The truths and untruths about one of the trials of the century…

Three-time presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan was involved in one of the most important trials of the twentieth century. The Scopes Trial took place in 1925 and involved the age old debate between religion and science. Edward Vinski follows up on his first article on the trial (available here) and considers what William Jennings Bryan believed and when he believed it.

On the surface, William Jennings Bryan’s involvement in the famous State of Tennessee vs. John Thomas Scopes court case seems inconsistent with his earlier public life. Although he was long a supporter of progressive causes, Bryan’s prosecution of Scopes, a high school teacher who violated Tennessee’s statute against the teaching of non-Biblical Human Evolution, appears to represent an about-face: a harsh, conservative punctuation to the life of a man who famously backed women’s suffrage, prohibition and regulation of the railroads. Indeed, for those whose knowledge of Bryan comes only from the film or stage versions of Inherit the Wind, dramatizations that use the trial as a metaphor for McCarthyism, he appears to be an arch-conservative purveyor of hostility and fear. What is the truth about Bryan’s anti-evolution position? Were they long-held beliefs or did they reflect a growing conservatism in Bryan’s social ideas?

Who Was William Jennings Bryan?

Born in 1860, Bryan became one of America’s most influential political and social figures. His famous “Cross of Gold” speech at the 1896 Democratic National Convention secured him that party’s presidential nomination. Despite his loss to William McKinley in the general election, Bryan would receive the Democratic nod two more times, losing to McKinley again in 1900 and to William Howard Taft in 1908. In spite of his pacifist leanings, he volunteered for duty in the Spanish American War, and although he never saw combat, he achieved the rank of Colonel in the Nebraska State Militia. Bryan was selected as President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, but resigned in 1915 over a disagreement with Wilson’s position following the Lusitania sinking. Still, he campaigned for Wilson’s re-election in 1916, and offered his services to the President following the United States’ entry into World War I. In the years following his work for Wilson, he was, among other things, a frequent speaker on the Chautauqua circuit, and a supporter of the progressive movements mentioned above. 

A campaign poster for William Jennings Bryan in the 1900 presidential election.

In the film version of Inherit the Wind, The Bryan character[1] speaks in opposition to “godless science” and “agnostic scientists”.  In fact, Frederick March, in his portrayal of the character goes so far as to pronounce “evolution” as “evil-ution” throughout the film. Bryan is portrayed as being a strict Biblical literalist who believed truly that Jonah was swallowed by a whale, that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still and in the accuracy of Bishop James Ussher’s estimates of the earth’s age. In fact, Bryan was excited by the potentialities of applied science. He went so far as to join the American Association for the Advancement of Science as a means of refuting the notion that he opposed scientific investigation. Bryan also accepted the possibility of non-human evolution, but he was worried that when science denied the supernatural, “every manner of immoral behavior” would be unleashed upon the world (Kazin, 2006, p. 273).    

Two questions now arise. First, did Bryan’s opposition to evolution reflect a long-standing belief or a change to more conservative opinions in his later years? Second, to what degree was his attack on science inconsistent with his progressivism? To answer these questions, we will turn our attention to three sources: Bryan’s oft-repeated speech “The Prince of Peace”, his argument against scientific testimony during the Scopes Trial and his never-delivered closing speech that was included as a postscript in the trial transcript.

The Prince of Peace

One of the first clues to Bryan’s position on evolution comes from his 1904 speech “The Prince of Peace” (published in book form in 1909). In it, he stated that:

I have the right to assume, and I prefer to assume, a designer back of the design-a creator back of the creation… no matter how long you draw out the process of creation, so long as God stands back of it you cannot shake my faith in Jehovah… I do not carry the doctrine of evolution as far as some do; I am not yet convinced that man is a lineal descendant of the lower animal. I do not mean to find fault with you if you want to accept the theory…you shall not connect me with your family tree without more evidence than has yet been produced” (Bryan, 1909, p.12-13).

Fine. He seems willing to say “to each his own”. Yet years later, he would be at the fore of the anti-evolution movement in the United States. Was this a change of heart? Well, a closer examination of “The Prince of Peace” demonstrates that there was not necessarily a substantial change, for there is one easily overlooked passage a mere three pages earlier that sheds light on his fears. In describing why a system of morality based upon reason alone would be deficient, he stated:

As it rests upon argument rather than authority, the young are not in a position to accept or reject. Our laws do not permit a young man to dispose of real estate until he is twenty one…because his reason is not mature (Bryan, 1909, p.9).

Bryan’s concern for the moral life of young people would, in part, drive his anti-evolution crusade decades later. He feared their blind acceptance of materialistic arguments without a solid foundation of faith behind them. Shortly after this statement, he described his own youthful skepticism before concluding that “I have been glad ever since that I became a member of the church before I left for college, for it helped me during those trying days” (p. 11). The young person “is just coming into possession of his powers, and feels stronger than he ever feels afterwards-and he thinks he knows more than he ever does know” (p. 11). Thus, young people can become easily confused.

The Argument Against Expert Testimony

The second source for understanding William Jennings Bryan’s ideas comes from the Scopes Trial Transcript. On Thursday July 16, 1925, the focus of the trial turned to whether or not the testimony of scientists would be admitted into evidence. The defense hoped that these scientists would demonstrate that the study of evolution did not necessarily contradict the Biblical account of creation. In speaking against such testimony, Bryan turned to the tried and true position that had made him a three-time presidential nominee: the right of the populace or their elected representatives to regulate what is taught in US public schools.

“The statute,” he said, “defines exactly what the people of Tennessee desired and intended and did declare unlawful and it needs no interpretation” (Scopes Trial Transcript). The statute contained two provisions. It was illegal first “to teach any theory that denies the story of the Devine Creation of man as taught in the Bible” and second “to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals” (Tennessee House Bill 185). Bryan acknowledged that the testimony of experts would be acceptable if the statute only contained the provision relating to Biblical contradiction. By adding the provision about descent from lower animals, however, the legislature removed that possibility.

This is not the place to try to prove that the law ought never to have been passed…the people of this state passed this law, the people of this state knew what they were doing when they passed the law, and they knew the dangers of the doctrine-that they did not want it taught to their children (Scopes Trial Transcript).

It is not for nothing that he was called “The Great Commoner”. Long a champion of the working class and opponent of corporate power, he fought to protect the weak and poor from exploitation. “The rule of majority opinion against imposing elites” (Gould, 1999,p. 156) was long one of William Jennings Bryan’s primary focuses, and it is that point he tried to drive home in his attempt to block expert testimony.

Bryan’s Final Speech

A final source of Bryan’s views come from his proposed address following the trial. On the final day, the defense led by Clarence Darrow waived its right to closing argument and recommended that the jury return a verdict of guilty upon Scopes. In so doing, they not only set the stage for an appeal, but also deprived Bryan of his own closing remarks. Bryan’s speech was, however, appended to the trial transcript.

In the address, Bryan rehashed several of the points we have covered. Citing recent precedent, he pointed out the right of the state to control the public schools and to “forbid the teaching of anything ‘manifestly inimical to the public welfare’” (Scopes Trial Transcript). In addition, he claimed that the law was in no way an attempt to force religious beliefs upon the populace, but rather the majority’s attempt to protect its religious heritage from attacks by “an insolent minority…to force irreligion upon the children” (Scopes Trial Transcript). The statute, according to Bryan, did not represent a devaluation of science, and in fact Christians welcome truth wherever it may be found. This, in turn, led to his second point: that evolution is not truth but rather “millions of guesses strung together” and that “there is no more reason to believe that man descended from some inferior animal than…to believe that a stately mansion has descended from a small cottage” (Scopes Trial Transcript).

Toward the end of the address, however, Bryan describes Darwin’s “barbarous sentiment”. “Darwin,” he wrote, “speaks with approval of the savage custom of eliminating the weak so that only the strong will survive” (Scopes Trial Transcript). It was the Social Darwinism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that William Jennings Bryan most feared. He feared that under it, eugenics, euthanasia and sterilization would flourish as persons and nations tried to create a perfect race based upon the doctrine of survival of the fittest. From those perfect “supermen” world-dominating superstates would surely emerge. “Science,” he continued, “is a magnificent material force, but it is not a teacher of morals. It can perfect machinery, but it adds no moral restraints to protect society from the misuse of the machine” (Scopes Trial Transcript). In Bryan’s mind, this was never more evident than in the First World War - not yet a decade in the past. “Science,” he wrote, “has made war more terrible than it ever was before. “The world needs a Savior more than it ever did before” and it is only “the meek and lowly Nazarene” who could save it (Scopes Trial Transcript). With that, Bryan returns full circle to “The Prince of Peace”.

Conclusion

It’s clear that Bryan’s involvement in the Scopes Trial did not represent a substantial deviation from his prior progressive tendencies. He was long concerned with the effect adults can have on the impressionable minds of the young, and he strove to protect the young from such influence. He championed the right of the people to determine their laws. Finally, he long believed that, left unchecked, science posed a great threat to humanity. 

With hindsight, it is hard to argue with Bryan’s claims. One can only image his outrage at Nazi concentration camps, at US internment camps, and at bombs so powerful that they could destroy the world as we know it several times over. Bryan may have been wrong on a number of levels, not least of which is that scientific facts are not bound by majority opinion. But if he was wrong, he might well have been wrong for the right reasons.    

