The Korean War (1950-53) pitted the capitalist South Korea, backed by the U.S., against communist North Korea. A major offensive by South Korea ultimately led to Communist China becoming involved in the war.
Here, Victor Gamma considers how failures in the U.S. understanding of China’s intentions and over-confidence that China would not intervene led to the U.S. backed forces moving ever closer to China and the eventual Chinese counter-attack.
If you missed it, part 1 on how the U.S. backed forces moving very close to the Chinese border is here.
U.S. soldiers with a tank make their way through the streets of Hyesanjin in November 1950.
“Home for Christmas”
UN forces continued their advance into North Korea, Pyongyang falling to South Korean troops on October 20. MacArthur quickly ordered his forces to continue their advance toward the border with China. The Eighth Army under General Walker advanced along the West Coast and the X Corp moved up the eastern side of the peninsula. The Chinese watched this advance warily. They decided that the UN's goal was now to invade China and overthrow the communist government. For his part, MacArthur demonstrated his complete disregard of Chinese capacity to disrupt his plans by neglecting basic rules of military science. He allowed his forces to become divided and advance toward a potentially significantly larger enemy army. The Chinese, in fact, had up to 500,000 troops massed in Manchuria. The potential enemy was close to his base of supplies, while his own men had now outrun their own. In addition, the Eighth Army and X Corps were divided by a thirty-mile gap of extremely hilly terrain that made communications by phone impossible. Despite this, MacArthur urged his men forward until some units began to reach the Yalu River. The Chinese commander, General Lin Piao, now gathered his strength and waited for the UN forces to come within striking distance. In late October, 1950, the Chinese launched a series of probing attacks to gauge enemy strengths and reactions. The positive results convinced the Chinese that they could be successful in a major offensive. They withdrew their forces, giving the illusion of a retreat. American commanders accepted this as a fact, noting the drubbing the 7th Regiment gave to the Chinese and assumed they were in headlong retreat back to China. The reduction of fighting convinced many that the war was over. The misgivings of General Walker, commander of the Eighth Army concerning the supply situation, which was becoming critically short of needs for his widely scattered forces, were ignored.
Also reflecting the lack of concern over the Chinese, the contingency plans of the UN failed to follow sound principles of military intelligence. The enemy's capabilities, not his possible or probable intentions, are supposed to form the basis for contingency plans. By the time the Chinese had begun to infiltrate troops into North Korea to begin their First Phase Offensive, the United States-dominated UN command decided that if the Chinese had wanted to intervene, they would have done so earlier. By the time UN forces approached the Yalu River, it was held that the Chinese had missed their chance. The monitoring for possible Chinese intervention was therefore reduced. The capability of the Chinese to intervene was not considered. The massive buildup in Manchuria and the infiltration into North Korea was mostly missed by intelligence. In late October the first clashes with Chinese units occurred. However, this did not result in a major revision of contingency plans.Increasing reports of a Chinese buildup were spurned by senior intelligence and higher level commanders. American generals were focused on the Yalu River and ending the war. They did not want to consider the possibility of a protracted conflict. On November 24 MacArthur visited the front and repeated his promise that the troops would be home for Christmas once they reached the Yalu. Coupled with this massive failure of intelligence were the considerable abilities of the Chinese to remain unobserved. The Chinese secretly infiltrated divisions into the barren wastes of North Korea to the tune of 100,000, undetected by the UN forces. This success owed much not merely to American intelligence failings but Chinese skill at concealing their movements. Chinese troops had been trained to avoid any movement at the sight of enemy aircraft. They moved mostly at night. They moved mostly by foot. Since they did not use motorized vehicles on a large-scale, they were harder to spot. In contrast, UN units raised huge clouds of dust with even one vehicle as they moved along the unpaved roads of Korea.
