How the US Misjudged Fidel Castro: Part 1 - Before the Revolution

At the moment of Fidel Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Cuba on January 9, 1959, the charismatic revolutionary leader was a relatively unknown quantity. Many are surprised to discover that Castro at first enjoyed much popular support in this country. Early reports on the rebel leader featured positive, if sometimes guarded, reactions. Even Ed Sullivan, America’s premier show man, got caught up in the excitement. He journeyed to Cuba himself to interview the victorious rebel leader shortly after the latter’s entry into Havana. He was but one of myriad journalists who descended on Cuba to cover the exciting changes in the island.

In this series, Victor Gamma returns and considers how the US misjudged Fidel Castro. Here, we look at how the US intervened in other places in the 1950s, and its pre-Cuban Revolution attempts to understand Fidel Castro’s beliefs.

Fidel Castro with his in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba. December 1956.

In April 1959, Castro visited the United States itself, where he appeared on popular American TV shows, gave talks at Harvard and was buoyed aloft on the shoulders of an admiring audience. In the US he generally received royal treatment wherever he went. This included children sporting Castro beards and other manifestations of Castro-mania. This is strange considering the fact that his mortal enemy, Batista, enjoyed the full backing of the US but a few months before.

As we all know, this “honeymoon” period did not last. Before the end of that year, relations between the US and Castro deteriorated beyond the point of no return. The point is: if we had a more clear idea of his ideology, if he were a communist or might become one and would become an ally of the Soviet Union, we would have been justified in acting decisively to keep him from power. An operation similar to that carried out in Guatemala in 1954 or Iran in 1952 could have been mounted. In the tense competition with the Soviet Union, it was imperative to prevent a communist government 90 miles from American shores. But without a clear understanding of Castro's ideology and/or future plans no firm policy was formulated. Instead, US policy would evolve in reaction to Castro's moves. The result of that policy was that in less than two years diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba severed and relations degenerated into clandestine warfare. Subsequently, Cuba under Castro became a disaster for U.S. foreign policy for decades. Why did the US allow such a hostile regime to take hold so close to our shores? Why were US policy makers not clear on what Castro’s motives were or what the nature of his ideology was until too late? How did we miss the warning signs?

The problem began towards the end of the Batista regime. By 1957, after almost two decades of unwavering support of Cuban regimes, the State Department began to have doubts about continued support of Batista. Batista’s efforts to label Castro as a communist and tool of Moscow failed to gain Eisenhower’s continued support. In the corridors of power, criticism of America’s Cuban policy became more vocal. Such sentiments were even becoming a matter of public record. On August, 17, 1958, Henry Wriston, president of the Council on Foreign Relation appeared on the Mike Wallace Interview. He openly uttered such anti-Batista statements as “we don't like Batista'' and “we would be delighted to see Batista and Trujillo (the dictator of Guatemala) overthrown.” The US went beyond mere distaste. In March,1958 Eisenhower stopped sending arms to Batista, “Obviously Castro had won the emotional support of the Cuban people,” he said later in justification. The CIA had even actually begun supporting opposition movements in hopes of getting rid of an increasingly unpopular dictator. 

The US and Castro

The US enjoyed major success in sponsoring overthrows of regimes in places as diverse as Guatemala and Iran. Unlike in those countries, however, the US had no plan about whom to replace Batista with. To complicate matters, the insurrection movements prowling around in the mountains and jungles of eastern Cuba were of uncertain ideology and attitudes toward the US - and time was running out. Castro’s group, called the “26th of July Movement,” which was the most important of the various anti-Batista movements, threatened yet another violent overthrow of a Cuban government. By the summer of 1958 it was becoming clear that his regimes’ days were numbered. What should US policy be? Some feared that if something were not done soon the threat of violent revolution would materialize and replace Batista with an even worse (and leftist) government. Since Castro was likely to be an increasingly dominant force, it was vital to decide whether to support him or keep him from power.

What did the US know of Castro? Much knowledge came not from official government efforts but enterprising journalists. The long struggle by the barbudos (bearded ones) attracted much sympathy from the American press, Chief among these was New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews. Castro had been reported killed by the Batista regime. But Matthews was able to locate him. After some days with Castro, Matthews sent his report to the Times. On February 24, 1957, the world was electrified by the news: “Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba’s youth, is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged, almost impenetrable fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, at the southern tip of the island.” Along with the report Matthew provided the rebel leader’s signature as proof. The article gushed with praise, included a description of Castro as an “educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkable qualities of leadership.” He had not only dramatically revealed that Castro was not dead, he successfully portrayed him in a way that garnered widespread interest and sympathy from readers across the country. Even more importantly for US policy, he also denied that Castro was a communist or that communists were a significant force in his movement. Such reporting built a groundswell of support among the American public.

Less supportive of America

But if the US had done a profile on the indefatigable rebel, they would have known that he blamed the US for many of Cuba’s problems. At his trial in 1952 he defended himself and used the courtroom as a platform to promote his views. Included in his diatribe were such statements as “The United Fruit Company owns land the north to the south socast in Orient Province-but two hundred thousand Cuban families there don’t own an inch of land!” His villains were companies and landowners. As it was, the CIA psychological profile on Castro did not appear until December 1961, much too late. 

During this time, the American embassy in Havana was not much help. From the years 1953-57 under Ambassador Arthur Gardner, strict orders to avoid contact with anti-Batista movements were in force, effectively thwarting any chance to learn more about Castro. Not only that, such a policy put the CIA in an awkward position. It could not utilize embassy personnel and interfered with intelligence gathering. To overcome this problem, that spring of 1957 Washington sent an official fact-finding mission to Cuba to find out more about Castro. After obtaining Ambassador Gardner’s cooperation, the mission, led by CIA officer Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. set out to fill in the gaps of knowledge about the opposition to Batista. The delegation spent most of its time in Santiago de Cuba, the main town of Castro's home province, Oriente. Here they hoped to obtain first-hand information about Castro's character and philosophy. Basically, the mission did not discover anything alarming about Castro. He came from a large, wealthy land-owning family. He had attended parochial schools, gone to college, and enjoyed baseball. His former teachers had nothing but good to say about him, “He was a good Catholic boy,” said one. Others insisted that he could not possibly be a communist. The team felt that the rebel movement simply reflected the desire of Cubans to be rid of dictatorship and restore a functioning democracy. So as of 1958 the fog around Castro’s political leanings had still not cleared. It was known that he had been involved in leftist politics and that his movement included communists but in the words of Kirkpatrick “we were not sure whether he was an avowed Communist.” Castro himself had refused to make common cause with Cuban communists.

What do you think about American intelligence’s attempts to gather information on Fidel Castro in the 1950s? Let us know below.

Now read Victor’s series on whether Wernher von Braun was a dangerous Nazi or hero of the space race here.

Why does Vladimir Putin want to Capture Kyiv?

When the Russian Federation, on the orders of President Putin, invaded the territory of independent Ukraine on February 24, 2022, one of the main goals of the Russian troops was to conquer the capital of Ukraine - Kyiv. This attack failed and the Russian Army withdrew to concentrate on eastern Ukraine. Here, Konstant Teleshov explains why Kyiv remains an important target for Vladimir Putin.

The Baptism of Kievans by Klavdy Lebedev.

Thanks to the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people and the competent actions of the military-political leadership of Ukraine, the Russian army suffered a humiliating defeat near Kyiv and Chernihiv during the Russo-Ukrainian War, after which it was forced to retreat at the end of March 2022.

Historical meaning

In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made the country's historical past an important element and pillar of his regime, which some political experts call Putinism. He wrote several articles, one of which is called "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians." In this article, the Russian autocrat positions himself as a supporter of the concept of the triune Russian people, which for centuries has formed a single cultural and spiritual space of historical Russia - a large ethnocultural region in Eastern Europe, historically inhabited by three peoples - Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.

One of the most important components of the common historical past of these three peoples is a medieval state called Kievan Rus, which existed from 862 to 1240. During its peak, Kievan Rus occupied the territory from the White Sea in the north to the Black Sea region in the south. It consists of many principalities (provinces). One of the provinces of Kievan Rus was the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, one of the parts of which was the Principality of Moscow - the future center of the Russian Empire. The Moscow principality became an independent state only in the 13th century, becoming one of, but not the only successor of Kievan Rus.

The capital of Kievan Rus, located in the north-east of Europe, was Kyiv. The modern Ukrainian capital from the second half of the 9th century has an interesting name - "the mother of Russian cities." Why did such a paradox arise? The fact is that Kyiv was first called the "mother of Russian cities" by the semi-legendary Varangian prince Oleg, who seized power in this city in 882. This is written in the chronicle "The Tale of Bygone Years", which is dated to the 12th century.

Thus, Kyiv was declared the political, cultural, economic and religious center of Kievan Rus. The name "mother of Russian cities" is similar in its meaning to the expression "mother of all cities", which is used to characterize Jerusalem as the religious center of the world. In fact, the “mother of cities” is a calque from the Greek word “metropolis”, which was used to denote a capital city.

It turns out that the real spiritual and cultural center of Russia is located in Kyiv, and not in Moscow, which is about 7 centuries younger than the capital of Ukraine. Thus, the Russian Federation is a unique country that has no control over its spiritual and historical capital. In my opinion, this is fair, since the modern Russian army has nothing to do with the army of Kievan Rus, which was one of the strongest in Europe. Russian soldiers behave like cowardly barbarians, which is also unworthy of the army of the state, which considers itself the successor of Kievan Rus. Whereas the daughters of Yaroslav the Wise (one of the most prominent rulers in the history of Kievan Rus) were more educated than European kings.

Considering all of the above, the desire to capture Kyiv fits into the ideological concept of "gathering Russian lands", which was used by all Russian princes, tsars and emperors to seize new lands since the 13th century. President Putin clearly wants to go down in history as a great ruler of Russia, such as Ivan "The Terrible" IV, Peter I and Catherine II. All of them significantly expanded the territory of Russia, and Putin, using false accusations against Ukraine of Nazism, came up with a pretext for the invasion under the guise of protecting the Russian-speaking population from genocide, also wanting to remain in the history of his country as a brilliant strategist and commander.

However, Russia does not deserve to own Kyiv. This city is used to being the center of one of the most developed European countries, while the Russian Federation is clearly not one of them. Kyiv will never want to be part of the "Russian world", which brings with it only destruction, death and lack of culture.

Strategic importance

The Ukrainian capital is also of great strategic importance. It is located on the banks of the largest river in Ukraine called the Dnieper. During the time of Kievan Rus, it was through Kyiv that the famous trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks" passed, which connected the Baltic states and the Byzantine Empire.

Today Kyiv is the most important economic, political and military center of Ukraine. Of course, the capture of the capital of a neighboring state would greatly strengthen Russia's position in negotiations with Ukraine, but this did not happen, because Kyiv has long been a quality fortress. For example, the German Army was able to capture Kyiv only after 3 months of siege, having suffered huge losses in 1941.

Psychological factor

The capture of Kyiv, according to the plan of the Russian military-political leadership, was supposed to psychologically break the spirit of Ukrainian resistance to the invaders. For example, they could start spreading fake news that President Zelensky has fled or been assassinated. However, the Russian military failed to understand the psychology of the Ukrainians. They never understood that the city would be defended to the last Ukrainian soldier.

The fact is that in Russia almost all regions are completely subordinated to the capital Moscow. However, in Ukraine, each region is able to independently make decisions and defend itself. That is why, even if the Russian military managed to temporarily capture Kyiv and kill the military-political leadership of Ukraine, they would not be able to break the spirit of the Ukrainian people.

What do you think about President Putin’s motives for wanting to capture Kyiv? Let us know below.

Now read Konstant’s article on the history of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine here.

World War 2: Would Greater Use of Napalm in 1944 have Helped the Allies?

After the Normandy Invasion in June 1944, the Allied Powers had to move across France to reach Germany. However, the terrain was not always easy to cross. Here, Daniel Boustead returns and considers whether greater use of napalm could have helped the Allies as they crossed French hedgerow country in 1944.

Crowds celebrate the liberation of Paris on August 26, 1944.

The Allied campaigns which occurred after the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion are often not as well known to the public. In the hedgerow country in France, the Allies encountered alarming casualties from the Nazi German Army. The Allied solutions to the hedgerows were slightly effective but still had fatal flaws. The use of napalm and other explosives in Operation Cobra and other military operations allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy. Napalm was used effectively as weapon in the military campaign in France and the campaign that occurred after that. The Allies should have used napalm early on in the Normandy Campaign which would have prevented many lives being lost in hedgerow country.

The hedgerow country or Bocage, was west of the French City of Caen.(1) For the Germans, the hedgerows were ideally suited for defense. The effects of how deadly the hedgerows were to become quickly became obvious. On June 6, 1944, when German mobile artillery batteries used the hedges to accomplish their mission of camouflaging themselves.(2) This preventing Allied Aviation from either destroying them or defining their position to allow the Allies to destroy them. The hedgerow fighting lasted from June 7, 1944, until the end of August 1944 when the Allies ended up liberating most of the present-day Basse-Normandie.

Issues with hedgerows

The hedgerows consisted of a patchworks of thousands of small fields enclosed by almost impenetrable hedges. The hedges consisted of dense thickets of hawthorn, brambles, vines and trees ranging up to 15 feet in height, growing out of earthen mounds several feet thick and three or four feet  high. The hedges were equipped with a drainage ditch on either side. The walls and hedges together were so formidable that each field took on the character of a small fort. Defenders dug in at the base of a hedgerow and (hidden by vegetation) were all but impervious to rifle and artillery fire. So dense was the vegetation that infantrymen poking around the hedgerows sometimes found themselves eye to eye startled at the Germans. A single machine gun concealed in a hedgerow could mow down attacking troops as they attempted to advance from one hedge to another.  Snipers, mounted on wooden platforms in the treetops and using flashless gunpowder in order to avoid giving away their positions, were a constant threat.

