The Polish Army’s World War 2 Bear Soldier

World War 2 has many unpleasant tales, but occasionally a tale isn’t so unpleasant. Here, Lior Bouchnik looks at how a bear came to be part of the Polish Army – and even helped in a major battle.

Wojtek the bear with a Polish soldier during World War II.

It all starts at the opening shot of the Second World War. 1939 - the invasion of Poland by Germany and the USSR and the following annexation left millions of formally Polish citizens under Soviet authority. In 1942, amid the deportation of thousands of Polish civilians, the Ander’s Army was formed, a common name for the Polish armed forces in the east. Ander’s army accompanied the deported Polish citizens to Iran which became a refugee camp that received up to 2,500 people per day, and in total 116,000.

On April 8, 1942, the Polish soldiers stationed in Iran brought with them was the 18-year-old niece of General Bolesław Długoszowski who persuaded her uncle to buy a small Syrian bear cub from a young Iranian boy. The boy claimed that he found the cub after the bear's mother was shot by hunters. The young cub accompanied the soldiers and was given the name Wojtek, an old Slavic name that loosely translates to “happy warrior”. The cub grew into a bear on the campaign and as he grew, he became more than just a mascot to the Polish soldiers. The cub learned to adapt as he lived among them, imitating their actions. Wojtek learned to salute and he even started standing on his hind legs and marching beside them. Wojtek also developed a love for drinking beer and eating cigarettes, but he would only eat lit ones otherwise he would refuse to consume them. He and the soldiers enjoyed wrestling together and on cold nights he would sleep with them.

Battle of Monte Cassino

Wojtek moved with the 22nd Artillery Supply Company all around the Middle East. First, they moved to Iraq then Syria, Palestine, and finally Egypt, and when it came time for his major contribution in the Battle of Monte Cassino, he weighed 90 kilograms (200 pounds). The Polish soldiers of the 2nd Polish Corps were tasked with joining the British 8th Army in the campaign to liberate Italy. By now Wojtek developed a close bond with his human companions, who treated him like a fellow soldier, and when they were told that the designated ship that was supposed to carry them to Italy forbade mascots and pets, they did what they felt was the only natural step. To account for his rations and transportation Wojtek was officially enlisted as a soldier. He was listed among the soldiers with his given name, he had his own serial number and pay book. He lived with the other soldiers in tents or in a special wooden crate, which was transported by truck.

In the 1944 Battle of Monte Cassino, Wojtek continued to showcase his learned behavior by helping his unit move heavy ammunition onto trucks. Wojtek helped the soldiers by carrying himself 45 kg (100 Ib) crates of 11 kg (25 Ib) artillery shells that normally required four men. Wojtek helped to speed up the loading process, and the positive effect on the soldier's morale did not go unnoticed. His efforts earned him a promotion to the rank of corporal. Wojtek was later immortalized by the 22nd Artillery Supply Company by becoming their official emblem, showcasing a depiction of a bear carrying an artillery shell.

After the war

 After the war in 1947, Wojtek was given to Edinburgh Zoo where he spent the rest of his life. He was often visited by his former Polish comrades who threw him cigarettes to eat like he used to do in their shared time in the army. Wojtek died on December 2, 1963, aged 21, weighing nearly 500 kg (1,100 pounds) and being over 1.8 m (5 ft 11 in) tall. Wojtek's legacy is one of family. In the war ridden world of the 1940s, Wojtek was much like the Polish soldiers who lost their homes, and what started as a mere amusement to the soldiers became real comradery. The Polish soldiers gave Wojtek a family and he returned the favor in equal measure, by boosting morale, by being one of them. In what must be one of the most unique stories of the war, soldiers found a true comrade who didn’t have a flag or a nation to fight for, just a group of Polish soldiers who became his only family.

Now read about the cat that survived 3 ships sinking during World War 2 here.

More from Lior can be found here.

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 2: July 1, Day 1

The Battle of Gettysburg has been described as a “meeting engagement”, meaning that the battle there was an accident, which was unplanned by the command on either side.  That the largest battle of the war originated from a desire for the acquisition of shoes for the Confederate troops seems preposterous, yet Maj Gen Henry Heth himself reported it that way in his official report on the campaign. But this isn’t the complete story: Lee had ordered his widely scattered army, which spanned from Chambersburg to Harrisburg, to converge at Cashtown & Gettysburg when he was informed by a spy on the evening of June 29th that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. Cashtown is located at the eastern base of South Mountain, about 8 miles from Gettysburg, and was selected as being close to his wagon-based supply line.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

If you missed it, part1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here.

John Buford, a Unionist who played a major role on day 1 at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Generals Heth & Pettigrew Move

We don’t know what Lee thought of Hill sending 2 of his 3 divisions into Gettysburg on July 1, a reconnaissance in force; he never said, but it seems inconsistent with his desire to ”not bring on a general engagement” until all of his troops were up. Lee knew he was outnumbered, and what he wanted ideally was to find an isolated Union army group to attack. But neither Buford nor Pettigrew was much surprised to find the other there in force on July 1. After all, they had seen and skirmished on June 30. If this was a meeting engagement from the standpoint of the army commanders, it was only because of a lack of communication with those who were there. Buford clearly understood: he knew the meaning of what he had seen the day before, and had informed his superior, Major General John F. Reynolds.

On the morning of July 1, Heth’s division marched down the Chambersburg Pike. If he and Pettigrew thought there might be Union troops on the road to town, their line of march wasn’t appropriate: there were no cavalry vedettes or other skirmishers in front. The troops were deployed in columns when they should have been deployed in line. While this kept the movement faster initially, it caused Pettigrew to continually redeploy his men into line to fight the Buford’s men on the flanks of his column. The front of the line was Pegram’s artillery, followed by Brig Gens Archer and Davis’ infantry brigades. This was another error since they were not the optimal front line to be deployed in an emergency. Moreover,  Archer’s brigade had sustained heavy casualties at Chancellorsville and was undersized, and Davis was the least experienced brigade in Hill’s Corps.

The first contact was with Union vedettes. Then they reached dismounted cavalry from the brigade commanded by Col William Gamble. At about 7:30 am, 3 miles outside of town near the McPherson barn, the first shots of the battle were fired. The First Shot Marker at the Wisler House is placed on the corner of Chambersburg Pike and Knoxlyn Road. Lt. Marcellus Jones fired the shot with a borrowed Sharps carbine.

Although this has been celebrated as the first shot for decades, it’s not exactly true. A union corporal is known to have been shot and killed in a skirmish earlier that morning. Corporal Cyrus James of the 9th New York Cavalry was killed on vidette duty at daybreak on the Hunterstown Road – east of the town. This is the exact opposite direction of the actual attack. He was killed in a skirmish with the Virginia 14th Cavalry. We know the time of 4:30 am for a fact since his horse dragged his body back into the town, creating a commotion.

John L. Burns, age 69, was the Constable of Gettysburg. After being arrested by General Early in his first pass through town he was released and then arrested by Confederate stragglers. At daybreak on July 1, he stopped the horse dragging Corporal James’s body in the street. Angered at the kerfuffle brewing in his quiet town, he volunteered to General Buford to fight at McPhersons Woods with the Iron Brigade. He received wounds in the arm, leg, and minor chest wounds after falling in with the 24th Michigan. He escaped capture by hiding his weapon and telling the Confederates he had been caught in the crossfire. He later became a national hero.

Buford

General Buford resisted the approach of two Confederate infantry brigades on the Chambersburg Pike until the nearest Union infantry, Reynolds' I Corps, began to arrive. His light cavalry held off more than twice their number of veteran Confederate infantry for 5 hours. In the morning alone, his two dismounted cavalry brigades held off two divisions of Hill’s Corps for 3 hours. Buford’s tactical strategy defined a covering force action, in which space is traded for time. Buford traded 3 ridges for the time for Reynolds and the First Corps to come up.

Having only enough strength to post one man per yard of ground, Buford instructed one of his brigades, under Colonel William Gamble, to dismount to impede the advance of A.P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps along the road from Cashtown. He deployed all 6 guns of Calef's battery (battery A, 2nd US) of Tidball's battalion. The guns were 3" ordinance rifles. Besides being prepared and in excellent defensive position, Buford’s men had weapons that gave his men an advantage: breech-loading carbines, which allowed a 2-3 times faster fire than muzzle-loaded rifles, although sometimes it is incorrectly stated they had multi-shot repeating carbines, they did not, as these only became available that Fall.

Reynolds rode out ahead of the 1st Division, met with Buford about 9 am, and then accompanied some of his soldiers, probably from Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade, into the fighting at Herbst's Woods.

Reynolds

General John Reynolds was the Union commander on the morning of July 1. President Lincoln had offered Reynolds command of the Union Army before Meade, but he had insisted on no political oversight if he accepted the position, which was rejected. Nevertheless, Meade respected and trusted him greatly, making him Left Wing Commander; which as fate would have it, is exactly where General Lee was congregating.

The Pipe Creek Circular was dated July 1, written early that morning well before the battle began. In it, Meade ordered his forces to start pulling back to this line to await Lee’s expected advance once Lee is found and begins his attack. George Meade had no intention of fighting in Pennsylvania on the eve of battle. That much is beyond dispute. On the morning of July 1, Pipe Creek was The Plan rather than a contingency. Meade intended to rest his forces where they were on July 1.

The night before the battle, both Reynolds and General OO Howard had received myriad reports by scouts, residents, and of course Buford the night before. Reynolds informed Meade at around midnight, whose headquarters was in Taneytown MD, of Hill massing apparently at Cashtown. Early in the morning of July 1, they received a response from Meade, giving them orders to advance to Gettysburg, and telling them that Longstreet was located around Chambersburg and Ewell near Carlisle. These were highly accurate intelligence reports, but they seemed to conflict with the Pipe Creek Circular. Whether or not Reynolds ever received that order isn’t known, nor do we understand how either general understood the two orders, one to advance and one to fall back simultaneously. Meade had given Reynolds, the man he had full confidence in, independence to do what he thought warranted. Reynolds commanded the 1st Corps and, as a wing commander, also had operational control of the 11th and 3rd Corps.

Buford is known to have pointed out Cemetery Ridge to Reynolds, the heights at the south part of town, as the best position ultimately for the Union defense. Reynolds ordered him to resist as long as possible to keep the Rebels out of the town. He then sent word to his Corps to hurry.  He sent couriers to Meade and his commanders about what was going on. We do know that the courier he sent to Meade, Captain Weld, did tell Meade that a stout defense was underway.

Reynolds had three options: Deploy into a defensive position near Emmitsburg, occupy the high ground south and southeast of Gettysburg, or occupy the ridges west of the town. Reynolds decided to place his corps on the march and ordered the other two corps to Gettysburg. Another possibility is that Reynolds was organizing a fighting retreat, the correct terminology being covering force action/advance guard operation, consistent with Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular.

Abner Doubleday

After Reynolds’ death, Major General Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer on the field, assumed command of the Union defenses at 10:50 am. Doubleday was at the front as division commander of the second infantry division on the field. For the next 5 hours, he defended the ridges west of Gettysburg as increasing numbers of Confederate soldiers appeared, eventually outnumbering him by about 16,000 to 9,500. The 1st Corps arrived in time to take over the fight from Buford and hold Confederate forces west of Gettysburg until late afternoon.

Reynolds’ death and Doubleday’s decision to make a stand west of Gettysburg scuttled Meade’s plan. It is entirely unknown if Reynolds had told him his orders; if he was aware that he was supposed to fight a covering action, he certainly never tried. If a planned withdrawal was the plan, it wasn’t communicated to Buford nor Doubleday, nor did they have any experience in undertaking this kind of maneuver. Gettysburg might have been simply the product of what transpired on the field and no one actually ordered it.

But where was the plan lost? Did Reynolds not convey to Doubleday the overall plan to move as a covering force action or was Doubleday unable to make this happen, or did he simply change the plan on the fly? We don’t know exactly what Reynolds thought Meade had ordered. Doubleday was quoted after the war as saying, ”It was General Reynolds’s intention to dispute the enemy’s advance, falling back, however, in case of a serious attack, to the ground already chosen at Emmitsburg” That, of course, was precisely what Meade instructed Reynolds to do.  

