The First Woman Convicted of Murder in the Oregon Territory: Charity Lamb

Charity Lamb (c. 1818-1879) was infamous in her time for the being the first woman convicted of murder in the new Oregon territory (the territory in the north-west of the United States). Here, Jordann Stover returns and tells us about the murder, Charity’s trial, and the aftermath.

You can also read Jordann’s article on Princess Anastasia Romanova, the youngest daughter of Tsar Nicholas II here, and on Princess Olga ‘Olishka’ Nikolaevna, the Eldest Daughter of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia here.

The Oregon Hospital for the Insane, where Charity Lamb spent her years from 1862.

Charity Lamb -- we do not know the exact date of her birth or what she looked like. We have photos of the asylum she spent the rest of her days confined to, photos of her lawyer but there is nothing of the woman herself. She was born around 1818 and died some sixty years later. She was convicted of murder, the first woman to recieve such a conviction in the new Oregon territory after she plunged an axe into her husband, Nathaniel’s, skull. 

Humans have always had an inherent curiosity for crime, the deadlier the better. We find ourselves captivated by blood spatter and ballistics, by the process of getting into the mind of the world’s most violent individuals. Just as we have done and continue to do in the face of horror, Charity Lamb’s case was sensationalized by the world around her. There were talks of love triangles, insanity, infidelity, and more. The Oregon territory would have had you believing that Lamb was certifiable, that she was a woman lusting after a young man under her husband's (and daughter’s) nose. She, who was almost certainly a housewife who led a monotonous, ordinary life up until the beginning of this fiasco, was seen as a cold-blooded sex-feind. The truth was, of course, far less Lifetime-y. The story of Charity Lamb is one born of an all too familiar circumstance-- a woman trying desperately to survive her marriage to a violent man. 

The Crime

It happened on a Saturday evening. Charity, her husband, and their children sat around the table for a dinner Charity had certainly spent some time preparing. At some point during the meal, Charity stood from the table and left the cabin. We cannot be sure if there was a reaction of any sort from the rest of the family, not until Charity returned just a moment later with an axe. She stepped up behind her husband and hit him as hard as she could in the back of his head not once but two times. After doing so, she and her eldest child, Mary Ann, who was seventeen at the time, fled. The remaining children watched in horror as their father fell to the floor, his body “scrambl[ing] about a little” before falling unconscious. The man did not die immediately; instead, he held on for a few days before dying.

What seemed to have precipitated this event was the affections Mary Ann felt for a man named Collins. Collins was said to have been a farmhand working for a family nearby. There is no record to confirm whether or not the feelings were reciprocated. Perhaps Mary Ann had not gotten a chance to truly express her feelings to the man before her father forbade her from being with him which subsequently led to the teenager asking her mother for help in writing a secret letter to the young man. 

Nathaniel discovered the letter on his wife and accused her of having feelings for Collins herself. We cannot be sure whether or not she truly had feelings for the young man but we can make assumptions-- a case such as this makes a retelling without such assumptions practically impossible. It is unlikely that this woman with a group of children and nearing forty would have been pursuing a presumably penniless farmhand. What is far more believable is that Charity, a mother who knew very well how deeply her daughter’s feelings went, was doing her best to help. Regardless of what was the truth, Nathaniel was furious. He threatened Charity, threatened to take her children away, to murder her. Charity was quite obviously terrified but according to their children who testified at her trial, Nathaniel had frequently been violent with their mother. He’d knocked her to the ground, kicked her, forced her to work when she was sick. He was downright brutal with her for their entire marriage which leaves us to wonder-- what was it about this last threat that scared her so much? Charity was used to this violence so whatever he said to her, whatever he might have done was enough for her to legitimately believe her life was in jeopardy. 

According to Charity, he’d threatened her just as he had many times before; however, this time he was serious. He told her that she would die before the end of the week and once she was gone he’d take their children far away, hurting them in the process. He told her that if she ran, he’d hunt her down and shoot her— it was known how good of a shot Nathaniel was as he was an avid, accomplished hunter. 

The Trial

Charity and Mary Ann were arrested following the events of that morning. The community was outraged. They hated them, and saw them as monsters. Newspapers practically rewrote the events to match whatever story they believed would sell. They told salacious fable after salacious fable until Charity became the most hated woman in the Oregon territory. 

Mary Ann went to trial before her mother and was acquitted. One can only imagine the relief Charity must have felt— this was her fight, certainly not something she wanted her daughter tangled up in anymore than she already was. Charity’s trial followed a few days later and a similar outcome was expected; however, she would not be so lucky. 

A part of the blame can be put on the men who decided to defend her. They had her plead not guilty by reason of insanity, insisting that Charity was not mentally sound; therefore, she could not have known the consequences of her actions. They claimed that her husband’s actions had driven her to insanity. This proved to be the beginning of the end for her hopes of acquittal as anyone in the room could see that she was relatively competent. The judge, in a move that was questionable for someone who was supposed to remain impartial in such matters, sympathized with her. He instructed the jury to acquit if they truly believed her actions were done in self defense.

Despite the sympathies of the judge and the testimonies of the Lamb children confirming the abuses Charity claimed to experience, she was found guilty of murdering her husband. 

Charity wept loudly as the verdict was read. This woman who had survived the Oregon Trail, multiple pregnancies, life on the frontier, and a violent husband was sentenced to prison where she would be subjected to hard labor. The officers had to take her infant from her arms, depositing the child into the arms of another. 

There were no prisons for women in the Oregon territory; Charity was the first woman to be charged with such crimes in the area. The local prison where she was eventually sent had no provisions for her and she remained the only female prisoner for her entire stay. She did the warden’s laundry and other household tasks to fulfill her sentence of hard labor until she was transferred to Oregon Hospital for the Insane in 1862. She lived out the rest of her days in that hospital with a smile on her face and proclaiming her innocence. 

What do you think about the trial of Charity Lamb? Let us know below.

Sources

Lansing, Ronald B. "The Tragedy of Charity Lamb, Oregon's First Convicted Murderess." Oregon Historical Quarterly 40 (Spring 2000)

“Charity Lamb.”, The Oregon Encyclopedia 

https://oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/lamb_charity_1879_/#.Xukj7kXYrrc

The British Colonization of Botany Bay: A Brutal Encounter

Botany Bay in Sydney, Australia has had human habitation for thousands of years. But when Captain James Cook led arrived in 1770 with his British ship HMS Endeavour, it changed its direction greatly. Here, Spencer Striker tells us about what happened after the British arrived – and its negative effect on the native Aboriginal communities.

Botany Bay, a watercolour by Charles Gore from the late 1780s.

A penal colony

Back in 1770, the British, under the command of Lieutenant James Cook, landed in Australia for the first time, in what is known as the Botany Bay. Thus far, the land belonged to many Aboriginal tribes who were indigenous and were believed to reside there for the previous 5,000 years. This landing of the British in the island marked a historical turning point, from which onwards Australia was considered a profitable colony for the British Empire. What attracted the British were the wide variety of flora and fauna, and Cook decided to name the bay Botany Bay, for its botanical biodiversity. An interesting fact that is relatively unknown, is that the land was not used as a plantation as many colonies were, but as a place where convicts and prisoners of the British Empire were relocated, but not under any restrictions. Practically, the British were said to use Botany Bay as a place to 'dump convicts' and other felons, for British reasons and interests, one of which included lumbering, despite the harm this caused to the native populations and the natural habitat. 

The rich resources

Like the plantation colonies of the Caribbean islands, the Australian colonies were results of the ‘push and pull’ factors of competitive capitalism. The needs of the huge empire were enormous, and Australia's rich land, with untouched forests and natural resources, was valuable for the capitalist interests of the time. The colonizing processes included mining, agricultural activities, lumbering of the forests, and the usage of the large water resources. However, it is important to understand the strategic significance of the colonization of Australia, as a position that facilitated remote control over the "Indo-China trade routes”. Upon arrival, the economic system they established in the natives’ land was liberal, claiming the land for the financial interests of Britain, and the Crown. The relocation of the convicts in Australia saved the need for social reform in Britain. Another colonizing factor could be considered the widely accepted philosophy of spreading ‘European’ socio-political and cultural influence over foreign territories, across borders and boundaries. 

Terra Nullius

When the British colonizers came, they considered the land ‘terra nullius’, which means 'empty land', and is a term used in post-colonial studies to explain the colonizer's ideology behind colonization and indigenous genocide. By considering land empty, the British considered the indigenous tribes of Australia less than humans, and they justified their atrocities against them for the sake of their Empire. It can be seen that this philosophy of 'terra nullius' has an enormous impact on Australia since the descendants of these Aboriginal natives still suffer from racism. The Aboriginals, however, were very advanced culturally, and their existence revolved around spirituality and tribal practices in "respect for the sanctity of life." By considering the land empty, the settlers reduced the Aboriginals to the state of ‘bare life’, a concept used to describe how people stripped of their human rights are treated exceptionally, not very different from animals. In addition to that, this imperialist concept also denoted that the lands were declared British property, and the treatment of the natural habitat and environment fell under the hands of the Empire. Therefore, the Australian land suffered from ecocide, as well, as thoughtless wasting of the natural resources and exhaustive cultivation of land, along with deforestation, led to the damage of its natural diversity. 

A case of genocide

In contrast to the colonialists, the tribes were peaceful, and whatever conflicts arose “didn’t result in warfare.” With the arrival of the British, a physical genocide of the Native population was practically inevitable, since diseases foreign to the land were devastating for the population. However, the British effectively forged a chemical and physical war against the Natives by importing dangerous viruses. Death was obliterating the Native population, with diseases such as "smallpox, syphilis, typhoid, whooping cough, diphtheria, tuberculosis, measles, dysentery, and influenza." The British settlers’ chauvinistic approach caused not only the death of vast numbers of the native population, but it also resulted in a sort of cultural genocide, or as is referred to in post-colonial studies, an "ontological violence" that did not allow room for the bare existence of the Native population in their own land. Similar cases of colonization and genocide took place in the New World, with the arrival of Columbus in America in 1492. The very same "dispossession, with ruthless destructiveness" of the land, their people, and their culture shaped the future of the continent in ways difficult to untangle.

The history of this colonization is recorded in detail, but rarely is the side of the Aboriginal people represented, for whom this first encounter with the British was in fact an invasion of their land. Revisiting historical archives can always shed light on shadowy historical events, and it has been giving voice to the under-represented people, who can now come into the center of the hegemonic representation and tell their story as well.