On July 9, 1944, 3rd Armored Division member Belton Cooper was with most of the tank maintenance mechanics when they received fire from German Tree Snipers.(4) Belton Cooper stated that “The Tall pines of Normandy were festooned with larch bunches of mistletoe, which grew as a natural parasite”. Belton Cooper further recollected “There were so many trees and so many bunches of mistletoe that it was difficult to find the snipers who hid there”. Most of the roads were wagon trails, worn into the sunken lanes by centuries of use and turned into cavern-like mazes by overarching hedges. These gloomy passages were tailor made for ambushes and were terrifying places for men on both sides. The sunken lanes were also lethal to Allied Tanks. Confined to narrow channels, they were easy prey for German Panzerfausts (German Anti-Tank Rocket Launchers) camouflaged in the hedgerows. A tank that ventured off the road and attempted to smash through the thicket, was particularly vulnerable. As the tank climbed the mound at the base of the hedgerow, its guns were pointed helpless skyward, and its underbelly was exposed to fire from antitank guns in the next hedgerow.

Fear

The Germans defense of the hedgerows caused much fear, casualties, and losses for the Allies.  Dennis Bunn of the Scottish 15th Reconnaissance Regiment, described hedgerow fighting while driving through them in a heavy armored car. “Inside the car was intense heat and darkness, outside brilliant sunshine. I sweated and gripped the steering wheel with damp hands as I peered through a small aperture at the ground in front, the high hedge on the right, the ground sloping away to the left, at the trees, the bushes, seeing or suspecting danger in every blade of grass”(1).

From June 29 to July 1, 1944, the American Combat Command A of the 29th American Infantry Division captured the French village of Villiers-Fossard in hedgerow country.(3) However, the American Combat Command A lost 31 tanks, 12 other vehicles, and 151 men while trying to capture this French village (3). The losses which the Americans endured in trying to capture Villiers-Fossard were directly caused by German heavy small arms fire, German mortar, anti-tank fire from a German reinforced infantry battalion, and German Panzerfausts (3).

Solutions

The Allied solutions to the hedgerows were effective but had some fatal flaws. The use of Bulldozer Tanks to remove hedgerows proved faulty because they were easily knocked out by German Anti-Tank weapons. This was brutally demonstrated during the military action of Combat Command A of the 29th American Infantry Division at Villiers-Fossard. In this action the Americans lost two bulldozers early in the action to German Anti-Tank Weapons while trying to capture this village. This only left Combat Command A of the American 29th Infantry Division with only explosives to blow through the hedgerows. The American action to capture the Villiers-Fossard also displayed another faulty American tactic. The use of explosives to blow gaps in the hedgerows resulted in warning the Germans where the Americans were coming from. The Germans then directed their fire at the places where the explosives were which resulted in killing more American troops.

A more effective anti-hedgerow device were the “hedgerow cutters” developed by Sergeant Curtis G. Cutlin Jr. of the U.S. 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.(5) Cutlin Jr. welded pointed steel blades cut from the German beach obstacles onto American tanks. This allowed them to go through the hedgerows during combat. Cutlin’s innovation was so effective and popular that in General Omar Bradley’s First Army, three of every five tanks were equipped with the “hedgerow cutters”. General Dwight David Eisenhower said about the “hedgerow cutters” they “restored the effectiveness of the tank and gave a tremendous boost to morale throughout the Army”(5).  However, the tanks equipped with the “hedgerow cutters” could be knocked out.(6)

Napalm

The use of napalm along with other explosives helped the Allies break out of Normandy. On July 25, 1944, a total of 4,150+ tons of high explosives and napalm were dropped on the Periers-Saint Lo Road.(7) A total of 125,000 rounds of artillery were also fired at the Periers-Saint Lo Road. The end result of this bombardment was that 1,000 men of the German Panzer Lehr Division had perished, and the survivors were left stunned across the Periers-Saint Lo Road. Panzer Lehr Division Commander Fritz Bayerlein said about the bombardment “My front lines looked like the face of the moon, and at least 70 per cent of my troopers were out of action-dead, wounded, crazed, or numbed. All my forward tanks were knocked out, and the roads were practically impassable”(7). Some survivors of the Panzer Lehr division would be deaf for 24 hours. Three German battalion command posts simply vanished, along with a whole German parachute regiment. Only a dozen German tanks remained operable. As Fritz Bayerlien frantically tried to restore a semblance of order by calling up units from the rear, American P-38s, P-47s, and P-51s Fighter planes and British Typhoons continued to blast his troops and tanks. The July 25, 1944, bombardment helped ignite Operation Cobra.

Operation Cobra was developed by General Omar Bradley.(8) Operation Cobra tore a funnel-shaped hole in the German defenses that was 10 miles wide at Avranches, France and narrowed to a single road and a bridge at Pontaubault. The German forces also faced another threat when Allied Forces landed in Southern France on August 15, 1944, as part of Operation Anvil-Dragoon.(11) The French and American forces landed in French Rivera region as part of Operation Anvil-Dragoon. This occurred near the city of Cannes. British Paratroopers participated in this action.(12) Operation Cobra and other such Allied military operations would ultimately liberate the whole of France. The Apex of this liberation was when Allied forces liberated Paris, France on August 25/26, 1944.(9)

There were some effective tactical air uses of napalm by the Allies in France and the military actions that occurred during and after the campaign. In August 1944 American Fighter bombers carrying fire bombs flew frequent missions against the Germans escaping the encirclement at Falaise France.(10) In August, 1944 P-38s and P-47s armed with bombs, rockets, and napalm attacked fleeing concentrations of German trucks and German armor that were retreating from Falaise France. General Dwight David Eisenhower described what he witnessed from the aftermath of the German forces fleeing from Falaise France “As being able to walk hundreds of yards, walking only on dead bodies”.(10)

An example of the effectiveness of napalm was demonstrated on August 25, 1944, on the headquarters of Feldmarschall Guenther Von Kluge, German Army Group commander at Verzy, France(10). On that day, 15 fighter bombers carrying 24 165-gallon napalm bombs and eight 500 lbs. HE bombs attacked Feldmarschall Guenther Von Kluge’s headquarters at Verzy, France. Twenty-two of the napalm tanks made direct hits on the Verzy headquarters buildings completely destroying eight houses. In the Battle of the Bulge from December 1944 to January 1945, the American Army Air Force fighter bombers used fire bombs effectively against the German motor transportation and German armored concentrations in the wooded sections of the battleground.

The Anglo-Americans faced a “meat-grinder” campaign in the hedgerow country of France against their German adversaries. In retrospect the Anglo-American military forces should have used napalm more frequently against the hedgerows in the time before, during, and after the June 6, 1944, Normandy Invasion. This factor would have resulted in less Allied soldiers being killed, wounded, or captured and ultimately brought about a quicker end to the conflict in Europe.

What do you think of the use of napalm in World War 2 Let us know below.

Now, you can read World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here, “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here, and “Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?” here.

References

1 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia.  Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 17.

2 Laurenceau, Marc. “Hedgerow warfare in Normandy-D-Day Overlord”. Last Modified or Updated 2003 to 2022. Accessed on May 16th, 2022. www.dday-overlord.com  of Encyclopedie du debarquement et de la bataille de Normandie. https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/battle-of-normandy/tactics/hedgerow-warfare.

3 Cooper, Belton Y. Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II. Novato: California. Presidio Press. 1998. 10 to 11.

4 Cooper, Belton Y. Death Traps: The Survival of An American Armored Division in World War II. Novato: California. Presidio Press. 1998. 28.

5 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time Life-Books, Inc. 1978. 21.

6 “Knocked Out M4 Sherman Tank with hedgerow cutters Normandy”. World War Photos. Updated or improved from 2013 -2022. Accessed on May 17th, 2022.  https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/usa/tanks/m4_sherman/knocked-out-m4-sherman-tank-with-hedgerow-cutters-normandy/

7 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time Life-Books, Inc. 1978 . 54 to 56.

8 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 76.

9 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 156 and 162.

10 Wolf, William. U.S. Aerial Armament in World War II: The Ultimate Look Vol. 3: Air-launched  Rockets, Mines, Torpedoes, Guided Missiles, and Secret Weapons. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History Books of Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 2010. 70.

11 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 102 and 115.

12 Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 107.

Bibliography

Blumenson, Martin. Liberation. Alexandria, Virginia. Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978.

Cooper, Belton Y. Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division In World War II. Novato: California. Presidio Press. 1998.

“Knocked Out M4 Sherman Tank with hedgerow cutters Normandy”. World War Photos. Updated or Improved from 2013-2022. Accessed on May 17th, 2022. https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/usa/tanks/m4_sherman/knocked-out-m4-sherman-tank-with-hedgerow-cutters-normandy/

Laurenceau, Marc. “Hedgerow warfare in Normandy-D-Day Overlord”. Last Modified or Updated 2003 to 2022. Accessed on May 16th, 2022. www.day-overlord.com. Of Encyclopedie du debarquement et de la bataille de Normandie. https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/battle-of-normandy/tactics/hedgerow-warfare.

Wolf, William. U.S. Aerial Armament in World War II: The Ultimate Look Vol. 3: Air-launched Rockets, Mines, Torpedoes, Guided Missiles, and Secret Weapons. Atglen: Pennsylvania. Schiffer Military History Books of Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 2010.

Legendary Musician Robert Johnson: Me and the Devil Blues

It is one of music’s great mysteries that one of the most influential figures of the 20th Century has remained unknown to a vast number of people. The story of this man’s life is one of myth, folklore, and legend. His playing technique and general style have gone on to inspire countless musicians. These include Bob Dylan, Keith Richards, and most notably, Eric Clapton who claimed him be ‘the most important blues singer who ever lived.’ This man is Robert Johnson.

Matt Austin explains.

The crossroads where Robert Johnson supposedly sold his soul to the Devil in exchange for his Blues skills, according to the myth. It is at Clarksdale, Mississippi. Source: Joe Mazzola, available here.

To those who are even slightly aware of Robert Johnson, there is one resounding detail that is synonymous with his name. This is the tale that the legendary blues singer visited a Mississippi crossroads late one night where he sold his soul to the Devil, and in return, was granted exceptional musical talent.(2) This myth lies at the heart of Johnson’s otherwise relatively unknown life and as such it has become impossible to focus on the impact of this great musician without this looming detail.

The legend of the deal with the Devil is nothing new in the music world. This story traditionally derives from Germanic folklore, whereby the fictional character Faust surrendered his soul to an evil spirit in exchange for otherwise unattainable knowledge and power.(3) This phenomenon has therefore become known in Western culture as the ‘Faustian Bargain.’(4) The notion that hugely successful musicians had attained their talent through supernatural means was first explored as a popular theme in the 18th Century. Early examples of this include classical violinists Giuseppe Tartini and Niccolo Paganini, the latter considered by many to be ‘the greatest violin virtuosi to have ever lived.’(5)

This popular music myth exploded in the early 20th century, with numerous individuals earning connections to the Devil. This includes jazz composer Ferdinand ‘Jelly Roll’ Morton and blues musicians Peetie Wheatstraw and namesake of Robert, Tommy Johnson.(6) In addition, this theme is not without its place in slightly more recent music history. Most notably, both Jimi Hendrix and Jim Morrison were thought to have developed ties with the supernatural.(7) Even the Rolling Stones were not immune, as they jumped on the Satanic Bandwagon with their 1968 hit “Sympathy for the Devil”. This, however, was no real surprise given lead guitarist, Keith Richard’s, absolute fascination with the blues and Johnson in particular.

Leading historians on Johnson, Gayle Dean Wardlow and Bruce Conforth, have been determined in their efforts to highlight the real story of the mythical bluesman. They have fervently denied any links to the crossroads or the supernatural, instead shifting their focus onto Johnson’s actual life, which remains ‘obscure, save for a few inaccurate anecdotes.’(8) What we do know for certain about Johnson is that he was born in 1911, and died in 1938 almost without a trace, save for 42 recordings, consisting of 29 original tracks and 13 alternative takes, in addition to a couple of grainy promotional photographs.

Life

From the impressive amount of information that historians have painstakingly managed to piece together about Johnson’s life, it is understood that he split most of his time between his biological family in the Mississippi Delta, and his adopted family in the bustling city of Memphis, Tennessee. While his experiences in 1920s Memphis may have first inspired Johnson to pick up a guitar, it was in the heart of the Delta where he would truly hone his skills, as he travelled along the Mississippi river, stopping wherever he could to perform at small-town juke joints and bars. It was during this time that he realised he could earn more money by playing his guitar than working in the fields.(9) Following his family into a life of sharecropping was not going to cut it for the young Johnson. He wanted to play the Blues. This passion and desire for music led to him becoming a highly renowned bluesman in the Delta region, and as his skills developed, so did his reputation. He was soon more popular than artists he had once looked up to, such as Charley Patton, Son House, and Willie Brown. As a result of this, after several years of performing for local audiences in the Delta, Johnson successfully auditioned and earned his opportunity to become a recorded artist in 1936.(10) This was an unimaginable privilege for an impoverished African American from the Deep South. He would however, only get the chance to record once more following his debut session and no sooner had Johnson achieved his dream, his playing days were over with his untimely death in 1938 at the age of just 27.

The facts surrounding Johnson’s death are largely unclear and much like his life, it has remained a thing of myth and mystery. Wardlow and Conforth, in their efforts to promote the most accurate account of Johnson, refer to the story of fellow bluesman David ‘Honeyboy’ Edwards.(11) His account has been deemed by far the most reliable, lacking any romanticism or falsehoods. In essence, Johnson, a notorious ladies man, began flirting with a married woman at a Delta juke joint in which he was playing.(12) The woman’s husband soon became enraged with jealously and he slipped Johnson a glass of poisoned whiskey, which, following several days of extreme sickness, eventually killed him.(13) In a cruel twist of fait, it was the three things Johnson had held most dear: women, whiskey and the Blues, that ultimately cost him his life.