As infantry reinforcements arrived under Reynolds from the I Corps, Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed. The periodic arrival of Hill’s divisions on the Cashtown Pike, and then later on that morning on the more northerly Mummasburg Road required Buford and Doubleday to increasingly extend the Union line as Confederate infantry arrived. As Union troops entered from the south, they had to be routed to the constantly moving front. The roads go through town, so they needed to cross fields to bypass it and get to the place they were needed.

Fighting took place on both the north and south sides of Chambersburg Pike.  The intense fighting occurred on McPherson Ridge. North of the Pike, an unfinished railroad bed created three sections of depressed ground. To the south, fighting centered on Willoughby Run and Herbst or McPherson Woods. The main forces engaged were Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler's brigade opposed by brigades of James J Archer and Jefferson R Davis. Three of Cutler's regiments were positioned north of the Pike and two to the south. The Iron Brigade directly opposed Archer. The Union infantry forces were commanded by Maj Gen James J Wadsworth.

For a few hours, Confederate regiments entered the battlefield from the west and northwest, as Union troops arrived from the south and then moved west to the sound of the guns. Because of the roads and distances involved, there was a temporary advantage in number of troops for the Confederates. Fresh troops were sent to battle as they arrived, to face other troops that also just arrived. The arrival of Confederate units was dictated by the position that morning. Hill’s 2nd corps, under Heth and Rodes, were on the western roads, and they arrived in the morning from Chambersburg.

The Railroad Cut

The engagement at the railroad cut, an incomplete railway excavation near the McPherson farmhouse, witnessed a series of brutal assaults and counterattacks. Although lacking actual railroad tracks, the cut provided a deep entrenchment that was utilized by both Union and Confederate forces. The Union Army stationed multiple units near the site to fend off the Confederate attacks, managing to hold their ground until the Confederates, with superior numbers, eventually forced them to retreat.

During a crucial moment around 10 am, the Confederates, overwhelming the Union defenders, flanked their right side and launched an attack. Three regiments strategically positioned themselves at the railroad cut, with one half of the brigade utilizing the cut as a trench while the other half remained at the northern edge. In response, Union forces, led by division commander James Wadsworth, organized a counterattack that exploited the terrain advantage provided by the depression of the cut. This tactic allowed the Union troops to flank the Confederate positions and secure a significant number of Confederate prisoners

A lull in the fighting ensued as both sides awaited reinforcements. Maj Gen OO Howard arrived before his XI Corps did, and assumed command from behind the town of Gettysburg. He communicated with Maj Gen James Slocum of XII Corps and Maj Gen Daniel Sickles of III Corps  to come to the field immediately.

In the afternoon, Ewell’s Corps appeared on Oak Ridge from the north, beginning a massive assault. With Rodes’ division attacking from Oak Hill, the Union lines were under heavy pressure. The CSA 3rd Corps, under Early and Gordon, came from the north and arrived later in the afternoon from Carlisle. This sequence provided a clockwise en echelon pattern that was unintentional but devastating, as the Union Corps were further away in Maryland that morning.

On June 28, Ewell's corps, consisting of three divisions, was strategically positioned at Carlisle and York, Pennsylvania. However, upon receiving orders to concentrate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, Rodes made the decision to move his division south from Carlisle, while another division led by Jubal Early marched southwest from York. Simultaneously, Edward Johnson's division was sent back down the Cumberland Valley towards Chambersburg under Ewell's command.

In the early afternoon, the Union XI Corps arrived under General Howard, who deployed his men to the right of the already existing line. The Union position was shaped in a semicircle from west to north of the town

Iverson

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson’s brigade fell victim to a well-executed ambush around 2:30 pm, resulting in devastating losses. The lack of skirmishers screening their advance left the Confederates vulnerable to the Union army positioned behind a stone wall at Oak Ridge. The sudden attack caught Iverson’s men off guard, leading to over 900 casualties out of the 1,384 soldiers in his brigade.

The aftermath of the ambush saw the Union forces counterattacking and flanking the Confederate position, leading to further surrenders and retreats. The communication breakdown within the Confederate ranks, exacerbated by the linear landmark of the field, contributed to the disastrous outcome. Iverson’s ineffective leadership, compounded by personal issues such as alcoholism, further worsened the situation, ultimately resulting in his reassignment and leaving a bitter legacy among the survivors of his regiment.

Rodes

When Rodes' division reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on July 1, they could hear the sounds of intense fighting between Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's corps and the Union's 1st Corps. Believing that he was positioned on the right flank of the Union forces, Rodes deployed his division on Oak Ridge after marching south. At this critical juncture, Rodes faced a crucial decision. He could either wait for the army to fully concentrate, as per Lee's instructions, or take the initiative and launch an attack.

Despite the significant impact of Rodes' Division on the outcome of the battle, his contributions are often overlooked. The losses suffered by his division, despite being fully engaged only on the first day of the battle, were among the highest of all Confederate divisions. Ramseur was held in reserve. Rodes’s Division suffered the second-highest losses of all Confederate divisions.

Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes played a pivotal role in the initial day of the battle, with his division being a key factor in the success of the Confederate forces. The aggressive attack launched by Rodes' troops on the Union's I Corps resulted in the pushing back of Union forces, compelling them to retreat through Gettysburg and towards Cemetery Hill. Rodes strategically positioned his division at the junction of the Union First and Eleventh Corps, preventing their link-up on Oak Hill and enveloping the Union right flank.

Despite Lee's directive to avoid a general engagement, Rodes, in agreement with Ewell, decided to ignore this order and launch an assault. Following the initial unsuccessful attack, Rodes persisted and led a second assault. These actions resulted in Early's division joining the battle and forced Hill's corps to deploy an additional division. While the Confederate forces did eventually achieve victory, it was not without consequences. The premature commitment of four divisions from Lee's army in a disjointed manner hindered Lee's ability to effectively utilize the full strength of his forces.

After the failure of the first assault, Rodes proceeded with a second attack, which ultimately led to Early's Division entering the fray and the subsequent deployment of another division from Hill's Corps. Although the Confederate forces were successful in the end, the premature involvement of four divisions from Lee's army in a fragmented deployment prevented Lee from fully harnessing the power of his forces.

Howard and Hancock

General Howard arrived 2 hours before his divisions did. Searching for a place to observe the battle, he found Cemetery Hill and recognized it as being the best place to fight a defense, just as Reynolds and Buford had. He tried to find a place to observe in town but could not. When he was informed of Reynold’s death, he became the senior officer on the battlefield. As 11th Corps arrived, starting around 12:30 pm, he gathered them on top of the hill. He observed and was informed of Rodes’s arrival on Oak Ridge and then Ewell’s arrival further west. He rode through the town of Gettysburg with Barlow, then met with General Wadsworth and General Doubleday behind the lines. He then returned to Cemetery Hill.

Operationally, Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday thought the high ground south of town was a good place for defense and worth fighting for. It’s controversial whether Reynolds made an actual decision when he arrived at the scene and agreed with Buford that this was an excellent place to make a defensive stand. OO Howard suggested that it was his decision, and was credited with delaying the Confederates long enough to ensure the rest of the federal army was concentrated on the heights south of the town. Howard did leave a reserve division and artillery on Cemetery Hill and used this area to collect those retreating from the front line. Others give Hancock credit for that choice. Convinced of the strength of this position, Hancock expressed his belief to Howard, stating, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." With Howard's agreement, Hancock solidified the decision, declaring, "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Although Howard received Congressional commendation for his actions, Hancock did not receive similar recognition.  It may be that no one actively chose Cemetery Hill at this stage of the conflict, but its obvious merits were plain to all.

When Meade learned of Reynold’s death, he immediately sent for Hancock. Unable to leave his army at that moment and undecided about the course of action regarding Pipe Creek, Meade entrusted Hancock with written orders to assume command, despite his junior rank compared to Howard. Hancock arrived at Cemetery Hill at approximately 4:30 pm. Hancock urged Meade to swiftly bring the entire army to the strategic position on Cemetery Hill. Additionally, Hancock decided to gather the scattered soldiers from various battles around the town and relocate them to the elevated hills south of Gettysburg, with the existing cemetery at its center. Hancock positioned his artillery there, enabling them to target the north over Culps Hill or the west over Cemetery Ridge.

During this critical juncture, Doubleday was in retreat, prompting a meeting between him and Hancock on the field. Recognizing the importance of the situation, Hancock ordered Wadsworth to position his troops at the base of Culp's Hill. This maneuver proved crucial and probably saved the field that day.

Barlow’s Knoll

The arrival of Ewell’s Corps from the north changed the entire dynamic of the battle to that point. To the east, the threat to Doles’ position had been reduced by the appearance of Early’s division. He had arrived at about 3 p.m. but paused for half an hour so that his infantrymen could catch their breath after their hard march to the field. Early then charged out of the northeast, sending the brigades led by Brig. Gens. John B. Gordon, Isaac E. Avery, and Harry T. Hays against the Union line.

Upon the arrival of Gordon's division on the far right, only Barlow's division stood as a barrier against an attack. Recognizing the imminent danger posed by the arrival of Ewell's 3rd Corps from the north, which threatened the Union's right flank, General Francis Barlow decided to advance his division of the 11th Corps to a knoll along the Harrisburg Road. At the time, the area now known as Barlow's Knoll was called Blucher's Knoll.  The Confederate brigades led by Gordon and Doles converged, overpowering Barlow's forces. Outnumbered by Gordon's division, Barlow and his men were unable to maintain their position, which was positioned as a vulnerable salient. Barlow was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Howard’s XI Corps were overwhelmed and forced to fall back As the Union line collapsed, XI Corps retreated back through town and assumed a defensive position on Cemetery Hill.

As Rodes launched a renewed assault from the north and Dorsey Pender attacked from the west, the Union line crumbled. The road system played a significant role in determining the outcome, favoring the Confederates who ultimately emerged victorious as Union troops retreated through the town in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, Union troops hastily withdrew through the town's streets.

Ultimately, of course, the Union lines were overrun as 2 Confederate corps arrived in just a few hours. Doubleday fought an outstanding controlled retreat back to the new lines on Cemetery Ridge. General Howard told Meade that his line had collapsed and it was Doubleday’s fault, because his line faltered first. This incorrect report led to his removal from command and ultimately, in his leaving active service.

Ewell Advances

At about 4:30 p.m., the Confederate superiority in numbers of Ewell’s Corp began to tell, and although Union fire opened gaping holes in their ranks, Hill’s men finally pushed the Federal I Corps off Seminary Ridge. With the Yankees in full retreat, both Rodes and Early called a halt to their pursuit, following the instructions issued by Ewell at the onset of the battle per Lee’s order.

With the collapse of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps fell back on Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were stationed to protect the retreat. Wadsworth’s division raced to Culps Hill to defend the right flank, and other reinforcements were also arriving. 500 troops from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps arrived. The 1stDivision, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers mixed with the XI Corps. In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 guns had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered, and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights.

Culp’s Hill & the “If Practicable” Order

Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill /Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often considered one of the great missed opportunities of the battle. Ewell had to decide about whether to make an attack. Rodes’ Division had already incurred heavy casualties and two brigades of Early’s Division had been sent east to block a rumored enemy force on the York Pike, and Maj. Gen. “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division was still marching toward Gettysburg.

Ewell insisted that Lee must approve an attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. When he asked A.P. Hill for assistance, Hill contended that his divisions were not capable of further offensive action that day, leaving Ewell with only two brigades of Early’s Division for an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Federals had already established a strong defensive position. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests. Colonel Walter Taylor delivered the message. According to his post-war recollection, Lee was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff. He then instructed Brown:

‘To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army…” ‘

From Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenant’s: A Study in Command, One volume abridgment by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571.

Smith returned, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the large group of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? Consequently, Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

What did Lee Expect?

Lee did not directly order Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have given a peremptory order for Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division, just now arriving and ready to fight, ahead to Cemetery Hill. After Barlow was defeated at the base of Culp’s Hill and XI Corps retreated through the town, Ewell was given discretionary orders to take the hill. He did not immediately try, and when later he sent Johnson’s Division, they ran into the Union line digging in.

Ewell felt, correctly by reports of those who were there, that his men were exhausted and disorganized. Most military students of the battle have concluded that Ewell made the right call under the circumstances. He was a professional soldier who had to make a split-second decision in the heat of the moment. The failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk suggests that any opportunity, if it ever existed, was fleeing. The question will always remain if the Union was as well dug in at 5 pm.

