Could the US and the West have done more? The Balkan Wars and the West

In this article, Nick Shepley considers the background to and views on Western intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Before his death in 2010, historian Tony Judt discussed the Balkan Wars and their causes at length in his book Postwar. In the London Review of Books, in March 2010, he also discussed the historic roots of the lack of concern over the fate of the Balkans amongst her nearest European neighbors with the journalist Kristina Božič. Judt argued that in the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe fought predominantly colonial wars against non-European peoples, and treated even their most implacable European foes far better during conflict than their own colonized subjects. This process changed with the two world wars of the 20th Century. With the advent of Nazism and Soviet Communism, Europeans were colonized and exterminated by other Europeans, a process Judt describes as 'internal colonization'.

Ruins of Sarajevo, Bosnia. 1997. Following the siege of the city.

The aftermath of this age of conflict has had profound and negative implications for the way in which Europe has dealt with conflicts on its doorstep, and far from meddling, Judt argues that there has been an indifference to the Balkans conflict. In the article he says:

"I don’t think the consequence is that Europeans have once again exported their conflicts of interest out of Europe. It is more passive than that and in a way worse. What we see is an utter lack of concern. Before the Yugoslav wars broke out in 1991 I was in Europe a lot, especially in Germany and Austria. I would talk to people and say: ‘This is going to be bad. This is serious. If you listen to what Milosevic is saying and watch what is happening in Serbia and Kosovo, there is going to be trouble.’ People would say one of two things. Either: ‘No, no, of course not, it won’t happen.’ Or: ‘So what? This isn’t our problem. We have no moral responsibility, they aren’t part of Europe.’ That is an ethically catastrophic position but not the same as active participation. It’s an expression of indifference."(1)

Judt's stance on the Balkans, as a self-confessed social democrat and liberal interventionist (his faith in liberal interventionism was tested to breaking point over the Iraq War), was that the West had a duty to intervene and was woefully inadequate prior to, and during the 1990s NATO intervention. His argument is not that international meddling caused the wars, but that international inaction and indifference actually allowed them to happen.

Western inaction?

In Postwar, he places responsibility for the Balkan Wars largely at the feet of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, claiming of the latter that the wars that wracked the region for seven years were of his design. Judt applauds Tony Blair's eventual intervention in the conflict as necessary and morally courageous, and is excoriating in his criticism of French, Dutch and Danish peacekeepers for their alleged complicity in the Srebrenica Massacre.

Judt writes: "Outsiders did indeed contribute crucially to the country's tragedy, though mostly through irresponsible acquiescence in local crimes."(2)

In the opening chapter of his book The Age of Extremes, Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm makes a similar point when he recounts the visit by the elderly Francois Mitterrand to Sarajevo on June 28 1992. Hobsbawm points out that the world's media gave Mitterand plaudits for his visit, drawing attention to a conflict that was being largely ignored, whilst at the same time missing the significance of the date of his visit, the anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand - the event that triggered World War I. Mitterand's visit was an ominous warning to the world to intervene in the conflict, a message, according to Hobsbawm, that was delivered slightly too subtly. (3)

Both historians, approaching the conflict from subtly different ideological and historiographical perspectives seem to concur that inaction, as opposed to interference, was key.

Judt, in Postwar, questions why the path out of Communism to liberal democracy and free markets was so much more problematic for Yugoslavia than for other eastern bloc states like Czechoslovakia or Poland. (4)

He concludes that in Czechoslovakia and other former Communist states, few alternatives to free market economics and democratization existed, and there was an absence of ethnic division (or in Czechoslovakia's case it was a clear and easily resolvable one) to exploit. In the Balkans, the failure of Communism was followed by a retreat into ethnic nationalist politics, and given the intermingled nature of communities this was bound to result in conflict.

The US view

Judt argues that western indifference was fuelled by a media portrayal of the Balkans as a mystifying and impenetrable conflict, the kind that western states dislike engaging in, where a clear binary division between 'good' and 'bad' is impossible to establish. He quotes US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who said: "Until the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it." (5)

America had recently washed clean the slate of national humiliation over Vietnam by successfully expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. She had been determined not to become drawn into complicated and morally ambiguous ethnic conflicts within the multi-ethnic state of Iraq, and so did not advance into Iraqi territory.

The Clinton administration that would come to power in November 1992 inherited a strong foreign policy legacy from George Bush Senior and was not keen to be seen, as Democrat Presidents sometimes are, as committing US troops to unnecessary wars.

Judt claims that critics of the role of outside nations focus on the two centuries of imperial interventions in the Balkans, from nearly every major power in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The role of Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German foreign minister in 1991, prematurely recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, was, according to the same audience, evidence of culpability. It was this action that encouraged Bosnia to do the same and risk intervention from Belgrade, thus commencing the bloodiest phase of the Balkan wars. (6)

Judt doesn't offer much in defense or condemnation of this perspective, though he does state that it fails to take into consideration the role of Yugoslavians themselves in the crisis, something he argues is far more important.