Jiemba and the Death of the Rainbow Serpent

Jiemba is a fictitious character of the Eora tribe, who were the Aboriginal people around Sydney, and they even had sub-tribes with variations in languages. They used to call the Botany bay 'the blue bay' and they have been native to their land since their development and domination over animals. Their civilization was blooming, until the British came with their ship "bringing with them sickness and aggression." 

Jiemba's story starts around 1795, although the very first 'white men' as he calls them were spotted seven years before.

With the help of the newly-published book History Adventures, World of Characters Revolutions & Industrialization, 1750 – 1900 by Spencer Striker, we get a glimpse of what it was like for a common aboriginal man to witness the first British ship arrival. Through the story of Jiemba, the indigenous witness, we can get closer to a wider view of the events, that represents both parties and allows us to see the complex history of the colonization of Australia by the great power that Britain was.

More on Spencer’s book:

History is a fascinating subject, so why is it that so many students struggle with it? It's because of the way it is taught. Just being pumped full of names, events, and dates takes all the real meaning out of it. It's the stories and characters behind the happenings that make it memorable, which is what makes Spencer Striker PhD's interactive digital history book, History Adventures, World of Characters, Revolutions & Industrialization, 1750 – 1900, so interesting. 

Sources

Agamben, G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Banner, Stuart. "Why Terra Nullius-Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia." Law & Hist. Rev. 23 (2005): 95.

Genger, Peter. "The British Colonization of Australia: An Exposé of the Models, Impacts, and Pertinent Questions." Peace and Conflict Studies 25.1 (2018): 4. p. 2.

Gillen, Mollie. "The Botany Bay decision, 1786: convicts, not empire." The English Historical Review 97.CCCLXXXV (1982): 740-766.

Spencer Striker, PhD. History Adventures, World of Characters Revolutions & Industrialization, 1750 – 1900. 2020 [Online] https://books.apple.com/us/book/history-adventures-world-of-characters/id1505237819?ls=1

The Amazing Life of American Photographer Margaret Bourke-White

Margaret Bourke-White (1904-71) was a photographer who had a fascinating career. She went to the Soviet Union in 1930, photographed the Great Depression in 1930s America, and took photos in various wars. Parker Beverly explains – and we also include Parker’s documentary on Margaret below.

American Way of Life, a 1937 photo by Margaret Bourke-White

From the battlefields of Italy during World War II to the tranquil home of Mahatma Gandhi throughout the Partition of India, Margaret Bourke-White was there to capture it all. Born in the Bronx, New York in 1904, Bourke-White grew up in a modest household.[1] It was not until her college years that Margaret began exploring the art of photography.[2] A gifted writer, Bourke-White fused the line between visual and written mediums, creating photographs that spoke to viewers' emotions and sensibilities. A serendipitous shoot at Cleveland's Otis Steel factory landed her industrial photograph portfolio on the desk of Henry Luce, the publisher of Time magazine who tasked her with being the first photographer for Fortune magazine.[3]Climbing atop ledges of the Chrysler Building and entering hazardous industrial factories, Bourke-White soon gained a reputation of being a fearless photographer, undaunted by gender or occupational boundaries.  

Her 1931 book Eyes on Russia which documented her travels throughout the nascent industrial Soviet Union through photographs made her the first photographer to capture the country's steadily growing industrialization.[4] In 1937, she along with her then husband, Erskine Caldwell published You Have Seen Their Faces which detailed the plight of poor rural Southerners in the midst of economic hardship.[5] It was this experience with suffering along with a Fortune assignment covering Midwestern droughts[6] that changed Bourke-White's photography from an advertiser's lens to one depicting the human condition. One of her more famous photographs captures the stark difference between commercial and racial realities in the United States with a line of African Americans seeking emergency aid pictured against a billboard depicting a white unaffected family.  

Wars

In 1936, Margaret's career changed focus as she transitioned into her role as a staff photographer for Life Magazine.[7] Well regarded for its photo essays which documented everything from the building of the Fort Peck Dam to a wartime Thanksgiving, Life provided a national platform for Bourke-White's photography. Seeking to relay news from the battlefield to the home front, Life sent Margaret to photograph various scenes from World War II including torpedo attacks, bombing missions, and the liberation of concentration camps.[8] Soon after, she captured the struggles of apartheid in South Africa and lastly, documented the strife of the Korean War.[9]  While in Korea, Bourke-White began noticing symptoms of Parkinson's disease, a condition which she fought for nearly 20 years.[10]

I came across Margaret's fascinating story while researching for the National History Day (NHD) contest in 2017. I was struck by the lack of coverage on her remarkable and pioneering photojournalism career and knew I wanted to tell her story. Interviewing individuals such as Cokie Roberts and Judy Woodruff, I brought her noteworthy narrative to life through a documentary film seen in both the NHD contest and the All-American High School Film Festival. Three years later, I am still inspired by Margaret's overwhelming tenacity.  Today, her photographs still provide relevant discussion of important moments in history while her trailblazing career encourages others to follow their passions.

You can see Parker’s film on Margaret Bourke-White below. Let us know what you think below.

[1] Vicki Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White:  A Biography (New York City, NY:  HarperCollins, 1986).  

[2]  Ibid.  

[3]  Beverly W. Brannan, “Margaret Bourke-White (1904-1971),” Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division.  

[4]  Ibid.  

[5]  Jay E. Caldwell, Erskine Caldwell, Margaret Bourke-White, and the Popular Front:  Photojournalism in Russia     (Athens, GA:  University of Georgia Press, 2016).  

[6] Beverly W. Brannan, “Margaret Bourke-White (1904-1971),” Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division, https://loc.gov/rr/print/coll/womphotoj/bourkewhiteessay.html. 

[7]  Margaret Bourke-White, Portrait of Myself (New York City, New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1963). 

[8]  Ibid.  

[9]  Vicki Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White:  A Biography (New York City, NY:  HarperCollins, 1986).

[10]  Ibid. 

My documentary for the National History Day Contest (2017-2018) for the theme "Conflict and Compromise in History." 2018 Official Selection for the All Ameri...

How Defeat in the American Revolution Strengthened Britain in India

The American Revolutionary War (1775-83) resulted in defeat for the British; however, its impact was very different in other parts of the world. Here Bilal Junejo explains how defeat in the war led to Britain strengthening its presence in India.

King George III of England, 1799/1800.

Of all the upheavals that dot the annals of the turbulent eighteenth century, it is improbable that many could readily vie in either import or impact with the seminal War of American Independence, a landmark which, whilst it tolled the death knell of imperial aggrandizement at one end of the globe, simultaneously, if inadvertently, also served to herald its retrospectively ineluctable flourish at the other by dint of the virtual liquidation that it secured of all non-Indian obstacles in the path of British expansion in India. Indeed, had it not been for this colossal western loss that preceded the eventually colossal eastern gain, General Charles Cornwallis, the Governor-General of India from 1786-93, might never have been afforded the means of expiating his ignominious capitulation to General George Washington at Yorktown in 1781.1 What might have happened in the case of the colonists’ defeat at British hands must necessarily remain the sport of conjecture, but what is certain is that with their victory, the eventual one of their erstwhile masters in London also became well-nigh certain in that illustrious subcontinent of Asia entitled India, the lure of the ages. The way Great Britain’s own fortunes were affected by the American fiasco directly determined the manner in which she would go on to determine those of India. Principally, the impact of the Revolution had two facets: one domestic and one foreign. But because the latter could scarcely have made any difference in the absence of the former, it is to the domestic aspect that we must first turn our attention, before proceeding to contemplate how it operated in conjunction with the other one to render the cumulative result of incorporating India as the brightest jewel in the British crown.

The immediate domestic consequence lay in the dissolution of that effete administration whose memory has become intertwined with the loss of the American colonies, and the hallmark of   which had lain in the anachronistic fantasies of a monarch and the correspondingly complaisant follies of his premier. The government of Lord Frederick North (1770-82) had distinguished itself not only by the acute myopia which had informed its dealings with the colonists since, at least, the Boston Tea Party (1773)2, but also by the slow, yet steady, erosion of those gains which had been consolidated in the practice of parliamentary government since the Glorious Revolution of 1688. King George III, the unfortunate disciple in his early years of the royalist tutelage that pervaded the philosophy of the ironically hapless Earl of Bute3, and in stark contrast to the relatively democratic predilections of the first two Hanoverians, ascended the throne with a vigorous resolve to effect the full exercise of royal powers, but in his personal capacity, a regression that would entail a gradual erosion of the need to govern through ministers responsible to parliament. The Settlement of 1689 had provided that thenceforth the government should be a constitutional monarchy, but the immediate consequence of that compromise, as Trevelyan explained, was to limit any further expansion of the royal prerogative, rather than effect its transfer from the sovereign to their ministers, which only transpired gradually over the decades— a classic example of what the Fabian Sidney Webb called the ‘inevitability of gradualness’. Of this inexorable transformation’s culmination, the essence was succinctly delineated by one Lord Esher, in a memorandum that His Lordship prepared for King George V in 1913, during the constitutional troubles over the issue of Home Rule for Ireland:

“Has the King then no prerogatives? Yes, he has many, but when translated into action, they must be exercised on the advice of a Minister responsible to Parliament. In no case can the Sovereign take political action unless he is screened by a Minister who has to answer to Parliament. This proposition is fundamental, and differentiates a Constitutional Monarchy based upon the principles of 1688 from all other forms of government.”4

The impact in Britain

It is not for us to delve into the constitutional implications of George III’s untoward proclivities, for all that need concern us here are the political ramifications, in the light of that era’s constitutional status quo, that would likely have ensued following a British victory in America. In any given society, it is axiomatic to say that an overseas victory achieved by the incumbent regime will redound to its credit and increase its popularity amongst the electorate, whereas any loss would only serve to undermine its popular appeal and support. Because the defeat in America was so categorical, the pretensions of the George-North administration were dealt a mortal blow, and the peril of a return to the polity of James II was practically expunged. Englishmen of the seventeenth century had waged a formidable Civil War for the blessings of political liberty and accountable government, restored Charles II when it seemed expedient to do so to restore stability after the less than favorable developments following Cromwell’s demise, but then again overthrown   James II a mere five and twenty years later when it appeared that his deleterious inclinations promised a return to the autocracy of his father’s days. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that had autocratic power begun to increase in the wake of a victory in America, the people (especially the Whigs) of Britain would have so submissively acquiesced in a renewed emulation of the traditions that still inspired the dilapidated ancien régime in neighboring France. Indeed, the famous writer and politician, Edmund Burke (1729-97), had begun to sound the alarm as early as 1770, even before the Revolution, when he published his pamphlet entitled Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, arguing that King George III was upsetting the balance between crown and parliament in the British constitution by seeking to rule without due acknowledgement of the party political system.5 And in 1780, whilst the war was still going on, Dunning’s resolution— which lamented that “the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished”— was passed by a distrustful House of Commons.6 Thus, it is not fanciful to suppose that victory in America would have given a fresh lease of life to the George-North administration, any continuance of which could have only served to deepen the fissures in British society. If the King could block Catholic Emancipation, despite his American failure, for as long as he lived, then one can only wonder at what he might have done had he won that redoubtable contest of wills on transatlantic shores. As it happened, though, a contretemps in America averted the much greater danger of domestic unrest and civil war at home, which would scarcely have conduced to the acquisition of empire in the world. The last Jacobite uprising of 1745-6, with all its turbulence, was still a living memory, and Bonnie Prince Charlie, the Young Pretender, was destined to live until 1788, which means that it was not impossible for him, or his nominee, to become the figurehead   of a popular resistance to a jubilant George-North oligarchy. An unstable metropolis cannot exude the aura of that infallibility and serenity which is indispensable for cowing a foreign people into deferential submission, even against their will.