Ewell had at least 6 rational reasons not to make the attack:  a) His men had been through a huge firefight after marching many hours and were fatigued. b) Assaulting the hill through the streets of Gettysburg was not an easy task since the narrow passageways prevented massing the troops for an attack. c) Lee’s ambiguous order resonates through history. Any dispassionate reading of that phrase in the context of battle is more confusing than anything else. And it should be noted that Early himself was reluctant at that moment. d) Ewell requested assistance from AP Hill, who declined due to the condition of his corps, which had taken the brunt of the first day. e) There was intelligence that Union troops were approaching from the east on the Hanover Road. This was the vanguard of the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. If those troops had arrived at the wrong time, Ewell's flank would have been turned. f) This was Ewell’s first Corps command. He was hesitant given these issues. Ewell was never the same after the loss of his leg and marriage.

Ewell did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed, noting in his report “that by the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” In fact, at that moment, although victorious, his corps had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties, leaving him with about 8,000 men under arms. The charge into Gettysburg had also left Ewell’s two divisions badly disorganized, and thousands of prisoners had to be rounded up and secured. The third division, under Edward Johnson, was rushing to the scene, but no one knew when it would arrive.

On the hill at that hour and shortly afterward was the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. The XII Corps in George Greene’s brigade of John Geary’s division would soon arrive.

When Ewell’s third division, under Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, arrived on the battlefield, Johnson was ordered to take the hill if he had not already done so. Johnson did not take Culp's Hill. He sent a small party to reconnoiter, and they encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, part of Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge. Johnson's party was taken by surprise and almost taken prisoner before fleeing. Culps Hill at 7 pm when the reconnaissance occurred was far from empty. Was it empty at 5 pm? No but less well defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, Gordon said in his memoirs he was ready, but he’d seen significant action. Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. And the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell, after assessing the situation and considering various factors such as the approaching darkness, the strength of the Union defenses on Culp's Hill, and the absence of clear orders from Lee to attack, decided against launching an immediate assault. Instead, he chose to consolidate his positions.

Casualties

About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000. In itself, Day #1 of Gettysburg would rank among the top 25 battles of the war, even though most of both armies hadn’t even arrived yet.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

References

•    James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

•    Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative. Volume 2. Random House, 1963.

•    Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. The University of North Carolina, 1993.

•    Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

•    Stephen Sears, Gettysburg. Mariner Books, 2004.

•    Eric J Wittenberg, The Devils to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg. Savas-Beattie, 2014.

• Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. "Second Guessing Dick Ewell: Why Didn't the Confederate General Take Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863?" Civil War Times, August 2010.

• Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009.

·      https://gettysburg.stonesentinels.com/confederate-headquarters/rodes-division/

·      https://gettysburgcompiler.org/tag/alfred-iverson/  

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/20-fateful-decisions-at-gettysburg/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hnt-hnn-theme

·      https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg/

·      https://www.historynet.com/richard-ewell-at-gettysburg/#:~:text=On%20the%20first%20day%20of%20the%20Battle%20of,new%20Federal%20position%20on%20Cemetery%20Hill%20%E2%80%9Cif%20practicable.%E2%80%9D

·      https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/general-ewells-dilemma/

·      https://padresteve.com/2014/06/03/gettysburg-day-one-lees-vague-discretionary-orders-and-lack-of-control/

Captured by the Comanche in the American West in the 1830s: The Story of Cynthia Ann Parker

In the year 1833 the Parker family moved to Texas, the beneficiaries of large acres of free land, given in the hope that they would establish a settlement in country that at the time was still in contestation between the Mexican government and the United States. They built a fort and homes in what was then one of the most sparsely occupied areas in the state, on the edge of Native American territory. At the time Texas was at the edge of America, and skirmishes were frequent, in particular raids from the feared warrior society of the Comanches. The Comanche were struggling not only with white settlers but many other bands of Native American who had been displaced and forced onto the Plains by rapid American expansion. Their way of life was under threat and they retaliated. Despite this the Parkers, unfortunately, overestimated their safety.

Erin Bienvenu explains the story of the capture of Cynthia Ann Parker.

Cynthia Ann Parker and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Image taken around 1861.

Fort Parker Massacre

The morning of May 19, 1836 began normally enough for the extended Parker family. They were busy working on their farms and getting their families ready for another day. Cynthia Ann, nearly nine years old, the oldest child of Silas and Lucinda, was with her mother and three siblings. Inexplicably, despite the dangers of the Texas frontier, the large gate of the fort had been left open.

The morning was soon interrupted by a large group of Comanches who appeared bearing a white flag and professing peace. The Parker men suspected their motives but Benjamin Parker, Cynthia Ann’s Uncle, bravely went out to speak with them. He hoped he could give the women and children enough time to hide in the surrounding woods but he was quickly killed and the Comanches descended on the fort and surrounding farms.

At the end of what became known as the Fort Parker Massacre, five men were dead, including Silas, and the Comanche had taken five hostages: Cynthia Ann, her younger brother John, their cousin Rachel Plummer, her son James, and their Aunt Elizabeth Kellogg. For the captives the days and nights that followed were horrific, they were repeatedly beaten, starved, and the older women raped.

Eventually, after several days of hard riding, the captives were separated and sent to different bands. As fertility rates were low amongst the Comanche, due to their nomadic life style which required almost daily riding, captive children were often adopted by families who had lost a child. This is what happened to Cynthia Ann.

Her childhood then began anew as she was immersed in Comanche culture, taught such practicalities as how to sew buckskin and gather firewood, and how to speak the language. She would also have learnt about the tribe’s customs, religious beliefs, and been raised in preparation for marriage and motherhood.

Life with the Comanche

In 1842 John and James were ransomed back to their families and a few years later Cynthia Ann was discovered by Leonard Williams, a Native American agent. She was said to have ‘wept incessantly’ and tried to hide from Williams, though he offered a substantial ransom for her return. However, the Comanche refused to give her up.

In the years that followed more ransoms were offered but all were refused, often by Cynthia Ann herself. She was now married to a warrior who had participated in her capture, Peta Nocona, and they had three children. She also had a new name, Naduah, which meant ‘someone found.’ She was completely integrated into Comanche life and even her brother John could not persuade her to return. She had already been separated from one family, and she would not be taken from another.

Cynthia Ann and her family were constantly on the move, it was a hard life and she was in charge of most of the work. One of her main tasks was to prepare the buffalo hunted by her husband. Not one part of the huge animal was wasted and Cynthia Ann became a skilled tanner. It was dirty, time-consuming work, but she also found joy in the lives of her children - two boys, Quanah and Peanuts (so named because of her fond memories of eating the nuts during her childhood at the Fort) and daughter, Topsannah (Prairie Flower). Her husband was also a skilled warrior and the family was considered to be quite wealthy in Comanche society.

Return to the Parker Family

In 1860 in retaliation for Peta Nocona’s constant raids on white settlements, his tribe were attacked by a group of Texas Rangers led by Captain Lawrence Sullivan Ross.

Cynthia Ann attempted to flee on horseback but was stopped by Ross who, to his great surprise, realised she was a white woman. He declared that Peta Nocona had been killed during the battle and Cynthia Ann had wept over his body, though their son Quanah was to claim his father had died at a later date.

The rangers took Cynthia Ann and her young daughter to Fort Cooper, though she made repeated attempts to escape. Once again, she found herself violently taken from all she knew, her family and her home, forced to assimilate to a culture and language she had largely forgotten. Despite speaking in a mixture of Comanche and Spanish she did recall the massacre at Fort Parker, and her birth name, responding when called ‘Cynthia Ann.’

She was treated as a curiosity by all who saw her and at one stage, under the ‘care’ of her Uncle Isaac was even put on display so that the citizens of Texas could come and stare at her. She tried repeatedly to run away from Isaac’s home. He, and her wider family, could not understand her longing to return to her Comanche life. They expected her to immediately accept the way of life she had left aged nine, to re-adopt their language, dress and religion, but Cynthia Ann would not comply. Consequently, she was treated by her family, and the wider community, as a woman who did not know her right mind.

Eventually she was sent to live with her brother Silas Jr, but her situation did not improve. Around this time a photograph was taken of Cynthia Ann, in which she is nursing Topsannah with her hair cut short, a symbol of Comanche mourning. She was grieving not only her husband, but her two sons, who she believed were lost on the prairie. When Silas joined the Confederate army Cynthia Ann was sent to live with a different set of relatives, this time her sister, Orlena. Here, life was a little better. There were more sympathetic people to speak with and she earned a reputation as a hard worker and expert tanner. She remained, however, largely unhappy and would frequently lament the loss of her sons, often cutting herself in the traditional Comanche way of expressing grief. The Parker’s promised her that when the Civil War ended, they would take her to find her sons, but as time wore on, she began to realise their promises were empty.

Then in about 1864 Topsannah died from pneumonia and a grief-stricken Cynthia Ann lost all hope. It is believed she died of complications probably bought on by self-starvation around 1870.

Conclusion

Cynthia Ann left no written account of her life, or her feelings about her experiences, what little we do know about her was told through the eyes of those that briefly encountered her, but who often had their own agendas when it came to telling her story. Her son Quanah, regarded as the last of the great Comanche Chiefs, remembered her as “a good woman” who he “always cherished.” Hers was a life between two worlds and, as it was for many people in the early history of the American West, one marked by frontier violence and tragic misunderstanding.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

References

https://archive.org/details/rachelplummernar00park/page/16/mode/2up?q=cyntha

https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4492&context=etd

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth85556/m1/2/zoom/?q=cynthia%20ann%20parker&resolution=2.565054159331353&lat=3373.065552681177&lon=3245.6007365528353

https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth583180/m1/14/zoom/?q=%22cynthia%20ann%20parker%22~1&resolution=2.1904496702355107&lat=3009.330046382758&lon=3003.1985262518583

Exley, Jo Ella Powell (2001), Frontier Blood: The Saga of the Parker Family. Texas A&M University Press

Frankel, Glenn (2013), The Searchers: The Making of an American Legend. New York: Bloomsbury

Gwynne, S.C. (2011), Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanche Tribe. London: Constable

Michno, Gregory & Susan (2007), A Fate Worse Than Death: Indian Captives in the West, 1830-1835. Idaho: Caxton Press

Myron Taylor: A Man on a Mission

Thomas Carlyle once opined that “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.”  And that is certainly true in the case of Myron C. Taylor, whose consequential life helps explain a great deal about the 20th Century.

Taylor was born in 1874, and grew up in the small, upstate town of Lyons (in Wayne County), just south of Lake Ontario. Taylor went to the Cornell Law School in Ithaca, graduating with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1894.  Returning to Lyons, he established a small law practice, but shortly transitioned to helping his father’s tannery business.  That quickly led to bigger things.

Taylor soon became America’s leading industrialist: first as the “czar” of the textile industry; and later, in the 1920s and 30s, as CEO of U.S. Steel.  Thereafter, he became a key diplomatic participant in some of the most important geopolitical events of the World War II era.  Taylor is little remembered today, however, because of his intense personal dislike for self-promotion and publicity; for much of his business career, the national media called him “the man nobody knows.”

C. Evan Stewart explains.

Myron Taylor in the Vatican. Image provided by the author.

Ambassador Extraordinary

Having literally saved U.S. Steel from ruin during the depths of the Depression and then restoring it to its position as the country’s most important corporation, Taylor stepped down as CEO in April of 1938; he hoped to enter a “sabbatical period of life” with his wife, Anabel.  But his friend, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked him to take on an assignment: could Taylor help solve the crisis of Jews who were attempting to flee persecution in Nazi Germany.  Taylor’s efforts actually led to a deal with Hitler and Germany, whereby 150,000 “able-bodied” Jews were to be permitted to emigrate, with their dependents to follow later.  Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles told the president it was “better than we hoped for.”  Unfortunately, with the Nazi invasion of Poland (which led to World War II), that deal came to naught.