Legacy

Following his death, popular knowledge of Robert Johnson remained very limited for many years. It wasn’t until 1959 that his music was first made widely accessible. This occurred as a result of historian Samuel Charters’ landmark book The Country Blues, in which he introduced the public to Johnson’s music, claiming that ‘almost nothing is known about his (Johnson’s) life.’(14) This still echoes true today and what exists now is a messy concoction of fact and fiction. It is within the murky waters of Johnson’s story where the myth of the Devil at the crossroads shines most bright. This is due to a number of factors. One of which being the abundance of unreliable recollections from Johnson’s contemporaries, most notably that of Son House, whose accounts of Johnson dramatically altered throughout the years. Blues fans rediscovered House in 1964, as the singer had largely vanished from the public eye during the Second World War. Following his rediscovery, he subsequently released new music and was frequently interviewed about his former life in the Delta. His story about Johnson attested to the fact that the young musician did leave the Delta for a period of several months in his early career. When he left, he was an enthusiastic, yet mediocre guitarist, but when he returned, he was a confident and established bluesman who could outplay his contemporaries with minimal effort.(15) Another key factor that would later fan the flames of the crossroads myth, are the serial misinterpretations of these accounts by historians and folklorists. Many have inserted their own personal beliefs into the story, implying that House’s comments indicated that Johnson had gained his exceptional talent through some supernatural force, which House never alluded to.(16) Nevertheless, the lack of information surrounding his life, combined with the fascinations of historians and fans alike, formed the core building blocks upon which a largely fictionalised portrayal of Johnson has developed.

Additionally, the crossroads story has had a somewhat negative impact on Johnson’s legacy, in that it significantly takes away from his ability as a musician. Whether he met the Devil or not, he was without doubt an exceptionally gifted guitarist, whose technique and style has set the standard for modern Blues. As such, his music has inspired countless musicians and his name has become synonymous with the genre.

Crossroads

Nevertheless, Robert Johnson’s visit to the crossroads is undeniably a watershed moment in music history. This event, albeit a myth shrouded in mystery and scepticism, has gone on to define not only Johnson’s life, but also the Blues as a genre. Many of Johnson’s recordings were highly evocative of his connection to the supernatural; arguably his most famous song, “Cross Road Blues” depicts his infamous deal with the Devil. Meanwhile one listen to the ghostly “Hellhound on My Trail”, is enough to understand that he certainly portrayed a deeply troubled individual. It is easy to observe therefore, how a man whose life left much to the imagination, has become a fascinating subject of mythical proportions. The small collection of eerie recordings left behind by Johnson, several of which made months before his death, only serve as a haunting reminder of the tragic reality of a young, flawed, but highly skilled and ambitious musician.

The Blues and the supernatural have developed an intrinsic connection, to the point of becoming almost inseparable, and it is Robert Johnson, the man who walked side by side with the Devil, whose legacy has evolved into the ultimate embodiment of music’s most captivating legend.

What do you think of Robert Johnson’s life? Let us know below.

1 Stephen LaVere, The Complete Recordings (Box Set Booklet). Robert Johnson. (New York: Columbia Records, 1990), in an essay by Eric Clapton, 23.

2 Patricia R. Schroeder, Robert Johnson, Mythmaking, and Contemporary American Culture (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 1.

3 “Faustian Bargain,” Britannica, accessed 14/05/2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Faustian-bargain.

4 Ibid.

5 Alex James Taylor, “Faustian Pacts: Musicians said to have made deals with the Devil,” 13 May 2019, Satanic Verses, Hero Magazine, accessed 14/05/2022, https://hero-magazine.com/article/148564/faustian-pacts-musicians-said-to-have-made-deals-with-the-devil.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Bruce Conforth and Gayle Dean Wardlow, Up Jumped the Devil: The Real Life of Robert Johnson (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2019), 1.

9 Ibid, 65.

10 Ibid, 143-144.

11 Ibid, 253-254

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid, 1

15 Ibid, 117-118.

16 Ibid.

The Sinking of the British Ship Lancastria in June 1940: A Personal Tale

Here, Michael Sheldrick explains his personal story about the Lancastria tragedy that took place 82 years ago today on June 17, 1940…

June 1940 was a month that changed the course of the Second World War. It was both Britain’s darkest hour, and witness to a tragedy that remains little known to this day; a tragedy that changed my family, forever.

The sinking of the Lancastria in 1940.

As a child growing up in Britain in the 1990s, my sister and I would every so often be left with my grandmother, Claire. A tiny, frail woman, Claire lived in a terrace house in the oldest part of Swindon (an area locals these days refer to colloquially as “Old Town”).

Owing to Claire’s serial chain smoking ways, a stale cigarette odor lingered in every nook and cranny. To avoid the unpleasant smell, I would usually eat meals in the back garden. I can picture it clearly: me eating tinned meatballs, Claire sipping re-heated coffee while lighting herself yet another cigarette. By that point in her life, Claire rarely had much of an appetite except on the rare occasion she would pour a cup of leftover lukewarm coffee over a bowl of Kellogg's corn flakes, garnished of course with raisins.

With the best of Vera Lynn audible from inside, I would ask Claire all about “The War.” She always referred to the Second World War as “The War”, such was the overbearing impact the conflict had on her, and by extension, our life. Claire would recount to me her experiences as a young woman working with what was then known as the Auxiliary Territorial Service, which tasked women with a range of vital roles during the Second World War. In my Grandmother’s case, she was charged with assisting Anti-Aircraft operations. It was one conversation in particular, long buried in my subconsciousness, that would suddenly return to me decades later.

Claire had told me that she had decided to sign up to the ‘war effort’ following news that her older brother Colin, serving as a soldier in France, was missing in action. I distinctly remember asking Claire what happened to him. Looking in the distance, as if talking more to herself than me, she described how Colin had been aboard a ship that had been bombed by the luftwaffe and his body had never been discovered. She said there was a grave somewhere in France but “of course, there is nothing beneath it.” As far as I recall her saying, no one had visited it.

Decades later

Claire passed away shortly after sharing that story. Decades went by and Colin’s story retreated to the far recesses of my mind. That is until a hot summer's day in August, 2019. I was on the New York subway, traveling to where I now work, listening to an audible book about a journalist trying to recover the remains of an American soldier who had died in Japan during WWII. The journalist was explaining that official US policy holds that the US Government is committed to recovering the remains of any and all American soldiers who died during the course of duty.

Suddenly, my mind lit up. I could hear Claire’s words re-telling Colin’s fate, along with many unanswered questions. How exactly did Colin die? What ship was he on that was bombed? Where is his grave, and the ship, now? And why didn’t anyone in my family seem to know the answers?

I spoke with both my dad and his older brother, my uncle, as a starting point. Unfortunately, they knew little more than what Claire had told me decades ago. My uncle told me that he remembered someone once telling him that Colin had died during the British evacuation at Dunkirk apparently due to the betrayal of a shipmaster who had given the ship’s departure time and location to the Germans. But he admitted, he could not remember correctly if that is exactly what he heard. It's simply the case, they both told me, and in a departure from today’s tendency to overshare, that those who served in The War, such as both their parents, did not discuss these things in too much detail.

My own research quickly hit a dead end. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC), generally pretty comprehensive and accessible online, had no trace of a ‘Colin Thomas’ born in 1918 and with recognizable parents. It was like he never existed.

Then finally, one Saturday evening, late into the night, I realized my error. An error based on a very simple oversight, and yet one that remarkably no one else had picked up on either. My mum had sent over scans of a very old black and white photo of a four month old Colin, dated June, 1918, that she found amongst Claire’s old possessions. Only it had “Baby John Colin Lee Thomas' ' written on the back. Aha! Although it seems he went by Colin all his life, his full name had been lost to history. Armed with this new information, I went back to the CWGC archives and just minutes later I was staring at a picture of what appeared to be my Grand Uncle’s name on a memorial plaque at the Commonwealth War Graves section of Dunkirk Town Cemetery.

Uncovering the mystery

“I’ve found him…” I remember murmuring out loud to my housemate as I scrolled down. There he was: Private John Colin Thomas, died 17 June 1940, aged 22, Son of John Weldon Thomas and Amy Thomas, of Hall Green, Birmingham; my great grandparents.

On the surface at least it seemed like my uncle might have been right. Judging by the location of his memorial plaque, had Colin died in the Dunkirk evacuation? Not quite. Some quick googling revealed that the final evacuation from Dunkirk had taken place on June 4th, 13 days prior to when Colin had officially died. Something wasn’t right.

Further digging eventually revealed that Colin had actually ‘died’ some 335 miles south of Dunkirk, off the coast of the small port town of Saint-Nazaire, aboard the SS Lancastria, the sinking of which, as I would soon discover, remains the largest single loss of life in British maritime history. Indeed, more people died in this tragedy than that of the death toll from the sinking of the Titanic and Lusitania combined. Now I had found my uncle, I dove into the Lancastria’s story; a story I ashamedly hadn’t even known the existence of.

Colin at the age of 22, as he would have been in 1940. Courtesy: Michael Sheldrick, shown with full permission.

Lancastria

The SS Lancastria was a 16,243-ton, five decked ship that up until the outbreak of war in 1939 had been a lavish luxury cruise liner. It toured the Norwegian fjords, and across the Mediterranean and West Indies before being hastily requisitioned by the British Government and outfitted as a troop ship. It spent the early months of the war ferrying soldiers back and forth from Canada to the UK, assisted in the evacuation of Norway, before finally being called upon to play a pivotal role in ‘Operation Ariel’; the name of the lesser known campaign that followed the aftermath of the evacuation of Dunkirk. The scenes leading up to it were no less dramatic.

Overwhelmed by the might of the Nazi blitzkrieg, French defenses had quickly collapsed in the days following the last departure from Dunkirk. Countless civilian refugees, French soldiers and the vast remainder of British forces in France - some 150,000 men - hurriedly escaped south. On June 14th, an urgent call went out to the crew of Lancastria, then docked in Liverpool, to make haste for the French port of Saint Nazaire. That very same day, the Nazis occupied Paris. Things were dire.

Colin, I discovered, was by this point based at a weapons and equipment storage base at Nantes, the old historical capital of Brittany located about 40 miles from the sea. Having been an articled clerk prior to the war, Colin was one of many support troops, engineers, repair men, transport and communications staff, wireless operators, air force ground crew, store minders, cooks, bakers, and clerks that supplied the main British Expeditionary Force. Known collectively as “the Grocers,” the vast majority of these personnel were located, at least initially, far behind the main defense lines and most would never have expected to see conflict. Of course, few expected either that France would fall so quickly to the German onslaught.

In the wake of Paris’ capture, General Alan Brooke, the commander of all remaining British forces in France, pleaded with Churchill to issue a general order for evacuation. During an intense thirty minutes call in the early hours of June 15th, a desperate Brooke informed Churchill of the irreversible collapse in French morale saying it “was impossible to make a corpse feel.” Churchill relented and at 10am that same morning, a general evacuation order was given. Later that day, word reached my uncle’s base in Nantes.

As those at the base rushed to depart, numerous reports document a rushed frenzy ensuing to burn and destroy any equipment, vehicles and armaments that could not be carried out to prevent them from falling into German hands. Meanwhile, others helped themselves to remaining food and drink stockpiles. As 19-year-old Henry Harding from Wales would later recount: “Everything was thrown open… you could help yourself to whatever it was you wanted, so we took chocolate.”Then, with German planes already in control of the skies above, they headed out to converge on what author Johanthan Fenby describes as “the last escape hatch left.”

Within the next 24 hours, Saint Nazaire was overcrowded with British soldiers and refugees. Local French citizens cried as the British began clambering aboard requisitioned ocean liners. It was into this scene of chaos that the Lancastria would arrive the next day, June 17th. It was to prove a fateful day.

More than six thousand reportedly boarded the Lancastria with Colin’s corps amongst the very last to board. Those who had boarded first were greeted by men in fancy white uniforms with gold buttons who assigned them all rooms. While they waited for others to board, a lucky few tucked into sausages, bacon and eggs with hot buttered toast for breakfast. It must have been quite the comfort after days after a hurried dash to the coast.

Eventually though, the vessel was so cramped that officers pleaded with Lancastria’s Captain to take no more. He pushed back, saying he had been ordered to take as many as possible without respect to international law. They were all anxious to leave. They had good reason to be. There had been reports of other ships being attacked by the Luftwaffe although fortunately no major disasters had yet struck.

As thousands crammed onto the assembled ships, news was already spreading in the port that France’s newly appointed leader, Marshall Pétain, had that morning agreed to open armistice talks with Germany. Across the English Channel, Churchill was soon meeting France’s soon to be leader in exile, Charles de Gaulle, in the gardens of Number 10 Downing Street. While that same day, up in Belgium, Hitler was said to have hit his thigh in glee upon hearing the news of France’s capitulation. As Churchill would declare later that day, “the Battle for France was over.”

Sinking

After waiting painstakingly for its escort, the Lancastria finally began to pull out of the dock. Yet, any relief those aboard felt was quickly dashed as shortly thereafter six Luftwaffe planes came down from the skies. A minute later siren on the ship sounded. Heard “a chilling banshee scream… howling from the sky.” Initial bombs missed but a series of successive bombs hit their mark, with one payload going straight down the ship’s fennel. It was fatal. The ship went down in 20 minutes. Thousands onboard perished.

To read the survivor accounts is harrowing. Collectively, they portray a scene straight from Dante’s inferno. One 15 year old who helped with the rescue described the scene he saw as “hell… abominable, the height of horror.”

We will never know for sure exactly how Colin died, and perhaps that is for the best. Most of those packed in the ships hold died instantly from the initial bomb explosion. Many others drowned, either because they couldn’t swim or were trapped. Only 2,000 life belts were on board for at least 3 times that many men. Splinters of wood from walls and floors impaled people standing nearby. Oil flowed out of a ripped oil tank. Those who survived the initial sinking choked on the oil that flooded the surrounding waters. But most ghastly and cruelly, the Luftwaffe planes returned to gun down those swimming to shore.