The rivalry with France

The second aspect that merits consideration here is the impact that the Americans’ victory had on France, Britain’s historic— and, in India, the principal— rival and the chief abettor of seditious endeavors across the Atlantic. How the war affected France was aptly summed up by the historian, Herbert Fisher, when he observed that “for Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, no policy could have been more improvident, for not only did the American war give the final push to the tottering edifice of French finance, but the spectacle of republicanism triumphant and monarchy overthrown across the Atlantic kindled in every forward-reaching mind in France the vision of a Europe remade after the new American pattern of republican liberty.”7  Again, we can only speculate about what might have happened in the case of French neutrality or the Americans’ defeat, but what is certain is that after Washington’s triumph at Yorktown, and the ironic, not to mention portentous, fact that the treaty of peace and recognition between Great Britain and the new American democracy was signed at despotic Versailles, revolution in France became only a matter of time. The cost of the war was unlikely to have been inflamed to the degree that it was on the eve of the Bastille’s fall had it not been for the legitimate pride that the likes of Lafayette could take in the succor they had rendered the armies of Washington. France might have collapsed even earlier in the case of defeat in America, but it is also possible that she might have launched a fresh war of revenge in Europe for the distraction of domestic opinion from real domestic issues to manufactured foreign perils. And if France had lost, then England would have won, and thereby consolidated the insidious gains in royal power made by King George III up to then, resulting in British foreign policy coming to reflect royal predilections more and more, as opposed to those of Parliament. One must not forget that the English monarch back then, a Hanoverian, was also the Elector of Hanover at the same time, and if France had decided to avenge an ignominious failure in America by attacking Hanover to her east (thereby precluding the need to try to reach a conclusion with the Royal Navy), George III might have decided to focus his entire attention on saving his Electorate without worrying about Britain’s overseas possessions, and given the latent insanity with which we know, thanks to the benefit of hindsight, that he was afflicted, all sorts of untoward eventualities might have arisen.

The impact on India

How exactly did these two consequences cumulatively affect India? This is the question that constitutes the end of our discussion. In 1623, the massacre of Amboina had forced the English to withdraw from the East Indies. Now, Yorktown had also necessitated a kindred evacuation from the American colonies, so India was perforce the main attraction left for imperial gratification. But such gratification, quite naturally, presupposes uninterrupted stability in the metropolis, and this was achieved by the Revolution when it shattered the autocratic ambitions of King George III, any realization of which might have imperiled the island state’s security by precipitating a fresh civil war. And we must not forget that towards the end of the eighteenth, as well as the beginning of the nineteenth, century, some of the most crucial battles that would determine the fate of the East India Company in India were fought (e.g. with Tipu Sahib of Mysore and the Marathas). Even though France was wracked with internal unrest, the contagion of which soon pervaded the rest of Europe and did not abate until 1815, she was nevertheless able to create great problems for the British. Indeed, one of the main reasons for remembering Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of India from 1798-1805, is his frustration of Napoleon’s plans, which encompassed burgeoning contacts with Tipu, to subvert the Indians.8 And when Admiral Nelson decimated the overweening French fleet at Aboukir Bay in August 1798, thereby annihilating any hopes of Napoleon’s advance eastwards to India, it was the East India Company that, out of profuse gratitude, rewarded him with a munificent ten thousand  pounds sterling, a stupendous sum in those days.9 To judge from the magnitude of this largesse, such were the fears aroused by the grandiose ambitions of a feverish and unstable France that one can only wonder what might have happened had the Bastille not been stormed in 1789— a cogently distinct possibility, but for that eruption which commenced at Lexington and was carried to triumph under the auspices of French arms.

Thus, the inevitable conclusion we draw is that the American Revolution, by domestically strengthening Britain at the same time as it domestically weakened France, made it assured that no serious challenge from without could henceforth arise to check the British rise within India. It was so because, to recollect the memorable verdict of Fisher, after the Peace of Versailles, “the continent merely saw that an empire had been lost. It did not perceive that a constitution had  been saved. Yet such was the case. The failure of the king’s American policy involved the breakdown of the last effectual experiment in personal rule which has been tried in Britain.”10 And it was from the ashes of this humbled royal pride that there arose the Pax Britannica. God bless Peace, and God bless Britain.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

1 John Kenyon, The Wordsworth Dictionary of British History (first published 1981, Wordsworth 1994) 93

2  Ibidem, 44

3  Ibidem, 55

4 G. M. Trevelyan, The English Revolution 1688-1689 (first published 1938, Thornton Butterworth Ltd 1938) 193

5 John Kenyon, The Wordsworth Dictionary of British History (first published 1981, Wordsworth 1994) 54

6 Ibidem, 118

7 H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe (first published 1935, The Fontana Library 1972) 861

8 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-speaking peoples (Cassell and Company Ltd 1957) Volume 3, pages 188-9

9 James Brown, The Life & Times Of Lord Nelson (Parragon Book Service Ltd 1996) 41

10 H. A. L. Fisher, A History of Europe (first published 1935, The Fontana Library 1972) 862

The American Civil War: The Legacy of Social and Economic Control

The American Civil War ended in 1865, but its effects lasted a long time – and even linger to this day. Here, Daniel L. Smith returns and presents his views on how economic and social control emerged from the Civil War and last to the present in America.

Daniel’s book on mid-19th century northern California is now available. Find our more here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Freedmen voting in New Orleans in 1867.

It's far from over. In fact, it was never over. Here's a historical clarification to give an insight and some background information into the political 'shadow-war' occurring today in Washington DC and within states nationwide. And that is just the fallout of the ongoing American Civil War. American historians James McPherson and James Hogue, both prominent intellectuals whose area of expertise are in the era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, gave an eye-opening account on the forecast of the Democratic Party’s intentions for America in 1857 and beyond.

​“Slavery lies at the root of all shame, poverty, ignorance, tyranny, and imbecility…” With a direct emphasis on the rogue political tactics used to obligate the whole mass of society, “the lords of the lash” (speaking of Democratic politicians and business elites) who “are not only absolute masters of blacks [but] of all non-slave-holding whites, whose freedom is merely nominal, and whose unparalleled literacy and degradation is purposely and fiendishly perpetuated.”[1]

R. H. Purdom would give an early warning: "Decided course for the speedy suppression of the intolerable abuses” taken on by workers was absolutely necessary for the “permanent welfare of the institution of slavery itself.”[2] Mr. Purdom was a master mechanic who stood up to address a meeting in Jackson, Mississippi. He gave a stark warning to the elite’s controlling the southern economy. By this point, even the poor working white class were ready to turn coat on their own institutions.

In September 1865, a prominent leading Democratic politician (just recently pardoned by the federal government after losing the Civil War) publicly scoffed at any idea of the Democratic Party remaining loyal or maintaining good relations with the newly re-established United States government. Even Wade Hampton, one of the South’s wealthiest elite farmers, would mention immediately after the Civil War that it “is our duty” (talking of the post-war Confederates who were legally pardoned of treason) to support the President of the United States; however their loyalty to the new government would only stay intact if “he manifests a disposition to restore all our rights as a sovereign State.”[2]

After war’s end

Even though rebellious military action ceased weeks after the loss, the Democratic Party of the post-Civil War period only declared a momentary political ceasefire. And although they had formally lost, they did not willingly capitulate to the federal government (the Union) at the moment of military surrender. Between April 9 and November 6, 1865, a nearly invisible ‘shadow war’ marked the 'beginning of the end' for the future of political and social cohesion within America.

Democrats had regained power in most Southern states by the late 1870s. Later, this period came to be referred to as "Redemption". From 1890 to 1908, the Democrats passed statutes and amendments to state constitutions that effectively disenfranchised most African Americans and tens of thousands of poor whites. They did this through devices such as poll taxes for voters and literacy tests to “qualify” to vote (among other underhand tactics). By the late 1950s, the Democratic Party began to embrace the Civil Rights Movement, and the old argument that Southern whites had to vote for Democrats "to protect racial segregation" grew weaker.

The Democratic Party realized that regardless of the outcomes of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the policy of "slavery-by-color" was over. Segregation also became incompatible with their party’s ethics, which is to oppress the poor regardless of color. So what did they do? Modernization had brought factories, national businesses and a more diverse culture to cities such as Atlanta, Dallas, Charlotte, and Houston. This attracted many northern migrants, including many African Americans. They gave priority to modernization and economic growth over preservation of the "old ways" of the Democratic Party, but they wanted social and economic control, a process which had started earlier.

Social and economic control

Between 1865 and the late-1880s, prices were falling and people's incomes increased six-fold, so offering American's more purchasing power.[3] The politicians of the New South began feeling the pressures of big businesses complaints that the increased wages were rising fast. It is because of this major economic shift that the attack on the greedy worker was to begin. There was another shift as well. A social one. Now the freedmen (former slaves) and previously non-slave-holding whites, were able to climb the free-market ladder unhindered. For the Democratic Party, it was time to shift the focus to social and economic control.