Then, right before Christmas 1939, FDR called on Taylor again, asking him to be the president’s personal representative to Pope Pius XII (with the rank of “Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary”). This very controversial appointment, which FDR undertook for multiple reasons (e.g., domestic politics; his wanting a third term; trying to influence Church policy (and its internal politics) in the United States; getting international-diplomatic information at the Vatican; influencing the Vatican on geopolitical issues; etc.), led to what was widely known as the “Taylor Mission.”  And in fulfilling that Mission over the next eleven years, Taylor was at the heart many of the era’s critical matters, including: (i) efforts to keep Italy, Spain, and Portugal out of the war on the Axis side; (ii) ensuring that Lend-Lease aid got to the Soviet Union in 1941, which at that point was about to be overrun by the German army; (iii) bringing the first documented proof of the Holocaust to the Vatican in September of 1942; (iv) ensuring that the Church would support the Allies’ policy of unconditional surrender (and later, not break with that policy); (v) helping to broker Italy’s surrender and Mussolini’s departure; (vi) blocking German attempts to have the Vatican broker a peace; (vii) helping to godfather the Bretton Woods agreement and the United Nations; (viii) almost single-handedly helping Italy recover from the war; and (ix) under President Truman, engaging in an effort to have all the world’s religions unite against atheistic communism (i.e., the Soviet Union).

Lend-Lease to Russia

To cover all the foregoing (and more), readers will have to pick up Myron Taylor: The Man Nobody Knows (Twelve Tables Press).  For the remainder of this article, the focus will be on Taylor’s critical role in ensuring Lend-Lease aid got to Russia in 1941.

On March 11, 1941, FDR signed the controversial Lend-Lease legislation. Premised on the president’s campaign pledge in 1940 for America to be the “great arsenal of democracy,” it was understood - by Congress and the American public - to apply only to providing assistance to Great Britain, then isolated and under the German attacks known as the “Blitz.”

On June 24, 1941, the geopolitical world was up-ended when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.  The German army’s advance through Russian territory was swift; FDR and his top advisors feared that the if the USSR were to be overrun and conquered, then stopping the Nazi regime when (not if) the United States became a belligerent might well provide impossible. (Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, told FDR that Russia might not last three months.)  The president was determined to provide substantial military assistance to Joseph Stalin, but there was a very significant roadblock.

In 1937, the Vatican had issued the Encyclical Divini Redemptoris - issued by Pope Pius XI (but authored by his Secretary of State, who would succeed him as Pope Pius XII).  That Encyclical condemned in no uncertain terms the Soviet Union and expressly forbade all Catholics from having anything to do with supporting that nation-state. Given the 1937 Encyclical and the strong isolationistic sentiments of many American Catholics, FDR feared that the political backlash would prove too great if he tried to extend Lend-Lease aid to Russia.  (For example, the Bishop of Buffalo had publicly stated that Catholics would be justified in not serving in the U.S. military if the country were allied with the Soviet Union.)  In the words of Robert Sherwood (an FDR speechwriter and later biographer), “[a]s a measure for coping with serious Catholic opposition to aid for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt decided to send Myron C. Taylor … on another mission to Rome.”

Myron Taylor shares a letter from FDR with the Pope. Image provided by the author.

Threading the Needle

Before his trip, Taylor, together with two Church officials in the United States and Sumner Welles, devised a strategy to thread the needle of the 1937 Encyclical: that any U.S. aid would not constitute supporting communism, but would instead be directed at alleviating the suffering of the Russian people, for whom the Pope and the Church always had special affection.  But that nuanced approach to the problem got off to a rocky start at Taylor’s first meeting with the Pope on September 9, 1941.  FDR had asked Taylor to present a hand-written letter to the Pope, a document which went to great lengths to assure him that “the churches in Russia are open” and that “freedom of religion” was a likely outcome of the Nazi’s invasion.  The Pope and his advisors were incredulous; at least seven Vatican memoranda were prepared in response to FDR’s letter, many of them questioning the president’s mental state and his grasp on reality.

Notwithstanding FDR’s blunder, Taylor, over a number of days and multiple sessions with the Pope and his advisors, was able to get the Vatican to agree to the concept of delinking the Russian people from the Soviet Union; but this message could not be seen as being issued from or dictated by the Pope or the Vatican.  Instead, guidance would be sent to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to have the message delivered by a high-ranking member of the Church in America.

Once Taylor returned to America, in consultation with the Apostolic Delegate and other Church officials, it was decided to effectuate the Vatican’s hidden-hand strategy by having an outspoken isolationistic Church leader - Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati - deliver the message.  With time of the essence - not only were German troops closing in on Moscow, but a second Lend-Lease appropriations bill was pending in Congress and over 90% of available Lend-Lease funds had already been allocated - McNicholas was summoned to Washington and given his marching orders.

On October 30, 1941, McNicholas published a pastoral letter (which received broad national coverage and was printed in toto in the Congressional Record) explicitly endorsing the need for America to help the “persecuted people of Russia, deprived of freedom and put in bondage.”  That same day, FDR cabled Stalin that he had approved $1 billion of war materials to be shipped to the USSR.  But the president waited a week for the McNicholas letter to sink in and take effect in the American body politic (and Congress).  As Sherwood wrote: “It is an indication of Roosevelt’s concern for public opinion that he did not formerly include the Soviet Union among the recipients of Lend Lease until November 7.”

In the words of the leading historian on the decision to aid the USSR in 1941, because of “Myron Taylor’s special mission to the Vatican” - which had secured the Church’s overt approval of such aid, “[s]o perished the great dread of the President that the encyclical of Pius XI would provide a sanction for equating aid to Russia with aid to communism and thereby permit his opponents to insist with telling force that his program was in conflict with the doctrines of the Church.”  Ultimately, eleven billion dollars in aid was sent to the Soviet Union to help them repulse the Nazis.  And at the Tehran Conference, Stalin toasted that, without the U.S.’s war materials, the USSR would have been overrun.  In reflecting upon Taylor’s contribution to this historic result (which was “given no great amount of publicity”), Sherwood wrote: “Taylor was one who truly deserved the somewhat archaic title of ‘Ambassador Extraordinary.’”

The Taylor Archives

Myron C. Taylor donated his papers to his alma mater, Cornell University, and I drew upon these papers (in the University’s Olin Library) for this article.  Other archival sources with important Taylor documents include the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library to Independence, Missouri; the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; and the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; in addition, the Baker Library at Harvard University (papers of Thomas Lamont) and the Oral History Project at Columbia University (including oral histories of Frances Perkins, George Rublee, etc.) contain many valuable materials on Taylor’s life and career.  The Vatican has made many, but not all, archival materials covering the World War II era available for scholars.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

What If Leon Trotsky had not been Assassinated?

Throughout history, certain moments stand out as pivotal turning points, altering the course of nations and shaping the destiny of millions. One such moment occurred on August 20, 1940, when an ice pick-wielding assassin attacked, Lev Davidovich Bronstein, better known as Leon Trotsky, the fiery revolutionary and one of architects of the Bolshevik Revolution. Trotsky died of his injuries the next day August 21, 1940.

However, what if fate had taken a different path? What if Trotsky had not met his untimely demise in Mexico City? The ripple effects of such a scenario would have undoubtedly reshaped the landscape of the 20th century, altering the trajectory of communism, world politics, and the course of countless lives.

Terry Bailey considers this alternative history.

Trotsky in Mexico, January 1937 with his wife Natalia Sedova. The artist Frida Kahlo is behind them.

The Rise of Trotsky

To understand the profound impact of Trotsky's hypothetical survival, we must first delve into his revolutionary legacy. A brilliant orator, strategist, and ideologue, Trotsky played a pivotal role in the overthrow of the Russian Tsarist regime in 1917. Alongside Vladimir Lenin, he galvanized the masses, leading the Bolsheviks to victory and laying the groundwork for the world's first communist state.

Had Trotsky survived the assassination attempt, he would have remained a formidable force within the Soviet Union. His intellectual prowess and unwavering commitment to Marxist principles would have posed a significant challenge to Joseph Stalin's consolidation of power. Unlike Stalin, whose brutal tactics and cult of personality alienated many within the party, Trotsky garnered widespread respect and admiration among the rank-and-file Bolsheviks. With his continued presence, the internal power struggle within the Communist Party would have taken a drastically different turn.

The Trotskyist Vision

Trotsky's vision of communism differed fundamentally from Stalin's authoritarian regime. While Stalin advocated for "socialism in one country," prioritizing the consolidation of power within the Soviet Union, Trotsky championed the concept of "permanent revolution." He believed that true socialism could only be achieved through the international spread of proletarian uprisings, challenging the global capitalist order and ushering in a new era of worldwide socialism.

Had Trotsky maintained his influence within the Soviet leadership, his emphasis on internationalism would have profoundly shaped Soviet foreign policy. Rather than pursuing a policy of isolationism and realpolitik, as Stalin did, Trotsky would have actively supported revolutionary movements abroad. This stance would have likely intensified tensions with capitalist powers, particularly the United States, leading to a more confrontational Cold War dynamic.

The Fate of Communism

One cannot ignore the impact Trotsky's survival would have had on the global communist movement. In the aftermath of Stalin's purges and the rise of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, many disillusioned leftists looked to Trotskyism as a beacon of hope for a more democratic form of socialism. With Trotsky at the helm, the Fourth International would have emerged as a formidable challenger to both capitalist imperialism and Stalinist dogma.

Moreover, Trotsky's continued influence could have averted some of the excesses and atrocities committed in the name of communism. His commitment to democratic centralism and workers' democracy stood in stark contrast to Stalin's autocratic rule. By promoting a more decentralized and participatory form of governance, Trotsky may have prevented the worst abuses of state power, preserving the integrity of the socialist project.

The Legacy of Trotsky

In exploring the counterfactual scenario of Trotsky's survival, we are confronted with a multitude of possibilities and uncertainties. Would he have succeeded in his quest to overthrow Stalin and establish a more democratic socialist order? Or would he have met the same fate as countless other dissenters crushed by the machinery of the Soviet state?

Regardless of the outcome, one thing remains clear: Trotsky's legacy endures as a testament to the power of revolutionary ideals and the enduring struggle for social justice. His writings continue to inspire generations of activists and intellectuals, offering insights into the nature of power, oppression, and resistance. While his physical presence may have been extinguished on that fateful day in 1940, his spirit lives on in the ongoing quest for a world free from exploitation and inequality.

Conclusion

In contemplating the hypothetical scenario of Trotsky's survival, we are compelled to confront the complexities and contradictions of history. The assassination of one man irrevocably altered the course of world events, unleashing a chain reaction of consequences that continue to reverberate to this day. Yet, amidst the uncertainty and speculation, one thing remains certain: the enduring legacy of Leon Trotsky serves as a reminder of the transformative power of revolutionary thought and the indomitable spirit of those who dare to challenge the status quo. As we reflect on the road not taken, we are reminded of the countless possibilities that lie ahead, waiting to be shaped by the actions and aspirations of those who refuse to accept the world as it is and strive to create a better one in its place.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

The Battle of Gettysburg - Part I: General Lee’s Advance to Pennsylvania

In late May 1863, the Confederacy was facing a challenging situation. Despite General Robert E Lee's success in defeating the Union forces in almost every major battle, the war's progress remained stagnant along the Rappahannock River. The Confederacy had not made significant gains despite the intense fighting. On the other hand, the Western Theater had experienced substantial territorial losses, particularly in Louisiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The fall of Vicksburg and western Mississippi seemed imminent. It was evident that a dramatic shift was necessary to alter the course of the war while maintaining the people's confidence in the government and military. The war had already surpassed the South's expectations in terms of duration, and resources were depleting rapidly.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Confederate troops battling Union forces in the first day at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the left background is the Railroad Cut; on the right is the Lutheran Seminary. In the background is Gettysburg.

The Rationale

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Davis invited General Lee to Richmond for a three-day meeting with his cabinet on May 26. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their plans and devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war. It is crucial to understand the significance of the Battle of Gettysburg within the broader context of the war. It was seen as a final attempt to secure victory on the battlefield. General Lee aimed to provoke a large-scale battle that could potentially be decisive. The intention was to divert attention from the Western Theater and instigate a battle in the East that could alter the war's trajectory. Building on his previous victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee proposed taking the war into Northern territory. While General Grant was closing in on Vicksburg, there were discussions about detaching General Longstreet's corps and sending them to assist General Pemberton. However, it was increasingly apparent that Vicksburg was already lost. Lee suggested the alternative: retain Longstreet in his army and launch an invasion of Pennsylvania, hoping to achieve a breakthrough.