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Edward J.Vinski, Ph.D is Associate Professor of Education at St. Joseph’s College, NY.

[1] Bryan’s name was changed to Matthew Harrison Brady for Inherit the Wind. 

References

Bryan, W.J. (1909). The Prince of Peace. New York: Fleming H. Revel Company.

Gould, S.J. (1999). Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life. New York: Ballantine Books. 

Kazin, M. (2006). A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan. New York: Anchor Books.

Scopes Trial Transcript, 1925 Tennessee House Bill, 185.

Michael Collins - A myth about the Irish independence leader's death

The first article of this series (available here) opened a re-examination of several popular misconceptions about Irish independence hero Michael Collins. Here S.M. Sigerson looks at just one of the most notorious myths – that Collins died because he was inexperienced in live combat. 

Ireland's Revolutionary Era (1900 - 1923) was a time when controversy pervaded practically every aspect of life on that island. As a prominent leader in the conflict, Michael Collins lived and breathed controversy.

Some of the critical national questions at issue then have yet to be agreed, to this day. It is hardly surprising, then, that debate likewise continues, concerning points of Collins’ own character.

This is especially true in what may be the single most controversial event of his storied life: his suspicious death.  In the complete absence of the sort of official inquest which one would expect to have taken place, and utterly without the kind of authoritative records such an inquest would have bequeathed to us, folklore and gossip have rushed in to fill the gaps.

Remarkable assertions, plausible and otherwise, have tried to explain away unanswered questions around the killing of Ireland's Commander-in-Chief.  Some of these propositions have acquired a currency and repetition, tossed off in the heat of political debate, in the press, in interviews, in biographies through the years. But where did these "facts" come from?  Who said that? 

The contention that Collins was inexperienced in live combat had its origins among Collins' avowed opponents, at the time of Dáil debates on the Treaty.  They formed part of general efforts to discredit Collins; in the hope of dislodging his dominant position as head of the independence movement, in public perception.

This, in itself, places the question in the context of precisely the political conflict that culminated in his assassination.  It thus cannot be separated from a campaign of character assassination that immediately preceded, and then later, attempted to excuse his death.

Michael Collins in London in 1921.

Emmet Dalton

The promoter of the false charge simply expresses his gratification at finding that he had been misled (by erroneous information). It is not customary for him to express gratification... that, out of all the mud which he has thrown, some will probably stick!

- A Trollope

This misstatement about the Commander-in-Chief's battle experience is in no way improved by its association with Emmet Dalton.  The ranking officer under Collins that day, Dalton was the one most personally responsible for the Commander-in-Chief’s safety there.

When asked to explain the death of the one man he was there to protect, Dalton blamed the victim, claiming that Collins didn't know enough to keep his head down under fire.  This is the origin of the charge that Collins' death was caused by extraordinary incompetence on his own part. 

But there are problems with Dalton's statements.  At a glance they are consistently and suspiciously self-exonerating. Nor are they well corroborated by others who were present.

On the other hand, there is abundant testimony regarding the Commander-in-Chief’s career of astounding survival, through bullets and cannon, through countless ambushes and daring escapes, between 1916 and 1922.  Even those who later bore arms against him during the Irish Civil War have left vivid accounts of Collins' hands-on leadership under fire, in many now-forgotten raids.

Collins was apt to come up suddenly behind someone in the street and invite him to join him immediately in blowing up a barracks... they never knew when he might be serious. 

Collins got word that Lord French would be passing through College Street a little later and he got himself a gun, rounded up anyone who happened to be nearby, and set off to lead an ambush.

The balance of evidence reduces Dalton's claim to absurdity. Common sense likewise belies his "expert opinion" on the military prowess of "the man who won the war".  In his early twenties at the time, Dalton's insinuation is that his own military judgment was vastly superior to that of this famous general who had just defeated the world's most sophisticated Empire.  If so, it is remarkable that Ireland did not seem to make much progress under Dalton's leadership, once that supposedly less-competent superior was removed.

Although strategic command was Collins' foremost role after 1919, evidence is overwhelming that he not only oversaw, but personally commanded, carried out, and survived more such actions than can ever be known: due to the clandestine nature of the war, and other factors which made public statements or written records far less available to historians than under normal conditions. 

Volatility

Many of those concerned in these events took oaths of secrecy, sworn never to discuss the actions, nor to name comrades who took part. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB, parent body of the IRA)  was a secret organization throughout Collins' life.  Armed conflict against the British, although officially ended in the 26 southern counties, was still alive and well in the northeast of Ireland, and frequently spilled over the as-yet-undefined border between.  The IRB in general, and Collins in particular, were highly active in arming and directing Irish military measures there.  These were secret operations, which the Commander-in-Chief showed no qualms about carrying on without much regard for the nascent Free State government's official policy.  Indeed, up until a short time before, the IRB had recognized no government outside their own Supreme Council; their own president being, according to their by-laws, President of Ireland.

Consider the volatility, at this writing, of similar details regarding armed conflict in Northern Ireland (1970s - 1990s). Any publication of details about the underground forces' personnel, numbers, operations, precise past whereabouts etc., have been a highly sensitive issue, involving risk of reprisals.  The more active and responsible, the greater the danger inherent to those concerned.

Michael Collins' ultimate fate, shortly after shared by many of his best and brightest, proves that such a threat to those "who won the war" was certainly very real and present in 1922. 

It is Collins' long career of continual escape from enemy ambush and survival under fire, which casts his ultimate end in such a curious light.  As an explanation of his death, "inexperienced in combat" is a square peg in a round hole: a paralogism that does not fit the big picture.

Portions of this article are excerpted from "The Assassination of Michael Collins: What Happened At Béal na mBláth?" S M Sigerson. It is available here: (Amazon US | Amazon UK) or ask at your local bookshop.

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What if… D-Day did NOT happen in 1944?

Nick Tingley writes his latest article for the site on a fascinating topic. He postulates on what could have happened had the 1944 Normandy Landings against Nazi Germany taken place in 1943. As we shall see, things may well have not turned out as well as they did…

In a mid-spring morning in 1943, France was awash with blood. Like the brutal battle of Gallipoli in the First World War, Allied troops found themselves once again pinned down and being forced back into the sea by a well-trained army. These troops, under the command of US General George Patton, had barely been on the shores of Normandy for more than a week before the German war machine had finally kicked in to gear. Starting at Benouville in the east, German Panzer units were screaming across the coast of Normandy, cutting off the divisions that had already made their way inland. Those that managed to cling on to the coastline began to be evacuated but the German counter-attack was so swift that many were left to their fate. For the second time in the Second World War, the Allies had been kicked out of France.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied effort in Europe, was given little choice but to order the withdrawal of the rest of the invasion force. Soon after he accepted full responsibility for the failure and was fired. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who only a year before had quite happily dismissed Churchill’s plan to attack the “soft underbelly of Europe”, was now forced to admit that the British Prime Minister may have been right. Under immense pressure from a population that was already astonished by America’s “Germany First Policy”, Roosevelt was forced to withdraw his forces from Europe to face off with the Empire of Japan in the Pacific.

After a year of revelling in the presence of their strong, American allies, Britain once again found itself facing the Nazi threat – alone in the West.

US troops before fighting began in June 1944.

Operation Round Up

But none of this happened.

The Allies did not launch a large-scale invasion of France in 1943. Nor did they fail to hold on to the landings when D-Day finally came about in 1944. Eisenhower was not fired and the American population did not demand that the Armed Forces withdraw to take on the more immediate Japanese threat.

But, when the Americans finally joined the war in Europe in 1942, this scenario of an attempted invasion of France in 1943 was certainly a real possibility. President Roosevelt and his generals, under a huge amount of pressure from the American people and his new Russian ally, Josef Stalin, were eager to open up a second front in France and bring the Nazis to heel as soon as possible.

The proposed invasion of France, codenamed “Operation Round Up”, was intended to take place in the spring of 1943. Its goal was to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union and force a quick end to what had already been a war to rival the Great War of 1914-18. The plan could have ended the war by Christmas 1943. But it was not to be.

The British Question

The main character responsible for delaying the invasion of France was the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. As a politician who had led Britain against the threat of invasion in 1940 and saw the turn about of the British fortunes of war in North Africa, Churchill held a lot of sway over both the British people and the American president. Whilst American generals were advocating an invasion of France as soon as the troops were ready to do so, Churchill and the British generals were suggesting a more roundabout way of dealing with the Nazi threat.

Churchill’s suggestion was simple. The Allies should focus on removing the Axis Powers from Africa first, to relieve pressure on the forces fighting from Egypt. Then, once Africa was secure, he later suggested that the Allies should attack Sicily and then mainland Italy in an attempt to knock the German’s closest ally, Italy, out of the war before taking the Nazis on in the final attack.

Unwilling to argue with the British, whose island offered the only close staging point for any invasion of France, Roosevelt eventually capitulated to Churchill’s plan, much to the dismay of his own generals. Seaborne landings took place in Africa in 1942 and in Sicily and Italy the following year.