In the dominant anti-war narratives in the West, Yugoslavians are effectively edited out of the picture; whereas, according to Judt, their involvement in the tragedy of Yugoslavia was key. (7)

Eric Hobsbawm, in interviews with Antonio Polito in The New Century, discussed the eventual intervention in Bosnia by NATO, pointing out that part of the reason for the delay in acting and for the confusion over the nature of the mission was the uncharted political and diplomatic waters that the West was entering.

Hobsbawm cites the 'fusion of domestic and international politics' in the post-Cold War era, that made the mission's brief and its rules ambiguous and confused, thus adding to the reluctance of western nations to act. (8)

Western hesitation

It is possibly this reluctance, along with the disinterest cited by Judt that actually facilitated Milosevic's crimes, allowing him the luxury of knowing that any intervention would be a long time in coming.

Hobsbawm suggests that actual outside interference was relatively trivial in the breakup of Yugoslavia, stating that there were minor 'irredentist pressures' from Italy and Romania, seeking to claim territories lost throughout the course of the 20th Century. (9)

It seems highly doubtful that even these irredentist claims were serious or state led, perhaps more the demands of fringe nationalist parties and newspapers. Their overall effect was trivial compared to the forces within Yugoslavia that eventually tore the nation apart.

Hobsbawm disagrees that there was a real sense, prior to the 1990s, that Yugoslavia would break up. In his interviews with Polito, he claims there was no good reason to think the multiple ethnic state housing multiple nationalities would 'splinter as a result of the political pressure of its nations'. As with Judt, the explanation of internal nationalist tension is as inadequate for Hobsbawm as the explanation of external meddling. Both historians seem to agree that it was a toxic and violent part of the process of the end of Communism, a blood-letting that the USSR had largely been spared.

In The New Century, Hobsbawm states that Communism in Yugoslavia had not successfully penetrated people's lives in the way that religion might have; it simply prevented them from being motivated by other political ideas.

He said: "Where forms of nationalism had previously existed, they were obliged by history to fulfill a new, more powerful and more prominent role." (10)

One factor cited by both Judt and Hobsbawm in their writings that made intervention slow to materialize is a strange millennial historical amnesia that seems to have gripped the western world.

Judt, in his anthology of essays published in 2010, Reappraisals, wrote: "Not only did we fail to learn very much from the past...But we have become stridently insistent in our economic calculations, our political practices, our international strategies, even our educational priorities - that the past has nothing of interest to teach us. Ours, we insist, is a new world: its risks and opportunities are without precedent." (11)

New age. Forgotten past?

Judt's analysis of this particular aspect of western culture - the decline in our ability to think about the past - touches on a number of key areas of public discourse, one of which is foreign policy. Judt was making clear reference to the debacle of Anglo American policy that was Iraq, but also his perception of a sense of western amnesia that derives from the myopia exhibited by European and American powers over the Balkans.

Just as Mitterrand tried to ignite public memory in his visit to Sarajevo in 1995, Judt seems to lament our ability to see the historic dangers that emanate from the South Eastern corner of Europe.

Hobsbawm also makes similar statements about the phenomenon of forgetting in The Age of Extremes, stating that: "Most young men and women at the century's end grow up in a sort of permanent present, lacking any kind of organic relation to the public past of the times they live in... In 1989 all governments, and especially all Foreign Ministries, in the world would have benefitted from a seminar on the peace settlements, after the two world wars, which most of them had apparently forgotten." (12)

Hobsbawm clearly makes reference here to the missed opportunities for global security at the end of the Cold War and the making of a stable and comprehensive world order after Communism. Much of this obviously relates to the failure to help Soviet Russia to adapt from a command economy and a one party state, but also part of the West's failings after 1989 were to deal with the crises afflicting the states created during and after 1919. A clearer understanding of the consequences of Versailles, Lausanne, Sevres and Triannon might, in Hobsbawm's opinion, have motivated the West to act differently when the Balkan Wars began.

Slobodan Milosevic – his role

For Judt, the real culprit is Milosevic, and he explicitly blames him in Postwar not just for the destruction of Bosnia Herzegovina in 1992, but for the other Balkan Wars as well. However, Judt does not follow a narrow 'great man' version of history.

The circumstances in which Milosevic was able to create a series of wars in the Balkans result from the end of the Communist state and the failure of liberal democratic institutions to take root in Belgrade or in the other capitals of the region. Whilst countries like Poland assumed that the de facto alternative to membership of the Warsaw Pact was not necessarily embracing free market American capitalism, but acceptance into the EU, the Yugoslavs were not presented with anything like as compelling an opportunity. Whilst Poland's accession to the EU might have been credible, it seemed utterly inconceivable in 1992 that Bosnia, Serbia, Slovenia or any of the other former Yugoslav states would be invited to join. This played neatly into the hands of Balkan nationalist’s intent on territorial acquisition, as it made aggressive nationalism the only viable replacement as an alternative to Communism.

Hobsbawm's argument that the lessons of other failed and partially successful attempts to win the peace after winning the wars should be observed by world leaders is particularly relevant here.

Versailles and the Balkans

In his 1920 Economic Consequences Of The Peace, John Maynard Keynes led a withering attack on the failure at Versailles to address any of the most pressing concerns of post war Europe, but it might well have been written for Eastern Europe in 1989. He said: "The Treaty includes no provision for the economic rehabilitation of Europe - nothing to make the defeated Central Powers into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe...It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes...and they settled it from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling." (13)

Keynes attacked the myopic folly of Britain and France, knowing that the excluded, marginalized and ignored states of Europe, and the vanquished Germans, would not allow the Allies their triumphalism for long.

