World War 2 in Italy: The 1944 Battle of Anzio

World War II’s 1944 Battle of Anzio took place from January to June in Italy. It started following an Allied decision to attack this central part of Italy. William Floyd Jr. explains the background to battle and how it evolved over the first half of 1944.

Sherman tanks at Anzio in 1944.

In early November 1943, Adolf Hitler would sign a formal order stating there would be an “end of withdrawals.” In Italy, this would condemn a million German soldiers to the brutal combat that would soon follow. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Hitler’s favorite general at the time, would leave the Mediterranean Theatre to over see the Atlantic Wall defenses in France for the expected Allied invasion.

Rommel, at the time, would state to a comrade that, “the war is as good as lost and hard times lay ahead.”

The Battle of Anzio was incredibly brutal and would cost thousands of Allied and German lives as well as the lives of Italian civilians. Anzio is a small town on the west coast of Italy on the Tyrrhenian Sea about thirty miles south of Rome. In the early morning hours of January 22, 1944, Allied troops of Fifth Army came ashore along a fifteen-mile stretch of Italian beach near the prewar resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno. The Allied landings could not have been carried out any better. German resistance was so light that British and American forces gained their first day’s objectives by noon, moving three to four miles inland by dark.

The local German commanders were surprised by the landings. They had been assured by their superiors that an amphibious assault would not take place during January or February. Within a week, the Allies would consolidate their positions and achieve a minor breakout from the beachhead. The Germans began to gather troops to eliminate what Hitler would call the “Anzio abscess.” The fighting over the next four months, on the Italian peninsula, would be some of the most savage of the war.

Agreeing the operation

The Anzio operation had been shelved on December 18, 1943, due to the fact that Anzio was too far ahead of the front to guarantee a swift overland hookup with the isolated vulnerable beachhead. However, changes of the command structure in the Mediterranean theatre would soon lead to the operation being revived. General Dwight Eisenhower would relinquish command of Allied forces in the Mediterranean to British General Sir Henry M. Wilson in January 1944. Eisenhower would become Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord, the cross-channel invasion of France. Under Wilson the Anzio plan would be resurrected with the influence of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill playing a large roll. Despite their differences on certain aspects of strategy, both the Americans and the British were united in the hope that Italy, the weaker of the Axis partners, could be forced out of the war. 

Anzio was not only within striking distance of Rome, the ultimate prize, but was also within range of Allied aircraft operating out of Naples. One week before the landings at Anzio, the Allied Fifth Army made up of U.S., British, and French units would mount an offensive on the German Gustav defensive position in the area of Cassino and plan to link up with the forces at Anzio for the drive on Rome. In the meantime, Allied forces of the Eighth Army were to break through on the Adriatic front or at least tie down German forces to prevent them from being sent to Anzio.

General Mark Clark had chosen Major General John P. Lucas, U.S. Army Commander of Fifth Army’s VI Corps to lead the Anzio invasion. Lucas’s orders were to divert enemy strength from the south in anticipation of a violent enemy reaction requiring defensive positions. Secondly, he was to move toward the Alban Hills for a link-up with the remainder of Fifth Army on D + 7. Clark became increasingly pessimistic about the British plan and the feasibility of the overall Anzio operation. The notion that the troops landing at Anzio could take and hold the Alban Hills so soon after the landing, as part of the British plan, seemed overly optimistic. Under the circumstances, the best that Clark could tell Lucas was to be flexible, leaving the decision about how far and how fast to move VI Corps up to him.

The landings at Anzio would be protected by Allied air and naval forces. There were approximately 2,600 Allied aircraft available to provide close air support for the invading forces and to destroy enemy airfields and hinder communications. The naval flotilla assigned to support the landings was designated Task Force 81, commanded by U.S. Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry. The task force was made up of over 250 combat-loaded vessels and amphibious craft of all sizes and descriptions. 

The German Forces in the Mediterranean were led by air force officer, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring who had arrived in Rome in December 1941. He had been a founding member of the Luftwaffe prior to receiving the rank of Field Marshal. The exact German reaction to the landing at Anzio was, of course, impossible to predict. The only thing that was known for certain was that the German response would be swift and brutal.

Start of the invasion

The Anzio invasion began at 2:00 A.M. on January 22, 1944, and achieved, General Lucas would recall, one of the most complete surprises in military history. The Germans had already sent their reserves south to counter the Allied attacks on the Garigliano River on January 18, leaving a nine- mile- wide stretch of the Anzio beach defended by a single company. The first waves of Allied troops moved rapidly inland. All VI Corps objectives had been taken by noon as Allied air forces flew 1,200 sorties in and around the beachhead. By midnight over 36,000 troops and 3,200 vehicles, over 90% of the invasion force, was ashore.

Allied units would continue to push over the next few days against scattered but increasing German resistance. Allied forces would capture the town of Aprilia on January 25. The Allied drive created a huge bulge in enemy lines but did not completely breakout of the beachhead. The Third Division commander, Major General Lucian Truscott, on orders from the corps commander, ordered a halt to the offensive which turned into a reorganization of the beachhead forces between January 26 and 29. During this time the materiel buildup would continue despite German air and artillery harassment. During this time the number of Allied troops on the beachhead increased to over 60,000.

In response to the landings, Kesselring would send elements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads leading north from the Alban Hills. Hitler would send additional forces from Yugoslavia, France, and Germany. By the end of D-Day thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite delays caused by Allied air attacks. The German commanders were astonished that Allied forces had not taken immediate advantage of the unopposed landings. 

General Lucas now planned a two-pronged attack for January 30. One to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna and the second was a move northeast up the Albano Road, break through the Campoleone salient, and exploit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A link-up with Fifth Army in the south was still believed possible.

Driving forward?

The initial Allied attack on Cisterna would be carried out by Ranger Battalions under Colonel William O. Darby. Unknown to the Americans, their assault was aimed at the center of an area occupied by thirty-six enemy battalions massing for the February 1 counterattack.

The Rangers would get within 800 yards of Cisterna, when the Germans discovered the advancing lightly armed Rangers armed with only grenades and bazookas for anti-tank weapons. They attempted a fighting withdrawal but were mercilessly cut down. Of 767 men in the two battalions, only 6 would survive.

In spite of the disaster involving the Rangers, some progress was made by 3rd Division units against a much stronger enemy. But by nightfall on January 31, the Americans were still a mile from the village. It became apparent that the Americans were not going to capture Cisterna, and that new German units were arriving in the Anzio area. On orders from Clark and Lucas, Truscott was ordered to dig in.

The other prong of the Allied attack resulted in the Allies reaching Campoleone and penetrating the German main line. But the exhausted Allied troops were unable to exploit their success causing their drive to come to a halt, as a German counterattack began on February 3-4 at Campoleone salient. British forces held but were then ordered to retreat a distance of about 2.5 miles. Lucas then ordered Allied troops to form a beachhead defense line which was to be held at all costs. The Germans would continue their attack off and on until February 22. The offensive would be halted by Allied air power, naval gunfire, and artillery. The VI Corps would go over to the offensive and re-take some lost ground.

On February 29 the Germans resumed the offensive directed at the U.S. 3d Division in the Cisterna sector. General Truscott who had replaced General Lucas as VI Corps commander would substantially reinforce his defensive position. The Germans would continue to seek a breakthrough without any success. A final German assault would fail on March 4.

Following the collapse of the German drive, a three-month lull would begin. Both armies would limit their operations to defending the positions they held at the beginning of March. The VI Corps would reorganize and regroup bringing its full strength to 90,000 men in six divisions.

Supply problems at Anzio, originally one of the main concerns of the Allies would never reach a crisis point. LSTs would begin bringing loaded trucks to Anzio every day, fifteen smaller vessels arrived each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty Ships delivered heavy equipment. Between January 22 and June 1, over 531,511 long tons of supplies arrived at Anzio.

Operations in the spring

On May 5 General Clark would give General Truscott orders for a new Allied offensive code-named BUFFALO. Units from Anzio were to cut Highway 6, the main German line of retreat and trap the enemy forces retreating north through the Liri Valley. The operational concept had been dictated to Clark from Alexander, but Clark had little faith in the plan succeeding. Clark felt the British had received too much credit for Allied gains thus far. Clark wanted Fifth Army to have the honor of liberating Rome. He told Truscott to be ready at any moment during the breakout to swing north toward Rome.

On the night of May 11-12, Fifth and Eighth Armies launched their long- awaited attack against the Gustav Line but initially achieved little success. However, the Germans would abandon Monte Cassino after a week of fighting against Polish forces and the French along with US II Corps and would finally succeed in breaking the Gustav Line. The II Corps would move toward the Anzio beachhead against weakening German resistance.

At 0545 on May 23 an artillery barrage opened on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry attacks along the entire line from Cassino to the Mussolini Canal. Although enemy resistance was very stiff, but by evening the Allied forces had breached the main line of resistance. The next day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna. The town would fall on May 25. On the same day the II and VI Corps would complete their juncture causing the beachhead to cease to exist.

Meanwhile, the breakout in the west was proving very costly to the VI Corps, taking over 4,000 casualties in the first five days of the offensive. In the meantime, elements of Fifth Army joined in the pursuit of German forces falling back on Rome. American forces would liberate the Italian capital on June 4, 1944.

In perspective

The Anzio campaign has always been controversial from the time it was conceived. General Lucas had stated before the landing that he had always considered it a gamble. He maintained that under the circumstances the Anzio forces accomplished all that could have been realistically expected. However, some of Lucas’s critics maintain that a more aggressive commander such as Patton or Truscott could have obtained the goals of the landings with a bold offensive. Yet the campaign did achieve a number of goals including the eventual liberation of Rome.

What do you think of the Battle of Anzio? Let us know below.

Now read William’s article on World War II’s 1943 Trident conference here.

Bibliography

1.     Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

2.     Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001).

3.     Clayton D. Laurie, Anzio 1944 – United States Army Center of Military History.

4.     John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed, The Oxford Companion to American Military History ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

5.     Correlli Barnett, Hitler’s Generals (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989).

The Modern Greek State: 1898–1913 – Glory Days

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece. This article covers the period from 1898 and 1913 and looks at what happed in Crete, the Greek political, and scene, the Balkan Wars, and how ultimately it was a positive period for Greece. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here and part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here.

A lithograph of the Battle of Yenidje/Giannitsa in the First Balkan War.

The story narrated so far for Greece is not unique. (Papageorgiou, History Is Now Magazine, 2021) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) By the turn of the 20th century, all modern Balkan countries (Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) had suffered indebtedness and political instability, and the maneuvering of the great powers restricted their foreign policy options. The governments of all three were committed to schemes of territorial expansion, but the restraining influences of disorganized armies, chaotic public finances and great power pressure inhibited them. Only through cooperation with one another could they realize their expansionist dreams.  The cooperation process culminated to the inferno of the first and second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Greeks, these were good wars. (Glenny, 2012)

I. Introduction

Cooperation between the Balkan States was not easy. Under the guiding hand of Bismarck, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 subordinated all interests and demands of the Balkan States to three expanding spheres of interest – Austro-Hungarian, Russian and British. This created confusion and resentment in many parts of the Balkans. Especially Bulgaria was reduced from 176,000 square kilometers, after the Treaty of San Stefano, to just 96,000 square kilometers. Serbia’s westwards expansion was also blocked. Thus, they both turned their expansionist ambitions south to Macedonia, claimed also by Greece.

Things became more complicated when in 1885 Bulgaria, violating the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Eastern Rumelia, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Powers accepted the outcome of the Bulgarian intervention. The Serbian king Milan Obrenović knew that the annexation gave Bulgaria an important strategic advantage in the impending struggle for Macedonia. He saw the treaty violation as an opportunity to test his new standing army and attacked Bulgaria but was thoroughly defeated. 

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the victory over the Serbs and with Greece bankrupt, distracted by the Cretan Revolt and finally defeated by the Ottomans in 1897, Bulgaria had indeed an important strategic advantage in Macedonia at the eve of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the realization of the Bulgarian threat by the Ottomans and internal divisions among the Bulgarian parastatal organizations which, like in Greece, were coordinating foreign policy led to a significant decrease of the Slavic influence in Macedonia immediately after the suppression of the Ilinden uprising in 1903. (wikipedia, 2021)

Indeed, Greek guerrillas, under the leadership of officers secretly sent by the government in Athens, used the opportunity and swept through western Macedonia restoring the Greek influence in the region. This renewed activity and the retreat of Bulgarian aspirations hastened a change in Serbian policy, too. Serbia would now be fighting for territorial influence not just against the Greeks and Bulgarians, but also against the Ottomans and Albanians. The situation was so complicated that, at various times, the struggle for Macedonia pitted Slav against Slav (Bulgarians against Serbs); Slav against Hellene (Bulgarians against Greeks); Slav against Muslim (Serbs or Bulgarians against Ottomans or Albanians); Hellene against Muslim (Greeks against Turks or Albanians); and Muslim against Muslim (Ottomans against Albanians). The situation calmed after the Young Turks revolution of 1908, which, in its early stages at least, rejected the path of nationalism and created hope for peaceful coexistence among the different ethnicities in Macedonia. (Glenny, 2012)

The successes in Macedonia restored the confidence of the Greek officer’s corps after the debacle in the 1897 war. The army blamed the Crown Prince Constantine for the defeat against the Turks and the politicians for Greece’s chronic lack of preparedness for war. In August 1909 an army conspiracy, the Military League, launched a successful coup d’etat. This did not aim at the overthrow of the monarchy or the establishment of a junta. The officers involved exercised pressure on the new government from behind the scenes to provide for the necessary restructuring of the army and the obliteration of the influence of the palace on it. They also invited Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan rebel politician outside the old political establishment to lead the effort. (Glenny, 2012) (Malesis, 2018)

II Eleftherios Venizelos

In Crete

Venizelos was born in Mournies, a part of the city of Chania, in Crete in 1864, the year of the first territorial expansion of modern Greece to the Ionian Islands. His father Kiriakos, a merchant, was involved in the local social and political developments and was often prosecuted by the Turkish authorities during the frequent Cretan revolts. Thus, Venizelos spent part of his early life in exile. 

