The Worst Union General? Major General Ambrose Burnside

Delving into the character of General Ambrose Burnside, the man whose facial hair lives on as “sideburns” in the vernacular, threatens to lose many readers from the start. Most Civil War enthusiasts would consider him a prime candidate to be named the worst Union general in the war and with some merit. And, no question, he made a series of wild miscalculations and poor judgments.

Lloyd Klein explains.

Ambrose Burnside, 1862 (on the left).

“All the world is a stage, but the play is badly cast.”

― Oscar Wilde

Burnside was actually a very talented man who was grossly miscast in the war. Baseball fans recognize that a pitcher who loses 20 games in a season must be thought of highly because a bad pitcher would never get the opportunity to keep losing; that may be a good analogy to keep in mind when reading about him. The commonly held view that he was always on hand to lose a battle will absolutely be demolished by this in-depth study, although some will not willingly part with that cherished myth.

His father had been a slave owner in South Carolina who freed his slaves and moved to Indiana. Ambrose graduated from West Point, served in garrison duty at the end of the Mexican War, served under Braxton Bragg in Nevada and California, and was the recipient of an Apache arrow through his neck in Las Vegas. He was promoted to first lieutenant and sent to duty in Rhode Island. There he resigned from the army, became commander of the state militia, got married, and went into business, with no expectation of seeing military service ever again. But you know, life can be funny sometimes; our destiny is often beyond our control.

Burnside relinquished his U.S. Army commission to fully dedicate himself to perfecting the Burnside carbine, a groundbreaking breech-loading firearm (as seen in the patent drawing). He ingeniously crafted a unique brass cartridge for this carbine, designed to hold both bullet and powder, with a notable absence of a primer. To load the weapon, users would open the breech block by manipulating the twin trigger guards, inserting the cartridge. Upon pulling the trigger, the hammer struck a separate percussion cap, creating a spark. A hole in the cartridge base ignited the black powder, with the conical cartridge expertly sealing the barrel-breech junction. Unlike many contemporary breech-loaders prone to gas leaks upon firing, Burnside's design triumphantly eliminated this issue.

President Buchanan's Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, entered into a substantial contract with the Burnside Arms Company to outfit a substantial portion of the Army, mainly cavalry, prompting Burnside to establish extensive manufacturing facilities. However, these plans were marred when allegations arose that Floyd accepted bribes to terminate the $100,000 contract with Burnside. This revolutionary concept took time for the military to grasp, and by the time its value was recognized, Burnside had already sold the patent. In 1857, the Burnside carbine triumphed in a competition at West Point, outclassing 17 other carbine designs. Nevertheless, government orders for these carbines were initially sparse. This changed with the outbreak of the Civil War, resulting in over 55,000 carbines being requisitioned for Union cavalrymen. It became the third most widely used carbine during the Civil War, surpassed only by the Sharps carbine and the Spencer carbine.

In 1858 he ran for Congress as a Democrat in Rhode Island and lost. Newly married and out of a job, he needed to find a way to support his young family. So, Burnside went west looking for a job, any job. And he was hired as the Treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad. Anyone who doubts that the Goddess of History doesn’t have a mordant sense of humor will find this coincidence a bit much. So, consequently, his new boss became George B. McClellan, and in his position, he began working directly with its corporate attorney, one Abraham Lincoln.

The Start of the Civil War

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Burnside was a colonel in the Rhode Island Militia. He raised the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry Regiment and was appointed its colonel on May 2, 1861. Notably, two companies of this regiment were armed with Burnside carbines. In less than a month, he advanced to brigade leadership within the Department of Northeast Virginia. His performance during the First Battle of Bull Run in July was unremarkable, but he temporarily assumed division command in lieu of the wounded Brig. Gen. David Hunter.

And so suddenly, Ambrose Burnside, inventor, failed politician and businessman, Indian fighter, and fledgling railroad executive, found himself a brigadier general in the Army of the Potomac. Initially tasked with training troops in the nation's capital, his destiny took a sharp turn that autumn. Burnside was entrusted with leading three brigades within the North Carolina Expeditionary Force. Their mission: to seal the North Carolina coast to shipping as part of the naval blockade. Collaborating closely with maritime experts, Burnside orchestrated an impressive amphibious operation that indeed achieved an 80% closure of the coastline. His significant promotion to Major General on March 18, 1862, played a pivotal role in later events during the war. His brigades were officially amalgamated to form the IX Corps, and he earned recognition as one of the Union generals who contributed to Union victories.

1862

In a context where career professional soldiers ruthlessly vied for advancement, an extraordinary occurrence transpired after McClellan's Peninsula Campaign failure: Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac.  He declined, citing his lack of experience in leading an army of that magnitude, resulting in John Pope assuming command. Still, the other generals looked up to him.  In the lead-up to the Second Battle of Manassas, a fellow Major General, Fitz-John Porter, repeatedly conveyed messages to Burnside, questioning Pope's competence. Burnside, concurring with Porter's assessments, forwarded them to higher-ranking authorities, a crucial factor in Porter's later court-martial, during which Burnside testified in his defense.

And after the debacle of Second Manassas, once again he was offered command, and once again, Burnside declined, citing his inexperience as the reason. He acknowledged his shortcomings as a military officer. President Lincoln pressured him on several occasions, but Burnside stood firm in his belief that he wasn't capable of leading such a sizable army, a belief ultimately vindicated by history. He repeatedly declined, saying, "I was not competent to command such a large army as this."

During the Battle of Antietam, Burnside assumed command of the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, overseeing the I Corps and his own IX Corps at the outset of the Maryland Campaign. However, McClellan separated these two corps during the battle, stationing them at opposite ends of the Union battle line and restoring Burnside's authority solely over the IX Corps. Burnside, implicitly refusing to relinquish his control, operated as if the corps commanders were first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (who was killed at South Mountain) and subsequently Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, directing orders through them to the corps.

At Antietam, the fact that Burnside delayed his attack on the Union left flank until the afternoon, particularly in the context of the stone bridge over Antietam Creek, the Rohrback Bridge now known as Burnside Bridge, likely influenced the battle's outcome. A cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing the Rohrback, later Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough. Sears suggested in Landscape Turned Red that the problem was that Burnside felt he was demoted and was piqued.  But its hard to imagine Burnside allowing a Union loss for that reason, and even harder to imagine that Lincoln would choose him to be the next Commander in Chief a month later if it were true.

The real story is far more complicated. McClellan sent his engineer to position Burnside but did so incorrectly. Rodman’s small force has to move on its own to Snavely’s Ford, which was the best downstream ford; this was too far away at this point for an alternative route. The idea that the Union forces could have waded across the Antietam Creek was based on a post war remark by out old friend, Henry Kyd Douglas. It was picked up by historians over the 20th Century, including Catton, who used it to make Burnside appear incompetent. The best guess is that it was not true, that there was just one ford, and it was far from ideal for a cross-river crossing under fire. This very complicated story is told in these two links: https://www.historynet.com/sculpting-a-scapegoat-ambrose-burnside-at-antietam/ and https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/assault-on-burnsides-bridge-at-the-battle-of-antietam/In the afternoon, Burnside's corps advanced against the Confederate right. At this critical moment, Jackson's subordinate, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, arrived at the last minute from Harpers Ferry McClellan might have secured victory if Burnside had acted differently. The cumbersome command arrangement contributed to Burnside's sluggishness in launching his attack and crossing Burnside's Bridge, positioned on the southern flank of the Union line. This delay allowed Confederate forces to reinforce and ultimately repulse the Union breakthrough.

Burnside failed to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area and failed to exploit numerous easily accessible fording sites beyond the reach of Confederate forces. Instead, his troops were repeatedly forced into assaulting the narrow bridge, under the threat of Confederate sharpshooters on elevated terrain. McClellan, growing impatient, sent couriers to urge Burnside forward, even ordering, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." Despite this, Burnside didn't receive reinforcements, and the battle ended with missed opportunities. He further increased the pressure by sending his inspector general to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders.” The IX Corps eventually broke through, but the delay allowed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's Confederate division to come up from Harpers Ferry and repulse the Union breakthrough. McClellan refused Burnside's requests for reinforcements, and the battle ended. 

Astonishingly, Burnside was offered command once more, despite his poor performance at Antietam.

Fredericksburg

Lincoln issued the order to remove McClellan on November 5, 1862, and on November 7, 1862, he selected Burnside to take his place. Burnside reluctantly complied with this directive, the third such instance in 1862, partly due to the courier's message that if he declined, command would instead be given to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, whom Burnside had an aversion to. It is instructive that he was offered this position and compelled to accept the third time given his own reluctance and, as history shows, his lack of preparation for the position.  The fact is, no one in the Union Army had ever been prepared for such a role, and he was as accomplished as anyone in senior leadership.

Burnside on taking command moved his army from near Culpepper to Falmouth within a few days, a pretty monumental achievement. His plan was to then make a direct attack on the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia, avoiding Lee’s forces who were then in Culpepper. Burnside arrived in Falmouth by November 19, but the pontoons that he planned to use to cross the Rappahannock were delayed. He had ordered pontoon bridges from DC, but they were not delivered for weeks by the Quartermaster Department.  General Halleck acknowledged afterward that he had opposed the movement and had not hurried their supply. The loss of time allowed Lee to position Longstreet on Marye’s Heights.

The Assault on Marye's Heights resulted in a casualty rate estimated at 15-20% for Union troops, contributing to a total Union casualty count of 8,000. By comparison, Pickett’s charge had 6000 Confederate casualties of 12,500 engaged, or close to 50%. Malvern Hill had 8000-9000 casualties on both sides combined, or about 16-18%. Numbers aside, these figures tell us that attacks of entrenched or prepared positions in the Civil War were challenging, and the technology didn’t exist to overcome those odds.

It is so obvious to us, 160 years later, that this was a disastrous move. It wasn’t obvious to Burnside. Burnside’s decision to escalate the initial diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg was a costly and unsuccessful move. Why smart people make decisions that don’t work out can be perplexing, and General Burnside at Fredericksburg gives us a chance to see how external pressure and internal self-delusion impact our choices.

Several factors influenced Burnside's decision-making. There was a breakdown in communication and coordination among Union commanders. Burnside received reports of limited success in the diversionary attack on the Confederate right flank, leading him to believe that a more aggressive assault on Marye's Heights was needed to divert Confederate attention. Pressure to achieve a decisive victory and optimism may have clouded his judgment.

Burnside believed in his numerical advantage and hoped to dislodge the Confederate defenders through overwhelming force. Given the circumstances, Marye's Heights seemed the most promising target due to its proximity to the shelter of Fredericksburg and the less steep terrain. These factors, combined with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the desire for a breakthrough, led Burnside to escalate what was originally intended as a diversionary attack into a full-scale frontal assault on Marye's Heights. I think none of the Civil War commanders understood that artillery had changed war a great deal and still believed that brute force attacks could overcome any defense; see Lee at Gettysburg, Grant at Cold Harbor. I also think Burnside was not a strategic genius and had exactly one plan in mind, and when it failed, he panicked.

Several of Burnside's subordinate commanders, including General William B. Franklin, expressed reservations about the frontal assault on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Franklin, in particular, was critical of the plan and argued against it. He believed that attacking Marye's Heights directly would result in high casualties and was unlikely to succeed. Hooker, Sumner, and several others told Burnside it was futile, but he continued to order piecemeal attacks.

The Battle of Fredericksburg is not a moment of shining glory for General Burnside. The battle and the subsequent ill-fated offensive led to Burnside's officers voicing vehement complaints to the White House and the War Department, citing his incompetence. Burnside attempted a Spring offensive, only to encounter hindrances stemming from poor planning and organization. The Spring Offensive was known as the Mud March. Although conceptually clever, it was highly impractical for January in Virginia. Burnside's plan was quite similar to Hooker's strategy in the Battle of Chancellorsville, aiming to outmaneuver Lee using the upriver fords on the Rappahannock. Burnside intended to execute this with his cavalry, which had thus far delivered lackluster performances in the war. However, heavy rains in January transformed the roads into impassable mud, forcing the plan's abandonment

After Fredericksburg

Burnside offered his resignation, but Lincoln declined, proposing that there might still be a role for him within the army. Consequently, Burnside was reinstated as the head of the IX Corps and dispatched to command a relatively inactive department, a quiet region with limited activity. Lincoln's rationale was that Burnside couldn't get into significant trouble there. However, he swiftly found himself embroiled in a major political controversy.

Burnside was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which encompassed the states of Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois. Burnside issued a series of orders in a region with divided loyalties and sentiments, seeking to suppress "the expression of public sentiments against the war or the Administration." General Order No. 38, in particular, declared that "any person found guilty of treason will be tried by a military tribunal and either imprisoned or banished to enemy lines." On May 1, 1863, Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent opponent of the war, held a large public rally in Mount Vernon, Ohio in which he denounced President Lincoln as a "tyrant" who sought to abolish the Constitution and set up a dictatorship. Burnside had dispatched several agents to the rally who took down notes and brought back their "evidence" to the general, who then declared that it was sufficient grounds to arrest Vallandigham for treason. This led to the arrest and trial of Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent war opponent, further fueling political discord. A military court tried him and found him guilty of violating General Order No. 38, despite his protests that he was simply expressing his opinions in public. Vallandigham was found guilty of violating General Order No. 38, and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war. This turned him into a martyr by antiwar Democrats. Lincoln had to extricate the entire Republican administration from the fallout that Burnside had produced.

Lincoln and Grant faced a dilemma concerning Burnside, pondering whether he posed a greater hindrance as a general in the field or in political administration. Initially, he was dispatched to relieve Knoxville, a relatively manageable task since only 2,300 troops opposed him. However, it still necessitated the return of all three brigades from Knoxville to force the Cumberland Gap's surrender. The strategic intent of the Knoxville campaign was to prevent Burnside's reinforcement of the besieged Federal forces at Chattanooga. Longstreet’s movement forced Burnside back into the defensive works in Knoxville. Burnside effectively outmaneuvered Longstreet at the Battle of Campbell's Station and successfully reached safety in Knoxville, where he endured a brief siege until the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Fort Sanders outside the city. It should be noted that General Burnside, widely seen as incompetent by modern enthusiasts, defeated Longstreet, widely seen as stellar, in this one-against-one campaign. There were extenuating circumstances, such as favorable terrain and supply routes, of course; but that is history. Longstreet then began a siege but it wasn’t very effective. After the first week, Longstreet learned of Bragg’s defeat at Chattanooga. Longstreet realized that time was not on his side, so he ordered an assault a few days later, but it failed miserably. Then, General Longstreet, who had bested him at Marye's Heights, launched an attack, preventing disaster despite being besieged. Grant sent Sherman to assist, but Longstreet had already withdrawn to Virginia. Longstreet's siege ended when Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman led the Army of the Tennessee to Knoxville, entered the city, and relieved Burnside.  Longstreet withdrew his men and later rejoined Gen. Robert E. Lee’s command in Virginia.

Later, Grant, thinking he could better monitor Burnside in the east, brought him back to Virginia. Unfortunately, Burnside's performance at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House and later at the Battle of the Crater was subpar.

During the Overland Campaign, Burnside's actions were less than stellar. At the Wilderness, timely attacks over three days could have secured victory, but Burnside failed to launch them. On the second day, had this union general moved rapidly when ordered (or even at all), AP Hill’s corps might have been destroyed. But once again, he was too slow to recognize the potential.

The blame for the Union's failure at the Battle of the Crater initially fell on Burnside, but it was later lifted. Burnside had been ordered to change the attacking troops at the last minute by Meade. General Ambrose Burnside was the corps leader of the Union assault. He was relieved of command for the final time for this failure. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's division of black soldiers sustained very high casualties, perhaps because the Confederates refused to accept them as prisoners when they tried to surrender. He and  General James H. Ledlie were drinking rum throughout the battle in a bunker behind the lines. A division of United States Colored Troops under Ferrero trained to lead the assault. The plan was for one brigade to go left of the crater and the other to the right. A regiment from both brigades was to rush perpendicular to the crater. Then, the remaining force was to seize the Jerusalem Plank Road just 1,600 feet behind the line.

But the day before, Meade ordered Burnside not to use the black troops in the lead assault. Instead, Ledlie’s division was chosen but no one told them what to do once the explosion occurred. Meade did not let them charge because he thought if it failed then it would receive political backlash in the north and only prove Lincoln's message as false. He was aligning military goals with political ones. The USCT instead charged behind the lead troops. Tactically, Union troops entered the crater instead of going around it.  There, they were trapped in a hole with no support on the flanks. The ANV began shooting surrendering troops, perhaps due to racial animus. Ledlie was forced to resign by Meade and Grant.

Post-war Accomplishments

Burnside exhibited his intelligence and abilities in all of his positions after the war. He was elected Governor and later served as a US Senator from Rhode Island, chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He even attempted to mediate an end to the Franco-Prussian War.
It is remarkable that as accomplished as he was both before and after the war, his legacy among Civil War enthusiasts is so diminished. Grant remarked that Burnside was "unfitted" for army command, a sentiment shared even by Burnside himself. It should be recognized that Grant fired handfuls of generals during the war who did not live up to his standards, but he always kept Burnside around. Despite his affable personality and diverse talents, Burnside's Civil War decisions showcased his weakest contributions to history. However, astute historians recognize his deeper well of aptitude.

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The Building of America’s Trans-Continental Railroad

The Trans-Continental Railroad was built in the 19th century and helped to transform the American West. Here, Richard Bluttal looks at its history and how it was built.

The painting depicts the ceremony for the driving of the Last Spike at Promontory Summit, Utah, on May 10, 1869. This joined the rails of the Central Pacific Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad. The painting in partly fictional as not all of those depicted were there.

The Anglo-American Convention of 1818 stipulated that the citizens of both the United States and Britain would have equal access to the Oregon Country—the lands north of Spanish California well into present-day Canada—until its final status was resolved.  But to claim the lush lands across the Rockies and the lucrative trade with China and East Asia the United States had to make good on that claim, whether through diplomacy or war. Some intrepid Americans had already made the trek, but the common view in the East was that the intervening lands were a “howling wilderness” populated by hostile Indians. The experts said that respectable women and families would never make it to, or live in, Oregon. Narcissa Prentiss Whitman (1808–1847) proved them wrong, traveling by wagon train. She sent letters and her journal entries to relatives that described the beauties of the West and offered reassurance that rivers were affordable, travel by wagon was practical, and the so-called hostiles were generally friendly. These letters were circulated among friends and widely published in eastern newspapers. A flood of American, men, women, and children soon headed west following the Oregon Trail, the superhighway of the early American West. By the mid-1850s some 400,000 had made the journey, with perhaps 30,000 perishing en route, primarily from disease.