Ever since, historians have been arguing over Churchill’s intentions for suggesting an attack on the “soft underbelly of Europe”. Many suggest that Churchill was only ever interested in securing Britain’s Empire by having troops in Africa and that the attack in Italy was designed so that Churchill could gain leverage against the Soviet Union in any potential post-war agreement. It appeared that many of the American generals at the time had considered this possibility as well. When Churchill further suggested the idea of an invasion of the Balkans prior to an invasion of France, the generals, and later historians, were quick to suggest that this was merely a ploy to ensure that the Soviet Union would have little bargaining power after the war was over. However, this invasion did not take place and Roosevelt finally stood his ground, insisting that the Allies’ next invasion should take place in France.

There are, however, some historians who have suggested that Churchill had learned from his experience at Gallipoli during the First World War and, as such, was proceeding with a greater caution when addressing the issue of defeating the Nazis. These historians are keen to point out that the sea and air landings in Africa, Sicily and Italy were by no means successful.

Learn By Experience

Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, was a complete farce in comparison to the later D-Day landings. Both the British and Americans failed to achieve their objectives, the landings were delayed due to poor planning and an airborne operation with a single American parachute battalion turned into a complete nightmare. In the aftermath of Operation Torch, both the US General Patton and British General Clark acknowledged that the landings had been completely chaotic. They even went so far as to suggest that their troops would have been massacred had they been fighting German troops rather than the badly armed French colonial troops that they actually engaged.

Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, was little better. Although pre-dawn airborne drops and sea landings saw 80,000 allies land on in Sicily, the attacks themselves were often chaotic. After landing on shore, the US Seventh Army had no clear objectives due to the vague planning of the operation and it was only by the exploitative nature of General Patton that the army did not stop dead in its tracks. Furthermore, troops often came ashore in the wrong place and airborne troops found themselves scattered all over the place. The British glider force, who were tasked with capturing a key bridge south of Syracuse, lost the majority of its gliders to the sea and were forced to capture the bridge with only thirty men. To make matters worse, ground commanders often complained about the lack of Allied air cover over Sicily, but their air force colleagues were unwilling to risk fighters as they would often get picked off by their own anti-aircraft batteries.

The Allied landings in Italy in September 1943 appeared to be a drastic improvement on the earlier attempts in North Africa and Sicily, but this was largely due to the Italian government surrendering shortly afterwards. A later landing at Anzio in January 1944 failed to advance quickly enough and allowed the occupying Germans to fall back to more defensible positions.

Whilst many are quick to criticise Churchill for “leading the Allies up the Mediterranean path”, the chaotic invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Italy show us that the Allies were by no means ready to take on the Germans in 1943. In fact, many of the lessons learned from these failures during the earlier invasions ensured the success of Operation Overlord in June 1944. Regardless of Churchill’s reasoning, he had at least prevented a potentially disastrous invasion of France in 1943.

The What Could Have Beens

So what would have happened during a 1943 invasion of France?

There are many interpretations for what might have happened. I believe that General Patton would have been the obvious choice to lead the invasion of France. Patton was not chosen to lead the attack in 1944 due to an incident during the Sicily campaign where he slapped a soldier who was suffering from combat fatigue. But if the invasion of Sicily had never happened, this event may not have happened leaving Patton open to command the attack on the Normandy beaches.

There may still have been an attempt to attack and capture Pegasus Bridge, which was one of the few bridges that would allow the Germans access to attack the eastern flank of the Normandy beachheads. And this attack would probably have been undertaken by glider assault. But we can imagine that the attack would have been as successful as the glider assault in Sicily. With gliders crashing well short of the target there would have been few troops in position to hold the bridge. The troops at Pegasus Bridge would have easily been overrun and the Germans would have had the opportunity to cut the invading armies off from the sea.

There would have been an airborne assault, but given how chaotic the airborne assaults in North Africa and Sicily had been, the confusion that the paratroopers encountered on D-Day in 1944 would have been far greater in 1943 had they not had that earlier experience in the Mediterranean. The same can be said of the beach landings that would have been chaotic and delayed. We can quite easily imagine that the struggle that occurred on Omaha beach in 1944 would have been present and even greater at every single landing site in 1943.

Whilst we can’t know for sure that a 1943 invasion of France would have been a disaster, history suggests that it would have been. It is entirely possible that the landings themselves may have been a success, but without the experience of encountering those small failures in the otherwise successful landings in the Mediterranean it seems highly unlikely that the invasion of France would have achieved anything close to the success of D-Day. At best, an Allied Army would have found itself penned into the Normandy region by a more experienced German force. At worse, the Germans would have poured along the coast, cutting off the invasion forces and driving the rest back in to the sea.

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References

The Second World War - Anthony Beevor (2012)

Invaders: British and American Experience of Seaborne Landings 1939 - 1945 - Colin John Bruce (1999)

Fighting them on the Beaches: The D-Day landings, June 6, 1944 - Nigel Cawthorne (2002)

D-Day Fails: Atomic Alternatives in Europe - Stephen Ambrose (1999)

The top 10 reasons why the Russian Revolution still fascinates us

The article that needs no introduction! Following up on her previous pieces on World War One, including the spark that caused World War One to break out here, Rebecca Fachner tells us the 10 reasons why we are still fascinated by the Russian Revolution.

The Bolshevik by Boris Kustodiev. 1920.

 1.     It is Bogo (Buy One Get One).

The Russian Revolution is the ultimate historical bargain; you get 2 for the price of 1. There were actually 2 revolutions inside of a year, the February/March revolution, which deposed the Tsar, and the October revolution that toppled the Provisional Government and brought the Bolsheviks to power.

2.     It was so much larger than life.

The Russian Revolution is all about contrast, which is what makes it so fascinating and unbelievable. The extreme opulence of the upper class and the Tsarist court, the wretched poverty of everyone else. There was such a huge gap between the “haves” and the “have not’s” that its actually staggering. Of course there was royalty and wealth in other countries, but the Russians cornered the market on royalty, excess and flamboyance. And the poor were just so overworked, starving and helpless. Poor is poor everywhere, but the poor in pre-Revolutionary Russia seem so much worse off than elsewhere.

3.     Rasputin.

Enough said.

4.     How did the Tsar and his government not see what was going on?

The Tsar himself represents another fascinating aspect to this entire historical episode. Has there ever been a man less suited to his position in life than Nicholas II?  He was not a ruler; he was indecisive, small minded, family oriented and lacked any forcefulness. His wife was similarly poorly placed in history, being unstable, hysterical and incredibly stubborn. Both were hugely lacking in self-awareness, which is the only explanation for how both Nicholas and his wife managed to completely ignore the unrest and unhappiness of their population. It takes a special kind of blindness not to see how the Tsarist government was teetering. In the ultimate historical irony, Nicholas would have been a perfect constitutional monarch, like his cousin George V in England, had he not been so dogmatically opposed to any constitution of any kind. 

5.     There is something for everyone.

The Russian Revolution is an incredibly accessible historical event, easy to understand and yet dense and scholarly all at the same time. It has fascinated popular historians, Hollywood and serious scholars because there are so many layers and so much going on. Movies have been made about the revolution (even cartoons), scholars have devoted entire careers to studying the Russian Revolution, and books of all types: popular history, memoir, even historical fiction have been written en masse about the Russian Revolution.

6.     Those poor, beautiful, doomed kids.

Everyone has seen one of the photos of the Tsar and his family, with the four beautiful daughters in their long white dresses and pearls, standing almost protectively around their parents and their little brother. There are so many pictures of the family, and as the girls get older they seem to look increasingly tragic and haunted. Maybe it is because we know what is coming for them, and we just can’t help but look at those pictures with a sense of foreboding. The revolution cost many lives, not to mention those killed in the first years of the Soviet government, but these four girls seem to represent the passing of an age and the lost potential not only of their young lives, but their parents entire reign.

7.     How did the Provisional government make the same mistakes their predecessors did?

The Provisional government took power in the chaotic and incredibly confused first days after the Tsar was deposed, and had the unenviable task of trying to form a new government under the absolute worst conditions: in the middle of a war, with almost no experience, and a population that was starving, sick and desperate for change. Many of the members of the new government had been in the Duma before the revolution, the very limited elected body that the Tsar had reluctantly allowed ten years earlier. Even those who had not been in the Duma were familiar with the problems of the Tsarist government, so how is it that the Provisional government proceeded to immediately make the exact same mistakes as the Tsar had? The new government continued Russia’s involvement in World War One, and spent their entire tenure fighting among themselves, rather than addressing the problems that had put them there in the first place. It is telling that the Provisional government was only in power for about six months before Lenin and the Bolsheviks took over with their promises of peace and bread. Russia wanted peace, and it is a mystery how the Provisional government failed to heed this.

8.     What other revolution ends with a street gang taking over an entire country?

The Bolsheviks were essentially a street gang, when you come right down to it. Both before the Tsar was toppled and after there were larger, far more prominent revolutionary groups in Russia, on every end of the political spectrum. The Bolsheviks were a relatively small-scale operation, until they suddenly took over St. Petersburg and then the rest of the country. How did they actually do that?  How did a gang of criminals and street thugs take over a country and then consolidate their power so quickly?

9.     We all know what comes next.

Part of the reason the Russian Revolution is so interesting, even now, is that we all know what comes next: Lenin, Stalin, the Bolsheviks and 70 plus years of Soviet rule. The revolutionary moment is so interesting because it is one of the great pivots of the twentieth century, and perhaps the greatest what-if.  Think about how different everything might have been if the Tsar could have saved his reign, or if the Provisional government could have transitioned smoothly into a more permanent democratic government. Had things happened even slightly differently, the twentieth century could have been a totally changed place.