His father was granted amnesty in 1872 and returned to Chania, where he successfully set up his business and provided for the best preparation of Eleftherios as merchant. The latter complied at first, but later managed to convince his father to study law in Athens, where he developed his interest for politics. He also became involved with chieftains and veterans of the island’s revolutions and exiles because of them, who, together with his compatriot students, constituted the core of the Cretan irredentism in the Greek capital. He develops intense activity and soon becomes a leading figure among them.

By the time that Venizelos returned to Chania to practise law in 1887, apart from the respect of the Cretans in Athens, he had the good fame of his father, who died four years earlier, and the help of Kostas Mitsotakis, a local politician and husband of one of his sisters (he had four as well as a younger brother) to rely on for the advancement of his political carrier. He also proved to be an excellent lawyer, which added to his fame and financial comfort.

Thus, it came to no-one’s surprise, when in 1889, he was elected to the Cretan Assembly, a representation body of the semi-autonomous state granted to the island by the Pact of Chalepa in 1878. (wikipedia, 2020) This first tenure did not last long though. A few days after the elections, the old political establishment, proposed the declaration of unification with Greece. Venizelos, as well as the Greek government, immediately realized the dangers of yet another premature revolt and worked to establish a climate of appeasement and moderation. To no avail. The Turks crushed the new revolt and declared martial law. The Pact of Chalepa was no more and Venizelos found himself in Athens once more, this time as an exile.   

His exile does not last long. In April 1890 he returns to Chania, after general amnesty was granted, and in December 1891 he marries his wife, Maria. His happiness does not last long though. After the birth of his second son, in November 1894, his wife died. At the same time Crete was going through one of the worst periods of its history. The martial law and Turkish terror were casting a dark shadow over the island. The Cretan reaction comes with another revolt in May 1896. Venizelos feared a repetition of the harsh measures of 1889 and was against it. The international condemnation of the Hamidian massacres (wikipedia, 2021) though and the pressure exercised by the Great Powers to the Sultan did not allow for a similar reaction. Thus, the movement was successful in forcing the sultan to commit himself for the restoration of the privileges of the Pact of Chalepa.  

Venizelos was not hesitant to get involved in another revolt though, when the sultan did not honour his commitment. Not only as a politician but also as front-line fighter. This is the crisis that culminated to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. Although Venizelos was in line with Trikoupis’ approach that foreign policy should be dictated by the national centre and supported unification with Greece, he did not hesitate to disagree with the Greek government after the Greek defeat and opt for the more realistic solution of Cretan autonomy under the condition that the Turkish army withdrew from the island. His insistency and the clumsy handling of the situation by the Turks, with irregulars attacking British forces, resulted not only to Crete’s autonomy, but also to the appointment of the Greek king’s second born prince George as high commissioner. 

In December 1898 prince George arrived in Chania. He claimed excessive powers for himself, and Venizelos supported him as a strong executive authority was necessary for the rebuilt of the devastated island. He also served for two years as minister of justice in the cabinet of the prince demonstrating significant legislative work. Cooperation did not last long though. Venizelos believed that the main aim should be full Cretan autonomy and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ armies from the island, which, in effect, occupied it. Prince George on the other hand was unsuccessfully trying to convince the Powers to accept the unification of the island with the Greek kingdom. When the commissioner used suppressive measures to settle the differences with the politician, Venizelos revolted. 

The centre of the revolt was at Therisos, near Chania, where Venizelos and his supporters declared the unification of Crete with Greece on the 11th of March 1905. This was an attempt to turn the tables as any reaction from the prince would be an act against his own diplomacy that far. In any case, it was the reaction of the foreign armies on the island that would decide the outcome of the revolt. Eventually, Venizelos found himself in a tough spot, but, preferring a realistic approach instead of a fight to the end, he managed to exploit the differences between the Great Powers and by mid-summer managed to achieve: amnesty for himself and his supporters, the establishment of Cretan militia and withdrawal of the Powers’ armies from the island, a loan for the Cretan autonomous state, provisions for the settlement of important pending issues with the Turks, revision of the Cretan constitution. The Greek king would have the right to nominate the high commissioner, but his suggestion was subject to the approval of the Powers. King George decided to withdraw his son and substitute him with former prime minister Alexandros Zaimis. The Powers accepted. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Thus, by 1905 Venizelos had two revolts on his account and a major clash with the royal dynasty and the political establishment supporting it in mainland Greece. No wonder that the officers of the Military League considered him the ideal candidate for the premiership a few years later.

In the Greek political scene

In the elections of the 8th of August 1910 Venizelos was voted member of the Greek parliament for the first time in his career. Contrary to might be expected of him, he did not accept the premiership offered by the Military League. He pointed out that the army officers had committed a serious political mistake: They revolted against the old political establishment and the crown and after gaining control of the situation they trusted the same establishment with the reorganization of the state. Instead, he proposed a compromise: A revision of the constitution of 1864 to introduce the necessary reforms, after which the Military League would dissolve itself. Nevertheless, material provisions of the constitution and especially that concerning the form of government would remain untouched. The crown was safe. Venizelos’ stance served for an improvement of his relations with the palace, especially with king George.

After the king’s invitation to implement the compromise he suggested, Venizelos formed his first government on the 6th of October 1910. But, although the parliament elected in August included 122 independent members, the majority was still with the old parties and Venizelos was not willing to become ‘prisoner’ of this majority. Thus, he convinced the king to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections on the 28th of November. The leaders of the old parties considered this a constitutional coup and decided to abstain from the upcoming elections. As a result, Venizelos’ newly formed Liberal Party won an overwhelming majority of 307 out of 362 seats. 87% of the new MPs were elected for the first time. 

The revision of the constitution introduced important novelties such as a new regime for the expropriation of land, the establishment permanence for the civil servants, compulsory and free elementary education and a ban on the election of army officers as members of parliament. The goal was to address chronic problems of the state like the oppression of the landless, clientism and army interventions in politics. Venizelos actually retained the ministry of the army for himself, and significant compromises were made here. He took as his adjutant the pro-royal captain Ioannis Metaxas, the later dictator during the interwar period in the 1930s, and most importantly restored the crown prince Constantine at the head of the army in June 1911. The reason behind these compromises was the avoidance of an internal front as Venizelos’ concern during this period was the country’s foreign policy. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Nevertheless, he ensured public support with the elections of March 1912 by winning again with an overwhelming majority against the united opposition this time.

Preparation for war

In February 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed a defence agreement and two months later a military pact for common action against the Turks regarding their claims in Macedonia. Venizelos actively pursued Greece’s participation to the alliance but was at first met with reservation from the Bulgarian side. (Malesis, 2018) Nevertheless, the Slavs had no navy and Greece was necessary to restrict the capacity of the Turkish fleet to move freely in the Aegean. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) As far as the Greek army was concerned though, after Greece’s defeat in 1897 and considering its financial problems, it was estimated that it counted far below those of the other Balkan States. (Glenny, 2012) Knowing this, Venizelos did not insist on any settlement of the division of the potential territorial gains in Macedonia during the negotiations. Thus, finally Bulgaria felt comfortable to accept Greece in the alliance in May 1912. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Bulgaria completely underestimated the capacity of the Greek army. The international financial control after 1897 helped tiding up the country’s finances and the surpluses of 1910 and 1911 together with loan take outs in the same period created an abundance of cash for the Greek state at the eve of the war. (Kostis, The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day, 2018) Actually, the reorganization effort started in 1904 already with the establishment of the National Defence Fund by the government of George Theotokis. From 1904 till 1912 214 million drachmas were spent on armaments of which 50% during the last two years, when Venizelos came to power. For comparison, the national GDP in 1910-11 was 282.28 drachmas per capita (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) , whereas the legendary armoured cruiser Averof (Carr, 2014) cost 24 million drachmas. Venizelos also materialized the decision of Stefanos Dragoumis’ government in 1910 to invite, following a demand of the Military League, French and British officers to undertake the training of the army and navy. The French mission under general Eydoux arrived in January and the English mission under admiral Tufnell in May 1911.

During this preparation period Venizelos faced the opposition’s criticism that once again preferred the old ‘wait and see’ tactic determined by public opinion and possible political cost. The palace and general staff were also not pleased with the invitation of the Anglo-French military missions as the crown prince and his officers were trained in Germany and admired the Prussian military tradition. Nevertheless, Venizelos was determined to pursue an active participation to the upcoming war and did not hesitate, against the public opinion, to refuse the admission of Cretan representatives to the Greek parliament in May 1912 that might have triggered a reaction form the Great Powers (and the Turks) that at this point were split regarding their policies in the region and could not undertake coordinated action to prevent the war. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars commenced on the 8th of October 1912, when tiny Montenegro, the fourth member of the Balkan alliance, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Five days later an ultimatum issued by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia was delivered to the Turks, demanding such an extensive number of reforms in favour of the Christian populations of the empire that could not be accepted. Their declaration of war followed on the 17th of October. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Military operations lasted only 10 weeks, but the numbers of combatants involved were huge. The Bulgarians mobilized a full 25% of their male population, just under 500,000 men. (Glenny, 2012) The Greeks and Serbs fielded about 200,000 men each and this at a time when their population was less than 3 million. (Malesis, 2018) The Turks were about 350,000. 200,000 combatants, excluding civilians, were killed. The vast massacres of the soon to come First World War relegated the social and economic impact of the Balkan Wars to the penny place. But those who witnessed or participated in them were given a unique insight into what the 20thcentury had in store for the world. (Glenny, 2012)

During the first phase of the war (First Balkan War) the Turks had just come out of a war with Italy and were obliged to fight in four different fronts: against the Bulgarians in Thrace; against the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia; against the Serbs and Montenegrins in northern Albania (I refer to modern Albania, as this state did not exist at the time of the Balkan Wars) and Kosovo; and against the Greeks in Epirus. (Glenny, 2012) The Greek army made significant gains in southern Epirus, setting the city of Ioannina under siege, and in western and central Macedonia, taking Thessaloniki, after winning the race to the city over the Bulgarians. The Greek navy was proved predominant in the Aegean by blocking the naval transport of Turkish troops from Asia Minor to the different fronts and freed all occupied islands. At the same time the rest of the Balkan Allies neutralized almost every pocket of resistance in Europe stopping only 40 km from Constantinople. Thus, soon the Turks reached for an armistice which was signed with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins in December. The Greeks retained a state of war as Ioannina was still under siege and they also needed to continue controlling the movements of the Turkish fleet in the Aegean. (Klapsis, 2019)   

At the conference of London, in December 1912, the Great Powers tried to regain the initiative in the Balkans with their ambassadors discussing separately from those of the war parts. Nevertheless, Sofia, Athens and Belgrade were no longer prepared to bow to the strategic requirements of the Great Powers. (Glenny, 2012) Furthermore, the Treaty of London, signed in May 1913, although it confirmed the drastic reduction of the Turkish possessions in Europe, contained no specific provisions for the definition of the new borders in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. The incorporation of a new Albanian state complicated things even more.(Klapsis, 2019) It was time for the Balkan states to settle the differences among themselves. 

Meanwhile, Greece, still in a state of war with the Turks, had taken Ioannina and advanced into northern Epirus, before the Treaty of London was signed. Bulgaria, overemphasizing the contribution of its army during the hostilities, was by no means willing to accept any conventional ratification of the status quo after the First Balkan War. (Klapsis, 2019) Realizing the danger, Venizelos turned to Serbia for the formation of a common front against their former ally. The Serbs accepted but demanded that the Greco - Serbian Defensive Treaty includes also mutual support in the case of an Austrian attack against Serbia now that the latter’s ambition on the Adriatic were restricted by the Italo – Austrian push for an Albanian state in the region. Although the Germanophile crown prince Constantine was against this development, later to play a crucial role for the Greek participation to the First World War, the Treaty was signed on the 1st of June 1913. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

The Second Balkan War commenced in mid-June with a sudden Bulgarian attack against Greece and Serbia. After few initial successes, the Bulgarian army was thoroughly defeated by the combined armies of Greece and Serbia (supported also by the Montenegrins). Taking advantage of the situation Romania also entered the war occupying Dobruja in northern Bulgaria. The Turks also retook Adrianople from the Bulgarians. The final settlement took place on Balkan ground with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. For Greece the result was astonishing. The gains in Epirus, west and central Macedonia were supplemented by eastern Macedonia till the port city Kavala. In Bucharest, Crete was also finally ceded to Greece that occupied also the islands of north - eastern Aegean, although their fate was to be decided by the Powers at a later point. Within a year the frightened and despised Greece of the past doubled its territory (from 63,211 to 120,308 square kilometres) whereas its population increased by 80% (from 2.6 to 4.7 million people). (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

III Conclusion

Greece’s expansion before 1912 was rather coincidental. The Ionian islands came as a ‘dowry’ to the new king George in 1864. The annexation of Thessaly was also the result of serendipitous international relations in 1881. It was actually lost to Turkey after the defeat of 1897 and was luckily granted back to Greece, together with the right to appoint the high commissioner in Crete, because of the power play between the Great Powers that the Greek government could barely influence. 