Transportation

So, what was the modes of transportation in the United States during the early-mid 1800’s? Before the first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, people traveled across the American West mainly by stagecoach. While railroads were available in the East, travel through the West was a slow, laborious process. Of course, waterway travel could be accomplished on a flatboat or a canoe, and then came the Erie Canal in 1825 where travel was done by using mules or horses to pull the riverboats along the sides of the water.  Remember In the early 19th century, most roads were dreadful. They served local needs, allowing farmers to get produce to market. Americans who did travel long distances overland to settle the West rode on wagon trails, like the Oregon Trail, rather than well-defined roads. Still, a few major roads served as important transportation links. The first commercially successful steamboat was tested on the Hudson River in 1807. Steamboats were soon introduced on most navigable rivers, they allowed commerce and travel both upstream and down encouraging trade by lowering costs and saving time. By 1830, steamboats dominated American river transportation. Steam railroads began to appear in the United States around 1830 and dominated the continental transportation system by the 1850s.

The possibility of railroads connecting the Atlantic and Pacific coasts was discussed in Congress even before the treaty with England which settled the question of the Oregon boundary in 1846. Chief promoter of a transcontinental railroad was Asa Whitney, a New York merchant active in the China trade who was obsessed with the idea of a railroad to the Pacific. In January 1845 he petitioned Congress for a charter and grant of a sixty-mile strip through the public domain to help finance construction. Although Congress failed to sanction his plan, Whitney made the Pacific railroad one of the great public issues of the day. The acquisition of California following the Mexican War opened the way for other routes to the coast. The discovery of gold, the settlement of the frontier, and the success of the eastern railroads increased interest in building a railroad to the Pacific.

While sectional issues and disagreements were debated in the late 1850s, no decision was forthcoming from Congress on the Pacific railroad question. Theodore D. Judah, the engineer of the Sacramento Valley Railroad, became obsessed with the desire to build a transcontinental railroad. In 1860 he approached Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker, leading Sacramento merchants, and soon convinced them that building a transcontinental line would make them rich and famous. The prospect of tapping the wealth of the Nevada mining towns and forthcoming legislation for federal aid to railroads stimulated them to incorporate the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California. This line later merged with the Southern Pacific. It was through Judah's efforts and the support of Abraham Lincoln, who saw military benefits in the lines as well as the bonding of the Pacific Coast to the Union, that the Pacific Railroad finally became a reality.

The railroad

The Railroad Act of 1862 put government support behind the transcontinental railroad and helped create the Union Pacific Railroad, which subsequently joined with the Central Pacific Railroad Company. On May 10, 1869, Leland Stanford, president of the Central Pacific Railroad Company and Thomas Clark Durant, Union Pacific Railroad Company vice president, drove the last spike at Promontory, Utah, linking the eastern railroad system to California. In six years, more than 20,000 workers' Chinese, Irish, and others had laid down some 1,700 miles of track in the largest American civil-works project to that time.

The railroad opened for through traffic between Sacramento and Omaha on May 10, 1869, when CPRR President Stanford ceremonially tapped the gold "Last Spike" (later often referred to as the "Golden Spike") with a silver hammer at Promontory Summit. In the following six months, the last leg from Sacramento to San Francisco Bay was completed. The resulting coast-to-coast railroad connection revolutionized the settlement and economy of the American West. It brought the western states and territories into alignment with the northern Union states and made transporting passengers and goods coast-to-coast considerably quicker, safer and less expensive.

The first transcontinental rail passengers arrived at the Pacific Railroad's original western terminus at the Alameda Terminal on September 6, 1869, where they transferred to the steamer Alameda for transport across the Bay to San Francisco. The road's rail terminus was moved two months later to the Oakland Long Wharf, about a mile to the north, when its expansion was completed and opened for passengers on November 8, 1869. Service between San Francisco and Oakland Pier continued to be provided by ferry.

Native American impact

Although, by the 1860s, Native Americans had signed away the rights to much of their land in treaties with the federal government, they likely never imagined that a disruptive and massive system like the railroad would be constructed through their traditional hunting grounds. The construction of the Transcontinental Railroad had dire consequences for the native tribes of the Great Plains, forever altering the landscape and causing the disappearance of once-reliable wild game. The railroad was probably the single biggest contributor to the loss of the bison, which was particularly traumatic to the Plains tribes who depended on it for everything from meat for food to skins and fur for clothing, and more.

Tribes increasingly came into conflict with the railroad as they attempted to defend their diminishing resources. Additionally, the railroad brought white homesteaders who farmed the newly tamed land that had been the bison’s domain. Tribes of the Plains found themselves at cultural odds with the whites building the railroad and settlers claiming ownership over land that had previously never been owned. In response, Native Americans sabotaged the railroad and attacked white settlements supported by the line, in an attempt to reclaim the way of life that was being taken from them. Twice, Native Americans sabotaged the iron rails themselves. In August 1867 a Cheyenne raiding party decided they would attempt to derail a train. They tied a stick across the rails and succeeded in overturning a handcar, killing its crew of repairmen, with the exception of a man named William Thompson. If they were not taking aim at the railroad tracks and machinery, they would attack the workers and abscond with their livestock. Ultimately the tribes of the Plains were unsuccessful in preventing the loss of their territory and hunting resources. Their struggle serves as a poignant example of how the Transcontinental Railroad could simultaneously destroy one way of life as it ushered in another. 

We must address the forgotten Chinese workers who built the western leg of the railroad across the Sierra Nevada mountains, connecting the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroad in 1869.

From 1863 and 1869, roughly 15,000 Chinese workers helped build the transcontinental railroad. They were paid less than American workers and lived in tents, while white workers were given accommodation in train cars. Chinese workers found some economic opportunity but also experienced hostility, racism, violence, and legal exclusion. Many came as single men; others left families behind. Despite laws restricting Chinese immigration, a few workers were able to send for wives and establish families and lasting communities in the United States. The majority of Chinese railroad workers came from the province of Guangdong in southern China. They were recruited through a vast network of small firms and labor contractors that supplied workers to railroad companies. After arriving in America, many migrants relied on labor contractors and ethnic associations, like the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco, to find employment and to broker labor contracts with prospective employers.  

Workforce

Chinese workers made up most of the workforce between roughly seven hundred miles of train tracks between Sacramento, California and Promontory, Utah. During the 19th century, more than 2.5 million Chinese citizens left their country and were hired in 1864 after a labor shortage threatened the railroad’s completion.

Workers toiled six days a week, from dawn to dusk, under extreme weather conditions. To speed progress, a second shift of workers often labored at night by the light of lamps and bonfires. Workers using mostly muscle power graded the road, bored the tunnels, and laid the track they pushed along  the Central Pacific Railroad over the granite wall of the Sierra Nevada Mountains and across the arid west. The work was tiresome, as the railroad was built entirely by manual laborers who used to shovel twenty pounds of rock over four hundred times a day. They had to face dangerous work conditions – accidental explosions, snow and rock avalanches, which killed hundreds of workers, not to mention frigid weather. “All workers on the railroad were ‘other’,” said curator Peter Liebhold. “On the west, there were Chinese workers, out east were Irish and Mormon workers were in the center. All these groups are outside the classical American mainstream.”

The railroad company provided room and board to white workers, but Chinese workers had to find their own meals, which were often brought to them from local merchants. The Chinese workers were educated and organized; 3,000 laborers went on strike in 1867 to demand equal wages, as the white workers were paid double. “They were unsuccessful because they were out in the middle of nowhere,” said Liebhold. “The railroad stopped them from getting food. That’s one way it failed.” By paying laborers a low wage, they were able to skim millions from the construction and get rich.

The Transcontinental Railroad fundamentally changed the American West. As the United States pushed across North America, railroads connected and populated the growing nation. Railroads also sparked social, economic, environmental, and political change. For many, completing the Transcontinental Railroad symbolized achievement and national unity—yet it was built with mostly immigrant labor. Ironically building the Transcontinental Railroad presented both physical and monetary challenges. Even with huge government subsidies, the railroad companies had to raise millions of dollars to cover construction costs. Directors skimmed millions off the construction and became rich. Operating the enterprise was often less profitable.

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From Reconstruction to the Present: A Small Place in Downtown Atlanta

Much of historic research relies upon an analysis of broad events through a general historical context. We as historians tend to put emphasis upon significant events and people and explore as far as we can to try to contribute to larger scholarly debate. However, sometimes its best to start small in a place that does not necessarily look like it has much to offer as to uncover histories that largely remain forgotten or undervalued. Here, Roy Williams considers a place in downturn Atlanta from Reconstruction to the present.

An 1887 depiction of Atlanta from Harper’s Weekly.

In exploring the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block going back to the train tracks, the current buildings do not necessarily show easily distinguishable historic buildings. Currently the Marietta Carrier hotel building stands at 56 Marietta Street with the company Digital Realty operating a telecommunications business. Behind the Carrier Hotel at the 10 Forsyth address, a parking lot stands next to the train tracks. The only other building which has a connection to the block is the abandoned Atlanta Constitution building on 143 Alabama street. While this building is not on the block it serves as a connection to the block in exploring the history of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution as both companies occupied the block at one point. The current Marietta Carrier Hotel building has a plaque commemorating the first Georgia State Capitol which stood on the block from 1869 to 1889 and was razed in 1900. Out of relative significance, the story of the block begins with the first Georgia State Capitol.

To describe the block effectively, a chronological order is established throughout this paper spanning from the 1860s to the present. A general history of the area also stands as accompaniment in understanding how the block changed throughout the trajectory of history and how certain events affected changes at the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block. Certain aspects of the block’s history are emphasized over others to contribute original primary source research as well as out of pragmatism due to the relative lack of sources on some businesses that occupied the block that were not necessarily as historically significant. References and pictures are detailed in footnotes as well as the end of the paper in the bibliography and index.

After the destruction of Atlanta at the hands of Union forces during the Civil War the state capitol was moved to Atlanta from Milledgeville as the center of Georgia government. Multiple primary source documentation exists detailing this move as well as the process by which the building was updated to house the Georgia State Capitol. Prior to serving as the first Atlanta based Georgia state capitol the building was the Kimball Opera House which was constructed by the brothers Edwin Kimball and Hannibal Kimball and would be purchased by the State in 1870. From 1869 to 1889 the Kimball Opera House served as the state capitol and post office. An advertisement from 1870 details this showing the new state capitol with its characteristic clock tower announcing the building as Kimball’s Opera House serving as the Georgia State Capitol and Post Office.[1] Hannibal Kimball was an entrepreneur and had a significant impact as a wealthy businessman in moving the state capitol from Milledgeville to Atlanta. The 1889 History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers describes Kimball’s significant role stating that, “The first work of a public character in which he took a prominent part was in relation to the location of the state capitol at Atlanta. He saw the advantage to accrue to the city by its selection as the legislative center of the state, and he lent all his influence and power to further this end.”[2] The city purchased the building for 100,000 dollars after originally leasing it.[3]

To Atlanta

In 1877 the Georgia Constitutional Convention voted to permanently move the capital to Atlanta, and in 1879 acquired the City Hall tract, which in 1880 was finally transferred to the state of Georgia. The legislature in 1883 agreed upon a budget of one million dollars for the new state capitol. This budget required that all materials for the new capital be sourced from Georgia rather than out of state.[4] Details of the construction of the new capital as well as the Austell building are present in the account book of William B Miles. Listing the costs, profits, and materials for the construction of such buildings as the Georgia State Capitol Building; Inman Building; Austell Building; Fulton County Court House Annex; and the police station and stables. William B Miles pocketbook July 1888 entry lists the costs of constructing the new building at 539,810.33 dollars not including labor with a net gain of 188,510.43 dollars.[5] The one-million-dollar budget established in producing the new capital as it moved from the Kimball Opera House to its permanent location stands as beneficial when considering the construction of the Austell building and the Forsyth viaduct.

The Austell Building was designed by the architectural firm, Bruce and Morgan and completed in 1897. The building was Financed by William W. Austell, and the twelve-story office building cost $300,000 to build. It was located on Forsyth Street adjacent to the Western and Atlanta Railroad in downtown Atlanta, Georgia where the current 10 Forsyth parking lot stands.[6] William B Miles account book also lists details regarding the Austell building in 1888. Since the building was completed in 1897, this entry appears to be something of a punch list of detailing finishing costs regarding the building such as an entry detailing the cost of paying for an architect report at 771.00 dollars.[7]Intriguingly there is another entry regarding the cost of bridgeworks materials and labors which could potentially point to the Forsyth Street viaduct beside the Austell Building and Kimball Opera House. The 1888 February entry right after the Austell building entry regarding bridgeworks details the cost of stock materials for the bridge at 4715.80 and the supplies at 1522.62 dollars, certainly a far cry from the massive budget of the Georgia State Capitol.[8] Whether this bridge entry refers to the Forsyth Street Viaduct is difficult to say but its proximity to the Austell building entry gives reason to consider its possibility. A photo from 1907 displays this viaduct with the Austell building in the background after the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capital were razed in 1900.[9]

The 1907 Sanborn Fire Maps show the Austell building once again describing it as a fireproof building with another building occupying the grounds where the Kimball Opera House once stood. The Sanborn Fire maps list a lodge hall and general hardware and machinery regarding this other location.[10] The 1919 Foote and Davies Company Atlanta birds eye view atlas shows the block as having the Austell building facing towards the Forsyth Viaduct but also shows the site where the Kimball Opera House/Georgia State capitol used to stand as being listed as a multi-story building titled transport.[11] The 1910 building lists the Forsyth Marietta intersection as containing the Austell Building and Georgia News Co at 10 Forsyth with 8 and 9 Forsyth remaining vacant. It also lists the Brown-Randolph building at 56 Marietta Street with rooms being occupied by businesses such as Dunbar and Sewell Brokers, Ajax Lumber, Southern Flour and Grain Company, General Adjusting Company, Georgia Farm Mortgage Co, and the Brown and Randolph law practice.[12]

In addition to the city directory, there is a court case detailing the construction of the building in 1917 by the Brown-Randolph Company who paid an architect, A. V. Gude, Jr. The supreme court case lists that, “On July 30, 1917, petitioner determined to erect an eight-story building on its property at the southwest corner of Marietta and Forsyth streets in the city of Atlanta, Ga., employing Brown as architect and the Gudes (then partners under the name of Gude & Co.) as contractor. The contractor, in a letter to the architect on June 28, 1917, stated that the building would cost $375,000, including the commissions of Gude & Co. Following said estimate, on July 30, 1917, petitioner entered into a written contract with the contractor relative to the construction of said building. Under the terms of the contract the building was to be erected complete in every detail and delivered to petitioner, free of all liens, at and for the sum of not to exceed $375,000.”[13] The building was completed in 1919 but not within the 10-month contract and the price of construction ran over the agreed upon $375,000 cost of construction. The judgement was ultimately found for the defendant. The 1920s Atlanta city directory[14] lists the Austell building as well with dozens of businesses at the 10 Forsyth address, however the Brown-Randolph building was now listed as the Transport building just as it had been listed in the 1919 Foot and Davies Atlanta birds eye view atlas.[15] Finally the 1940 directory shows the Atlanta Union station behind the Austell building as well as the Western Union Building where the current Marietta Carrier hotel stands at present.[16]

Atlanta Union Station

The Atlanta Union Station was built in 1930 in Atlanta between Spring Street and Forsyth Street. It succeeded the two previous Union Stations. The previous 1853 Union Station ran from 1853 to 1864 and was ultimately burned by General William Tecumseh Sherman’s forces in the Battle of Atlanta. The second Union Station was built on the same site as the first in 1871 and would operate from 1871 until 1930 when it was torn down for the 3rd Union Station to be built.

The Atlanta Union Station served the Georgia Railroad, Atlantic Coastline, and Louisville and Nashville line. The structure was designed and built by McDonald & Company of Atlanta, Georgia. The station would eventually be razed in the early 1970s. The Union Station can be seen circa 1935 with the Austell building in the background across the Forsyth Street Viaduct.[17] The Atlanta Union Station would stand in operation until 1971 when it was closed and demolished in 1972. The destruction of the 1930 station is shown in multiple archival photos from the Atlanta History Center, displaying the utter loss of architectural history and cultural continuity that are significant to the buildings constructed in the late 19th century and early 20th century.[18]  A 1949 map of downtown Atlanta by the publication Gay Atlanta recirculated by the Atlanta Time Machine shows the block including the Union Station, the Western Union building, the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal as residing on the block.[19] While there are less sources pertaining to the Lucy Wood Cafeteria, there remains a litany of resources documenting the Atlanta Journal’s tenure at 10 Forsyth Street. A 1950 picture of the block confirms this map’s details, displaying the Western Union building, Lucy Wood Cafeteria, and the Atlanta Journal.[20]

Western Union building

The history of the Western Union building has a brief intersection with Atlanta labor history as, in 1971 the United Telegraph Workers went out on strike against the Western Union Telegraph Company. A 1971 New York Times article details the demands of the workers, saying, “The telegraph workers have asked for a two‐year pact with 16 per cent wage increases each year, Mr. Hageman said. Workers now average $3.37 an hour. The company said its offer included 10 percent increases in each of the two years.”[21] E. L. Hageman, the union president authorized the strike once negotiations with the Western Union Telegraph Company collapsed. A June 1971 photograph shows two AFL-CIO workers participating in the Strike.[22] The AFL-CIO was formed in 1955 when the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations merged. A 1972 Atlanta Constitution article details how the strike left 450 Atlanta workers idle interviewing a soon to be retiring striking employee, James Maxwell who said, “You gotta do it, Itl be better in the end.”[23] The article also describes how the workers were not only picketing for better pay but also for a continued nationwide Western Union office presence of 1300 rather than the proposed cutback to 300 offices that was originally planned before the strike. While the strike was well intentioned in maintaining the livelihoods and economic liberty of Western Union employees in Atlanta and throughout the nation, the writing was on the wall for the telegraph industry. The expansion of the telephone at the expense of the telegraph in addition to the Western Union Telegraph Company’s aggressive diversification ultimately pointed towards the decline of the telegraph industry.[24]

The Atlanta Journal was founded on February 24, 1883, and the Atlanta Constitution was first published on June 16, 1868. Both newspapers bounced around multiple locations around the area ranging from Alabama street, Marietta, and different sides of Forsyth. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution were in direct competition with one another but ultimately in March 1950 became under common ownership. While under common ownership they would still work in competition until they were merged in 2001. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution worked with such journalists as Henry Grady who lobbied for the industrialization of the south during Reconstruction and coined the term “New South” in relation to this industrialization. As well as such figures as Margaret Mitchell, author of Gone with the Wind, and Ralph McGill an early voice for racial tolerance in the south.[25]

10 Forsyth Street

The Atlanta Journal would occupy 10 Forsyth Street from 1949 to 1972. The Atlanta Journal building sat in between the Austell building which was then called the Thrower building at that point, and the Western Union Building. The Atlanta Constitution would soon move into the same building as the Atlanta Journal. While both media companies were under the same ownership, they worked in direct competition. This combination of both companies under the same roof would inevitably lead to the combination of both the Atlanta Journal and Constitution into the AJC of present. When both companies moved to their next location at 72 Marietta Street, the building which had once stood beside the Austell building and housed the historic Atlanta Journal and Constitution would be demolished in 1973 leaving the Western Union or Marietta Carrier Hotel as the only building left standing. [26] The Atlanta Journal demolition can be seen in the archival photo provided in the Central Atlanta Progress, Inc Photographs collection which displays the building being gutted beneath the iconic “Covering Dixie Like the Dew” motto.[27] The only remnant of the days of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution on the block stands in the dilapidated building across the train tracks at 143 Alabama Street which house the Constitution from 1947 to 1953.