There were two main objectives in mind for this operation. Firstly, it aimed to remove the war from central Virginia during the summer months. Additionally, the hope was to secure a victory in a battle north of the Mason-Dixon Line, which would potentially lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by France and Britain. Another crucial objective was to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with essential resources such as food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the fertile farmlands of Pennsylvania. This was necessary as the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments were struggling to meet the increasing demand due to the blockade's significant impact. Alongside these objectives, there were several other goals to be achieved. These included diverting the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line, disrupting any offensive plans General Joseph Hooker may have had, driving Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley, drawing Union forces away from other theaters, and ultimately dealing a decisive blow to Northern morale.

Lee's unwavering confidence in his army led him to believe that if he could secure advantageous terrain, the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) would triumph over the Army of the Potomac (AoP). This perception fueled his hope that such a victory would compel the war-weary North to seek peace, potentially serving as a decisive military maneuver to showcase the Southern will for independence to Great Britain and France.

However, Lee's strategic approach was marred by a series of misconceptions regarding the state of morale in the North, which ultimately shaped his flawed strategy and resulted in miscalculations. One of these misinterpretations was his misunderstanding of Northern sentiment, as he mistakenly believed that the general public in the North was fatigued by the ongoing conflict. Consequently, he failed to grasp the unwavering determination of the Lincoln Administration to persevere in the face of adversity. This misjudgment of the North's resolve played a significant role in shaping Lee's flawed assumptions and strategic decisions.

Reorganization

Following Chancellorsville and the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee undertook a significant reorganization of his forces. To strengthen his army, Lee decided to create three Corps instead of the previous two. As part of this restructuring, he promoted AP Hill to command the newly formed 3rd Corps, while Richard Ewell assumed leadership of the 2nd Corps. James Longstreet remained in charge of the 1st Corps.

Before the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had suffered significant losses in terms of both brigade and regimental commanders. Out of the 28 brigades that participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, a staggering nine of them lost their commanders during the battle. Furthermore, three of these brigades experienced the loss of multiple commanders. Additionally, the ANV lost 64 out of its 130 regimental commanders. Consequently, many of Lee's brigades entered the Gettysburg campaign with inexperienced unit commanders, which would have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the battle.

As part of the reorganization efforts, Lee made a crucial decision to disband the army's reserve artillery and redistribute its batteries to the infantry corps. This adjustment allowed each corps to have five artillery battalions at its disposal, granting them the flexibility to assign these battalions to the infantry divisions or retain them under the command of the corps. Although this change in the command structure may have appeared insignificant at first glance, it would prove to have significant implications on July 3rd, during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Was the ANV Designed for a Northern Invasion?

Lee's Army was not designed to leave the confines of Virginia due to several factors. Firstly, Lee had limited intelligence operations compared to his Union counterparts. Instead of having a dedicated intelligence service like the Bureau of Military Intelligence, Lee relied on three main sources for information: the civilians of Virginia, Stuart's Cavalry, and his staff. However, when Lee moved north, he left behind his most valuable intelligence source - the civilians of Virginia. These civilians not only provided crucial information but also aided in the communication and navigation of local roads and geography. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that Lee heavily relied on his cavalry for intelligence and did not trust information from other sources. This deficit in intelligence gathering put Lee at a significant disadvantage. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north. Lee primarily used individual undercover agents to provide intelligence, usually assigned to one of his subordinate generals, most famously Henry Harrison. Lee depended strongly on his cavalry and never trusted actual intelligence from other sources.

Lee may have overlooked the political landscape of the areas he intended to invade. While there were a significant number of KGC operatives and Copperheads in Baltimore, western Maryland, and southern Pennsylvania, these regions were predominantly pro-Union. This meant that Lee would face strong opposition and limited support from the local population in these areas. Overlooking this factor could have further contributed to the challenges Lee encountered when attempting to expand his operations beyond Virginia.

Another limitation was that his staff was too small to plan and coordinate a foray into enemy territory. Lee had a very small staff to manage his corps movements, so when he needed them to regroup, it took several days.  These 6 men comprised all of Lee’s staff

·      Chief of Staff, Inspector General: Col. Robert H. Chilton

·      Chief of Artillery: Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Walter H. Taylor

·      Aide de Camp, Asst. Military Secretary: Maj. Charles Marshall

·      Aide de camp, Asst. Inspector General: Maj. Charles S. Venable

·      Engineer Officer: Capt. Samuel R. Johnston

This would repeatedly be a limitation: his command and control at critical moments was inadequate, and he lacked sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges during the Pennsylvania Campaign due to his lack of adequate supply support. Unlike the Union forces, who had the advantage of utilizing railroads and rivers for transportation, Lee had to rely on a primitive system. With no railroads or rivers available to him, Lee's only option was to transport his supplies over land using horse and mule-drawn wagons. This resulted in a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, which posed a major hindrance to his operations.

One of the key issues that Lee encountered was the dependency on a long supply line that relied on horse and mule-drawn wagons. This meant that his forces had to cover a significant distance to transport essential provisions and equipment. The reliance on such a method of transportation not only slowed down the movement of supplies but also made them susceptible to attacks and disruptions along the way.

Lee's forces suffered from a shortage of long-range artillery ammunition, which severely limited their ability to sustain multiple attacks during the campaign. This deficiency became evident during Pickett's charge, where the lack of sufficient ammunition hindered their offensive capabilities. Lee also lacked the availability of pontoons over the Potomac River, which provided a crucial emergency crossing point. This would become evident in his retreat after the battle.

Lee’s heavy reliance on horse and mule-drawn wagons led to a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, insufficient long-range artillery ammunition, challenges in transporting captured goods, and limited emergency crossing options. These logistical challenges significantly impacted Lee's ability to sustain his offensive campaign and ultimately contributed to his setbacks in the Pennsylvania Campaign.

Lee faced significant logistical challenges in transporting supplies to Gettysburg and Harrisburg. The route spanned 125 miles from Winchester, and even more to Harrisburg, requiring wagons pulled by either four horses or six mules. These wagons had a carrying capacity of 2000-2500 pounds but moved at a slow pace of about 3 miles per hour, which could be further reduced by unfavorable road conditions. The animals themselves had substantial needs, with mules requiring 9 pounds of grain, 10 pounds of fodder, and 12 gallons of water daily, while horses needed 14 pounds of grain, 14 pounds of fodder, and 10 gallons of water. Additionally, the animals required horseshoes, which required manpower to apply. The waste disposal issue was also daunting, with each animal producing 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine daily. Failing to properly care for the animals would result in decreased efficiency, as they would move more slowly and carry less until they eventually broke down, rendering the army immobile. The sheer size of Lee's trains, stretching for dozens of miles, further complicated matters as infantry and artillery had to share the same roads as the wagons, leading to traffic congestion and delays. The meticulous administration of the order of march was necessary to prevent pile-ups at crossroads, requiring significant labor. Overall, these logistical challenges posed a nightmare for Lee, impacting the timing of Longstreet's arrival on the field, the availability of weapons and armaments, the organization of the three corps in battle, and the retreat after the battle.

General Lee relied on an incomplete map during the Battle of Gettysburg, as he did not possess a detailed map of the town itself. The map he had was a product of the efforts of Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographical engineer, who had been tasked with creating a small-scale map of the region encompassing northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania. Due to the vast scope of the project and limited time, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps to complete the map. He meticulously penciled a grid on a heavy watercolor paper and transcribed the map onto this grid, resulting in a visually appealing yet incomplete representation of the area.

The map used by General Lee was crafted on cream-colored paper and featured red pencil lines to denote roadways, blue markings for rivers and streams, and black ink for the names of towns, mills, blacksmith shops, and major topographical features. The attention to detail extended to including the names of every rural resident in impeccable handwriting. However, despite its aesthetic appeal, the map lacked crucial information such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites. Additionally, it failed to depict the now-famous landmarks of the battle, including Seminary Ridge, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Little Round Top.

The absence of comprehensive maps placed the ANV at a significant disadvantage, particularly when a thorough understanding of the local geography was crucial. These omissions had consequences during the battle. On July 1, two regiments from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis's brigade were lost when his soldiers unexpectedly jumped into an unmapped twenty-foot-deep railroad cut and were subsequently captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes's 6th Wisconsin Regiment. On July 2, as Lee strategized to encircle Meade's left flank, his engineer, Captain Samuel R. Johnston, claimed to have ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. However, the area was teeming with Union troops. Likely, Johnston had mistakenly identified Warfield Ridge or Houck's Ridge as being vacant. Furthermore, when Johnston was tasked with guiding Hood's and McLaws's divisions to the southern end of the battlefield in preparation for an early afternoon assault on the Union left, he had to retrace his steps and march in the opposite direction due to his lack of a map and his misunderstanding of the area's topographical features. Lastly, the map itself did not accurately depict the Round Tops, nor did it adequately represent the undulating and wooded regions east of the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain surrounding Weikert's and Trestle's farms, Rose's Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between Houck's Ridge and Little Round Top.

The Invasion Begins

On June 3rd, the ANV initiated their departure from Fredericksburg, marking the beginning of their movement. The initial phase of their march led them to Culpeper Court House, to advance further to the Shenandoah Valley while being shielded by the cavalry division under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However, the Union cavalry, led by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton detected Stuart's concentration. Believing that Stuart was planning a raid towards Washington from his right flank, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the commander of the AoP, instructed Pleasonton to cross the Rappahannock River and eliminate the Confederate cavalry.

The Battle of Brandy Station

Taking place on the 9th of June, 1863, the Battle of Brandy Station emerged as the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War. In a surprise attack at dawn, Pleasonton launched columns across the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and Kelly's Ford. Following the successful crossing at Beverly Ford, the Union troopers launched an assault on Stuart's camp near a rail station known as Brandy Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The Confederate forces swiftly regrouped, and the Union troops encountered fierce resistance at St. James Church and the Richard Cunningham farm. Simultaneously, the Union cavalry divided, with one division advancing towards Brandy Station and the other heading to Stevensburg. The arrival of Union cavalry at Brandy Station posed a threat to Stuart's rear position, prompting him to skillfully maneuver his brigades. The ensuing clash between the two sides occurred in mounted combat on a lengthy, undulating ridge named Fleetwood Hill, situated near the station. Meanwhile, Pleasonton's forces at Stevensburg faced obstacles from Confederate horsemen and were unable to penetrate Stuart's defenses. After enduring fourteen hours of intense fighting, Pleasonton ultimately withdrew from the field.

The Union suffered a total of 907 casualties, including 69 killed, 352 wounded, and 486 missing or captured, out of approximately 11,000 troops. The Confederates had 523 casualties out of about 9,500 troops. Consequently, the battle can be considered inconclusive. Union forces withdrew without discovering Lee's infantry camped near Culpeper, which was the mission assigned to Stuart. Nevertheless, Hooker deduced that if Stuart had ventured that far north, Lee must be planning a further northward movement into Maryland. Consequently, Hooker promptly initiated the movement of the AoP across the Potomac River, well before Stuart commenced his ride around the Union Army. Therefore, many argue that it was a strategic victory for the Union. Stuart, however, contended that the battle constituted a tactical victory for the Confederates since they had fewer casualties, held the field at the end of the day, and successfully repelled Pleasonton's attack. Nevertheless, General Stuart suffered a significant blow to his reputation in the Court of Public Opinion. He fell victim to two surprise attacks, which the cavalry was expected to prevent. The Southern press generally expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, and subordinate officers criticized Pleasonton for not aggressively defeating Stuart. Although Hooker had ordered Pleasonton to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate cavalry near Culpeper, Pleasonton justified his actions by claiming that he had only been instructed to conduct a "reconnaissance in force toward Culpeper." Consequently, Pleasonton did not gain much reputationally from this battle. It is worth noting that this battle marked the end of the Confederate cavalry's dominance in the Eastern theater of the war. From this point onward, the Federal cavalry grew stronger and more confident. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be considered a limited operational victory for the Union.

The Early Stages of the Campaign

To maintain the illusion that he was still at Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg, Lee had to ensure that Hooker remained unaware of his northward movement. To achieve this, Lee left AP Hill behind and protect Richmond, effectively holding back Sedgwick and the VI Corps. Although Hooker was aware that Lee was on the move, he lacked precise information regarding its route and destination.