Keynes fear, along with a minority of the British establishment, had been of a resentful, resurgent Germany, able to profit from an unstable Europe where acute national questions had gone unresolved.

Unlike the case of Germany, there was no fear in the minds of post-Cold War planners that rogue states like Serbia would have grand continental wide ambitions and succeed in implementing them as Germany did. Milosevic did not have his equivalent of Weltpolitik; instead he was content to re-establish medieval Serbian borders and become a regional, rather than a continental, hegemon. At the same time, however, Yugoslavia was wedged between a liberal democratic western and now central Europe, allied under NATO, and with an EU membership rapidly expanding eastwards, and a post-Soviet Russian Federation, struggling to re-assert itself as a world power. Therefore the great danger was not that, left to their own devices the Serbs might build a vast arsenal and attack the West, but that interfering in their affairs could bring the confrontation that both sides in the Cold War had worked hard to avoid for fifty years. The other possibility was that of being dragged into a multi-ethnic conflict where all sides were guilty of war crimes, and whoever the West backed would be morally tainted in some way. There was the (later realized) fear that the war would often be fought by irregular troops, while America and Britain were particularly hesitant about being drawn into conflicts that were difficult to extricate themselves from owing to the lack of a clear exit strategy.

A map of the states of the former Yugoslavia in 2008.

In conclusion….

Seen in this context, some of the criticism leveled by Judt and Hobsbawm at the western allies might be judged as unfair. Did they really suffer from a lack of historical insight, or had the lessons of countless internecine conflicts across the globe in the 20th century been learned? Was Eagleburger actually correct when he stated that NATO was powerless?

Could the West have seized the post-Cold War initiative, and offered a new European settlement likely to lead to peace and security, as was created in Vienna in 1815, Berlin in 1876, Versailles in 1918, and at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945? The sudden collapse of Communism, and the lack of the experience of warfare amongst the populations of Europe probably made this impossible, especially if one considers the still fiercely insular and nationalistic Russian Federation.

There was little on offer to the Serbs in 1992 other than Milosevic and his brand of violent irredentist nationalism, and western military planners distanced themselves from the conflict, looking upon it as Communism's tragic 'fall out'.

Both Judt and Hobsbawm are right to suggest that many Serb crimes were facilitated or exacerbated by NATO forces who stood by as killings took place. Srebrenica is the clearest example of this, but again, this is due to an inability of western powers to find a clear and cohesive strategy to deal with the complexities of the Balkan Wars. NATO-led and then UN-led troops allowed massacres to happen (and this phenomenon is not just limited to the Balkans), because of a fear that the nations that had committed them would become fully involved in a conflict they had little, if anything, really invested in.

Both Judt and Hobsbawm make clear points that dismiss the more conspiratorial arguments that the West planned to destroy Yugoslavia and worked to undermine it, but the argument that NATO was slow to act often fails to accommodate the scale of the problem Europe and America were presented with.

The fact that intervention took place at all, that it was as successful as it was, and that there was a clear exit strategy, is perhaps the most surprising aspect to the Balkan Wars.

International action, in the final analysis, did little to cause the Balkan Wars. Those actions which can be seen as contributory are, as both historians argue, acts of omission, not commission. The acts of commission by the West are those, ultimately, that brought the Balkan Wars to a close.

Do you agree with the conclusion about the West’s impact in the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans?

By Nick Shepley

The author runs the site www.explaininghistory.com, a site that has a wide selection of interesting 20th century history ebooks.

To find out about more articles by the likes of Nick, as well as other surprises, join us for free by clicking here!

References

Footnotes

1) Judt, 11-14

2) Judt, 665

3) Hobsbawm, 2-3

4) Judt, 672

5) Judt, 666

7) Judt, 665

8) Hobsbawm,19

9) Hobsbawm, 24

10) Hobsbawm, 24

11) Judt, 2

12) Hobsbawm, 3

13) Keynes, 43

Bibliography

Judt, Tony. "The Way Things Are and How They Might Be." London Review of Books. 23 Mar 2010: Ex: 11-14. Web. 14 Oct. 2012. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n06/contents.

Judt , Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. 2nd. London: Vintage, 2010. 665. Print.

Judt, Tony. Reappraisals: Reflections on the forgotten 20th Century. 2nd. London, Vintage 2010: 2. Print

Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Extremes. 3rd. London: TSP, 1996. 6. Print.

Hobsbawm, Eric. The New Century. 1st. London: Little Brown, 2000. 19. Print.

Keynes, John Maynard. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. 12th. London: Bloomsbury, 1971. 43. Print.

How do events influence what you wear? Women and Fashion in Society 1900s-1920s

In the article, we look at the interactions between historical events and fashion about 100 years ago. 

As the world entered the 20th century, society changed very little. Edwardian society was, more or less, the same as society in the Victorian Era. Society functioned in the way older members of the aristocracy approved of because in order to work your way up the social ladder, they were the ones that had to accept you. It was a society full of rules and social hierarchy in which an upper class woman was seen largely as a decorative object. But not long into the century, things began to change drastically. These changes can be seen through rapidly changing women’s fashions of the time.