At the beginning of the 20th century things were different. Greece was actively pursuing international alliances. It did not hesitate to change sides when the national interest and not have public opinion dictating it. It capitalized on the painful cumulative growth it had experienced since its establishment and combining military action with diplomacy achieved its greatest triumph to this day. As it was noted ‘For the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Greece was fighting and winning without patrons’. (Kostis, History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State, 2018) (Mavrogordatos, 2015) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017)

Nevertheless, despite Venizelos’ criticism to the Military League that it tried to push reform using the old establishment, he worked with the same establishment. It was probably necessary in view of the imminent developments and the need for internal peace. By restoring the crown prince at the head of the army and pro-royal officers at the general staff though, he revived a power system that the Military League meant to neutralize. Already during the Balkan wars there was significant friction between the politician and the commander in chief regarding the appropriate strategy. The disagreement for the race to Thessaloniki in 1912 (supported by Venizelos) against an advance to Monastir (supported by Constantine) or that on signing the agreement with the Serbs, before the Second Balkan War, are typical examples. King George, who, within a few months, tasted all the joy that was deprived of him during the humiliations of the past, was able to mediate successfully between the two. But in March 1913 he was murdered in Thessaloniki by a paranoid person, according to the official version. It has been commented though that the murder came in handy for the ‘German factor’. (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) Constantine was now not only at the head of the army but at the head of the state, too.

In short, this was undoubtedly a triumphant period for Greece. But the seeds for another catastrophe to come had also been planted.

What do you think of these years in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References                                                                                                     

Carr, J. (2014). R.H.N.S. Averof, Thunder in the Aegean. Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Klapsis, A. (2019). Politics and Diplomacy of the Greek National Completion 1821-1923. Athens: Pedio (in Greek).

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Kostis, K. (2018). The Wealth of Greece, The Greek economy from the Balkan Wars till this day. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Malesis, D. (2018). '... let the Revolution Begin' Great Idea & the Army in the 19th Century. Athens: Asinis (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, May 16). History Is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/5/16/the-modern-greek-state-1827-1862-a-bad-start#.YLe-yqFRVPY

Wikipedia. (2020). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Halepa

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilinden%E2%80%93Preobrazhenie_Uprising

Wikipedia. (2021). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamidian_massacres

Charles de Gaulle: The French Leader’s Divided Legacy

Charles de Gaulle’s impact on French history and the world history cannot denied. However, de Gaulle had his detractors and supporters on both ends of the political aisles. During World War II his actions often strained his relationships with the other Allied Powers. His actions and decisions during the Algerian War of Independence left polarizing legacies that are felt to this day. Lastly de Gaulle’s actions in 1967 in Canada would nearly lead to its dissolution.  Charles de Gaulle was the epitome of the Volte-Face or two faced leader of Europe.  

Daniel Boustead explains.

French President Charles de Gaulle with US President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

World War II

In World War II, Charles de Gaulle started to show his divisive ways by undermining the Allied political and military leadership. On one hand de Gaulle (after fleeing France after the 1940 German invasion) portrayed himself as the embodiment of the French nation, a modern-day male Joan of Arc who would lead the fight against the Nazis and their Vichy hirelings and thus restore France to its rightful place and greatness ([1]).  On the other hand according to French historian Francois Kersody, de Gaulle seemed to be permanently involved in a two-front war: “a public war against Vichy and the Germans, and a private war against the British Admiralty, the British Air Ministry, the British War Office, the British Intelligence Service, the British Foreign Office, the British Prime Minister, the U.S. State Department, and the President of the United States”. The British and the Americans viewed de Gaulle as a useful ally but also as a source of much consternation because of his prima donna behavior, incredible ego, and arrogance. On June 18, 1940, during a radio broadcast, de Gaulle gave the French people hope and issued an appeal to French servicemen to fight against the Nazis. However, his sense of ego, arrogance, and vain glory would always come to the forefront.  After the Allied Landings in North Africa in 1942 to 1943, he was particularly worried that Great Britain would take over France’s colonial role in the Levant. Once, when asked for his opinion about Charles de Gaulle, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill mused: “If I regard de Gaulle as a great man? He is selfish, he is arrogant, he believes he is the center of the world. He… You are quite right. He is a great man” (1). In May 1943 when de Gaulle (before departing London) to set up his headquarters in Algiers de Gaulle said goodbye to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Eden asked, “Do you know you have given us more difficulty than all our European Allies?” to which de Gaulle answered “I have no doubt of it. France is a great power.”(1) Once when Winston Churchill blamed de Gaulle right in front of him for his stubbornness, de Gaulle replied in a moment of naked candor “I am too poor to bow” (1). De Gaulle could not afford to compromise, as he did not have anything to compromise with. This stubbornness (according to author Jonathan Fenby) was “bordering on the irrational”(1). 

American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw Charles de Gaulle as a dictator type saying, “There is no man in which I have less confidence”(1). In fact, FDR wanted to replace de Gaulle as leader of the Free French with General Henri Giraud, but Giraud was politically inept and lacked popular support. So, as a result of this the Anglo-Americans were stuck with de Gaulle. After the June 6, 1944, D-Day Normandy invasion FDR had wanted to place France under military administration, but typically de Gaulle presented the Allies with a fait accompli by immediately setting up his own administration in Baujeau. In August 1944 when the French Resistance engaged in an insurrection which forced General Dwight David Eisenhower to liberate the city rather than bypass it, General de Gaulle ordered French General Leclerc to rush his tanks to Paris, making it look like the French had liberated themselves. To the Allies he was both a useful ally and a prima donna and who was also difficult as a partner. 

Algerian War of Independence

The Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962 would not only bring Charles de Gaulle back into political and military power but also into controversy over his actions. On May 30, 1958, Charles de Gaulle agreed to form a government and then on June 1, 1958, he presented himself to the National Assembly of France as Prime Minister ([2]). On June 4, 1958, de Gaulle visited Algeria and General Raoul Salan introduced him by saying “Our Great cry of joy and hope has been heard”, which was followed by a loud cheering for de Gaulle for three minutes ([3]). However, it was as de Gaulle was giving this speech at the Government General building in Algiers Algeria, there was an apartment building in which an unrepentant Petainist member belonging to the French Army’s splinter group of Ultras, had a rifle with a telescopic sight ready to kill de Gaulle (3). The reason this man wanted to kill de Gaulle was that he believed (along with his splinter group) that de Gaulle was going to abandon Algeria. This was the first of some 30 assassination attempts on de Gaulle’s life. This first one failed because the assassin listened to the rest of de Gaulle’s speech and abandoned his attempt to kill him.

In time de Gaulle would create many enemies over his Algeria policies. In October 1958 he told General Massu and other army officers in the Committee of Public Safety to withdraw from the organization (which was subsequently stood down altogether) ([4]). De Gaulle also issued an order to General Raoul Salan in October 1958 that said, “The moment has come when the military must cease to take any part in any organization with a political character”(4). This order enraged the “ultras” in the military, but it was followed anyway. In a devastating blow in December 1958, a one -time de Gaulle supporter General Raoul Salan (who was Commander in Chief of the French Army in Algeria and de facto civil governor of Algeria) was sent into a “gilded retreat” as a military governor of Paris by order of de Gaulle. Salan viewed the appointment as an insult.

On January 8, 1959, he became the first President of the Fifth French Republic ([5]). In September 1959 de Gaulle made an announcement in support of Algerian “self determination”. De Gaulle also made three speeches that were in favor of Algerian independence in lead up to the January 8, 1961 successful referendum offering Algerians several options, including self government. On April, 20 1961 there was a failed French Army General Putsch against de Gaulle’s Pro-Algerian independence policies that lasted until April 27, 1961 ([6]). From September 5, 1961, de Gaulle announced that his negotiations with the Algerian FLN Resistance group would no longer insist on maintaining French sovereignty over the Sahara. De Gaulle officially explained his actions towards Algeria in terms of the “inevitability” of independence, and as part of “the process of decolonization”. Furthermore, de Gaulle simply did not believe Algerian Muslim people were French (5). As de Gaulle exclaimed to French General Marie-Paul Allard in 1959, “You cannot possibly consider that one day an Arab, a Muslim, could be the equal of a Frenchman” (5). On July 3, 1962, Algeria declared its independence from France ([7]). The consequence of Algeria’s independence was that France assimilated one million Pied Noirs (Black Feet), the European settlers and Jewish people who once lived in Algeria ([8]). To Algerian Muslims, de Gaulle caved into their demands for independence, while some segments of the Pied Noirs viewed de Gaulle as a traitor for giving up Algeria.  

Canada

Charles de Gaulle’s actions in Canada would lead to subsequent events that almost split up Canada. On July 24, 1967, de Gaulle visited Montreal, Quebec and stood on the balcony of Montreal City Hall and shouted during a speech “Vive le Quebec libre” or “Long Live Free Quebec” to a crowd bellow (9). The result of the speech gave an international voice to Quebec’s burgeoning sovereigntist or separatist movement and caused a diplomatic incident. In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle’s speech Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson criticized de Gaulle’s speech saying de Gaulle’s “statements were unacceptable to the Canadian people” (9). After he gave the legendary speech he skipped his planned events in Ottawa, Canada and returned to France early. Relations between Canada and France remained touchy for years. 

One prominent Quebec separatist who was directly impacted by de Gaulle’s speech was Rene Levesque, who was then a high-ranking Liberal member of Quebec’s National Assembly. Levesque wrote a letter to then ex- Quebec Premier Jean Lesage not long after de Gaulle ‘s visit and said de Gaulle’s message had provided a “formidable injection of pride”, “the best occasion we’ve ever had to break our isolation”(9). Rene Levesque then founded the Pro-Sovereigntist political party Parti Quebecois or PQ in November 1967. Rene Levesque vaulted the PQ to power in 1976, winning 71 seats out of the 110 seats in the Quebec parliament.

Since then, there have been two referendums in Quebec, with the second putting Canada on the brink of breaking up. In 1980 there was referendum in Quebec, in which 59% voted to remain part of Canada(10).  The Second Referendum in Quebec was held in 1995 in which 50% voted to remain in Canada and 49% voted to choose to follow a secessionist path (10). The impact of de Gaulle’s words that fateful 1967 speech still lingers in Quebec’s society (9). To the Quebecois Separatist Secessionist Sovereigntists, Charles de Gaulle is a hero who continues to inspire their ideals of an Independent Quebec, while to other Canadians, especially English-speaking Canadians, de Gaulle is a separatist instigator with no diplomatic tact who almost destroyed their country.  

Conclusion

Charles de Gaulle’s impact on the 20th and even 21st centuries was important. He provided decisive leadership to the French people during World War II, while managing to also butt heads with other Allied leaders. His decisions during the Algerian War resulted in the Algerian people’s demands for independence being realized. At the same he uprooted and alienated some segments of the Pied Noir population of Algeria. In Canada he is beloved by Quebecois separatist secessionists while other Canadians despise him because he wanted to rip apart their country. Charles de Gaulle left a truly polarizing legacy.

What do you think of Charles de Gaulle? Let us know below. And find out more about him here.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Bering, Henrik. “The Audacity of de Gaulle”. Policy Review of the Hoover Institution of Stanford University (February 1st, 2013): . Accessed on November 7th, 2021. https://www.hoover.org/research/audacity-de-gaulle . 

[2] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 298. 

[3] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 301. 

[4] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a  New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 309. 

[5] Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and The Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006.  74 to 75. 

[6] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962: With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 448 to 460. 

[7] Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and The Remaking of France. Ithaca: New York. Cornell University Press. 2006. 1. 

[8] Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962:With a New Preface. New York: New York. New York Review Books. 2006. 549. 

9 Bellemare, Andrea. CBC News . Last Posted or Modified or Updated on July 24th, 2017. Accessed on November 7th,2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/charles-de-gaulle-speech-50th-anniversary-1.4218130

10 Bryant, Nick. “Neverendum referendum: Voting on independence, Quebec-style”. Last Updated or Modified on  September 8th, 2014.  BBC News . Accessed on November 10th, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/magzine-29077213 . 

Poland in the Interwar Years: 1918 - 1939

Poland in the interwar years was relatively new to Europe as she had not been an independent country in her own right since 1772, having been previously absorbed into the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire.  Her reinstatement and Polish actions did little to peace or stability of post war Europe. As Europe moved closer to war in 1939 Britain was deciding whether to support Poland against Germany.  

Poland had behaved in ways that were largely indistinguishable from the likes of other neighboring totalitarian states. Could the West be confident in the Polish as an ally in the East? Was she worthy and secondly was she at scrutiny really any better than the other authoritarian European states like the USSR or Germany?

Stephen Prout explains.

Members of the Polish Army's 2nd Death's Squadron during the 1918-21 Polish–Soviet War.

Poland and the First World War

During the Great War Poland was part of Austrian-Hungarian Empire and so fought on the side of the Central Powers, technically by default Poland was part of the enemy forces. After the war all belligerents lost territory through various treaties. Poland, however had gained territory but she would not be satisfied with her initial spoils.

Whilst the war raged, Pilsudski formed the Polish Legions to assist the Central Powers defeat Russia and gain a favorable light with her Austrian masters to pave the first steps toward full independence. According to Prit Buttar, "At the beginning of the war, Pilsudski committed his forces to support the Austro-Hungarian cause, believing that Poland's best chance for independence lay in a victory of the Central Powers over Russia” however in the event of the Central Powers being defeated he secretly in in overtures to the west assured them would that he would never fight against them. However, other promising plans were afoot offered by Germany and Austria that the Polish were keen to keep simmering so in the meantime, Poland’s loyalties were with the central powers.

The Central Powers defeated Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceased hostilities. Germany and Austria-Hungary then mooted the creation of a "Mittel Europa" which translated means Central Europe in November 1917. This promised a puppet state Kingdom of Poland. Just about when it seemed the Poles were about to have their independent state Germany was defeated, and it was time for Pilsudski to try his options with the West.

A New Republic and a return of warfare

Poland’s post-war frontiers were established by Lord Curzon in 1919 (the “Curzon Line”) out of the post war treaties. Poland then engaged in a series of overlapping wars that would expand her Eastern territory beyond the post war demarcations and create enmity amongst her new neighbors. She would be far from the peaceful state that a devastated Europe now needed.