Lee's strategic position was precarious, as his forces were dangerously spread out. On June 12th, the Confederate army extended over a vast expanse of 70 land miles, with no direct roads connecting its wings. If Hooker had been privy to Lee's position on that day, the Confederate general would have been highly vulnerable. However, Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, skillfully concealed this vulnerability. A series of battles with Union cavalry prevented them from ascertaining the location and strength of Lee's army, thus obscuring its direction and ultimate objective:

Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.

Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.

Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.

Although the movement north is often portrayed as a display of Lee’s cunning while Hooker was deceived, both sides were screened from the other. Both sides were effectively screened from each other. Moreover, it was widely known that Lee intended to invade, prompting Hooker to make numerous attempts to locate the ANV. Maj Gen Sharpe of the BMI had early on suggested that Lee would move in a northwesterly direction, a prediction that proved to be accurate. In light of this information, Hooker dispatched several cavalry patrols in search of Lee. On June 5, Brig Gen John Buford reported Confederate cavalry presence in Culpepper, which led to Sharpe's one error in intelligence assessment, suggesting that the northward movement might only be a cavalry raid. Despite the efforts of brigades led by Gregg, Munford, and Duffie to locate Lee, the Rebel cavalry remained elusive. It is important to acknowledge that Hooker did what he could, but his cavalry ultimately failed to outmaneuver Stuart. With this phase of the campaign concluded Lee was now prepared to cross the Potomac River and proceed into Maryland.

JEB Stuart gets lost

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was Jeb Stuart’s absence after crossing the Potomac until July 2nd. His absence had significant consequences, as it left Lee without crucial cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence. The lack of information regarding the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions greatly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial stages of the battle. Many historians speculate that if Stuart had effectively screened the front of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would not have been caught off guard by the proximity of the AoP, and the Battle of Gettysburg might have unfolded differently. Stuart's desire to redeem himself after the surprise attack at Brandy Station and his eagerness to outmaneuver the Union army led him to attempt to circumnavigate the enemy once again. However, his plans were hindered by encounters with Union troops, forcing him to deviate from his intended path and ultimately leaving him unable to effectively screen General Ewell's right flank.

The orders given by Lee to Stuart on June 22 have sparked controversy ever since. Stuart, upon separating from the main force on June 23, was granted permission by Lee to ride around the Union army unhindered, cross the Potomac River, and provide cover for the right flank of Ewell's Corps as it marched north. However, Stuart's movement on June 25 was met with opposition from the Union 2nd Corps near Haymarket, Virginia, preventing him from advancing northward. Despite this setback, Stuart decided to press on. His original intention was to circumvent the Union army by starting from its rear, but to his surprise, the Union army shifted northward, turning his position into its eastern flank. Encountering more Union troops near Fairfax Court House, Stuart was forced to move further eastward and could not turn north until reaching Rowser's Ford on the Potomac River. As a result, Stuart found himself positioned to the east of the Union army, unable to effectively screen Ewell's right flank.

Stuart had taken his three most capable cavalry brigades, leaving the remaining two brigades without strong leadership. Approximately 5000 cavalry troops were left behind with Lee, and the commander of this force was aware that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River between June 25 and 27. However, this crucial information was not relayed to Generals Longstreet and Lee, leaving them without reliable reconnaissance. Stuart did send a dispatch to General Lee on June 27, informing him of Hooker's crossing, but it never reached him. A copy of the dispatch did reach Richmond, but no one there took the initiative to confirm this information with the Commanding General.

Lee specifically instructed Stuart to move northward, protect the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain communication with Lee's forces. It was crucial for Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) informed about the movements and activities of the Union Army, as well as act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gathering intelligence on Lee's army. Lee emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information, and he also wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and protect Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. However, beyond these instructions, Stuart had considerable discretion in how he accomplished these objectives.

Stuart's interpretation of the orders differed from Lee's intentions due to his ambitions and the allure of bypassing the AoP. Instead of maintaining close contact with Lee's army, Stuart embarked on an extensive raid around the Union forces. Lee had specifically directed Stuart to safeguard the mountain passes with a portion of his force while the ANV was still positioned south of the Potomac River. Subsequently, Stuart was supposed to cross the river with the remaining troops and protect the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. However, Stuart opted for an alternative route, choosing to lead his three best brigades between the AoP and Washington. He proceeded northward through Rockville to Westminster and eventually into Pennsylvania, to seize supplies and cause disruption near the enemy capital. Instead of taking a more direct path north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart decided to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades, namely those commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (who replaced the injured Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee), between the Union army and Washington. This strategic choice was made in the hopes of capturing supplies along the way and creating chaos near the enemy capital.

Furthermore, despite Stuart's direct orders for Brigadier General Beverly Robertson to join Lee's forces when General Hooker advanced, Robertson displayed a lackadaisical approach to his duties. Instead, Robertson focused on guarding the mountain gaps and the baggage train, ultimately failing to arrive at the battle. The brigades that Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade, which was temporarily attached to the army and more accustomed to partisan activities, as well as the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was regarded as the outcast of the ANV's cavalry command, having previously been dismissed, while Jones, although competent, earned the nickname "Grumble" due to his difficult nature. Lee did not place as much trust in these brigades or their commanders compared to Stuart and the three brigades he chose to accompany him.

Stuart and his three brigades at 1 a.m. on June 25. Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement to defend Washington and Baltimore was underway, so his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes, and ears" of the army while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.

Stuart's decision to seize a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was motivated by various factors. Stuart believed that capturing the wagon train would provide the Confederate army with valuable supplies and provisions, such as food, ammunition, and other resources necessary for their operations. Additionally, Stuart may have seen this as an opportunity to disrupt the Union's supply lines, causing panic and confusion among their forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Moreover, capturing such a significant wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It could have been a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and restore his reputation, which had been tarnished by earlier criticisms in southern newspapers. However, it is important to note that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train over gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would have posed a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as emphasizing the importance of acquiring supplies. This interpretation aligns with Lee's campaign objectives and goals, justifying Stuart's actions.

Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army.  From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day.  Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes included Thoroughfare Gap June 25, Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride note that he faced genuine challenges and required astute tactics to ensure the preservation of his command.

On June 30, General Jubal Early, who would later blame other Confederate generals for the loss at Gettysburg, including Stuart, heard the sounds of battle at Hanover. Despite being aware that Stuart was supposed to be locating him, Early made no effort to ascertain the identity of the combatants. Remarkably, Early was within a mere 5 miles of the battle, and had he made contact, Stuart could have arrived at Gettysburg on July 1.

The Plan of Invasion

The ANV traversed the Blue Ridge Mountains and advanced north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15, 1863. After crossing the Potomac at Falling Waters, Lee made the strategic decision to divide his forces during their march northward to maintain secrecy regarding their exact location and to sow confusion among the occupied areas. Lee aimed to demonstrate to the people of the North that he held the advantage in the conflict. Additionally, the division of forces was necessary for the procurement of supplies and helped to prevent traffic congestion. It also hinted at Lee's intention to engage in open battle rather than launching a direct assault on a fort or initiating a siege of a city. However, the chosen western route seems indirect if Lee's ultimate goal was to target Baltimore, Washington, or Philadelphia. It is often suggested that Harrisburg was his intended objective, but if so, he was planning on its capture with just one corps. Ewell had swiftly advanced northward towards Harrisburg, while Longstreet remained concealed behind South Mountain until their exit at Cashtown.

However, the AoP was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. General Hooker had to anticipate a potential attack on Washington or Baltimore. He took measures to defend these crucial locations by mobilizing as many troops as possible. In the absence of concrete information, Hooker made the prudent decision to concentrate his forces and secure the roads leading to the capital to thwart any potential assault. Given the circumstances, Hooker's decision to remain centrally located was the correct course of action.

Meade takes over

After Chancellorsville, calls for Hooker to be replaced were widespread. With Lee on the move, somewhere, and realizing that a major battle was soon to take place, a decision had to be made by Lincoln and Stanton. Darius Couch, as second in command, would have been the obvious choice to replace Hooker, and Lincoln offered him the position. Couch instead resigned his post to create the Department of the Susquehanna, where he brilliantly held off General Gordon with the militia at Sporting Hill on June 30. He recommended Meade instead.

Following Couch's refusal, President Lincoln held a private meeting with Major General John Reynolds on June 2, during which he reportedly inquired about Reynolds' willingness to assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds, however, expressed his readiness to accept the position only if he could operate independently and free from the political influences that had plagued previous commanders. Understandably, Lincoln could not agree to such a condition, leading to an impasse in their discussion.

The lack of confidence in General Hooker expressed by his senior officers, as well as by General-in-chief Henry Halleck, further exacerbated the situation. Hooker suggested the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the consolidation of his forces, but his demand to regain control of the garrison or else resign provided Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln with the perfect opportunity to accept his resignation. In a moment of impulse, Hooker tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Subsequently, when General Meade assumed command, he immediately made the same request and was granted the authority over the garrison.

Stanton dispatched a civilian engineer, Herman Haupt, his chief of railroads, to oversee the management of the railroads, including the civilian lines. This individual possessed extensive knowledge of the area and coincidentally owned a house in Gettysburg.. On June 30, he informed General Halleck that the Confederates were planning to gather near that vicinity. On July 1, he strategically utilized a single-track line and organized the operation of 5 or 6 10-car trains, one after another, to swiftly transport goods from Baltimore to Westminster. He also instructed Meade's quartermasters to have troops prepared to unload the cargo upon arrival and promptly send the trains back. To ensure effective communication in the absence of functioning telegraph lines, he established a communication line resembling a pony express system that followed the tracks. By July 3, this well-coordinated operation had successfully transported 1500 tons of cargo to the battlefield and returned 2000 wounded soldiers to hospitals in Baltimore. Notably, when President Lincoln delivered his address in November, he traveled by train from Baltimore to Gettysburg on the same line.

Henry Thomas Harrison

On the evening of June 28th, Lee was informed by a spy that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. The spy, a diminutive actor who worked with General Longstreet, was known to provide highly accurate information. General Lee had to swiftly adapt his strategies. Recognizing that Meade was a cautious and meticulous commander who was unlikely to make any major errors, Lee needed to devise a more careful plan. The immediate priority was to ensure the concentration of his widely dispersed army, which extended from Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The initial step in this process was to gather his army in a centralized location. Consequently, Lee directed his troops to converge around the crossroads towns of Cashtown and Gettysburg.

Pipe Creek Circular

Meanwhile, Meade decided that his best course of action was to stop looking for Lee and instead let Lee look for him. On June 30, Meade relocated his headquarters to Taneytown, MD, and issued two orders. The first order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, outlined the construction of a defensive perimeter, while the second order directed a general advance toward Gettysburg starting on July 1. Gettysburg was located between 5 to 25 miles away from each of Meade's seven infantry corps. The Pipe Creek Line served as a defensive barrier to protect against potential attacks on Baltimore and Washington D.C. It also acted as a reserve line in case a retreat from Gettysburg became necessary for the Union forces.

The Pipe Creek Line was positioned just north of Westminster, Maryland, and held strategic importance for the AoP.: the Western Maryland Railroad had its terminus in Westminster, making it the primary supply line for the army in the region, including Gettysburg. Safeguarding this crucial supply route was of utmost importance. The Pipe Creek Line followed Parr Ridge, a significant ridge that stretched from Manchester in the east to Middleburg in the west, running on an east/west axis. Except for some lower ground near Middleburg, the entire position was situated on high ground that was easily defensible. It was believed that this strong position would be nearly impregnable unless Lee could successfully flank it.

The Day Before. Brig Gen John Buford arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of June 30, accompanied by 2 cavalry brigades and approximately 3000 soldiers. Upon his arrival, he was informed by residents that Confederate soldiers were in the vicinity. One of AP Hill's brigades, led by Brig Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured towards Gettysburg. According to the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, Pettigrew was sent to search for supplies, particularly shoes, in the town. With a brigade of 2700 men, Pettigrew conducted a scouting movement. During this movement, he encountered a physician named Dr John O'Neal, who was on a house call. After inspecting O'Neal's medical equipment, Pettigrew inquired about the presence of Union troops, to which O'Neal responded negatively. However, as they approached the town, Pettigrew spotted what he believed to be Union cavalry in the distance. He did not bring on an engagement, as he had been ordered, and returned to Generals Heth and Hill to report.