The development of the block from reconstruction to the present and the change in buildings serves as a cautionary tale when considering its trajectory from a historical preservation perspective. The only remnants of the history of the block stand in the current Marietta carrier hotel building with a plaque commemorating the Kimball Opera House and a statue of Henry Grady in the middle of Marietta Street. The reality that the Austell building, Atlanta Journal, and Union Station were all demolished in the 1970s follows a broader trend in urban planning which saw the destruction of many historic buildings throughout the nation. While the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 provided the framework to preserve certain buildings, the 1970s saw the destruction of many buildings for new development. The most frustrating aspect of this development on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block stands in the reality that no new buildings were built after the destruction of the previous historic properties. The area around the railroad tracks is near the Atlanta downtown area known as the Gulch, in which development projects have been planned but have never come to fruition. Jeremiah McWilliams detailed in a 2012 article how revitalizing the area into a transit hub would ultimately be a net positive economically, stating, “The city and state have struggled for years to gain traction on a transit hub envisioned for the area residents known as the “Gulch.” The sunken tract of downtown, spread for acres around CNN Center, is crisscrossed with railroad tracks and parking lots. Late last year, the Georgia Department of Transportation signed a $12.2 million contract for a new master plan with a team of contractors experienced in large-scale developments.”[28] This funding has not made any discernible change on the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block bordering the Gulch.

The economic growth and development that ultimately led to the demolition of many historic Atlanta buildings led to conflict in managing the city’s urban planning. As stated by Michael Elliot, the population of Atlanta grew by over 25% over the 1980s and the office inventory of the central city increased by 50% in the central city. By this point the Forsyth, Marietta, Farlie block had lost all its historic buildings but the Maritta Carrier Hotel, however this growing opposition to development in the interest of historic preservation follows the larger trend in historical preservation in Atlanta in attempting to conserve what was left from the demolitions of the 1970s.[29]

Rather, Elliot describes how a new mediation process was initiated in attempting to soothe tensions between the forces of economic development and historic preservation. This mediation process required a 9-month negotiation in finding consensus regarding development and preservation of properties but most importantly established a new system for categorizing, designating, and protecting historic properties. Mayor Andrew Young while originally in opposition to historic preservation eventually relented and supported the concept arguing that it was in the public’s interest to preserve certain aspects of the city’s history.[30]

Changes

It is important to consider that while the properties that once stood at the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block can be argued to have historic merit especially the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol, the trajectory of history and historic identity is infinitely malleable and changing rapidly with each passing generation. The history of the Western Union building, and the Western Union telegraph Company may intersect with both economic and labor history but the nature of its waning importance economically and practically indicates why its story is not preserved or considered significant. Much like the rapid change from horse drawn carriages to automobiles over the course of the early 20thcentury, the decline of the telegraph and the rapid advancement of the telephone warrants that the story of the Western Union Building only exist as a relatively forgotten footnote in Atlanta history. Timothy J Crimmins utilizes the Walter Havinghurst quote, arguing, “The past is not the property of historians, it is a public possession. It belongs to anyone who is aware of it grows by being shared.”[31] This quote allows Crimmins to segway into the realm of public history describing the expansion of the field stemming for the NHPA of 1966 and the growing cooperation between historic preservation and urban planning. This quote also helps to understand that the fields of historic preservation and public history have an inherently more democratic role in establishing what is significant than individual historians. The reality that the story of the Western Union Building is not as prevalent as others shows directly that there is a popular consensus in determining what stands as significant to historic identity and therefore what should be preserved and studied.

Crimmins describes how Atlanta serves as a unique example in attempting to piece together the connection to the past through the present. Specifically, Crimmins says that the changes wrought by economic and technological advancements regarding Atlanta have left much of the heart of Atlanta with little remains in linking the present to the past. Crimmins states that, “The public history issue is one of devising a course of action which would permit citizens to identify the present configuration with that of the nineteenth century.”[32] This problem of reorienting and reconnecting the present area of downtown Atlanta with its historic identity remains a challenge.

In considering the challenges in piecing together historic identity from the remaining built environment of Atlanta, Elizabeth A. Lyon argues that the fields of history and historic preservation must work together in a more efficient manner. Lyons states that, “The problem, however, is not so much the removal of history from historic preservation, as others have observed. The problem is that we often lack the historical information needed to measure and evaluate the historical significance of archeological and structural properties.”[33] This argument points to the heart of the problem, that sometimes changes in the built environment necessitated by technological and economic changes move faster than historic research and preservation. With the example of the Marietta, Forsyth, Farlie block, the most historic property, the Kimball Opera house, and Georgia State Capitol had been razed in 1900, 66 years before the National Historic Preservation Act was passed and 6 years before the Antiquities Act was passed. The Atlanta Union Station, Austell building, and Atlanta Journal were all demolished in the 1970s as well. While it can be difficult to piece together the identity of the past through the present when considering the built environment and the buildings which were demolished along the way, the most important remaining action stands in preserving what is left.

Conclusion

The only remaining building, the Marietta Carrier Hotel currently occupied by Digital Realty may not be on the National Register of Historic Places, but its significance as a grounding point for all the buildings that have been on the same block makes it worthy of local historic preservation. Though the first Atlanta based Georgia State Capitol may have been razed 123 years ago, and all other buildings on the block have been demolished, the history of all the structures of the block can be reoriented through the preservation of the current building. Once again, this topic returns to the introspective nature of historic identity and preservation of this identity through the built environment. While the current state of the block may not seem to have historical significance on a surface level observation, the simple reality that the seat of Georgia’s government was moved to this location from Milledgeville set in motion significant changes that ultimately defined the history of Atlanta. While the structures that made this history cannot be replaced, the importance of reconnecting the present to the past in the Atlanta downtown area is still a worthy aspect of preservation.

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Bibliography

  "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times. May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

  1972 September. Central Atlanta Progress. Inc. Photographs. VIS 139.21.01. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Account Book 1885-1889. William B Miles Account Book. MSS236f. Folder 1. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

AJCN005-041b. Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives. Georgia State University Library, 1950. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

 Atlanta Georgia Government. "Georgia State Capitol.” Accessed October 1, 2023. https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

    Atlanta. Map. Atlanta Georgia. Foote and Davies Company. 1919. From Library of Congress. Map Collections. https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

  Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

  City Directory. Atlanta Georgia. 1910.  https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

  Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141.

Corson, Pete. “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

Crimmins, Timothy J. “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

  Downs, Billy, Photographer. AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union. 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution. https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3.

  Elliott, Michael. “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

“Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta.” Atlanta Time Machine. Accessed September 30, 2023. http://atlantatimemachine.com/.

Kimball Opera House. Atlanta History Photograph Collection. VIS 170.2583.001. Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Lyon, Elizabeth A. “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

  McWilliams, Jeremiah. “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty.” The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012. https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

  Miles, Richard. Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia. The Atlanta Constitution. 1972. https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/.

  Nonnenmacher, Tomas. “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/

  Perry, Chuck. "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/

Reed, Wallace Putnam. History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co. 1889.

  Sanborn Map Company. "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company." 1911. Accessed September 28, 2023. https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item.

  Union Station. Floyd Jillson Photographs. VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Union Station. Kenneth Rogers Photographs. VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

  Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

References

[1] Kimball Opera House, Atlanta History Photograph Collection, VIS 170.2583.001, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[2] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 163.

[3] Wallace Putnam Reed, History of Atlanta, Georgia, with Illustrations and Biographical Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers, (Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & Co., 1889), 165.

[4] "Georgia State Capitol”, Atlanta Georgia Government, Accessed October 1, 2023, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-design/urban-design-commission/georgia-state-capitol.

[5] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[6] Unknown. "Austell Building." 1906. September 28, 2023. http://album.atlantahistorycenter.com/cdm/ref/collection/athpc/id/1242.

[7] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[8] Account Book 1885-1889, William B Miles Account Book, MSS236f, Folder 1, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[9] Cleaton, J. D.. "Forsyth Street Viaduct, 1907." 1907. September 28, 2023. http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/guidebook/id/141 .

[10] Sanborn Map Company, "Insurance maps, Atlanta, Georgia, 1911 / published by the Sanborn Map Company", 1911, (Accessed September 28, 2023), https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_sanb_atlanta-1911#item .

[11] Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[12] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1910, 64, 116, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12245934?ssrc=&backlabel=Return.

[13] Brown-Randolph Co. V Guide Et Al., No.2032. 106 S.E. 161,151 GA 281, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1921.

[14] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1920, 583-584, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12230775?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[15]Atlanta, Map, Atlanta Georgia, Foote and Davies Company, 1919, From Library of Congress, Map Collections, https://www.loc.gov/item/75693190/. (Accessed September 28, 2023).

[16] Atlanta, Georgia, City Directory, 1940, 837, https://www.ancestrylibrary.com/imageviewer/collections/2469/images/12164878?ssrc=&backlabel=Return

[17] Union Station, Kenneth Rogers Photographs, VIS 88.625.05, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[18] Union Station, Floyd Jillson Photographs, VIS 71.72.25, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[19] “Gay Atlanta Map of Downtown Atlanta”, Atlanta Time Machine, Accessed September 30, 2023, http://atlantatimemachine.com/ .

[20] AJCN005-041b, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library, 1950, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/14049/ .

[21] "Telegraphers Call a Strike at Western Union Tonight." New York Times, May 31, 1971. https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/telegraphers-call-strike-at-western-union-tonight/docview/119326236/se-2.

[22] Billy Downs, AFL-CIO United Telegraph Workers on Strike Against Western Union, 1971, Atlanta Journal Constitution, https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/ajc/id/1270/rec/3 .

[23] Richard Miles, Western Union Strike Idles 450 in Georgia, The Atlanta Constitution, 1972, https://www.newspapers.com/article/118359555/the-atlanta-constitution/

[24] Tomas Nonnenmacher, “History of the U.S. Telegraph Industry”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. August 14, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-the-u-s-telegraph-industry/.

[25] Chuck Perry, "Atlanta Journal-Constitution." New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Sep 11, 2019. https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/atlanta-journal-constitution/.

[26] Pete Corson, “Photos: Former Atlanta Constitution and Journal buildings”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 14, 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/local/photos-former-atlanta-constitution-and-journal-buildings/ndwtDtspsH27pLQvT3H98L/.

[27] 1972 September, Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. Photographs, VIS 139.21.01, Kenan Research Center at the Atlanta History Center.

[28] Jeremiah McWilliams, “Study: ‘Gulch’ impact hefty”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Jan 29, 2012, https://www.ajc.com/news/study-gulch-impact-hefty/YNv4JB0YYk77PDSBbvg34L/.

[29]Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[30]  Michael Elliot, “Reconceiving Historic Preservation in the Modern City: Conflict and Consensus Building in Atlanta.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 149–63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43030496.

[31]Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[32] Timothy J Crimmins, “The Past in the Present: An Agenda for Public History and Historic Preservation.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 63, no. 1 (1979): 53–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40580077.

[33]Elizabeth A Lyon, “Cultural and Environmental Resource Management: The Role of History in Historic Preservation.” The Public Historian 4, no. 4 (1982): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/3377048.

The Story of Napoleonic Duels

In the wake of the much anticipated November 2023 release of Ridley Scott’s Napoleon, this year is the 45th anniversary of Ridley Scott’s debut 1977 film, The Duellists. The Duellists was Scott’s first on-screen project capturing French military life during the Napoleonic Wars.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt looks at The Duellists.

François Fournier-Sarlovèze

The Duellists captures this era perfectly with gorgeous cinematic filming locations in the lush countryside of France as well as placing the viewer directly into French military traditions during the height of Napoleon Bonaparte’s time as Emperor of France.

Ridley Scott’s 45-year film career has been significant. With 41 Academy Award nominations and 9 wins, Scott also has an extensive television career, amassing ten primetime Emmy Awards. Scott’s most notable films include Alien, Thelma & Louise, and Gladiator.

Background

The basis for the film is a 1908 short story by Joseph Conrad entitled The Duel. It is believed that the basis for the Conrad piece was a 1858 account that was published in Harper’s Magazine. It is also very possible that Conrad was inspired by another Harper’s Magazine published account of a true story about a series of Napoleonic-era duels between two real life French officers, Pierre Dupont de l’Étang and François Louis Fournier-Sarlovèze.

Duels of honor date back to the time of antiquity. In France, duels were recorded many, many centuries back. The duel between Fournier-Sarloveze and Dupont de l’Etang lasted thirty years and according to legend ended with a showdown with pistols at the conclusion of which Fournier-Sarloveze had to promise to never again engage his nemesis.

Winner at the 1978 Cannes Film Festival, The Duellists is an epic tale of the military interpretation of upholding one’s honor while navigating the regulations around being a soldier during wartime. 

The story of these two rivals begins at the beginning of Emperor Napoleon’s rise to power around 1800 and extends until after his exile in. The cinematic tale takes the journey of Armand d’Hubert (3rd Hussars) and Gabriel Feraud (7th Hussars) as they endure Emperor Napoleon’s campaigns, military life in the French Army, as well as their contempt for each other.

Contrast

With both characters being different of temperament and background, D’Hubert is of noble birth and Feraud is not, adding to the intrigue of their parallel climb through the ranks of the French Army. During the nearly fifteen-year clash between the two rivals, Feraud and D’Hubert duel in the beautiful countryside of Augsburg, on horseback in the early morning midst of Lubeck, and even a confrontation during the French retreat from Moscow in 1812. As you might predict, it even ends with a climatic showdown.

Ridley Scott’s The Duellists is not only a visual marvel and a historical account of life in the French Hussars during Napoleon’s campaigns but also an exploration into two men’s interpretation of both the military and civilian code of honor.

Whether for its epic storyline, incredible scenery, or perfectly choreographed action scenes, The Duellists is worth seeing.

Especially if you find yourself in anticipation of Scott’s November release of Napoleon.

Now read about the three times Russia was invaded in history here.

Michael Thomas Leibrandt lives and works in Abington, Pennsylvania.

The Logistical Challenges of the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War

Much of what happened on Civil War battlefields was determined by the economic and logistical foundations of the societies the armies represented. The military that a country puts on the battlefield is not a generic collection of soldiers but rather a direct reflection of the culture that creates it. War can be compared to an iceberg: the armies and battles are its visible and graphic “tip”, but what actually decides the outcome of the battles are the money and resources available to acquire the weapons and equipment needed to wage war effectively. The procurement and transportation of clothing, food and supplies were the decisive factors, but are typically relegated to footnotes, remaining submerged and invisible.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the logistical challenges in the Confederacy through the Confederate Quartermaster and the Subsistence Corps.

Colonel Abraham Myers.

The Logistics Problems of the Confederacy

The Confederate government faced myriad interconnected problems that hindered its ability to adequately plan for and address the logistical challenges during the American Civil War. The combination of the Union blockade, limited industrial capacity, transportation issues, financial strain, diplomatic challenges, and internal divisions contributed to the Confederate government's difficulties in acquiring and sustaining critical resources during the Civil War. The combination of resource limitations, economic constraints, political factors, and the nature of the conflict itself made it difficult for the Confederate government to plan and address the logistical challenges in a comprehensive manner (see below).

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Origins of the Logistics Issues Faced by the Confederacy

Blockade: The Union Navy imposed a blockade on Southern ports, severely restricting the Confederacy's access to foreign trade and essential supplies. This blockade made it challenging for the Confederacy to import much-needed goods and resources.

Insufficient Industrial Capacity: The Confederate states had a smaller industrial base compared to the more industrialized Northern states. They relied heavily on agriculture, and their limited industrial capacity hindered their ability to produce weapons, ammunition, and other crucial supplies necessary for war.

Poor Rail. Transportation: The war disrupted transportation networks, making it difficult to move resources efficiently within the Confederate states and further complicated efforts to acquire and distribute resources efficiently.

Political Conflict between states and national government: The Confederate states prioritized their individual interests over the collective needs of the Confederacy, leading to internal divisions and challenges in coordinating resource allocation.

The Confederacy had fewer resources and a smaller industrial base compared to the Union. They struggled to match the Union's manufacturing capabilities and lacked the infrastructure to support large-scale production and transportation of weapons and supplies. Moreover, the Confederate government faced economic difficulties throughout the war, including inflation and a strained financial system. These constraints made it challenging to allocate sufficient funds for logistics, transportation infrastructure, and the procurement of necessary resources. The Union blockade severely restricted the Confederacy's ability to import weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from foreign sources. This created a significant reliance on domestic production, which was insufficient to meet the demands of the war.

The Confederate government was structured in its Constitution to be a federation of states without a strong national government, consistent with its founding philosophy based on states’ rights. It was comprised of individual states with varying priorities and interests. Coordination and cooperation among these states in terms of logistics and supply chain management were challenging. Additionally, disagreements and competing interests among political leaders impacted efficient planning and execution of logistics.

Impact of military strategy. The Confederate military leadership, including General Robert E. Lee, opted for offensive strategies and focused on battlefield victories. This emphasis on aggressive tactics sometimes overshadowed the need for comprehensive logistical planning, leading to inadequate preparations for sustaining operations. As an insurgency, a better strategy might have been to defend critical territories and cities, hoping to withstand a Union invasion. But a short war was envisioned and this was not politically a choice Jefferson Davis thought was feasible at the time.

Limited industrial and manufacturing sector. The new Confederate nation possessed insufficient production capacity for the trial ahead. The Confederacy had fewer factories, foundries, and manufacturing facilities compared to the industrialized North. Consequently, the Confederacy struggled to meet the demands for weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other essential supplies. This scarcity hindered their ability to adequately equip and sustain their troops in the field.

The Confederacy relied heavily on imports to compensate for their domestic manufacturing limitations. However, the Union blockade disrupted their ability to import goods and materials, including weapons and vital supplies. The inability to access foreign sources of production and technology exacerbated the supply shortages faced by the Confederacy.

The limited industrial sector also affected the development of transportation infrastructure. The Confederacy had fewer railways, fewer navigable waterways, and fewer well-maintained roads compared to the Union. The lack of robust transportation systems made it challenging to move goods, weapons, and supplies efficiently to the front lines, resulting in delays and logistical difficulties.

The limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy meant there was a scarcity of raw materials, such as iron, coal, and other critical resources needed for production. This scarcity affected the ability to produce and maintain weapons, ammunition, and other necessary supplies, further straining logistical operations.

The Confederacy's industrial base was heavily agricultural, with limited diversification into other industries. This lack of diversification made it difficult to develop a robust manufacturing sector capable of meeting the varied demands of the war effort. The limited range of industrial capabilities constrained their ability to produce a wide array of equipment and supplies needed for the military.