One account stands out from the rest however. A handful of soldiers standing on the Lancastria’s rapidly sinking hull as it descended into the water, proudly and defiantly singing the war time classics of Roll Out The Barrel and There Will Always Be An England.

I have discovered the initial telegram that was issued in the immediate aftermath of the Lancastria’s demise. Colin is listed as ‘Missing In Action.’ It is hard to say exactly when my great grandparents and his two sisters would have been notified. I do know that when they did it left a deep scar on my grandmother, claire, and a burning desire, in her words, “to kill Germans.” A self-described “Tom Boy”, Colin was her hero and in joining the defense forces she was determined to ensure his life was not in vain.

Only in more recent decades has the story of the Lancastria become more known. Despite it, or perhaps because of it, accounting for more than a third of all losses in the war up to that point, and wanting to maintain British morale, Churchill felt justified in putting a censorship notice on the media and even survivors from talking about it. After all, it must not have been hard to imagine England falling next to the Nazi war machine. It was so kept so tightly under wraps that those who survived did not talk to wives and relatives about it until decades later.

75th anniversary

It wasn’t until the 75th anniversary of the Lancastria’s sinking, in 2015, that the British Parliament formally acknowledged it. Standing in for the Prime Minister, George Obsborne said: "It was kept secret at the time for reasons of wartime secrecy, but I think it is appropriate today in this House of Commons to remember all those who died, those who survived, and those who mourn them."

Unfortunately, it is the brutal reality that for most those who died onboard Lancastria is just one of many tragedies during the war. What should make this one stand out from all the rest? Added to this is the fact that unlike Dunkirk’s “victory in defeat”, which continues to provide the source material for so many TV shows and films, a tragedy of Lancastria’s proportions is unlikely to stir British patriotism. The stories of the 150,000 men left behind in France after Dunkirk has been largely forgotten in popular mainstream history books on the Second World War.

Even amongst members of my own extended family I encountered indifference. I remember one of my dad’s cousins, Colin’s own nephew, replying curtly to a message I sent that no one ever spoke to him about Colin and I probably know more than he does.

I could not let the story end there however. I thought about Claire all those years ago telling me about her beloved brother. And I thought of Colin's memorial plaque in Dunkirk. It occurred to me that not one member of his family had visited it in the past eight decades. My dad said it was a shame he did not find this out in Claire’s lifetime. He would have taken her to see it. She couldn’t go, but we could.

So shortly before the 80th anniversary of the Lancastria’s sinking, my sister, dad and mum, took the ferry across. At 8am on a cold, misty, winter day we visited the grave. We had taken with us a small bottle of whiskey. We poured each of us a small cup, and then a fifth one. Then, crouching to the small plaque, we raised a toast.

John Lee Colin Thomas, lost on the Lancastria on June 17, 1940. Lost but not forgotten.

What do you think of Michael’s touching article? Let us know below.

Isolationism in the United States from World War One to Trump

There were many factors behind the United States becoming more isolationist during the 1920s and 1930s. However, here it is argued that the primary factors were the history and mindset of America, the overall ending of the First Word War, and the extreme economic turmoil of the 1930s and the Great Depression.

Alan Cunningham explains - and also adds some more recent context with the Trump years.

A US ‘NO FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENTS’ anti-war sign prior to the US joining World War II.

The attitudes and overall mindset many Americans Margaret MacMillan, a professor of history at Canada’s Ryerson University and a fellow at Oxford, describes America’s disdain of European powers as being ingrained within the country since the American Revolutionary War, writing, “the very act of rebellion by the 13 colonies was a turning away from the old, corrupt European powers”. MacMillan also writes how this sentiment did not end at the turn of the 19th century, but continued with the ever present fear that the British would return and try to reclaim their lost territories (as had occurred in the War of 1812) and was strengthened by a fear of Catholicism, which she asserts was just as reviled in the 19th century as Communism would be in the 20th century, noting, “the fear was the same and helped to fuel isolationism”.

The end of the First World War brought about the desire to improve the domestic standing of the country, with many Americans believing they had performed their global duty and preserved their own safety and should not become involved in the creation of international legal bodies or more ingrained into the European-led system. According to Jeremy Suri, a professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin, “Americans in the 1920s felt betrayed by leaders and allies who had taken them into a long and costly war that ended with the strengthening of Europe's largest empires and a communist revolution in Russia”; certainly engaging in a conflict that many thought would be “over by Christmas” and that resulted in one of the largest countries (in terms of population and outright size) becoming a Communist power was an outcome many disliked. Seeing soldiers who now suffered from what would today be called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), had ghastly wounds and hearing the media report on victories and losses with horrific death toll numbers also would have moved many to want to cease involvement in similar conflicts.

Domestic focus

What many Americans desired was to focus on their own domestic economy and social issues, this “internal growth and development” coming about through increased tariffs which, “restrict[ed] the influx of imported goods, thereby increasing domestic production”. However, as Suri points out, “Isolationism and intolerance in the 1920s smothered the openness and cooperation necessary for healthy economic growth. Closing markets triggered, in part, the Great Depression, cutting off the country from needed resources, consumers, and allies abroad”. These types of economic policies that are wholly domestic and involve no other outside relationship with foreign markets became a recipe for disaster. They contributed to one of the worst periods in American history, when unemployment was extremely high, food became harder to find, and it seemed democracy could come under strain. The Depression forced Americans to focus on improving their own economic standing which resulted in Americans being left out of decisions that would lead to Hitler’s rise to power, the rise of Fascism in Europe, and the growing threat of Japan as a military power. As the State Department’s Office of the Historian bluntly puts it, “[there were] clear dangers [that] emerged during the Great Depression of the 1930s”.

Because of these reasons, it is apparent why the U.S. did not feel the need to embrace the larger world and Europe in economics and foreign policy, basing this on their own desire for pause and respite and building off centuries old sentiments about their country’s place in the world. However, one of the more intriguing questions is why the U.S. chose isolationism over other solutions that seemed to improve foreign relationships, build strong economic ties, and improve the safety and security of the United States in addition to the globe (something that is often mentioned in U.S. politics)? Suri again provides an explanation to this, writing, “Americans embraced isolationism and intolerance because they were false solutions to deeper structural problems. Technological innovations like the assembly line and the automobile displaced millions of people, but instead of adjusting, citizens turned to leaders who promised to halt change. As demographics were re-defining ethnic, racial and religious identities, politicians pledged to keep America white, Anglo-Saxon and protestant”. In the end, the meaning behind why Americans voluntarily chose to isolate was built upon the fact that it seemed to be the easiest and fastest option, not because it was the most beneficial (though those who supported it certainly found reasons to justify the measure) to improving America’s place in the world.

Modern day

There are many similarities to American sentiments in the 1920s to current, modern-day public sentiments. Suri also discusses this, writing, “Trump has identified some serious problems within American society: economic inequality, social displacement and deep distrust in established institutions. Millions of Americans feel they have been cheated, and they blame political elites. They are looking for changes that will restore hope and dignity to their lives. In response, Trump is recycling the repertoire of the early 20th century because it appears to address these contemporary concerns”.

Simply put, Trump capitalized on fear throughout the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, fear of the other, fear of the establishment, and fear of the upper and lower classes. This can easily be seen in the rhetoric he utilizes in which he made note through his 2016 campaign that he would build a wall and keep illegal immigrants out of the country (fear of the other), he attacked other Republicans on their stances (fear of the establishment), and capitalized on a large amount of American’s distaste of the Affordable Care Act and the fact that the Obama administration seemingly allowed the Wall Street bankers to continue their business without repercussion. While many economists (Paul Krugman for instance) and journalists (like Andrew Ross Sorkin and Bethany McLean) agree that the 2008 bailing out of the banks was the best course of action to save America’s economy and preventing another Great Depression, members of both the left and right political ideologies disliked this action and resented the bailout. Much like how the Great Depression prevented the U.S. from becoming more entrenched in foreign policy actions around the world, the 2008 financial crisis left many Americans desiring to recoup their lost income and benefits and focus on their own domestic issues instead of turning an eye to the rest of the world. The president’s remarks about Muslims and immigrants also capitalizes on the American public’s fears surrounding those groups (going back to Islamophobia); there are quite obvious similarities to public fears of Irish and Chinese immigrants and Catholicism in earlier periods. 

I believe that the factors that influence Trump and those who support him are very similar to those non-internationalist policies we saw in the 1920s. They are built upon the same biases of hatred and fear along with desires for fairness and improvement in the economic system. Also, it is interesting to think about how the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq play into this. Many Americans now are tired of being involved in foreign military operations and nearly every president since 2001 has run on the platform of removing troops from Afghanistan, the longest war in U.S. history. The forces that propelled the U.S. into an isolationist stance in the 1920s also propelled Trump to the White House in the 2016 election and will absolutely be a factor in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.

What do you think of the article? Let us know below.

Now read Alan’s article on how public opinion impacts foreign policy in America here.

Western Relations with Russia from 1900 to Today

The West has had a long and complicated relationship with Russia since 1900. From Britain, France, and America being allies with Russia and the USSR during the world wars to deep distrust in the Cold War, Stephen Prout explains how the relationship has evolved to the present day.

Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at the 1943 Tehran Conference.

Throughout the last century and certainly in current times the impression of Russia from a western perspective has been of a menacing spectre. Previous decades have seen imperial rivalry with Britain over the Far and the Middle East, the threat of communist expansion resulting in the Cold War, the tyranny of Stalin during the great purges, the arms race with all its hostile rhetoric, and threats of nuclear escalations. In recent times we have evidence of accusations of meddling in US elections, assassinations in the UK of Russian dissidents and alleged cyber-attacks on Western governmental and commercial organisations. In fact, it is hard not to pick any decade where Russia has been regarded in a favourable light.

Winston Churchill once quoted of Russia “I cannot forecast you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped inside a mystery inside an enigma, but there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”  This summed up well the feelings of the time concerning the Soviet Union and this quote continues to be relevant in modern times. To try and understand this we must track Russia’s journey from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present day. What events have created this hostility, mistrust even paranoia?

A New Century and the First World War

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian Empire amongst all the main European powers was the most reviled in Europe. It was less than half a century since when Britain and France had clashed with Russia in the Crimea.

Despite the relationships and direct family connections of Britain and Russia’s royal families, Britain had been wary of Russia and had been making endeavors to contain Russia’s influence in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

By 1904 Russia had embarked on a short and disastrous war with Japan and the result was defeat and international humiliation that highlighted military weakness. More humiliation ensued as her ally France reneged from treaty obligations with Russia to avoid antagonizing Great Britain. The world it seemed did not trust Russia and the feeling would be reciprocal - and as time went on irreconcilable. All this would shortly be put aside when the three powers formed the triple entente in the face of German militarism. Unity against a common enemy did not necessarily mean they would be lasting allies though.

Russia had ambitions for a sphere of influence in the Middle East. This time Britain and France found it expedient to offer such a prospect at the expense of the Ottomans as an incentive to her contributing to an alliance against Germany. None of this would come to fruition as the events of World War One unfolded and the promises to Russia were not honored.

Like the war with Japan the war went in an adverse direction. The Russian forces were partially capable of containing the Austrians, but no match for the Germans who rolled her forces back through Belorussia and Ukraine. The combined effects of economic devastation, hatred of the Tsar and the war itself drove the discontent that created the Russian Revolution. That would be the first foothold of communism and would unsettle the world. Russia would find herself friendless, ostracized, bitter, and mistrustful at the war’s end.

The Russians needed peace and time to augment their new regime and make good on the revolution's promises to its people. This stability came in the form of the Brest-Litovsk peace settlement and it came at an extremely high price. Russia lost large chunks of European land and her many coal mines. It was a loss that for the time being she would have to bear but opportunity would later come to reclaim it.

At this time, her former allies occupied various ports in Russia and supported the anti-revolutionary movements much to the new government’s chagrin. The west it seemed was no more to be trusted than the very nations she fought against so in 1922 Russia signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, another outcast. This treaty had secret clauses that allowed Germany to develop her military machine out of sight of Western eyes, a violation of the Versailles Treaty. Had Western actions and meddling created a future unnecessary hostile force?

The Interwar Years and World War Two

As the first world war was ending the newly established USSR was at war with Poland. Poland was formerly incorporated into former Imperial Russia, but the post war settlement created a new Polish state that would not be satisfied with the boundaries established by Lord Curzon as they took large expanses of Ukraine and Belorussia. The Soviets lost even more territory and received little support.

However, the USSR did little to improve the perception of themselves in their formative years to reassure the West. The USSR was finally recognized by the international community and admitted to the League in 1934. The remaining interwar years were overshadowed with the ruthless actions of its leader, Stalin. A totalitarian shadow had been cast over Russia and the world feared it would expand as the USSR intervened in the Spanish Civil War. Internally, very public trials during the purges and long incarcerations in the labor camps gave a glimpse of what Soviet rule would bring.

Despite this the USSR had its external supporters. The socialists in Britain, enamored with Soviet achievements, overlooked or condoned any controversy that slipped out of the USSR. Major industrial corporations from the US and Britain such as Rolls Royce and Ford clamored to do business with a vibrant economy.

For the unemployed, desperate, and needy, the Soviet Union was seen as a utopia as the capitalist nations such Britain and the USA struggled in the Great Depression. The USSR boasted of full employment, affordable housing and free education and health services so much so that thousands from the USA emigrated, something that these people would later regret when they found themselves abandoned. There were reports of desperate messages reaching the US embassies from US expatriates, but political expediency allowed such things to be conveniently ignored. It did not mean that the West fully trusted the USSR and they were given good reason as the Second World War loomed.

By 1939 the USSR had signed two pacts, one with Germany and one with Japan. That meant the three main militaristic powers were aligned in a state of co-operation and were threatening British, US and other interests around the world. The USSR in two treaties had derailed any collective security and in turn allowed the full might of Japan and Germany to be unleashed on the rest of the world.