"Cut their wages to begin with. Make them work harder. To align their interests with their employers, put wage earners on piecework (part-time). Above everything, do something to stop skilled workers from setting the pace of production and spreading to co-workers their spirit of 'manly' resistance to speed-ups" (hostile resistance to forced increases in manual labor). Much like the post-Modern Institutions of Fast Food, Gas, and Retail, one laborer wrote: "You start in to be a man, but you become more and more a machine.... It's like any severe labor. It drags you down mentally and morally, just as it does physically."[4] Of course the Iron Workers during those times had it painstakingly hard physically, but the shift today has moved to being exhausting mentally.

With the Covid-19 Pandemic, Republicans are screaming at Americans to "get out and live!" They want to encourage financial independence and societal success. The Democrats are screaming at Americans to "stay home and save lives!" At this point, for what? One Democratic politician was quoted recently as telling Americans that they should just stay home and "get paid" with the federal government paying out a basic universal income for everybody. And in the future? Who knows, but the way things look, it could possibly be by something as simple as misleading everybody into eventually doing everything from home -and only home.[5]

It is apparent through history's evidence that control is the Democratic Party's modern end-game.

At least it seems that way.

​Enough said.

You can read a selection of Daniel’s past articles on: California in the US Civil War (here), Spanish Colonial Influence on Native Americans in Northern California (here), Christian ideology in history (here), the collapse of the Spanish Armada in 1588 (here), early Christianity in Britain (here), the First Anglo-Dutch War (here), and the 1918 Spanish Influenza outbreak (here).

Finally, Daniel Smith writes at complexamerica.org.

Bibliography

​[1] McPherson, James M., and James K. Hogue. "The Problems of Peace and Presidential Reconstruction, 1865." In Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 543. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009.

[2] Beatty, Jack. "The Problems of Peace and Presidential Reconstruction, 1865." In Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900, 543. New York: Vintage, 2008.

[3] “Mechanical Association,” Mississippian State Gazette, Dec. 29, 1858, 3.

[4] Perrow, Charles. "A Society of Organizations." Theory and Society 20 (1991), 791. doi:10.1007/bf00678095.

[5] Chris Talgo, Opinion Contributor. "Universal Basic Income and the End of the Republic." TheHill. Last modified May 12, 2020.https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/497244-universal-basic-income-and-the-end-of-the-republic.

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 4 – Conclusions – ’Such a big event, so little public memory’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 4 in the series considers some personal tales of the Great Flu of 1918 – and reflects on how little that flu is remembered today. After all, if we knew more about it, maybe the 2020 Flu Pandemic would have been less destructive.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy (here), part 2 considered the healthcare lessons from the pandemic by contrasting a successful and less successful approach (here), and part 3 looked at the importance of effective leadership (here).

Policemen in Seattle wearing masks made by the Red Cross, during the flu epidemic. December 1918.

My mom, who has long since passed away, was the first person to ever tell me about the “Spanish Flu” as she called it. Her uncle died from it in 1919 – several months after he returned from World War One. She was five at the time.

She had a photograph of him kneeling beside her in his “doughboy” uniform. He was quite a guy, I guess. Served with distinction, survived multiple “over-the-tops”, gas attacks, trench strafings, and came home to die in the third and last wave of the infamous influenza pandemic. 

He was one of the 675,000 American casualties of that virus.

Across America during the fall and winter of 1918-19, many such tragic memories were made. Here are a few from Mike Leavitt’s The Great Pandemic of 1918 State by State. (Leavit, 2006)

In Hartford, Connecticut, Beatrice Springer Wilde, a nurse, recounted the tragic story of four Yale students she treated. They had become ill while traveling and decided to get off the train in Hartford. Their last steps were taken from the train station to the hospital. Within twenty-four hours, all were dead. 

Bill Sardo, a funeral director in Washington, D.C., remembered:

"From the moment I got up in the morning to when I went to bed at night, I felt a constant sense of fear. We wore gauze masks. We were afraid to kiss each other, to eat with each other, to have contact of any kind. We had no family life, no church life, no community life. Fear tore people apart." 

All public gatherings were banned in Seattle, Washington including church services. Many of the local ministers complained until the mayor said publicly, “Religion which won’t keep for two weeks, is not worth having.” 

The town council in Rapid City, South Dakota made spitting on the sidewalks illegal. A local police officer was seen spitting shortly thereafter. He was arrested and fined $6 for committing the offense. No one was exempt.

Augusta, Georgia was the hardest-hit city in the state. The nurses in the local medical facilities were also struck down by the pandemic. As a consequence, nursing students were put in charge of shifts at a local hospital. Schoolteachers were enlisted to act as nurses, cooks and hospital clerks, and an emergency hospital was constructed on a local fairground. In Athens, Georgia, the University of Georgia indefinitely suspended classes.

An Ocala, Florida man named Olson traveled to Jacksonville, Florida for a carpentry job. Jacksonville was inundated with the flu at the time, and despite a citywide quarantine and the use of gauze masks, Olson contracted the flu. Eager to return to his hometown and family, he slipped past the quarantine and caught a train back home, taking the virus with him. Within days of his return, he had infected his family, and his neighborhood.

James Geiger, the U.S. Public Health Service Officer for Arkansas continuously downplayed the influenza threat to the state - even after he caught the flu, and his wife died from it.

Alaska & Authors

The 1918 pandemic also swept through Native American communities in Alaska killing whole villages. One school teacher later reported that, in her area, three villages were wiped out entirely. Others, she said, averaged as many as 85% deaths and probably 25% of those were too sick to get firewood and froze to death before help arrived. When the pandemic passed, because many were so sick that they were unable to fish or hunt and store food for the winter, they died of starvation. Some were forced to eat their sled dogs, and some sled dogs, unfed and hungry, ate the dead and the dying.

This last story from 1918 is about the effect this epidemic had on one of America’s best known authors - Katherine Anne Porter. 

Porter, who would later earn a Pulitzer Prize for her short stories, was one of the thousands who became ill during the epidemic in Denver, Colorado. Porter contracted influenza while working as a journalist for the Rocky Mountain News. She could not be admitted to the hospital at first, because there was no room. Instead, she was threatened with eviction by her landlady and then cared for by an unknown boarder who nursed her until a bed opened at the hospital. Porter was so sick that her newspaper colleagues prepared an obituary, and her father chose a burial plot. That near-death experience changed Porter in a profound way. She said afterward, "It just simply divided my life, cut across it like that. So that everything before that was just getting ready, and after that I was in some strange way altered." Her book, Pale Horse, Pale Rider, is a fictionalized account of her experience in the 1918 pandemic.

Lesson Four: Conclusions – ‘Such a big event, so little public memory’

Will and Ariel Durant, the husband and wife co-authors of that massive eleven-volume study The Story of Civilization, also wrote a thought-provoking short work entitled, The Lessons of History. On page eleven they ask:

As his studies come to a close the historian faces the challenge: Of what use have your studies been?... Have you derived from history any illumination of our present condition, any guidance for our judgments and policies, any guard against the rebuffs of surprise or the vicissitudes of change? (Durant, 1968)

While that quote is certainly apropos for this last article in a series entitled “Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic”, it’s not for that reason that I selected it. 

It’s for a far more personal reason.

When I grew up and became a historian, that epidemic in 1918-19, despite my personal connection to it, was never a topic in my teaching curriculum.

And it should have been. 

As an educator, I admit now that I was remiss in not teaching about pandemics and our nation’s susceptibility to them. Had I done so, perhaps one of my students (and there were many) would have gone on to do something in that field. Or perhaps, the 2020 Pandemic would have been less traumatic for all of them.

Every experience that we’ve had in 2020 - our delayed response to the threat of a pandemic - our overwhelmed medical personnel and inadequate supplies - the quarantines - the public pushback and even the key community “stakeholders” – was there in 1918. 

But no one paid attention. It’s unfortunate that we never seem to seek (or adequately teach) the lessons that the past provides us - until it’s too late. We are NOW facing the greatest threat to our Democracy and to our existence as a nation that the United States has faced since the Civil War. The lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic would have helped us in so many ways.

During my research for this series, I came across a 2018 comment that someone left at the end of an article on the Philly Voiceblog during the 100th Anniversary of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic – “Such a big event, so little public memory.” (McGovern & Kopp, 2018)

Indeed. How many five-year-olds will lose a favorite uncle this time?

Food for thought.

Why do you think there is so little public knowledge of the 1918 Great Flu Pandemic? Let us know below.

Read more from Mac Guffey in the Amazing Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War Two here.

Works Cited

Durant, W. a. (1968). The Lessons of History. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Leavit, M. (2006, January thru July). The Great Pandemic of 1918: State by State. Retrieved May 3, 2020, from Flu Trackers.com: https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/welcome-to-the-scientific-library/-1918-pandemic-data-stories-history/14750-the-great-pandemic-of-1918-state-by-state

McGovern, B., & Kopp, J. (2018, September 28). "In 1918, Philadelphia was in 'the grippe' of misery and suffering". Retrieved April 10, 2020, from Philly Voice: https://www.phillyvoice.com/1918-philadelphia-was-grippe-misery-and-suffering/

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 3 – Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 3 in the series considers the importance of effective leadership. Mac looks at how the cities of St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis managed to have lower rates of infection when compared to other comparably sized cities thanks to effective leadership.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy (here) and part 2 considered the healthcare lessons from the pandemic by contrasting a successful and less successful approach (here).

A 1918 poster warning about ‘Spanish Flu’ and how it could impact war production for World War I.

The federal government’s role regarding the public health is generally an advisory one. By and large, the real business of public health and safety is basically a local matter. State, county, and city health departments operate under a rag bag of rules and regulations that vary from community to community based on a community’s prior public health experiences. (Garrett L. , 2020)

Because of this, the way the 1918 Influenza Epidemic unfolded across the United States actually provides a tremendous series of independent case studies about what worked and what didn’t work.

The determining factor – community mortality rates.

Thirteen years ago, Anthony Fauci* and David Morens did just that and wrote an article about the 1918 Influenza Pandemic for The Journal of Infectious Diseases. It was subtitled “Insights for the 21st Century”. 

In their article, they made several key points. One - historical evidence about pandemics suggests there are no predictable cycles; therefore, countries need to be prepared for the possibility of a pandemic at all times. Two - if a novel virus as virulent as that of 1918 were to reappear, a substantial number of potential fatalities could be prevented with aggressive public-health and medical interventions. 

But the best antidote, they said, was prevention - through vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning. (Morens & Fauci, 2007)

Morens’s and Fauci’s recommendations were partially based on the similar way several major urban areas truly “met the moment and prevailed” with the lowest mortality outcomes during that exceptionally virulent second wave of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.