These conflicts over the next few years would the cause for the growing discontent in the Eastern regions of Europe. Between 1919 to 1920, whilst the Soviet Union was in a chaotic state, Poland invaded former Russian territory annexing vast areas of Ukraine and Belarus. By the time these overlapping wars ended with the Treaty of Riga (1921) chunks of Lithuanian territory were added, which was further subsequently “legitimized” by a questionable election held in that country in 1922.

There were numerous motives; Poland wanted to incorporate Polish peoples into their new borders and more so to re-establish her pre-1772 glory.  The opportunity was ripe as the newly formed Soviet Union was distracted by internal strife whilst simultaneously the Western powers the fates of Germany and her colonies, Turkey, and the balance of power in the Middle East.

By the time the 1921 Treaty of Riga was signed Poland had extended further into Eastern Europe. Polish borders extended 160 miles east of where they were intended by the Curzon Line and added 52,000 square kilometers.  She had significantly grown her size – and the extent of her future problems.

The new Czechoslovakia would also be subject to territorial claims. In the Conference of Ambassadors in Belgium in August 1919 Poland received a portion of Cieszyn after a brief military clash. This would not be her last claim to Czech sovereign territory. In 1938 she would participate in the dismemberment of that country, taking advantage of the Munich conference and take the industrial town of Tesin as Germany took the remainder of that country.

Poland was clearly insatiable. Not being content with just European gains in 1935 she approached Britain and France to demand ten percent of Germany’s lost African colonies. It was strange in so much as she never had any presence colonial or otherwise in Africa. It was rejected by the West, as they already seized most of the territories for themselves. Why she set her sights on Africa was contended to be due to her growing anti-Semitism.

Anti-Semitism

Germany had cast the darkest shadow in the field of anti-Semitism, but other nations also held a complicit agenda against Jewish populations. Poland had the largest Jewish population in Europe and although her actions were not as violent as Germany, she instigated numerous laws that excluded the Jewish from many avenues of daily life. 

These laws were introduced from March 1937, the first aimed at the restriction of Jews entering the legal and medical professions (not dissimilar from Nazi efforts). Another followed placing restrictions on the slaughter and supply of kosher products, which would be devastating for Jewish businesses. In April of the following year likewise restrictions were applied to Jews joining the journalist profession.  

At the same time the government passed a Citizenship Law, which set rules to revoke Polish citizenship from anybody who had lived abroad in excess of five years and only having minimal contract with the Polish homeland.  Although it did not specifically reference the Jews it was engineered to discriminate against them.

The success of these measures could be evidenced within the education sector. In 1937 the number of Jewish Students in universities stood at 7.5%; where as ten years earlier the figure stood at 20.4%.

Support of these measure where also present amongst the clergy. A surviving comment by a Cardinal Hlond labeled the Jews as a “vanguard of atheism, bolshevism and revolution.”  The comment was so blatant as to label them an “evil influence” and advised his congregations “one does well to avoid Jewish shops”.

The lack of sympathy for the Jewish population was clear in their refusal to take in Jewish refugees expelled from Nazi Germany in October 1938.  The refusals by the Polish government consequently saw fifteen thousand Jews interned in appalling conditions in a border zone of Zbaszyn.  Their fate seemed marginally better than that of those remaining in Germany.  The anti-Semitic movement within Poland continued during the occupation not by the Nazis or Soviets alone but with some Polish collaboration.  

In 1937 Poland set up a commission (Lepecki Commission) jointly with France to investigate the feasibility of a scheme on the African Island of Madagascar to relocate their Jewish population - again expulsion of a similar a kind to the Nazi’s but expulsion all the same that has received little exposure. The idea failed.

Dealing with Danzig and Germany

In the following years Poland’s presence would be a bitter reminder for Germany over her lost Eastern borders and a sizable proportion of Germans peoples that found themselves under what they regarded as a foreign rule.  Danzig would be the focal point of these major issues. Polish treatment of the overwhelmingly German population would sour German-Polish relations. 

Danzig was a free city established in 1920 by the allies that occupied approximately two thousand square kilometers of territory. After Danzig’s new status became established Poland was given control of the commerce and development, which to the indigenous Germans was ominous itself.  Poland did not always exercise her administration well and this angered the majority German population who saw their identity being diluted.  Protests ensued and the Nazi Party began to gain support.

The German population was seeing Polish dominance with Polish letter boxes appearing, commerce controlled by the Poles and the presence of increasing numbers of their soldiers on the Westerplatte around Danzig.

Poland however could also accommodate the Nazis. By 1934 the Non-Aggression Pact eased tensions and Poland suppressed any anti-Nazi protests - and in return Germany curtailed the local Nazi Party’s actions. For the time being tensions eased but it would be short lived.

Alliances & Non-Aggression Pacts

Poland could form alliances with states considered abhorrent to the Western powers (Britain could also accommodate the dictators as well).  She signed two Non-Aggression Pacts with the Soviet Union (renewed again in 1934) and one with Germany in 1934.  At the same time, she had a nascent relationship with the West.  It could be perceived that she was once again hedging her bets by playing both sides.

Apart from Italy, Poland had shown the most aggressive and expansionist tendencies for much of the inter-war years. Britain and France really did not want to expend any more loss of life, especially in an area they had less interests.

Lord Halifax and Chamberlain were rightfully hesitant over offering any promises to Poland yet ultimately favored Poland more out of lack of choices in that region for a suitable eastern ally. The only reason to favor Poland was that if Germany had to watch her eastern borders there was less of her military resource to send westwards.  Poland seemed to be the only remaining choice after the USSR’s poor military performance in the 1920s and the detrimental effect of the purges on her military.

Conclusion

Britain ultimately leant to the side of Poland, but it took a lot of deliberation on the part of Chamberlain and Halifax, who harbored doubts - much to the dismay of the Polish. 

On balance, perhaps the British were justified.  Polish invasions and annexations into other European states up the eve of the war outweighed all other aggressive states other than Italy. This would cause the enmity of her neighbors and so create her own problems. The anti -Semitic laws that were passed, and Poland’s move to a dictatorship had many similarities to Germany. Poland it seemed could accommodate the Nazis and communists with separate non-aggression pacts when expedient, the very states that alarmed the West. 

Britain ultimately opted for Poland out of political expediency.  Britain was not averse to accommodating the dictator states either if her own interests needed serving though. Lord Halifax and Chamberlain still followed the appeasement policy as the nation wanted to avoid another war. However, they needed an Eastern ally for the containment of Germany, i.e., Poland or the USSR so there was less of Germany’s military resources to face Westwards.  Poland seemed to be the most viable choice.

The Western Powers throughout the interwar period were troubled by the prospect of Soviet expansion westwards. Poland could provide part of the answer, but Britain also did not want to be tied into any perilous obligations nor did she want to guarantee Polish borders. Some of those concerns were addressed by the presence of Nazi Germany as a strong bulwark and that combined with Poland as an additional eastern buffer effectively halted Bolshevik expansion. The Eastern problem looked as secure as it could be, at least until the autumn of 1939. 

The Polish question was not a straightforward one.  Britain had already sacrificed a democracy in ceding Czechoslovakia to Germany, much to the outrage of public opinion (the same public opinions that also did not want war and praised peace in our time).  It was a difficult and divisive time. The political landscape was an almost impossible one to navigate.

What do you think of Poland in the interwar years? Let us know below.

Now read Stephen’s article on Britain’s relationships with the European dictators in the interwar years here.

Sources

Origins of The Second World War – AJP Taylor

Europe Of the Dictators – Elizabeth Wiskeman – Harper Torchbooks 1966.

Article: Anti-Semitism in Interwar Europe: The cases of Poland and Hungary - Dr Marco Soddu

Article – Graham Stewart – Historical Notes – 1999 – Chamberlains motives for Standing by Poland

Anna Maria Ciencala – Polish Review – 2016 – University of Illinois

References also from Orgy OF Murder – Jan Gabowski I review by Ofer Aderet 2017 - Haaretz

Evidence of a JFK Murder Conspiracy? The Dictabelt Recording of the Kennedy Assassination

While the Kennedy assassination occurred some fifty-eight years ago, the case still galvanizes the American public. There remains a constant fight over the release of records pertaining to the assassination from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), QAnon supporters gathered on November 22nd 2021 to await JFK and JFK Jr.’s return, and Oliver Stone is in the process of releasing a new (and quite factually inaccurate) documentary on the Kennedy assassination.

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy still very much remains in the public consciousness and stimulates the minds of many. While the amount of persons who believe Kennedy was assassinated by way of conspiracy has decreased substantially, still nearly 25% of the American public believes there was a conspiracy of sorts, either with the CIA, the Italian-American Mafia, Castro’s Cuba, or the U.S. Armed Forces playing a role.

And one of the most definitive items of proof that conspiracy theorists provide comes from the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations.

Alan Cunningham explains.

President John F. Kennedy just before his assassination in Dallas, Texas, Friday, November 22, 1963. Also in the photo are Jackie Kennedy, Texas Governor John Connally and his wife, Nellie.

The Findings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations

The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) was an eleven-man committee created in 1976 amidst the aftermath of the Church and Pike Committees and intended to investigate “not only the assassination of Kennedy, but also that of Martin Luther King, Jr.”. In the HSCA’s final 1979 report, the Committee found that “scientific acoustical evidence established a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John f. Kennedy” while stipulating that additional “scientific evidence did not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President”.

To quote more simply from Encyclopædia Britannica, “a Dictabelt audio recording made from a Dallas motorcycle policeman’s microphone that was said to provide evidence of four shots—that is, three by Oswald and a fourth by another shooter. That fourth shot, a miss, was thought to have come from the grassy knoll. As a result of this acoustic evidence, the HSCA concluded that there had been two shooters and that the assassination was likely the product of a conspiracy”.

Interestingly, this was the only real delineation the HSCA’s final report made from the Warren Commission, which had investigated the Kennedy assassination and submitted their final report over a decade before. To quote from Encyclopædia Britannica, “…the HSCA’s findings were largely in line with those of the Warren Commission (including the conclusion that a shot by Oswald had killed the president and that a single bullet had hit both Kennedy and Connally)... The committee also concluded that neither any U.S. security or intelligence agencies (including the CIA) nor the government of Cuba or the Soviet Union had been involved. It did not rule out the involvement of organized crime or anti-Castro groups, but it could not prove it”.

For the most part, the HSCA made only one demarcation from the original Warren Commission and it came in their analysis and acceptance of the Dictabelt recording.

The Evidence for a Second Shooter

On November 22, 1963, the day Kennedy was killed, a dictabelt recording was made. For those younger readers who may be less attuned to such devices, a dictabelt was an analog audio recording device, which came about in the late 1940s and predominantly was used to take dictation.

Essentially, the dictabelt would use “a stylus to emboss a groove into flexible plastic belt, the groove being much like the groove in a phonograph record”. This video here explains the Dictabelt in far greater detail.

On the day in question, a Dictabelt recording was made of all radio traffic coming from Dallas Police Radio Channel 1, the ordinary radio channel used by the Dallas Police Department. Channel 2 was reserved for special events, which the presidential motorcade would be classified as and was recorded using a different audio device. The audio recording lasts for roughly five and a half minutes and begins at 12:20 pm, a minute before the assassination took place. The full audio can be found here.

According to Vincent Bugliosi in his mammoth book on the Kennedy assassination Reclaiming History, “…two acoustics experts from Queens College in New York, Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy [claimed] based on their mathematical computations and a static-filled Dallas police Dictabelt recording…they were able to discern, from “impulse sounds” and “echo pattern predictions,” that there was a “95 percent or better” probability that the fourth shot was fired from the grassy knoll, and hence, a conspiracy”.

This evidence for the HSCA to claim that Kennedy was assassinated by way of a conspiracy came from these audio recordings and these audio recordings alone. Prior to this, the Committee was effectively going to conclude that Lee Harvey Oswald had committed the act alone and even developed a draft of their final report. Four members of the Committee, Representatives Harold Saywer (R-MI), Robert Edgar (D-PA), Samuel Devine (R-OH), dissented to the final report with Sawyer even stating that the final report was based on “supposition upon supposition upon supposition”.

With this new evidence, the Committee entered into their report that President Kennedy was assassinated by way of a conspiracy. Today, the vast majority of Americans forget that the HSCA also affirmed that a single bullet struck both Governor Connally and the President, that Oswald had fired that round, that no signatory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community nor a Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) was involved in the assassination; the only thing that anyone takes away from the HSCA’s final report is that there was a conspiracy to kill the President.

For example, in one of the most notable (and historically inaccurate) films ever made, Oliver Stone’s 1991 picture JFK, a final title scroll reads, “A Congressional investigation from 1976-1979 found a “probable conspiracy” in the assassination of John F. Kennedy and recommended the Justice Department investigate further” while also detailing that the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not further investigate.

Most people remember the headlines, not the rest of the story. However, what gets left out of this story is the continued investigation of the Dictabelt recording by members of the U.S. government, news journalists, and scientific research based Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The Problems with the Conspiracy Claim

Almost immediately, the HSCA’s claim was met with sharp criticism from a wide array of fields and experts.

The DOJ, in spite of Stone’s JFK claiming otherwise, did investigate, commissioning a study from the National Academy of Science (NAS), a non-profit and NGO focusing on the advancement of various scientific fields in the United States. A panel of twelve physicists with a wide array of practical and academic experience in the fields of astrophysics, atomic physics, astronomy, and nuclear physics analyzed the audio recording and released their final report to the DOJ and the public in 1982.

Quoting from the NAS report, the twelve-man panel found unequivocally, “…the acoustic analyses do not demonstrate that there was a grassy knoll shot, and in particular there is no acoustic basis for the claim of 95% probability of such a shot. The acoustic impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot and the motorcade had been instructed to go to the hospital. Therefore, reliable acoustic data do not support a conclusion that there was a second gunman”.

In the succeeding decades, additional information has come out placing further doubt on the credibility of the Dictabelt recording.