The pacts at face value were very strange and politically incongruous considering the ideological differences. In 1936 Germany and Japan had signed The Anti-Comintern Pact aimed specifically at the USSR and the advance of communism. Hitler’s speeches left no room for doubt how he felt about the USSR even in his early writings in Mein Kampf. As the democracies were in retreat, Germany and the USSR invaded and divided up Poland. The USSR added Baltic states and ten percent of Finland’s territory to her spoils.

Following Operation Barbarossa Russia joined the allies to defeat Nazi Germany but would leave the outcome of Europe and future international relations in an equally parlous state. As the war ended so the question of Soviet reliability raised its head again. Once again, a unity against a common enemy did not necessarily mean a long-term friendship.

The Cold War to Glasnost and Perestroika

The war ended with Eastern Europe remaining under a new totalitarian rule. Poland had found itself liberated from one dictator only to be ruled by a no less brutal Soviet version along with East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Czechoslovakia.

The uneasy wartime alliance had dissolved by the end of the war. Hostile actions by the USSR with the Berlin Blockade and the establishment of the “Iron Curtain” led to NATO’s formation in 1949 as communism now appeared to be the new enemy. In 1955 the USSR, viewing NATO as a threat, formed their own defensive alliance with its satellite states. Security was the underlying motive certainly in Europe, but the following decades would have the USSR supporting various insurrectionist organisations and proxy wars against the west.

From the point of view of the USSR they had without debate experienced the most savagery in the war. Allied actions did little to give assurances such as the delays to opening a second front in 1943. The USSR it seemed was left to bear the full force of the Wehrmacht alone. Too many times had she been betrayed so the future security and the buffer states of Eastern Europe provided a bulwark against future aggression they perceived would come again from the West. However, the USSR’s perspectives are veiled by secrecy, their intentions will never fully be clear, and this makes it difficult to offer any counterarguments. We are left with her actions that seem to speak louder than anything else.

The next four decades saw the Soviet military machine brutally suppressed its own satellites in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviets were keeping their vassal states under a tight reign. In 1979 the world watched a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to shore up a failing communist government. Her presence behind the scenes of revolutionary regimes in Palestine, Libya, Syria, and Iraq would have their own limited but destructive impacts.

For a short while there appeared to be optimism after the fall in Communism in 1989, the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact - but this was to be short lived as history moved into the twenty first century. As the USSR broke up into separate autonomous nations it created an unstable base for peace and security for the future.

Russia – back to a New Cold War?

There is a quote from a source Putin’s People, “The Soviet Empire might have been lost…for them, the end of the communist empire did not mean an end of hostilities, but an opportunity to eventually continue them under new auspices.” The events of the twenty first century support this.

The twenty first century saw the East-West rapprochement disintegrate. In eight months in 2014 Russia conducted thirty-nine violations into NATO airspace. In that same year, the world saw her annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine. Russian dissidents were poisoned allegedly by Russian agents on British soil in the infamous Salisbury incidents. There followed allegations of tampering in US elections and in 2022 Russia began an invasion of Ukraine after false reassurances of military exercises.

In March 2014, US President Barack Obama, in a speaking engagement at the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, stated that Russia was a regional power as opposed to a superpower, which is what she believed. In the speech he implied that NATO would support non-member countries with non-military means to counter Russia but at the same time stating that Russia was not the principle geographical threat. It was a slap in the face.

Russian pride was hurting, and they needed to reinstate their status as a world power on the same level as the USA who it seemed could cherry pick the international rules by which they could play. Already in 2008 Russia had taken military action in a breakaway region of Georgia to international disdain and the rest Ukraine was soon to follow.

Putin authored an essay in 2020 titled On the Historical Unity of Russia and Ukraine. In that essay he references Ukraine and reveals a motive. It quotes “modern Ukraine was entirely invented by Russia” and goes on “Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us” but “an inalienable part of our own culture and space.” Was Russia lamenting its lost territories from the collapse of the USSR? Is Ukraine an omen that these are losses they will not be prepared to let go and will bring back into a new unified Russia?

It appears history repeats with a new cold war and Russia is now internationally isolated again, with few allies and harsh economic sanctions. Nevertheless, there is no acceptable defence for her current actions in Ukraine or any displays of her aggression. The argument of Russia entering her own backyard is reminiscent of the one used to condone Nazi actions in the Rhineland occupation. It is as legitimate as say Britain or France seizing her former colonial possessions by force. The excuse of needing security is risible and although NATO has without doubt expanded easterly it has not threatened Russian or attempted any sovereign violations. Those new nations joined out of fear of Russia and the conditions they endured as former satellites.

There is a pattern of deep mistrust, secrecy and paranoia that has always been and always will be firmly rooted in Russia and this is also projected inward as well as externally as leaders fear lost privilege, power and sometimes safety. No matter the leader, no matter when the decade and no matter the type of regime. It is true to say that the more things change, the more they stay the same.

What do you think of Western relations with Russia since 1900? Let us know below.

Now, read about Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union and France in World War 2 here.

Bibliography

Who Lost Russia? – Peter Conradi – One World Publications - 2017

Armageddon – Max Hastings – Pan Macmillan 2004

Putin’s People – Catherine Belton – William Collins - 2020

Creeds of the Devil Churchill Between the Two Totalitarianisms 1917-45 – Antoine Capet Universite De Rouen

We Need to Talk about Putin- How the West Gets him Wrong – Mark Galeolli – Ebury Digital - 2019

The Forsaken: From the Great Depression to the Gulags: Hope and Betrayal in Stalin's Russia - Tim Tzouliadus – Abacus 2011

Mein Kampf – Adolf Hitler – Kindle edition

BBC Archives – reference Obama quote

Top Secret World War 2: Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and their Submarine Trade Missions

As allies, Japan and Nazi Germany collaborated together at times during World War 2. One such time was with the Yanagi missions, a series of fascinating submarine voyages undertaken by Imperial Japan to exchange technology, valuable materials and skills with Nazi Germany. These missions make us think – what might have been accomplished had this seemingly hollow ‘marriage of convenience’ placed greater strategic emphasis on collaboration?

Felix Debieux considers this question.

The Japanese I-8 submarine in 1939. It was to take part in the Yanagi missions in 1943.

What if – an alliance of missed opportunity?

When we talk about history, it is hard not to think about the what-ifs, the what-might-have-beens and the what-could-have-beens. Such counterfactual thinking can be traced back to the very beginning of Western historiography, when Thucydides and Livy wondered how differently their own societies might have turned out, “if the Persians had defeated the Greeks or if Alexander the Great had waged war against Rome”. More recently, an anthology published in 1931 included an essay by Winston Churchill titled, ‘If Lee Had Not Won the Battle of Gettysburg’. It imagined an alternative outcome to the American Civil War in which the Confederacy triumphed over the Union. Having read history to a postgraduate level, my impression of the counterfactual approach was pretty much the same as most professional historians. At best it was a harmless bit of fun, at worst it was dodgy, unacademic terrain completely unworthy of serious scholarship. In the somewhat less diplomatic words of Marxist Historian E. P. Thompson: “Geschichtswissenschlopff, unhistorical shit”.

Shit it may be, but that has not halted the imagination of authors who have spawned an entire genre of speculative fiction. One example which succeeded in grabbing my attention is Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High Castle, an alternate history in which Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan overcame the Allies to win the Second World War. Having at last finished watching Amazon’s onscreen adaptation of the story, I was left wondering how the alliance between the two Axis powers functioned in reality. Was it always the antagonistic and frosty partnership portrayed in The Man in the High Castle? You may be surprised to learn, as I was, that despite the vast geographical distances, there are in fact examples of cooperation between the two powers which do not feature prominently in our conventional retelling of the war. One such case is the Yanagi missions, a series of fascinating submarine voyages undertaken by Imperial Japan to exchange technology, valuable materials and skills with Nazi Germany. These missions make us think – what might have been accomplished had this seemingly hollow ‘marriage of convenience’ placed greater strategic emphasis on collaboration? Let’s start by taking a look at the early days of the missions.

Early strategic compatibility

Following Japan’s surprise offensive on Pearl Harbour and Germany’s declaration of war on the United States, the Axis Tripartite Agreement of September 1940 was amended to provide for an exchange of strategic materials and manufactured goods between Germany, Italy and Japan. At the outset, these voyages were made by surface ships and were dubbed Yanagi (Willow) missions by Japan. As the Axis began to lose its foothold in the naval war, submarines naturally came to be seen as a safer transport option.

As early as March 1942, German naval high command – hoping to alleviate pressure on its Kriegsmarine – requested that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) launch offensive operations against Allied ships in the Indian Ocean. In April that year, the Japanese agreed to send forces to the east coast of Africa to reinforce their German allies. Shortly afterward, the IJN’s 8th Submarine Squadron was withdrawn from its mission in the Marshall Islands and dispatched to Penang, Malaya.

Commander Shinobu Endo’s I-30 was among the first submarines assigned to the 8th Squadron. On 22nd April, I-30 departed Penang and just a week later assisted in the detachment’s successful attack on British shipping in Diego Suarez, Madagascar. In addition to losing a tanker, the British HMS Ramillies was heavily damaged. Following the skirmish, I-30 set off from Madagascar and was ordered on the very first submarine Yanagi mission.

The first submarine Yanagi mission

On 2nd August, four months after it had departed Penang, Endo’s I-30 entered the Bay of Biscay. Off the coast of Cape Ortegal, Spain, he was met by eight Luftwaffe bombers that provided air cover. Three days later, he was joined by a flotilla of minesweepers and escorted to Lorient — then the largest of five German U-boat bases on the French coast.

This was a historic achievement. Indeed, I-30 was the very first Japanese submarine to arrive in Europe. To mark the occasion, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the Kriegsmarine; Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of the U-boat force; and Captain Tadao Yokoi, Japanese naval attaché to Berlin, waited to greet Endo and the crew of I-30. Music greeted them at the Lorient station and Endo was presented with a bouquet of flowers. Meanwhile, the Japanese cargo was unloaded:

• 3,300 pounds of mica.

• 1,452 pounds of shellac.

• Engineering drawings of the Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo.

The Germans were also keen to offer the Japanese their technological expertise. For example, the Kriegsmarine examined I-30 and concluded that its noise levels were unreasonably high - high enough to be detected by enemy ships or aircraft. The Germans generously fitted I-30 with some improvements, notably a Metox Biscay Cross passive radar detector and new anti-aircraft guns. Footage was also shot during I-30’s floatplane test flights, and stories were released detailing a Japanese naval air corps operating from French bases.

While all of this was going on, Endo travelled to Berlin where Hitler presented him with the Iron Cross. The visit came to an end on 22nd August, when I-30 slipped out of the sub pen and began its journey home. Its cargo included a complete Würzburg air defence ground radar with blueprints and examples of German torpedoes, bombs and fire control systems. Most valuable of all to the mission, the submarine also carried industrial diamonds valued at one million yen and fifty top-secret Enigma coding machines.

A month later, I-30 rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean. Early on the morning of 8th October, the sub arrived back at Penang. Rear Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina, chief of the IJN’s logistics section, waited patiently to receive ten of Endo’s Enigmas. Two days later, I-30 slipped its moorings yet again and headed south for Singapore.

The following morning, I-30 made its way into the port. Indicative of the importance of the mission was the presence of Vice Admiral Denshichi Okawachi of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet, who was on hand to greet Endo and his senior officers. Understandably desperate to return home after thousands of miles of submarine travel, that very afternoon Endo set sail for Japan. It was perhaps the height of bad luck when, just an agonising three miles from its final destination, that I-30 struck a mine. While the submarine was lost, miraculously Endo and the majority of his crew were rescued. Divers were immediately dispatched to recover I-30‘s cargo, but they found that the Würzburg radar had been destroyed in the explosion and its technical drawings rendered useless by saltwater. In addition, the remaining Enigma machines were lost, an embarrassment that was hidden from the Germans for four months.

Despite the somewhat ignominious conclusion of the mission, officials on both sides of the alliance were clearly excited by what had been learned and the potential of future exchanges. But with so many surface ships sunk by the Allies, how could the mission be scaled up? The Germans had the answer. On 31st March 1943, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Hiroshi Oshima, cabled Tokyo a recommendation from their allies that large, older U-boats should be converted to carry war materials between Europe and the Far East. Unfortunately for Japan, Oshima’s cable was decoded by the Allies.

The missions continue

On 1st June 1943, I-8 departed Kure, Japan, with I-10 and submarine tender Hie Maru. Commander Shinji Uchino had just been given his orders to proceed to Lorient. Their cargo:

• Two Type 95 oxygen-propelled torpedoes.

• Technical drawings of an automatic trim system.

• A new naval reconnaissance plane.

Nine days later, the mission arrived in Singapore and added to their cargo quinine, tin and raw rubber. On 21st July, nearly two months after departing Japan, I-8 crossed into the Atlantic. The only greeting to welcome the crew this time were terrible storms that pounded the submarine for ten days.

Eventually, the by now very weary Japanese crew received their first contact from the Germans. A sign of the Axis’s changing naval fortunes, a German radio signal alerted I-8 to air patrols searching from the skies above. These patrols forced a change of plan, and - after waiting for five days - I-8 received a second message from their allies: forget Lorient, make for Brest.

Once they crossed the equator, it was not until 20th August that the Japanese rendezvoused with Captain Albrecht Achilles and his U-161 submarine. The next day, I-8 took aboard a German Lieutenant and two radiomen. As with the previous submarine mission, the Germans were keen to make improvements and wasted no time installing a more sophisticated radar detector on I-8’s bridge. Eleven days later, the Japanese finally arrived at Brest – a whole three months after their initial departure from Kure. A German news agency announced that even the Japanese were now operating in the Atlantic!

More bountiful than I-8’s outbound shipment was the cargo it departed from Brest with on 5th October 1943. Indeed, the submarine set sail with:

• Machine guns.

• Bombsights.

• A Daimler-Benz torpedo boat engine.

• Naval chronometers.

• Radars.

• Sonar equipment.

• Electric torpedoes.

