Russia’s 4 Great Resets: From the Romanovs to the End of the Cold War

Russian history has been beset with a number of seismic changes. Here, Daniel McEwen considers four key ‘resets’ in Russian history – the start of the Romanov dynasty, two early 20th century revolutions, and the end of the Cold War.

Vladimir Lenin, a beneficiary of one of Russia’s ‘resets’. A 1920 depiction by artist Isaak Brodsky.

“Reset” was the buzzword on speakers’ lips this past January during [an online version of] the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In words as lofty as the Alps in the background, Klaus Schwab, the event’s impassioned founder hailed the Covid pandemic as “a rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, re-imagine, and reset our world." 

Ironically, his idea was swept overboard by Covid’s next wave and hasn’t returned, perhaps because its advocates have since checked their history books. Resets have a chequered track record at best, with the 1789 French Revolution revered as the most notable, the Russian Revolution as the most execrable. And it was only one of that country’s four attempts to exploit a “rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, re-imagine, and reset their world ". Their failure explains why journalist Vladimir Pozner arguing Russia has never really been a democracy.

Reset #1 - 1613

Ivan the Terrible is dead. One third of the fledgling nation’s population has been wiped out in the internecine warfare known as “The Time of Troubles”. Weak and leaderless, the country is beset by enemies on all borders. Desperate to end the violence, the Zemsky Sobor, an assembly of the realm’s elites, gather to reset their system of governance. 

This was a mountaintop moment in the country’s history, never to be repeated; a singular chance for Russians to shrug off the yoke of autocracy and rule themselves. But not one of the gathered could spell democracy let alone run one. Self-rule sounded like a lot of work. Had Fyodor Dostoevsky lived then, no doubt he would have been heard telling his countrymen that: “to go wrong in one's own way is better than to go right in someone else's.” Not that anyone would have listened. Instead of a reset, they rebooted the old system. 

Historian Abraham Pailtsyn listened in on this assembly and was struck by what he didn’t hear – there was nobody speaking up for running the country for the people. Easier to just hand things over to the Romanov clan, the least objectionable of several candidates for the job. It was led by a 16 year-old teenager. His first official act was to hang a rival for the throne and his eight-year-old son, setting the tone for the next three hundred years.

Pailtsyn blamed this fateful lethargy on a deep national apathy.

Indeed it was. The appalling inhumanity of serfdom under the Romanov’s thumb approached can be compared to slavery. Nine tenths of the population lived in squalor, worked like beasts of burden to generate the unconscionable wealth enjoyed by the other one tenth. Little wonder the largest country in the world could do no better than a GDP barely equal to Spain’s! Quaintly embarrassing at first, this state-sponsored feudalism threatened the empire’s very survival when the forces of technological, social and political change began shifting the tectonic plates of world power. 

Had it been the best of times, czarist Russia would still have needed Paladins of Enlightenment to guide it along the perilous path to modernization. But it was the worst of times - disingenuous czars, amply aided and abetted by motley crews of corrupt cabinet ministers, sadistic secret police and a supine nobility used brutality and repression to manipulate modernization to their exclusive benefit.  

Typical of their tactics was the subverting of the abolition of serfdom, often depicted as the country’s ‘Great Leap Forward‘ to social and economic modernity. Some leap. Russia’s Emancipation Act of 1860 improved the quality of life for serfs about as much as the American Emancipation Act three years later improved the quality of life of slaves there. The czar and his minions retroactively limited, diluted and prolonged their people’s emancipation. At least freed American slaves did not have to pay compensation to their owners for the loss of their labor as was required of Russian serfs. In the end, emancipation offered the overwhelming majority of Russians basically two career options: over-worked, underpaid farmer or over-worked, underpaid factory worker.

Reset #2 - 1905

Still considered by many to be the ‘real’ Russian Revolution, this aborted reset was the high-water mark of Romanov duplicity. Japan had sent Czar Nicholas’ grand vision of a Pacific Empire to the bottom of Tsushima Bay in a naval defeat so shameful it nearly cost him his throne. Humiliated, he was forced to agree to a constitutional monarchy. Bells rang throughout the kingdom, people partied in the streets, and newspaper editors rhapsodized about the dawning on a new age of freedom. 

All the man had to do was keep his word and he, his family and some hundred million Russians would have lived happily ever after, never having heard of Vladimir Lenin. But always more a ruler than a leader, Nicholas stayed true to his family colors and cravenly reneged on the deal, dismissing the reformers behind it as deluded dreamers. Egged on by a witless wife in the thrall of a charlatan monk, Nicholas all but dedicated the last twelve years of his reign to giving those dreamers even more reasons to want to him gone – dead or alive!

Reset #3 - 1917

Three years into World War One, two million Russian soldiers are dead and five times that number of peasants have died of starvation or disease. Millions more face the same fate, caught between the scorched earth policy of their own retreating soldiers and the pillaging by the advancing German troops. In the cities, people are starving to death, if they don’t freeze first, awaiting trains of wheat that rarely arrive. Ever bereft of empathy or wisdom, Nicholas felt not the slightest obligation to feed his own people, breaking their three-hundred year near-religious faith in the Czar as an all-knowing, all-caring ‘Little Father’. Not surprisingly, none of them felt the slightest obligation to save him when mutinous troops stopped his train. He went without a whimper. The bang was still to come.

Free at last of their Romanov masters, there was none of the apathy of 1613 and no going back like in 1905. This time rank and file Russians knew exactly what they wanted: participation in power, a fairer share of the nation’s wealth and no more czars! Unlike 1613, this time there was lots of talk. And talk. And talk. And so enters a man author/historian Edward Crankshaw described as “one more bacillus let loose to spread infection in a tottering and exhausted Russia.” 

How Russians ended up with Vladimir Lenin and the tyrannical czars of Bolshevism is a question a library of books have attempted to answer. The most charitable explanation seems to be that a destitute, disillusioned people were simply too cold and too hungry to read the fine print on their deal with the Devil. 

However it happened, Vladimir Lenin played a ghastly game of bait-and-switch, promising ‘Peace, Bread, Land’, but delivering war, terror and death. For this unwitting lapse of judgment, another ten million citizens would perish in the civil war that followed World War One. Its hapless survivors were condemned to seventy years in the gulag of Soviet-style socialism, notorious for short trials and long bread lines. Tellingly, the USSR’s GDP did not rise above a third that of arch-rival America’s.

Reset #4 - 1991

The catastrophic Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 opened Russians’ eyes to the true magnitude of the corruption and incompetence inherent in the Soviet system. Profoundly shocked, they began publicly questioning their leaders’ fitness for office. Five years later the Berlin Wall fell, burying Leninism in the rubble. At that time, per capita GDP was $23,000 in the United States, $16,000 in Western Europe and $6,800 in the rapidly dissolving ‘workers’ paradise’.

The Soviet Union was formally dissolved on December 26, 1991 but much to their dismay, the long-suffering proletariat were no sooner free of the iron grip of communism than Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to shackle them to unregulated capitalism – and barely escaped with his life for his trouble! When the dust of Glasnost had settled, Vladimir Putin and his oligarch friends had installed themselves in the Kremlin. While he labors mightily to restore the nation to a dubious former glory, its inglorious GDP has now shrunk to one-fifteenth that of United States.

What’s next?

Speculation about when and how Reset #5 will occur keeps pundits’ tongues wagging. Incredibly, the notion persists that Russians actually like strongman rulers. No one likes being bullied, surely the Russians least of all.  

What do you think of Russia’s ‘resets’? Let us know below.

How Strong were Britain’s World War Two Alliances with France and the Soviet Union?

Britain had two major alliances in World War Two prior to the USA joining the war. These were with France and the Soviet Union. Here, Steve Prout considers their effectiveness, including how Britain fought with France and also overlooked several aggressive acts committed by the Soviets.

Vichy France leader Petain meeting Hitler in October 1940. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H25217 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

For people who take the Hollywood pictures as gospel the Second World War was essentially one “set of good guys”, being the allies, versus one “set of bad guys”, being the axis.  The reality was far more interesting. Alliances were not as static as is what has been portrayed in such simplistic Hollywood war film formulae or the stories we all enjoyed in our childhood comics.

Not quite standing alone

At no point was Britain alone in facing the Axis threat from the European continent.  From the beginning the combined forces of the Dominions and Commonwealth were present but Britain also had two other principal allies that joined and left at various stages. These were France and the Soviet Union.  The former was an ally that that became for all intents an adversary and the latter started the war in collaboration with the Nazis to be later courted by the British.

France

By the middle of 1940 the allies were in full retreat.  A month after the Dunkirk evacuation France had signed an armistice with Nazi Germany that would establish a “new order” and new political climate in France and her overseas territories.  This new order saw a shift to an Anglo-phobic attitude and the establishment of pro-German authoritarian regime under Petain.

Britain and France: The pre-war alliance

There was always underlying tension in Franco-British relations. As recent as the 1890s both nations almost come to blows over the Fashoda incident due to colonial rivalry.  However, the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the World War I alliance managed to put a plaster of sorts over such differences, but there still deep down remained the old suspicions as demonstrated in 1925 in the Treaty of Lausanne and disagreements over the treatment of Weimar Germany.  