As briefly mentioned before, one of the best books on the Kennedy assassination is Vincent Bugliosi’s work Reclaiming History, a 1,000+ page work that was an over twenty-year endeavor documenting the assassination, the Warren Commission investigation, and the many conspiracies that have arisen in the over fifty years since the event. Bugliosi mentions the Dictabelt at various points and, in many cases, interviews persons with extensive knowledge of the recording.

Bugliosi writes how the DOJ also conducted their own investigation into the audio, building off of the NAS’ report and, in 1988, disclosed to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary that they disagreed with the HSCA on the charge of a conspiracy. He also found that the FBI’s Technical Services Division completed their own report on the recording in 1980 and reached the conclusion that the Committee could not conclusively prove that the sounds heard on the recording were gunshots or even came from Dealey Plaza.

Bugliosi also interviewed the Dallas police officer who was allegedly driving the motorcycle from which the recording came from, H.B. McLain. McLain had testified to the Commission that his own radio had been stuck in the “on” position, allowing the audio to be recorded, yet had done so without listening to the audio in question.

Hearing the recording later, McLain informed Bugliosi that the recording’s movements did not match his own actions on November 22nd (McLain followed the presidential motorcade the entire time from Dealey Plaza to Parkland Hospital with sirens on the entire time while the recording appears to have sirens simply passing by). McLain also claimed that the motorcycle’s engine from the recording was from a three-wheeled motorcycle while he only ever drove a two-wheeled motorcycle.

Other discrepancies within the audio can be heard, such as noise from the crowd never being heard on the recording in spite of the fact that hundreds had come out to see Kennedy’s motorcade in Dallas and were making raucous noise throughout the procession.

In 2001, a rather important development occurred that, to some, seemed to vindicate the HSCA. Publishing in the peer-reviewed journal Science & Justice, Dr. Donald B. Thomas, an independent researcher of the Kennedy assassination and a research entomologist with the USDA’s Agriculture Research Service, claimed that the NAS study was flawed and that the HSCA’s original conclusion was in fact accurate. He writes, “The validity of acoustic evidence for a gunshot from the ‘Grassy Knoll’ was challenged on statistical grounds and on the basis of an anomaly on the Dallas police recordings. However, the assumptions underlying those criticisms were not in accord with evidence overlooked by the review panel. With a rigorous statistical analysis one arrives at a calculation for the probability that the recording contains a random pattern which by chance resembled the acoustic signature of a gunshot from the Grassy Knoll”.

This journal article prompted a re-investigation of the Dictabelt recording by various authorities and persons.

In 2003, multiple investigations were performed. Court TV commissioned an analysis by the signal analysis firm Sensimetrics, Inc. for a November episode of their program Forensic Files which “concluded that there is no valid evidence for gunshots on the Dallas Police Department (hereinafter DPD) recordings… the match between the suspect sound pattern on the DPD recording and a test shot fired from the grassy knoll, was no greater than expected to occur by chance”. After the episode premiered, Thomas wrote an article aiming to rebut the conclusions made by Sensimetrics and Court TV.

Also in 2003, Peter Jennings of ABC News, for the program Peter Jennings Reporting, analyzed the Dictabelt recording and came to the conclusion that the sounds recorded on the Dictabelt could not have come from Dealey Plaza and that H.B. McLain could not have been the originator of the recording as he had yet to enter the Plaza with the rest of the presidential motorcade. The reporting in this documentary also won the Edward R. Murrow Award for News Documentary in 2004.

Interestingly, some independent researchers have criticized both the NAS report and Thomas’ conclusions. Michael O’Dell, writing for The Kennedy Assassination blog in 2003 (the personal project of Associate Professor John Charles McAdams of Marquette University), concluded that the timeline both Thomas and the NAS relied upon was faulty while also finding that original claim of a “95 percent or better” probability that a shot came from the Grassy Knoll was logically unsound. In spite of this inaccuracy on the part of the NAS, O’Dell notes that, “Although the [NAS’] timeline is inaccurate, mostly due to the misunderstanding about the Audograph mechanics and missing the skips, the corrected timeline still supports their conclusionthat the impulses occurred after the shooting”.

Perhaps most significantly, many of the original investigators from the twelve-panel NAS report published their own article in response to Thomas’. In 2005, publishing in Science & Justice as well, five of the original twelve wrote, “We affirm the NRC conclusion “that the impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot and the motorcade had been instructed to go to the hospital.” We also show that if, instead, the HOLD synchronization is ignored and the “YOU . . . Stemmons” synchronization is used, the first sounds alleged to be from shots occur at least 30 s after the assassination” while also noting that Thomas’ analysis utilized “erroneous parts of the Committee’s analysis of the Bowles recordings and combined it with an erroneous implicit assumption…”.

Despite this, debate still raged on. In 2013, Professor Larry J. Sabato, Director of the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics and a Professor of Politics, commissioned an analysis of the Dictabelt recording, coming nearly fifty years after the assassination.

Utilizing various improvements in acoustical analysis and digital methods, Sabato’s commissioned team from Sonalysts, Inc. came to the overall conclusion “The evidence obtained suggests that the motorcycle was not part of the motorcade and therefore was not in a position to record the sounds of gunfire”. Expanding upon this in their conclusion, the team states, “These data uniformly indicate that the motorcycle with the open microphone was not part of the motorcade. Therefore, it is unlikely that the motorcycle was in a position to record the sounds of gunfire. Based on these observations, we conclude that the Dictabelt recording is not applicable to the identification of assassination gunfire”.

Conclusion

The Dictabelt recording has been analyzed again and again and again. Repeatedly, it has been shown that the Dictabelt recording has been inaccurate and scientifically incapable of proving a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. There are far too many inconsistencies for it to be utilized in any kind of argument. In fact, in 1986, there was a televised criminal trial put on by London Weekend Television in which Lee Harvey Oswald was tried for the murder of President Kennedy; Vincent Bugliosi played the role of the prosecutor (which would later inspire him to write the book Reclaiming History) and Wyoming based criminal defense attorney Gerry Spence representing Oswald.

Throughout the entire trial, Spence never once brought up the Dictabelt recording, as even he knew that utilizing this would damage his client’s case. This was even before the DOJ’s 1988 report in addition to the various scientific and investigative analyses performed with more advanced equipment in the 21st century. This to me is quite telling as Spence either knew the Texas jury would not be swayed by such evidence or would have no significant basis in having his client be freed.

To put it simply, the Dictabelt recording has been proven to have far too many inconsistencies for a criminal trial or for usage in determining the surrounding aspects of the assassination. Furthermore, even when combined with all of the additional forensic, documentary, eyewitness, and ballistic evidence the end result is the same; the only logically valid conclusion is that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting on his own, assassinated the President from the Texas Schoolbook Depository.

Various government commissions and committees, federal agencies, journalists, and historians have never been able to link a U.S. federal intelligence or law enforcement agency, the Italian-American mafia, the Johnson administration, Castro’s Cuba, the Soviet Union, or the U.S. Armed Forces to the assassination beyond circumstantial evidence. There has never been any conclusive, indisputable evidence put forth that shows a conspiracy or identifies another shooter or rifle used in the assassination.

The HSCA’s final report was written with the best of intentions, to examine the subject fully and try to either verify or refute the claims made by the Warren Commission. In the end, due to sensationalist and baselessly conspiratorial forces like Mark Lane, Oliver Stone, and L. Fletcher Prouty, the American public has gained a severely misinformed view of the assassination, which continues to cause problems for society and politics.

What do you think of the dictabelt recordings? Let us know below.

US Cold War Propaganda: The CIA's Ship for Radio Broadcasts to Albania in the Early Cold War - Part 1

The US had a variety of ways to influence citizens behind the ‘iron curtain’ during the Cold War. One of those was radio broadcasts. Here, Richard Cummings, author of a recent book Cold War Frequencies (Amazon US | Amazon UK), explains how the CIA got a vessel ready to broadcast in Albania in the early 1950s.

A 1980s Radio Tirana badge. Source: Rugxula, available here.

The best-laid schemes of mice and men

Go often askew,

And leave us nothing but grief and pain,

For promised joy!

From the Poem by Robert Burns, in modern English.

Introduction

The Voice of America began broadcasting to Albania in May 1943; the broadcasts were interrupted in 1945 and resumed in May 1951. Radio Free Europe began broadcasting from Munich on June 1, 1951 and stopped on September 30, 1953.

The June 30, 1953, report from the President's Committee on International Information Activities defined early Cold War white, gray, and black shortwave radio broadcasts as: 

·       White -- The first type consists of broadcasts made in the name of the American Government, such as the Voice of America programs, or by an overtly supported station such as RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)

·       Gray -- The second type includes broadcasts by stations that are overtly supported by unofficial American organizations but to which the Government gives covert financial Support. Such stations are Radio Liberation, supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., which now broadcasts to Soviet occupation troops in Germany and Austria and selected areas in the Soviet Union; Radio Free Europe (RFE), supported by the National Committee for a Free Europe, which broadcasts to the Soviet satellites; and until recently Radio Free Asia (RFA), supported by the Committee for Free Asia, which has now ceased broadcasts to Communist China

·       Black -- The last, or black, the category includes CIA-supported clandestine stations, which purported to speak for groups inside the satellite countries

In the late 1940s, the United States decided to stem Soviet underground subversive operations and create a new clandestine agency. This would have to be a new organization not to operate against the established clandestine collection of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks already assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). On June 18, 1948, the US National Security Council (NSC) directed that the task of confrontation with the Soviet Union clandestinely to a new Office of Special Projects – the name was changed later to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).

The NSC directive gave OPC,  "A loose charter to undertake the full range of covert activities incident to the conduct of secret political, psychological, and economic warfare together with direct preventive action (paramilitary activities)-all within the policy direction of the Departments of State and Defense." In October 1949, OPC planned to use a "sea-borne broadcast transmitter" to transmit recorded programs inland with "live spot" announcements.

Albania

It was planned to use a 1000-watt, medium wave transmitter to reach the largest audience in Albania by using a strong enough signal to overpower Radio Tirana's frequency: "It has been agreed that these broadcasts shall be based, for various technical, security, and political reasons, on a ship to cruise in and around the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. [T]his vessel with minor modifications can be converted into a floating broadcasting station capable of sending medium wave broadcasts into all points in Albania. It will be operated in a 100-mile arc at the end of a 300-mile radius from the farthest point to be covered in the country."

The decision to use a vessel carrying a medium wave transmitter was that there were, at that time, no OPC land-based transmitters in Italy or Greece. Medium wave broadcasts were chosen because of an estimate that of the approximately 50,000 radios in Albania, between 30,000 and 37,500 were medium-wave sets.  It was also estimated that 10,000 to 12,000 shortwave radios receivers were in Albania, owned mainly by Communist officials.

The idea was that the boat would be purchased in Britain. In November 1949, four prospective vessels were located, with one finally identified as being suitable enough for the operation. The cost of buying this vessel was $56,000 (circa $560,000 in 2021) and OPC was to pay for it. The British Intelligence Service (SIS) was to:

·       provide cover for the purchase, refit, and extended operation, plus

·       arrange for the transfer of the vessel's title and conceal the ownership through a cover owner

SIS was also to provide the crew and costs of refitting the boat for broadcasting and the operating costs were to be divided "fifty-fifty."

For some unknown reason, this project was not jointly pursued. In April 1950, OPC, using the outline of the British plan for Albania code-name VALUABLE, decided to seek a vessel in the United States to be put into operational use in August 1950.  The project was given the cryptonym BGSPEED, a subproject of the OPC Albanian country plan BGFIEND: "A country project to select, train, and infiltrate indigenous agents into Albania to effect and support resistance activities for the purpose of overthrowing the Communist-controlled government in Tirana." 

The requirements for this vessel included:

·       Ability to support a propaganda staff of five men in addition to a full complement of the crew

·       Ability to carry sufficient water, fuel, and food to remain on the station of the heel of Italy for at least twelve consecutive days with a full complement aboard, between return trips to Athens, Greece

·       Sufficient stock of engine parts and spares aboard to operate overseas independently for one year

·       Sufficient space aboard to permit installation of radio equipment and one compartment to be used as a recording and broadcasting studio

OPC decided to use a "yacht-type vessel" because it was:

a.     The more suitable for reasons of the flexibility of operation

b.     Private cover potentialities as viewed against commercial cover

c.      Height of masts in relationship to size for the accommodation of the radio broadcast antennae

The vessel

By May 1950, two yacht brokers were asked to locate an appropriate vessel. Three yachts were identified: one was in Acapulco, Mexico, one in Miami, Florida, and one in Gloucester, Massachusetts. OPC then used a cleared "cutout" for the purchase of the yacht.  The man already owned two yachts and bought and sold yachts for years.

The "cutout" was to be financed by OPC, receive the title to the yacht and deliver it to the Smith Boat Yard in Baltimore, Maryland, for refitting and conversion to include "decking, placing of copper sheathing on the hull, …broadcast studio, and other repairs necessary for extended operations."  The "cutout "owner then was to transfer the vessel to Panamanian registration. With an OPC security clearance, a Panamanian-licensed master named Leslie Holmes would then choose the crew. $150,000 ($1,500,000 in 2021)was budgeted for the purchase. 

After inspection of two of the vessels, the "motor sail /ketch" IRMAY was chosen as the most "adaptable from the point of view of broadcast requirements, maneuverability, accommodations for the crew and staff and can be outfitted in the least time and expense." The IRMAY was purchased for $80,000 (circa $880,000 equivalent in 2021).

The captain of the IRMAY and crew were experienced and reportedly were involved in several scientific expeditions in the Caribbean and South America.