At the end of the Victorian Age, women became increasingly unsatisfied with their roles in the world. They sought out independence and a voice in the political world. Many middle and upper class women began to organize themselves and fight for suffrage. As some women were fighting for their rights in the streets, others began fighting for their rights in the workplace. More job opportunities were available to women at this time. They started to become secretaries, a role previously held by men. With typing skills, a woman could get a job in an office. This was a socially acceptable way to earn a living with better hours and pay than they could get as a maid. Because of this, many women and men started leaving their positions in service to the aristocracy for the cities and office jobs. This marked the beginning of the end of the aristocracy’s way of life.

As more women began marching, picketing, and surviving in a male dominated workplace, women’s clothing began to change. Their dresses became simpler, less fussy. Their skirts lost a lot of their fullness and rose up off the ground, becoming much more practical. Their clothes also often featured masculine details inspired by men’s suits creating a more powerful, no nonsense appearance. In fact, throughout history, women have worn masculine inspired clothing to emphasis their strength. This was the case with the broad shouldered, sturdy clothing worn as women took care of the home front in WWII and with the shoulder-padded, suit inspired clothing of women climbing the corporate ladder in the 1980s.

Contrary to all this forward thinking clothing, was the hobble skirt. A hobble skirt was a long, tight skirt with no slit which made walking difficult. Some women were literally hobbling themselves by wearing them. The fashion didn’t last long.

World War I and real change

World War I further broke down the existing social structure. People of all classes were stepping up for the war effort. Whether they got jobs or volunteered, women were more often getting out of the house. Men of all classes fought alongside each other. These men realized that the enemy didn’t care what class they belonged to; neither did the Spanish Flu, which killed an enormous number of people just as the war was ending.

During the war, changes in fashion were quite straight forward. They were a direct result of the war. Many men, and some women, wore uniforms. Many civilian clothes featured military inspired details to give a sort of patriotic support. Upper class women who volunteered for the war effort wore more practical, work appropriate clothes day to day.

As the war ended, the survivors returned home wounded - both physically and mentally. They may have realized that there were things in life more important than maintaining a strict hierarchy in society. Those social conventions soon broke down.

In the 1920s, society began to be led not by the older aristocracy, but by the lucky upper-class young people who had survived the war. Their world views, no doubt, had been completely changed. The feeling that life ought to be lived to the fullest was abundant. They felt that it was no time to hold on to the strict rules of society. It was time to have fun. And they did. These young people went out to nightclubs, danced, and did drugs. Because of these new venues to party, social classes began mixing in a way that hadn’t really happened before.

Society’s relaxation was clearly shown through popular fashion. Women’s clothing became less complicated. Again, this largely came down to practicality; many women no longer had servants helping them to take care of their homes. Women’s fashion needed to be easier to take care of and possible to get in to without the help of a maid. Clothing also became less confining with girdles and brassieres replacing corsets and skirts becoming shorter. Skirts became so scandalously short that several American states attempted to create laws to control their length. The laws didn’t work and skirts were just below the knee by the end of the decade.

The 1920s

Women’s clothing in the 1920s began to further resemble menswear. Women deemphasized their curvy figures by wearing clothes that flattened their busts and straightened their hips. Cutting their hair short was the finishing touch to this popular new androgynous look. This may have been a 1920s version of what occurred with the suffragettes in the 1910s. By the end of the 1920s, the struggles of the suffragettes finally paid off as women in the US and UK could vote. The male-inspired clothing they wore may have been a reflection of the newfound power and independence they felt.

As the century wore on, from the longer skirts in the conservative 1930s to the mod and hippie looks of the 1960s, women’s clothing continued to evolve based on their place in society and vice versa. Where we are in society always has, and always will, dictate what we wear.

How do you think World War I affected society?

By Corinne Porter

The author has an MFA in Theatre Design from The Ohio State University with a concentration in scenic and costume design. She is also the owner of porterphotorepair.com, a photo restoration service which specializes in repairing antique photographs.

For more great history articles by the likes of Corinne, join us by clicking here.

References

James Laver, Amy de la Haye & Andrew Tucker. Costume and Fashion: A Concise History. New York: Thames & Hudson, 2002.

Bronwyn Cosgrave. The Complete History of Costume & Fashion from Ancient Egypt to
thePresent Day. New York, NY: Checkmark Books, 2000.

Cold War fun! JFK Asks His Mom To Stop Writing To Khrushchev..

The Cold War wasn't just dangerous - as this syndicated article shows us!

A letter dated September 3, 1962 shows JFK asking his Mom, Rose Kennedy, to stop mailing Khrushchev for pictures.  What’s even funnier, is it looks like she sent the photos she received to her son so that he could sign them.

At the time, the U.S. had just launched the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and had installed an embargo against Cuba in February 1962.  A month prior to this letter, the U.S. become aware that the Soviets were building the missiles sites in Cuba.  The month after this letter was sent the U.S. would be involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis for almost two weeks.