However, these differences did not prevent these two nations from collaborating again in the face of a growing and repeat threat from Germany.  Britain and France were to form a military alliance to contain German aggression in 1939 but by June 1940 this came to an end with French defeat and subsequent armistice.

Tensions already existed and were growing even before the allied armies were awaiting evacuation from Dunkirk and considering surrender terms. During the life of the allied alliance, as France saw herself contributing most of the land forces compared to a smaller British contribution who had, by the time of Dunkirk, only contributed less than ten divisions, one tenth of the allied force.  Further reluctance to commit the RAF fighters as events turned even more impossible meant France saw Britain as only looking out for her own interests and not fully committed to the alliance. The actions and the clumsy rhetorical manner of some of the British high command, primarily Lord Gort, did little to persuade the French that the British had no other reasons than self-preservation.

French soldiers were repatriated from British shores back to their home soil less than a week after the mass evacuation, with no commitment of significant British forces. It was very much now seen as a separate battle of France and a separate battle of Britain with France being left to her fate.  Churchill, to restore faith and confidence, offered a union of the two nations but Petain likened it to being “fused with a corpse” and senior ministers considered “better a Nazi province at least we know what that means”.  To say it was a non-starter would be an understatement and so the Vichy Government was formed.

Life after the French Surrender - Vichy

Once the armistice was signed a defeated France adopted an Anglo-phobic stance and established a near fascist state seeking parity with Germany and a part in the New Order. British and French forces would soon clash in various areas of the globe.

The British were concerned that the French Navy and the French colonies would be utilized by the axis against Britain.  Churchill feared the Nazis would demand the surrender of the French Fleet.  Unbeknown to Britain, Germany at the time did not require the surrender of the fleet but German intentions offered no reassurances and so the British warned the French to surrender or face destruction of their fleet as a last resort, which the British navy high command were loathe to do.  The French refused to surrender the fleet and so hostilities commenced.

Fighting with the French – “an old and new adversary”

The first clash in July 1940 was in very limited scale and saw four casualties with three deaths (British) from small arms fire in Devonport, Plymouth as the Royal Navy boarded the destroyer Sarcouf which was docked in British waters.  A wider scale operation named Operation catapult a few weeks later saw the destruction of a large part of the French Fleet and the deaths of 1,300 French sailors at Mers-Al-Kebir, Algeria. The political damage was more severe and the propaganda value to the Nazis was invaluable. The French were in an unforgiving mood.

In September 1940 the loyalty to Vichy and unforgiving attitude to the British had reached the far reaches of the French Empire.  The British and a Free French force were repulsed at the French colony in Dakar, Senegal.  What was apparent was not only hatred for the British but also dislike for the De Gaulle’s Free French movement whom his countrymen seemed to largely view as a traitor.  In retaliation to this attack French bombers flew two sorties over Gibraltar, again causing limited damage.  This was enough to find favor with the Germans but minimal enough not to cause any British reprisals.

Dakar presented many oddities and revelations. It tested the resolve of Vichy and the real level of support of De Gaulle and his Free French movement.  It was set apart from the main theatre in Europe - French fought fellow countrymen and Vichy forces used US planes to fight French and British counterparts.  Nowhere in this were the axis forces, the principal enemies.  The British would fail in this operation.

Britain would find herself in conflict in Syria and the Middle East against significant Vichy French Forces. Admiral Darlan wanted to assist the Germans by offering the territory to oust the British from Iraq and take the Iraqi oil and resources, but the Germans had other ideas and both objectives were nevertheless unsuccessful. Meanwhile, in Europe, Petain, like Darlan would continue to win German favor to achieve equal status with Germany in the European New Order. 

France’s behavior was not helped by British actions like Dakar and Mers-El-Kebir, but on balance was understandable for the time in the face of nefarious Nazi intentions.  Admiral Darlan however alludes to a deep distrust he held to his former ally - in December 1941 he was quoted as saying “I worked with the English for fifteen years, they always lied to me. I’ve negotiated with the Germans for 3 months, and they have never misled me.”  It is said that Darlan was finding excuses retrospectively, however flimsy, to account for his collaboration tendencies. On close inspection of De Gaulle’s Free French army and the domestic resistance forces, several sources say this contribution and effectiveness has been inflated and exaggerated over time to hide the shame of collaboration by Vichy France, who had become effectively a co-operative and willing German vassal.

It is interesting also that twenty thousand servicemen chose to join the SS Charlemagne and were one of the last divisions to hold out tenaciously in 1945 in Berlin.  On top of the forty thousand personnel in Vichy Syria and West Africa, 200 Vichy airmen in Europe, a significant French force, had opposed their former ally.  The numbers even suggest that France was truly a co-operative German Vassal.

There were to be more twists and turns. In another bizarre yet tragic twist of fate, the French themselves in November 1942 scuttled their own fleet in Toulon when the Nazis attempted to take the French feet and hand it over to Italy. At the same time Darlan, conveniently forgetting his Anglophobia, also defected to the allies.

The USSR “Supping with the devil” – the unlikely alliance

In June 1941, a year after the French surrender, Britain entered an alliance with the USSR after the German invasion, Operation Barbarossa. There were pre-war efforts to bring the Soviets on the allied side, but Polish objections and allied deliberations derailed this.

It was a curious pairing when looking at the recent history of the USSR at the time, which was anything but reassuring. There are few who could argue with Churchill’s analogy about “supping with the devil” to achieve victory as the USSR was a totalitarian state equally as barbaric and ruthless as Hitler’s Germany.  The more divisions that were used on the Eastern Front, the fewer there would be on the Western Front.  The strategy for the west was simple - the human cost would be borne by the Soviets. Stalin saw through this, under no illusion and prepared to pay this. It was more an alliance of expediency and it would barely endure the end of the war itself.  Suspicion between the Allies and the USSR was present throughout.

British minds had been wary of Russia since as far back as the Crimean War, with an only a brief respite in World War One.  Despite royal family ties there was still an abhorrence of the “Russian Bear”. The communist revolution in 1917 and the subsequent events did little help this.

During Stalin’s purges in the 1930s Britain managed to ignore the fact that some her own subjects in the Soviet Union had become victims of the purge. On the economic front the USSR’s five-year plans had advanced her industrial capacity, becoming a rival for the Western industrial powers which at the same time inspired international supporters of communism.  The involvement of the USSR in the Spanish Civil War was also interpreted as a Soviet communist regime trying to impose itself on the Western sphere of influence.

Throughout the 1930s the Germans had been broadcasting venomous propaganda against the USSR. Then something very unexpected happened. Stalin in August 1939 signed the infamous Nazi-Soviet pact, which gave Hitler the open door to begin World War Two because he was no longer contained and fearing a war on two fronts.

As the Nazis invaded the West of Poland, Stalin took full advantage of the recent pact and invaded the Eastern Part and imposed a Soviet form of brutality that was not dissimilar to the Nazis’.  Soviet territorial ambition was not limited to Poland. In December 1939, Stalin began a bitter four-month Winter War with Finland where eventually the USSR took 11% of Finnish territory.  After worldwide condemnation, the USSR followed the example of other aggressor states such as Germany, Italy and Japan and left the League of Nations.

Not only had the USSR allowed the war to happen at this stage, they also violated further sovereign states by annexing Bessarabia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to their territorial gain, thus re-acquiring newly independent territories that she lost after the First World War.

Clearly a deal with the Nazis was more beneficial to the USSR and the excuse that these acquisitions offered a buffer against German strength was a weak one used in hindsight, as the USSR was a co-operative ally in all areas and cut from the same cloth as the axis powers.  There was little threat from the East due to a Neutrality Pact signed in 1941 between Japan and the USSR, freeing Japan to wage her own war. The USSR was in every event an Axis ally.  It is interesting to note that the two very pacts the USSR signed with Japan and Germany were highly instrumental in allowing both a European War and Pacific war to happen.  Was appeasement’s failure the only reason for the start of World War Two?

Curiously the pretext that drove Britain to declare war on Germany, namely the invasion of Poland, was not strong enough to provoke a similar action against Russia who did the same thing.  Interestingly the West at an early point in the war considered the USSR an enemy and considered military action in two arenas. Whilst the Winter War with Finland was in progress Britain and France considered bombing areas of Russia such as the oil fields of Baku. Also, during the Nazi’s Norwegian Campaign in 1940 the motive was not only to deprive Germany of Iron Ore from Scandinavia; it was also to assist the Finns by creating a supply route in their fight against the USSR. 

Katyn and Iran

This alliance, until close to the war’s end, would center only on Europe, with Britain and later America taking on Japan with minimal Soviet help. The benefit in this alliance meant the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Act enabled Stalin to move military resource from the eastern reaches of the USSR to the western theatre of war.  

The British would deliberately overlook Soviet perfidy as displayed with the discovery of a massacre of twenty thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. They would help propagate lies that placed the responsibility on the Germans rather than the Soviets for the sake of the wartime alliance. They would at the same time pressure another ally, the Polish Government in exile, to accept these falsities.

The first military act with the USSR was a joint invasion of Iran to deny the axis powers access to the Middle East and allow an alternative corridor to supply the Soviet Union. This would not be to the Iranians’ benefit. Indeed, what the Soviets and British were prepared to do in other sovereign states show what the British would conveniently overlook once again. 