Overall, the limited industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Confederacy had a profound impact on logistical operations. Supplying and equipping Confederate forces during the war was a serious problem for the entire 4 years but became worse as time wore on and critical ports and geographic areas came under Union control.

Scarcities of various essential war resources. The Confederacy struggled to produce enough firearms and ammunition to adequately equip its troops. Rifles, muskets, and other weapons were in high demand, but the limited manufacturing capabilities meant that many soldiers had to rely on outdated or inferior weapons. Ammunition shortages also occurred, limiting the firepower of Confederate forces.

The production of uniforms and clothing was insufficient to meet the needs of the Confederate Army. Soldiers often faced shortages of proper uniforms, resulting in a mix of civilian clothing, captured Union uniforms, and makeshift garments. This not only affected morale but also impacted the identification of friendly troops on the battlefield.

Adequate footwear was scarce among Confederate soldiers. Leather shortages and limited production capabilities led to soldiers marching and fighting with inadequate or worn-out shoes. This created significant discomfort, increased the risk of foot-related health issues, and impacted mobility on the battlefield.

The production of blankets and tents fell short of demand. Confederate soldiers often lacked sufficient protection from the elements, especially during harsh winter conditions. This further contributed to the hardships endured by troops in the field.

The Confederacy faced difficulties in procuring and producing medical supplies needed to treat wounded soldiers and to treat communicable diseases. Scarcities included items such as bandages, medicines, surgical instruments, and anesthetics. Medical personnel often had to improvise and rely on limited resources, resulting in compromised healthcare for the wounded.

The limited industrial capacity of the Confederacy affected the production of essential machinery and equipment needed for various sectors, such as manufacturing, mining, and transportation. This hindered the development and expansion of critical industries and further impacted the overall war effort.

The Sustainment Bureaucracy

Expecting only a brief war and anticipating merely a perfunctory Northern response, secessionist leaders had quietly planned to construct a sufficient military force for that limited mission. After preparing a political ideology that succeeded in establish secession, they planned for a single battle that would decide the question. They had amassed abundant weapons through subterfuge and capturing supplies at federal forts to last them for a year or two. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Confederate leaders had not expected to fight a long war and had not made contingency plans until secession actually forced a serious consideration.  The creation of military sustainment departments began on February 26, 1861, even before the authorization of an army on March 6 (1,2). A Bureau of Ordnance was created on April.27. The leaders of the Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordinance Departments, Colonel Abraham Myers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucius Northrop, and Major Josiah Gorgas had considerable influence on logistics organizations and operations for the Confederate armies. These three men were charged with the responsibility of harnessing the Southern economy to support the armies.

The Confederacy was a newly formed nation with a limited institutional framework and experience in managing large-scale logistics and warfare. The absence of a well-established bureaucracy and logistics system further hampered their ability to plan and execute effective supply chains. After Manassas, it became clear that food, additional armaments and clothes would be needed to carry on the war effort.  Financial means and mechanisms for their procurement became critical facets of war planning. As the duration of the war lengthened, inherent weaknesses in the Confederate economy began to show. The political and military leaders expected their land mass to be their defense, never thinking that the Union could build bridges and roads and repair railroads as fast as its cavalry could burn them. They expected cotton to be their financial strength, but never considered where armaments and supplies would come from or paid for, and never planned on the expense of a naval presence to counter a blockade of its ports.

The Quartermaster Department

The Confederate Congress created the position of Quartermaster-General on February 26, 1861. The Secretary of War was allowed to appoint one colonel and six majors to serve as Quartermasters (3, 4).  Abraham Myers served as the first Quartermaster General for the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. Myers was responsible for managing and supplying the Confederate Army with various provisions, including food, clothing, and equipment. The role of the Quartermaster General was crucial in maintaining the logistics and efficiency of the Confederate military operations. Myers played a significant part in ensuring that the Confederate forces were adequately equipped and provisioned throughout the war.

The Confederate Quartermaster Department was responsible for procuring, transporting, and distributing essential supplies to the troops, including food, clothing, equipment, and ammunition.

Overseeing the supply of an army is a complicated job: besides weapons and armaments procurement, the responsibilities also included uniforms, horses, wagons, and railroad cars; and finding the money and resources to acquire these supplies.  It also entails transportation of the materials to the location of the army, constructing supply depots near enough the front to be effective but not where it could be captured, and coordinating production with need. The quartermaster department is responsible for creating a supply network for the army; in particular, the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materiel, facilities, and personnel. It is the functional bridge between economics and tactical operations. To operate optimally, the logistical network must connect the combat forces with the strengths and capabilities of the society it defends. It does not simply create itself and it is not merely an administrative task; it is an enterprise in itself that requires using technological and economic resources to overcome an enemy and sustains the military forces by supporting its warfighting readiness (5).

Myers had a very difficult if not impossible situation to accomplish these goals. The Confederacy faced severe resource limitations, including shortages of essential supplies such as food, clothing, and equipment. Additionally, the Union blockade hindered the Confederacy's ability to import necessary goods from overseas.

His pre-war experience in southern forts and his contacts in those positions were especially valuable in getting started. Myers sent agents into the domestic market, contracting with local manufacturers and paying competitive rates. The department bought cotton, woolen cloth, and leather goods.  He also established shops for making clothing, shoes, tents, wagons, and other equipment, and purchased livestock at market prices for as long as possible.  During the first few months the South had sufficient supplies to cobble together a supply chain (6,7).

But the South lacked the manufacturing infrastructure required to produce and build the required huge quantities of food, equipment, shoes, and clothing.  Settling in for what would be a long war they had not planned for, the supply deficits developed into a crisis as the financial weakness of the country led to runaway inflation. The CSA government had to create a supply chain that would bring its armies the supplies needed to allow it to continue the war. Creating a new country with a new financial system, revamping its rail system, and developing its industrial capacity would have posed inconceivable and perhaps impossible problems for a state government dominated system in peacetime. Trying to accomplish these tasks while being invaded by a much larger, more resource rich country bordering its most critical strategic areas was likely beyond anyone’s capacity.

Myers was a highly experienced quartermaster officer who was widely admired for competence, integrity and efficiency (8). Myers' efforts to fulfill the needs of the armies brought praise from some and condemnation from others. He immediately began advertising for tents and other camp equipment from southern vendors (9).  As president of the military board, Myers helped design the first Confederate Army uniform. (10) Blankets, shoes and wool remained scarce. Quartermaster depots were created around the South in large cities (11). Supplying uniforms in bulk in 1861 was a huge problem (12). He estimated in 1861 that he needed 1,600,000 pairs of shoes for the first year, but he could only locate 300,000 (13). He also estimated that he would need hundreds of thousands of blankets, socks, and shirts, and almost no industry was present in the South to procure them. They would have to be imported from Europe and brought through the blockade.

It was not enough to purchase these items; they had to be transported to the armies. He devised a system of supply depots; Richmond and Nashville would be the main depots for the two armies, with multiple satellite storage areas closer to the front (14). The railroads were the primary means of transporting these items, as there was minimal merchant marine activity with the blockade and overland wagon routes were slow and subject to military attack.

Despite a very large service, he was restricted by a lack of funds, inflation, and poor railroads, over which he had no control. His department was criticized among its generals because the South could not obtain supplies to outfit the Army. His inability to provide shoes and uniforms was an especially serious problem.  He set goals and controls on southern manufacturing throughout the war. By commandeering more than half the South's produced goods for the military, the quartermaster general, in a counterintuitive drift toward socialism, appropriated hundreds of mills and controlled the flow of southern factory commodities, especially salt (15).

Some criticisms of Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department include inefficiency, inadequate coordination, and difficulties in providing timely and sufficient supplies to the army. These issues were partially attributed to the limited resources and the overall logistical challenges faced by the Confederacy. The CSA lacked nearly all manufactured products and had little capacity to make them. The Quartermaster Department proved to be unable to properly equip and clothe the Confederate soldiers. Myers consistently failed to anticipate the operational requirements of the army (16). As a result, Lee was often at a logistical disadvantage. The significant constraints and limitations that Myers and the Confederate quartermaster department operated under made the task of supplying the Confederate army extremely challenging. Despite these challenges, Myers and his department managed to provide some level of support to the Confederate forces throughout the conflict. Overall, assessing Myers' performance as a quartermaster general requires considering the extraordinary circumstances of the Confederacy during the war.

Subsistence Department

Lt Col Isaac M. St. John Northrop served as the Commissary General and Subsistence Director of the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for procurement and transportation of food to soldiers in the field. Northrop's tenure as Subsistence Director was marked by significant challenges due to resource shortages, logistical difficulties, and the impact of the Union blockade on the Confederate food supply. These challenges resulted in widespread food shortages and inadequate rations for Confederate soldiers throughout the war.

Critics of Northrop argue that he was inefficient, lacked effective management skills, and failed to adequately address the logistical and supply issues facing the Confederate army. There were allegations of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement within the commissary department, which contributed to the inadequate provisioning of soldiers. Moreover, Northrop had a frustrating tendency to deny support by creating unnecessary administrative hurdles and red tape (17).

His performance in a capacity for which he was completely unprepared was abysmal.  The supply of food, shoes, clothing, and other materials has been termed inexcusably inadequate (18) Confederate soldiers were frequently obliged to make do inadequate rations, and to forage amongst their own countrymen. While the stuff of legend and a sign of intrepidness, it’s no way to fight a war – on one’s own territory. It is incomprehensible that commissaries in Vicksburg and Virginia were unable to stockpile provisions in military zones located in friendly territory (19).

Ordinance

In contrast, Josiah Gorgas served with distinction as the Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army. He was responsible for overseeing the procurement, production, and distribution of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies for the Confederate forces. Gorgas is generally regarded as a highly competent and effective ordnance officer. Under his leadership, the Confederate Ordnance Department faced numerous challenges, including limited resources, inadequate industrial infrastructure, and the Union blockade. Despite these challenges, Gorgas worked to establish and expand Confederate arms factories, streamline production processes, and improve the efficiency of supply chains.

His primary function was to create an armaments supply system: the acquisition and distribution of armaments and ammunition in the Confederate army. The new country possessed almost no industry capable of providing arms and ammunition: ante bellum ordnance-making factories were mostly located in the North. Furthermore, existing supplies of weapons had been seized by Confederate state militias, and their state governments resisted sharing them. Gorgas recognized that only a limited amount of money was available to spend on arms and ammunition.

The limited production capacity due to the absence of manufacturing industries constrained the ability to mass-produce firearms. The scarcity of raw materials, particularly iron and steel, also posed a significant challenge for firearm production. The Confederacy lacked the technological expertise and infrastructure necessary for the efficient production of advanced firearms. They lagged behind the North in terms of machinery, precision manufacturing techniques, and skilled labor. This limited their ability to produce modern and sophisticated firearms.

Consequently, the Confederacy relied on imports to supplement their domestic firearm production. The Confederacy faced difficulties in accessing these resources from abroad due to the Union blockade. As the war progressed, the Union blockade efficacy increased, disrupting the ability to import finished firearms or components from abroad.

To compensate for these limitations, the Confederacy resorted to various measures. They converted existing weapons, such as hunting rifles or smoothbore muskets, into serviceable firearms. They also sought to repair and reuse captured Union weapons. Additionally, they established government-owned and private armories to manufacture firearms, although these facilities were often limited in output and faced resource shortages.

Gorgas implemented measures to increase domestic production of firearms, ammunition, and artillery, making the Confederacy less reliant on imported arms. He also made efforts to repair and refurbish captured Union weapons to supplement Confederate armament. Gorgas emphasized the importance of quality control and strived to ensure that Confederate forces were supplied with functional and reliable weapons.

Gorgas constructed systems to scavenge arms from battlefields, import arms and essential manufacturing supplies from Europe, and build an industrial complex to manufacture what the army required. He was responsible for ensuring that artillery tubes and rifles were delivered through the blockade. He established armories to store the materials so when needed, they could be transported easily to the front lines (20,21). Gorgas created a system that supplied all the powder and artillery for the Confederacy, despite labor shortages. (22) Although the Confederate armies often lacked basic food and clothing, they were rarely without necessary ammunition.

Faced with the problem that the Confederacy had few facilities for weapons manufacture and no plants to produce gunpowder, Gorgas demonstrated brilliant administrative skill in building these capabilities. Gorgas, as Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States Army, implemented several measures regarding weapon procurement during the American Civil War. Gorgas recognized the need to increase weapon production to meet the demands of the war. He established new armories and expanded existing ones to boost manufacturing capacity. He sought assistance from private companies to fulfill the Confederacy's weapon needs. He entered into contracts with private arms manufacturers to produce firearms, artillery, and other military equipment. He recognized the necessity of captured Union weapons and directed efforts to refurbish and reuse them. This practice helped supplement the Confederate Army's weapon inventory. Since the Confederacy had limited domestic manufacturing capabilities, Gorgas focused on importing weapons from abroad. He coordinated efforts to procure arms from Europe, primarily from countries such as Britain and France.

Gorgas and his team faced immense logistical challenges in transporting weapons.
Gorgas prioritized the allocation of available resources to meet the most pressing weapon needs. He assessed the demands of various theaters of war and distributed weapons accordingly, based on strategic requirements. He relied heavily on the existing railway networks to transport weapons and ammunition. Railways were crucial in moving large quantities of arms from manufacturing centers to distribution points closer to the front lines.

Other methods of transporting arms were necessary given the state of the railroads in the South. When feasible, Gorgas utilized rivers for transportation. Riverboats and steamers were employed to move weapons and supplies along navigable waterways, providing an alternative to overland transportation. Overland transportation via wagon trains played a significant role in moving weapons and supplies to the front lines. Wagons, pulled by horses or mules, were used to transport arms overland from distribution depots to the troops in the field.

By 1863, the South had several factories producing modern weapons. Despite the inferior southern rail system and southern governors who hoarded supplies in their own states, Gorgas almost single-handedly assured that the troops on the front line had sufficient weapons and ammunition to carry on. Gorgas performed an outstanding service in developing businesses to produce weaponry and transporting it to the front. Rifles and ammunition continued to be in abundance even when supplies of food and other materials had vanished (23,24).

Logistics Network

The procurement and transport of military materiel into the Confederacy was a dismal logistical failure. At first, it was borderline in its efficacy; but as ports were closed, key mining and farming territories lost, and supply depots captured, the network became increasingly unable to supply the needs of its armies in the field.

Cost of Supply

The Confederate government faced severe financial constraints throughout the war. The limited funds available hindered the procurement and distribution of supplies, and often resulted in inadequate provisioning for the troops.

Inefficiencies and corruption. The Confederate quartermaster department encountered issues with inefficiencies, mismanagement, and corruption. Supply routes were not always optimized, and there were instances of fraud and misappropriation of resources, leading to further logistical challenges. Perhaps even more problematic than limited resources was the “pervasive ineffectiveness that characterized every aspect of Confederate administrative life, especially its logistical and supply arrangements” (25).

Inflationary spiral. Understanding the problems that confronted these officers requires a comprehension of the costs of Confederate supply and how the Confederate inflationary spiral altered the war. As a comparison, the US dollar has experienced on average a 2.18% inflation rate per year since 1860. Hence, $1 in 1860 is roughly equivalent to $32.43 in 2023 dollars. (26). The inflationary spiral of the Confederate dollar during the four years of the war increased its costs exponentially: every 6 months, the value of the Confederate dollar decreased in value so much that costs were almost incomparable to the previous time frame. The total expenditures of the CSA government, nearly all of which were for the War Department, increased from $70 million in November 1861 to $329 million in August 1862. That is a dizzying figure to contemplate in retrospect, and impossible to imagine what it was like for Myers, whose job it was to administrate and develop budgets for his department a year in advance.  One example is that the $199 million allocated for the war budget for 1862 had run out by September (27). It’s impossible to operate a functional war machine with inflation at that unsustainable rate. 

A significant escalation of the problem can be ascribed to a single event of marked importance. On April 29, 1862, Commander David Farragut captured the South’s largest port city, New Orleans. (28)  The fall of New Orleans was a powerful financial disadvantage. For a nation composed of rebellious states to wage war, it must have capital with which to pay for war supplies: weapons, armaments, horses, food, clothing, soldiers’ salaries, etc.

Impact on Subsistence Administration. The resulting budgetary pressure had consequences all along the administrative path. In 1862, Myers saw his estimated budget cut from roughly $27 million/month to $19 million.  He informed the cabinet that at that time, the current actual expenditure was $24.5 million/month, and with inflation would clearly become much higher. Myers lobbied the Congress for more appropriations to keep the war effort on track. The CSA Congress then passed a supplementary expenditure of $127 million to pay for just the 3 months of December 1862 to February 1863 (29).

In response to these absurd cost rises, even more Treasury notes were issued on March 3,1863. In total over $517 million in notes were issued that year alone, reflecting the tripling of costs in just one year.  These would further worsen the inflationary spiral.

Centralization of Manufacturing

With the onset of the war, the Confederate War Department centralized control over the nation’s industries. This was surprising given that the CSA was designed as a state-controlled government with limited federal powers. The Quartermaster and Ordnance Bureaus organized the production and distribution of war materiel.  In time, many of the Confederacy’s large-scale manufacturers – textile mills, foundries, and machine shops – worked under contract with the Ordnance and Quartermaster Bureaus. The salt industry was entirely operated by the CSA government in what has been termed “salt socialism” (30). A government formed on the principles of state primacy and not a central government was finding it necessary to institute federal control of industry.

Moreover, by 1862 shortages of supplies and equipment, in addition to inflated prices in the domestic markets, led to the conferring of impressment powers on Myers in addition to the Commissary Department (31). While this somewhat alleviated the supply issues, it became demoralizing for the public.  The central government was now empowered to seize the products of its citizens and pay them what it could, not what it was worth.

Cost of Transportation. The transportation of supplies at a cost-efficient price was one of the Confederacies biggest difficulties. The southern railroad system failed to transmit sufficient supplies to the armies, and many supplies were kept in storage because they couldn’t get to the soldiers. By February 1862, horses and men were not receiving sufficient rations. The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac RR was not carrying food and forage because the prices able to be charged for these items were small and there was no centralized control. Eastern North Carolina had abundant stores of corn, bacon and grain but the route necessary to carry these items to the front was byzantine: The Wilmington and Weldon RR was a single-track road, connecting with the Richmond line, but this connection was in terrible condition and there was no cooperation between the lines. In a confederation system without centralized government authority, private ownership of railroads continued to run on profit not patriotism. Despite these inefficiencies, Myers opposed central government control or the building of its own trains, believing that would only increase the inefficiencies. Later in 1863, he worked with Secretary of War Seddon and President Davis to put pressure on the rail owners to expedite shipments despite lower profit margins (32).