His Mom’s response is pretty funny:

“I understand very well your letter, although I had not thought of it before. …When I ask for Castro’s autograph, I will let you know in advance!”

This article originally appeared here on the History Kicks Ass blog, an interesting and varied blog about topics in history!

Clickable references

Buzzfeed

JFK Presidential Library

How do you break through the Iron Curtain? July 25, 1953: Riding the Czech “Freedom Tank” through the Iron Curtain

The Iron Curtain, with rows of barbed wire, armed patrols, land mines and guard towers, did not stop the flow of persons who were determined in finding ways to "escape" the “Communist-dominated” countries of East Europe. 

One daring and ingenious method was crashing through the Iron Curtain in a “Freedom Tank.” The episode was then used to rally Americans behind the Crusade for Freedom and Radio Free Europe. 

Freedom tank at RFE in Munich

After two years of planning and preparation, on July 25, 1953, a World War Two German “armored car,” covered with foliage for camouflage, driven by Vaclav Uhlik, and carrying seven passengers, rolled over three rows of barbed wire of the Iron Curtain near the Bavarian town of Waldmuenchen, along the Czechoslovakia-German border. 

Vaclav Uhlik, his wife and two children, two former Czech soldiers Walter Hora and Vaclav Krejciri, Josef Pisarik, and Libuse Hrdonkova were in the vehicle. 

The “armored car” was described as a “Freedom Tank”, because the sheet metal armor had been on it in such a way that, at first glance from a distance, it did resemble a Czecho-slovak army vehicle. Czech border guards saw the vehicle, but, apparently, they were so surprised but its actions they did not shoot at it or otherwise attempt to prevent the escape. The eight passengers were taken by German police and handed over to American military authorities, for processing as “refugees.”  

The August 3, 1953, issue of Time magazine carried an article about the “Freedom Tank” that was entitled “The Wonderful Machine” and described the escape:

Sleepy police patrols in Pilsen hardly glanced at it. By 5 a.m. the car had reached the barbed-wire border area. Vaclav wrenched the wheel, lurched off the road and into the wire barrier. Czech border guards stood by, mouths agape, as the machine snorted through the wire and crossed into West Germany. None fired, or even raised a Tommy gun. The car rumbled westward for several miles before West German police caught up with it.

A tank on the move

Carl Koch of Radio Free Europe reportedly negotiated the purchase of the vehicle and the “tank” was delivered to Radio Free Europe in Munich, which broadcast the story of the escape of the refugees. 

The “Freedom Tank” was then sent to the United States in September 1953.

Escapee Libuse Hrdonkova met Leonard Cloud, an American soldier in Prague following the end of World War Two, when he was stationed there. He then returned to the United States only to return to Czechoslovakia in 1949, when they married. His visa expired, and he was forced to leave Czechoslovakia without her. 

Where the Iron Curtain was pierced

She had not seen him since he left Czechoslovakia. She finally succeeded on her 21st attempt to leave Czechoslovakia. She departed Germany in September 1953 to be re-united with her husband in Iowa. 

Her arrival in the United States was a “red carpet” affair, named “Project Silver Lining,“ with welcoming speeches, a welcoming telegram from the Governor, a marching band, motorcade, and parade through Sioux City, Iowa. Upon arriving in Sioux City, she said, "I'm so happy to be in a free country. It's wonderful." For years, she spoke at various civic functions throughout the United States about the virtues of freedom.

The “Freedom Tank” was delivered to the Washington meeting of the Crusade for Freedom and American Heritage Foundation organizers in October 1953, attended by over 400 delegates. A Paramount Pictures newsreel, released October 23, 1953, covered the events of the meeting and at one point showed some of those who attended the meeting looking intently at the “Freedom Tank”. Audiences in movie theaters heard Jackson Beck, the film’s narrator, solemnly proclaim:

This symbol of resistance to Kremlin tyranny was constructed by Vaclav Uhlik, a Czech mechanic. For three years, Mr. Uhlik listened to Radio Free Europe broadcasts and from them took courage and hope while he worked patiently and in secret to build this vehicle in which he and seven others dashed across the frontier to freedom. Behind the iron curtain are seventy million Vaclav Uhliks to whom this crusade for freedom is the messenger of the Lord.

Vaclav Uhlik, his family and the other passengers went to the United States in December 1953. Bill Watson, narrating a Paramount Pictures newsreel showing their arrival at New York's Idlewild airport, said:

Arriving in New York from Frankfurt, Germany, seven Czechoslovak refugees are ready to participate in the fund raising campaign for Radio Free Europe, whose broadcasts sustained their hope and courage. They crashed through the iron curtain last summer in a fake armored car in a daring escape plan.

The tank on the Ed Sullivan TV show

The newly-arrived refugees were settled in Springfield, Massachusetts, with the assistance of the American Heritage Foundation, which financially supported the families. They were able to supplement their income through television appearances and newspaper and magazine interviews. 

During the Crusade for Freedom newspaper campaign, Vaclav Uhlik was quoted in Advertising Council advertisements, “People believe RFE broadcasts like the Bible.”

"Heroes"

The “escapees” appeared as “heroes” on American television shows and numerous newspaper and magazine articles were featured in the Crusade for Freedom’s campaign, showing them before the RFE microphone. 