Both occupying powers commandeered much of Iran’s grain supplies for their own troops, which caused hyperinflation and starvation in Iran.  After the war the Soviets reneged on the promised withdrawal after Hitler’s defeat, and continued to occupy the country until 1946 after trying to set up two short-lived separatist and destabilizing republics on Iran’s border. 

Conclusion

The period of history from the beginning of the war until the German invasion of the USSR was an ever-changing political landscape of alliances and allies becoming foes and foes becoming allies.  This period has many other interesting oddities, peculiarities, and different perspectives but that is for another time.

What do you think of Britain’s World War Two alliances with France and the Soviet Union? Let us know below.

Now, you can read Steve’s article here on “Britain and the 1920 Iraq Mandate: Signs of the British Empire’s Decline?”

Was the Italian Military in World War 2 Really that Bad?

The Italian military has often been portrayed as having not performed very well in World War Two. But is that true? Here, Daniel Boustead looks at this by considering the Italian wars in the 1930s, their impact on Italy’s performance in World War Two, and how Italy fared during fighting in the war itself.

Italian Troops in Addis Ababa during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War in May 1936.

In the years following World War II, the Italian military has been satirized in popular culture as well as historical scholarship. The Italian military was weakened by military conquests in Ethiopia, Spain and Albania before World War II. Their equipment, weapons and leadership were inadequate which caused their numerous defeats. Furthermore, while the 10a Flottiglia MAS was the most successful unit, it pales when compared to British Special Forces and German Special Forces. The unpopularity of the war and lack of Italian military success resulted in Mussolini’s fall from power in July 1943. Civil war followed.  Was Italy’s Military the weakest Axis Power? Let’s examine the facts.

Wars in the 1930s

On October 2, 1935 Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) and did not conquer the country until May 5, 1936, when Italian troops entered the capital of Addis Ababa ([1]). The Ethiopian war cost the Italians about 1,500 men ([2]). The Italian support to Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War (from 1936 to 1939) cost the Italians 3,819 soldiers dead and 8.5 billion lire ([3]). The Italian military conquered the country of Albania in April 1939 ([4]). While the conquest of Albania was a success, it exposed the problems that plagued the Italian Army in the coming conflict. In Albania, the Italian military sent men who had never operated motorcycles to motorcycle companies (5). They sent men who did not even know Morse Code to signal units! (5) A member of the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano’s staff commented about the Italian military’s performance in Albania saying, “If the Albanians had possessed one well-armed fire brigade they could have driven us back into the Adriatic” (5).  By the time Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Italy had drained away the gold it had collected from its citizens during the Ethiopian war of 1935 to 1936 (6). This meant that Italy did not have enough gold to help finance a major conflict (7). These small conflicts combined with the Spanish Civil War debt would result in fatal consequences when Italy entered the war in 1940.

Entering World War II

The Italian military was not ready to go to the war by the time Mussolini declared war on France and Great Britain on June 10, 1940(9). The Fascist Italian military organization was so inept that the Army, Navy, and Air Force would frequently squabble, plot and sometimes spy on one another’s activities (8). Dictator Benito Mussolini’s belief that “Italy was an unsinkable aircraft carrier” and his decision to place all of Italy’s air power under the command of the Italian Air Force, deprived the Royal Italian Navy of an air force and aircraft carriers (8). The Italian Navy became dependent on the Royal Italian Air Force for both long-range reconnaissance and for air cover in its many battles in the Mediterranean (8). The Air Force would fail in their assigned duties at such battles as the Battle of Cape Spada and the Battle of Calabria (8). The military command was flawed because promotion came as often by political favoritism as by military skill (10).  Mussolini not only stifled debate in his military, but even fired one general on the spot for counseling him not to go to war, and he judged his military officers almost solely on “Fascist merits”(10). 

The Royal Italian Army had a lack of uniforms and equipment, which badly compromised their battle readiness (10). The recruits usually were trained less than the required 18 months that was prescribed by Italian law (10). In 1940 the Royal Italian Army had rifles that dated back to 1891, horse drawn artillery, no heavy tanks, 70 medium tanks, and 1,500 light tanks that had armor that was so thin machine gun bullets could penetrate them (11). They were ill-equipped, ill-trained, and skeptical of Fascism’s propaganda (10). In 1940 the Royal Italian Air Force only had 3,296 fighters and bombers, and they had neither the speed nor the armament to match Allied Fighters (10). The Royal Italian Navy’s ships were also not equipped with radar, which would prove a fatal flaw in various battles to come (12).

1940 to 1941

The Italian military would suffer numerous defeats in 1940 and 1941. The combination of lack of radar, lack of aircraft carriers, poor reconnaissance and air support resulted in 1 out of 2 Royal Italian light cruisers being lost at the Battle of Cape Spada against the British Royal Navy in July, 1940 (13). The Royal Italian Army invaded Egypt on September 13, 1940 (14). The British forces launched Operation Compass to counter the Italian invasion on December 9, 1940 (15). By the time Operation Compass ended in February 1941, the British forces had pushed the Italians 500 miles back into Libya and taken 130,000 Italians as prisoners (16). The Italians were rescued in North Africa when the Germans sent the Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel (16).

On October 28, 1940 the Italian Army invaded Greece (17). By the end of December 1940 the Greek Army drove the Italians out of Greece and were controlling more then one quarter of Albania (18). Hitler decided in November 1940, in the immediate aftermath of Mussolini’s invasion of Greece, to also invade Greece. This was not so much to bail out Mussolini but to protect and to prevent British Royal Air Force bombers from bombing the Ploesti Romanian oil fields that were supplying his forces for the invasion of the Soviet Union (19). Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union was initially scheduled for May 1941 (19). Indeed, had Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in May 1941 the war in the east might have turned out differently.

On November 11 to 12, 1940 the British Navy launched an aircraft carrier raid on the Italian fleet at Taranto, Italy (20). This raid resulted in three battleships, two cruisers, and two destroyers being sunk or severely damaged (20). They were useless for months (20). The raid on Taranto also forced the Italian Navy to retire to Naples (20). This was too far to be a hindrance against British convoys in the Mediterranean (20). In late March 1941 the British Royal Navy, using intelligence from Bletchley Park’s Ultra and exploiting the Italian’s ship lack of radar, fought the Battle of  Matapan (21). Italy lost three cruisers, two destroyers, and 2,400 men (21). The defeat at the Battle of Matapan was so devastating for the Italian Navy that Mussolini ordered his fleet confined to waters under firm Italian control (22). Fascist Italy’s military also suffered a further defeat on May 5, 1941 when Haile Selassie and his British forces entered the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa (23).

A more successful attack

The 10th MAS Flotilla was formed on March 15, 1941 and consisted of Frogman, Manned Torpedoes, and Assault Motorboats and was renamed Xa Flotilla in autumn 1943 (24). This group in both incarnations sunk, between March 1941 and April 1945, 12 Allied ships and damaged two British Battleships (25). The 10th Flotilla MAS’s units’ greatest success came in December 1941 when their frogman severely damaged the British Battleships HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth (25). This put them out of action for more than a year (25). This action left the British Royal Navy with only three light cruisers, and a handful of destroyers in the east and central Mediterranean, thus altering the balance of naval forces in favor of the Axis (25).

Later in the war

Mussolini was deposed in July 1943, in large part because the Royal Italian Military had suffered numerous defeats, first by the Fascist Grand Council on July 24, 1943 and then by King Victor Emmanuel III on July 25, 1943 (30). The aftermath of Italy’s surrender on September 8, 1943, split the Italian military into two sides, the Kingdom of Italy’s military, which fought for the King, and the other side for Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic (24). Following this, a group of German Paratroopers and SS Soldiers were sent on a raid to rescue deposed Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini at Gran Sasso massif (28). This German Special Forces raid was significant because it allowed Mussolini to rule as head of the German backed Italian Social Republic until his death in April 1945 (29).

The Royal Italian Military’s performance has been much maligned since World War II. Its military was weakened by pre World War II conflicts. Italy was not prepared to go to war in June 1940. The weakness of the Italian military is not a stereotype but an established historical fact. 

What do you think of Italy’s record in World War II? Let us know below.

Now, you can read more World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here and “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here.

[1] Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005. 367. 

[2] Elson, Robert T. Prelude to War. Alexandria: Virginia:  Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977. 158. 

[3] Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005. 402. 

[4] Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 18. 

6 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 39. 

7 Adams, Henry. Italy at War.  Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 33 to 39. 

9 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 21

8 Adams, Henry. Italy at War . Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 53. 

10 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life- Books, Inc. 1982 59.

11 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life-Books, Inc. 1982. 58. 

12 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time Life-Books, Inc. 1982. 61. 

13 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 52 to 53. 

14 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 8. 

15 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 26. 

16 Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 33 to 35. 

17 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. . Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 17. 

18 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 19. 

19 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 22

20 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 72 to 75.

21 Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981. 92 to 98. 

22 Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978. 24. 

23Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 101. 

24Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 8 to 42. 

25 Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 16 to 44. 

30 Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982. 156. 