Confederate Response: When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. It is perplexing to consider why neither General Heth nor General Hill placed trust in Pettigrew's observations. One possible explanation is that both Heth and Hill were relatively new to their positions and had reputations for impulsive decision-making. In terms of practical experience, Heth did not possess significantly more than Pettigrew.

Furthermore, Pettigrew's background as a non-West Pointer from a wealthy family, coupled with his lack of military experience before the war, may have contributed to the skepticism towards his report. Additionally, the fact that Pettigrew's men were freshly outfitted with new uniforms and rifles, and his staff consisted of fellow aristocrats, may have given the impression that they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the realities of battle. Consequently, Hill may have discounted Pettigrew's interpretation due to these factors, leading to a failure to take his report seriously.

Union Response: In contradistinction, Buford had also spotted Pettigrew’s men. He recognized that he was facing a sizeable force of rebels because they had moved without vedettes as a screen. Buford's identification of a significant enemy presence in the area was taken seriously by his superior, Gen Reynolds. Buford was the ideal individual in the ideal location at the opportune moment. He had attended West Point, was acquainted with many of the generals as school friends, had served in the US First Dragoons, had commanded infantry, and had recently led his cavalry division at Brandy Station and Upperville. His military expertise was highly regarded; Buford and Reynolds had trust and confidence in each other, and their shared experiences at Second Manassas had demonstrated the consequences of disregarding accurate reports from a subordinate. Therefore, when Buford requested close support, Reynolds promptly initiated the advance. The outcome of battles hinges on such intricate details; these specifics determine the victor and the vanquished.

Recognizing that the Confederate movement was originating from the northwest, Buford strategically positioned his men along the roads in this vicinity. Anticipating that any engagement involving his division would serve as a delaying tactic, he dismounted his troopers and stationed them on the low ridges to the north and northwest of the town, aiming to buy time for the army to arrive and secure the advantageous positions to defend McPherson and Seminary Ridges.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

References

·      James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988; and

·      https://www.historynet.com/conquer-peace-lees-goals-gettysburg-campaign/

·      https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244

·      https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/

·      Eric J Wittenberg and J David Petruzzi, Plenty of Blame to Go Around. SavasBeattie, 2006.

·      Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.

·      Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.

·      Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg. A Study in Command. University of North     Carolina, 2021.

·      Lloyd W Klein, https://www.rebellionresearch.com/why-did-lee-want-gettysburg-2?fbclid=IwAR3BX-K30era80r4YbpIK7akPaYj4JauC3XoaHZYFtvj8lTQzuQ3v1rfD5c&fs=e&s=cl ;

·      https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-were-robert-e-lees-goals-for-invading-pennsylvania-in-1863?fbclid=IwAR02kXsGHSKe992kDLtyFQy41v5igLfai3YrNN6Fb8v9SDFPDJxywT9zKZ0 ; and

·      https://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/8/24/logistics-challenges-of-the-army-of-northern-virginia-in-the-gettysburg-campaign

·      John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

·      Scott L Mingus and Eric J Wittenberg, If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania.Vol1. SavasBeattie 2022.

What You May Not Know About the History of U.S. Election Campaign Trains

Whistle-stop campaign trains were an effective way for politicians to connect with voters in large cities and small towns for more than 185 years. Unfortunately, memories of the pivotal role that trains played in elections fade a bit more with the passing of each generation.

In researching the history of the trains for my new book, Whistle-Stop Politics, I came across dozens of stories and largely forgotten pieces of information about candidates who sought votes from the back of trains at railroad stations across the country.

Here are a few examples that will likely be new to today’s voters.

Edward Segal explains. Edward is the author of Whistle-Stop Politics: Campaign Trains and the Reporters Who Covered Them (Amazon US | Amazon UK).

President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the Ferdinand Magellan train in April 1943. Source: White House History, available here.

Some Presidential Candidates Were Impersonated on the Campaign Trail

To provide candidates respite from the rigors of the campaign trail, stand-ins would occasionally deceive people into thinking they had seen the whistle-stopping politicians. The list of those who were impersonated by their staff, family members, and reporters includes William Jennings Bryan, Eugene Debs, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower.

During his 1936 campaign train tour, FDR said he was tired of sitting by the window of his railcar and waving to the crowds at every town the train passed through, according to Bernard Asbell, author of When F.D.R. Died.

That’s when Roosevelt asked White House usher William D. Simmons, “How would you like to be President for a while? Only for a little while. Maybe an hour or two,” Asbell recounted.

“With a flourish, [Roosevelt] turned over his cigarette holder to Simmons and showed him how to wave a big, open-fingered hand in the Rooseveltian manner and how to smile a big, open-jawed smile,” Asbell wrote in his book. ‘Fine! Fine!’ the President said again. ‘Now, every time we pass a town, just sit there and wave. I’m tired. I’m going to take a nap.’”

All across Arkansas, “Simmons sat by the President’s window. At each town, the train slowed, not too little, nor too much, just enough so the local townsfolk could experience the incomparable thrill of seeing someone who appeared to be Franklin Roosevelt waving to them,” Asbell noted.

Whistle-stopping Politicians Were Not Always Well-Received

Democratic running mates John Kerry and John Edwards faced a divided and raucous crowd when their campaign train pulled into Sedalia, Missouri, in 2004. “Holding candles, flashlights and posters, the people of Sedalia engaged in a shouting contest: Some called out ‘Four more years’ and ‘We want Bush,’ while their neighbors chanted, ‘Three more months’ and ‘Kerry! Kerry!’”

“The candidates could barely get a word in,” the Chicago Tribune reported. “Posters held aloft competed for attention too. There were signs that read ‘Give ’em hell, Kerry’ and others that simply said ‘W.’ “‘Will you let us speak? Will you let us speak, please?’ Edwards urged the jeering Republican section of the crowd.”

Lyndon Johnson Planned His 1960 Trackside Rallies

Lyndon Johnson designed the format of his 1960 vice presidential campaign train tour, according to historian Robert A. Caro, author of The Passage of Power: The Years of Lyndon Johnson.

As the LBJ Special approached towns, its public address system would be switched on, and over it would come the stirring strains of “The Yellow Rose of Texas.”  The music was turned up as the train neared the towns, until the song could be heard for several surrounding blocks.

Once the train arrived at depots, the music and the locomotive’s engine would stop simultaneously, a dark blue curtain that had been hung over the doorway onto the rear platform would be pulled aside, and the tall figure of Lyndon Johnson, waving a ten-gallon hat, would step through to address the crowd.

Johnson choreographed his departures, according to CBS News reporter George Herman. The candidate would signal an aide for the train to pull out of stations before he finished speaking, yelling to crowds that “They’re taking me away from ya! Bye, everybody! Vote Democratic! They’re taking me away from ya!”

A Candidate’s Train Was Ticketed

California governor Edmund G. Brown (father of future governor Jerry Brown) rode the “Progress Special” train during his losing battle for reelection in 1966 against his challenger, actor Ronald Reagan.

At a trackside gathering in downtown Inglewood, a Los Angeles suburb, the campaign special became the first whistlestop train to receive a ticket when local police issued a citation to the engineer for blocking a traffic intersection.

Will one of this year’s presidential or other candidates seek votes from the back of a railroad car? If so, it would be a fitting way to help celebrate the 188th anniversary of the first whistle-stop campaign train trip.

As a reminder, Edward is the author of Whistle-Stop Politics: Campaign Trains and the Reporters Who Covered Them (Amazon US | Amazon UK).

The Story of the Person who Founded the World’s First Anti-War Museum

In today's world, marked by escalating conflicts and geopolitical tensions, the principles of pacifism hold more significance than ever before. As wars once again ravage regions like Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the urgent need for nonviolent solutions and peaceful resolutions to international disputes becomes glaringly evident. Pacifism, rooted in the belief that violence and war are inherently destructive and counterproductive, advocates for the pursuit of peace through dialogue, diplomacy, and nonviolent resistance. Originating from various philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions, pacifism emphasizes the inherent dignity and worth of every human life, rejecting the notion that violence can ever be justified in achieving noble ends. One individual who epitomized the essence of pacifism and paid a heavy price for his unwavering commitment to nonviolence was Ernst Friedrich. Ahead of his time by a significant margin, Friedrich's steadfast refusal to participate in World War I and his unyielding opposition to militarism even led to his confinement in a mental institution.

Matti Geyer explains.

Ernst Friedrich.

Childhood & Youth

Ernst Friedrich was born on February 25, 1894, in Breslau (now Wrocław). Despite his humble beginnings as the thirteenth child of a washerwoman and a saddler, Friedrich's journey was marked by a relentless pursuit of justice and a commitment to pacifism. His parents imparted values of compassion and resilience that would shape Friedrich's lifelong dedication to humanitarian causes.

His early life was marked by the struggles of working-class existence. Despite limited formal education, he displayed a voracious appetite for knowledge and social activism. After a brief stint as a factory worker and an aborted apprenticeship as a book printer, Friedrich embarked on a journey of self-discovery, traversing Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland as a "journeyman." It was during this period of exploration that Friedrich's encounters with anarchist thought and socialist principles ignited the flames of rebellion within him. In 1911 he joined the Social Democratic Party, but it was the outbreak of World War I that catalyzed his transformation into an ardent pacifist.

First World War: Confrontation with Conscience

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 thrust Friedrich into the heart of a moral quandary. Confronted with the prospect of military service, he steadfastly refused to partake in the bloodshed, citing conscientious objection as his guiding principle. His refusal to don a uniform led to his confinement in a psychiatric observation station, where he endured the harsh realities of wartime incarceration. Not wanting to serve for one's fatherland was simply unimaginable at the time. In 1917, he was further sentenced to prison in Potsdam for sabotage in a war-critical enterprise. He was released at the end of 1918 due to the November Revolution.

Friedrich's activism took various forms, from his involvement with illegal anarchist groups to his founding of the "Freie Jugend" (Free Youth), an anarchist group with a publication of the same name, advocating for anarchist principles and antiauthoritarian socialism. His publications were frequently banned or confiscated, and Friedrich repeatedly found himself in court. Lawyer Hans Litten defended him in numerous trials. After several previous convictions, on November 14, 1930, he was once again sentenced to one year in prison for his political activities, specifically "preparation for high treason." He was alleged to have been involved in distributing antimilitarist texts among the police and the Reichswehr. Friedrich's commitment to peace ultimately found expression in his establishment of the International Anti-War Museum in Berlin in 1925, which served as a testament to the horrors of war and a rallying point for peace activists.

The Anti-War Museum

At the heart of Friedrich's activism lay the Anti-Kriegs-Museum, a pioneering institution dedicated to exposing the brutal realities of war. Through meticulous curation and compelling exhibits, Friedrich sought to shatter the romanticized notions of warfare propagated by the authorities. In addition to objects from the First World War, paintings by Käthe Kollwitz and Otto Dix were exhibited. Furthermore, the museum founder managed to acquire and exhibit photographs of war mutilations, which were also published in a two-volume book titled "War Against War." The museum was predominantly financed through the sales of this book. The exhibition also addressed the issue of children playing with toy soldiers.

Nazi Persecution & Exile

Even before the Nazi takeover in 1933, Ernst Friedrich was terrorized by them. The windows of the Anti-War Museum were constantly destroyed, and Friedrich was regularly subjected to violent attacks. After the Reichstag fire, he was arrested on February 28, 1933. After his release, he fled in December of the same year. For some time, he found refuge in the Rest-Home project operated by Quakers. His first wife Charlotte Friedrich, née Meier (1895-1981) was able to emigrate to England. 

The Nazis looted the Anti-War Museum in March 1933 and renamed it „Richard Fiedler House“ (after SA leader Richard Fiedler). It then served as a meeting place for the SA until the demolition of the building in 1936. 

Ernst Friedrich ended up in Belgium, where he simply reopened his museum in Brussels in 1936. However, it was once again destroyed in 1940 following the German occupation of Belgium.