There was even a Crusade publicity photograph with television personality Ed Sullivan and the Uhlik family posing with the “tank” -- The Uhlik family had appeared on Ed Sullivan’s popular Sunday-night CBS national television program.

During a Crusade parade in New York, on January 21, 1954, the tank broke down during the planned 15-mile drive from the Bronx to the City Hall in Manhattan.  The first problem was a radiator leak and Vaclav Uhlik and Waler Hora, his fellow Czech escapee, fixed it to the sound of newspaper photographer's flash bulbs. There were other problems and finally the motor just stopped running. It had to be towed to Times Square, but by then it was too late for the final leg of the trip to the City Hall.  

One newspaper carried the story with the headline, “Home-Made Czech Tank Meets Waterloo in Bronx.” For the remainder of the nation-wide tour, the “Freedom Tank” was placed on a flatbed truck with a poster, “Czech “Freedom Tank” Escaped from Iron Curtain. Support Crusade for Freedom.”

Americans were encouraged to sign Freedom Scrolls showing their continuing support for the Crusade and Radio Free Europe. A large empty telephone cable reel was also on the flatbed truck and was used as a “short snorter” to tape, glue, or somehow connect the Freedom Scrolls together and roll them around it. For example, on February 22, 1954, in New Castle, Pennsylvania, the “Freedom Tank” was on display for a few hours. American Legion volunteers pasted together and attached 80 Freedom Scrolls with 6000 signatures (75 on each scroll) to Scrolls from other cities that already were wrapped around the cable reel.

Adding water to freedom tank

At a “kickoff” banquet for the Crusade for Freedom fund-raising campaign in Des Moines, Iowa, in January 1954, Libuse Cloud said that her mother and family did not know of her escape plans and “learned immediately of her escape over Radio Free Europe, which “sometimes feels like a voice from heaven.” She added, "I knew the bad life was behind me. I was free. I was no longer a slave. I was a human being again ... Radio Free Europe is giving our people hope and courage at a time, when life is very hard and difficult for them."

The Scrap Iron Curtain

On Tuesday evening, January 12, 1954, the CBS television network aired a 30-minute drama entitled "The Scrap Iron Curtain." The drama, part of the CBS "Suspense" series, was written by Reginald Lawrence and stared Bart Burns as Vaclav Uhlik. 

The program's preview description read: "Dramatization of the true story of Vaclav Uhlik, a Czech machinist who built and armed car and last July transported his wife, two children and four friends to the town of Waldmuenchen in the Western Zone of  Germany." The program was "presented in conjunction with Radio Free Europe." Another preview description read, "Dramatic documentary account of eight Czechs, prisoners of the Communists behind the Iron Curtain, who made a fantastically bold dash for freedom in a homemade armored car. Political melodrama, written for the Crusade for Freedom program, packs considerable excitement."

In Lima, Ohio, Pangles,"Lima's Leading Food Market", combined sponsorship of a Crusade for Freedom advertisement with one for its store in the February 19, 1954, local newspaper edition. On February 26, 1954, the "Freedom Tank" arrived in Lima, Ohio. Pangles sponsored another advertisement with a copy of the Freedom Scroll, and these words:

It's at PANGLES - Tonight 6 p.m. Famous FREEDOM TANK. SIGN THIS SCROLL. See and hear the local persons who will participate in this big program and history making event!

For the 1956 Crusade campaign, the Advertising Council produced a two recording set for radio stations in the United States. One was a 15 minute radio “dramatic playlet” entitled “The Tank that Jan built,” narrated by famed actor Vincent Price. The second recording was that of personal appeals from Hollywood stars Walter Brennan, Bing Crosby, Alan Ladd, Pat O’Brien, Jimmy Steward, Robert Stack, Barbara Stanwyck and Dick Powell, plus television stars Art Linkletter, Dinah Shore and Jack Webb.

The "Freedom Tank" was on display for years at the Ford Museum in Detroit, Michigan, before it was sold to a local farmer. Military vehicle collector Jim Gilmore in Pennsylvania now owns the “Freedom Tank," which is currently located in the state of Michigan.

By Richard H Cummings. This article originally appeared on the Cold War Radios blog here. The author has written a number of books on the Cold War.

For information on more great articles from Richard and others sign-up to our newsletter by clicking here.

The photograph of where the "Freedom Tank" crashed through the Iron Curtain  is taken from an album of the Czech Border guards entitled "The Tactic of the Enemy" that is now in the collection of the Czech police in Prague.

Other photographs of "Freedom Tank" courtesy of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Vaclav Uhlik died in 1977.

Libuse (Lela) Cloud died on December 1, 2012; she was 90 years old.

The Cold War – Quick reads

As people who follow the site will know, our main focus to-date on the site has been on the Cold War. That war’s intrigues made the second half of the 20th century.

From the Berlin Crisis to the Vietnam War, and the Korean War to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that war defined nearly 50 years of world history and continues to impact our world.

We’ve previously released a few books on the early and middle years of that war, and one more will come later in the year.