And in 1862, the level of rail efficiency was at its peak: it declined from there. As the war continued, the rail system became even less adequate. The tracks began to deteriorate. The metal composition of the Southern rails was of relatively soft iron, frequently fractured or wear after continued use, requiring high maintenance. In the mid- 19thcentury, Northern foundries began to produce more durable iron products such as steel but the southern foundries did not switch to the more difficult to manufacture material. Steel must be smelted from iron ore, in which impurities (e.g., carbon, nitrogen silicon) are removed and alloying elements (e.g., manganese, nickel, chromium) are added. Consequently, the infrastructure of southern track crumbled throughout the war, with limited resources for their repair. Myers complained that the locomotives were breaking down and had no replacement parts. (33)

Conclusion

The skills of a society to identify, purchase and convey the goods and supplies necessary to maintain an army in working order is a window into the health of that society and transcends mere administrative planning.  How the needs of the Confederate armies in the field were determined, acquired, transported and distributed is a central but often overlooked piece of the Civil War narrative. How they fared is a vital part of the story of the Confederacy.

What do you think of the Confederacy’s logistical challenges during the U.S. Civil War? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

1.     Woodruff JD. The Impact of Logistics on General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083715.pdf 6/23/23.

2.     Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. Pranava Books.1969, pages 6-7.

3.     Wilson HS. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War. University Press of Mississippi, 2002, pages 15-25. https://epdf.pub/confederate-industry-manufacturers-and-quartermasters-in-the-civil-war.html  

4.     The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. I, 495. (Hereafter: OR). https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/001/0495

5.     Wissler, John E. Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power. Heritage.org. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power

6.     Goff op cit pages 15-

7.     The Twiggs-Myers Family. Fix Bayonets Blog. (hereafter: Fix) https://fixbayonetsusmc.blog/2019/03/29/the-twiggs-myers-family-part-iii/

8.     Goff op cit pages 33-35.

9.     Goff op cit pages 15-16.

10.  Goff op cit page 16

11.  Goff op cit page 16

12.  Goff op cit page 33

13.  Goff op cit page 34

14.  Goff op cit page 35

15.  Lonn, Ella. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York, W. Neale, 1933 and

Davis, William C. Look Away: A History of Confederate States of America. The Free Press, New York, 2002, Chapter 10.

16.  Wilson op cit page 4

17.  Vandiver F. Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1952, 165.

18.  Wiley, Bell I. (1968). The Road to Appomattox. New York City: Atheneum Books. 31.

19.  Hess, Earl J. Civil War Supply and Strategy. Louisiana State University Press, 2020. Page 84

20.  McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom.  Oxford University Press, 2003. page 318.

21.  Klein LW. How the Confederacy got their Weapons – Fueling the Confederate War Machine. The Civil War Center. Accessed 6/23/23. https://thecivilwarcenter.wpcomstaging.com/2022/06/06/how-the-confederacy-got-their-weapons-fueling-the-confederate-war-machine/

22.  Goff op cit 246

23.  Klein LW. How did the Confederacy Fund its War Effort in the U.S. Civil War? History is Now Magazine.http://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/6/5/how-did-the-confederacy-fund-its-war-effort-in-the-us-civil-war Accessed 6/23/23.

24.  Josiah Gorgas. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/josiah-gorgas  Accessed 6/23/23.

25.  Hess op cit 361.

26.  Consumer Price Index Calculator. https://www.in2013dollars.com/

27.  Goff op cit page 90

28.  Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent Of Money. A Financial History of the World. 10th Anniversary Edition. Penguin, New York, 2009. And Edwin C Bearrs. The Seizure of the Forts and Public Property in Louisiana.  Louisiana History (2:401‑409, Autumn 1961) 

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Louisiana/_Texts/LH/2/4/Seizure_of_the_Forts*.html

29.  Goff op cit pages 90-91 & 47-49

30.  Davis op cit chapter 10

31.  Goff op cit pages 41-2

32.  Goff op cit pages 107 & 40

33.  Davis op cit 307

Ulysses Grant versus Robert Lee: US Civil War Generals

On April 6, 1865 Union forces managed to capture a considerable chunk of Lee’s army at the Battle of Sailor’s Creek. And by April 8, Union cavalry had cut off Lee’s further retreat to the west. Grant wrote Lee with a summons to surrender. The Confederate general demurred for as long as there seemed a chance to break out and continue the retreat. But when one key subordinate assured him that the situation was hopeless, Lee said sadly, “Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.”

Richard Bluttal tells us about the US Civil War generals.

A reproduction of a Thomas Nast painting showing the surrender of General Lee to General Grant at Appomattox Court House in Virginia on April 9, 1865.

On that day in April 1865, Lee arrived at the McLean house about one o'clock and took a seat in the parlor. A half hour later, the sound of horses on the stage road signaled the approach of General Grant. Entering the house Grant greeted Lee  in the center of the room. The generals presented a contrasting appearance, Lee in a new uniform and Grant in his mud-spattered field uniform. Grant, who remembered meeting Lee once during the Mexican War, asked the Confederate general if he recalled their meeting. Lee replied that he did, and the two conversed in a very cordial manner, for approximately 25 minutes. The subject had not yet gotten around to surrender until finally Lee, feeling the anguish of defeat, brought Grant's attention to it. Grant, who later confessed to being embarrassed at having to ask for the surrender from Lee, said simply that the terms would be just as he had outlined them in a previous letter. Aside from Grant and Lee, only Lt. Colonel Marshall and perhaps a half dozen of Grant’s staff officers were present for most of the meeting. Approximately a dozen other Union officers entered the room.

briefly, including Captain Robert Todd Lincoln. Few besides Grant left detailed accounts of what transpired and while some accounts disagree on the details, there are many key consistencies.

Terms

The heart of the terms was that Confederates would be paroled after surrendering their weapons and other military property. If surrendered soldiers did not take up arms again, the United States government would not prosecute them. Grant also allowed Confederate officers to keep their mounts and side arms. Although Lee agreed to the terms, he asked if his men could keep their horses and mules in the

cavalry and artillery. The Confederate army provided weapons and military property, but the men provided their own mounts. Grant indicated he would not amend the terms but would issue a separate order allowing that to happen. Lee said he thought that would have a happy effect on his men. By 3:00p.m., the formal copies of the letters indicating the terms and acceptance of the surrender were signed and exchanged, and General Lee left the McLean House to return to his camp. Horace Porter, one of Grant’s staff officers recorded that Lee paused at the top of the stairs and energetically “smote” his hands together three times. Grant and his staff followed him and removed their hats as a respectful, farewell gesture which Lee returned in kind before riding down the stage road.

The Start

This war opened with a clash between half-armed farmers and half-trained soldiers. From the beginning materials and industry were complete in  the North and throughout the war were lacking in the South. The South did not have the type of industrial advancement as the North. If was lacking in methods of transportation such as railroads. The Northern soldier was compelled to fight in his enemy’s country, but he was compelled to devastate it as well as conquer it.

The story of Grant and Lee is a very complex one. You are talking about two of the greatest generals in our history who had so much in common as education and training but there were differences in terms of character and military tactician.  

The author Bruce Caton explains it best in his article Grant and Lee: A Study in Contrasts. “The most obvious difference was in terms of early childhood. Lee was tidewater Virginia, and in his background were family, culture, and tradition. . . the age of chivalry transplanted to a New World which was making its own legends and its own myths. He embodied a way of life that had come down through the age of knighthood and the English country squire. Lee stood for the feeling that it was somehow of advantage to human society to have a pronounced inequality in the social structure. There should be a leisure class, backed by ownership of land; in turn, society itself should be keyed to the land as the chief source of wealth and influence. It would bring forth (according to this ideal) a class of men with a strong sense of obligation to the community; men who lived not to gain advantage for themselves, but to meet the solemn obligations which had been laid on them by the very fact that they were privileged. He was Virginian all the way.

Grant, the son of a tanner on the Western frontier, was everything Lee was not. He had come up the hard way and embodied nothing in particular except the eternal toughness and sinewy fiber of the men who grew up beyond the mountains. He was one of a body of men who owed reverence and obeisance to no one, who were self-reliant to a fault, who cared hardly anything for the past but who had a sharp eye for the future.

Contrast

And that, perhaps, is where the contrast between Grant and Lee becomes most striking. The Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. He lived in a static society which could endure almost anything except change. Instinctively, his first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. He would fight to the limit of endurance to defend it, because in defending it he was defending everything that gave his own life its deepest meaning. The Westerner, on the other hand, would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society. He fought so because everything he lived by was tied to growth, expansion, and a constantly widening horizon. What he lived by would survive or fall with the nation itself. He could not possibly stand by unmoved in the face of an attempt to destroy the Union. He would combat it with everything he had, because he could only see it as an effort to cut the ground out from under his feet.”

They both graduated from West Point, Lee earlier due to age. At the age of 18, Robert leaves for the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which had earned one demerit. Robert E. Lee graduates second in his class from West Point. While at the military academy, Lee is one of six students in his graduating class to never receive a demerit. His classmates note his drive for perfection and focused, secluded personality with the nickname "Marble Model." As one of the top cadets, Lee is able to choose the branch of service for his first assignment and elects to work for the Army’s Engineer Corps. Lee, second in his West Point class, an engineering officer, a career military officer, truly was a great general. As a tactician, he was head and shoulders above Grant.  Good defensively, Lee was even better on the offensive. He was bold and decisive, a calculating gambler. Can anyone who has studied the Battle of Chancellorsville deny it? Splitting his army on several occasions, he surprised his opponents and won the day. Lee was a master of the holding attack; a tactic George Marshall would later instill as the only tactic taught at the Army War College prior to World War II. Lee  fought in the Mexican American War (1846-1848) as one of General Winfield Scott’s chief aides. He was instrumental in several American victories through his personal reconnaissance as a staff officer, which allowed him to discover routes that the Mexicans hadn’t defended because they thought it was impossible to pass through the terrain.General Scott later wrote that Lee was “the very best soldier I ever saw in the field”.

In 1839, seventeen-year-old Hiram Ulysses Grant received an appointment to the United States Military Academy at West Point. It changed the course of his life—and his name. Grant always disliked his first name and was commonly known by his middle name. He wanted to swap his first and middle names when he entered the Academy. However, Congressman Thomas Hamer had submitted Grant’s application to West Point under the name “Ulysses S. Grant.” Hamer knew the boy as Ulysses and, at a loss for his middle name, chose “S” because Grant’s mother’s maiden name was Simpson. Later on, as result of military victors in the West, the USG becomes unconditional surrender Grant.

West Point

Grant’s experiences at West Point and as a young officer provided both formal and incidental preparation for his later career and gave him insights into future Civil War comrades and foes. Grant, for his part, was a keen observer of human nature who believed that attending West Point at “the right time”—he encountered more than 50 future Civil War generals there—together with his experiences in Mexico, proved “of great advantage.” In addition to teaching “practical lessons,” the Mexican War introduced him to “older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion.” More important and what developed into a major military strategy was his proficiency in being a quartermaster, one whose prime responsibility is managing supply trains and transportation  in a hostile environment, this became essential during the Civil War.

Surviving drawings and paintings from Grant’s West Point years show early signs of what the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called a “special gift” common to successful painters and generals alike: namely, a remarkable visual memory. After Grant studied a map, his staff officer Horace Porter recalled, “it seemed to become photographed indelibly upon his brain.” Besides having an incredible gift of memory, he also excelled in horsemanship. Grant experienced combat for the first time on May 8, 1846, at the Battle of Palto Alto during the Mexican American War. Grant served as regimental quartermaster, but yearned for a combat role; when finally allowed, he led a charge at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. . He demonstrated his equestrian ability at the Battle of Monterrey  by volunteering to carry a dispatch past snipers, where he hung off the side of his horse, keeping the animal between him and the enemy. 

Historians increasingly have pointed to the importance of Grant's experience as an assistant quartermaster during the war. Although he was initially averse to the position, it prepared Grant in understanding military supply routes, transportation systems, and logistics, particularly with regard to "provisioning a large, mobile army operating in hostile territory," according to biographer Ronald White. Grant came to recognize how wars could be won or lost by crucial factors that lay beyond the tactical battlefield. Serving as assistant quartermaster made Grant a complete soldier, and learning how to supply an entire army gave Grant the training to sustain large armies. This experience as a quartermaster will later benefit him In the Civil War.

After his victory at Donelson, Grant never failed to base his strategy upon supply, more than often than not the latter strategy upon supplies Lee based his upon search, after supplies and consequently suffered chronically from a shortage of supplies and a dispersion of forces. In the object of the campaign Grant eclipsed Lee, not only because his army was stronger, but because it was better organized and supplied.

From his training and time spent at West Point a number of  characteristics were greatly enforced such the ability to develop lucid orders, even in the heat of battle.  General Meade’s chief of staff commented that “there is one striking feature of Grant’s orders; no matter how hurriedly he may write them on the field, no one ever has the slightest doubt as to their meaning or even has to read them over a second time to understand them.” His study of maps and creating artwork at West Point was extremely useful. James McPherson attributes to Grant a “topographical memory.” He “could remember every feature of the terrain over which he traveled and find his way over it again; he could also look at a map and visualize the features of terrain he had never seen. . . . Grant could see in his mind the disposition of troops over thousands of square miles, visualize their relationship to roads and terrain, and know how and where to move them to take advantage of topography.” His perseverance was that of history, in 1864–65, Grant demonstrated his perseverance as he carried out his campaign of adhesion against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, achieving all his goals within a year.  Grant was a simple man who dealt with the facts as he found them. While his contemporaries saw the war in all its complexities and too often took counsel of their fears, from Belmont to Appomattox Grant saw the main chance, stuck to it, and thus led his armies to victory.” When President Lincoln brought Grant east from his triumphs at Vicksburg and Chattanooga to confront Lee, Grant refused to back off, waging a bloody war of attrition which last exactly a year. His focus, early in the war was to defeat, capture or destroy opposing armies, not simply occupying geographic positions, was critical to his success.

War tactics

Grant had no fear of using all the resources that were available to him. Remember the North always enjoyed a substantial edge in manpower and almost every manufacturing category, He recognition and deployment of these resources stands as one of his achievements. Grant was decisive. Colonel James F. Rusling of the quartermaster general’s staff recalled that in the winter of 1863–64, a quartermaster officer approached Grant for approval of millions of dollars of expenditures for the coming Atlanta campaign, and Grant approved the expenditure after briefly examining the papers involved. Questioning Grant’s swift decision, the officer asked him if he was sure he was right. Grant replied, “No, I am not, but in war, anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find out and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money and may ruin everything.”

Grant has gone down to history as a bludgeon general, a general who eschewed maneuver and who with head down, seeing red, charged his enemy again and again like a bull: indeed an extraordinary conclusion, for no general, not excepting Lee, and few generals in any other war, made greater use of maneuver in the winning of his campaigns, if not of his battles. Without fear of contradiction, it may be said that Grant’s object was consistent; strategically it was to threaten his enemy’s base of operations.’ Lee acted on the spur of the moment and never once brought fruition, because he acted so impulsively as to  be unprepared to take full advantage of them.  The Seven Days campaign ended in the disaster of Malvern Hill, the Second Manassas campaign in that of Antietam and the Chancellorsville campaign led to Gettysburg.

War was very simple to him, you have a job to do, you go out and do it to your fullest. One of his biographers said of him “His success was the success of sheer common sense-----which is almost the same thing as generalship—and of American Democracy. “  Here is a man who is not only capable but self-reliant, and  its self-reliance which nearly always wins over a superior, because it relieves him of onus of a work which he himself can not control.  His honesty and modesty towards himself endowed him with wisdom; he could discover his own mistakes and was never stampeded by his success. Grant’s outlook was simpler and consequently more all-embracing. He sees the war as a whole far more completely than so than even Lee saw it.  He is the preeminent grant-strategist, while Lee is the preeminently the field strategical. His orders are simple , direct and unmistakable. Lee’s more often than not are vague and frequently verbal.

He relied on his staff for detail not ideas, which was his job. He was able to bear in mind a clear picture of the topography of the country he operated in. This would enable him to work out a strategic problem mentally with more certainty than could one who does not have this ability.  When others were at their wits ends Grant was perfectly calm and collected.  With the Vicksburg campaign, in the time that a plan was essential General McPherson offered him a glass of liquor, Grants response. “Mac, you know your whiskey won’t help me to think; give me a dozen of the best cigars  you can find…. I think by the time I have finished them I shall have this job pretty nearly planned. “

As  Bruce Catton later goes on saying, “Each man had, to begin with, the great virtue of utter tenacity and fidelity. Grant fought his way down the Mississippi Valley in spite of acute personal discouragement and profound military handicaps. Lee hung on in the trenches at Petersburg after hoping itself had died. In each man there was an indomitable quality. . . . the born fighter's refusal to give up as long as he can still remain on his feet and lift his two fists. Daring and resourcefulness they had, too, the ability to think faster and move faster than the enemy. These were the qualities which gave Lee the dazzling campaigns of Second Manassas and Chancellorsville and won Vicksburg for Grant.”

Grant was a mass of contradictions: loved order and yet could find no place in an orderly world. He hated war, and yet found his place there above all his fellows. He went to West Point not to be a soldier but because he was determined to escape the life of a tanner, and West Point did that for him. He never failed to look at every problem from the simplest point of view, and to answer it in the simplest possible manner. He has said he watched the progress of the Army of the Potomac ever since it was organized and has been greatly interested in reading the accounts of the splendid fighting it has done. This is very illuminating for a few generals who had to face his problems would have troubled to find the time to examine those of others hundreds of miles away.  

Flaws

Grant also had his flaws. As a tactician, he was horrible. He seemed to know only one tactic – the frontal assault. Time and time again, he threw troops at entrenched positions, only to suffer incredible casualties. At Vicksburg, he attacked strong fortifications and suffered accordingly. Did he learn to try other methods? No. At Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor he did it again on an even grander scale, suffering even grander casualties. Grant seems to be one of those Civil War generals, of whom there are quite a few, who did not understand the changes the rifled musket forced on tactics. Frontal assaults no longer worked, but many a general seemed to think if only another division were thrown in, the result would be different. 

Grant’s modesty, lucid orders, topographical memory, full use of his staff, perseverance, full use of Union resources, minimizing support personnel, full use of assigned generals, decisiveness, moral courage, political common sense, focus on enemy armies, maneuverability, and intelligent aggressiveness all combined to make him the best general of the Civil War and to demolish the myth of “Grant the Butcher.” Grant was one of the greatest generals in American history.

Lee

On April 18, 1861, as rising star in the U.S. Military, Lee is called to a meeting with Francis Blair, a close associate of Abraham Lincoln. Blair offers Lee command of the Union Army, but Lee declines the offer, unwilling to fight against his home state of Virginia. Lee next seeks the advice of his former commander and Director of the War Department, Winfield Scott. Lee explains his divided loyalties to Scott, but his superior refuses to allow him to "sit out" the war.  On  April 20, 1861 After days of deliberation, Lee resigns from the United States Army. He states in a letter to his Union-supporting sister, Anne Marshall, that "with all of my devotion to the Union and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizens, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home." Just two days later, the governor of Virginia assigns Lee to command the Virginia forces for the Confederate Army.  This is perhaps where the contrast between Lee and Grant is so striking. As historian Bruce Catton says, “the Virginia aristocrat, inevitably, saw himself in relation to his own region. His first loyalty would go to the locality in which that society existed. On other hand the Westerner would fight with an equal tenacity for the broader concept of society, “ or for his country. Lee was a Virginian first and a Confederate second. This trait was harmful, even though he was not the commander-in-chief, due to his crucial role as Jefferson Davis’s primary military advisor throughout the war.