28 McNab, Chris. Weapon: German Automatic Rifles 1941-45: Gew 41, Gew43, FG 42 and StG 44. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013. 43 to 44. 

29 Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under a Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books, 2005. 506. 

References

Adams, Henry. Italy at War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1982.

Bailey, Ronald H. Partisans and Guerrillas. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1978.

Battistelli, Pier and Crociani, Piero. Elite: 191: Italian Navy & Air Force Elite Units & Special Forces 1940-45. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing. 2013.

Bosworth, R.J.B. Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship 1915-1945. New York: New York. Penguin Books. 2005.

Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977 and 1999. 

Elson, Robert T. Prelude to War. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1977.

Ford, Ken. Campaign: St. Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2001. 

McNab, Chris. Weapon: German Automatic Rifles: 1941-45: Gew 41, Gew 43, FG 42, and StG 44. Osprey Publishing. 2013.

Whipple, A.B.C. The Mediterranean. Alexandria: Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc. 1981.

Why was the Nazi’s Luftwaffe Air Force in Terminal Decline by September and October 1944?

The Nazi Luftwaffe air force played a key role in World War II, causing havoc as it rampaged through Europe in the early years of the war. However, by 1944 it was in terminal decline. Here, Matt Whittaker looks at the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s decline by focusing on September and October 1944.

Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-6 in September 1943. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-487-3066-04 / Boyer / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

Introduction

The Nazi air force, the Luftwaffe, was in a critical spot in September and October 1944. Germany was fighting a three-front war each with demands that put pressure on the economy. The Allied bombing campaign had grown since the start of the year, wreaking havoc with economic and oil industry targets. The D-Day landings in June increased the stresses that wrecked the Luftwaffe in the West.

By September, the Germans got an unexpected gift from the Allies: logistics problems. The Allies could not keep their forces sufficiently supplied. This led to a halt to most pursuit, giving their opponents some space. The air war did not slow, however.

The biggest three issues the Luftwaffe faced were:

1.     The Numbers Game

2.     Fuel Shortages

3.     Training Cuts

The Numbers Game

The battles above Normandy and the attempt to slow the Allied bombing campaign drained the Luftwaffe. Air defense squadrons sent west as reinforcements returned at half strength. Such was the ferocity of the battles from June to August that only 175 operational fighters were available to fight by mid-September (1). 

A big contributor was the change in American fighter tactics. Escort fighters were now freed from the bombers to range ahead, clearing any opposition. Luftwaffe groups were broken up before they organized. Airfields were strafed or fighters lurked, waiting to pounce as their opponents landed. The German pilots tangled with increasingly larger American fighter groups with inexperienced pilots and heavily armed, cumbersome bomber destroyers like FW-190s. Many were shot down before even reaching the bombers. 

On September 11, 1944 the Luftwaffe intercepted an American raid heading for oil refineries. 350 fighters were sent against 700 fighters and 1,100 bombers. 305 made contact with the bombers and escorts; 110 were shot down for a loss rate of 36% (2).  A number of bombers were destroyed, but the Americans could accept such losses. Since early 1944 raids of 1,000 plus bombers and escorts were the norm. Interceptions resulted in high losses with many pilots killed in action (KIA).

September and October were the best wartime production months for Germany, despite strategic bombing. Of 3,821 aircraft that were produced in September, 80% were fighters (3). Despite this increase, the loss rate stayed par with deliveries. Gas and pilot shortages kept many of the planes from being utilized.

Fuel Shortages

The worst predicament facing the Luftwaffe by the fall was the lack of fuel. Since the start of the war, the fuel supply was a great concern. Germany possessed few natural sources. Much of the supply came from the Soviet Union, other Axis governments like Romania or, later, synthetic production. Much has been written about the efforts to protect sites like Ploesti from Allied bombing. 

Beginning in January 1944 the American heavy bombers made a concentrated effort to target Axis refineries and synthetic oil plants. By May, the raids had reduced the output from most sources of aviation gas by 90 percent (4).  These deficiencies could not easily be made up due to the damage. The raids, which had only slowed to support the D-Day campaign, were renewed after August. Flight operations drew on existing fuel supplies which were not replenished quickly. Starting in September, the Luftwaffe grounded many squadrons, leaving mostly fighters because of the shortfalls. Spare ground personnel were formed into infantry units; some were used in the fight at Arnhem. 

The Luftwaffe had to operate with 10% of its fuel requirements for September and October. All manner of methods were undertaken to reduce usage. Pilots had orders not to taxi upon landing or takeoff. Planes were moved with teams of oxen to tow planes into position or hangars.  The shortages cut severely into operations, reducing interceptions and ground attack requests. During Operation Market Garden, more Allied aircraft were downed by flak, rather than in combat. Occasional attacks were made against bridgeheads or supply depots, but the Luftwaffe was seldom seen.

Training Cuts

The double problems of fuel scarcity and rising attrition led to increasing cuts in training hours for novice Luftwaffe pilots. Total hours were cut, starting in 1941. This only grew worse, especially as the war expanded further into Russia, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Losses started to exceed the number of pilots graduating flight schools for service. The increasing clashes with more numerous Allied fighters led to a high death rate. By fall, the average lifespan of a fighter pilot was between 8 and 30 days (5). In an attempt to increase the number of active pilots, bomber squadrons were converted to fighters and flight instructors were transferred to the front lines. The German flight schools reduced hours but even more so with the front-line types that were used. Novice pilots got basic and some advanced instruction but much less in the operational models. German pilots averaged 60 hours of training while British RAF pilots had 225 hours (6).  

As with frontline groups, training fuel allotments were cut, feeding the cycle. Perhaps the greatest hindrance was the introduction of fighters like the P-51, which meant that nowhere in Germany was safe for training. The escorts flew ahead of the bomber streams or in free flights, looking for opportunities. Training flights or their airfields were attacked which meant further reductions.

Conclusion

These two crucial months were when the Luftwaffe’s back was broken. Losses in the first six months of the year led to Allied air supremacy. Still, pressure was building on all fronts but more so in the West. The ramping up of the strategic bombing campaign and the consistent targeting of the fighter arm culminated in this timeframe. Airplane manufacturing reached all-time highs in the fall but increased losses, fewer replacement pilots and a dearth of fuel resulted in an unrecoverable spiral.

Despite the best efforts of its leadership, the Luftwaffe of September and October 1944 was outmatched and outgunned. The short respite while the Allies played logistical catch-up from their advance didn’t last. By the end of October, that spiral was too great.

What do you think of the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s weakening in September and October 1944? Let us know below.

References

1 Zaloga, Steven J., Campaign 270 Operation Market Garden The American Airborne Missions (London: Osprey Publishing 2014), p. 1.

2 Caldwell, Donald and Muller, Richard, The Luftwaffe Over Germany Defense of the Reich (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd. 2014), p. 452.

 3 February 22, 2013 MILAVIA Military Aviation Specials - The Luftwaffe's Comeback in Autumn 1944

 4 May 24, 2016 Luftwaffe Lovers: The role of synthetic fuel in World War II Germany - implications for today by Dr. Peter W. Becker

 5 Murray, Williamson, Strategy for Defeat 1933-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press 1983), p. 302

 6 Murray, Williamson, Strategy for Defeat 1933-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press 1983), p. 452

The Origins of Sesame Street

Sesame Street is an American cultural institution. It started in 1969 and is produced to this day. Here, Douglas Reid looks at the origins of the show.

Then First Lady Barbara Bush on Sesame Street in October 1989.

Do you recall these lines in a song from 1965? 

Counting flowers on the wall,

That don’t bother me at all.

Playing solitaire ‘til dawn,

With a deck of fifty one

Smokin’ cigarettes and

Watchin’ Captain Kangaroo

So don’t tell me I’ve nothing to do”

It is certainly the case that Captain Kangaroo held sway in 1965 but a little green frog was in the wings and he and his muppet gang were about to sweep the clouds away and with them Mr. Bob Keesham, a.k.a. Captain Kangaroo. The prime sweeper was Jim Henson. His early main assistant was Frank Oznowicz, forever after to be known as Frank O. Early additions included Joe Raposo and Caroll Edwin Spinney, who was a child-like man both on and off the set. It can be no surprise that he was Big Bird. Two other major muppets were Cookie Monster (my favorite) and Grover. And the key non-muppet in those early days was Lloyd Morrisette. The next item to be looked at was a name for the show and here is a tale to tell.

A cluster of eight people who made up the Friday afternoon meeting had only one name considered at the time but nobody but nobody liked it – Sesame Street. It was being used tentatively only. Every one hated it. One board member thought it had too many ‘esses.’ Another found it unimaginative. And so on. Then it was decided that until something was agreeable to all they would go with the interim name. No one did and that begs the question, where did the name come from in the first place? 

The name

Just one week earlier Virginia Schoen, a representative of the Children’s Television Workshop (CTW), asked the children to suggest names for the new show and they submitted seven names for her to consider. One of the choices was Sesame Street. And so it prevailed. Virginia never was able to identify the five-year old name-giver. The group had a name for the production. Now it needed a set.

Earlier In the year the CTW had decided that its home base would not be Los Angeles. The unanimous choice was New York. It was felt that the sorts of people needed for this enterprise were to be more easily found here. First a locum was needed.