The End Result
For the location of the attack, the Chinese wisely chose an area that would reduce the technical superiority of UN forces: the rugged terrain between the divided UN forces. The Eighth Army and X Corps should have been linked in a strong defensive line, but MacArthur deemed such a plan overly cautious. Additionally, the Supreme Commander believed that this terrain was too rugged for military operations. The battle was fought in a terrain that made communications and operations difficult. Ch'ongch'on River valley features a landscape so hilly that a mechanized army was effectively hindered in its movements. Thus, the UN superiority in equipment was largely overcome. The lack of flat places made setting up command posts or medical stations difficult or impossible. The endless hills also blocked vision and hearing. It became almost impossible for units to effectively support one another. Units often fought in isolation. UN forces also had not been trained to cope with harsh winter conditions. Many made the mistake of crossing streams or rivers in their pants. As a result some units had to have their clothing cut off because it had frozen solid.
The UN forces began to encounter Chinese tactics as they neared the Yalu River. The Chinese tactics were the result of the conditions in China. They were hopelessly outgunned by UN forces, lacking equipment both in quality and quantity. Many Chinese soldiers attacked without a firearm and were expected to obtain captured or abandoned equipment from the enemy. Some even fought with spears improvised from enemy vehicles. However, they made up for these deficiencies with a number of devices. First and foremost, the Chinese took full advantage of their enormous reserves of manpower. They favored attacks by masses of men who rushed a smaller enemy unit from all sides. The Chinese 'human wave' was a reflection of manpower strength and a disregard for human life the UN forces found shocking.
On November 24 MacArthur ordered a general offensive toward the Yalu River of his already tired and battered forces. In defiance of President Truman's specific orders, American units were ordered to advance along with Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. Forward units of the Eighth Army, including the American Second Division, began crossing the Ch'ongch'on River on the morning of November 24th. Due to the difficult terrain and probable overconfidence, they left most of their supplies south of the River including extra grenades and overcoats. On November 25-26 the Chinese attacked along the entire Korean front. As a part of a larger Chinese operation termed the Second Phase Campaign Western Sector, the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) 40th Army attacked across the Ch'ongch'on. These forces were reconstituted to avoid official war with the United States - officially, they were “volunteers” helping the North Koreans. At this time the Eighth Army was not in a good defensive posture. The advance units attacked by the Chinese were strung out. The ROK division on the right flank of the Eighth Army disintegrated and was now in danger of envelopment. A halt order was given to the Eighth Army but a panicked retreat soon developed. Despite this, the Eighth Army command continued to underestimate the seriousness of the situation and so failed to take effective counter measures such as ordering retreating troops to strategic points. Air attacks against the Chinese took a huge toll but did not stop the retreat. On November 27, the U.S. divisions retreated south of the Ch'ongch'on River and ultimately south of the 38th Parallel.
Long-term consequences
The battle permanently ended hopes for an early victory to the Korean conflict. A conflict limited to the Korean Peninsula now involved the world's most populous nation, threatening to explode into global war. Politically the battle led to the abandonment of United Nations efforts to achieve a unified Korea and a subsequent proposal to continue the division of the peninsula along the 38th Parallel to the Chinese by December 11. Had UN forces been expecting a large-scale Chinese attack and had the officials in charge taken measures to prepare for it, the battle either would not have occurred or at least the magnitude of the disaster could have been reduced. Possibly, the on-going difficulties with the North Korean regime would not exist. Nor would the presence of so many U.S. forces be necessary.
In retrospect, senior U.S. military and political leaders often failed in their ability to evaluate and act on quality intelligence. A soldier is often only as good as his commanding officers. The men closest to the action, including field commanders such as General Walker of the Eighth Army and General Almond of X Corps and their troops, had a much more accurate view of the situation, but their repeated warnings were dismissed. The same condition existed in intelligence with excellent information being interpreted as a bluff or simply ignored.
Now, you can also read Victor’s article on Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon here.
Finally, why do you think many in the U.S. did not think China would join the Korean War? Let us know below.
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"Analysis:The Foreign Interventions:Stalin and USSR" www.mtholyoke.edu/~park25h/classweb/worldpolitics/analysisstalin.html)