As Catton states, “So Grant and Lee were in complete contrast, representing two diametrically opposed elements in American life. Grant was the modern man emerging; beyond him, ready to come on the stage, was the great age of steel and machinery, of crowded cities and a restless burgeoning vitality. Lee might have ridden down from the old age of chivalry, lance in hand, silken banner fluttering over his head. Each man was the perfect champion of his cause, drawing both his strengths and his weaknesses from the people he led. Yet it was not all contrast, after all. Different as they were--in background, in personality, in underlying aspiration--these two great soldiers had much in common. Under everything else, they were marvelous fighters. Furthermore, their fighting qualities were really very much alike.” Despite his lack of manpower and material, Lee’s military genius was the principal factor in keeping the Confederacy alive. He was a legend in his own lifetime. In May 1862 Stonewall Jackson wrote, “Lee is the only man I know whom I would follow blindfold. “ His soldiers, to whom he was either ‘Uncle Robert’ or ‘Marse Robert’ idolized him.

For another difference, Lee was not a good quartermaster. The Army of Northern Virginia was always poorly equipped. Much of its equipment and supplies were taken from the Army of the Potomac after their numerous victories, but there was never enough. Not all of this blame can be laid at the feet of Lee, though. The Confederacy was woefully short of the industry needed to supply its armies, and the Northern blockade prevented adequate supplies from being imported as the war dragged on. Some may lay additional fault on the South’s lack of railroads to deliver supplies. Virginia, however, did not suffer from this lack. Finally, northern Virginia was fought over so much that it simply could not feed the army. Lee was also determined to include Europe in his war with the North. On April 7, 1865 he said to General Pendleton; “ I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination   of our subjugation, make good in the long run our independence unless foreign powers should directly or indirectly, assist us.”

Strategist?

Another major difference, was Lee as a strategist. In a word, he was not. His concern was northern Virginia and nothing else. Throughout the war, he resisted attempts by Jefferson Davis to draw forces from the Army of Northern Virginia to reinforce the western armies. Lee was obsessed with the operations in Virginia and urged that additional reinforcements be brought to the Old Dominion from the West, where Confederates defended ten times the area in which Lee operated.  Only once did it happen, when Longstreet went west and fought at Chattanooga, but not without Lee’s efforts to stop it. He also opposed attempts to make him commander in chief of Southern forces until it was too late for it to be of any benefit. Lee’s Civil War strategy concentrated all the resources he could obtain and retain almost exclusively in the eastern theater of operations. His approach overlooked the strength of the Confederacy in its size and lack of communications, which required the Union to conquer and occupy it. He often refused requests by President Jefferson Davis to comply with requests to send critical reinforcements to the West. Lee was obsessed with Virginia and the moral aspects of the war. His one and only grand strategy was to terrify Washington. This would have been a perfectly sound object had his army been well trained and provided with a grand siege train, which was greatly limited in materials and funding.  Only once did Lee agree to send a portion of his army west. He delayed for two weeks from Virginia which caused many of them to arrive only after the Battle of Chickamauga and without their artillery.

Additionally, and most importantly, Lee failed to realize that the Confederacy’s best hope of survival was to hold out. Since the South had a lack of fighting men compared to the North, its best hope was to keep casualties to a minimum, to live to fight another day. Lee’s offensive tactics ensured the Army of Northern Virginia sustained greater casualties than it could afford. Had he fought defensively most of the time, Lee would have saved soldiers who could fight again, perhaps outlasting the North’s will to win. That Lee though loyal to Virginia, was at heart disloyal to the Confederacy is absurd. To him the base of the Confederacy was but the base of Virginia because the only form of attack he really understood was the moral offensive, and Virginia enabled him to carry this out.

While the North was compelled through force of circumstances to develop its resources the South, relaying on Europe for its munitions of war, failed to do so, with the result, that more and more did Southern policy develop into a political game of chance.

Conclusion of the war

Lee was successful only at winning battles. He never had a conception of how to take battlefield victories and turn them into victory in war, unlike U.S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, who both came to realize that individual battles were themselves meaningless — what mattered was winning the war. In this area Grant, in particular, completely out-classed Lee. Sherman proved better at achieving goals without the waste of battle — but battle was what graduates of the U.S. Military Academy had been trained to think was how wars were won.

Lee ceased being “successful” (except at not-losing) when Grant was put in charge of all Union armies because Grant, unlike Lee, had a conceptual strategy and (some) subordinates he could trust to execute it out of his sight. But the decisive theatre of war was not Virginia, even though this is where nearly all the focus of study on the U.S. Civil War stands. The Western Theatre contributed far more to the collapse of the Confederacy first by splitting the Confederacy in two, logistically and economically, and then destroying Southern morale via Sherman’s destruction of the Confederate back yard — all of it effectively unopposed, because Sherman was a master of achieving his ends without uselessly killing his men in meaningless battles.

In the words of the General who defeated him, the legend of Lee as a “great general”, is much overrated and a product of the lovers of the “lost cause”. His use of Napoleonic tactics caused Lee to lose more men than all of his other generals combined. Lee himself said that even in victory that he never did anything that would “last longer than the battle that occurred that day.” His blunders at Gettysburg cost him that battle and was the beginning of the end for his army of northern Virginia. “It is all my fault”, Lee said to the men of what was left of Pickett’s division after he sent them to their slaughter.

Lee rejoins his family in Richmond, where Mary has been living since 1861. That summer they will move to the country in Derwent, Virginia.In a letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee blames the loss of the war on the moral condition of his men. He believes that the troops had been getting letters from home indicating that they no longer supported the war, leading the soldiers to lack aggressiveness and the grit necessary to win battles.

The Lee family moves to Lexington, Virginia, where Lee assumes the role of President of Washington College. Lee overhauls the curriculum, requires weekly progress reports for all of the students, and encourages the females in his family to attend church services in the hopes that "if the ladies would patronize it that the students would be more interested in going." The college has since changed its name to Washington and Lee University. 
Lee assembles notes, letters and data in an effort to defend his actions and his Army of Northern Virginia, but never writes. Lee discusses the failures of Gettysburg in conversations with his peers at Washington College, attributing the loss to his commanders J.E.B. Stuart and Richard Ewell.
Lee is summoned to give testimony to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. In his testimony, Lee expresses his concern over the social and political structure of the country and his doubts that African Americans should have civil rights. Above all, he expresses a desire to be left alone.

After suffering a severe stroke on October 12, 1870 Lee dies in the company of his family. Lee's coffin is paraded through the small town of Lexington, Virginia. The procession, filled with former Confederate soldiers, Washington College students and state politicians, makes its way past the Virginia Military Institute for a small service.

Grant became a national hero, and the Republicans nominated him for president in 1868. A primary focus of Grant’s administration was Reconstruction, and he worked to reconcile the North and South while also attempting to protect the civil rights of newly freed black slaves. While Grant was personally honest, some of his associates were corrupt and his administration was tarnished by various scandals. After retiring, Grant invested in a brokerage firm that went bankrupt, costing him his life savings. He spent his final days penning his memoir which was published the year he died and proved a critical and financial success.

What do you think of Grant and Lee? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

George McClellan: Problematic U.S. Civil War Commander

Major General George McClellan was one of the central figures of the Civil War. He served as commander of the Department of Ohio, the Army of the Potomac, and was Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army for 5 months. Historically, his command decisions have been criticized and his personal qualities are examined minutely. He represents a paradox: a superbly prepared and highly intelligent man who, during his moment on the world stage, failed in almost every task he performed.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

George B. McClellan. Portrait by Mathew Brady.

Background

McClellan came from a wealthy, elite Philadelphia family.  His father was Dr George McClellan, a foremost surgeon of his day and the founder of Jefferson Medical College. A great grandfather was a brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. After attending the University of Pennsylvania for two years, he left to enroll at West Point, where he graduated second in his class at age 19 in 1846, losing the top spot because of weaker drawing skills. He was friends with aristocratic southerners including George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and AP Hill.

He was breveted a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. During the Mexican War he served as an engineer building bridges for Winfield Scott’s army. He was frequently under fire and was breveted to first lieutenant and captain. Since his father was friends with General Scott, he received a coveted spot to perform reconnaissance for the general.

He returned to West Point as an engineering instructor after the war. He was given charge of various engineering projects. He was also sent on a secret mission to Santo Domingo by the Secretary of State to scout its military preparedness. In 1852 he helped to translate a manual on bayonet tactics from French. In 1853, he participated in land surveys to scout a transcontinental railroad route. The route he advised through the Cascade Mountains, Yakima Pass, was known to be impassable during the winter snow. The Governor of Washington territory, himself a top of the class graduate of West Point and a mathematics whiz, had made his own survey. He knew that McClellan hadn’t studied the situation carefully. Time has shown that he missed three greatly superior passes in the near vicinity, which were eventually used for railroads and interstate highways.

He was then appointed By Secretary of War Jefferson Davis as captain of the new First Cavalry Regiment, one of two that would be the proving grounds for the Civil War. Because he spoke French fluently, he was sent to be an observer during the Crimean War. There he conferred with military leaders and the royal families on both sides. He observed the siege of Sebastopol first-hand. His report was hailed for its brilliance. McClellan's observations and insights from the Crimean War played a role in shaping his views on military organization, logistics, and the importance of proper training. He was particularly impressed by the Allied forces' well-organized supply lines, medical services, and use of siege warfare. However, he totally missed the significance of how rifled weapons had changed military strategy, an error that would have substantial repercussions in the conflict ahead. McClellan wrote a cavalry manual and designed a saddle, called the McClellan saddle, which is still in use for ceremonies. This was a promising young man with a great future.

But the fact is, promotion in the small pre-war army was very slow, and McClellan was an ambitious man. At age 31, he resigned to become Chief Engineer of Illinois Central Railroad, a position with a huge increase in salary. There he would be promoted to Vice President and work with an obscure railroad lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.

McClellan was, frankly, bored with railroad management. He served as chief engineer and vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and then became president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. McClellan supported the presidential campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 election. He also married Mary Ellen Marcy, a woman who had fielded 8 prior proposals, rejecting 7 of them, including a prior one from McClellan; the man she had accepted was not liked by her family, so he withdrew. Finally McClellan asked again, and they were married in New York City in May 1860.

Start of the Civil War & Rapid Promotion

The firing at Fort Sumter changed the trajectory of a lot of people’s lives. For McClellan, it was transformative: he found himself a highly regarded and sought after authority on large scale war and tactics, having written two volumes on the subject. He was wanted by the Governors of 3 states to lead their militias, and he settled on Ohio. He was commissioned a major general in the regular army on Amy 14, 1861, outranking everyone except Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief. McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator. Once again, political connections moved him rapidly to the top.

After losing First Manassas, Lincoln needed a military leader who could win battles. McClellan had several victories in western Virginia including Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain, and was being hailed as the “Young Napoleon” and “Napoleon of the Present War” in the press. But the fact is, McClellan’s actions there showed a number of disturbing features that in retrospect were prescient. McClellan failed to attack at Cheat Mountain several times despite action being underway. Colonel Rosecrans was promised reinforcements but McClellan didn’t send them, forcing him to achieve victory on his own; McClellan’s report gave him no credit.  Another subordinate was warned to follow cautiously but then criticized in the report for moving slowly.

Positive Attributes

There can be no doubt that he was a fabulous administrator and logistician. He excelled in organizing and training the Union Army at the start of the war, preparing them for the battles ahead. His meticulous attention to detail and emphasis on discipline contributed to a well-structured and efficient force. Additionally, he implemented effective supply and transportation systems to support his troops. His skills in these administrative tasks were superb and are appropriately admired by all.

Criticisms as Commander in Chief

Throughout his tenure as a commander, McClellan consistently exhibited a tendency to overestimate the strength of his opponents and to be overly cautious in his decision-making, often erring on the side of preserving his own forces rather than aggressively engaging the enemy. McClellan was reluctant to begin his offensives, routinely delayed attacking, demanded an impossible number of reinforcements even though his army greatly outnumbered the enemy, displayed insubordination to the President and civilian leaders, allowed the enemy to escape repeatedly, and retreated several times despite not having lost a battle. He had an inability to create original or innovative ideas, despite being tremendously smart and a quick study. His cautious approach to battle and reluctance to take decisive offensive actions limited his overall success as a military leader.

Over-Cautiousness

Several instances highlight McClellan's consistent pattern of over-cautiousness, which led to missed opportunities and strategic setbacks:

• Peninsula Campaign: McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was marked by his excessive caution. Despite having a numerical advantage over Confederate General Robert E. Lee, McClellan moved slowly and hesitated to press his advantage, allowing Lee to consolidate his forces and ultimately repel McClellan's advances.

• Seven Days' Battles: During the Seven Days' Battles, McClellan's caution led him to withdraw his forces in the face of Lee's attacks, despite having numerical superiority. This retreat allowed Lee to successfully defend Richmond and avoid being decisively defeated.

• Maryland Campaign: After discovering Special Order #191, McClellan has been criticized traditionally as moving slowly. Even though McClellan had gained intelligence indicating that Lee's forces were divided, he still proceeded cautiously. However, recent scholarship has questioned the accuracy of this conclusion.

• Battle of Antietam: This battle became the single bloodiest day in American history, and McClellan's failure to exploit his opportunities to defeat Lee's army decisively was attributed to his caution.

• Following the Battle of Antietam, McClellan was slow to pursue Lee's retreating army, allowing them to escape across the Potomac River into Confederate territory. His hesitation to pursue and engage the enemy hindered the Union's success in taking advantage of its tactical success.

Repeated Inflated Estimates of Enemy Strength

McClellan’s propensity to inflate enemy troop numbers occurred so routinely that it’s beyond possibility that it wasn’t intentional, and perhaps psychologically motivated.

The pattern of inflating enemy troop numbers was a recurring theme that marked McClellan's career. McClellan doubled the number of troops he had defeated at Rich Mountain, making his victory appear spectacular. He tripled the number of actual troops facing him across the Potomac, leading to a crisis sense and elevation to commander in chief. In the Peninsula Campaign, the process reached its zenith: hyper-inflate the numbers of the enemy, lament about what was necessary to win, when it was impossible to provide that number to reluctantly proceed anyway, and blame superiors if victory wasn’t achieved.

Procrastination

McClellan’s fatal flaw as general was that he was viewed as a procrastinator. His continual delays and refusal to move against the Confederates allowed them to call in reinforcements and win key battles with less than half the manpower.  McClellan had a long history of delaying attacks. Maybe he thought that he had to plan in great detail before launching them. But these delays were never beneficial and never justifiable. His delay to initiate the battle at Antietam cost him a decisive victory and ultimately led to his dismissal.

He was an excellent administrative general, but as a tactician he was incapable of taking chances, and war is all about chances. Strategically he really wasn’t bad: Peninsula was an interesting idea but he did not follow through tactically. He wanted to cross the James, as Grant would do 2 years later, but was denied. He had a great advantage at Antietam and won, but he failed to pursue the enemy. He might have been incapable of responding creatively to the real time exigencies of battle.  He could not creatively adjust his plan. Thus, at Antietam, when his plan of assault did not unfold like a predetermined Napoleonic success, he was unable to develop any new concepts on the spot to adapt to the changed circumstances.

It is also possible that there were cynical benefits to General McClellan's exaggerated reports of the enemy's size. By consistently overestimating the enemy's strength, McClellan could have positioned himself as the savior of the Union, creating a narrative that he was the only one capable of defending against such a formidable foe. This could have enhanced his political stature and potentially garnered more support from certain factions. McClellan's tendency to exaggerate the enemy's strength could have provided him with a convenient excuse for his reluctance to engage in battle or take more aggressive actions. This allowed him to avoid the risks associated with decisive battles, while placing the blame on the perceived overwhelming enemy forces .And, by portraying the enemy as stronger than they actually were, McClellan might have been able to secure additional resources, troops, and supplies for his own forces. This could have allowed him to build up a larger and more well-equipped army, potentially boosting his own reputation in the process. Finally, the exaggerated reports could have been a way for McClellan to deflect blame for any failures or setbacks onto the supposedly formidable enemy forces. By doing so, he could have avoided taking responsibility for any missteps in his own strategy or decision-making.

Psychological Profile

Psychological profiling of historical figure is fraught with hazard. Nevertheless, historians have found McClellan to be an excellent subject for this kind of analysis. McClellan has been portrayed as “… proud, sensitive, overwrought, tentative, quick to exult and to despair”. He was a competent administrator and engineer who had no skill at winning battles. McClellan's actions and exaggerations might have been influenced not only by strategic considerations but also by his own ambitions and self-preservation. His reluctance to engage in battle can be attributed in part to his fear of failure. His job was to lead, he was supposed to be a great leader, but he was afraid to be wrong. McClellan was more concerned with not losing than with winning. In his mind, as the fate of the Union rested on his shoulders, he could not allow a defeat.

Stephen Sears wrote: “There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision.”

A fragile ego covered by conceit was reflected in many of his letters to his wife.

He had to build himself up because in fact he lacked self-confidence. McClellan often suggested that divine intervention had chosen him to save the Union. McClellan frequently thanked God for allowing him to be the deliverer of the nation. His letters to Ellen Marcy, his wife, have been widely quoted in this regard (see Table). Many of the letters were intentionally destroyed or burned in a fire after the war, and there is a great deal of speculation as to exactly why the ones that remained still exist. Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses” in his memoirs.

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Some well-known quotes from his letters to his wife:

“I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land … I almost think that were I to win some small success now I could become Dictator. . . . But nothing of that kind would please me. Therefore I won't be Dictator. Admirable self denial!”

“Half a dozen of the oldest made the remark . . . ‘Why how young you look — yet an old soldier!! ... It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?”

“The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever. What a specimen to be at the head of our affairs now.”

““It may be that at some distant day I too shall totter away from” Washington, “a worn out old soldier. . . . Should I ever become vainglorious & ambitious remind me of that spectacle.”

“I ought to take good care of these men. I believe they love me from the bottom of their hearts. I can see it in their faces when I pass among them.”

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Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote that a review of his personal correspondence during the war, especially with his wife, reveals “a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.” McClellan thought of himself as the only man who could save the union, and was willing to sacrifice anything and anyone—mentors, colleagues, his own men—to further his ambition.  In that sense, George McClellan's memoirs and letters provide some indications of his personality and mindset, and a narcissistic tendency is suggested. But drawing definitive conclusions about his psychological condition, such as labeling him as a narcissist, solely based on these sources can be misleading.