The operational cover included the chartering of the vessel to a non-existent "Institute"-- the Marine Biological Research Institute (MBRI), Inc, which was incorporated in Maryland as a non-profit organization engaged in research of Marine biology. The Charter included in the articles of incorporation was:

To promote generally the accumulation, analysis, and dissemination of scientific knowledge in the field of Marine Biology by undertaking, sponsoring, participating in studies, research projects, and field expeditions in any part of the world – making loans and gifts for such purposes – and to make such knowledge available through articles, lectures, books, letters, motion pictures, etc. 

Four Directors of the "Institute" were listed, three of whom were pseudonyms.

Funding came from a "fictitious person purportedly of eccentric habits and keenly interested in this field of science." In reality, OPC's finance office sent a cashier's check to a Baltimore bank. Other cover activities included the printing of the letterheads, issue of bona fide stock to the Directors, chartering of the vessel (including the actual transfer of funds", and the establishment of a bank account in Baltimore for "Mediterranean Marine," through which funds to pay personnel aboard and to operate the vessel would be transferred regularly to a bank account. OPC hired a part-time trusted bookkeeper to keep "double-entry bookkeeping of both the overt and covert expenses.

The "Institute" also made a letter of endorsement to the Chief OPC officer on board the vessel, indicating that he was employed in "scientific explorations in the Mediterranean." 

Approval & Set-up

OPC Assistant Director for Policy Coordination Frank Wisner approved the project on June 14, 1950. However, he wrote this handwritten comment on the cover sheet: "This project has been approved, with much trepidation… I have seen this kind of thing tried twice during the last war with eventual project abandonment in each instance."

Final arrangements for the cover "Institute" were made. A lawyer in Baltimore was cleared to set up the articles of incorporation in the State of Maryland.  His office was listed as the official address of the "Institute" for any correspondence. Four Directors of the "Institute" were listed, three of whom were pseudonyms. The printing of the letterheads, issue of bona fide stock to the Directors, chartering of the vessel (including the actual transfer of funds", and the establishment of a bank account in Baltimore for "Mediterranean Marine," through which funds to pay personnel aboard and to operate the vessel would be transferred regularly to a bank account.

In June 1950, a joint Bulgarian-Albanian propaganda center was set up in Athens, Greece. The Albanian broadcasts were to be prepared there, based on a joint propaganda policy-directive approved with the British. However, the British were not involved on the operational level. One of the Athens central radio stations would transmit to the vessel a daily teletype broadcast of the next day's program. Spot broadcasts would be transcribed on the boat.

The IRMAY left Baltimore for Miami, Florida, in December 1950 with OPC engineering personnel on board. There were tests conducted of the medium (sky-wave) transmissions on the way. Rough seas off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, seasickness, and mechanical problems ensued, but the tests were generally positive. The conclusion: "It can be seen that there are no technical radio factors which might limit the effectiveness of BGGIEND project as originally planned."

While in Miami, Captain Holmes made an unknown security violation. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) became aware of the OPC connection to the IRMAY. The Miami office of the Bureau of Customs wanted to inspect the vessel, but OPC contacted the Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Customs with the request to stop the inspection. ADPC Frank Wisner sent a message to Navy Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens giving some details of the BGSPEED operation. Admiral Stevens, coincidently, would later become President of the American Committee for the Liberation of Bolshevism – the parent organization for Radio Liberty. Wisner promised Stevens and the Bureau of Customs that any future operations having any bearing on those agencies would be advised by OPC.

OPC decided to let Captain Holmes continue to hold his position until the first port of call in Europe when he would be replaced and returned to the United States, possibly to face prosecution.

In St. Thomas, American Virgin Islands, the name of the yacht was changed to "JUANITA," and the registry changed from the United States to Panama. JUANITA departed from Barbados on February 1, 1951, for Europe and arrived in Patras, Greece, on March 25, 1951.

What could go wrong?  A lot…

This article is based on Chapter 5 of Richard’s book: Cold War Frequencies: CIA Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, published in 2021 by McFarland & Co. Available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Now read part 2 on what happened during the catastrophic mission in Europe here.

Jacqueline Kennedy’s Influence on the Arts in America

In 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a powerful speech on the arts in America. But what is less known is that Kennedy’s speech was heavily influenced by his wife Jacqueline Kennedy. David Huff explains.

Jacqueline Kennedy in May 1962.

Art and history

On Saturday, October 26, 1963, President Kennedy gave a speech to the students at Amherst College as he dedicated a library named for the American poet Robert Frost, who died on Tuesday, January 29, 1963. The speech was rich, eclectic, and moving as he galvanized a generation of Americans not only to lead lives of civic commitment, but also to challenge the conventional power structure that existed in America at that time.

The speech is well known for its stirring statements in which the late-President issued a clarion call about the hope and possibility for American society. Kennedy, who was ahead of his time, spoke eloquently when he declared:

"I look forward to a great future for America, a future in which our country will match its military strength with our moral restraint, its wealth with our wisdom, its power with our purpose. I look forward to an America which will not be afraid of grace and beauty, which will protect the beauty of our natural environment, which will preserve the great old American houses and squares and parks of our national past, and which will build handsome and balanced cities for our future"

"I look forward to an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or statecraft. I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. And I look forward to an America, which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well. And I look forward to a world which will be safe not only for democracy and diversity but also for personal distinction."

Yet, Kennedy also issued a warning that is true today as it was in his time:

"And the nation which disdains the mission of art invites the fate of Robert Frost's hired man, the fate of having "nothing to look backward to with pride, and nothing to look forward to with hope."

Jacqueline Kennedy and the arts

In our contemporary society, we need to improve the growing differences that divide us as a civilization. The ongoing discussions and vitriolic debates regarding race, poverty, social unrest and economic disparity fail to provide a positive impetus for a consensus as to the course of action. Yet, many Americans do not realize that President Kennedy's innovative speech at Amherst was, in fact, influenced by the artistic mind-set of Mrs. Kennedy when she was first lady. Eclectic and forward thinking, she adopted as her mantra that successful civilizations can achieve a cultural renaissance by cultivating the reservoir of talent and individual ingenuity that resides within its people.  Mrs. Kennedy understood that other parts of the world, such as Europe, had implemented cultural policies not only to preserve their unique cultural heritage, but also to broaden public participation in cultural life. For example, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Britain are countries that promote an active cultural policy in their respective countries. Mrs. Kennedy believed that if these Western civilizations engaged in the improvement of the cultural and artistic fabric of their modern-day societies, America had the power to create a Department of Culture that would provide the basis for an educated exchange on the improvement of our own unique culture.

The creation of a culture department could help oversee the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, assist colleges with instituting and preserving arts management programs; and assist in the coordination of complex and myriad tasks that confront major artistic American centers and symphonies. In addition, a Department of Culture could conduct arts and cultural economy studies, develop cultural plans for neighborhoods or cities or towns that elevate eclectic cultural communities and assets, and allocate workforce investment and small business administration, and community economic development funds to arts and culture organizations. 

Furthermore, a culture department could work closely with major American music festival organizers - such as those at Aspen and Interlochen, the Tanglewood Music Festival, and the Wolftrap National Park for the Performing Arts - to encourage and assist young people, via corporate and privately sponsored scholarships, to study the performing arts.

The generous commitment of corporations, foundations, nonprofit groups, individual donors and others to invest time and resources in support of a department of culture would greatly benefit children and youth and provide the impetus for the kind of bold and creative synergy that the performing arts really need for continued growth and development in America. Prominent organizations, such as The Ford Foundation, The Catherine B. Reynolds Foundation, and The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation have demonstrated a keen interest in promoting and supporting arts organizations throughout the United States.

Lack of Artistic Willpower and It’s Consequences

Unless there is a concerted effort, however, on the part of government, corporations, private philanthropy, and grass-roots organizations, the political climate - and debate - concerning the arts is likely to get worse. Throughout our nation, politicians are cutting arts programs in the public schools and universities at both the state and federal level. In addition, artistic institutions, such as symphony orchestras, are struggling to survive due to a lack of corporate sponsorship and poor ticket sales. One might ask if poor ticket sales are a direct result of the decease in music and art programs in public education. As these programs have been the first to be cut in education over the past forty years, there goes any chance for children to gain knowledge and an appreciation for classical music and art.

Conclusion

The creation of a culture department in America is not quixotic, even in these turbulent times. In our multicultural society, the partnership between the government and corporations and individual philanthropy in sponsoring a department of culture would provide the engine for an infusion of creative, engaging and innovative ideas that will inspire people regardless of race, gender, and economic background to reach for something better. Artistic expressions would serve as a beacon of hope and promise in a world enveloped by skepticism and uncertainty. To those who suggest we cannot afford to implement a Department of Culture, I reply that America cannot afford not to do so. We have the funds to create a Department of Culture, we simply need to summon the will and self-discipline to raise the cultural bar in our country. The missing link, however, is the political willingness to embrace, to encourage a forward-thinking enterprise capable of creating a cultural renaissance in America. To that end, the American people - particularly the young - deserve a better society that benefits all of our citizens, not just a few.

What do you think of Jacqueline Kennedy and the arts? Let us know below.

David M. Huff was born in Wheeling, West Virginia in 1968. A violist, he studied with the Pittsburgh Youth Symphony Orchestra from 1983-1984. He attended the Interlochen Arts Festival and Interlochen Arts Academy from 1984-1986 and also participated in the Boston University Tanglewood Institute's Youth Program during the summer of 1986. He earned a B.A. in History from West Virginia University and an M.A. in History/Research from West Virginia University. He works in a Washington, DC International law firm as an Intellectual Property Trademark, Litigation, and Patent Specialist.

How the 1952 US Election Led to the Modern Election Campaign

The 1952 election was important for a number of reasons, with Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the first Republican president for two decades – but in many ways it was also the birth of the modern election campaign. Here, Victor Gamma looks at the story of how television commercials became a part of the campaign thanks to an advertising executive.

Eisenhower on the presidential campaign trail in Baltimore, September 1952.

In October 1952 millions of television viewers began seeing twenty to thirty-second advertising “spots” that appeared every hour between their favorite programs. Audiences were used to seeing ads, but this one was like nothing they had ever seen. The ad did not feature Lucky Strikes or some other product; it featured one of the candidates running for president that year. After the announcement “Eisenhower Answers America” blared into the living room, viewers watched the Republican candidate deliver short, simple answers to questions from average citizens. 

Many were appalled. Senate hearings, conventions and addresses had all been televised before, but this felt more like watching a commercial than observing a serious discussion about national issues. Television was for low-class entertainment. When the Eisenhower ads began running, Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, declared “I think the American people will be shocked by such contempt for their intelligence; this isn’t Ivory Soap versus Palmolive.”  In 1952 television was an uncertain element in the political landscape. That uncertainty, along with the contempt, would not last long. Beginning that year it would play such a significant role in American politics that, essentially, a run for the White House would soon become a glorified marketing campaign. Advertising people were now hired to help “sell” the candidate. These slick professionals would “handle” the campaign—at least the TV appearances. Politics had become a business. The results would forever affect everything from the way candidates were presented to the cost of campaigning, which would go from less than $20 millions in 1948 and rise steadily up to an incredible $260 million by 1972. 

The power of TV

The potential of television was first seen the previous year. On March 12, 1951 a political event was televised to a national audience for the first time. The occasion was the Senate Committee hearings on organized crime in New York. If the hearings had taken place just a year earlier not much would have happened, but since then the number of homes with television sets had skyrocketed. In New York 51% of homes now had a set. During the Senate hearings, people were not only glued to the television, they called their friends to tell them about it. Americans watched, mesmerized, as gangsters like Frank Costelo came under the harsh glare of questioning. At one point the camera focused on the Mafiosi’s hands, clearly revealing a frightened and guilty man. The mobsters in turn drummed nervously on the table, sweated, or tore pieces of paper to shreds. It was the stuff of Hollywood. The mob became the subject of conversation in households across America. LIfemagazine wrote, “Never before had the attention of the nation been so completely riveted on a single matter.” But an unexpected, and even more important result was that, overnight it catapulted the chairman of the hearings, Estes Kevauver, to national fame. The senator duly announced his candidacy for the White House shortly afterwards. The lesson was not lost on keen observers of the political scene: if the relatively bland and uncharismatic Kevauver could become an overnight celebrity with a shot at the presidency, what could be done with a candidate with more “star” quality? They were soon to find out - with the help of Madison Avenue. 

Rosser Reeve

By the time Rosser Reeve took his first stab at presidential politics, he was the most innovative and successful advertiser in the country. In his youth he left his native Virginia for New York to work in the advertising industry. After learning the ropes with a number of firms he co-founding Bates & Co. with Ted Bates and began to evolve an approach that would lay the foundation for ‘scientific’ advertising. His technique was simple, blunt, and amazingly successful. His ad for Anacin, for example, increased sales from $18 to $54 million in eighteen months. Sophistication and artistry were not a prominent feature of his ads. Many of them, in fact, have been called “the most hated commercials in television history.” But he knew how to sell a product. To be effective an ad had to stick relentlessly to a single theme, focusing on the essentials. Reeves invented a new term: unique selling proposition (USP) to describe his methods. The goal was to make a product stand out from the competition in a way that made sense to consumers. Reeves would find a simple, easily relatable concept and pound it into the head of potential buyers. For this he earned the nickname “The Prince of Hard Sell.” That was all well and good for Anacin, but could this same approach get a candidate elected? Reeves' first attempt took place in 1948.

That year Thomas Dewey was running for president against the incumbent, Harry Truman. Overwhelmingly, political pundits predicted an easy win for Dewey, Reeves was not so sure. He attempted to interest the Republican candidate in a series of campaign ads. He proposed to the nominee that they saturate the swing states in the two or three weeks before the election with short radio or television features that the industry called “spots.” Although the number of television sets in the nation was small, Reeves believed that the strategic use of well-crafted ads placed in critical states or counties could make the difference. The overconfident Dewey turned Reeves’ proposal down flat, “I don’t think it would be dignified,” the candidate remarked. The Republicans lost that November. Later research confirmed Reeves suspicion: the Republican contender had fallen short by just a handful of votes in a few key states.