• Penicillin.

This time, the Yanagi mission included not just technological but also human resources. Welcomed aboard I-8 were Rear Admiral Yokoi and Captain Sukeyoshi Hosoya, naval attaché to Berlin and to France respectively. Also aboard were three German naval officers, an army officer and four radar and hydrophone technicians. We can only wonder how the dynamics of the Japanese crew were affected by the arrival of their German comrades.

It did not take too long for I-8 to run into trouble. After crossing back over the equator, a position report was transmitted to the Germans but – unfortunately for the mission – the report was intercepted by the Allies. The very next day I-8 was targeted by antisubmarine aircraft, but it succeeded in pulling off a crash-dive escape.

By 13th November 1943, I-8 passed Cape Town. That same day, I-34 – which was travelling to France on a Yanagi mission of its own – earned the unfortunate distinction of being the first IJN submarine sunk by the British. This served as a powerful reminder of the danger posed to the Yanagi missions, and so I-8 was ordered to head straight for Singapore where it arrived on 5th December.

At Singapore, I-8 anchored near to Commander Takakazu Kinashi’s I-29. I-29 had just arrived from Japan and was about to embark on its own long journey. During an encounter between the two submarine commanders, Uchino warned Kinashi of the Allied air patrols and praised the German Metox radar detector that he had received from U-161 back in August. The technological benefits of the Yanagi missions had already started to prove themselves. On 21st December 1943, I-8 arrived back in Japan having finally completed its 30,000 mile, seven-month long journey. Uchino travelled to Tokyo and presented his report to Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the naval general staff, and navy minister Admiral Shigetaro Shimada.

Experienced hands

Although Commander Takakazu Kinashi was a distinguished submarine captain, he had not yet had the opportunity to participate in any previous Yanagi missions. Earlier in the war he had become Japan’s submarine hero, credited with the sinking of U.S. Navy carrier Wasp in September 1942, and with damaging the battleship North Carolina and the destroyer O’Brien, which eventually sank. His assignment to the Yanagi missions again underscores their strategic importance (at least to the Japanese).

On 5th April 1943, I-29 left Penang carrying an eleven-ton cargo. This consisted of:

• One Type 89 torpedo.

• Two Type 2 aerial torpedoes.

• Two tons of gold bars for the Japanese embassy in Berlin.

• Schematics of a Type A midget submarine and of carrier Akagi, which the Germans wanted to study as they constructed their own carrier Graf Zeppelin.

Twenty days later, I-29 arrived at a predesignated point 450 miles off the coast of Madagascar where it met Captain Werner Musenberg and U-180. The German sub had left Kiel on 9th February carrying blueprints for a Type IXC/40 U-boat, a sample of a German hollow charge, a quinine sample for future Japanese shipments, gun barrels and ammunition, three cases of sonar decoys, and documents and mail for the German embassy in Tokyo. Of strategic significance to the war in Asia, the U-boat also carried an important passenger: former Oxford University student Subhas Chandra Bose, the head of the anti-British Indian National Army of Liberation. The two submarines met on 26th April.

The next day, Bose and his group transferred from U-180 to I-29 and two Japanese officers switched in the other direction. The eleven tons of cargo followed shortly after. Once the exchanges were completed, I-29 turned eastward and U-180 turned back towards France. This experience was valuable to Kinashi when he, himself, finally set off for France in December 1943. In addition to his crew, he carried rubber, tungsten, tin, zinc, quinine, opium and coffee. He also had sixteen IJN officers, specialists and engineers on board. By 8th January 1944, the submarine had left Madagascar.

In early February, Kinashi received a signal from Germany to rendezvous with a U-boat that would upgrade I-29 with superior radar technology. On the 12th, he met U-518 southwest of the Azores. The Japanese submarine took aboard three technicians who installed a new FuMB 7 Naxos detector. Kinashi did not have to wait long to put his new equipment into action. While running along the surface off Cape Finisterre, Spain an RAF patrol plane equipped with a searchlight suddenly illuminated the water around I-29. Reacting with the decisiveness and speed gained through long experience, Kinashi crash-dived the submarine and escaped unscathed. Five days later, I-29 entered the Bay of Biscay, but Kinashi had arrived ahead of his escort and had to spend the night at the bottom of the sea. The next day, German forces escorted the Japanese submarine toward Lorient. Unbeknownst to Kinashi, however, he and his crew were not safe yet.

I-29’s schedule had been earlier decoded by the Allies. British aircraft were dispatched with the aim of sinking the submarine and its German escorts. They found the Yanagi mission off Cape Peas, Spain, but did not succeed in damaging I-29. Later that same day, the submarine and its escorts were attacked by more than ten Allied aircraft but, fortunately for Kinashi and his crew, all the bombs missed.

Cross-cultural encounters and Axis potential

After the two near misses, I-29 arrived at Lorient on 11th March and anchored safely next to Lieutenant Commander Max Wintermeyer’s U-190. Lorient was home to two U-boat flotillas, and the large number of veteran submariners set the scene for some lively cross-cultural encounters. On one occasion, German officers entertained the Japanese crew at a nearby bar. The bar’s rafters were inscribed with signatures of U-boat officers. Eager to get in on the act, I-29‘s Lieutenant Hiroshi Taguchi, Lieutenant Hideo Otani and several other officers added their own signatures to the rafters. After a 30,000 mile trip it must have felt good to make it to dry land and leave a mark of success!

The Japanese were treated to further German hospitality. Indeed, the entire crew were hosted at Château de Trévarez before a special train carried them onto Paris. While his crew enjoyed the sights, Kinashi travelled to Berlin and was decorated with the Iron Cross by the Führer himself. Ever the diligent workers, their German hosts busied themselves with the upgrades to I-29’s outdated anti-aircraft guns. They also loaded aboard:

• A HWK 509A-1 rocket motor.

• A Jumo 004B axial-flow turbojet.

• Drawings of the Isotta-Fraschini torpedo boat engine.

• Blueprints for jetfighters and rocket launch accelerators.

• Plans for glider bomb and radar equipment.

• A V-1 buzz bomb fuselage.

• Acoustic mines.

• Bauxite ore.

• Mercury-radium amalgam.

• Twenty more Enigma coding machines.

Hinting at the more frightening potential of greater Axis strategic collaboration, there is some evidence suggesting that I-29 carried a quantity of U-235 uranium oxide, one of the components needed to assemble an atomic bomb. Loaded with its vital military cargo, I-29 departed Lorient on 16th April.

On 14th July, I-29 passed through the Straits of Malacca and arrived at Singapore. Its passengers disembarked with their sensitive documents and proceeded by air to Japan. Most of the military cargo, however, remained aboard. Initially worried about the sub’s location, Allied code-breakers breathed a collective sigh of relief when they learned of I-29’s arrival in Singapore. Relief, however, quickly turned to alarm when an intercepted message between Berlin and Tokyo revealed the true value of the submarine’s cargo. Now alert to the terrifying potential of I-29’s mission, the Allies worked tirelessly to stop the submarine from reaching Japan.

The Allies were lucky when, on 20th July, Kinashi transmitted his proposed route for the last leg of the trip. The U.S. Navy deciphered the message, and the sub was sunk by torpedoes launched from the USS Sawfish. While the loss of the aircraft engines slowed the Japanese jet program, their blueprints, flown to Tokyo, arrived safely. They were used immediately to develop the Nakajima Kikka (orange blossom) and the Mitsubishi J8MI Shusui (sword stroke) – both based on German designs.

The sinking of I-52

Japan’s hope for further technological marvels now rested on Commander Kameo Uno and I-52, which had left Kure on 10th March 1944 (while I-29 was busy dodging Allied attacks near Brest). In its hold, Uno’s submarine carried strategic metals including molybdenum, tungsten, 146 bars of gold, as well as opium and caffeine. I-52 also carried fourteen passengers including engineers and technicians with ambitions of studying German weaponry. To avoid Allied spotter planes, Uno travelled submerged during the day and only surfaced at night.

After passing the Cape of Good Hope and entering the South Atlantic, on 15th May Uno sent his first message to Germany. By this time the British and Americans had broken the military codes of both Axis powers. Allied intelligence intercepted and deciphered Uno’s reports to Tokyo and Berlin, including his daily noon position reports. When I-52 entered the South Atlantic, the code-breakers quickly relayed its predicted route to a U.S. antisubmarine task force.

On 16th June, I-52 sent a coded transmission, giving its position away off the West African coast. The U.S carrier Bogue, equipped with fourteen aircraft, was ordered to track and destroy the sub. After arriving in the area where the Japanese were supposed to meet a German U-boat, the Americans began around-the-clock efforts to search for the Axis submarines. Although the skies were filled with American aircraft, Uno somehow managed to rendezvoused with Kurt Lange’s U-530 about 850 miles west of the Cape Verde Islands.

The Japanese commander welcomed a Lieutenant Schäfer on board to help navigate the last leg of his journey. Schäfer was accompanied by two petty officers who carried with them an improved radar. Bizarrely, the equipment fell into the sea during the exchange, but a dutiful Japanese crewman jumped in and managed to retrieve it. About two hours after meeting I-52, U-530 submerged and headed for Trinidad, leaving the three German officers aboard the Japanese sub. Again, we can only wonder how the two crews interacted with one another.

The day after his rendezvous with U-530, Uno, confident that he could take advantage of a stormy and moonless night to cloak his location, travelled along the surface in order to reach sooner the sanctuary of a German-occupied port. That evening, Allied forces picked up I-52 on their radar. Flares illuminated the area around the submarine and two 354-pound bombs were dropped, just missing I-52’s starboard side. Although Uno crash-dived and avoided the attack, his location was now compromised.

This game of submarine whack-a-mole could not go on forever. Sonobuoys, which detect underwater sounds, were deployed across a square mile of ocean. These were followed up with homing torpedoes which locked onto I-52’s propeller noises. After a long wait, the Allies heard a loud explosion. Another sonobuoy-torpedo combination later and the Allies got their desired outcome; a large oil slick at the site of the attack was spotted. Nearby, a ton of raw rubber bales bobbed along the surface of the water.

Meanwhile at Lorient, a German ship stood by ready to escort I-52, and diplomats scheduled to return to Japan waited anxiously for their ride home. With them at the dock were tons of secret documents, drawings and strategic cargo, which included acoustic torpedoes, fighter plane engines, radars, vacuum tubes, ball bearings, bombsights, chemicals, alloy steel, optical glass and one-thousand pounds of uranium oxide. The Germans also intended to improve I-52 with a snorkel. By 30th August, the Kriegsmarine finally presumed I-52 sunk.

The end of the Yanagi missions – a strategic oversight?

The question must be asked, why did the Yanagi missions stop? What happening to the initial excitement for military, scientific and strategic cooperation? The answer is a fairly simple one.

With the Americans closing in on the Home Islands and the final showdown of the Pacific war rapidly approaching, the IJN was compelled to devote every available resource to the defence of the Japanese mainland. After the failure of I-52‘s mission, it was no longer practical to send limited submarines on long, perilous journeys to Europe.

Reflecting back, what should we take away from the Yanagi missions? Although the missions are not remembered as much more than peculiar footnotes in the larger story of the Second World War, the threat of an exchange of nuclear materials and state-of-the-art technology was no doubt deemed important by the Allies – important enough for them to invest precious resources in locating, tracking and sinking the submarines before they could make their deliveries. The missions are scarcely known today, but at the time the threat they posed was clear.

The true importance of the Yanagi missions, however, lies in what I believe they represent. While we tend to think of their partnership as an uneasy ‘alliance of convenience’, the missions help us to imagine what Japan and Germany might have been able to achieve had they placed greater emphasis on joined-up, strategic coordination. Indeed, they represent a failure by the two Axis powers to think of the war beyond their own local, expansionist ambitions. Given the nuclear potential of the missions, we are perhaps fortunate that the Axis did not develop their partnership much beyond these largely overlooked submarine convoys.

What do you think of the Yanagi missions? Let us know below.

Now read Felix’s article on how Henry Ford tried to end World War One through diplomacy here.

Bibliography

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yanagi_missions#:~:text=The%20Yanagi%20missions%20were%20a%20series%20of%20submarine,with%20Japan%20%27s%20Axis%20partners%2C%20principally%20Nazi%20Germany.

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/japanese-and-germans.html

https://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-yanagi-missions-japans-underwater-convoys.htm

https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-033/h-033-1.html

https://www.booktopia.com.au/nazi-germany-and-imperial-japan-johanna-menzel-meskill/book/9781412846196.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_4yaH6Y_hQ

Read more – on counterfactual history

https://camdenhistorynotes.com/2020/02/02/what-if-counterfactual-history/

Gavriel, R., 2002, ‘Why Do We Ask ‘What If?’ Reflections on the Function of Alternate History’, History and Theory, vol. 41, no. 4

Sustein, CR., ‘What If Counterfactuals Never Existed?’, The New Republic, 21 September 2014, accessed 27 February 2019, <https://newrepublic.com/article/119357/altered-pasts-reviewed-cass-r-sunstein&gt;

Pain’s Port Arthur: Pyrotechnic Re-enactments of the Russo-Japanese War in the English speaking world (1904-6)

In the early twentieth century, an age before cinema, audiences still wanted thrills. And following the Russo-Japanese War, there were a number of explosive re-enactments in America and the broader English-speaking world of that war. Doctor Robert Brown explains.

A drawing of a Japanese attack during the Battle of Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War.

In a 10 May 2022 article for the Guardian newspaper, ‘I almost got hit’ Ukrainian journalists recounted their stories of how the Russia-Ukraine war turned their personal and professional lives upside-down. Before the war, many such as Kristina Berdynskykh were civilian writers and reporters.  However as the invasion began, these journalists found themselves on the front line of the biggest story in the world, and ‘they became war correspondents overnight’.  They have done heroic and life threatening work, for which the Pulitzer prize board has already awarded them with a special citation.