In contradistinction, Lincoln had failed in life before; he made himself a success by hard work and careful thought, and wasn’t afraid of risk. McClellan had been handed everything, had always come out on top, and was afraid to fail. In war, as in much of life, fortune favors the bold. McClellan’s fear of failure and routine promotions on the basis of political connections would be his downfall.

Relationship with President Lincoln

The personal and professional conflict between General McClellan and President Lincoln that manifest in 1862, and continued into the election of 1864, is one of the fascinating subthemes of Lincoln’s presidency. Lincoln and General McClellan didn’t like one another and didn’t get along well. McClellan believed he had a superior education and family background; Lincoln knew he was being looked down upon, but with his superior emotional quotient, he knew that what was important was getting victories, and if this man could, then he would put up with him.

They originally met before the war: Lincoln was an attorney for the Illinois railroad and the two spent time together between cases. He saw Lincoln as socially inferior and intellectually not nearly on his level. He found the country stories Lincoln told to be below him.

Once the war began, Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan clashed repeatedly. McClellan constantly ignored Lincoln’s orders, and did not share his plans with anyone including the president. McClellan let it be known that he had contempt for Lincoln. He called him the ‘original gorilla’ in public. On November 13, 1861, Lincoln Seward and Hay stopped at McClellan’s home to visit with him. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan’s retirement to bed.

Historian William C. Davis wrote that in 1861, “believing what the press and an admiring circle of sycophants on his staff and high command said about him, Little Mac bristled at being subordinate to the civil authority, and especially to Lincoln, of whom he almost instantly developed a condescending and patronizing opinion. He not only regarded the president as his intellectual and social inferior, but also passed on that attitude to those around him – or even fostered it.”

Famously, President Lincoln came to visit General McClellan on October 3rd. As you can see from the photo by Alexander Gardner, the temperature of the meeting was frosty.  Abraham Lincoln spent four days travelling over the field, just two weeks after the guns fell silent. He met with McClellan, trying to prod his young Napoleon into action, met with other generals, and with thousands of wounded soldiers, Including both Union and Confederate. His trip was well-documented, and the photos of his visit are among the most famous of the entire war.

Lincoln expected McClellan to pursue Lee and engage him in a decisive battle as soon as possible. Although the Union outnumbered the Confederate army by almost three to one, McClellan did not move his army for over a month. McClellan overestimated the size of Lee’s force, suggesting that 100,000 troops were in his command, when he likely had just more than half that number. McClellan also noted that his requisitions for supplies had not been filled. Although traditionally these complaints are dismissed as a manufactured excuse, substantial documentation suggests that McClellan had a genuine supply crisis.

It may be that top Lincoln administration officials ruined his reputation intentionally for political reasons. Knowing that he was popular with the troops and a Democrat, they could see where 1864 was leading. That is not to say that McClellan wasn’t slow at times, but it may have been exaggerated in retrospect when he became Lincoln’s opponent.

What were McClellan’s political opinions about slavery, defeating the South, and his post bellum vision?

McClellan’s view on how the war should be prosecuted differed significantly from Mr. Lincoln’s views. McClellan was a Democrat. He was anti-emancipation. He made clear also his opposition to abolition or seizure of slaves as a war tactic, which put him at odds with the executive branch and some of his subordinates. He had a set of political beliefs almost completely at odds with the Republican Party, the party in power. Most of the officers in the United States Army were Democrats. The army was a conservative institution and many of these officers didn’t agree with the vision for the United States that many of the Republicans had, especially the radical Republicans in Congress, who even departed more radically from Lincoln.

What McClellan wanted to do was to restore the Union to what it had been. He was very happy with that Union. And that was not going to be possible during the war once it had gone past a certain point. McClellan was very clear about what kind of war he wanted. He wanted to beat the Rebels just enough to persuade them to come back under the Union. He didn’t want to slaughter their armies. He didn’t want to overturn their civilization, and he wanted to keep emancipation out of the picture.

McClellan had different views about race and southern aristocracy then we do today and that Lincoln had then: but he was not a traitor, and he did want to win the war, not lose it. McClellan emphasized the fact that he previously led the Union military effort in the War and that he was and remained committed to "the restoration of the Union in all its integrity" and that the massive sacrifices that the Union endured should not be in vain.

As he wrote to one influential Northern Democratic friend, and I’m quoting him here, “Help me to dodge the n____. I’m fighting to preserve the integrity of the Union.” That’s McClellan’s take on the war. He was not fighting to free the slaves, and he was not alone. McClellan almost never spoke of African Americans, and when he did it was always in disparaging terms. McClellan was a quiet racist, one who wanted to ensure that the Civil War ended soon so that the question of black emancipation would not become the leading element.

Now, it must be emphasized that up to that stage of the war, Lincoln was also highlighting union and not slavery. He downplayed emancipation because he thought it would alienate the border states, and he wanted to make sure that they stayed in line. After Antietam, Lincoln thought the North was ready for emancipation, but McClellan never changed his attitude.

Quotes from President Lincoln’s Letters to General McClellan

“After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington, and Manassas Junction … My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army Corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected– It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell– … I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mannassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied…”

“There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War, a statement, taken as he said, from your own returns, making 108.000 then with you, and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85.000, when all en route to you shall have reached you– How can the discrepancy of 23.000 be accounted for?” (April 7, 1862)

“And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow– I am powerless to help this– You will do me the justice to remember that I always insisted, that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty — that we would find the same enemy, and the same, or equal, intrenchments, at either place– The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated–“

“You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?” (October 13, 1862)

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is “to operate upon the enemy’s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.” You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor.”

“I have just read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?”

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The 1864 Presidential election

By the summer of 1864, the Civil War had gone on for over three years. Over 250,000 Union soldiers had been killed, with many more injured permanently. Victory was not yet in sight. Democrats knew that many of the policies of Lincoln  were not popular, including many of those we take today as the reason for the conflict, such as emancipation, the military draft, the use of black troops, and violations of civil liberties. Democrats further suggested that the Republicans were advocating in favor of miscegenation and trying to destroy the traditional race relations. They believed they could win, and famously, Lincoln thought that too.

But then the Democratic Party blundered. The convention adopted proposals by Copperheads like Clement  Vallandigham calling for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement to the war; but then they selected George McClellan as their candidate. His central argument was that he could win the war sooner and with fewer casualties than Lincoln & Grant. He did not run on a platform of surrender, as is often alleged.

To get the nomination, McClellan had to defeat his opponents Horatio Seymour, New York Governor, and Thomas Seymour, Connecticut governor. Both were real “peace” candidates. Once he was nominated McClellan repudiated the Democratic Party platform. As a result, whatever message intended to be sent to separate their views from Lincoln was garbled. McClellan’s campaign floundered as his repudiation of the peace plank in the Democratic platform provoked discord.

As late as August 23, Lincoln considered it “exceedingly probable” that he would not be reelected. He thought the copperheads would force McClellan into accepting a negotiated settlement, so he made his Cabinet secretly promise to cooperate with McClellan if he won the election to win the war by the time that McClellan will be inaugurated.

Many civil war histories suggest that the victories at Atlanta and the Overland Campaign changed public opinion from the summer of 1864, and surely they did. But a good part of the reason Lincoln was re-elected was that the Democratic Party self-destructed in the campaign.

History books gloss over the closeness of the popular vote. They cite that Lincoln received over 90% of the total electoral votes (212 versus 21 for McClellan). But a 10% margin is relatively close under the circumstances. McClellan ran against Abraham Lincoln, a sitting president, our greatest president, as the war was being won; and garnered 45% of the popular vote. Not only isn’t that pretty under the circumstances of voting against a sitting president in a war (the US has NEVER done this), but the Democratic Party of the 19th century was a fundamentally southern party.  In other words, McClellan got 9/20 votes in a population that was northern, running on a platform of stopping the war and reversing emancipation. Moreover, McClellan won 48% of the total vote in a bloc of states stretching from Connecticut to Illinois (Lincoln's home state); Lincoln underperformed in 1864 relative to 1860 in several crucial U.S. states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana); and that the Republicans lost the Governorship in his (McClellan's) home state of New Jersey.

What do you think of George McClellan? Let us know below.

Now, read Lloyd’s article on the Battle of Fort Sumter and the beginning of the U.S. Civil War here.

References

• https://www.historynet.com/george-mcclellan/#:~:text=He%20graduated%20second%20in%20his,through%20often%20rugged%2C%20inhospitable%20terrain.

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2088&context=etd#:~:text=McClellan%20loved%20his%20troops%20and%20they%2C%20in%20turn%2C,of%20the%20relationships%20he%20developed%20while%20in%20command

• https://www.historynet.com/mcclellans-war-winning-strategy/

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/civil-war-gen-george-mcclellan-deemed-a-savior-then-a-failure/2011/09/21/gIQAfpF6SL_story.html

• https://www.wondriumdaily.com/american-civil-war-the-fault-lines-in-the-lincoln-mcclellan-relationship/   

• https://www.abrahamlincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincolns-contemporaries/abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-rocky-relationship-between-abraham-lincoln-and-george-b-mcclellan/

• Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Da Capo Press, 1988. ISBN 0-306-80913-3.

• Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X.

• Bonekemper, Edward H. McClellan and failure. McFarland & Co, 2007

• Waugh, John C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

The Early History of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Since the founding of the nation, this United States has had a president in office. This fact has not changed over the years, but the campaign leading up to the election has. In the country’s formative years, it was practically unheard of for a presidential candidate to actively campaign for office. However, over the years this changed. Richard Bluttal explains.

American photographer Mathew Brady, 1875.

In the early years of presidential campaigns, it was up to local supporters to organize campaign events and speak on their behalf. Parades, rallies, and stump speeches by surrogates were followed on Election Day by voter drives in taverns and on the streets. Partisan newspapers were another part of the mix aligning themselves with a particular party and openly slanting news coverage to favor allies and excoriate enemies. Commercial publishers quickly realized they could make money by printing and selling broadsides, cards, and prints depicting the candidates of all parties.

In American presidential campaigns from 1789 through the 1820s, Presidential candidates thought it was undignified to campaign. Political parties were embryonic and in flux – nothing like the organizational powerhouses they are today. Before the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 there was no mass electorate. In most states, legislatures, not citizens, chose presidential electors. Enslaved people, free women, and free propertyless men – constituting most of the adult population at the time – were denied the vote. Throughout this period, however, both an electorate and campaign machinery began to develop.

From 1800 onward presidential campaign songs and songbooks filled the air at rallies, parades, and debates. A watershed moment in campaign music history occurred during the 1840 campaign of General William Henry Harrison against incumbent President Martin van Buren. “Tippecanoe and Tyler Too” was the official song supporting Harrison and his running mate, John Tyler. Harrison had defeated American Indians at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 and helped defeat the British in 1812. Like almost every other campaign song in every presidential campaign going forward, this song was a contrafactum: a popular preexisting tune matched to new lyrics. Set to the tune of Yankee Doodle, the chorus declared “Old Zack Taylor! Keep Him up! / Honest, Rough and Ready! / We’ve a voucher in his life / He’s good as he is steady.”

By the early 1830s, cheap newspapers, known as the “penny press,” allied themselves with political parties, and a growing network of roads, canals and railroads began to carry political information nationwide.

1830s

The Democratic Party’s first association with the donkey came about during the 1828 campaign of Democrat Andrew Jackson. Running on a populist platform (by the people, for the people) and using a slogan of “Let the People Rule,” Jackson’s opponents referred to him as a jackass (donkey). Much to their chagrin, Jackson incorporated the jackass into his campaign posters. During Jackson’s presidency the donkey was used to symbolize his stubbornness by his opponents.

By the election of 1860, parades, banners and music were part of the political landscape, as were newspapers that openly supported political parties. Advances in printing technology by the mid-19th century allowed Americans to express their political sympathies through their choice of cigars and stationery. Cigar box labels in 1860 included images of Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln and his democratic opponent, Stephen A. Douglas. For those who might have heard of “Honest Old Abe” and the “Little Giant” but had never seen their likenesses in print, the cigar box label introduced the candidates’ faces to the public. In early March 1860, Abraham Lincoln spoke in Hartford, Connecticut, against the spread of slavery and for the right of workers to strike. Five store clerks, who had started a Republican group called the Wide Awakes, decided to join a parade for Lincoln, who delighted in the torchlight escort back to his hotel provided for him after his speech. Over the ensuing weeks, the Lincoln campaign made plans to develop Wide Awakes throughout the country and to use them to spearhead large voter registration drives, since they knew that new voters and young voters tend to embrace new and young parties.

Members of the Wide Awakes were described by the New York Times as "young men of character and energy, earnest in their Republican convictions and enthusiastic in prosecuting the canvass on which we have entered." In Chicago, on October 3, 1860, 10,000 Wide Awakes marched in a three-mile procession.

Mathew Brady

Mathew Brady was one of the earliest American photographers and the owner of a successful photography studio. He photographed celebrities, presidents, and, most famously, scenes of his country’s Civil War. From 1860 to 1864. Those picturing President Lincoln—in particular a portrait taken on February 27, 1860, after the speech at The Cooper Union, in New York City, which launched his presidential campaign—sold widely. A number of acclaimed historians believe that his portrait of Lincoln that went nation wide was greatly instrumental in Lincoln being elected President.

Political buttons touting presidential candidates increased in popularity during the 19th century. Metal campaign buttons were available in 1860, but the election of 1896 saw the first use of the mass-produced, pin-backed, metal buttons. These became ubiquitous and collectible in 20th-century presidential campaigns and remain so today.

The earliest connection of the elephant to the Republican Party was an illustration in an 1864 Abraham Lincoln presidential campaign newspaper, Father Abraham. It showed an elephant holding a banner and celebrating Union victories. During the Civil War, “seeing the elephant” was slang for engaging in combat so the elephant was a logical choice to represent successful battles.

Thomas Nast, his cartoons, and those by his predecessors and contemporaries, were published in mass market magazines—as well as in newspapers and as separate, sheet prints are credited with widely influencing voters at a time when most would never see or hear their White House candidate in person. Instead, the public read campaign materials, attended barbecues, picnics, parades, mass meetings, and rallies. Campaign songs written about candidates fit right into a culture where singing was popular. Many of these early voter solicitation activities are still staples of presidential campaigns today in one form or another. From the 18th through the 19th centuries, these political cartoons were a popular form of political protest and often depicted rival politicians in satirical or unflattering ways and of course are still in use today.

Gilded Age

The Gilded Age (c.1877-1900) presidential elections split between Democrats and Republicans along mostly sectional lines – a legacy of the Civil War. The imagery on Grant’s poster linking him and his running mate to “common man” themes hearkens back to an earlier era as did his decision not to refrain from actively campaigning. Noting that only presidential candidates who had taken to the trail had lost, he declared: “I am no public speaker and I don’t want to be beaten.” The tradition continued with Grover Cleveland in 1888 whose front-porch talks with visitors were published in newspapers and brochures. Smear campaigns persisted through the 19th century. In 1884, supporters of Republican Party candidate James Blaine coined a jingle that alluded to an illegitimate child that his opponent Grover Cleveland had allegedly fathered:

Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?

Gone to the White House,

Ha, ha, ha!

Cleveland's party responded with a tune of their own:

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,

The Continental Liar from the State of Maine!

Presidential campaigns, however, soon started to shift. Instead of remaining silent, candidates began to give speeches, often referred to as “stump speeches.” William McKinley gave a variant on this during the 1896 campaign when he delivered a speech on his front porch. This became the centerpiece of his so-called “front-porch campaign,” and he continued to deliver speeches from his home. His opponent, William Jennings Bryan, chose instead to conduct a “whistle-stop campaign,” traveling the country by railroad and giving speeches at various train stops.

This 1896 campaign is probably the most famous campaign in U.S. history. It is remembered for Bryan's precedent-shattering speaking tour as well as for the carefully orchestrated and impressive front-porch campaign of William McKinley. An estimated 5 million Americans across 27 states heard one of the 600 passionate and substantive speeches Bryan crave during the campaign. McKinley stayed home but still managed to speak to 750,000 people in the 300 or so speeches he gave. Neither Bryan nor McKinley shied away from issues, the former focusing almost exclusively on free silver while the latter preferred to harp on the virtues of the protective tariff.

McKinley’s 1896 poster shows him as the champion of American capitalism, upholding the gold standard and linking prosperity and American power. Bryan wanted the U.S. on a silver standard which he believed would help workmen and farmers hurt by the depression. Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech, brilliantly delivered at the Democratic convention on July 9, 1896, secured him the nomination. His vivid language still resonates today.

Conclusion

It used to be considered ill-mannered for presidential candidates to openly campaign for themselves. Times have changed. Presidential campaigns are now billion-dollar operations that involve attack ads, social media strategy, and lots of stump speeches.

What do you think of early U.S. presidential campaigns? Let us know below.

Now read Richard’s article on the role of baseball in the US Civil War here.

The Battle of Fort Sumter & the Beginning of the US Civil War

The firing on Fort Sumter was the immediate action that started the Civil War. Once the Confederates under PGT Beauregard fired on US Federal property, a line had been crossed and a rebellion had begun. At issue was whether federal property in a state that seceded was now property of the new government.

Charleston SC was the most important port on the Southeast coast. The harbor was defended by three federal forts: Sumter; Castle Pinckney, one mile off the city’s Battery; and heavily armed Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan’s Island.

Here, Lloyd W Klein looks at the beginning of the U.S. Civil War.

The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederacy.

The Construction and Deed to the Fort

The island in Charleston harbor on which Fort Sumter is built was originally just a sand bar. In 1827, engineers performed measurements of the depths and concluded that it was a suitable location for a fort. Construction began in 1829. Seventy thousand tons of granite was transported from New England to build up an essentially artificial island. By 1834, a timber foundation that was several feet beneath the water had been laid. The fort was built in the center of the channel to dominate the entrance to the harbor. Along with the shore batteries at Forts Moultrie, Wagner, and Gregg, the idea was to cover the harbor from invaders. The brick fort was designed to be five-sided, 170 to 190 feet long, with walls five feet thick, standing 50 feet over the low tide mark, and to house 650 men and 135 guns in three tiers of gun emplacements. The majority of the gun emplacements faced out to sea, to cover the entrance to the harbor (not facing the city). Construction dragged on because of title issues, and then problems arose with funding such a large and technically challenging project. Unpleasant weather and disease made it worse. The exterior was finished but the interior and armaments were never completed. On December 17, 1836, South Carolina officially ceded all "right, title and, claim" to the site of Fort Sumter to the United States Government. For these reasons, at the time of the bombardment, not only was this a federal fort, but also it was legally land ceded by the state of South Carolina.

Fort Sumter was covered by a separate cession of land to the United States by the state of South Carolina, and covered in this resolution, passed by the South Carolina legislature in December of 1836.