1952

Four years later, in 1952, having been denied the White House for twenty years, the Republicans were desperate and this time it was Reeves who was asked to help with Eisenhower’s run against the Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson. Rosser’s chance had come. It took no time for the basic scheme to formulate in his mind; he would “package” Eisenhower just as he did his products; Eisenhower would be the unique item that television viewers needed and Stevenson would be brand X. Reeves understood the audience of the coming image-obsessed age: They would not sit still for a long speech. Instead of a thirty-minute speech by Eisenhower, (who was a mediocre speaker anyway) he would offer a mini drama. Viewers would see Eisenhower’s triumphant arrival, applauded by adoring citizens, some standing on chairs to see the conquering hero. Flags would be everywhere, and then shots of his proud wife Mamie, brief segments from his speech, more wildly cheering crowds, and then the hero’s equally dramatic departure. 

But it was another idea, the political spot that would have the greatest impact. The strategy was to deluge the public during the last three weeks of the campaign with short TV broadcasts called “Eisenhower Answers America.” The spots, lasting no more than thirty seconds, catered to a short attention span and did not appeal to depth of knowledge. The ads came straight out of a manual on marketing. To quote one of them;  “the art of penetrating a specific market with a high-density campaign and yet using a minimal amount of time and money.” In these spots, an average American citizen would be seen asking a question. The next scene would feature Eisenhower giving a short, pithy reply. Above all, the candidate would speak the language of the average person. But they would not waste money broadcasting them everywhere at once, they would concentrate on only the critical areas, forty-nine counties in twelve states, to be exact.

Spots

The whole scheme almost didn’t come off. When Reeves met with Eisenhower in the summer of 1952 to pitch his idea, the candidate at first resisted. The general failed to see how he could articulate his views in thirty seconds. But when the persuasive Reeves began to describe his television spot concept as “the essence of democracy,” Eisenhower capitulated. Reeves, now working with “Citizens for Eisenhower” set to work. His first task was to sharpen the candidate's image in the minds of the voters. He sat down with a stack of newspaper clippings of Eisenhower speeches and read through them. Ike’s speeches, like his entire campaign, tried to hit every target, like buckshot. There was no clear message. This was against every sound principle of advertising. The mind of the voters could only hold on to one, or at most three, simple messages. Focus on these and then you could hope to penetrate the hearts and minds of the people. Some protested that “you can’t say anything in a fifteen-second speech.” But the virtuoso adman would soon prove that “less is more.”  Reeves distilled three “selling points” from Eisenhower’s speeches: he would bring peace through strength, fight communism and clean up corruption. Nor would he have his candidate deliver lengthy orations like the brainy Stevenson. As Reeves later remarked, all anyone could remember of even the greatest speeches in American oratory were a handful of words like “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.” Next, with the help of Reader’s Digest and George Gallup, he conducted surveys of Americans' most prominent fears. Near the top of the list of worries were the issues of war and peace. He could now craft his TV spot to cater to those worries and come up with one, simple, effective slogan; “Eisenhower, Man of Peace.” “Time for a Change,” was the other slogan used. 

Now it was time to produce the spots. This proved easier said than done. First off, the Eisenhower campaign would only set aside one day for filming. Reeves had to reduce his vision of fifty spots down to twenty-two. The candidate himself presented a problem, too. In his earlier television appearances Eisenhower came across as wooden and clumsy. The lighting, which hadn’t adjusted for television yet, made him look old. They were working with very primitive equipment and a candidate uncomfortable with the whole process. Reeves wanted Eisenhower to appear without his glasses but the general could not read the prompter board. They adapted by creating a prompter with extra-large letters. Finally things began to click. The initially nervous Eisenhower began to warm up after the first few spots. Things were going so well, in fact, that Reeves coaxed an additional eighteen spots out of the candidate. Once Ike’s footage was complete, Radio City Music Hall was searched for anyone who looked and sounded like a typical American. They directed these “typical Americans” to ask questions that would fit with Eisenhower’s pre-recorded answers. To the television audience it would all look like the questions and answer sessions took place at the same time. The spots, at a cost of $1.5 million, were then to be strategically broadcast in the states that looked close. 

The spots start

Beginning in the second week of October, 1952, television viewers began to see the spot in which Eisenhower, looking directly at the camera, candidly fielded questions from ordinary Americans. One spot featured a frustrated woman who complained “You know what things cost today. High prices are driving me crazy!” Eisenhower answered, ‘Yes, my Mamie gets after me about the high cost of living. That’s another reason I say it’s time for a change. Time to get back to an honest dollar and an honest dollar's worth.” In another spot an anxious-looking man flanked by his wife asked “Mr Eisenhower, will we have to fight another war?” Eisenhower calmed his fears while at the same time getting in a jab at the Truman administration, “No, not if we have a sound program for peace. And I’ll add this; we won’t spend hundreds of billions and still not have enough tanks and planes for Korea.” The spots aired in a slot of time between popular shows, when viewership was high.  For the next three weeks, just as Rosser Reeves planned, millions of television viewers and radio listeners could not escape the hourly-broadcasted “Eisenhower Answers America.” 

Did Reeve’s experiment pass the ultimate test? We cannot credit the television spots too much. The word to describe their impact would be more “helpful” than “decisive.” For a variety of reasons, Eisenhower would most likely have won with or without “Eisenhower Answers America.” Additionally, television viewing of the campaigns was actually relatively low. The Republican Convention only achieved a 36 Hooper rating as opposed to a 62 recorded for I Love Lucy. Even during the height of the campaign, in October, a mere 15% of Americans heard either candidate on television.  The fact was, most of the television audience preferred to watch their favorite programs instead of the political ones. But the canny Reeves overcame that obstacle by running his political spots like ads, between popular shows. Viewers would see them whether they wanted to or not, just like a shampoo commercial. On the other hand, many non-voters and normally Democratic voters switched to Ike based on the commercials. They liked what they saw: a likeable, hard-hitting war hero who was down to earth and serious about solving the major problems of the day. It was not until the next election that television became truly critical, but those pioneering ads of 1952 laid the foundation. The possible dangers of the dominance of media advertising on politics were discussed even during the 1952 campaign. Charges of demagoguery and shallowness abounded. But regardless of the dire warnings of critics, the marriage of politics and Madison Avenue was here to stay. 

What do you think of the 1952 election commercials? Let us know below.

Now, read Victor’s series on whether it was right to topple William McKinley’s statue in Arcata, California here.

References

Halberstam, David, The Fifties. The Ballantine Publishing Group, 1993. 

Kathryn Cramer Brownell, "This Is How Presidential Campaign Ads First Got on TV." Time, August 30, 2016. (online article.) https://time.com/4471657/political-tv-ads-history/

Hollitz, John E. Eisenhower and the Admen: The Television "Spot" Campaign of 1952.”The Wisconsin Magazine of History. Vol. 66, No. 1 [Autumn, 1982], pp. 25-39 (15 pages)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4635688?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_cont   ents

“Eisenhower Answers America: The First Political Advertisements on American TV (1952)” Politics,Television | September 28th, 2012. http://www.openculture.com/2012/09/the_first_political_advertisements_on_tv_1952.html

Reeves, Rosser (1910-1984) Ad Age, September 15, 2003.https://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/reeves-rosser-1910-1984/98848

The U.S. and Great Britain: The Birth of The Special Relationship and the Navy 1928-30

We frequently hear about the long-standing “Special Relationship” between the United Stated and Great Britain. In the twentieth century, the two powers bonded closely even as one waxed and the other waned. One superpower replaced another—without armed conflict between them. Only this once has that happened. Peter Deane explains the basis of this relationship through naval agreements from 1928 to 1930.

Herbert Hoover’s inauguration in 1929.

When one considers the “Special Relationship”, one often thinks of Prime Minister (PM) Winston S. Churchill, who made famous the phrase after World War Two (WWII), and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. But the real start was in 1929, by President Herbert C. Hoover and Prime Minster J. Ramsey MacDonald. A brief window for foreign policy progress was open, before the Great Depression took hold, when the negotiations leading up to the London Naval Conference of 1930 (LNC) took place. Hoover’s motivations in particular were unsentimental, and neither man sought an alliance. From this distance, the LNC itself seems history trivia: a disarmament conference that did not prevent WWII. However, the Anglo-American negotiations leading up to it left a lasting peace. After 1929, the Empire and the Republic may have had friction, but never was there a question of hostility. As late as 1928 this was not true.

The Situation through 1928

The nineteenth century saw alternate Anglo-American cooperation and friction. The Empire and the Republic shared a common language and some history. In 1902 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty seemed to Americans to be directed at their new Pacific power. The British interdiction of neutral American trade with the Central Powers during World War One (WWI) was a potent source of hostility among some Americans, particularly within the United States Navy (USN). Naval policy was a primary reason that the USN role was to safeguard belligerent rights, better known as “freedom of the seas”; i.e., American shipping and commerce; i.e., the American economy. The Naval Act of 1916 authorized a Navy “second to none”, but not one particularly suited to war against Germany. All knew the U.S. could out-build any island empire. The U.S. entered WWI only after Germany became a greater hindrance to American shipping than was Britain. 

American entry into the Great War papered over the belligerent rights issue, as did post-War disillusionment among the victors. Pacifist sentiment among them in reaction to the War led to a round of agreements in 1921-1922 aimed at disarmament as a means of war prevention. Among them were the Four Power Treaty which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Washington Naval Treaty which formalized Anglo-American “parity” in capital ships. The post-War Empire simply did not have the resources to out build the Republic.

This predicament sat poorly with some Britons. Churchill wrote that while many thought an Anglo-American war was unthinkable, “everyone knows that is not true…. Evidently on the basis of American naval superiority, speciously disguised as parity, immense dangers overhang the future of the world.” Britain nevertheless enjoyed a merchant marine quintuple the size of the American, with accompanying commercial advantages and many of which vessels could be armed, along with a worldwide set of fueling stations. The American code name for such a war was “War Plan Red.” 

Anglo-American agreement on further naval limitation fell through in 1927 at a conference in Geneva. Many on both sides of the Atlantic felt that the collapse of the talks was due to domination of the talks by the respective naval staffs, who would not compromise. The next year an Anglo-French disarmament compromise was proposed, which primarily limited the class of naval vessels the USN valued most. (This was in part due to French concerns that an Anglo-American rapprochement would distract Britain from its ties with France.) President Calvin Coolidge pulled out of further disarmament talks and signed the Naval Construction Act of 1929 to build more of the non-treaty vessels. 

Rivalry had officially resumed. International consensus was that a multinational disarmament treaty required the Empire and the Republic to settle their naval competition first. 

But in 1928, a new President was elected, who endorsed not only the naval construction bill if it proved necessary, but also naval reduction (not just limitation) by treaty if possible. 

1929: The Statesmen

The new President later recorded in his Memoirs that among basic goals of his administration was: 

“Elimination of friction with Great Britain.

a.     By ending naval competition. 

b.     By ending British expansion of air and naval bases in the Western Hemisphere. 

c.     By settling one major conflict over freedom of the seas by immunizing food ships from submarine attack in time of war.” 

His Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, wrote of his own positions: “He inclined to place primary emphasis on the re-establishment of understanding with Great Britain; returning … to the Atlantic coast he had been shocked to find that anti-British sentiment had greatly increased…. Being himself a confirmed believer in the vital importance of firm Anglo-American friendship, he at once determined to make the repair of relations with Great Britain a cardinal objective…. The obvious first step was to reach agreement on naval limitation … but it was the restoration of understanding with Great Britain that he put first.”

The President was of Quaker upbringing and saw the proper role of the USN as defense of the Western Hemisphere. (The Philippines was to become independent.) The navy was adequate to the task as it was and could be reduced significantly, with much money saved—if Great Britain was amenable. American civilians saw war with Britain as unimaginable. Friction could only be eliminated by civilian leaders.

That same Spring, MacDonald became Prime Minister. He was felt to be something of an Americanophile. Both he and the Foreign Office wanted better relations with the United States and saw naval disarmament talks as the means to that end. 

1929: Preliminary Negotiations

Hoover started in March by making statements favoring disarmament. On April 22, Hugh S. Gibson, American ambassador to Belgium and previous disarmament negotiator, proposed that the U.S. was prepared to develop “a method of estimating equivalent naval values”, such that parity did not mean identicality. (This method was not specified.) Soon known as the “yardstick”, the proposal was received with enthusiasm in both nations—a breakthrough in the naval disarmament issue. “What is wanted,” Gibson concluded, “is a common-sense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means.” One British periodical called it an “American declaration of peace to Britain.” 

In May, Hoover sent as an informal emissary to MacDonald, a journalist named Edward P. Bell, to gauge his thoughts about the matter and relations more generally. These included a possible (unprecedented) visit by the PM to the U.S. for direct talks with the President. The reply Bell cabled to Hoover: “HAVE AUTHORITY MACDONALD STATE THAT IF YOU INVITE HIM VISIT YOU WASHINGTON CANVASS WHOLE QUESTION BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS HE WILL ACCEPT WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS.” 

Hoover was taken aback by the enthusiasm. On June 18, the newly-arrived American ambassador, Charles G. Dawes, gave a prominent speech in which he reiterated the principle of parity and civilian control of negotiations. Dawes was left with the details to negotiate. He and MacDonald did so over the following few months. By the fall, most issues had been agreed. The bulk of issues need to be resolved before MacDonald could visit, not least of all because the Americans wanted to be sure MacDonald would receive a friendly reception in America. 

At his point, Hoover had agreed to forgo the belligerent rights question broadly. That Summer, Macdonald agreed to “parity” according to the yet-to-be specified yardstick, over the objection of his Admiralty. These two concessions, although not linked by anyone at the time, made the deal that made the Special Relationship. It also eased the peaceful rise of the U.S. concurrent with the early decline of British power.