It was all about leadership.

Lesson Three: Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’

In addition to St. Louis (covered in Parts 1 and 2 of this series and reviewed here for comparison), Milwaukee, and Minneapolis also registered lower mortality rates than most urban areas of a comparable size during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic. 

These cities also encountered many of the same problems and challenges during that pandemic that we’ve faced across the nation in 2020 – disruptive citizens, pushback from churches, schools, and businesses, and failures to comply with mask and distancing mandates.

However, the way those city leaders approached these problems and challenges had a major impact on the civilian death rates in their cities.

St. Louis

As just a quick review, St. Louis was led by a strong-willed and capable health commissioner, Dr. Max C. Starkloff, who had the foresight to actively monitor the news as the influenza contagion spread westward. The city’s medical and political communities were quickly prepared for the inevitability that the epidemic would find its way to St. Louis. His first action was to issue a request through the influential St. Louis Medical Society that physicians voluntarily report to his office any and all cases of influenza they discovered. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1918)

When St. Louis physicians reported their first cases of influenza, he asked the city’s Board of Aldermen to pass an emergency bill declaring influenza a contagious disease. This gave the mayor the legal authority to declare a state of public health emergency. The bill also levied stiff fines for physicians who failed to report any new cases of the disease. (St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1918)

Starkloff and St. Louis Mayor Henry Kiel then executed an open-minded, flexible approach to quarantining, school closings, and other social distancing measures. They also maintained a unified front despite persistent pushback from various St. Louis constituencies. Because of the quick and sustained action by its leaders, St. Louis experienced one of the lowest excess death rates in the nation. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

Milwaukee

Even with two influenza waves between October and December 1918, the magnitude of Milwaukee’s brush with the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was still less severe than other U.S. cities of a comparable size. In the aftermath, Milwaukee Health Commissioner George C. Ruhland believed there were three reasons for the better outcomes. (Milwaukee Health Department, 1918)

The first reason was the readiness of the public to comply with any regulatory measures. For that Ruhland credited the Milwaukee medical community’s plan to engage the public. With the support of the city’s newspaper editors, the group began an immense public education campaign - with printed literature in six languages, including English. They created flyers and speaker’s notes, selected respected physicians and city notables as speakers, and requested the area clergy to discuss the flyers from the pulpit. If citizens, business owners, and city government all understood exactly what they were facing, there might be greater cooperation and acceptance should any draconian measures be necessary to blunt the epidemic. (Milwaukee Sentinel, 1918)

The second reason Ruhland listed was the timing of the closing orders and the generally widespread compliance from Milwaukee’s citizens. What’s interesting is that because of the two waves – October and December - Ruhland’s team actually tried two different approaches to see which one worked better. The October approach involved mandated closings - all places of amusement, churches, public gatherings, and eventually the schools. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

However, as the number of new cases in Milwaukee declined, some citizens and business owners believed the influenza threat was almost over. They got together and sent a number of requests to Ruhland to lift the bans on public gatherings. He refused. As more businesses clamored for relief, Ruhland publicly pointed out the consequence of overconfidence in other cities - reopening prematurely resulted in another wave of the infectious disease. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

Despite Ruhland’s gradual reopening however, a resurgence of the virus occurred in December 1918.

This time, to avoid outright closures, Ruhland shifted the responsibility to the public. He recommended masks be worn in public, set restrictions to the amount of personal space surrounding people in public - every other row was vacant in theaters and churches, retail customers surrounded themselves with six square feet of vacant space – and then he left it up to the people to govern themselves. The citizens, for the most part, ignored the self-restrictions, and that idea failed. (Milwaukee Journal, 1918)

The conclusion Ruhland came to after these two experiences have important ramifications for the world pandemic today. While closures don’t prevent influenza, they are very necessary in order to flatten or prevent the severe spikes in the number of influenza cases that can occur over a short period of time. It’s the severe spikes, he said, that overwhelm the available hospital facilities, healthcare workers, and medical supplies. Preventing those spikes flattens the mortality curve because those who do fall ill have access to better – not desperate - healthcare. (Milwaukee Wisconsin Department of Health, 1918)

The last factor that helped contribute to the lower mortality rates was the overall cooperation from all the community “leaders” during the epidemic – city government, physicians, hospital administrators, businessmen, the Red Cross and other relief agency leaders. Thanks to that cooperation, all necessary decisions were implemented rapidly and immediately. (Milwaukee Health Department, 1918)

In this city of 450,000 people, more than 30,000 of them came down with the flu during those two waves in 1918. Thanks to leadership vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning, fewer than 500 died.

Minneapolis

“Spanish influenza does not exist in Minneapolis and never has, but it probably will reach here during the fall,” the City of Minneapolis Health Commissioner, Dr. H. M. Guilford, told residents on September 19, 1918. (Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 1918)

Less than a month later, the flu epidemic struck the city. By then, Guilford had a plan ready. The health department ordered all schools, churches, and non-essential businesses closed indefinitely. The measure was unanimously endorsed by the Minneapolis city council. The council also stipulated that the city’s department of health had the full authority to issue any closure orders with or without the consent of Minneapolis’s mayor or the council. (Minneapolis City Council, 1918)

Pushback, however, was almost immediate. 

The Minneapolis Board of Education disagreed with the shut-down order and reopened the schools. The Superintendent of Schools, B. B. Jackson, argued that the leading medical authorities across the nation had determined that epidemic influenza was not a children’s disease. Guilford however, refused to give ground and at his request, the Minneapolis Chief of Police met with the school board and persuaded them to close the schools once again. (Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 1918)

In spite of the school board resistance and a later protest by the owners of amusement businesses, Guilford kept the city closed down until November 15, when the number of new influenza cases reached what he deemed an acceptable level. At that point, schools and businesses were allowed to reopen. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

However, in early December, the number of Influenza cases spiked again – this time, it was among the school populations. Guilford reinstituted the school closures until the end of the month, but he added an important caveat: All students would be required to undergo a thorough examination to ensure that he or she was free of any illness before being allowed to return to the classroom. (University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine, 2016)

Strong leadership, sustained adherence to science, and a unified front both politically and medically throughout the 1918 Influenza Epidemic enabled Minneapolis to keep the mortality rate of its citizens lower than most urban centers of a comparable size.

Conclusion

One of the more important “negative” leadership lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was the ‘too little, too late” actions by many public officials at the national, state, and local levels that exacerbated the spread of that deadly pandemic. (Mihm, 2020)

That was not the case in St. Louis, Milwaukee, or Minneapolis. Doctors Stackworth, Ruhland, and Guilford each showed vigilance by tracking the progression of the epidemic in other cities, in the military camps nearby, and mandating that their local medical communities report every new case of influenza. They all formed teams, set sound policy directions, communicated and educated about them, and implemented effective, predetermined countermeasures.

However, the greatest insight that 1918 epidemic provides for our 21st century health crisis is the determination of those leaders to maintain the aggressive public-health and medical interventions they put in place for the well-being of their citizens in the face of political, economic, and public pushback.

History Is Now

After taking office in 2017, the Trump administration fired the government’s entire pandemic response chain of command, including the White House management infrastructure, and disbanded the National Security Council’s pandemic team and a State Department program designed to identify outbreaks and other emerging threats around the world. (Garrett L. , 2020)

Then, in late December or early January 2020, Trump and his administration were informed by intelligence officials of a contagion raging in Wuhan, China. The administration, however, publicly treated the epidemic as a minor threat that was under control, at least domestically, and repeatedly assured the public that the risk to Americans was very low. 

By the end of January, there were about 12,000 reported cases in China, and growing rapidly by the day. At this point, the U.S. had a handful of confirmed cases, but there was almost certainly already significant community spread in the Seattle area.

Finally, on January 27, the White House created the Coronavirus Task Force (publicly announced on January 29) and declared a public health emergency on January 31. At that point, the federal government began to put in motion the executive, legal, and regulatory pandemic response procedures already on the books. (Wallach & Myers, 2020)

On March 24, 2020, the U.S. death toll from the Covid-19 Pandemic stood at 705 Americans. (CDC, 2020) That day, President Donald Trump said in his then daily Coronavirus Task Force briefing:

“There is tremendous hope as we look forward and we begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Stay focused and stay strong and my administration and myself will deliver for you as we have in the past." (Woodward & Yen, 2020)

Trump’s ‘hope’ versus the ‘vigilance, predetermined countermeasures, and planning’ of Starkloff, Ruhland and Guilford.

As of June 1, 2020, America’s death toll stands at over 106,000 coronavirus-related deaths. (CDC, 2020)

Food for thought.

Now, read part 4 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 4 – Conclusions – ’Such a big event, so little public memory’

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

References

CDC. (2020, April 30). “Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic – Overview: statistics”. Retrieved May 2, 2020, from Bing.com: https://www.bing.com/search?q=death+toll+coronavirus&form=EDNTHT&mkt=en-us&httpsmsn=1&msnews=1&rec_search=1&plvar=0&refig=60ce389eba704e0788409300929840cb&PC=HCTS&sp=1&ghc=1&qs=EP&pq=death+toll&sk=PRES1&sc=8-10&cvid=60ce389eba704e0788409300929840cb&cc=US&

Garrett, L. (2020, January 31). Trump Has Sabotaged America’s Coronavirus Response. Retrieved April 28, 2020, from FP (Foreign Policy): https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/coronavirus-china-trump-united-states-public-health-emergency-response/

Markel H, L. H. (2007). " Nonpharmacuetical interventions implemented by U.S. cities during the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic". JAMA, 298:647.

Mihm, S. (2020, March 3). Lessons From the Philadelphia Flu of 1918: Prioritizing politics over public health is a recipe for disaster. Retrieved April 22, 2020, from Bloomberg Opinion: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-03/coronavirus-history-lesson-learning-from-1918-s-flu-epidemic

Milwaukee Health Department. (1918). Bulletin of the Milwaukee Health Department 8, no. 10-11. City of Milwaukee, Health. Milwaukee: np.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, October 10). "City closed to fight flu,” Milwaukee Journal, 10 Oct. 1918, 1. Milwaukee Journal, p. 1.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, December 2). "Schools closed to stop flu". Milwaukee Journal, pp. 1, 6.

Milwaukee Journal. (1918, October 26). "Weather Cause of Deaths". Milwaukee Journal, p. 2.

Milwaukee Sentinel. (1918, October 11). "City Starts Big Battle On Influenza". Milwaukee Sentinel, p. 6.