10.  If it were fiction, no one would read it.

The Russian Revolution proves the adage that truth is stranger than fiction.  There are so many bizarre circumstances surrounding the Russian Revolution, the story is on such a grand scale and so completely unbelievable, that it has to be true. No fiction writer would ever invent a story this grandiose and farfetched, and if they did, no one would buy a book this preposterous. It HAS to be a true story.

Now, you can find out more about Rasputin here.

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Unknown World War I – The battle that history is forgetting

The Siege of Leningrad and the Battles for Moscow and Stalingrad in World War Two (WWII) are well documented, but very little, certainly in the West, has been written about the Eastern Front during World War One (WWI). Apart from the crushing blows to the Tsar’s Imperial Russian Army at Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes and the German Army’s march east, the only other battle that ever seems to get a mention is the short lived Brusilov offensive in June 1916.

Here, the author Frank Pleszak returns to the site and tells us about the little known Battle of Vileyka in September 1915.

During WWI there was significant fighting and demonstrations all along the eastern front from Riga on the Baltic Sea in the north all the way south to Romania, and once Romania entered the war, right down to the Black Sea. My dad was born and raised in a small Polish village about 100 kilometres east of Vilnius near to Lake Naroch (in what is now Belarus). Though he never mentioned it, there was a huge, and to the Russians catastrophic, battle there in the spring of 1916. It was of such importance that the historian Norman Stone said of it “Lake Naroch was, despite appearances, one of the decisive battles of the First World War. It condemned most of the Russian army to passivity”.

The ‘Battle of Lake Naroch’, the ‘Russian Spring Offensive of 1916’, occurred following the Russian ‘Great Retreat’ when the Eastern Front had settled down into positional trench warfare. It was an ill conceived, poorly planned, and disastrously executed Russian offensive across a front of nearly 100km over a series of frozen lakes and swamplands. Its intention was to bring Vilnius into striking distance in an attempt to draw German troops east and away from their offensive on the Western Front at Verdun. The Russian 2nd Army massively outnumbered the Germany XXI Army Corps, almost 450,000 infantry to 75,000 but suffered staggering losses of more than 120,000 while the Germans lost about 20,000. After two weeks of bloody and futile fighting in the most appalling conditions the battle came to an end with the Russians having only captured a tiny area to the south of Lake Naroch.

Fighting at Ladischky-Bruch during the Battle of Lake Naroch.

Forgotten?

There is almost nothing written about this battle in the west and it is in danger of being lost to history. In a small effort to prevent this happening I have researched the battle from both sides and almost completed a book on the subject that should be published later this year.

Other than the Brusilov campaigns, Russia did have some other battlefield success. In fact in the lead up to the Naroch debacle, the battle for the small town of Vileyka, where the German advance east was stopped and then pushed back is considered by some to be one of the most significant military victories ever achieved on Belarusian soil. There will be a chapter with detailed information in my forthcoming book, but I include a summary here…

So, following on from the success at the second battle at the Masurian lakes at the end of February 1915, the German X Army, commanded by General von Eichhorn, after heavy fighting, had by mid-August, taken the strategically important fortress at Kaunas but then found the capture of the city of Vilnius altogether harder.

After regrouping to the north of Vilnius, supplemented with additional reinforcements, von Eichhorn’s X Army bypassed Vilnius and towards the end of August broke through Russian General Radkevich’s 10th Army in the so called Swenziany (Švenčionys) gap. Elements pressed on east through the city of Postavy towards Hlybokaje, but the bulk of the force headed south-east towards the City of Maladzyechna (Molodechno) and the primary objective; the city of Minsk.

By mid-September, amidst stiff opposition, General von Garnier’s VI Cavalry Corps (H.K.K.6.) had captured the towns of Vileyka and Smorgon. The 3 Cavalry Division moved on towards Maladzyechna, some units even approached the west of Minsk, and others had penetrated to the east of Minsk and attacked a bridge along the Beresina River south of Borisov. Stavka, the Russian high command, were clearly concerned. Not only was Maladzyechna an important railway cross roads but it also contained important secret government and military installations. 

German cavalry attack at Vileyka.

On 17 September, as the German X Army began to surround Vilnius, Russian forces were withdrawn and the city ceded to the Germans. But as the German Army marched east their supply lines had increased and become severely stretched. Russia’s had shortened and their material losses were made good from increased production at home together with supplies from France and England. The Russian 2nd Army, devastated at Tannenberg and then obliterated at the Masurian Lakes, had re-formed and re-grouped, and under General Smirnov were given the ‘honour to finally halt the German advance’.

Back on the front foot

The H.K.K.6.’s rapid advance had left them vulnerable. Whilst they had easily crossed the rivers, streams and swamps their infantry and artillery support struggled over rivers with bridges blown up by the retreating Russians. The Russian 10th and 2nd Armies struck back, and immediately halted the German advance before Maladzyechna, and then pushed them back north along a 40km stretch of the River Wilja from the town of Vileyka to Milcza where they were slowly reinforced with advanced infantry units of the 115 Infantry and eventually 75 Reserve Divisions.

Extent of the German X Army Advance East.

By 22 September the town of Smorgon between Vilnius and Maladzyechna had been recaptured by a combination of a Russian 10th Army offensive together with Russians withdrawing from Vilnius. The Germans were exhausted and hungry, most of their artillery and supplies of food and munitions were still far behind their front. The Russians counter-attacked at Vileyka. Smirnov’s 27th Army Corps commanded by General Balanin had moved into positions to the south of Vileyka along the southern bank of the River Wilja and bombarded German positions. At 16:00 an infantry company supported by a machine gun company attacked across the railway bridge south of the town, scattering the German defenders that enabled two companies to ford the river and through the night occupy high ground to the southwest of the town.

By the early morning of 23 September all the Russian artillery, including two heavy batteries, had assembled to the south of Vileyka and by the same time further infantry had crossed the Wilja near the village of Olszyna just to the east of Vileyka causing a distraction to the German defences. Taking advantage, a further three infantry brigades were moved quickly from reserve to consolidate the breakthrough.

Russian Artillery.

The Germans regrouped and counter-attacked the positions to the south and west, but even more Russian Infantry was brought up to assist. The German action was brave but futile and by mid-afternoon as the Russians massed ready to storm Vileyka from the south, southwest and west of the town the Germans stubbornly repeated their attacks. At 16:00 massed Russian artillery began bombarding the outskirts of the town and at 16:30, as the wooden houses burned, Russian Infantry moved forward from the south. Within minutes they had driven the Germans back towards the centre of the town. Fierce hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting took place at almost every building but by 17:00 the centre was under total Russian control. Dogged German resistance prevailed around the cemetery and at the nearby prison but with the assistance of targeted Russian artillery the fighting quickly moved to the northern outskirts where a German howitzer was captured. The Germans fought desperately to recover the lost gun but Russian support arrived and repeated German attempts failed.

Russian Map of attack (original dates in Julian format).

At the same time Russian units moved, largely unopposed, around the west of the town preventing any German withdrawal to the west. Fighting within Vileyka concentrated along the northern perimeter and particularly around the railway station where a furious firefight erupted with the station changing hands several times. More Russian units moved in from the southwest and eventually cleared the remaining resistance around the cemetery before moving to the northern edge of town where they helped capture the station.

The closing stages

20 kilometres to the east at the village of Sosenka Russian cavalry failed in an attempt to capture the bridge over the River Wilja that was guarded by a single company of 80 German defenders. But nearer to Vileyka Russian infantry had crossed the Wilja around the village of Kasuta and within 4 hours had forced the German X Army back along the road towards the town of Kurzeniec, capturing the villages of Kaczanki, Hrycuki, and Kłynie together with several light field guns in the process.

Further Russian infantry crossed the Wilja capturing the villages Chołopy and Małmhy on the eastern outskirts of Vileyka. The remaining Germans were surrounded on three sides and their support was too far back to assist. Their position was hopeless so during the night all remaining units were withdrawn to new positions north of Vileyka around the village of Wołkowszczyzna.

The battle for Vileyka was effectively over. The Germans, overstretched without supplies, exhausted and hungry, struggled on for a few more days but with increasing demands from the Western Front it became clear that the prospect of any further German short-term progress to the east was unrealistic. On 25 September General von Hindenburg ordered a halt to the advance east, withdrawal of all the forward troops along the River Wilja back to positions around Lake Naroch, and for the establishment of permanent defensive lines (Dauerstellung) which were developed through the winter of 1915.

Isolated but bloody fighting erupted periodically in sections along the whole of the new front through the winter and early spring of 1916. Both sides continued to build up their forces and prepare for battle, but neither were prepared for the onslaught that eventually came in the March of 1916. The Russian success at Vileyka was not to be repeated; in fact, despite overwhelmingly superior forces they were so badly beaten that the consequences were drastic and far reaching…

Frank Pleszak has written a book about his father’s journey from near Lake Naroch via the GULags of Siberia to England entitled Two Years in a Gulag.

It is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

You can also hear an excerpt from the book in our related podcast here.

Frank has also almost completed a book on the Battle of Lake Naroch. His YouTube presentation is here. He is working on a history of the Polish 2nd Corps – Anders Army. Finally, Frank’s Twitter handle is @PolishIICorps.