Why did Britain agree to parity? Great Britain was facing financial limits, in part due to the debts incurred to the U.S. for WWI. It could not afford an arms race with the United States and its seemingly endless resources.

1929: The Rapidan Conference

MacDonald’s reception in American cities proved warm and enthusiastic. His meeting with Hoover took place mostly at Hoover’s Rapidan, Maryland, fishing camp. MacDonald parried Hoover’s proposals for immunity for food ships (the Admiralty would not accept this at all)—they agreed this could be discussed after naval disarmament was settled. He declined Hoover’s offer to purchase British naval bases in the Caribbean Sea, including British Honduras, but the bases ceased to expand in subsequent years. They agreed on parity of naval forces and the use of the yardstick even if the yardstick was not fully defined. London was agreed as the setting for the next multinational Naval Disarmament Conference. 

Coverage of the Rapidan meeting generally eclipsed coverage of the October stock market crash. But the time when Hoover could concentrate on foreign affairs was coming to an end. 

1930: The LNC

From our perspective, the LNC was somewhat anticlimactic. The LNC was the last major world conference attended by ship, for the Americans the U.S.S. George Washington, the same vessel which took the Wilson delegation to the Versailles conference. Stimson led the U. S. delegation now, with another Cabinet Secretary—Charles Francis Adams III, Navy—and other members. The negotiators were civilians, not naval officers. Naval men were there as technical advisers only, unlike the failed 1927 meeting. The leading naval powers, Great Britain, the Japanese Empire and the U. S., achieved trilateral agreement on naval limitation as hoped. France and Italy could not agree and withdrew. 

The numbers and details of the London Naval Treaty are not important now. Its effect in Japan is beyond our scope here. But in both Britain and the U.S. it was considered a success and ratified that same year despite some naval opposition in both countries.

In perspective

Nineteen twenty-nine was a “hinge of history”. In the middle of the first half of the twentieth century, a deal was struck. That same half-century saw Germany twice fight violently to dominate Europe, only to founder on British opposition. One of the causes of WWI was the German Empire’s plan to achieve naval equality with the British, intolerable to the British. Yet the British Empire fifteen years later accepted parity, on paper, to the USN. Great Britain decided in this case that another war with the United States was not going to happen. 

This settlement was not without cost to either side. Both Britain and the U. S. were constrained in their potential responses to growing Japanese militarism and aggressiveness, and in their preparations for possible Pacific war. The U.S. quietly abandoned over a century of work in peace and war to preserve freedom of the seas, even merely limited to food ships. Great Britain made sacrifices which in retrospect hastened its decline as a naval power. 

Even the isolationism in the U.S. in the later nineteen-thirties, while a force among the American public, was not felt as antagonism at the highest levels of either nation. Hoover and MacDonald together had put hostility aside for good, and without fully realizing it.

What do you think of the period 1928-30 in Anglo-American relations? Let us know below.

Bibliography

Baer, G. W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 1993 (Chap. 6)

Dawes, C. G. Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain. New York, NY; The Macmillan Co., 1939 (Passim)

Ferrell, R. H. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1957 (Passim, esp. Chaps. 1-3 & 5)

Hagan, K. J. This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. New York, NY; The Free Press, 1991 (Chap. 9)

Hoover, H. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933. New York, NY; The Macmillan Co., 1952 (Chap. 45)

Jeansonne, G. The Life of Herbert Hoover: Fighting Quaker, 1928-1933. New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 (Chap. 7)

Maurer, J. H. and Bell, C. M., eds. At the Crossroads between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930. Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 2014 (Passim esp. Chaps. 0-2)

O’Connor, R. G. Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930. Lawrence, KA; University of Kansas Press, 1962 (Passim)

Roberts, A. “When Churchill Dissed America” Smithsonian Magazine, Nov. 2018

Stimson, H. L. and Bundy, McG. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York, NY; Harper Bros., 1947 (Chap. VII:2)

Wheeler, G. E. Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U. S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life. Washington, DC; Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1974 (Chap. IX)

The Japanese Yamato Battleship: Could it have been Decisive in World War 2?

The Japanese Army’s Yamato Class Battleship was an extremely powerful battleship that was launched during World War II. The battleship had incredibly powerful defenses, and had it been in use earlier it could possibly have impacted some key aspects of the war. Here, Daniel Boustead returns and considers its effectiveness, ‘what if’ scenarios, and how events turned against the battleship towards the end of the war.

Yamato battleship during trials in October 1941.

The Yamato Class Battleship was the most destructive ship ever constructed in history. The Yamato Class was created to fulfill a specific technological, strategic, and tactical goal. The technical information alone about the Yamato Class leads to the conclusion it could defeat any ship on the seas, and had events gone differently for the Japanese Military the Yamato Class could have been a game changer! The changing situation of the Pacific War ultimately doomed the Yamato Class ‘s fate - it could have helped Imperial Japan win the Pacific War had the military situation been different and had the battleship been deployed earlier.

The Yamato Class was designed to defeat a huge quantity of enemy naval forces.  According to historian and author James Holland, “The Japanese realized they couldn’t possibly hope to catch United States and Great Britain in terms of numbers of warships so the principle behind it was if we can’t get the numbers we will have a qualitative advantage. So, you build an enormous battleship that is basically the equivalent of two or three and which is capable of taking on multiple warships at any one time”([1]). 

The tactical and strategic role that the Yamato Class was built to fulfill was the Imperial Japanese Navy’s belief that the fate of an entire war would be determined by a great naval clash involving Battleships (2). This theory was supported by the Battle of Tsushima which occurred on May 27th -May 28th 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War. Like the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War the Imperial Japanese Navy thought, that the war against the United States Navy would be decided in a single great naval clash involving Battleships ([2]). The Imperial Japanese Navy felt that this decisive naval battle would occur after the Japanese military forces seized the Philippines. The U.S. Military would then mount a military campaign to retake their colony of the Philippines and the Imperial Japanese Navy would then decide to engage the United States Navy in a place somewhere in the western Pacific when they felt the time was right to stop the American advance to retake the Philippines. The Imperial Japanese military forces and their government also wanted to seize the oil and other natural resources of China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, Singapore, French Indochina, Brunei, and Burma. The Japanese Yamato Class was designed to both participate in this decisive struggle and sail across the vast Pacific Ocean.

Technologically advanced

The Yamato Class was a technological marvel that could wipe out any ship by its destructive firepower and was virtually impervious to any ship weapon. It was equipped with 18.1-inch Main Guns which could fire a 3,219 lbs. projectile at a rate of 1.5 rounds per minute (3). The range of Yamato Class’s main gun was 25 miles according to Battlefield historical archaeologist Dr. Tony Pollard (4). No other Battleship’s Main Gun has ever had a maximum range of this distance (5). 

The Yamato Class’s armor and other protection was unrivalled by any other Battleship. The total weight of the armor was 22,534 tons or 33.1% of the design displacement (6). The armored center section featured a main belt of just over 16 inches of armor inclined at 20 degrees, half of which was below the waterline. The lower armor belt was just under 11 inches in the magazines and 8 inches covering the machinery spaces. The ends of the armored citadel was covered by two transverse bulkheads that were covered by armor that was 11.8 inches thick. Deck armor was between 7.9 inches to 9.1 inches, which was thought to be capable of withstanding armor-piercing bombs of up to 2,200 lbs. dropped from 3,280 feet. The front of the barbettes was covered by 21.5 inches of armor plate with sides covered by 16 inches of armor, both specially hardened. The three main turrets had some 26 inches of armor on their face, 10 inches of armor on the sides, 9.5 inches of armor in the rear, and almost 11 inches of armor on the roofs. The conning tower was covered by a maximum of 19.7 inches of steel armor. A torpedo bulge was also fitted, which extended 9.25 feet from the main belt, from the waterline to the bottom of the ship. According to historian Mike Pavelec, Americans brought the Yamato’s 26.1 inches Turret Facing Steel Armor plate, which they found and recovered from a Japanese naval yard after World War II and ran a test on it (7). The conclusion from this test was that they were able only to penetrate the Turret Facing Armor at point blank range. This type of hit would never have occurred under wartime ocean warfare conditions. Therefore, the turret face armor of the Yamato was virtually impregnable. It would have been a suicide mission for any U.S. Battleship to engage the Yamato Class in combat.

American battleships

The American Battleships were thinly armored and outgunned by comparison to the Yamato Class Battleship. The Iowa Class Battleship was only equipped with a 16 inch Main Guns (8). The Armor on the Iowa Class Battleship was between 12 inches to 1.6 inches on the belt, armored deck was between 6 inches and 1.5 inches of armor, bulkheads were equipped with 11.3 inches of armor, and the main turrets were equipped with 19.7 inches of armor. It was considered the best American Battleship of World War II simply because it had a top speed of 33 knots. In contrast the Yamato Class only had a top speed of 27.5 knots (9) - although the Yamato Class could have still engaged and destroyed the Iowa Class Battleship as it was trying to run away because of the long range of its guns.  The reason for this is that the Iowa Class Battleship was so thinly armored.

What if?

The Japanese Military missed many opportunities to utilize the Yamato Class Battleship. It could have been a decisive war-winning weapon. Two examples of this were: Japanese airpower did not destroy two tank farms which contained millions of barrels of fuel oil and they did not destroy the indispensable ship-repair facilities during the Pearl Harbor Attack on December 7, 1941 (10). If the Japanese had destroyed the two tank farms and the ship-repair facilities at Pearl Harbor on that day, and then combined that with an air bombing and submarine shelling campaign led by the Yamato Class on the oil production facilities on the West Coast, and by a knockout sea and air strike on the Panama Canal, it would have crippled the USA’s ability to make war.  If the Japanese had commissioned the Yamato Class sooner, then they would have participated in this theoretical strike, and it would have made a decisive difference. Also, if the Japanese Military and Government had decided to both not attack Pearl Harbor and not invade the Philippines but decided to just focus on taking the British Colonies of Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies, then the American Isolationist political movement may well have prevented the USA from entering both the War in the Pacific and the War in Europe. Japan still would have succeeded in controlling most of Asia and had their decisive naval battle with the British - and not the Americans. However, all of this did not happen. The Yamato was not considered combat ready until May 27, 1942, and her sistership the Musashi was not commissioned until August 5, 1942 (11). By the time the Yamato Class entered combat the seeds for both the destruction of the Yamato Class and the Imperial Japanese Empire were being sealed.

Less effective?

The changing nature of warfare in the Pacific War ultimately doomed the Yamato Class. The Aircraft Carrier became the dominant and most effective weapon in the Pacific War. The effectiveness of the Aircraft Carrier was brutally demonstrated at such battles as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea. These and other such battles caused the Battleship’s influence to be substantially reduced. In addition, the appearance of American Fighter Planes such as the F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, P-38 Lightening, P-47 Thunderbolt, and the P-51 Mustang from the period of 1942 to 1945 marked the end of Japanese air supremacy in the Pacific. The fact that the Japanese no longer had air supremacy made the Yamato Class now very vulnerable to air attack. Lastly, in 1943 the Americans introduced a new explosive called Torpex, with twice the explosive power of TNT (12). This made the Yamato Class’s Anti-Torpedo defenses obsolete because the previous calculations of how much damage they could absorb was based on a warhead that was full of TNT and not Torpex (1). These factors would spell the destructive end of the Yamato Class. 

The sister ship of the Yamato, the Musashi, was sunk by American air power during the Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 24, 1944 (13). 1,376 Japanese survivors from the Musashi were rescued; however 1,023 Japanese sailors were lost during the American air attack (14). On April 7, 1945, the Yamato was sunk on its way to attack the American invasion off Okinawa (15). 3,063 Japanese sailors were lost during the American air attack on the Yamato, with only 269 survivors. The Americans losses during the air attack against the Yamato were ten aircraft and 12 aircrew.

No other battleship in history compares to the destructive power of the Yamato Class. The Yamato was created to meet the Imperial Japanese Navy’s need for a battleship to play a key role in their decisive battle strategy scenario. Unfortunately, the Yamato was not ready for Pearl Harbor.  The engineering marvel of the Yamato meant it could wipe out any ship opponent on the sea. If the Imperial Japanese Military had not made some fatal strategic miscalculations on the seas, then the Yamato Class would have been a war-winning weapon! However, this did not happen, and the advent of aircraft carrier warfare spelled an end to the Yamato Class. The Yamato was denied the chance of being a war-winning weapon because of military blunders committed by the Imperial Japanese Military. 

What do you think of the Yamato class battleship? Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

[1] Holland, James. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

[2] Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 12. 

3 Stille , Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 137. 

4 Pollard, Tony. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016.

5 Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons: Battleship Yamato. Darlow Smithson  Limited Productions.  PBS and National Geographic Channels International. 2016. 

6 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 133. 

7 Pavelec, Mike. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

8 Hewson, Robert. The World War II Warship Guide. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc. 2000. 44 to 45. 

9 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 141. 

10 Van Der Vat, Dan.  Introduction by Senator  McCain, John. Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy-An Illustrated History. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc. 2007. 138. 

11 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War.  New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 138. 

12 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 136. 

13 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 139 to 140. 

14 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 140. 

15 Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 141. 

References

Hewson, Robert. The World War II Warship Guide. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc.  2000. 

Holland, James. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016.

Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons: Battleship Yamato. Darlow Smithson Limited Productions. PBS and National Geographic Channels International. 2016. 

Pavelec, Mike. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

Pollard, Tony. “Battleship Yamato”. Nazi Mega Weapons: German Engineering in WW II: World War II Mega Weapons. PBS. 2016. 

Stille, Mark E. The Imperial Japanese Navy: In the Pacific War. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 

Van Der Vat, Dan. Introduction by Senator McCain, John. Pearl Harbor: The Day of Infamy-An Illustrated History. Edison: New Jersey. Chartwell Books, Inc, 2007.