The board, when first formed, had decided on a set that was a mirror image of contemporary Harlem. A suitable faux Brownstone was erected; complete with stoop and the address for the Brownstone would be 123 Sesame Street. By now it was time to call on good old Joe Reposo for Sesame’s new theme music.

Theme tune

Joe composed the theme music for Sesame Street. It is melodic and simple enough for a child to recognize and even to sing along to but still revealed a musical sophistication. It underscored the footage of joyful children running and the recurring chorus – “Can you tell me how to get to Sesame Street?” So do you ever wonder where the Children’s Television Workshop finds its stories, banter, plays, etc.? Here is a typical “Solve” achieved by the muppets themselves:

Muppets are sitting around a coffee table pretending they are suits (executives).

“Alright, all right. How about this for a title. ‘The two and two are five show.’”

Conference Leader Muppet, ‘Are you crazy? This is supposed to be an educational show. Two plus two don’t make five.’

First Muppet: they don’t? Then how about the two plus two ain’t five show? 

Second Muppet: This is a show for kids. Right? How’s about we call it the little Kiddie show?

All: Sounds all right! We like it!

Third Muppet: But we ought to say something about the show telling it like it is. Maybe the Nitty-Gritty, Little kiddie Show! 

All: Not bad! Yeah! We like that! 

Fourth Muppet: Yeah but “Little Kiddie” can mean any child up to the age of seven or eight. I think we should aim the show right at the preschooler. 

First Muppet: Well then, how about the Itty – Bitty, Nitty – Gritty, Little Kiddie Show? 

Fifth Muppet: But we shouldn’t aim at either just the city kids, or just the country kids, so we call it the Itty – Bitty, Farm and City, Witty – Ditty, Nitty –Gritty, Dog and Kitty, Pretty Little Kiddie Show. 

Judy Collins

By the mid-seventies the Muppets were in full stride. If there ever was a perfect guest on Sesame Street it was Judy Collins. On the day in 1975 that Judy Collins recorded “The Fisherman’s Song” for Sesame Street, a gaggle of Muppets formed an “old salt chorus, some bedecked in yellow oil-skin slickers. It was a scene right out of Gloucester harbor, with nets and lobster traps strewn about and a lighthouse in the distance. Strumming an autoharp at tempo that recalled a sea shanty, Collins poured out the melody clear and true as the Muppets harmonized and danced about. The puppeteers were Jane Henson, Frank Oz, Richard Hunt and Jerry Nelson, invisible to the eye of the camera, but palpable in presence. 

It was an enchantment of a performance. There are other highlights of the visits of Judy Collins that I recall. There was the operatic-alphabetic duet she sang with Snuffleupagus. To a mock – Mozart score, Collins and Snuffy flowed around the street dancing a mini-minuet. 

Judy Collins credited Sesame Street for extending the depth and breadth of her fan base. “People would come up to me at concerts and tell me how much they loved the Yes and No song I did with Bert and Ernie. They were little children when it first aired. They grew up and started coming to my shows.” For them, during a critically important time in their childhood, Sesame Street was the best of all television. If there is, or has been, anything more in sync with a happy, wholesome, and funny childhood on television I have yet to meet it.

Conclusion

However, some teachers are not best pleased – not all by any means and seldom high school teachers. The perpetrators claim little kids come to them already familiar with basic arithmetic and quite at home with the alphabet. This is bad? Apparently they find it too difficult to blend with their own lesson plans. Neither am I a fan of “lesson plans” but that is for another essay on another day. They act the part of being at odds with something wondrous.

I loved Sesame Street as a little person and as a big person. Now that I have no choice but to always be thoughtful and acting like a serious big person I will attempt to leave this stage with all proper decorum:

Me Like Cookie

Me eat Cookie

UMM-UM-UM-UM-UM

What do you think of Sesame Street? Let us know below.

Now, you can read more from Douglas here, with an article on the man whose book may have led to the American Revolution.

The World War Two Japanese Soldiers who Kept Fighting Decades After the War was Over

In the period after World War II the military and the public became aware of Japanese soldiers fighting in the Pacific Islands. These soldiers were later named Japanese holdouts. They did not know that World War II had ended, leading to some intriguing stories. Daniel Boustead explains.

Japanese soldier Hiroo Onoda (on the right) offering his sword to Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he surrendered in 1974.

Emperor Worship and the Bushido Code contributed not only to Japan’s soldiers’ “fight to the death” spirit but also their refusal to surrender. In addition, Japanese military orders, training, and regulations further reinforced this attitude. Japanese soldiers believed that all surrender orders were a work of American propaganda. Thus, some Japanese soldiers held out years after World War II was over

In the Japanese religion of Shintoism the Japanese Emperor was a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu ([1]). This made Emperor Hirohito a Demi-God, who Japanese soldiers gave their lives to (1). This belief was further supported by the Imperial Receipt on Education of 1880, which stated that the Emperor of Japan is a “deity incarnate” and “…the climax of harmony is the sacrifice of the life of a subject for the Emperor” (2). The Japanese religion of Shintoism elevated dying for the Emperor of Japan to a state of grace (2). This reason is why so many Japanese Military service personnel died in multiple battles in the Pacific and Asian theatres - they fought to the death.

Bushido Code

The Bushido Code was also an important philosophy that dominated the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy’s way of thinking. Bushido (or the way of the warrior) evolved from the 9th to 12th centuries CE and was a mixture of Zen, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism and was followed by the Japanese Samurai (3). Bushido stressed martial spirit, self-sacrifice, loyalty, justice, a sense of shame if dishonored, refined comportment, modesty, frugality, and honor being more important than life itself (3). The Zen Buddhism aspect of Bushido also stressed an indifference to pain as an essential virtue (4). Bushido also strongly emphasized self-discipline, loyalty to one’s superiors, and fearlessness in the face of death (5). The philosophy of Bushido existed long after the Japanese Samurai went away, and it found a ready acceptance in the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces (3). Bushido starting appearing in the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces during the reign of Emperor Meiji, who ruled from 1868 to 1912 (5). Captain Rikibei Inogichi elaborated on Bushido by saying “We must give our lives to the Emperor and Country, this is an inborn feeling. We Japanese base our lives on obedience to the Emperor and Country. On the other hand, we wish for the best place in death, according to Bushido”(2). The tradition of Emperor Worship and the Bushido Code is also captured in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Anthem “Umi Yukaba”, which emphasized death in battle and no surrender to the enemy (6). Bushido also motivated some Japanese soldiers to disappear and fight years after the war rather then give themselves up. 

Surrender was not an option

The Imperial Japanese Armed Forces regulations, orders and rules also made death preferable and surrender not an option. The 1928 edition of the document Principles of Strategic Command, deliberately expunged the words defense, retreat, and most importantly surrender, because such words were considered detrimental to the morale and marital spirit of the Japanese soldier (3). The 1908 Imperial Japanese Army’s criminal code contained the following provision: “ A commander who allows his unit to surrender without fighting to the last man or concedes a strategic area to the enemy shall be punishable by death”(6). The Imperial Japanese Army’s Field Service Code contained an additional injunction: “Do not be taken prisoner alive”(6). The Imperial Japanese Army Field Service Code also stated “In defense, always retain the spirit of the attack and maintain freedom of action. Never give up a position, but rather die”(2). Indeed the Imperial Japanese Army’s Field Service Code was not just simple regulations for Japanese soldiers; it was the result of lifelong conditioning in a culture revering honor, loyalty, and obedience to superiors above all else (2). This meant that if a Japanese soldier was to surrender or be captured, according to the Imperial Japanese Army’s Field Service Code, it meant failure to the Emperor and dishonor to soldiers’ families (2). 

Special orders - Hiroo Onoda

In some cases Japanese soldiers were given special orders. The longest holdout soldier, Hiroo Onoda, was given such an order. It was right before Hiroo Onoda was sent to Lubang to conduct guerilla operations against the Americans (7).  His commanding officer of the Eighth Division Commander, Lieutenant General Yokoyama, conveyed this fateful order to Hiroo Onoda by telling him: “You are absolutely forbidden to die by your own hand. It may take three years, it may take five, but whatever happens, we’ll come back for you. Until then, so long as you have one soldier, you are to continue to lead him. You may have to live on coconuts. If that’s the case, live on coconuts! Under no circumstances are you to give up your life voluntarily” (7). Furthermore, while it was Hiroo Onoda’s superiors, Major Taniguchi and Major Takahashi, who instructed him to conduct guerilla operations on Lubang, they had no authority to alter Lieutenant General Yokoyama’s no surrender order (8). Furthermore, Hiroo Onoda told Japanese adventurer Norio Suzuki in 1974 that he would only give himself up by the orders of his immediate superior Major Taniguchi (11). In addition since Hiroo Onoda was not sure that Norio Suzuki was not an enemy agent and thus he could not give away the officers who were above the rank of Major Taniguchi, who were Lieutenant General Yokoyama and Major Takahashi (11). When Major Taniguchi relieved Hiroo Onoda of his duties in 1974 he bypassed Lieutenant General Yokoyama’s no surrender order because Lieutenant General Yokoyama could not be found (9). Also, Hiroo Onoda was trained to view enemy surrender leaflets as tricks (10). Lastly because Hiroo Onoda was trained in unconventional guerilla warfare, his home was the battlefield and there was no going home (10). All these factors help explain why Japanese holdouts existed after the war.