Captured Communist flags during the Vietnam War, 1968

That book will focus on a particularly volatile period in the Cold War, the years from 1979 to the end of the Cold War. In our last book, you may have read that relations between the super-powers collapsed as the 1970s came to an end. A more assertive Soviet Union led to many in the US fearing that the Soviet Union planned to seriously challenge them for global hegemony once more. In the 1970s, the Soviets strongly supported various regimes in Africa, improved their missiles, and finally launched an offensive in Afghanistan on Christmas Day, 1979.

A worried US then underwent tumultuous change, and the outcome was that Ronald Reagan became President in 1981. Something akin to a paradigm shift then occurred in US-Soviet relations. Reagan’s administration massively increased defense spending, and with it, the world abounded in danger; however, a second paradigm shift then occurred as a very new and different Soviet leader emerged.

Ultimately it would be the actions of these two men that caused the Cold War to end.

While you wait..

You’ll have to wait a few months for the book, but while you wait for it, we’ve got some educational materials to share with you.

The first of these looks at the origins of the Cold War. It is widely held that the Cold War began in the mid-to-late 1940s – 1945 is generally the most popular choice. In our podcast series, we considered 1945 to be the start year; however this article looks back at the pre-1945 world and considers different times in which the Cold War could have started. As you will see, some think it started with the Communists gaining power in Russia during the 1917 Russian Revolution. After that revolution, many in the West, such as Winston Churchill, were keen to crush Communism as they feared its spread across Europe and the world.

Get the article.

The second of these materials considers the Cold War in its entirety by looking at the main events in three different periods. If you’ve listened to the podcasts or read one of our books, this is a great analytical took that recaps some of the main points and asks some key questions about the war’s events.

Get the article.

PS – you’ll have seen that the blog has been more active this week. And we plan to keep it that way! We’re always looking for new contributors, so if you’re interested get in touch. Or, click here to find out more.

George Levrier-Jones

The materials are supplied courtesy of our friends at www.explaininghistory.com.

You can find out more about the Cold War by going to our Cold War page – click here. 

The Italian invasion of Libya - Una Fatalia Storica

This article was previewed on the site for a time and the full article is now in the magazine. Click here for more information!

Meanwhile the next articles in this series are here: 

The Libyan Experiment and Italian Subjugation under Mussolini

Fourth Shore - The Italian Colonization of Libya

And here is the start of the Italian invasion of Libya article...

The Derna, a cargo ship, departed from Turkey in September 1911. Its cargo hold was filled with 20,000 rifles, 2 million rounds of ammunition, and machineguns. These arms were destined for the Ottoman-Libyan port of Tripoli, where they would be distributed amongst loyal Libyan tribesmen. On September 24, Italy caught wind of the ship’s journey and issued a warning to the Ottomans that “sending war materials to Tripoli was an obvious threat to the status quo” and endangered the Italian community in Libya. The ship started unloading its cargo at Tripoli harbor on September 26. Infuriated, the Italian government issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire on the 28th: let the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica fall under Italian jurisdiction and military occupation or else war would be declared. The Ottomans gave a reasonable and conciliatory reply but Italy would have none of it. On September 29, Italy declared war on Ottoman Libya, a decision described by the Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti as fulfilling una fatalia storica – a historical destiny.

And remember, the follow-up articles are here: 

The Libyan Experiment and Italian Subjugation under Mussolini

Fourth Shore - The Italian Colonization of Libya

The Italian siege of Tobruk

The Renaissance of the Russian Orthodox Church

Two of the focus areas of our blog are 20th century history and Communism. In this article, Brian Schmied looks at the struggles that the Church faced in the Soviet Union in the Communist period, and argues that it has become a powerful force in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

The Russian Orthodox Church is an integral part of Russian society, and a powerful political force. Not long ago, that would have been unthinkable. The Russian Orthodox Church has moved out from under the heel of brutal suppression and near extinction, to political dominance within the lifetime of most people reading this.

The Soviet Era Church

Communism, with its state atheism, had an official policy of religious tolerance that permitted the existence, but not the propagation of religion. Its rise resulted in the confiscation of the vast lands and property of the Orthodox Church. It was illegal to criticize atheism and to proselytize, and there were massive government led efforts to end religion[1] through education and persecution.

Destruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, 1931

It did not help that the Orthodox Church opposed the rise of Communism, encouraging believers to fight against the new regime. When Lenin abolished religious education and the privileges and legal status of the Church, the Patriarch excommunicated the government, which led to mass executions of clergy. 

Almost 600 convents and monasteries were liquidated and the inhabitants executed in those first few years, and it only got worse with time. In 1929, the USSR outlawed all distribution of religious materials and proselytization. Special taxes implemented for the clergy raised their total taxes to over 100% of their income. Debtors were carted off to Siberia. Then Stalin came to power.

He purged the Russian clergy in 1938, executing an estimated[2] 100,000 of them on the spot, and arresting the rest. Just as it looked like religious expression may be fully stamped out, World War II broke out and brought it back. The Nazi invaders reopened churches in conquered Russian territory. Stalin, fearing that this might make the still largely religious Russian populace sympathetic to the Germans, ended his campaign of persecution and reopened the churches.