Milwaukee Wisconsin Department of Health. (1918). Forty-second annual report of the Commissioner of Health City of Milwaukee. Milwaukee: np.

Minneapolis City Council. (1918). Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from January 1, 1918 to January 1, 1919. Minneapolis City Council, Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, (p. 536). Minneapolis.

Minneapolis Morning Tribune. (1918, October 20). "Clash Over School Order Due Monday". Minneapolis Morning Tribune, p. 1.

Minneapolis Morning Tribune. (1918, September 20). “No Spanish Influenza in City, Says Guilford”. Minneapolis Morning Tribune, p. 2.

Morens, D. M., & Fauci, A. S. (2007). The 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Insights for the 21st Century. Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 195, Issue 7,, 1018-1028.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat. (1918, September 20). “Doctors Here Must Report Influenza,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 20 Sept. 1918, 2. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, p. 2.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat. (1918, October 6). “No Quarantine Here against Influenza, Says Dr. Starkloff". St. Louis Globe-Democrat, p. 8.

University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine. (2016, September 19). City Essays. Retrieved April 21, 2020, from American Influenza Epidemic of 1918 - 1919: A Digital Encyclopedia.: http://www.influenzaarchive.org.

Wallach, P. A., & Myers, J. (2020, March 31). “The federal government’s coronavirus response—Public health timeline - part of the Series on Regulatory Process and Perspective”. Retrieved April 4, 2020, from Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-corona

Woodward, C., & Yen, H. (2020, March 28). ”Fact check: Donald Trump is a rosy outlier on the science of the virus”. - Saturday, March 28, 2020. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from Associated Press Website: https://apnews.com/

Wright, J. (2020, March 3). Four disastrous mistakes that leaders make during epidemics. Retrieved April 15, 2020, from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/03/four-disastrous-mistakes-that-leaders-make-during-epidemics/

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 2 – Healthcare – Two cities - Two outcomes - One reason

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey continues a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

Here, part 2 in the series considers the medical readiness lessons for today, by contrasting the very different approaches of Philadelphia and St Louis in the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.

If you missed it, the first article in the series considered what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy: Available here.

With masks over their faces, members of the American Red Cross remove a victim of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic from a house at Etzel and Page Avenues, St. Louis, Missouri. St Louis managed the Epidemic better than many other US cities.

American life in 1918 was busy, demanding, and non-stop. 

A world war was raging in Europe; military camps were springing up all over the country to accommodate the military’s demand for more soldiers. Factories (and even community clubs, organizations, and families) were busy turning out provisions needed by those boys going “over there”.

But the demands of this war also drained the nation’s supply of healthcare workers, medical equipment, and diminished the quality of available civilian medical care everywhere. So when the second wave of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic struck toward the end of September, the civilian hospitals and medical personnel were simply unprepared.

The state health officer for New Jersey announced on September 27th that the influenza “was unusually prevalent” throughout the state. Within the next three days, more than 2,000 new cases were reported. Newark’s medical facilities were so quickly overwhelmed that the city purchased a vacant furniture warehouse to be used as an emergency hospital. (Leavitt, 2006)

Makeshift hospitals like that one were hastily opened in almost every community to deal with the astronomical surge in people seeking medical help, but the virulence of this epidemic simply overwhelmed them all. 

One New Jersey physician recalled the outbreak: “There was no need to make appointments. You walked out of your office in the morning and people grabbed you as you walked down the street. You just kept going from one patient to another until late in the evening.” He treated more than 3,000 patients that month. (Leavitt, 2006)

Finally, in newspapers around the country, messages from desperate city health departments appeared:

. . . The spread of the Spanish Influenza is now a matter for the individual citizen. The city is doing what it can. Now it is up to the public. You can help keep the disease down. IT’S UP TO YOU—TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF  (Johnson City Health Department, 1918)

That 1918 directive – very pertinent in both substance and form as we currently battle our own pandemic of epic proportions – actually represented a capitulation of sorts by America’s city and state governments.

At that point, everyone was on his or her own.

Lesson Two: Healthcare - Two Cities - Two Outcomes – One Reason

The very virulence of the influenza virus that late summer and early fall doomed the unready medical system in this country almost immediately. The United States had 5,323 hospitals with just 612,000 beds available to accommodate a nationwide population of some 92 million people. Within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of almost every local outbreak, all of the hospitals in that area were filled beyond capacity. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976)

During the initial outbreak of the Covid-19 Pandemic in spring 2020, the modern healthcare system in the United States came perilously close to the limits that 1918 crossed. How do we handle a second wave that’s as virulent or more so than our first wave?

As history would have it, there actually is an answer to that very question in the 1918 Epidemic. It’s a tale of two cities – Philadelphia and St. Louis.

Philadelphia

For the sake of establishing a timeline by which to compare these two cities, let’s reiterate the facts we discussed in “Lesson One” of this series about Philadelphia’s health director Dr. Wilmer Krusen’s disastrous decisions that led to Philadelphia’s high mortality rate.

Despite evidence to the contrary regarding the virus’ virulence in the various military camps surrounding Philadelphia, Krusen was quoted in a Harrisburg newspaper on September 14th that he didn’t see any danger in the “Spanish Flu”. (Harrisburg Telegraph, 1918)

Three days later on September 17th, the first cases of the flu in the city were reported. Krusen took no quarantine measures or other social precautions, and furthermore, he ignored pleas from the local medical community to cancel the September 28thparade through the city. Over one hundred thousand people witnessed and participated in the parade that day. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

Within seventy-two hours, Philadelphia’s hospitals were overrun. As the disease spread, essential services collapsed. Nearly 500 policemen failed to report for duty. Firemen, garbage collectors, and city administrators fell ill. [1] But it wasn’t until October 3rd that the city finally closed schools, banned public gatherings, and took other citywide measures to suppress the epidemic. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

Krusen’s fourteen-day delay between the first reported cases in the city and his decision to finally impose a quarantine played a major role in the deaths of well over 12,162 people from influenza and other influenza-related complications between October 1 and November 2, 1918. (Dunnington, 2017)

One of the findings Thomas Garrett noted in his 2008 study of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic was that healthcare actually becomes irrelevant if there are no plans in place to ensure that a pandemic does not incapacitate the healthcare system like it did in 1918. (Garrett, 2008)

St Louis

In St Louis, Dr. Max Starkloff, the St. Louis health commissioner, planned ahead.

Instead of waiting for the virus to start, Starkloff started. 

First, he changed his thinking from IF to WHEN. By September 20th, Starkloff had already published a list of social “Don’ts” regarding behavior that could spread the “epidemic of influenza” that was happening in the east. (Evening Missourian, 1918)

He also alerted the local medical community to be prepared, and with their help set up a network of volunteer nurses to treat residents in their homes when the hospitals ran out of space. Members of the Red Cross Motor Ambulance Corps* were diverted from various camps to help transport civilian patients to the hospital and to deliver broth and food to those influenza patients being treated in their homes. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

Starkloff was ready.

When the first cases of the influenza epidemic were reported in St. Louis on October 5th, he and his staff moved rapidly. Two days later on October 7th, they closed schools, theaters, playgrounds and other public places. Quickly added to that list were churches and taverns, as well as restricted attendance at funerals. Streetcars were limited to seated passengers only – the usual crowds of standing riders were forbidden. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

These restrictions were enforced too. Despite significant pushback from local religious leaders and business owners who complained about the “draconian” measures and predicted dire economic consequences because of the closings, Starkloff and Mayor Henry Kiel remained firm. (St Louis Post Dispatch, 2014)

One Reason

What’s so staggering is the contrast in the mortality figures for these two cities. Philadelphia experienced 12,162 (or more) deaths in one month; St. Louis experienced 1,703 deaths over four months – the lowest mortality rate among the nation’s largest cities. (Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007)

The one and only reason: In St. Louis, an intervention plan was in place and ready to go when the first cases were reported.

History is NOW

In a recent Washington Post interview, a frustrated ER nurse at Sinai Grace Hospital in Detroit, Michigan, Mikaela Sakal, described their struggle against the coronavirus:

Nobody prepared us for this, because this didn’t exist. These aren’t the kinds of scenarios you go over in training. Where do you put 26 critical patients when you only have 12 rooms? How many stretchers fit into a hallway? (Saslow, 2020)

The Covid-19 Pandemic is filled with healthcare anecdotes like this one.

While all kinds of “plans” supposedly have been designed to deal with a pandemic, there were no complete readiness plans that had been designed, practiced, corrected, approved, and waiting to be implemented. Even essential medical stockpiles of such common essentials as facemasks, hazmat suits, ventilators, or the machines to make them were wholly inadequate to handle the demands of this disaster.

And when a pandemic like 1918 DID hit in 2020, what occurred was panicky, uncoordinated, reactionary moves with no contingency plans for implementation problems, the long-term effects of each measure, or the necessary vs. available resources.

“Nothing went by the book,” Ms. Sakal explained angrily, “Every night, we had to come into work and rewrite the rules.” (Saslow, 2020)

When there is no virus vaccine, “readiness” becomes the major factor in the government’s ability to protect its citizens from a pandemic. Faced with spiraling mortality rates across vast populations over a short period of time, a “virus war” requires preparation, the ready availability of healthcare workers, hospital beds, and huge stockpiles of ready medical equipment to meet the massive demand.

More importantly, as the Philadelphia and St. Louis examples demonstrated, a national readiness plan uniting all of these elements is necessary.

Otherwise, healthcare becomes irrelevant, and 675,000 Americans could die.

Food for thought.

Now, read part 3 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 3 – Leadership – ‘Vigilance, Predetermined Countermeasures, and Planning’ 

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 1 – ‘the threat of an outbreak you may not have experienced’

With the current Covid-19 pandemic causing upheaval the world over, can we look to the past to learn lessons? Here, Mac Guffey starts a series considering lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, an epidemic that infected around a third of the world’s population and killed some 40 million people (exact estimates vary from 15 million to 50 million or more). He will consider the question: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic?

The first article in the series considers what happened during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the lessons we can draw on the economy today, namely the current controversy about reopening the economy after only several weeks of quarantine.

US troops with influenza in 1918 at U.S. Army Camp Hospital No. 45, Aix-Les-Bains, France, Influenza Ward No. 1.

On December 1, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln wrote some advice for the nation’s legislators in his Second Annual Message to Congress. 

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. [1]

Embroiled in the chaos of America’s first and only civil war, Lincoln’s advice to Congress to do what today we call “think outside the box” was almost futuristic in its suggested application. But to think outside the box requires one to know what’s already IN the box.