Onoda finally surrendered to his “superior” Major Taniguchi at Wakayama Point, Lubang Island, Philippines on March 9, 1974 (18). Onoda fought a guerrilla war for many years on Lubang, which resulted in one of his fellow soldiers named Kozuka being killed in a shootout with Filipino Police in October 1972 (19).  After Major Taniguchi read Hiroo Onoda’s surrender order he was briefly in a state of shock because he could not believe Japan had lost the war and the war was over! (18)

Captain Sakae Oba

An early example of a Japanese holdout was Captain Sakae Oba. Oba and his 46 men formerly surrendered to the Americans on December 1, 1945 on the Island of Saipan (12). Sakae Oba had evaded capture by the U.S. Marines patrols for 512 days and was nicknamed “The Fox” by the U.S. Marines (12).  In the period of the battle, Sakae Oba was going to commit suicide after a failed attack against the Americans (13). He then realized that if every Imperial Japanese soldier killed himself there would be no Imperial Japanese Army left, which prevented him from doing so (13). Near the fall of Saipan, the vast majority of Japanese soldiers decided to kill themselves in a suicide attack on the American position, while a contradictory order was issued by Vice Admiral Nagumo, commander of Japanese naval forces assigned to Saipan, that said don’t participate in Lieutenant General Saito’s suicide attack and keep fighting because reinforcements were coming (14). Sakae Oba learned of these contradictory orders at Matansha, and decided and that he and his group of men would continue fighting using Mount Tapotchau as a base of operations - while the vast majority of men there decided to die in a suicide attack (14). On July 7, 1944, while 4,000 Japanese soldiers died in a suicide attack west of Matansha, Sakae Oba moved his forces south toward Mount Tapotchau (15). Captain Sakae Oba was persuaded to surrender in late November 1945, when Major General Umahachi Amo, the former commander of Japanese forces on Saipan, gave him documents from the defunct Imperial Japanese Army, that the war was over and that his group should surrender (16). Just before Sakae Oba was repatriated to Japan, he was feted by the U.S. Marine Officers Club on Saipan to honor him for his skill, courage, and tenacity (16). Captain Sakae Oba continued fighting because he believed the war was continuing and as he was cut off from his command, and therefore should continue the war until communication was reestablished and new orders received from his superiors (17). This was different from other Japanese holdouts who had the “fight until the end” mentality or persisted in disbelief that Japan had lost the war (17).

Conclusion

The Philippines became a notorious center of Japanese holdouts after World War II. Indeed during late 1940s there was a sign outside the capital Manila that warned about Japanese soldiers still in the hills (20). More broadly, the phenomenon known as the Japanese holdouts began in the aftermath of World War II. Emperor Worship and the Bushido Code gave the Japanese holdouts the ideological backbone to continue fighting. Japanese military orders, training, and regulations made surrender not an option. Surrender orders were viewed with much suspicion. The common theme of “fight to the death” and not to surrender permeated the Japanese psyche. This inspired the Japanese holdouts to continue to fight long past the end of the war.

What do you think of the World War II Japanese holdouts? Let us know below.

Now, you can read more World War II history from Daniel: “Did World War Two Japanese Kamikaze Attacks have more Impact than Nazi V-2 Rockets?” here and “Japanese attacks on the USA in World War II” here.

[1] Simons, Gerald. Japan At War. Alexandria, VA. Time-Life Books Inc., 1980. 30-31.

2 Rottman, Gordon L. Warrior: Japanese Infantrymen 1937-45: Sword of the Empire. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd, Inc, 2005. 32 

3 Rottman, Gordon L. Warrior: Japanese Infantrymen 1937-45: Sword of the Empire. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd. Inc, 2005. 31. 

4 Simons, Gerald. Japan At War. Alexandria, VA. Time-Life Books Inc., 1980. 32. 

5 Simons, Gerald. Japan At War. Alexandria, VA. Time-Life Books, Inc., 1980. 40. 

6 Bradley, James. Flyboys: A True Story of Courage. New York: New York. Little, Brown and Company. 2003. 38. 

7 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland.  Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 42-44. 

8 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 44-45. 

11 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books; Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 200-202. 

9 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry.  Annapolis; Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 13-14. 

10 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War.  56. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

18 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 11-14. 

19 Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War. Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books. Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999. 174-175. 

12 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 13. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

13 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 17. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

14 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 18. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

15 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers  Who Refused  to Surrender After the War. 19. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

16 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 23. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

17 Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 22. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com . 

20 “Japanese Holdouts:  Registry”. March 20th, 2021. https://wanpela.com/holdouts/registry.html

References

Bradley, James. Flyboys: A True Story of Courage. New York: New York. Little, Brown, and Company. 2003.

“Japanese Holdouts: Registry”. March 20th, 2021. https://wanpela.com/holdouts/registry.html

Onoda, Hiroo.  No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War.  Translated by Charles S. Terry. Annapolis: Maryland. Bluejacket Books: Naval Institute Press. 1974 and 1999.

Rottman, Gordon.  L. Warrior: Japanese Infantrymen 1937-45: Sword of the Empire. New York: New York. Osprey Publishing Ltd, Inc, 2005.

Simons, Gerald. Japan At War. Alexandria, VA. Time-Life Books Inc., 1980. 

Webb, William. Absolute Crime Presents: No Surrender!: Seven Japanese Soldiers Who Refused to Surrender After the War. 2014. www.absolutecrime.com

The Fates of Benito Mussolini, his Wife Rachele, and the Mistress Who Wouldn’t Leave his Side

Benito Mussolini, the Italian Fascist leader during World War Two, is infamous for many reasons. But do you know what happened to his wife Rachele Giudi and his loyal mistress Claretta Petacci as World War Two came to an end? David Lehmann explains.

A colorised image of Benito Mussolini.

One of the most notable characters of the Second World War and, indeed, of the 20th century, Benito Mussolini, or as he was better known, Il Duce rarely needs an introduction. The Fascist leader of Italy captivated the world with his bold promises of restoring the Roman Empire, promising to once again return the Mediterranean Sea to its rightful status as Mare Nostorm or “Our sea.” Il Duce’s meteoric rise to power, culminating in 1922, was fueled by his charisma and his bombastic addresses to the public. Using his imposing oratory skills, Mussolini fed the desperate Italian public the steady diet of instilling confidence in his demoralized countrymen and promising a return to Italian glory - ensuring that he was the man who could singularly heal the wounds that had plagued this once great people.

We all know the well-known trope that “opposites attract” in the world of relationships. But when considering a man of Benito Mussolini’s character type, who regularly consumed approximately 98% of the oxygen in the room in order to fuel his ego and oratory style, it was an absolute necessity. Enter Rachele Mussolini or “Donna Rachele”, as she became known to the world. Born Rachele Giudi in 1890, Rachele was first introduced to Benito after being hired to the Mussolini family-owned tavern in Predappio as a kitchen maid. In 1910 the two were joined in less than holy matrimony due to Benito’s anti-clerical stance - but matrimony nonetheless. The two were not formally wed until 1925, well after Benito’s rise to the position of dictator. Rachele resisted relocating to Rome, preferring life outside the capital and would only relocate seven years later. Even then she sustained her avoidance of the limelight, much preferring the life of a homemaker. This contrast to her husband, in addition to a lot of traditional Fascist propaganda, earned her the love and sympathy of the Italian populace who were eagerly consumed by the trope of Mussolini and his traditional wife. Much of what is known about Rachele is understood through the lens of her husband, but her dedication to her children and her husband and commitment to family cannot be overstated. Rachele lived for family and in turn dedicated herself to their care.

A less than perfect union

The marriage of Benito and Rachele most often unfolded in the privacy of their own home. Unfortunately Il Duce’s indiscretions often did not. A well-known philanderer, Mussolini wantonly disregarded the fidelity tenet of marriage and regularly absconded from his marital bed. The explicit details of Il Duce’s escapades came to light with the publishing of the diary of Ercole Borrato, Benito’s longtime driver. The diary depicts a man wanton in his lust who possessed all the efficacy of a less physically restricted JFK, often having him stop while driving to pursue a beautiful woman he observed. Benito would regularly retreat to his beach resort, Castel Porziano, in order to properly concentrate on his less than sanctimonious trysts. 