One night in September 1905 a plucky local reporter for the Minneapolis Journal also took on the role of a war correspondent overnight. He bore witness to the most important siege of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5), the bombardment of Russian held Port Arthur (Dalian) after a Japanese surprise attack.  Furnished with a long army overcoat and cap, he was instructed to make his way up the Port Arthur battlefront.

After years of bitter contention between the Empires of Russia and Japan over control of the Liaodong Peninsula, Manchuria, Russia occupied the Peninsula and constructed Port Arthur naval base in 1897.  This proved intolerable for Japan, and on 8-9 February 1904 they finally struck, as Admiral Togo launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet anchored there. The engagement and ensuing siege quickly gained international status as a gruelling cauldron of modern battle.  The spectacle of large naval battles and massive artillery duels became a focal point for media attention, commemoration, and later theatrical re-enactment.(1)

Japanese victory in the Battle of 203 metre hill, overlooking the city harbour, proved a turning point.  From here artillery spotters directed a devastatingly accurate bombardment of the bottled up Russian fleet.  Russia’s Pacific fleet was destroyed or interned, while the Japanese Army systematically mined and captured key Russian forts.  The situation hopeless, Port Arthur finally surrendered.

Such was the hellish ferocity of the bombardment the reporter witnessed that night, that even after escaping unscathed, he, ‘dreamed all night of crashing shot and bursting shell, of sinking warships and whole cities in flames.’ The horror of such a spectacle stayed with him, and even a ‘pencil falling on the floor…and the slamming of a door’ would send him into a post-traumatic ‘hysteria’ of palpitations.(2)

A Carnival of Fire

However something was amiss.  The buildings and warships were somehow made of canvas and wood rather than steel and stone, and the heavy ordnance, was a mixture of dynamite and nitro-glycerine. Those discharging explosives were not Russo-Japanese artillerymen and naval gunners, but some thirty pyro-technists co-ordinated by director Emil Capretz. Finally this was not at Dalian, but located deep in the heart of the American Mid-West at the Minneapolis State Fair in September 1905.  Russia had surrendered Port Arthur in January 1905, and six months later the spectacle of the carnage was being eulogised to baying crowds.

In fact this was ‘Pain’s Port Arthur’, a centrepiece production of James Pain junior and his son Henry J. Pain. The Pain’s Port Arthur spectacles were specifically ‘modelled’ or ‘al fresco’ painted canvas panoramas simulating the Manchurian battle zone, set up outdoors in large pleasure gardens, sports fields or exhibition grounds.  These outdoor panoramas were modelled much like a movie set with large props of wood and plaster, and offered the historical-narrative backdrop against which the massive fireworks displays took place for a viewing public.(3)

The Empire of Pain

The Pain’s in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century oversaw a sprawling continent spanning fireworks empire, the Royal Alexandra Palace Fireworks Company (shortened to Alexandra Palace Fireworks Company in the United States). Their American base of production was at the Greenfield, L. I. fireworks factory, New York. In addition to using their own 10,000 seat purpose built arena at Manhattan Beach, from 1904-6 the show visited Nashville, Chattanooga, St. Louis, Detroit, and Buffalo (New York).(4) On top of this, in addition to re-enactments in London and Manchester, UK, James Pain Junior presided over an ambitious tour of the ‘Port Arthur’ spectacle throughout Australia and New Zealand, stopping off at all the state capitals of Australia in addition to smaller venues.  In 1904-5 director Mr. T. Gaunt, operating under the Pain franchise, was still touring this war spectacle around New Zealand to enthusiastic audiences, warm reviews, and aggressive newspaper advertising.

Before 1904 the Pain Company already had a fine tradition for battles and sieges.  Although biblical themed glories and disasters such as Last Days of Pompeii were roaringly popular, Manhattan Beach audiences were fed a rich diet of nineteenth and twentieth century conflicts, and particularly sieges.  The Siege of Vicksburg in the American Civil War, the Siege of Sebastopol in the Crimean War, and even the burning of Moscow by Napoleon in 1812 among others proved consistently popular. The American bombardment of Tripoli against the Barbary Pirates was specifically more popular with American audiences.(5)

This activity points to a massive public appetite for simulated mock warfare in the pre-cinema era.  To historian’s frustration, the ephemerality of these spectacles obscures their importance in the historical record.  Firework panoramas and scenery were designed to be destroyed or thrown away.  Poor record keeping in the Victorian and Edwardian entertainment business means that often all that survives are the newspaper advertisements and the odd precious event program.

Madison Square Carnage

For all the decades of frenzied advertising and glowing reviews across the English speaking world, in reality Pain’s as a global fireworks empire had been living on borrowed time. At around 10pm on the night of the 4 November 1902, at the celebrations of the election of William Randolph Hearst as New York congressman, a gigantic fireworks explosion had ripped through Madison Square, and decimated a nearby crowd of people watching Pain’s performance.  An inquest was immediately set up, and ten of Pain’s employees were arrested.(6)

The ‘Madison Square Disaster’ killed fifteen and injured over a hundred, and left a trail of carnage, with blood and pieces of flesh littering the ground for a two block radius.(7)  The investigation initially blamed Mayor Low and the Board of Aldermen for approving an ordinance on 25 October, to allow the display of fireworks within the city of New York until the 10 November.(8) However three parties were claimed to be liable.  Hearst himself had through his agent arranged the firework display, and the Pain Fireworks Company employees had set off the explosion. In the end the City of New York, according to the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, had to pay out over half a million dollars in damages.(9) In August 1904, again one of Pain’s workers died in an explosion in the combustible chemicals mixing shed at the Manhattan Beach grounds.(10)

After the disaster Henry Pain was showered with lawsuits.  The technical deadline to compensate the dead and injured was 1911, but by that point Henry’s assets had been devalued by the accident, and he had insufficient funds. Leaving the United States to avoid arrest he sold the company to Central Fireworks who had previously been a partner.  A holding company with several other firework manufacturers under their wing, they eventually sold Pain’s America to the Unexcelled Firework Company. Pain’s pyrotechnics largely came to a halt when the First World War was declared in 1914.(11) The Company does continue to operate to the present day as Pain’s Fireworks, based in Salisbury, England.

Conclusion

Much as with the Russia-Ukraine war, the Russo-Japanese war elicited a flurry of sympathisers, sceptics and charlatans across the western world and other bystander nations interpreting and tracking the conflict for their own commercial or geopolitical ends.  Commercial interests in particular drove the Russo-Japanese war to loom large in the Western imagination. Edwardians were raised on a diet of escalating great power rivalry exacerbated by the British Harmsworth newspaper company’s campaign to propagate Germanophobia among the British public. Hysterical future war fiction such as William Le Queux’s million-copy selling The Invasion of 1910 (1906) imagined a German attack on London and H.G Wells’ The War in the Air (1908) explored frightening new weapons technologies. In this cultural atmosphere the spectacle of all out mechanised war in Manchuria shifted tickets and memorabilia like nothing except the major cricket or football fixtures. The war was narrated and even objectified by creative and savvy entrepreneurs throughout the English speaking world even as the conflict was progressing.

Through the Pain family’s bombastic firework re-enactments of the siege of Port Arthur, the article explored a snapshot of pre-cinema culture which sought to provide audiences with unsubtle yet fascinating simulacrum and mock warfare. In 2022, Japan supported Ukraine and joined in imposing sanctions on Russia. Entangled with the ongoing Russo-Japanese dispute over possession of the Kuril Islands, tensions have been turned up into downright antagonism once again. A Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Hideki Uyama, even compared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the occupation of the islands. At the very least then diplomatic fireworks between the two powers are back on the playbill.

What do you think of the pyrotechnic re-enactments? Let us know below.

Now read Robert’s article on the Liverpool City Council investigation of the Chinese community here.

References

1 R.M Connaughton, p.115

2 The Minneapolis Journal (Minneapolis, Minnesota) · Fri, Sep 8, 1905 · Page 20

3 Mimi Colligan, Canvas Documentaries, p.142

4 The Chattanooga News (Tennessee) 16 May, 1905, St. Louis Globe-Democrat (Missouri) 3 November, 1904, The Yale Expositor (Michigan), 1 September, 1905, Nashville Banner (Tennessee) 22 May, 1905, Buffalo Morning Express and Illustrated Buffalo Express (New York) 11 July, 1905

5 Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 28 August 1904

6 The Brooklyn Daily, 5 November 1902

7 The Brooklyn Daily, 5 November 1902

8 Ibid

9 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 December 1902

10 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 24 August, 1904

11 Ralph Hyde, Dictionary of Panoramists of the English-Speaking World (2015, unpublished, but donated to the The Bill Douglas Cinema Museum)

The Modern Greek State: 1914–1922 – Greeks Divided

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. There was not much to celebrate one hundred years earlier though, when the first centenary was completed. Indeed, in 1922 Greece suffered probably the worst catastrophe of its modern history. Its origin can be traced back to after the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Thomas Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, and part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here.

King Constantine I of Greece in the early 1920s.

I After the Balkan War was over

Defeat is an orphan, whereas victory is claimed by many fathers. King Constantine and his entourage of officers at the general staff, blamed by the Military League for the defeat at the Greco-Turkish of 1897, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) saw their redemption at the triumph of the Balkan Wars. Their approach though was that of complete denial of any credit to the prime minister Venizelos. The latter and his environment, similarly, but more moderately, exalted their contribution against the deficiencies of the pro-royals. (Malesis, 2017)

This was a rather petty quarrel and a bad sign for the future in view of the effort required to integrate the recently acquired territories. Significant minorities (the census of April 1913 shows that in Thessaloniki, for example, out of the 157,000 inhabitants, 39,956 were Greeks, 61,439 Jews, 45,867 Muslims, 6,263 Bulgarians and 4,364 Europeans and other ethnicities) (Papadakis (Papadis), 2017) constituted a potential problem that could be solved neither easily nor quickly. Furthermore, efficient exploitation of the new lands required the build of infrastructure in areas recently devastated by war. The fiscal sufficiency though was slim. By 1913, expenses for military operations amounted to 411,485, 000 drachmas in addition to 280,000,000 of collateral costs. The nation’s public dept had risen by 755,000,000 drachmas. These were dizzying figures considering the state of the Greek finances at the time (GDP before the war is estimated at 735,000,000 drachmas).

The prevailing expectations in Western Europe about the future of the Greek State, after its victorious military campaigns, allowed for the takeout of a 500,000,000 francs loan in February 1914, under favorable terms, to settle the pending depts. Nevertheless, the budget of the same year amassed a deficit of 170,000,000 drachmas, while immediate needs to be covered (not included in the budget) were estimated at over 300,000,000 drachmas. Thus, even before the outbreak of the First World War, issuance of the whole 500,000,000-franc loan proved impossible. The government turned to the National Bank and internal borrowing to supplement the required funds.

In any case, the needs could not be met with continuous borrowing. Payments of salaries and pensions were not being made on time and this gave room to the opposition to criticize the government. Even basic military needs, like the supply of food to the army, were only possible thanks to the advances from the National Bank. (Kostis, 2018)

II The First World War (WWI)

Thus, the outbreak of WWI found Greece facing significant challenges. These suggested that staying neutral was probably the most preferable option. At the beginning of the war, this was also the preference of the Central Powers and the Entente. Both were wooing Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire to join their ranks and taking up their foe during the Balkan Wars could hinder their efforts. King Constantine favored neutrality also for strategic reasons (exposure to a possible naval blockade by the British Empire in case of an alliance with Germany). (Rizas, 2019)

On the other hand, Greece was bound by an alliance with Serbia (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2022) which was under attack from Austria-Hungary since July 1914. Furthermore, when the Ottomans and Bulgarians signed treaties of alliance with Germany in September 1914 and September 1915 respectively, (Glenny, 2012) Venizelos, convinced that the British Empire would prevail, saw an opportunity for further territorial gains, if Greece joined the Entente.

The defeat of Germany, though, was by no means a certainty, especially during the early stages of the war. By the end of 1917 Soviet Russia concluded an armistice with the Central Powers followed by the Treaty of Brest – Litovsk with favorable terms for the latter. It was the late entry of the USA into WWI that tilted the scale in favor of the Entente. (Efthimiou)

Thus, steering the country within this complicated framework of international relations by carefully considering Greece’s fiscal and military capacity as well as its political (diplomatic) options required the setting of clear goals and a close collaboration between the prime minister and the head of state and the army. Venizelos and Constantine did exactly the opposite.

At first, Venizelos suggested that the Greek army should undertake the landing at the Dardanelles in February 1915, in return for territorial gains in Asia Minor promised by the Entente. The king seemed fascinated by the idea (considering a possible capture of Constantinople, where his synonymous emperor Constantine died, when the city was taken by Turkey in 1453), but the pro-royal chief of staff Metaxas considered the campaign too risky, leaving the northern border exposed to a Bulgarian attack and resigned his post. Venizelos then proposed the limitation of the Greek participation to only one division raising the king’s doubts about the success of the undertaking. Finally, Constantine refused to give his approval and Venizelos resigned. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The prime minister’s Liberal Party, though, won again in the elections of May 1915. The opposition, gathered around the king, refused to interpret the result as a vote for the participation to WWI proposing that it only showed the people’s trust to Venizelos. The king’s refusal to complement led Venizelos to resign again in September and abstain from the new elections of December 1915. (Malesis, 2017)

Meanwhile Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and the attack on Serbia was imminent. To implement the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty Venizelos, in the brief period before his resignation, invited the Entente to send troops to aid the Serbians through the port of Thessaloniki. The revocation of the invitation by the pro-royals and Greece’s protest could not prevent the landing of French troops in October 1915. (Mavrogordatos, 2015)

The presence of the allied forces in Thessaloniki allowed for the formation there of the National Defense Committee by Venizelos’ supporters aiming to confront the Bulgarian threat and align foreign policy with that of the Entente. When the Bulgarians took the Greek fortress of Ruper in May 1916 and later advanced in Eastern Macedonia by August, the government in Athens did not react in the name of a questionable neutrality as foreign armies were now clearly violating national sovereignty. This caused the armed reaction of the National Defense Committee on the 17th of August and when the city of Kavala was lost to the Bulgarians on the 29th, Venizelos, although hesitant at first, decided to lead the revolt. (Malesis, 2017)

Thus, Venizelos was now leading yet another revolt and the country was split in two with one government in Athens in charge of the ‘Old Greece’ and another one in Thessaloniki in charge of the ‘New Greece’ (territories acquired after 1912 except Epirus). (Mavrogordatos, 2015) The military presence of the Entente helped Venizelos to reunite the country though. On November 18, a detachment of 3,000 allied troops landed in Piraeus and advanced to Athens, but they were repelled by forces loyal to Constantine. After that, the royalists turned against Venizelos’ supporters in Athens killing dozens of them, arresting others and committing all kinds of atrocities. On the 26th, the allied fleet implemented a strict naval blockade of the ‘Old Greece’ causing food shortages and other catastrophic consequences for the population. Eventually, the king was forced to leave the country in June 1917 leaving his son Alexander at his place but did not resign. (Malesis, 2017) Venizelos returned to Athens and ‘resurrected’ the parliament elected in May 1915 (thus described as ‘Lazarist’). It was time for his supporters to retaliate against the opposition. Venizelos might have united the country again territorially, but the Greeks were now divided to Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists.

