independence. Filipino insurgents and the U. S. Army were allied during the siege of Manila in August, but it quickly became apparent to the Filipinos that the U. S. had no intention of supporting full independence. The insurrection turned against the Americans. This quickly became a full-scale colonial war with upwards of 30,000 American troops involved at any given time at its peak. A total of 125,000 Americans would fight in the war over its course. It lasted officially until July 1902, but some hostilities continued for years after. The American public quickly grew tired of this war, and war in general (the first occasion in what became a pattern of popular response to war) but McKinley had chosen his course of action. However, the U. S. never again waged war for territorial empire.

In December 1898, McKinley issued a proclamation that America’s goal in the Philippines was “benevolent assimilation”. This did nothing to satisfy the insurrectos who wanted no part of it. The policy was sometimes carried out at gunpoint. The American combination of benevolent ideals supported by military force, as a tenet of American foreign policy, appeared for the first time in the Spanish-American and Philippine wars, but not the last. 

The Constitution and the Flag

The Philippines all this time were under military rule, i.e., martial law. Was this constitutional? McKinley felt it was. The Constitution did not apply to a conquered colony, he felt.

Other new territories had to be governed as well. Puerto Rico easily accepted American suzerainty. One of the island’s economic mainstays was sugar cane. McKinley felt, logically (if the Constitution does follow the flag) that the tariff walls against Puerto Rican sugar should be lifted. (Never mind that this was a contradiction to his Philippine policies.) America had no tariffs against itself. The sugar lobby disagreed, and in the ensuing debate it would be decided by Congress that the Constitution does not follow the flag. Puerto Rican Sugar duties were reduced by 75%, so McKinley substantially won the immediate question.

In 1901, the Constitutional question would come to the U. S. Supreme Court. The verdict: The Constitution need not follow the flag.

McKinley’s second Annual Message (State of the Union) in December 1898 was to great extent a catalog of American accomplishments–and adaptations to empire and global power. He called for the standing, regular army to be increased to 100,000 regulars “will be none too many to meet the necessities” of the U. S. now. This shocked many, to confront the fact of America’s new role in the world. In early 1899 he called for a mainland-Hawaii-Guam-Manila cable. As usual, on both questions, he got his way.

1900

The Chinese Empire was disintegrating. Great Powers swooped in to claim coastal cities and inland spheres of influence as their own. This process not only made a mockery of China’s territorial integrity but also threatened to shut out American goods from the Chinese market.

In March, Secretary of State John Hay addressed correspondence to each of the relevant powers regarding an “open door” policy towards China. Nations seeking trade and opportunities in China were to be treated equally by all others; Chinese sovereignty was to be respected (at least in name). Some of the responses were vague, but Hay proclaimed the triumph of his policy, and the other powers played along. Thus was born the famous “Open Door” policy.

Even three years before, the U. S. would have had no say in how the Great Powers dealt with China. Now that the U. S. was a Pacific power, it had a seat at the big power table.

The Open Door was severely tested a few months later. During the Boxer Rebellion, the great power (U. S. included) diplomatic enclave in Beijing was besieged. To lift the siege and fight the Boxers, the Eight Power Alliance—all the great powers—was formed and their combined force marched on Beijing. The main force consisted of 18,000 troops under one central command. The U. S. contributed 3,400 troops from the Philippines. All eight nations participated in successfully lifting the siege.

Three years before, the U. S. would again have been a spectator, with no troops to send and no way to send them. Having troops in the nearby Philippines made U. S. participation possible. American unilateral action was not always going to be adequate to address global issues, they learned. So for the first time since George Washington’s Farewell Address, with its warnings against foreign alliances, the U. S. was acting in concert—in an Alliance—with other Great Powers. All saw the U. S. for the power it was. Afterwards, the Open Door survived as the other powers sought reparations from China, but not annexed territory.

McKinley realized the global and political significance of events. He was now responsible for Americans globally. And so he acted by joining the Alliance and committing troops. McKinley considered seeking Congressional approval for this, but was assured by his Secretaries of War and the Navy that this was not necessary, legally or militarily. He had adequate troops in Asia already. This was the first time a President had committed American troops to battle outside the contiguous U. S. without the permission of Congress. Some in Congress objected but it was done. This set the powerful precedent Presidents to come would use.

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The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 2: July 1, Day 1

The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side.  That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.

John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move

We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover,  Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.

The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.

Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.

John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.

Buford

General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.

Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.

Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.

Reynolds

General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.

The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.

The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.

Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry.  He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.

Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.

Abner Doubleday

After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.

Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.

But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.  

As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.

Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike.  The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.

For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.

The Railroad Cut

The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.

During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners

A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps  to come to the field immediately.

In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.

On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.

In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town

Iverson

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.

The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.

Rodes

When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.

Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.

Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.

After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.

Howard and Hancock

General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.

Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition.  It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.

When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.

During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.

Barlow’s Knoll

The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.

Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll.  The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.

As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.

Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.

Ewell Advances

At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.

With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.

Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order

Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.

Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:

‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘

From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.

Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

What did Lee Expect?

Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.

Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.

Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack:  a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.

Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.

On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.

When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.

Casualties

About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.

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References

•    James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

•    Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.

•    Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.

•    Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

•    Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

•    Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.

• Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.

• Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.

·      https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/

·      https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/  

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·      https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/richard-ewell-at-gettysburg/#:~:text=On%20the%20first%20day%20of%20the%20Battle%20of,new%20Federal%20position%20on%20Cemetery%20Hill%20%E2%80%9Cif%20practicable.%E2%80%9D

·      https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/

·      https://padresteve.com/2014/06/03/gettysburg-day-one-lees-vague-discretionary-orders-and-lack-of-control/