Reports and Resolutions of the General assembly, Page 115, here: https://www.carolana.com/SC/Legislators/Documents/Reports_and_Resolutions_of_the_General_Assembly_of_South_Carolina_1836.pdf

This resolution was made in response to a private SC citizen claiming ownership, which was denied. There can be no clearer statement that Fort Sumter had been ceded to the US Government by the state of SC.

https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/who-owned-fort-sumter/comment-page-1/#comments

In 1805, a prior land resolution of the SC legislature turning over all of the forts in the harbor to the US Government was made. Sumter did not exist at that time, so arguably it didn’t apply, although the language would be inclusive. It can be found on pages 501-502 here: https://books.google.com/books?id=S7E4AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

South Carolina had freely ceded property in Charleston Harbor to the federal Government in 1805, upon the express condition that "the United States... within three years... repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein." Failure to comply with this condition on the part of the Government would render "this grant or cession... void and of no effect." Hence, continued development was a condition, which did occur in spurts.

The Crisis Begins

On December 26, 1860, only six days after South Carolina seceded from the Union, Major Robert Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie, spiking its large guns, burning its gun carriages, and taking its smaller cannon with him. He secretly relocated companies E and H (127 men, 13 of them musicians) of the 1st U.S. Artillery to Fort Sumter on his own initiative, without orders from his superiors, because it could not be defended from a land invasion. The fort was still only partially built and fewer than half of the cannons that should have been available were in place.

In a letter delivered January 31, 1861, South Carolina Governor Francis W Pickens demanded that President Buchanan surrender Fort Sumter because "I regard that possession is not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina." Over the next few months repeated calls for the evacuation of Fort Sumter from the government of South Carolina were ignored.

In February 1861 South Carolina's Attorney General, Isaac Hayne sent a letter to the U.S. Secretary of War, John Holt about their intent to take possession of Fort Sumter and wished to negotiate monetary compensation threatening that if the United States refused to vacate, then force would be used to seize it. Holt responded that the United States' interest in Sumter is not that of a proprietor but that of a sovereign which "has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to 'exercise exclusive legislation' over the property referred to. and said "the President is, however, relieved from the necessity of further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it."

Realizing that the garrison at Fort Sumter was undermanned and undersupplied, General Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief of the US Army, sent the Star of the West to reinforce Anderson. On January 9, 1861, several weeks after South Carolina had seceded from the United States but before other states had done so to form the Confederacy, Star of the West arrived at Charleston Harbor to resupply troops and supplies to the garrison at Fort Sumter. The ship was fired upon by cadets from the Citadel Academy and was hit three times. Although Star of the West suffered no major damage, her captain, John McGowan, considered it to be too dangerous to continue and left the harbor. The mission was abandoned, and Star of the West headed for her home port of New York Harbor.  Even this minimal attempt at strengthening the fort was resisted (Mc266).  President Buchanan had been lukewarm about defending Charleston harbor in the first place and had seriously considered succumbing to southern popular opinion and ordering the defenders back to the indefensible Fort Moultrie.  He had only agreed to this single ship expedition after a cabinet shake-up bringing hardliners Edwin Stanton and Jeremiah Black to his advisory group. Yet in response to this attack on a federal ship, which might itself have triggered the war, he did nothing.

Over the next few months, Jefferson Davis was named president of the Confederacy and Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as US president. Confederate Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard was sent to lead the Confederate forces in Charleston, where his command included several thousand state militia and a few dozen seacoast guns and mortars. Davis sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate transfer of the fort. Anderson prepared the fort for battle as best as possible: remarkably, of the 60 guns placed in the fort, only 6 were capable of being turned around to face the town.

Lincoln searched for a political solution for the next 6 weeks. Most of his cabinet, including Scott, advised that he pull the troops out of Fort Sumter because it was indefensible. William Seward, Secretary of State, Simon P. Cameron, Secretary of War, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy favored withdrawal. Supporting the fort would require a military force comprised of both army and navy units way beyond what existed. But Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury and Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, argued that surrender would diminish morale and would lead to official recognition of the Confederacy. Only Blair opposed the withdrawal firmly because it would convince the rebels that the US administration lacked determination and firmness, would dishearten the Southern Unionists and push the foreign countries to recognize the Confederacy de facto. Moreover, the northern media called on Lincoln to make good his inaugural promise to defend federal property. Lincoln concluded that if the Union troops evacuated Fort Sumter, secession would be a fait accompli.

Lincoln was aware that a large - scale attempt to supply Fort Sumter by firing warships would result in the North as aggressor. It would unite the South and make Lincoln accountable for breaking out a war. Blair provided a person who would find a solution to the problem: Gustavus V. Fox. Fox suggested to supply Fort Sumter via some motorized barges while the US warships, off shore, would intervene only the Confederate guns would fire on the barges. Thus, he sent supplies only, while the warships would be ready to intervene if the Confederate guns had fired on the flotilla. If the Confederates had fired on the unarmed motorized barges hauling supplies only, they would be accountable for having attacked a humanitarian relief mission. At a cabinet meeting on March 28, 1861, the decision was made to send a small flotilla of vessels loaded with supplies. Realizing that Anderson's command would run out of food by April 15, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a fleet of ships, under the command of Gustavus V. Fox, to attempt entry into Charleston Harbor and supply Fort Sumter. It was plainly recognized that this small group of ships could not enter the harbor by surprise and would not be able to reach the fort unless the South Carolina batteries allowed their unfettered passage.  (https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2011/march/sumter-conundrum). Lincoln told Pickens the ships were on their way for re-supply.

Pickens contacted Robert Toombs, the CSA Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, who advised Davis that he was being set up by Lincoln and tricked into starting the war. Nevertheless, a Confederate cabinet meeting on April 9 endorsed Davis’s order to Beauregard to reduce the fort before its arrival. Fearing that a lack of action would revive Southern Unionism, Davis decided the Federal presence had to go, that is, Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was authorized to use the force to surrender Fort Sumter. Retrospectively, Davis would have been wise to have taken Toombs’ advice.  As a fort built to keep out ships, it served no purpose at that moment other than to allow Lincoln to use it as bait to trick the Confederates into starting the war, handing Lincoln reason/pretext and to claim the Confederates fired first.  But Davis  in fact wanted war; it was the only possible way to convince the ambivalent Upper South and border states to secede and join the CSA. Davis had considered attacking Fort Pickens instead, but Braxton Bragg correctly objected because Pickens would have been tough to attack by amphibious warfare and, unlike Sumter, had a secure sea lifeline.

On April 6, 1861, the first ships began to set sail for their rendezvous off the Charleston Bar. The ships assigned were the steam sloops-of-war USS Pawnee and USS Powhatan, transporting motorized launches and about 300 sailors; the USS Pocahontas, Revenue Cutter USRC Harriet Lane, and the steamer Baltic transporting about 200 troops, composed of companies C and D of the 2nd U.S. Artillery; and three hired tugboats with added protection against small arms fire to be used to tow troop and supply barges directly to Fort Sumter. However, the Pocahontas never did make it due to multiple countermanding orders. The first to arrive was Harriet Lane, on the evening of April 11, 1861.

Events Leading to the Bombardment

Also on April 11, Beauregard sent three officers to demand the surrender of the fort: Senator/Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., Captain Stephen D. Lee (later general), and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm. Anderson declined, and the aides returned to report to Beauregard. After Beauregard had consulted the Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, he sent the aides back to the fort and authorized Chesnut to decide whether the fort should be taken by force. Anderson, stalling for time, waited until 3 AM April 12 to tell them he would not leave the fort. They then returned to Fort Johnson where Chesnut ordered the firing to begin. So it was that on April 12, 1861 at 4:30 AM, the Civil War began when Confederate batteries opened on the fort. Although Edmund Ruffin, the noted Virginian agronomist and secessionist, claimed that he fired the first shot on Fort Sumter, and did, in fact, fire a signal shot, Lieutenant Henry S. Farley, commanding a battery of two 10-inch siege mortars on James Island actually fired the first shot at 4:30 a.m. No attempt was made by the Union to return the fire for more than two hours because there were no fuses for their explosive shells, which means that they could not explode. Only solid iron balls could be used. At about 7:00 a.m., Captain Abner Doubleday, the fort's second in command, was given the honor of firing the Union's first shot, in defense of the fort. Although he did not invent baseball as the Mills Commission erroneously concluded, in every other way, his life was eventful and fulfilling.

During the bombardment, according to the diary of Mary Chesnut, the Senator’s wife, and other accounts, Charleston residents along what is now known as The Battery, sat on balconies drinking salutes to the start of the hostilities.

The bombardment lasted for 34 hours. The Union return fire was intentionally slow to conserve its ammunition.  The next morning, the fort was surrendered. During the attack, the Union colors fell. Lt. Norman J. Hall risked his life to put them back up, burning off his eyebrows permanently. A Confederate soldier bled to death having been wounded by a misfiring cannon. One Union soldier died and another was mortally wounded during the 47th shot of a 100-shot salute, given after the surrender. For this reason, the salute was shortened to 50 shots.

PGT Beauregard

PGT Beauregard was the perfect combination of military engineer and charismatic Southern leader needed at that time and place.  It is highly suggestive that a man of Beauregard’s accomplishments was there at Charleston – before a war had started. Its also interesting that the South Carolina militia had been called out and that they had cannonballs with fuses but the US Army in the fort did not. These and other factors demonstrate that the new CSA was prepared for a battle. The South Carolina Militia had been in position for months. They were there when Citadel cadets fired on the Star of the West on January 9, 1861. They were on duty the previous December when Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie for Sumter.

Beauregard was the first Confederate general officer, appointed a brigadier general in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States on March 1, 1861.  His brother in law, James Slidell, was instrumental in convincing Davis to make this appointment. To me, the idea that the Union escalated violence to provoke the war is odd considering that the CSA had created an army at least 6 weeks before firing on Sumter. After the Mexican War, during which he contributed at least as much as Captain Robert E Lee did in terms of reconnaissance and strategy, his positions involved engineering in ports so he was the perfect man for this mission. He had recently been named superintendent of West Point January 23 1861, but these orders were revoked by the Federal Government 5 days later when Louisiana seceded. He returned to New Orleans with the hopes of being named commander of the Louisiana state army. On July 21, he was promoted to full general in the Confederate Army, one of only seven appointed to that rank; his date of rank made him the fifth most senior general, behind Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston. Beauregard was honored in the South for its first victory. He was ordered to direct the troops at Bull Run.

Anderson had been Beauregard’s artillery instructor at West Point in 1837, and Beauregard was serving as superintendent there until secession. Anderson told Washington that Beauregard would guarantee that South Carolina's actions be exercised with "skill and sound judgment." Beauregard wrote to the Confederate government that Anderson was a "most gallant officer". He sent several cases of fine brandy and whiskey and boxes of cigars to Anderson and his officers at Sumter, but Anderson ordered that the gifts be returned.

Aftermath

The state legislature appointed Braxton Bragg on February 20, 1861.Bragg had been a colonel in the Louisiana militia. Aware that Beauregard might resent him, Bragg offered him the rank of colonel. Instead Beauregard enrolled as a private in the "Orleans Guards", a battalion of French Creole aristocrats. At the same time, he communicated with Slidell and the newly chosen President Davis, angling for a senior position in the new Confederate States Army. Rumors that Beauregard would be placed in charge of the entire Army infuriated Bragg.  Their personal animosity was one of the subthemes of the western theater for the next 4 years.

Anderson’s valor and commitment to duty was recognized in the Union.  The Fort Sumter Flag became a popular patriotic symbol after Major Anderson returned North with it. The flag is still displayed in the fort's museum. The Star of the West took all the garrison members to New York City. There they were welcomed and honored with a parade on Broadway.

What do you think of the events at Fort Sumter? Let us know below.

Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.

The 3 Key Reasons for European Empires

European colonization took place over many centuries and for varied reasons, but some reasons were more important than others. Here, Parthika Sharma and Aarushi Anand look at the three key reasons that led to the growth of European empires.

Rudyard Kipling in Calcutta, India, 1892.

Take up the White Man's burden -

    Send forth the best ye breed -

Go bind your sons to exile

    To serve your captives' need;

To wait in heavy harness

    On fluttered folk and wild -

Your new-caught sullen peoples,

    Half devil and half child.

-Rudyard Kipling, White Man’s Burden

Since the beginning of time, humans have sought to dominate their counterparts. The Assyrian empire was superseded by the Persian empire, preparing the way for Greek expansion, which peaked under Alexander the Great, with its borders threatening to spill out of the Indus. The easternmost expansion was accomplished with the conquest of Bengal and the founding of the Delhi Sultanate under Muhammad Ghori. The urge for expansion is in human nature.

In its simplest form, imperialism can be defined as the process by which one state expands its dominance over another through conflict, conquest, and exploitation. In the long histories of the USSR, Japan, the USA, and Europe, two distinct phases of imperialism can be recognized, when it reached unprecedented extent and ferocity.

During the Age of Discovery, following the footsteps of the Portuguese; Britain, Spain, and France, colonized lands throughout North and South America in pursuit of the 3Gs- Gold, God and Glory. However, the so-called "New World" of the Italian explorer and cartographer Amerigo Vespucci was in fact not at all new: People had been living in the Americas for centuries; people, who would eventually become slaves in their own land.

This was however not the end. After a short period of calm, there was an explosion of imperialism yet again that had long lasting repercussions and has been seen by certain scholars as one of the leading causes of the war to end all wars- World War 1, changing the world forever. In 1885, only 10% of Africa was colonized by European powers, by 1905, only 10% was not colonized. Britain and France were the first nations to embark on colonial missions in the 19th and 20th centuries and they were after the 3Cs- Christianisation, commerce, and civilisation as mentioned by Livingstone.

But why was the need for 3Cs suddenly so important that it transformed different polities, cultures and economies and why now? Over the years, historians have offered a variety of hypotheses and justifications to make sense of the issue.

Economic Reasons

The answer to this question for liberals and Marxists is economy. Liberals such as J.A. Hobson argued that capitalism rising at this time led to the masses having less and less and capitalists having large surpluses which could not be invested internally as there was little purchasing power. This underconsumption of masses and oversaving of capitalists made foreign investment "the taproot of imperialism," with government intervention to safeguard the investments that followed.

For Marxist scholar R. Hilferding imperialism was the final and most advanced phase of capitalism.  Monopoly capitalists like Germany and Britain looked to imperialist expansion as a way to ensure reliable supplies of raw materials, markets for industrial goods, and avenues for investment. VI Lenin described imperialism as the pinnacle of capitalist progress, which could only be overthrown by revolution. He highlighted the necessity of seeking out new investment opportunities, and the need of preventing others from acquiring a monopoly. Imperialism and war were therefore necessary since it is a fundamental aspect of capitalism that wealth will eventually end up in fewer and fewer hands.

However, was the economy really the answer? Certain avenues go against the argument. Governments like Britain made investments in places like Argentina that weren't colonies. Because of a lack of finance, industrialization in France during the 19th century was extremely sluggish. In the end, it invested more money in Russia than it did in itself. At the end of the 19th century, northern nations like Norway, Denmark, and Finland had industrialized but had no interest in colonizing. Thus it seems like the imperialists wanted more than just resources.

Karl Kautsky postulated that imperialism results from the persistent desire of industrialized capitalist nations to enlarge the agricultural regions dependent on them. Only when the hinterland builds its own industrial capability and uses the tool of protective tariffs to break free from its economic dependence does sovereignty become important.

Social Reasons

According to Joseph Schumpeter, the older pre-capitalist class whose riches depended on expansionist strategies were motivated by economic considerations. Only Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia were truly imperialist nations because imperialism flourished where absolutism had the strongest hold. According to this argument, when modern industries developed, the Yukur class felt as though the entrepreneurial elite was pushing them out of the way. They could only keep their position by putting the military at the center, which was crucial in colonialism.

Few others believe that imperialism was all about balancing and unbalancing power relations. The conservative argument states that imperialism was required to uphold the current social order and prevent social revolution in the more industrialized nations. On a similar note, political theorists argue that imperialism was simply a manifestation of the balance of power and through this a nation tried to achieve favorable change in the status quo. The notion of prestige and power was advanced by D.K. Fieldhouse. The desire to establish national prestige meant gaining "places in the sun" for the French and the Germans.

Cultural Reasons

But the most popular arguments are probably the racist ones. Charles Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest was applied to social conditions by Herbert Spencer, resulting in the argument of Social Darwinism, which claimed that White European conquerors were more biologically adapted to the struggle for survival than the colonized. The White Man's Burden by Rudyard Kipling suggested that they had the "burden" of conveying the blessings to the native people. The ‘best race’, the whites had taken up the responsibility of ‘taming’ the “fluttered folk” and “wild”, the “half devil, half child”, without actually consulting if the natives wanted their ‘superior culture.’

This is expanded into the favor argument. It is argued that imperialism also had a humanitarian achievement of abolishing slavery. However, it is imperative to point out that these countries were the ones who started it. Establishment of Indian universities, introduction of technologies like steamships, canals and railways were turned to beneficial ends. However, the technologies were first introduced only to aid British functioning. It was argued that the Western medicine benefited indigenous people by eradicating epidemics- cholera, yellow fever, malaria, dysentery and plague. But it spread more diseases than it eradicated.

As pointed out by Edward Said, the formation of imperial culture has major roots in Orientalism, illustrated by disparaging and unflattering assertions and stereotypes. In terms of popular culture, Victorian era novels such as Jane Eyre (which contrasts Indianness with the true Christian British self) and adventures of Sherlock Holmes, (associating the East with wealth, mystery, and criminality), are classic instances of panoptical delusion.

Perceptions rooted in culture govern acculturation of ideas and goods: cross culturalization was also marked by exotica. Claude Monet’s water lilies and Japanese bridge displays an Asian-influenced water garden with a shade of spirituality in Giverny, France. Paul Gaugin painted the locals of the Pacific island of Tahiti with an intense focus on /through the prism of sexuality.Maile Arvin notably observes that a logic of possession through whiteness animates colonial subject, transforming both the land and its people into exotic, feminine objects owned by the whites. Thus the mimetic response to defend the tyranny of "the other" and boost imperial self-esteem was to create a cultural contrast between Europeans and Non-Europeans.

What do you think were the key drivers of European colonialism? Let us know below.

Bibliography

• Joll, James. "Europe since 1870: an international history." (No Title) (1973).

• Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson. "The imperialism of free trade." The Economic History Review 6.1 (1953): 1-15.

• Brewer, Tony. Marxist theories of imperialism: A critical survey. Routledge, 2002.

• Etherington, Norman. "Reconsidering theories of imperialism." History and Theory 21.1 (1982): 1-36.

• Porter, Andrew. "European Imperialism, 1860-1914." (2016).

• Pugh, Martin, ed. A companion to modern European history: 1871-1945. John Wiley & Sons, 1997.

Author Bio

Aarushi is a graduate in History honors from Miranda House, University of Delhi. Her areas of interest include Medieval history and Art history. She likes watching movies and writing blog reviews. She is also interested in sketching, origami and semantics.

Parthika is a graduate in History honors from Miranda House, University of Delhi. Her interest lies in Mughal History, Art Restoration and linguistics. She loves painting, clicking photographs, engaging in impromptu choreography and learning new strings on her guitar.