Rachele seemingly tried her best to deal with her husband’s nature. Once stating, “My husband had a fascination for women. They all wanted him. Sometimes he showed me their letters – from women who wanted to sleep with him or have a baby with him. It always made me laugh.”[1] This was a surprisingly cheery view of the situation. However Borrato’s diary also contains a small glimpse into the pain Rachele must have experienced. In one instance, Benito returned to their home only to find Rachele waiting for him to confront him, chastising him for his lack of fidelity. One can imagine his car was symbolic of her husband’s infidelities. Despite the pain his cheating caused it seems Rachele had a harsher view of Benito’s other great pastime, politics. She once remarked: “You can't be happy in politics, never, because one day things go well, another day they go badly." [2]

Veni, Vidi, Vici - except the opposite

Mussolini’s bold proclamations of a return to Roman glory were soon exposed as the blustering of an overcompensating tyrant. Fascist Italy’s dreams of conquest quickly came to a sputtering halt. First, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 after months of preparation badly exposed the Italian military. Despite modern weaponry and the use of highly controversial gas bombs, the military struggled to defeat the much more poorly armed Ethiopian forces. Next, after the commencement of the world war and Nazi Germany’s rapid success, Mussolini grew impatient and invaded Greece in 1940. Again, the Italian forces fared poorly against less equipped Greek soldiers. The Italian advance soon flagged and then was shockingly forced to retreat, only to be saved by a Nazi intervention, further shaming Mussolini. One embarrassing defeat after another followed as Mussolini’s image shrunk in the minds of the Italian people. So much so that on July 24, 1943, Mussolini was ousted from power by the Fascist Grand Counsel and imprisoned. The once great man and his family were prisoners of his own populace.

The final apple of his wandering eye

Mussolini and his family were soon freed from their captivity after a daring German rescue. Instead of leaving Italy completely under Nazi control, he agreed to lead a newly created puppet state based in northern Italy. Benito was conscious of the inevitability of his impending defeat though, and helpless to affect change as greater powers used his homeland for their battlefield. Benito’s flagging spirits were buoyed by the presence of one Claretta Petacci. A lover of Benito’s since 1936, Claretta was devoted to Benito, sticking by him through his fall from grace. Following him to his new northern base, Claretta transformed into more than just a fling. Claretta attempted to bolster Benito’s confidence, urging him to retake his country and punish his enemies. This was exactly the kind of support a man like Benito Mussolini preferred at the time. So much so, that as the Allies marched north and partisan Italians decided now was the time to do away with their former dictator, it was Claretta who accompanied him via car in his attempted escape. Abandoning his family, Benito, Claretta and a few supporters attempted to make their way north into Switzerland. Unfortunately for the newly formed family unit they did not get far, with Benito’s face being all too familiar to the general Italian population. The pair were captured on April 27, 1945 and after Claretta’s refusal to abandon Benito, both were summarily executed the next day. 

Rachele and her surviving children were soon captured and handed over to the Allies, spared in sharing her husband’s fate. Rachele eventually settled in her native Predappio and never disavowed her husband’s politics and legacy. While her public sentiments to Benito always remained positive we can never truly know what was in her heart. Being abandoned by her husband in his final drive to freedom must have deeply wounded La Donna. After the war, Rachele fought for the proper burial of her husband’s remains and the return of his personal items. However there was one personal item which she refused, a bed which she dismissed with the comment, “Claretta used it.”[3]

What do you think of the fate of Mussolini’s wife and his mistress? Let us know below.

[1] Rubert Colley. “Rachele Mussolini- A Brief Biography.” April 11, 2015 

[2] J. Y. Smith “Rachele Mussolini Dies, Fascist Dictator's Widow.” October 31, 1979

[3] ID.

Sources

Ben Downing, March 24, 2017 https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-bed-with-il-duce-1490382122

Patty Agnew December 9, 2004 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/driver-blows-the-whistle-on-mussolini-s-frantic-love-life-1.1169289

J.Y. Smith October 31, 1979 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/10/31/rachele-mussolini-dies-fascist-dictators-widow/06a5db07-fb20-4cfd-bee1-dd59fb6806c1/

October 31, 1979 https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/31/archives/rachele-guidi-mussolini-widow-of-italian-dictator-is-dead-at-89.html

Rubert Colley https://rupertcolley.com/2015/04/11/rachele-mussolini-a-brief-biography/

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini/Role-in-World-War-II

How Public Opinion Impacts Foreign Policy in America

Throughout the history of foreign policy, arguments have been made that public opinion is ineffective and cannot influence foreign policy, with cogent arguments being made by respected writers, historians, and international relations theorists likeWalter Lippmann, Thomas A. Bailey, and George F. Kennan. However, public opinion can influence foreign policy to a large degree.

Here, Alan Cunningham explains how US military conflicts have been influenced by public opinion.

The sunken USS Maine in Havana harbor, leading to the 1898 Spanish-American War.

By simply looking at military conflicts in the United States, we can find that many of these are sharply influenced by U.S. public opinion. The American Revolution, the First World War, the Second World War, the Vietnam War, and the 2003 Iraq War were all heavily influenced by the public’s desires and the media. Individual operations, such as 1989’s Invasion of Panama, 1916’s Pancho Villa Expedition, and 1980’s Operation Eagle Claw, too suffer from public opinion; if the public and Americans’ at large feel that the operation or the conflict is worthwhile, assists in preserving American security and safety, or stops an extreme crisis (like genocide or crimes against humanity) then the overall foreign policy goal continues, but that public support is integral.

Ole Holsti, a professor of political science at Duke University, writes, “the Vietnam War served as a catalyst for a re-examination of the post-World War II consensus on the nature and effects of public opinion. Although these recent studies continued to show that the public is often poorly informed about international affairs, the evidence nevertheless challenged the thesis that public opinion on foreign policy issues is...without significant impact on policy making”. I agree that while most of the public is largely uninformed on international issues and key political-military affairs (social media posts about a draft for World War III in the aftermath of General Qasem Solemani’s targeted killing exemplifies this in my view), the public’s voice does matter and can significantly shape foreign policy decisions and what actions a state takes. The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia and the 1898 Spanish-American War are prime examples of this.

1993 Battle of Mogadishu

To first understand the battle, one must look back at the conditions that shaped Somalia into needing outside, global intervention. The country had long been ruled by Mohamed Siad Barre, a ruler who had accepted both U.S. and Soviet aid, and eventually lost hold of his nation due to declining influence, the collapse of the Soviet Union and a major benefactor, and poor economic policies thrusting the country into decline; In 1991, a rebellion overthrew Barre which resulted in a civil warbased upon tribal lines. The UN developed a task force to return order to the country and U.S. Marines invaded and removed the major tribal forces from power in the capital of Mogadishu. Upon completion of the humanitarian mission, however, it became apparent that the strongest warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aidid, would return to power, so the U.S. began planning to return Somalia to a democracy. As most know, the following six weeks of military special operations were successful, but eventually made large scale, international news when Special Operations Forces operators became entrenched in a fifteen-hour firefight defending two crashed helicopters, with nineteen U.S. military personnel and two UN multinational force soldiers being killed throughout the entirety of the mission. While the mission itself (to capture two high level members of Aidid’s clan) was a success and the U.S. military severely crippled the clan’s military capacity, public opinion about the conflict was molded heavily after seeing the bodies of U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Pressured by their constituents, Congress began making similar statements and eventually the Clinton administration decided to fully remove American forces from Somalia.

Public opinion in this case completely changed the outcome of the entire, two-year mission in Somalia and essentially dictated Bill Clinton’s foreign policy until 1995. Due to the public’s desire to focus on domestic issues and not become embroiled in a foreign war (especially one that many saw as having no clear exit strategy or goals), Clinton’s administration kept out of Darfur, Rwanda, and (at least initially) Bosnia. Public opinion dictated how the U.S. should respond in these incidences and eventually forced the administration to reintegrate themselves into defending against genocides after the Rwandan incident.

1898 Spanish-American War

Another example of this can be seen with the Spanish-American War. The Spanish Empire was largely seen as a nuisance and fear to the U.S., being an imperial force so ingrained and entrenched within the Western Hemisphere. Being that the Cuban Revolution was largely seen as a force for democracy and were portrayed as brothers to the American public, many imperialists began calling for war against the Spanish. This call was bolstered by Pulitzer’s New York World and Hearst’s New York Journal and eventually culminated with the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor; with news reports claiming that the Spanish had deliberately sunk the warship, the U.S. made preparations for invasion and launched operations. While the war was short and something of an anomaly in military endeavors (with more personnel dying due to diseases than bullets or wounds), the impact of this was that Cuba’s populace were freed and then immediately put under U.S. rule for a period of time before being handed over to pro-U.S., anti-Communist strongmen like Fulgencio Batista. What this points to is the effect that public opinion and desires have upon foreign policy decisions. While some blame solely Hearst and Pulitzer for beginning the war and single-handedly provoking war, it is important to note that both Pulitzer and Hearst did not have an audience outside of New York and only appealed to the working class, not anyone in politics or white collar workers. As Thomas Kane points out in the journal Contemporary Security Studies, the true decision to invade was because the broad majority of Americans were sick of bloodshed and because many in American politics agreed that trying to contain the situation in Cuba was lost. In the end, public opinion mattered, not how influential newspapermen were.

Conclusion

In both of these, public opinion and support or opposition towards specific policies played a large role in determining how the government would deal with foreign policy matters and how individual administrations would deal with future crises in the globe. Public opinion and outward support of operations, military conflicts, or foreign policy goals has enough coherence to be effective and to seriously change the way that governments operate and go about performing missions and attaining their overall goals.

What do you think of the role of public opinion in influencing foreign policy in the US? Let us know below.