The Unknown SAS? World War Two’s Desert Raiders

The Long-Range Desert Group played a fascinating role in desert operations during World War Two, but unlike the SAS, it is largely unknown. Here, Robert Walsh shares the fascinating story…

An LRDG patrol during the Desert Campaign.

Heavily armed, heavily customized vehicles moving stealthily around the Western Desert, driven by men resembling pirates more than elite soldiers, going deep behind enemy lines to gather intelligence and raid enemy targets. Sounds familiar? You’re more than likely thinking of the original Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment founded and led by Lieutenant Colonel David Stirling. And in this case you’d be wrong. Well, not wrong, exactly. The original SAS were founded for that purpose. But there were other units doing similar work during the Desert Campaign and the SAS weren’t the only ‘desert raiders.’ These units are often overlooked or simply overshadowed by their SAS comrades and many who know the SAS might not have heard of their less famous brethren. The Long-Range Desert Group was one of these units, earning a compliment from their opponents that the SAS themselves would have envied.

They were originally formed in June 1940 at the suggestion of Major Ralph Bagnold, assisted by Captains Patrick Clayton and William Shaw. Bagnold was a pre-war desert explorer and approached General Archibald Wavell, proposing to form a long-range reconnaissance unit to work deep behind enemy lines on covert reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and small-scale raiding missions. Wavell had been a liaison officer with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the First World War and doubtless knew of similar operations performed by the ‘Light Car Patrol’. Unlike some of his colleagues (Montgomery, for instance) Wavell understood the concept of what we now call Special Forces and lacked a prejudice common to many generals of the time. Regular British Army officers often had a deep dislike for what they called ‘private armies’, especially when those ‘private armies’ used decidedly irregular methods. Units like the Commandos, SAS and LRDG often found themselves obstructed and hindered by Regular officers and their inflexible attitudes. Wavell not only understood the LRDG’s purpose, he actively assisted in their formation and ensured they were properly supplied and equipped for the job at hand.

Where the SAS tended toward more straightforward sabotage and raiding operations, the LRDG were to adopt a quieter approach, hence the unofficial LRDG motto of ‘Not by Strength, by Guile’ (still the unofficial motto of today’s Special Boat Service, an elite unit within the Royal Marine Commandos). The LRDG did perform raiding operations, but they were mainly to avoid combat and gather information covertly. The SAS might attack airfields, supply dumps, fuels dumps and suchlike, but it was often the LRDG that provided the intelligence and also the transport to get them to and from their targets. Hence the LRDG’s unofficial nickname of the ‘Libyan Desert Taxi Service.’ The LRDG did provide the SAS with transport and intelligence, sometimes joining them in raiding missions. They also ferried secret agents to and from their rendezvous deep behind enemy lines. But they were far more than simply a taxi service for spies and saboteurs. Once the SAS were fully equipped with their own vehicles they were able to mount their own deep-penetration operations and secret agents needed guides who could move stealthily through the desert while fighting if they had to. Hence, the LRDG has sometimes been seen (unfairly and inaccurately) as being merely a taxi service for other units. The LRDG were a small unit, never numbering more than 350 men at their largest, but they achieved results out of all proportion to their numbers.

Specialist Soldiers, Specialized Equipment

The LRDG was a volunteer-only unit. Nobody had to sign up and those that did knew full well the risks of working behind enemy lines. If anything went wrong then they could find themselves stuck hundreds of miles behind enemy lines with very limited supplies and ammunition, large numbers of enemy troops hunting for them, North African desert tribes who might either help them or sell them to the enemy depending on which suited them best, burning heat during the day, freezing cold at night, snakes, spiders, sandstorms, enemy aircraft, ground patrols, impassable obstacles and the ever-present chance of their vehicles breaking down and stranding them in the desert. It was also a multinational force. The first volunteers were from New Zealand, but they were swiftly joined by many volunteers from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Great Britain. Specialized equipment, vehicles, weapons and training were essential for the LRDG to even exist in the desert, let alone function effectively as a military unit. Fortunately, Major Bagnold was an experienced pre-war desert explorer. He could provide essential knowledge and even equipment of his own invention such as the ‘sun compass’ fitted to all LRDG vehicles. He knew how the vehicles needed to be customized to make desert travel less difficult, how to navigate across the desert, which weapons would be most effective, which tribes were pro-British, pro-German or simply helped the highest bidder at any given time. Without Major Bagnold or someone very similar, the LRDG would never have existed except as an idea.

Two LRDG patrols at a rendezvous with their typical vehicles.

Their vehicles were mainly two-wheel drive jeeps and small trucks, heavily adapted for desert use. Radiators were made larger and condensers fitted to save water and reduce the risk of engines seizing. Special low-pressure desert tires and improved suspension systems made vehicles faster and easier to drive. Every vehicle had a ‘sun compass’ for navigation, a device invented by Bagnold during his pre-war exploring days. Any excess weight and unnecessary parts were stripped and replaced with useful items. Shovels and sand channels were standard for digging vehicles out of sand banks. Excess bodywork was removed to make room for extra weapons and equipment. Everything possible was done to convert LRDG vehicles from ordinary small trucks and jeeps into fast, nimble, heavily armed raiding and reconnaissance vehicles. Ford CMP and Chevrolet trucks were standard issue and the famous Willys jeep also became very popular as a patrol commander’s vehicle. Each patrol had a custom-equipped radio truck and four 6-ton trucks to deliver supplies and set up secret replenishment bases in the desert, enabling patrols to patrol deeper into enemy territory and stay in the field for longer. Communications patrols and LDG headquarters were excellent. Courtesy of each patrol’s specialist radio truck, equipped with the most modern radio equipment and the best radio operators, there were only three occasions during the Desert Campaign where a patrol lost radio contact with their headquarters.

Irregular Warriors

Their personal appearance and vehicles were unconventional. Their choice in weapons was equally unusual and staggeringly broad. LRDG members thought nothing of equipping themselves and their vehicles with captured enemy weapons in addition to whatever they found useful from British arsenals. An LRDG truck might have twin-mounted Vickers or Browning light machine guns at the front, a 50. Caliber Browning machine gun in the back and captured German or Italian machine guns such as German MG42s or Italian Breda M38s mounted at its tail. An LRDG trooper might carry a mixture of personal weapons, British, German, American and Italian. It wouldn’t be unusual to see an LRDG trooper carrying a standard British Commando dagger, a German or Italian pistol (possibly more than one) and a British rifle, an American Thompson submachine gun or a captured submachine gun such as a German MP40 Schmeisser or an Italian Beretta M1934. Light machine guns ranged from British Bren guns to American 30. Caliber Brownings via German MG34s, MG 42s or Italian Breda M37s and M38s. It was expected that all LRDG troopers should be as comfortable with using and maintaining enemy weapons as British or American ones. The LRDG also used hand grenades, landmines, rifle grenades, plastic explosives and specially made ‘Lewis bombs’ (designed by SAS officer ‘Jock’ Lewes) for destroying enemy aircraft on the ground. Couple a mixed bag of weapons with dirty, torn, stained fatigues, Arab headdress, a deep suntan and two weeks of unshaved beard and it is no surprise that LRDG troopers tended to look more like pirates or mercenaries than soldiers, especially to traditional military eyes.

The LRDG cap badge, specially chosen to reflect their military role.

The LRDG’s differing role was reflected even in their cap badge. Where the SAS still have the ‘winged dagger’ representing their airborne capability and the Sword of Damocles that can instantly fall on an enemy, the LRDG had a less aggressive emblem. Their cap badge was a wheel (reflecting their mobility) around a scorpion (a small desert creature with a lethal sting). The rest of their uniform (if you could call it that) usually consisted of torn, stained desert fatigues, sun hats and Arab headdress. The LRDG prided themselves on their unconventional methods and practical effective performance, not on the conventional ‘spit and polish’ smartness of the Regular Army. They looked like a bunch of ruffians, but did their particular jobs as professionally as the smartest-looking soldiers on a parade ground. It was results that mattered, not appearances. The SAS had a similar attitude. Shiny boots and polished buttons meant nothing in the North African desert, hundreds of miles behind enemy lines and knowing that they were as likely to be shot out of hand as taken prisoner if an operation went wrong. For both units this apparent lack of formality and convention frequently caused tensions and rifts with soldiers from Regular units, especially with the more traditionally minded senior officers.

At first a typical LRDG patrol comprised two troopers and 28 non-commissioned officers. Between them a patrol drove one Ford CMP truck and ten smaller Chevrolet trucks. Patrol commanders and patrol sergeants had the option of driving customized jeeps. Each patrol had a patrol medical orderly, desert navigator, radio operator and mechanic. In March 1941 patrols were reorganized into one officer, fifteen to eighteen men and five or six vehicles. Halving the size of patrols gave the LRDG the ability to send more patrols over wider areas while each patrol retained sufficient firepower to fight their way out of trouble if they needed to. Stealth was always preferable to combat and the LRDG soon acquired a nickname from the Italian opposition. The Italians began calling them the ‘Pattaglia Fantasma’ or ‘Ghost Patrol’ acknowledging their ability to evade detection and strike at will.