The number of churches recovered to over 20,000 within a decade, but, like the war, it did not last. In the late 1950’s Nikita Khrushchev, resumed the persecution. All of the previous laws were enforced again, and a few new ones added. By 1963, it was illegal to bring a child to a church service, and to administer the Eucharist to a child over the age of four.

Time wore down the conflict, however. The Russian Orthodox Church ended its feud with the state, endorsing its various accomplishments and integrating with the KGB[3] to ensure their survival. The Russian state granted reprieve, weakening restrictions, allowing theological schools to open and train clergy, and allowing people to privately fund churches and hire priests for their communities.

It wasn’t until the Gorbachev’s glasnost policy, however, that ownership of some Russian churches was returned to the institution.

The Post-Soviet Renaissance

The Russian Orthodox Church has bounced back. While Russians are not overly religious, with only about 15-20% practicing Orthodoxy[4], far more Russians identify with the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian nationalism has become tied to the religion, driving many conservatives, neo fascists and anti-foreign elements, into the arms of the Church.

The inauguration of Vladimir Putin in 2012

Perhaps because of his ties to the former KGB, Vladimir Putin has built a strong bond between the Orthodox Church and the Russian State. He has voiced support[5] of increasing the political influence of the Church, and the Church has voiced their support of him in turn. The Patriarch, rather than fearing execution, like his predecessors, now walks the halls[6] of the Kremlin in return for bringing the votes of the faithful.

The orthodox people of Russia no longer fear the desecration of their holy sites by their government, but rather call for support in protecting them. There are scientologists are facing possible legal action on behalf of the Orthodox Church against their worldwide expansion efforts[7]. Russians protesting these Scientology proselytization efforts claim[8], “…anyone who cares about the survival of Russia must join the body of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Mere decades ago the same statement would have brought the KGB to your door.

Already by 2006, Russia boasted an impressive 27,000 Orthodox parishes and over 700 monasteries. Religion is uncharacteristically popular with the youth[9], as it helps them establish a cultural identity and connects to the international Russian community. As of 2007, the Moscow Patriarchate has brought the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, which split off when the Soviet Union cut Moscow off from the world, back into the fold[10].

Do you agree? Has the Church really become a major force in modern Russia? Let us know your thoughts below..

Brian Schmied loves to learn about the history of religion and politics. He has a B.A in political science, and enjoys writing because it pushes him to think analytically and objectively, and to learn new things.

If you enjoyed that article, and want to find out more about religion’s struggles in the Soviet Union, a great book is Imperium by Ryszard Kapuscinski, one of my favorite writers. Get the book - Amazon US | Amazon UK

References 

[1] Kowaleski, David. Protest for Religious Rights in the USSR. Russian Review, 1980. Vol. 39, No. 4. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/128810?uid=3739648&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102530492637

[2] Yakovlev, Alexander. Paul Hollander transl. A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia. Yale University Press, 2004, Pg 165.

[3] Meek, James. Russian Patriarch ‘was KGB Spy’. Guardian News and Media Limited. 12 February 1999. http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/12/1

[4]The World Factbook: Russia. Central Intelligence Agency, 10 July 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html

[5] Grove, Thomas. Church should have more Control Russian Life: Putin. Thomson Reuters, 1 February, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-russia-putin-church-idUSBRE91016F20130201

[6] Bennets, Marc. In Putin’s Russia, Little Separation Between Church and State. The Washington Times, LLC, 13 August 2012.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/13/putin-russia-little-separation-church-state/?page=all

[7] Creating an New Era of Expansion. Church of Scientology International, 2013. http://www.scientology.org/david-miscavige/creating_a_new_era_of_expansion.html

[8] Robinson, Robert. Orthodox Rally in Moscow condemns Scientologists. 1 July 2013. http://worldcultwatch.org/orthodox-rally-in-moscow-condemns-scientologists/

[9] Orthodoxy in Russia Today. The Mendeleyev Journal, 30 March 2012. http://russianreport.wordpress.com/religion-in-russia/orthodoxy-in-russia-today/

[10] Kishkovsky, Leonid. After 80-plus Years, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia Reconcil. The Orthodox Church News Magazine, 2007. Vol. 43. http://oca.org/holy-synod/statements/fr-kishkovsky/after-80-plus-years-the-moscow-patriarchate-and-the-russian-orthodox-church

The Taiwan Straits Crisis - A Hair’s Breadth from Annihilation

This article was previewed on the site for a time and the full article is now in the magazine. Click here for more information!

Meanwhile, you can see another of our articles on Cold War Taiwan here: 

Cold War Taiwan’s Electronic Industry

And here is the start of the article on the Taiwan Straits Crisis itself...

Sixty years have come and gone, but the sun has yet to set on the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Stranded on the rocky island of secrecy amid the storms of the Cold War (1947-1991), the mists of time should not be permitted to veil the lessons that must be learned.  In the U.S. during the early 1950s, Eisenhower was in office, China was engaged in a civil war, the Soviets were antsy, and the Air Force longed to hear the words ‘the pickle is hot’, indicating they were free to unload armaments. The only thing missing from the high-tension plot was a bevy of brilliant beauties unless, of course, you consider Madam Chiang Kai-shek and Hedy Lamar.

Remember - click here to find out more about the magazine! 

A Skyray plane in flight off Taiwan in 1958