That’s where the world is right NOW in 2020 – trying to think anew and act anew - as the Covid-19 Pandemic upends the entire globe medically, socially, economically, and politically. 

But humanity is desperate. 

We don’t have the lives to waste on actions that merely repeat past failures or the time to ignore proven medical measures to chase quack medical solutions or the economy to endure all these haphazard plans born of desperation or political expediency.

But do we actually have any idea of what has gone before? Do we know what’s been tried and failed or what’s been tried and worked or what was never tried at all during a pandemic of THIS magnitude?

Ironically, we do – the 1918 Influenza Epidemic. 

In 2008, Thomas Garrett, then an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, published a study on “Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-Day Implications”. The third paragraph of his study contains this common sense recommendation.

Certainly an event that caused 40 million worldwide deaths in a year should be closely examined not only for its historical significance, but also for what we can learn (in the unfortunate chance the world experiences another influenza pandemic). [2] 

But the relevant question is: Can something that happened over a hundred years ago in a society so vastly different from today provide any useful guidance regarding the Covid-19 Pandemic? 

With Garrett’s suggestion as a goal, this article is the first of a four-part series to answer that question. Using the 1918 Influenza Pandemic as our foundational model, this series will examine that event using the three top issues or questions that have emerged during the 2020 crisis. We’ll see how the government and the people in 1918 handled similar challenges, and what, if any, lessons from the past can help us in the present.

Starting with the current controversy about reopening our economy after only several weeks of quarantine, we’ll also take a look at two other 2020 issues: healthcare and government leadership in the 1918 pandemic. 

The final article in this series will present some conclusions from the lessons of 1918 and offer some anecdotes that give voice to those who experienced this same type of crisis more than a hundred years ago. 

If we must think anew and act anew, then we must do so with knowledge – not ignorance.

Lesson One: ‘the threat of an outbreak you may not have experienced’

The United States (and the world), due to social distancing and stay-at-home restrictions during the Covid-19 Pandemic, hasn’t come near the mortality levels of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic. In fact, we’ve even flattened the rate of infection and mortality curves projected by most, if not all, of the statistical models used for the 2020 crisis.

Because of this good news, public health experts, state governors, the Trump administration, business owners, and Americans from all walks of life are now debating the question uppermost in everyone’s mind: How long do the restrictions need to continue before we can reopen the economy?

Despite the statistical success, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said on CNN’s “State of the Union” that the answer to reopening the economy “depends”.

“It is not going to be a light switch. It is going to be depending where you are in the country, the nature of the outbreak you’ve already experienced, and the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced.” [3]

Whether Fauci intended it or not, the end of his statement - “and the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced” – actually contains a double meaning. For 2020, it means those areas of the country that were spared the Covid-19 virus thus far, which was his point.

But the unusually deadly 1918 epidemic suggests a far darker meaning for us – the possibility of another wave of outbreaks that could be far more murderous than the first. What made the 1918 Influenza Epidemic so unusual - and so devastating for humanity - were those two subsequent waves of infection in the fall of 1918 and the winter of 1919.

The first wave – spring 1918 

The great influenza pandemic first hit Europe, the United States, and Asia, in 1918 and raged across the globe for two years from January 1918 to December 1919. [4] However, early reports of the virus were almost dismissive.

On page one of the February 6, 1918 Malone, New York newspaper were several updates on area residents at home and abroad. One of the updates was about Lieutenant Clarence M. Kilburn, an infantry officer serving with the First Division in France.

Letters received by his wife and mother – the last one dated Jan. 14th - stated that the lieutenant was still in a hospital in France. He had been in the hospital since Thanksgiving, first with an infection of the bowels and then with influenza which followed. [5]

The April 4, 1918 Port Jervis, New York newspaper – The Evening Gazette – had an article on page six about new U.S. recruits training and marching at Camp Dix - the new World War I military training and staging ground built in New Jersey in 1917. Tucked away at the very end of that article was a short blurb about the March health report for Dix, the largest military reservation in the Northeast. 

Camp Dix. . . The March health report was a setback for the high health mark maintained at the camp for six months. Weather of considerable variance in temperature and humidity coming and going suddenly was responsible for the increase in pneumonia cases, according to Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Ekwurzel, division surgeon. The sudden changes in temperature, coupled with a week of consistently damp weather in early March when the sun failed to break through for days, brought on a camp wide attack of influenza. Many of the pneumonia patients were among those first bothered with influenza. [6]

These initial outbreaks had all the signs of a seasonal flu. But there were two important differences; this particular strain was highly contagious and particularly virulent.

Camp Funston, Kansas reported outbreaks of influenza in early March. A military installation of 54,000 troops, Camp Funston reported that within the first two days of the outbreak 522 men reported sick and by the end of the month, 1,100 troops were hospitalized and thirty-eight of them died from pneumonia complications. [7]

The virus continued spreading throughout Europe, but the number of cases from that spring outbreak of influenza in the U.S. dwindled over the summer. But the first wave was actually a warning of things to come. Unfortunately - like 2020 - these early warning signs were minimized, dismissed, or ignored - because things got better.

Or so the world thought.

The second and third waves 

In August 1918, an even more virulent strain of the influenza virus appeared simultaneously in the shipping ports of Brest, France, Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Boston, Massachusetts. Medical historians now believe this strain was caused by a mutation of the initial virus.

For the next three months – September through November – the virus killed millions worldwide. An estimated 195,000 Americans died in October alone. [8]

The last - but no less deadly - wave started in Australia in January of 1919. This one, however, spread more slowly because World War I was over, but it, too, eventually reached the U.S. in December.

After three waves of this pandemic, an estimated thirty-three percent of the world’s population was infected and the worldwide death toll stood at over 45 million people - 675,000 of whom were Americans. [8]

Contributing factors to the high mortality rate

What made the 1918 Influenza Epidemic so devastating for humanity - were those two subsequent waves of infection in the fall of 1918 and the winter of 1919. 

Why were they so deadly?

While there are a host of biological reasons for the virulence of the virus, war and human decisions also played key roles in exacerbating the spread.

Like all wars in America’s history to 1918, disease killed more soldiers than battles. Recruits in all those wars came from every part of the nation, and they were crowded together in training camps, winter camps, and on ships. They brought with them their own local viruses and immunities, as well as their susceptibilities to other local viruses to which they’d never been exposed. 

But this war was the first truly WORLD war – one that involved soldiers from every continent on the globe. This international mingling increased every soldier’s exposure to a host of local viruses from other soldiers to which they had no immunities. Combine these human petri dishes with crowded training camps and trench living conditions, and it’s a recipe for a medical pandemic. This exposure is similar to that found on public transportation, cruise ships, and during air travel in 2020.

As these soldiers in 1918 went abroad, came home, or went on liberty, they infected civilian populations with similar results.

Many cities and states tried to enforce some degree of social distancing restrictions in 1918 by passing regulations regarding public gatherings and travel in attempts to stay the epidemic. In many places theaters, dance halls, churches and other public gathering places were shut down – some for over a year. One U.S. town even outlawed shaking hands! [9]

Quarantines, however, were few and those that existed were enforced with little success. Some communities were so desperate to isolate themselves that they put armed guards at the town limits to turn back any travelers who might bring an infection. But on the whole, the efforts were unsuccessful. [9]

One historian, Dr. James Harris, who studies both infectious diseases and World War I, came to this conclusion: The reluctance of public health officials to impose quarantines during the first two waves was partly to blame for the high mortality rate.

“Little was done those first two thirds of the pandemic. There was the wartime context, pushback to social distancing, people moving around the globe on a massive scale.” [7]

The failure of public health officials to do what they knew was in the public good because of sensitivity to political or public opinion further endangered the lives of the very people they were hired or elected to protect. 

Philadelphia, in 1918, provides a graphic example. 

By mid-September 1918, the virus was running rampant throughout the various military installations, training camps and staging areas in and around Philadelphia. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Philadelphia’s director of public health, reassured the public. The September 14th edition of the Harrisburg Telegraph reported on page six that “Dr. Wilmer Krusen, Philadelphia health director, does not see any danger in the Spanish influenza at present.”  [10]

Then came the Fourth Liberty Loan Parade.

Scheduled for September 28, the parade and a subsequent concert were organized to promote the sale of “Liberty Bonds” – a way to get the public to buy war bonds to help the government finance the war.

However, as the date approached, the medical community of Philadelphia pleaded with Dr. Krusen to cancel the parade and concert. According to Sam Dunnington’s 2017 post on the blog site: HiddenCity: Exploring Philadelphia's urban landscape:

Dr. Wilmer Krusen found himself under pressure from the city’s medical establishment to cancel the event. Krusen was Philadelphia’s director of Public Health and Charities. Several doctors had called on him earlier that month to quarantine 300 sailors that had recently arrived at Philadelphia’s Navy Yard. The servicemen had come from Massachusetts, where a virulent outbreak of influenza had already caused the Army to cancel a draft call. Krusen refused to quarantine the men. As concerns about influenza grew, the medical community encouraged the cancellation of the Liberty Loan parade in the interest of avoiding crowds and ideal transmission conditions. [11]

Again, Krusen refused. On September 28, over a hundred thousand citizens and soldiers watched or took part in the parade and concert.

Within seventy-two hours, Philadelphia’s hospitals were overrun with influenza cases. Between October 1 and November 2, the city registered 12,162 deaths from influenza - a number that does not include those that died from underlying conditions while fighting the virus. [11]

Dunnington concludes:

Krusen could have lessened the death toll by mandating a quarantine or canceling the parade, but he operated in an environment that made such decisions almost unthinkable. . . With Krusen, Philadelphians experienced the pandemic under a public health official that could not act in their best interests without risking becoming an enemy of the federal government. [11]

History NOW

The controversy about our current pandemic now raging across the United States is whether the social distancing and stay-at-home restrictions need to continue since the rate of infection seems to be tapering off.

Gerard Tellis, Neely Chair of American Enterprise, director of the Institute for Outlier Research in Business (iORB) and his research partner Ashish Sood of UC Riverside, along with Nitish Sood, a cellular and molecular biology student at Augusta University, have released a paper that parses the possibilities.

"The U.S. faces a unique challenge. All states have still not ordered lockdowns. So states that have and contain the disease may suffer contagion and relapse from those that don't or were late to do so. A uniform federal policy seems imperative." [12]

Our experiences during the 1918 Influenza Epidemic indicate that underestimating the first wave of an outbreak and continuing to yield to public and political pushback against quarantines and social distancing may lead to much higher mortality rates. 