After The Desert War

When all German forces in North Africa surrendered in Tunisia in May 1943, the LRDG, now having grown to two squadrons comprising around 350 men in all, was at a loose end. They needed to find new areas to operate and so justify their continued existence. They soon found them. The LRDG operated in a number of areas besides the desert although they’re best remembered for their desert operations, especially their work at the Battle of Kufra and their raid on Barce as part of ‘Operation Caravan’. New hunting grounds in the Mediterranean and the Balkans now occupied their time. The Dodecanese campaign, the Battle of Leros, Albania, Yugoslavia and the Italian campaign all featured the LRDG, often operating jointly with other raiding and reconnaissance units such as the SAS, Special Boat Service and the Greek ‘Sacred Squadron’. They adapted their methods to fit the different locations they now operated in and their skill and flexibility made them a valuable asset right up until the end of the war. After the war in Europe officially ended on May 8, 1945 the LRDG’s leaders requested that they be deployed to the Far East and continue performing similar operations against the Japanese. Their superiors declined and on August 1, 1945 the LRDG was formally disbanded. Days after their disbandment the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Second World War was over; the Cold War was about to begin.

Earlier I mentioned the LRDG receiving the highest of compliments from the unlikeliest of people. The unlikely person was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the legendary ‘Desert Fox’ and commander of the Afrika Korps. His compliment to the LRDG was this:

The Long-Range Desert Group caused us more damage than any other British unit of equal strength.

Did you enjoy this article? If so, tell the world! Write about it, tweet about it or share it by clicking on one of the buttons below!

Sources

Gross, Kuno; O'Carroll, Brendan and Chiarvetto, Roberto. Incident at Jebel Sherif. Berlin: Kuno Gross, 2009

http://www.lrdg.org/

http://www.specialforcesroh.com/browse.php?pageid=lrdg

http://www.lrdg.de/vehicles.htm

Morgan, Mike. Sting of the Scorpion: The Inside Story of the Long Range Desert Group. The History Press Publishing, 2003

The Cold War: A War without a Winner

“Did anyone really win the Cold War?” was the question that Samantha Jones asked after the recent shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. After all, many assume that as the USSR collapsed in 1991, the US won the Cold War. Instead, Samantha argues that nobody really won this war. Here she explains why.

With the recent shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine, tensions in some ways similar to those felt during the Cold War are once again being raised upon the world stage. With President Putin’s reaction to the crisis and the obvious Russian military presence between the border of Russia and Ukraine, this hostility links back to events and ideologies that brought about the Cold War. Once again the rivalries between various countries have influenced nations and people worldwide. No longer is this a matter of communism versus capitalism, or socialism versus democracy, but is instead a power struggle that goes beyond two major superpowers. The aftermath and rivalries from the Cold War are still present today. Why? Perhaps it is because the Cold War was a war that had no final end without a final winner.

An East German soldier guarding the newly-formed Berlin Wall in August 1961.

AN UNUSUAL WAR

The Cold War was a war that was never won. Despite the massive cost and time spent on the conflict, little physical confrontation occurred between the super-powers. This was not a normal war. Simply put, the Cold War was a series of cooling, warming and frosty interactions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (US). Although these superpowers are said to be the big players, the hostility between these countries caused a catalyst for revolutionary worldwide events and issues. It involved the Third World, the Middle East and the Western sphere of influence. From the aftermath of World War Two, a vicious rivalry between communism and capitalism arose, bringing the world into a new age of technological warfare with nuclear weaponry. Welcome to the modern world.

It is widely believed that owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US won the Cold War by default. But this really is not the case. By analyzing the physical conflicts, technological aspects and scale of this worldwide conflict, one can see the deep layering and complications to this. To have a winner, one must have a loser. But what did the US win? It did not receive any territory, reparation payments or a formal apology from the USSR. It was a war with no surrender or defeat. Yes the Berlin Wall came down and yes the USSR is no longer a communist nation. However, this does not mean the US won the Cold War. In my opinion the Cold War has no winner, which is why remnants of the conflict continue today.

For a world war there was very little physical confrontation in regard to the scale of the conflict. In no way do I mean any disrespect to those that did fight during the Cold War; however in comparison to the world wars, the armed struggle was small. The Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are probably the most noted military contests during this time. Even so, both superpowers were defeated in Vietnam and Afghanistan and retreated after a series of long battles and the loss of many human lives. Also, both superpowers were overcome by an enemy that was not the USSR or the US. Of course the presence of each superpower was evident behind the battleground, such as supplying resources, aid and even initiating certain conflicts. But in a physical sense, it hardly seems reasonable to announce a winner when both the USSR and the US failed to decisively win militarily during the Cold War.

GLOBAL BATTLE, UNCLEAR WINNER

As mentioned before, the Cold War was also a revolutionary conflict in terms of technology, truly introducing the world to nuclear weaponry. The Space Race and the Hydrogen Bomb reveal how warfare took on a new meaning at this time. In this sense, the Cold War was a war that almost happened, or a war that could have been. What I mean by this is that it is a real victory for both superpowers as they decided not to use this form of weaponry against each other on a massive scale. Since neither superpower actually used their nuclear weapons and this war was not fought in outer space, the US does not deserve the title of ‘winner’ in this particular arena.

Lastly it is quite insular and ignorant to believe that the Cold War was only fought between the USSR and the US; therefore to announce one winner is incorrect. The crises in the Middle East, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the rise of Mao’s China, the Korean War, the Berlin Wall, the imposition of communism on Eastern Europe, and numerous nations fighting for their independence can all be connected to the Cold War. Countless personalities and politicians outside these two superpowers were involved in continuing and trying to stop this worldwide division. It was not just an ideological struggle between the democratic capitalists and the dictatorial communists. After World War Two the world entered into a period that broke with traditions of the past, such as colonization. The extreme layering in each piece of the Cold War puzzle does not add up to one clear victory. It is unjust and unfair to only include the US and the USSR in this debate and the question of who won.

As one could write an entire book on this subject, I have only touched the tip of the iceberg here. Hindsight tells us that the Cold War was unlike any other war in history for so many reasons – including that there was no clear winner or loser. Yes the USSR collapsed, but this was not due to any direct action caused by the US, rather domestic issues rotting the superpower from within. And yes the capitalist US did survive when the USSR did not, but just what did it gain? Reagan’s large increase in military spending in the 1980s caused the US to greatly increase its debt as well as use methods that can be argued to be crimes against humanity.

And was it worth it? After all this, parts of the world are still at war, the US and Russia aren’t friends, small nations are fighting for their independence in civil wars, and superpowers continue to dominate those that are weak. It seems that not much was learned from the Cold War.

Do you agree with Samantha’s argument? Did the Cold War not have a winner? Let us know your thoughts below…

World War One – How did the Eastern Front differ from the Western Front?

The Eastern Front in World War One is often largely unknown to many Westerners. The situation there was quite different to that on the Western Front. Here, Rebecca Fachner follows up on her articles on Royal Family squabbles here and the spark that caused war to break out here.

The 100th anniversary of the first summer of World War One rolls onward, and with it commemorations of battles that everyone in the Western world seems to know instinctively - the Marne, the Somme, Ypres…  The war on the Western Front is very much alive in the Western consciousness, but what is so often forgotten is that it was actually a two-front war in Europe. Germany was not only fighting in the West against the French and British (and eventually the Americans), but also in the East against the Russian Empire.

Russian troops on the move to the front line. From National Geographic magazine, volume 31. 1917.

As a fighting force, the Russian Empire was extremely contradictory. They were a formidable foe, but at the same time a very worrying ally. Their one huge advantage in warfare was the sheer numbers of troops that they had at their disposal. It was truly a staggering amount of men, millions upon millions of Russian troops, a “mass of bodies ready to bleed” in the words of one historian of the period.[1] The main disadvantage for the Russians was everything else. The army had miserably poor leadership, was woefully underfunded and was technologically backward. In the years before the war, the Allies, especially France, had spent enormous sums of money trying to improve Russia’s technological capability.

Railroads had been a particular target, as the movement of troops to the front as quickly as possible was of paramount importance. France knew that German war plans hinged on Russia’s inability to mobilize their troops and so planned on attacking France first, then moving on to Russia only after the French had been defeated. Therefore, if Russia could respond more quickly, and force Germany to divert troops in their direction earlier, so much the better for France.  Their efforts did do some good, but not enough, as was painfully demonstrated in the opening days of the war. It took weeks for the Russians to assemble a fighting force along the German and Austro-Hungarian borders.

DIFFERENCES WITH THE WEST

Russia began the war by invading eastern Germany. It was able to do so as Poland was not an independent country at this time meaning that Russia and Germany were contiguous. The first major engagement of the war was the Battle of Tannenberg, which was a resounding defeat for the Russians. The next week at the Battle of Masurian Lakes, the Russians were pushed back further, and would not fight on German soil for the remainder of the war. Despite the inauspicious beginnings, the Russians did enjoy some success, particularly against Austria-Hungary in the fall of 1914. By 1915, however, the Germans had made the Eastern Front their top priority and began to hurl troops at the Russians, managing to turn the tide of the eastern war permanently in their own favor. Russia never again enjoyed a significant advantage.