The prime minister’s harsh measures included the exile of this opponents (his former adjutant Metaxas and the leader of the Anti-Venizelists Gounaris, for example, were sent to Corsica) and the cleansing of the public sector, including that of justice and the church, as well as the army from the opposition supporters. Nevertheless, during the last phase of WWI Greece managed to field 10 divisions, that is about 180,000 men, that performed well in the Macedonian front, where they constituted about 1/3 of the total allied forces. To compensate for the late entrance in the war and in order to have the best possible treatment during the peace negotiations in Paris, Venizelos also sent the 1st Army Corps (23,000 men) to fight against the Communists in Ukraine in January 1919. (Malesis, 2017). The campaign was unsuccessful for the allies and they withdrew in April of the same year. The Greek communities in the Crimean suffered the retaliation of the Bolsheviks and many of their members were forced to seek refuge in Greece. Nevertheless, for Greece, the worst was yet to come.

III The Asia Minor Campaign

The story of the Greek expansion to western Asia Minor goes back to 1914. It was offered by the Entente in exchange for Greek concessions to Bulgaria of some of the territorial gains of 1912-1913 so that the latter would join the allies. These amounted to about 5,000 square kilometers including the port city of Kavala affecting 35,000 Greeks living in the area. In return, Greece was claiming a territory of about 125,000 square kilometers with the city of Smyrna at its center and a significant minority of 810,000 Greeks. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) By the end of the war, though, no concessions were necessary as Bulgaria was on the side of the defeated.

Such offers, backed by mostly secret treaties, in order to lure one country or the other to their side, was a standard tool used by both camps during WWI. In April 1915, for example, southwestern Asia Minor was also promised to Italy with the treaty of London. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) The overall situation in the Middle East was further complicated by the antagonism between Great Britain and France as the Sykes – Picot agreement was challenged by the Young Turks of Mustapha Kemal, who was not willing to comply to any agreements of the defeated Ottoman Empire he deemed as harmful for the interests of the Turkish nation. To make things worse, President Wilson, representing the late entrant USA at the peace negotiations of Paris, was not aware of this covert diplomacy and was thus indifferent to any claims over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. (Churchill, 2021)     

Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with the occupation of Antalya in southern Asia Minor. The claims and ambitions of the Italians to lay hands upon the Ottoman Empire resulted to a complete breach between them and President Wilson. This led to a temporary withdrawal of Italy from the peace conference in Paris. When reports reached the conference that the Italians were going to proceed further with the occupation of Smyrna, combined with stories of Turkish maltreatment of the Greek population, it was proposed that the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Smyrna at once for the purpose of protecting their compatriots there. (Churchill, 2021) Although Venizelos was earlier warned by the chief of the British General Staff Sir Henry Wilson that he could not rely on any military or financial aid for the undertaking and that this would result in a long war with Turkey  and a rapid depletion of Greece’s financial and human resources, he decided to take the offer. (Richter, 2020)

At the time of the Greek landing in Smyrna, on May 15, 1919, the Ottoman Empire was under the spell of defeat in WWI. It was surrendering arms and munitions. But as soon as Greece, the enemy of generations, landed its troops, Turkey arose and the leader of the Young Turks, Mustapha Kemal, was furnished with the powers of a Warrior Prince. (Churchill, 2021) Not unfairly. Whereas the Greeks had the sea on their backs and Smyrna was not protected by any natural defensible border, Kemal could exploit the strategic depth of Anatolia, where he could safely withdraw, after every strike. (Mavrogordatos, 2015) Furthermore, Italy was clearly hostile to the Greek presence in Asia Minor and France also opted for collaboration with Kemal in exchange for peace in Syria, now under the French Mandate. (Wikipedia, 2022)   

Thus, Greece was alone when the treaty of Sevres was signed in August 1920. The treaty ceded Thrace to Greece, which was also to possess the Gallipoli Peninsula, most of the Aegean islands, and to administer Smyrna and its hinterland until a plebiscite could be held there. The British prime minister Lloyd George favoured the Greeks, but the imposition of the treaty on the Turks was entirely up to the Greek army, now showing signs of strain under the influence of protracted financial, military and political uncertainties. (Churchill, 2021)

The situation was difficult, and Sir Henry Wilson again describes Venizelos as hopeless and desperate during this period. ‘The old boy is done’, he remarked. (Llewellyn Smith, 1999) In the internal front the national schism continued to fuel despicable acts of hate. Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, Venizelos himself narrowly escaped an attempt against his life by two royalist soldiers in a Paris railway station on his way home. His decision to call general elections in November 1920 allowing also for the return and participation of the exiled opposition is still a point of controversy. Venizelos’ opponents claim that he was looking for a way to abdicate his responsibility for the outcome of the Asia Minor Campaign. If this was the case, he was successful, because he lost and now it was the royalists that had to find a solution.

Winston Churchill, who was later to experience himself a surprising electoral defeat after the triumph of WWII (Gilbert, 1991), gives a different account though. On October 2, 1920, Prince Alexander (at this point king of Greece) was bitten by a monkey during a walk in the royal garden. The wound festered and after three weeks Alexander died. It was decided to offer the throne to Prince Paul of Greece. The latter was living with his exiled father in Switzerland and, as Churchill puts it, was inspired to reply that he could only accept after the Greek people had at an election definitely decided against his father. This forced a General Election.

Venizelos, with the Treaty of Sevres that expanded the triumph of the Balkan Wars, felt confident. He was willing that the issue should be put crudely to the electorate: Were they for the restoration of Constantine or not? But he did not make sufficient allowances for the strain to which Greece had been put; for the resentments which the allied blockade to make Greece enter WWI had planted; for the many discontents which arise under prolonged war conditions; for the oppressive conduct of many of his agents, when during his continuous absence for the peace negotiations the Greek people lacked his personal inspiration and felt the heavy hand of his subordinates; for the complete absorption of his opponents to party politics and for their intense desire for office and revenge. Eventually, he lost. (Churchill, 2021)

The only sane policy arising from Venizelos’ defeat would have been to reduce promptly and ruthlessly the Greek commitments in Asia Minor, negotiating also for the safety and well-being of the Greek minority there. The pro-royal officer Ioannis Metaxas made suggestions along these lines. (Stamatopoulos, 2020) After all, the return of Constantine further dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece as the king was a bugbear for them second only to the Kaiser himself. Nevertheless, the new regime, under prime minister Gounaris, was determined to show Greece how little Venizelos had had to do with its successes that far. They would strike Mustapha Kemal at the heart of his dominion. They would have the army march to Ankara. (Churchill, 2021)

What about the army then? Winston Churchill again gives a vivid description of the Greek army during the campaign to Ankara (which partly applies for the Greek people as well). He writes: ‘Imagine an army of two hundred thousand men, the product of a small state mobilized or at war for ten years, stranded in the centre of Asia Minor with a divided nation behind them; with party dissensions in every rank; far from home, and bereft of effectual political guidance; conscious that they were abandoned by the great Powers of Europe and by the United States; with scant food and decaying equipment; without tea, without sugar, without cigarettes, and without hope or even a plan of despair; while before them and around them and behind them preyed and prowled a sturdy, relentless and even more confident foe’. And he continues ‘over the Greek Army in Asia Minor there stole an ever-growing sense of isolation; of lines of communication in jeopardy, of a crumbling base, of a divided homeland, and of an indifferent world’. (Churchill, 2021) Nevertheless, the Greek army remained in martial posture for upwards of three years in Asia Minor. But, after the triumphs of the Balkan Wars and WWI, eventually it was defeated. On September 16, 1922 the last Greek Soldiers left Asia Minor. The Hellenism of Asia Minor followed them to escape the Young Turks’ atrocities.

IV Conclusions

Carl von Clausewitz in his classic On War defines the ‘Culminating Point of the Attack’ as that at which the forces remaining are just sufficient to maintain a defensive, and to wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns, there is a reaction; the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow. Everything then depends on discovering the culminating point by the fine tact of judgment. (Clausewitz, 1997) His fellow Prussian Otto von Bismarck did exactly that, when, after fighting against the Danes, then the Austrians and finally the French to achieve the unification of Germany in 1871, he stayed put in spite of expectations to storm the rest of Europe. (Steinberg, 2011) A more recent example is Menahem Begin, who, instead of provoking a civil war during Israel’s War for Independence, decided to take the blows of David Ben-Gurion without responding and remained in political exile for thirty years until he became prime minister in the end of the 1970s. (Gordis, 2016)

Obviously, the Greeks did not posses such qualities. As we have seen, civil wars were common during their War of Independence (and more came after that), and now political party quarrels that led to the national schism brought Greece beyond its culminating point of attack, deep in Asia Minor, after ten years of mobilization and war starting in 1912 with the Balkan Wars.

Who was responsible in the present case? Churchill criticized the United States, Britain and France for requesting the presence of the Greek Army in Anatolia, where it had been the foundation of allied policy against Turkey for three years only to fall victim to inter-Allied intrigues at the end. The way for the dissolution of all Allied loyalties to Greece was paved by the Greek people’s choice, at the moment of their greatest hopes and fears to deprive themselves of Venizelos, the commanding personality who had created the situation Greece found itself into and who alone might have carried it to success. (Churchill, 2021)

Several Greek commentators take the same stance (Mavrogordatos, 2015) although there are cases of harsh criticism against Venizelos and his policies and more favourable for the king (Kakouri, 2017). Others blame both Venizelos for his disregard of hard facts (e.g., Greek minority of only 20% of the total population in the disputed area, lack of natural defences etc.) that led to the disaster and the king for not opposing the advance to Ankara - even though he was convinced that the whole undertaking of the Asia Minor campaign would be fatal for Greece. (Stamatopoulos, 2020)

Indeed, in the period discussed here both Venizelos and the king (personally and as head of the anti-venizelists) offered bad service to their country. We have seen in previous parts of this short history of modern Greece that division, violence and civil war characterized its early years. Parliamentarism helped relax the tensions, but now the two rivals were resorting to the old methods again. Not only did they allow/cultivate violence for the (also physical) extermination of the opposition, not only did they allow/pursue foreign intervention for the support of their cause, but they did it with a ‘messianic’ attitude of infallibility that resulted in a complete disregard for the consequences on Greece and its people. This legacy, as we will see, tormented Greece in the following years. In contrast, in the short period of two years (1912-13) that Venizelos and Constantine managed to work together Greece triumphed.      

What do you think of the period 1914-22 in the Modern Greek State? Let us know below.

References

Churchill, W. S. (2021). The world crisis, Volume IV, The aftermath 1918-1928. London : Bloomsbury.

Clausewitz, C. (1997). On War. Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited.

Efthimiou, M. (n.d.). Global History IV: The Man Against Himself - Part B. Center of Open Online Courses (www.mathesis.cup.gr). Crete University Press, Heraklion (in Greek).

Gilbert, M. (1991). Churchill, A life. London: Heinemann.

Glenny, M. (2012). The Balkans 1804-2012, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. New York: Penguin Books.

Gordis, D. (2016). Israel, A concise history of a nation reborn. New York: Collins Publishers.

Kakouri, A. (2017). The two beta. Athens: Kapon.

Kostis, K. (2018). History’s Spoiled Children, The Formation of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst & Company.

Llewellyn Smith, M. (1999). Ionian vision, Greece in Asia Minor 1919 - 1922. Michigan: The Univeristy of Michigan Press.

Malesis, D. (2017). Defeat - Triumph - Catastrophe, The army in the Greek State from 1898 to 1922. Athens: EPICENTER (in Greek).

Mavrogordatos, G. (2015). 1915 The National Schism. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).

Papadakis (Papadis), N. E. (2017). Eleftherios Venizelos. Chania - Athens: National Research Foundation ''Eleftherios Venizelos'' - Estia Bookstore (in Greek).

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2021, September 5). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2021/9/5/the-modern-greek-state-18631897-bankruptcy-amp-defeat#.YVH7FX1RVPY

Papageorgiou, T. P. (2022, January 20). History is Now Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2022/1/20/the-modern-greek-state-18981913-glory-days#.YhPK6JaxW3A

Richter, H. A. (2020). The Greco-Turkish war 1919 - 1922, From the dream of the ''Great Idea'' to the Asia Minor disaster. Athens: Govostis Publications (in Greek, also available in English by Harrassowitz Pub. - 2016).

Rizas, S. (2019). Venizelism and antivezinelism at the beginning of the national schism 1915-1922 . Athens: Psichogios publications S.A. (in Greek).

Stamatopoulos, K. M. (2020). 1922 How we got to the catastrophe. Athens: Kapon Editions (in Greek).

Steinberg, J. (2011). Bismarck, A life. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

Wikipedia. (2022). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Syria_and_Lebanon