As Fauci said, it’s “the threat of an outbreak that you may not have experienced” that should guide our decision-making - not politics or boredom.

Food for thought.

Now, read part 2 here: Lessons from the 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Part 2 – Healthcare – Two cities - Two outcomes - One reason

What lessons do you think we can learn from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? Let us know below.

References

[1] Roy P. Basler, et al. eds. (1953). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln – Volume 5. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, p 538.

[2] Garrett , Thomas A. (2008). “Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-Day Implications”. Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis Review - March/April 2008. p.76. 

[3] Sonmez, Felicia, Taylor Telford, Elise Viebeck. “Public health experts urge caution about push to reopen the economy”. The Washington Post – April 13, 2020, First edition.

[4] Rosenwald, Michael S. “History’s deadliest pandemics, from ancient Rome to modern America”. Washington Post – April 7, 2020, First edition.

[5] The Malone Farmer. (Malone NY), February 06, 1918. p.1. Lt. Kilburn recovered, survived the war, and returned home to Malone. He was elected to Congress in 1940 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Wallace E. Pierce (R-NY). Kilburn served in Congress from February 1940 until January 1965.

[6] “Four-Week Recruits at Rifle Practice: Next Seven Days for 7,000 Soldiers Will Be One of Busiest and Most Interesting”. The Evening Gazette, (Port Jervis, NY) April 4, 1918. p. 6.

[7] Roos, Dave. “Why the Second Wave of the 1918 Spanish Flu Was So Deadly”. History Stories - March 3, 2020; Updated March 30, 2020. HISTORY. Archived April 2, 2020 from https://www.history.com/news/spanish-flu-second-wave-resurgence

[8] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “1918 Pandemic Influenza Historic Timeline”.  CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Archived April 4, 2020 from https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/pandemic-timeline-1918.htm

[9] “1918 Flu (Spanish flu epidemic)” About Avian Bird Flu - The Avian Bird Flu Survival Guide - May 21, 2008. Archived April 4, 2020 from http://www.avian-bird-flu.info/spanishfluepidemic1918.html

[10] “Well Known People”, Harrisburg Telegraph. (Harrisburg, Pa.) September 14, 1918. p.6.

[11] Dunnington, Sam. “A History Of Leadership During Philadelphia’s Epidemics”. HiddenCity: Exploring Philadelphia's urban landscape – July 21, 2017.

[12] Tellis, Gerald, et.al. “How long will the COVID-19 quarantine last? Business research provides insight”. Medical Xpress, April 8, 2020. Archived April 18, 2020 from https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-04-covid-quarantine-business-insight.html

Henry VIII's Divorce of Catherine of Aragon – Who had the Better Case in the Great Divorce? Part 3: Catherine’s Case for the Marriage

King Henry VIII of England’s divorce, or annulment, of Catherine of Aragon in 1533 is one of the most infamous separations in history. And while we nearly all know the end result of the divorce proceedings, in hindsight who had the stronger case?  In part 3 of the series, Victor Gamma considers Catherine’s arguments - and how Henry’s arguments related to consummation and the Bible were not terribly strong.

You can read part 1 on the background to the great divorce here and part 2 on how Henry’s efforts to overturn the marriage in the courts failed here.

An 18th century painting of Catherine of Aragon.

Catherine's Case

From the start Catherine of Aragon refused to entertain the slightest notion that her marriage to the king was anything but holy and entirely acceptable.  Moreover, she indicated that she would not accept any decision not coming from the Roman Curia or the Pope himself. Nonetheless, she appeared at the Blackfriars tribunal. On June 18, when both king and queen were present at Blackfriars, Catherine presented her case publically. When the clerk called out "Catherine. Queen of England, come into the court," she did not answer. Instead she went to the King directly, kneeling before him. In an unforgettable scene, Catherine pled her case before the king and the assembled court officials and nobles gathered that day. She knew that everything depended on her words and actions. She may never again have another chance to sway the mind of her husband and sovereign, King Henry VIII. In a "posture of absolute submission" Catherine ignored court protocol and knelt before Henry;

"Sir, I beseech you for all the love that hath been between us, and for the love of God, let me have justice. Take of some pity and compassion, for I am a poor woman, and a stranger born out of your dominion. I have here no assured friends, and much less impartial counsel."

Then in a brief but eloquent speech, she laid out her case. It included four main points. First, she reminded him and all those present that she had been a dutiful, good wife and had given no cause for offense. Second, lack of a male heir was not her fault. Third, she had been a virgin when she had married Henry and finally, she indicated that the court was biased against her and that she needed counsel.

Catherine’s supporters

But Catherine was not alone. Numerous supporters had come to her aid. Their arguments will be considered hers. Bishop Fisher, on behalf of the queen declared "this marriage of the king and queen can be dissolved by no power, human or divine." During the Blackfriars tribunal, the effort to build Catherine’s defense began in earnest. One argument was simply the insincerity of the king; “the idea of separation originated entirely in his own iniquity and malice” averred the Spanish ambassador, Eustace Chapuys. Furthermore he asserted that “The King’s passion for the Lady, (Anne Boleyn) combined with his obstinacy were such that there was no chance of recalling him by mildness or fair words to a sense of his duty.” Chapuys here referred to the fact that at this time King Henry was deeply involved with another woman, Anne Boleyn.

As to the character of Catherine, since no direct evidence existed, the character of the witnesses counted for much. Those who knew her were universal in their high opinion of her. Eustace Chapuys noted of Catherine that she was ‘so virtuous, devout and holy, so truthful and God-fearing’ that it was unthinkable for a lie to proceed from her pious lips.’ 

Consummation claim

The critical point of debate was over whether Arthur and Catherine's brief (four months) marriage had been consummated. In the words of the catechism, “the marriage bond has been established by God Himself in such a way that a marriage concluded and consummated between baptized persons can never be dissolved.” In Medieval thinking, an impediment of affinity only existed if the marriage had been consummated.  If the marriage had never been consummated then it could be considered not legally binding, thus for Henry to marry his brother’s widow would upset no precepts of Biblical or Canon law. Henry strove mightily, then to prove the marriage had been consummated. He could then more easily make the case that he and Catherine had been living in sin. The queen insisted that she was a virgin when she married Henry. Catherine had begun asserting this as early as 1502, within months of Arthur's death, and stood firm on this point to the end of her days. There is no record of Arthur's opinion on the subject. Catherine, known for her extreme piety, had sworn on the sacrament that her four-month marriage to Arthur had never been consummated. Rather than believe his saintly wife, Henry insisted otherwise. Despite this, Henry VIII himself had stated that he had found her a 'maid' on their wedding night and he never publicly called Catherine a liar, indeed he even publicly admitted she was right.

In October 1529, when his wife once again publicly proclaimed her maiden status, Henry shouted “I am content, but you are not my wife for all that.” Furthermore, the 'bedding' of Catherine and Arthur was a ceremonial part of a royal marriage process and did not require consummation. In marriages of state, the wedding and the consummation did not necessarily go hand in hand. Additionally, the health of the bridegroom was taken seriously. Arthur was frail and physically immature. Soon after the wedding ceremony to Arthur it was arranged that Catherine stay in London under the tutelage of her mother and grandmother-in-law while Arthur did some more growing up without the distraction of a wife. As to witnesses; after his wedding night, Arthur is reported to have asked for ale to quench his thirst "for I have been in the midst of Spain last night." These words indicating consummation repeated seventeen years later are doubtful. In each case they were most likely the self-serving claims of courtiers who wished to win their sovereign’s favor or the nervous, youthful boasting of the Prince who wished to hide his failure to consummate his marriage.  

Biblical claim

Now for the biblical grounds. Here Catherine’s cause was helped by several facts. First, whether the marriage of Arthur and Catherine was consummated or not does not bear on the scriptures of Leviticus that relate to the issue. The verses in Leviticus do not mention anything about the status of the relationship at the point it was violated. 

Another weakness with Henry's argument was that the verse states the offending couple shall remain childless. It said nothing about sons. Since Henry and Catherine had a daughter, he thus could not make a valid argument that God was punishing him. Henry argued that the Greek had been improperly translated into Latin. "Liberis" - "children," should have been rendered "filiis" - sons. However, in Leviticus 20:20, the verse before the one Henry used, a curse is placed on a couple if a man had relations with his uncle's wife. The same Hebrew term "childless" is used in verse 20. It is highly unlikely that a translator would use a different term just one verse later. 

Even more damaging to his case was Deuteronomy 25:5 that specifically stated a man's obligation to his brother's widow, namely, that he must marry her and raise up children so that his dead brother’s name would continue. The brother is not simply encouraged but commanded to fulfill this obligation. To marry Catherine King Henry had brushed aside this seeming contradiction to his interpretation of the Leviticus verses as an example of Jewish custom rather than Divine Law. But, as was pointed out, one cannot simply decide which verse is Jewish custom and which is Divine Law arbitrarily. Leviticus or Deuteronomy are silent as to any such distinction. Sound Biblical exegesis demands the two verses be harmonized. Bishop Fisher argued that a brother is never to marry his sister-in-law with one exception: that in Deuteronomy of the brother dying without children. The light shed by comparing scripture with scripture further withered Henry’s argument. The Old Testament contains multiple occasions in which someone is enjoined to fulfill this very duty. In Genesis 38:8 Judah twice orders his sons to perform this obligation with his daughter-in-law Tamar. In fact, when Judah’s son Onan refused to comply, he was struck dead by God! Here and in many other places it is clear that this was a well-established custom of the Jews, codified in the Law. In the New Testament, John the Baptist’s condemnation of Herod for marrying his brother’s wife was due to the fact that his brother was still alive. This clearly demonstrates the common Jewish understanding that the prohibition applied only in that case of a dead brother dying without offspring. If that weren’t enough, all the great Catholic theologians including St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, Thomas Aquinus, and others had analyzed the apparent contradiction between Leviticus and Deuteronomy and stood squarely opposed to the King.

Henry VIII’s solution

Ultimately, King Henry VIII solved his problem not with canonical or Biblical argumentation but a unilateral solution in which England would act independently of Roman law. As for Clement VII, he finally got around to ruling against Henry in 1533. He then went further and ordered him to take Catherine back and, finally, excommunicated him for not doing so. But at that point, the English no longer recognized his authority anyway.

Having reviewed the opposing sides, who do you think had the better case? Let us know below.