The geography of the war in the east was very different when compared to the west. Rather than a compressed front line, the Russians and Germans were eventually fighting over an area of more than a thousand miles. This spread the fighting, placing a much larger burden on military supply chains than in the west, and making Russian transportation problems an even bigger issue as they began to have supply problems soon after war broke out. One small, seemingly trivial problem added to the frustration, namely that Russian railroads were, and still are, on a different track gauge than parts of Europe further west. Railroad tracks in Europe (and almost everywhere else) are 4 feet 8 inches apart from each other, but in Russia the tracks are 5 feet apart. This means that trains from Europe don’t work in Russia and vice versa; to this day, if you are travelling by railroad into Russia it causes delays at the border. This created all kinds of chaos for supplying both armies and moving troops. All told, it generally slowed down the war in the east. Additionally, because the front line stretched over so large a territory, trench warfare, something that is so closely associated with the war in the west, was not a factor in the east. There was no need for trenches, as the armies had so much more room to maneuver.

Another significant and often remarked upon problem for the Russians was the personality of the men making the key decisions. Tsar Nicholas was a weak and largely ineffective leader, and enjoyed far too much command authority for a person with limited military experience. His two top commanders, Grand Duke Nicholas and Minister of War General Sukhomlinov, hated each other and constantly tried to undermine the other, often to the detriment of their command.  One of those commanders, it must be said, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievich, was an extremely dedicated and able military commander, frustrated by the duplicity of his counterpart and the ineptitude of his boss.

THE TSAR TAKES CHARGE

This was not a recipe for success, and as the Russians continued to lose, blame was shifted around and around the command structure. Eventually the Tsar, frustrated and exasperated, decided to move to army headquarters to take personal command of the military. He hoped that his presence would inspire both the troops and the command structure and turn the tide of the war. On the face of it, this was not as poor a decision as it turned out to be, and at least the Tsar’s heart was in the right place, so to speak. Unfortunately, Nicholas’ presence had the opposite effect, and he was blamed by many for every single thing that went wrong with the war from that point on. This severely undermined his authority, not just with his army but also with his people, who had previously believed that the Tsar was close to divine, and blamed all the military failures on his generals. With his very visible presence at the head of his army, Nicholas was exposed as ineffective and weak, and the Russian people had no choice but to blame him for the manifest failures of his strategy.

Compounding the Tsar’s image problem was that he had left his wife in control in his absence. Empress Alexandra was dangerously unstable, and extremely unpopular, partly due to her association with the monk Rasputin; it was widely thought that she was under his direct control. Alexandra quickly assumed many of the governmental duties that her husband had left behind, which was very unfortunate, as she had little political acumen and no experience in government. What she did have was an unshakable faith in Rasputin, and a stubborn refusal to grasp how widely he was mistrusted and disliked. Alexandra careened from one disastrous policy to another, dismissing competent ministers and replacing them with self-serving yes men. Events continued to spiral out of control, and after years of war and shortages, poor management and an ineffective monarchy, it is actually extraordinary that the revolution didn’t happen sooner.

The Russian Revolution, at least the first one, didn’t end the war. The first Russian Revolution, in February 1917, deposed the Tsar but the Provisional Government that took his place did not want to end the war. Alexsandr Kerensky, the leader of the Provisional Government, had the makings of a political genius, and it is one of the frustrating what-ifs of the Russian Revolution to wonder what he might have achieved, but he was intent on continuing to prosecute the war. This proved to be the undoing of both the Provisional Government and Kerensky, as they underestimated just how war weary Russia was, and suffered the consequences when the Bolsheviks launched the October Revolution, promising, among other things, to end the war.  The Bolsheviks sued for peace, and the Germans forced them to sign a humiliating treaty, ending the war in the east.

A clip about the 1916 Battle of Lake Narocz on the Eastern Front is available here on the site.

[1] Massie, Robert Nicholas and Alexandra: the Fall of the Romanov Dynasty. P. 302

The 3 most bizarre Tanks ever

Tanks have been integral to armies since World War One. But over the years a number of prototype designs have been made that never quite worked. Here, Adrian Burrows tells us about the most bizarre tank designs…

Since the Great War the mighty tank has formed the mainstay of any skilled (or unskilled) military commander’s army. The tank started its military career from fairly inauspicious beginnings.  Originally called ‘Landships’ - this name didn’t stick as military bods were concerned that such an overly descriptive title might give away what their secret weapon was to the enemy, so the name ‘tank’ was instead adopted - the tank really hasn’t changed a great deal in its design or function since its first use in battle. Yes, advances in technology have rendered a modern tank a distant relative to the first tank prototype (fondly named as ‘Little Willie’ by the British Military) but it still remains a relative nonetheless.

The classic image of a tank is of a hulking and box like central chassis, the twin caterpillar tracks either side in order to propel its vast form forward over any and all terrain, and a rotating turret to provide a 360 degree field of fire. Perhaps the core tenants of tank design haven’t changed because the initial concept was just so effective. Why try to fix what isn’t broken? Well, that didn’t stop people from trying. Allow me to present to you the top three weirdest tank prototypes of all time.

3. The Russian Tsar Tank

Caterpillar tracks are brilliantly effective at moving big heavy tanks across difficult terrain. Indeed, they were initially designed in order to allow tanks to climb up and over the trench-laden terrain of the Western Front. Yet, as thought by the Russian boffins Nikolai Lebedenko, Nikolai Zhukovsky, Boris Stechkin and Alexander Mikulin, if caterpillar tracks are great then surely two giant bicycle wheels would be awesome.

That was the primary design decision behind the Russian Tsar Tank - and what a sight it must have been. Each giant spoked wheel attached to the central hub of the chassis was a massive 27 feet in diameter, the idea being that such a vast wheel would be able to plough through any obstacles in its path (and the two 250 horse power Sunbeam engines would certainly help with that). The tank was ready for war armed with a giant 8-meter high cannon turret and plans for further cannons to be attached to the tank’s frame. The central casing itself was a massive 12 meters wide with thick armor to protect the soldiers inside. So far so good? Why on earth didn’t the Russian Tsar Tank take off?

Its Achilles heel turned out to be the small stabilizing wheel at the rear of the tank (giving it its tricycle appearance). During the first test run through a field the stabilizing wheel became firmly entrenched in a patch of mud. The entire mighty form of the Tsar Tank became rooted to the spot, making it a major target that resembled a giant penny-farthing. After the abysmal test run the tank never saw active service and remained stuck exactly where it was until the end of the war.

2. Ball Tank

Texan Inventor AJ Richardson had a noble goal, how best to ensure men could quickly and safely cover the distance of a mud and crater strewn No Man’s Land in order to close in on an enemy position? The answer he came up with? A giant metal ball. This mighty metal ball of death could not only protect the troops within it, but being spherical it could also outmaneuver anything else on the battlefield. The project was never developed due to one small problem that scientists at the time could not overcome… there was no way that the troops within could see outside of the tank. In theory though, it would have been amazing.

1. Antonov A-40 Krylya Tanka (Tank Wings)

Tanks are big and powerful but slow and cumbersome. If somehow their maneuverability could be increased then surely nothing could stand in their path as they rapidly out flanked the enemy’s position. The logical conclusion to this quandary? Invent a tank that can fly.

And that’s exactly what Oleg Antonov set about doing in 1942. A T-60 Light Tank (light being 5.8 tons) went on a crash diet under Antonov’s watchful eye by removing the vehicle’s armor, weaponry and headlights. The T-60 was also provided with a limited amount of fuel in order to decrease its total weight yet further. What was the next step? Attach some wings to the tank of course. Yes, they were literally stuck to the side of the tank, transforming it into the world’s most unlikely glider. The final step was to utilize a Tupolev TB-3 plane to lift the tank gently in to the air; once the plane had reached a sufficient height and speed, the prototype could be released, allowing it to glide majestically into battle.

Did it work? I would love to say yes, but no, no it didn’t.

Remarkably no one died in the experiment. The TB-3 had to ditch the tank in mid-flight due to the massive drag it caused, but apparently the T-60 did glide back down to earth before being driven back to base. This initial set back didn’t put off the Soviet Union. Over the next twenty years the country was able to develop the necessary techniques and equipment to para-drop BMD-1 vehicles with its crew on board.

So, that’s my top 3 most bizarre tank prototypes of all time. Tanks with bicycle wheels, ball tanks, tanks that can fly… the weird and the wonderful. Perhaps your list would differ? If so I would love to read your top 3. There’s plenty to consider after all. Those that just missed out on a place in my top three include the Russian Screw Drive Tank that couldn’t go in a straight line and the British Praying Mantis Tank intended to shoot over obstacles. Both fine ideas ruined by issues of common sense. But then that’s what makes them so brilliantly barmy. Until next time!

Adrian Burrows works at Wicked Workshops, an organization that prepares great history workshops. Find out more about a World War One related workshop here.

Do you know a weird and wonderful tank? If so, let us know below...

An alternative Founding Father – Theodore Roosevelt and the American Conservation Movement

Theodore Roosevelt was an impressive president for a number of reasons, but in many ways he is still quite hard to pin down. In this article, Wout Vergauwen looks at Roosevelt and his presidency through the prism of his one his more unknown policy areas, that of conservation.

There can nothing in the world be more beautiful than the Yosemite, the groves of the giant sequoias and redwoods, the Canyon of the Colorado, the Canyon of the Yellowstone, the Three Tetons; and our people should see to it that they are preserved for their children and their children’s children forever, with their majestic beauty all unmarred.