Joining the French Resistance

Ernst Friedrich and his son (who was also called Ernst) fled to France, where they were interned by the Vichy regime in the St. Cyprien camp, later in the Gurs camp. He managed to escape not only once but twice: First, after 18 months of imprisonment and for a second time after the Gestapo had tracked him down. While his son was arrested and forced to work as an interpreter for the Gestapo, Ernst Friedrich, despite being a committed pacifist, now joined the Resistance, fought in the liberation of Nîmes and Alès, was wounded twice, but managed to save around seventy children from a Jewish orphanage from deportation. 

Despite enduring internment in French concentration camps and facing the constant threat of arrest by Nazi agents, Friedrich remained resolute in his commitment to peace and resistance. His tireless efforts to defy oppression and aid the persecuted stand as a testament to the indomitable spirit of human resilience.

Legacy of Peace

Following the war, Friedrich became a French citizen and joined the Socialist Party, dedicating himself to the establishment of a new anti-war museum in France. In 1954, he received compensation for the loss of his property and the physical damage suffered in the Third Reich. With this, he bought approximately 3,000 square meters of wooded area on a Seine island near Le Perreux-sur-Marne (Val-de-Marne), where he established an international youth center. The "Swiss Pavilion", the "Berlin Pavilion", and the "Tolstoy House" built here together had fifty beds. With the help of a German union, the "Île de la Paix" (Peace Island) became an international meeting place for working youth from 1961 onwards. Friedrich now symbolically appointed himself as the "World Minister of Peace“. 

Plagued by severe depression in his final years, he died in 1967. His grave is located in the 5th Division of the cemetery of Le Perreux-sur-Marne, Val-de-Marne department. Peace Island was sold after his death and his written legacy destroyed.

A new Anti-War Museum 

On May 2, 1982, the 15th anniversary of Friedrich's death, his museum was re-established in Berlin. It was temporarily located in Berlin-Kreuzberg (which had a large anarchist population at that point) and has been at its current location in the district of Wedding since October 1984. Since then, Ernst Friedrich's grandson, Tommy Spree, and a group of volunteers have been running it. It is now recognized as a non-profit organization and is largely funded by donations. The museum's volunteers support the idea of peace and collaborate with students, politicians, artists, and scholars to design exhibitions. It displays relics from both World Wars. Rotating exhibitions also explore peace movements worldwide. Modern warfare with chemical and biological weapons is also depicted. A highlight of the visit is the trip to the basement, which is an original air raid shelter from World War II. In the cramped, light-tight space, visitors can immerse themselves in the feeling of the anxious nights spent in the bunker.

At the old location of the first Anti-War Museum, where the building no longer exists, a memorial plaque has been installed, with two World War I helmets hanging from the wall, in which flowers are growing.

Matti Geyer is a historical tour guide in Berlin: www.toursofberlin.com. His "Off the beaten path"-tour goes past the site of the first Anti-War Museum.

References

1. Bartolf, Christian, and Dominique Miething. "Ernst Friedrich (1894–1967)." Handbuch Anarchismus, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 2023.

2. Kegel, Thomas. "Ernst Friedrich. Anarchistische Pädagogik in Aktion." In: Ulrich Klemm (Ed.): Anarchismus und Pädagogik. Studien zur Rekonstruktion einer vergessenen Tradition, pp. 126–137. Dipa Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1991.

3. Kegel, Thomas. "‘Krieg dem Krieg!’ Ernst Friedrich – Anarchist und revolutionärer Antimilitarist." Graswurzelrevolution, Heft 115, June 1986.

4. Klemm, Ulrich. "Ernst Friedrich." In: Hans Jürgen Degen (Ed.): Lexikon der Anarchie.Verlag Schwarzer Nachtschatten, Bösdorf/Plön, 1993, ISBN 3-89041-008-1.

5. Linse, Ulrich. "Ernst Friedrich zum 10. Todestag." (Europäische Ideen, Heft 29). Verlag Europäische Ideen, Berlin, 1977.

6. Opel, Jürgen. "Vergessen in Deutschland - Das Anti-Kriegsmuseum des Ernst Friedrich." Freitag, September 6, 1991, p. 13.

7. Spree, Tommy. Ich kenne keine ‘Feinde’. Der Pazifist Ernst Friedrich. Ein Lebensbild.Anti-Kriegs-Museum, Selbstverlag, Berlin, 2000.

The industrial Revolution and Society Today

The Industrial Revolution was the passport to the future. Innovation propelled our economies, technology, and transportation further than ever. Britain, the first country to enter the Industrial revolution, set the tone for how capitalism would affect societies, economies, and the environment across the world. Unfortunately, as innovation and efficiency progressed, working conditions did not. Julius Olavarria explains.

A hurrier and two thrusters moving coal. From the 1853 book The White Slaves of England by J. Cobden.

During the Industrial revolution, there were many examples of maltreatment. One example is a hurrier, “A hurrier, also sometimes called a coal drawer or coal thruster, was a child or woman employed by a collier to transport the coal that they had mined.” 

Coal mine managers strapped women and children to carts, like animals, and made them crawl through mine shafts for 12-hour shifts. These mines were incredibly hot, reaching over 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38C) at times - workers never saw sunlight or breaks and had to hunch over for the entire workday. Jobs like these are textbook examples of the horrid conditions brought by the Industrial Revolution, especially for women and children working in factories or mines.

Jobs like these continued for a long time. For almost 80 years in the 18th and 19th centuries, women and children were subject to the worst of the worst. Generations would go by without much progress. Young lungs were filled with pollution leading to unhealthy lives and untimely deaths. Lives were like the unceasing, monotonous rhythms of the industrial machines. Hurriers saw no light at the end of their social tunnels - or in this case, mineshafts.

Factory Act of 1833

The Factory Act of 1833 set age requirements for child labor. The British House of Commons declared that “children under the age of 9” could not work any longer. Individuals aged 10 through 17 were subject to more restrictions, working fewer hours and in better conditions. This seemed like a win in the social books but was not popular in the slightest.

Sure, setting age requirements to work is great. In what world should a 4-year-old work in a coal mine? Children should be outside, exploring, learning, and having fun. They deserve a childhood just like everyone deserves a childhood. Setting age requirements for work is the first step towards getting them out of factories and into a normal life, right?

In fact, it is wrong.

In a normal working family, the children have to work because they have to. Believe it or not, children aren’t great left to their own devices. Usually, the wife of the family would look after the children during their new-born years, but for working families that wasn’t always possible: the wife needs to work, and if the wife works the child works too. Children, with this in mind, would work starting at ages 3 or 4.

It’s a sad reality. The family is so poor they can’t afford to hire a nanny or watch over their children. (And yes, nannies existed back then - interestingly enough they can be dated back as early as 800 B.C!)

Working children

I digress. Because the working families needed their children to work, the Factory Act of 1833 received a lot of pushback. Women were forced to stay at home or the families were forced to hire nannies. Some families were driven to the depths of poverty - a majority of the family’s wage earners were forced to stay at home.

Then, the Coal Mines Act of 1842 came along - the second act on the way to reform. This prohibited children under the age of 10, who could fit in the tiny mineshafts, from working there. Women were also prohibited as part of this act: major protests came as a result.

It is important to note that social critiques reported on the conditions of the Industrial Revolution. These authors, writers, and early muckrakers convinced the British parliament to set restrictions for women and children. They believed that they could improve conditions for the country by improving the conditions for workers.

Protests from women and children who were limited to work erupted - a paradoxical outcome. These women and children should be grateful: they don’t have to work in these horrible conditions, right?

Wrong.

Losing money

The women and children lost their earnings. The government stepped in and took their money. Now their families would be driven to even greater poverty - there’s no way to escape their social position besides picking up the most brutal of jobs. They were denied even that - they’re angry.

Reformers and parliament quickly realized the need for a solution for women and children. Women and children needed better lives but also needed to be productive. Women needed to make money while children needed a childhood. Possibly the most reasonable and ingenious solution to these problems was education - compulsory elementary education funded by the state.

Acts up until 1870 provided education for the children of poor families, while women took the role of teaching. Women who originally had lost their jobs in the mines could work in schools funded by the government. Children who originally had lost their jobs could be cared for by teachers at school, learning in the process. Families could get back on track because of the new system of education.

So this, finally, is the interesting reason why more women are schoolteachers. It all started in the Industrial Revolution- the innovation, factories, and working conditions then the critiques, acts, and protests all led up to the eventual creation of elementary education. Education acted as both an escape and outlet for women while giving children the childhood they deserved. To think this had historical roots doesn’t sound so crazy now, does it?

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Julius writes at: juliusolavarria.com.

The Victorian-era Volunteer Rifle Corps

The British volunteer rifle corps were formed on May 12, 1859 by Secretary of State for War Jonathan Peel, as a response to public fears of a French invasion or Britain. Italian, Felice Orsini  attempted to use a bomb made by the Birmingham Arms Company to blow up Napoleon III, Napoleon Bonaparte’s great Nephew, in Paris on January 14, 1858 . Despite recent alliances and diplomatic efforts, the French still felt the British were responsible due to the fact that an English city manufactured the bomb and consequently threatened invasions. Due to escalations on both sides, war seemed imminent.

Here, Charis Gambon explains how the volunteer rifle corps were set-up in response.

Jonathan Peel in the 1860s.

With the regular British Army largely fighting abroad a reserve was needed to become the first defence in the UK, with the aim of slowing the French invading force down in order to provide the regular army with enough time to return and take over, should the issue ever arise. Volunteer corps were to be raised under the provisions of the Volunteer Act 1804 which was last used during the Napoleonic Era.  The statistics from Ian F.W Beckett demonstrate the size of the volunteer force in England, Wales, and Scotland. These percentages were calculated based on number of volunteers per 100 people in the total population.  In 1861 the total for England was 0.629%, in Wales 0.655%, and in Scotland 1.119%.  Overall, there were 161,239 enrolled members within the volunteer force in 1861.

Each county of the country possessed at least one volunteer rifle corps, with many units possessing several at the peak of the movement. These corps were only to be formed on the recommendation of the county’s lord-lieutenant. Officers of the movement gained their commission from the lord-lieutenant, many of which had served in the regular army during the Crimea War.

Costs

Members had to attend eight days drill and exercise in four months, or 24 days within a year in order to be a part of a rifle volunteer corps. Additionally members were to provide their own arms and equipment, but as stated by Ian F. W. Beckett they did receive a 30% discount on ammunition from the government. However, this was not as generous as it may seem as the government were the only source for the ammunition. There was also a cost to join the volunteer rifle corps which was set at between 5s and £1.15s.6d. Enfield rifles with bayonet and scabbard cost £4.10s, with trousers and jacket costing the same.

The volunteer rifle corps were largely filled with middle class men, due to the fact that they could afford to purchase their uniform, Enfield rifle and ammunition. Additionally, the middle class were less likely to be in the regular army and consequently sought to make the volunteer movement their version of a men’s club.  The men were often seen as ‘playing soldiers’ by the regular army.  The social aspect of the volunteer movement was immense too. Typically men would take their family with them as volunteers would set up a camp for a week. The camps were seen as an opportunity to show off their wives and finery. Volunteer units would also meet up with other units for rifle competitions, with the biggest competition of the year being held at Wimbledon in London.

Shooting

To be classed as proficient and allowed to be a part of the volunteer rifle corps a volunteer was required to be able to shoot at a distance of 700 yards. This distance would also gain the volunteer a one star badge. To gain two stars a volunteer would have to be able to accurately shoot 900 yards and to gain three stars a volunteer would need to be accurate to 1,200 yards. The best shot in the unit earned himself a special badge that had crossed rifles on it - this signified that he was the most accurate shot.

The volunteers were initially mocked in sources such as PUNCH magazine, and were detested by the regulars, who felt they made a mockery of the military. As a result of this, units wore mostly grey uniforms (70%), the next most popular colour was green, emulating the rifle corps of the regular army (20%), and an assortment wore other colours; however only a few units wore red, and only briefly before being pushed away from this by the regulars. There was actually an approved uniform created by the war office for volunteer riflemen to wear, but no units opted to wear this uniform. Volunteer rifle units could create their own uniforms which they would then submit to the Lord- Lieutenant of the land for approval.  The ability to create uniforms led to a wide variety of uniforms being worn by corps across the country.  There were also generic cap badges and buttons created for all units to wear but similarly to the uniform each unit opted to create their own instead.

Enjoy that piece? If so, join us for free by clicking here.