 - Theodore Roosevelt, twenty-sixth President of the United States

Ever since Theodore Roosevelt left office in 1909, politicians, historians and naturalists have debated who the twenty-sixth president really was, and how he should be remembered: as a politician, a cowboy, a soldier, a historian, an author, a conservationist, or a hunter. However, Theodore Roosevelt could not be pigeonholed, and that is why he is now remembered as one of most versatile presidents since Thomas Jefferson. Though many aspects of his multi-faceted presidency have been covered by historians, his conservation efforts remain largely underexplored. 

Theodore Roosevelt when in the Rough Riders during the 1898 Spanish-American War. From Harper's Pictorial History of the War with Spain, Volume II. Published in 1899.

The key is to understanding Roosevelt’s conservation policy is that his efforts were not strictly political, but also personal. From his youth onwards, Roosevelt always felt passionate for the nature in which he found comfort while battling illness.[1] As a result, he entered Harvard on the brink of adulthood “intending to become […] a scientific man of the Audubon, or Wilson, or Baird, or Coues type – a man like Hart Merriam, or Frank Chapman, or Hornaday, to-day.”[2] Disappointed in the way science was practiced at university - through the microscope and in the laboratory with little field work - he decided to pursue his fascination for nature elsewhere. In 1888, he founded the Boone and Crockett Club, a foundation concerned with the preservation of big game species and their habitat that quickly became one of the most effective conservation organizations of its day.[3] Prior to his arrival in the White House, several other efforts followed, but the scale of his efforts drastically enlarged once he succeeded William McKinley as president. In his first annual message to a joint Congress, Roosevelt used McKinley’s assassination as a political opportunity to set the domestic agenda of his administration. He indeed managed to get hold of Congress’ attention and shifted it toward what he thought was important - conservation. After that, it was not long before he created his first - and the country’s sixth - national park: Oregon’s Crater Lake.[4]

PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS

Creating a national park, however, was not as simple as one might think, especially since Roosevelt had to create a new mindset. Indeed, Roosevelt did not only need to persuade Congress, but he also needed to invent a whole new policy domain that was understood by the people. Public support was almost nonexistent, or as Roosevelt noted himself in his autobiography: “the relationship between the conservation of natural resources and the ‘national welfare’ had not yet ‘dawned on the public mind’.”[5] The establishment of his conservationist ideals as the hallmark of his presidency was no easy task. Therefore, one should ask how he accomplished what he did and how he profiled himself as the founder of the conservation movement, even though he did not create the first national park, and neither did he establish the National Park Service, Woodrow Wilson’s accomplishment in 1916. Thus, the area that really needs to be addressed first is about the source of his powers, the way he obtained them, and the way he used them. Be sure, these powers were needed. From the beginning onwards, Roosevelt faced fierce opposition, not only from Congress, but also from ranchers, mine operators, loggers, power companies, and the Western states who protested his conservation efforts because they limited the exploitation of natural resources.[6] Even so, within the boundaries of the law, Roosevelt continued to protect the environment and resources for the generations to come, although he dealt rather creatively with Congress and legislation.

A remarkable though interesting way to approach the power issue is through one of the nation’s most popular historical myths: The Frontier Myth. Unlike other rhetorical presidents however, Roosevelt did not just use it, he altered the myth so it could serve his purposes.[7] Being perceived as a frontiersman himself, he used this image to rearticulate the myth and link it to his conservation purposes, thereby promoting his policies. Roosevelt thus needed to persuade his audience and confronted two rhetorical challenges to do so: “First, he had to create a sense of exigency, an urgency to resolve the environmental crisis. Second, he had to formulate a nexus between conservation and values and attitudes that his audience embraced.”[8] In doing so, Roosevelt did not only use the altered Frontiers Myth, but linked his alterations to both the Constitution and Thomas Jefferson. Although, these cannot be seen as “values and attitudes” in a literal way, they serve the purpose perfectly.

The Jefferson link becomes clear when reviewing the first alteration, that of the frontier’s hero. Once perceived as a Jeffersonian yeoman farmer, the myth’s hero had evolved toward the Old West cowboy whose brutal character and limitless exploitation of nature had been turned into virtues by the end of the century. Roosevelt linked the then contemporary farmer to his Jeffersonian counterpart, thereby restoring the “American hero that could symbolize the conservation of the nation’s resources”[9] and thus revitalizing the ‘original’ Frontier Myth. A second alteration dealt with the finite character of the Frontier, where Roosevelt played the commercial, rather than the environmental, card: “if you do not want to preserve nature for nature itself, at least support it for commercial interest.”

STRUGGLES WITH CONGRESS - A BATTLE FOR POWER

After signing the Crater Lake Bill, Roosevelt did not take the time to enjoy the creation of his national park, but started looking for another natural gem worth saving.  He found many, and continued his efforts to create national parks in order to protect them against human exploitation and to save them for the children of the future. In his fourth annual message to Congress, he announced the creation of a National Forest Service: “[…] neither can we accept the views of those whose only interest in the forest is temporary; who are anxious to reap what they have not sown and then move away, leaving desolation behind them […] The creation of a forest service in the Department of Agriculture will have […] important results”[10] Two months later, under the governance of Gifford Pinchot, the Forest Service was indeed put in place. Soon after its creation, the Forest Service accumulated power, so becoming independent from Congress.[11] Because of this, lawmakers were not very accommodating to the president’s following conservation policies and saw an opportunity to make this clear by delaying Roosevelt’s efforts to gain Federal protection for Wyoming’s Devils Tower - often described as the strangest molten rock configuration in North America - the Grand Canyon, and several other sites. Although Roosevelt tried to push this through, Congress did not approve it and the body adjourned for the summer in June 1906.

NATIONAL MONUMENTS - A SMART MOVE

Roosevelt, however, held the upper hand and revealed himself as an even stronger defender of nature. During the spring of 1906 he had gathered a team of preservationists to draft a bill declaring: “that the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments.”[12] The language of the legislation was carefully chosen and sounded inoffensive. Without realizing what they had approved, Senators passed the bill on May 24, 1906, and the House, also not fully understanding the impact of the bill on the floor, followed suit on June 5. Roosevelt signed the bill on June 8, and before apprehending that they were outsmarted by the president, Congressmen went home on June 30 - not to return before the start of their next session on December 3, 1906.  A lot of irony is to be found in this situation since Congress granted, unknowingly, their president the power they tried to hold on to. The newly ‘invented’ National Monuments did not need Congressional approval - as opposed to the National Parks - and gave the president free reign to protect whichever natural site he wanted to, something that he did. Wyoming’s Devils Tower was proclaimed the first national monument on September 24, and before the end of the year three others – El Morro (NM), Montezuma Castle (AZ) and the Petrified Forest (AZ) – would be added to that list. When Roosevelt left office in 1909, fourteen additional national monuments were created; whereas no new national parks were added to the list until Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, added Glacier National Park to the list in 1910.

This circumvention of Congress was only one example of what Theodore Roosevelt tried to accomplish: making the presidency more powerful. He never made an effort to hide his belief that the executive should be the most powerful branch of government and accomplished this in many ways.[13] Accusations that he usurped congressional powers were publicly ridiculed which made Congressmen yearn openly “for the day when [Theodore Roosevelt] would no longer lead – when [Congress] would have again a President in the mold of McKinley.”[14]

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[1] D. Brinkley, The Wilderness warrior. Theodore Roosevelt and the crusade for America, New York (NY), Harper Perennial, 2010, p. 22.

[2] O.H. Orr, Saving American Bird: T. Gilbert Pearson and the Founding of the Audubon Movement, Gainesville (FL), University Press of Florida, 1992, p. 74

[3] S. Marvinney, “Theodore Roosevelt, Conservationist” In: New York State Conservationist, 50 (1996), 6, [retrieved from: web.ebscohost.com on November 23, 2013]

[4] Already existing national parks were: Yellowstone, Sequoia, General Grant, Yosemite, and Mount Rainier.

[5] L.G. Dorsey, “The Frontier Myth in Presidential Rhetoric: Theodore Roosevelt’s Campaign for Conservation” In: Western Journal of Communications, 59 (1995), 1, p. 2.

[6] D.O. Buehler, “Permanence and Change in Theodore Roosevelt’s Conservation Jeremiad” In: Western Journal of Communications, 62 (1998), 4, p. 446.

[7] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 3.

[8] D.O. Buehler, art. cit., p. 441.

[9] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 8.

[10] T. Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1904 [retrieved from: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu on November 29, 2013]

This is part of a larger excerpt: “The forest policy of the government is just now a subject of vivid public interest throughout the West and the people of the United States in general […] The forest reserve policy can be successful only when it has the full support of the people of the West. It can not safely, and should not in any case, be imposed upon them against their will. But neither can we accept the views of those whose only interest in the forest is temporary; who are anxious to reap what they have not sown and then move away, leaving desolation behind them […] The creation of a forest service in the Department of Agriculture will have for its important results: First. A better handling of all forest work […] Second. The reserves themselves […] will be more easily and more widely useful to the people of the West than has been the case hitherto […] Third. Within a comparatively short time the reserves will become self-supporting.”

[11] W.H. Harbaugh, op. cit., p. 323.

[12] “An Act For the preservation of American antiquities.” In: US Statutes at Large, Volume 34, Part 1, Chapter 3060, p. 225.

[13] L.G. Dorsey, art. cit., p. 2.

[14] W.H. Harbaugh, op. cit., p. 333.