About

Alan Cunningham is a graduate student at Norwich University where he is pursuing an MA in International Relations. He will be joining the United States Armed Forces upon the completion of his degree and aims to gain a PhD in History and a JD from Syracuse University. He has been published in the Jurist, Small Wars Journal, the U.S. Army War College’s War Room, and Eunomia Journal.

The Secret Lie that Ended World War One: The Bulgarian Contract

As hard as it may be to believe, not everything is yet known about World War One. Even some major events have remained hidden for more than a century. Here, Graeme Sheppard, author of a new book, tells us about the extraordinary Bulgarian Contract.

Over a hundred years on, and after the production of so many detailed studies, anyone might reasonably assume that there can be nothing new, surely, to discover about the events of World War I. That is, nothing surely of major consequence. A new aspect or angle to a campaign or battle maybe, or perhaps a fresh insight into some familiar ground. But the discovery of new and previously unseen evidence of how and why the war ended when it did in 1918, rather than continue in to 1919? Surely not? And yet a few years ago that was precisely what a visit to the UK National Archives in Kew presented me with.

Why the war ended?

I hadn’t been looking for it or anything like it. In fact, I was searching for unrelated material pertaining to British diplomats in China. But while doing so, I came across a very slim Foreign Office file from 1931. It came in a box with the unpromising title of “Miscellaneous”. It contained a mere few pages: an internal letter from a junior diplomat, one D.J. Cowan, explaining how, while a prisoner-of-war in Bulgaria in 1918, he had encountered among its peasant population word of an extraordinary act of political propaganda and misinformation, one so effective that it had succeeded in propelling Bulgaria out of the war. It was this act, he believed, rather than the Allied offensive of that September, that had been the true cause of the collapse of Macedonian front - a collapse that foreshadowed the November armistice six weeks later. Cowan was clearly making an important claim, and yet, by the look of the file, at the time the letter had elicited little interest.

I was still trying to make sense of this find when a few weeks later I came into possession of the unpublished memoirs of another Foreign Office diplomat and fellow Balkan prisoner, Robert Howe. Howe wrote in the 1970s in his retirement. Quite independently, and with greater detail, he described being a witness to the same Balkan deception. But Howe went further: a few years after the war, in Belgrade, he had actually met the political architect behind the plot. He had discussed the matter with him in the royal palace.

An extraordinary tale

Quite apart from the startling information the pair provided, junior officers Cowan and Howe had an extraordinary story of their own to relate.

In late September 1918, Cowan and Howe, prisoners since 1915 and twice before failed escapees, walked out of their Bulgarian prison camp deep behind enemy lines. Having heard rumors that the Macedonian front had collapsed, on this third occasion they simply announced to their resigned captors that they were leaving. No one stopped them. They then spent several days travelling a hundred miles over chaotic roads and rail lines jammed with an enemy army in a rebellious retreat. Largely ignored on their way, they headed not toward the advancing Allied forces to the south, but instead west toward Sofia, the enemy’s capital, and a city now engulfed in political turmoil. Arriving at the main rail station, which they found in a state of frenzy, they caught a horse-drawn cab to the nearly deserted Ministry of War building. There, despite their less than orderly attire, they brazenly announced to staff there that they were British officers and were taking control of the city in the name of His Majesty the King. No one raised an objection. With their authority established, a ministry car and driver were summoned to take the pair to the city’s Grand Hotel, where they demanded and were provided with the best rooms the establishment had to offer. An hour later, having washed and shaved, they entered the hotel restaurant, only to find it full of senior German officers gloomily eating their dinner. The hotel, it transpired, happened to serve as the German regional headquarters. Undeterred, they informed the maître d' that they required the head table and would the two gentlemen seated there kindly vacate it, at which point the German officers concerned rose wordlessly from their seats. Rubbing salt into the remaining diners’ wounds, one of the chums then raised a toast to the victorious Allies.

“It was a great moment,” remembered Howe. “One of the greatest moments of my life - perhaps never again one like it. One of those moments when you know there is nothing you cannot do, when no obstacles exist, when no one can touch you.”

Contract

A great moment, indeed. And yet, though they did not realize it fully at the time, the two men had so much more to relate. They had experienced a very peculiar captivity in Bulgaria, one of extremes, ranging from internment in the worst of punishment death-camps to that of living in virtual freedom among its peasant folk. Their survival tale, however, provides only the backdrop to their unique eye-witness accounts of a secret act of Balkan propaganda, known as the Contract, one that triggered not only rebellion in Bulgaria and the collapse of the Macedonian front, but also acted as the catalyst for German defeat and the road to the armistice of November 11.

A new book, The Bulgarian Contract, provides readers with two new strands of evidence that together change our understanding of how and why the Great War reached its conclusion. Firstly, recently discovered eye-witness accounts of a clandestine deception that was crucial in bringing about the dramatic collapse of the Macedonian front. Secondly, the direct influence this fraud had on Germany’s High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) in occupied Belgium, and on de facto dictator, Erich Ludendorff, and his crucial meeting with the Kaiser of September 29, resulting in the road to German surrender six weeks later. Describing politics, revolution, treason, assassination, and deceit, the book explains how without the hitherto unknown Contract, the Great War was destined to continue through the coming winter and into 1919, resulting in many thousands of further deaths.    

You can order The Bulgarian Contract here: http://thebulgariancontract.com/

Image provided to the site and used with permission.

Was Romania Neutral or a Nazi Ally in World War 2?

Officially Romania started World War II as neutral, but was it really neutral throughout the whole war? Here, Stefan Morrone considers this question by looking at Romania in the 1920s, the rise of authoritarianism in the country in the 1930s, the role of Romania during the war in the USSR and the Holocaust, and finally how it changed position towards the end of the war.

Ion Antonescu and Adolf Hitler. Munich, June 1941. Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-B03212 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, available here.

Looking back on the belligerent nations of the Second World War, Romania is often counted as part of the Axis nations. Romania’s Fascist leader, Ion Antonescu, was close with Hitler, the country had officially joined the Axis in 1941, and Romanian troops fought alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front.

If one was to judge Romania simply by these factors alone, then the county can be consigned to the realm of yet another Axis collaborator. However, Romania’s situation during the Second World War was more complex than meets the eye, and an assessment of neutrality requires an examination of what led to its position in the conflict.

A Political Problem

Following the conclusion of the First World War in 1918, Romania was one of the few countries to end up better off than it had been before the war; it received generous awards of territory that allowed the country to nearly double in size, with its population reaching up to 16 million. [1] 

In addition to managing all its new peoples and territory, a major issue in Romania following the conclusion of the First World War was the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Romania had a solid foundation of democracy, given that its two strongest political parties throughout the 1920s, the Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party, were both recognized for their staunch democratic viewpoints. The National Peasant Party even won the 1928 election, and, at the time, the future seemed to bode well for democracy in Romania.

However, things changed in the 1930s with two major events that would shape Romania’s future turn towards authoritarianism. The first major change was the Great Depression, which crippled Romania’s economy and shook the people’s faith in their democratic government, led by Iuliu Maniu. This left people free to look for solutions to the country’s problems in more extreme political movements, a familiar narrative in Europe at the time. The second major change came with the accession of King Carol II to the throne, who would push democracy aside in favor of his own self-centered reign.

A Controversial Figure 

Carol was born on October 15, 1893 and was the first Romanian monarch to be born in the country; previous monarchs were of German descent. [2] Carol was raised by his aunt and uncle, King Carol I and Queen Elisabeth, who felt that his parents, King Ferdinand and Queen Marie, were unable to raise their son properly because they were too young. His uncle tried to raise Carol in his own militaristic image, but quickly found out the boy preferred a hedonistic lifestyle of party and drink, caring little for military pomp and ceremony. Carol was extremely adventurous; he joined the Prussian Guards military unit and fought in both the Second Balkan War of 1913 and the First World War.

Carol renounced his claim to the throne twice - first in 1918 and again in 1925 - and gave birth to his son Mihail, future king of Romania, in 1921 with his second wife Helen of Greece (his first marriage was a messy affair, conducted without the approval of Parliament and was swiftly dissolved). 

In 1927, Carol’s father died, and the throne went to his infant son, with a regency ruling on his behalf while Carol lived in France in exile. Although he had been officially excluded from the throne by his father’s will and by a law passed in 1926, he returned to Romania in 1930 with the goal of reclaiming his position on the throne. [3] Following a coup that took place on June 7, 1930, Carol took his place as Romania’s king over his infant son.

Upon usurping the throne, Carol immediately tried to increase his own power, disregarding the oath he had sworn upon taking the throne to uphold the 1923 Constitution, and began to fashion himself as a dictator. During his reign, and as a consequence of his growing admiration of the Fascist policies of Benito Mussolini in Italy, he began to dismantle Romanian democracy. His attempts came to a head in 1938, when he dissolved all political parties and proclaimed a royal dictatorship. This was done following his discovery of a plan that attempted to bring the anti-Semitic and Fascist Iron Guard into power.

As Europe once again drew closer to war, Carol tried to appease both sides - he appealed to Britain for help while also trying to improve relations with Germany by visiting Hitler. When the Second World War officially broke out in September 1939, Carol declared neutrality. However, in May 1940, seeing the shocking fall of France and the Allies back-pedaling, he decided to officially join the Axis.

Unfortunately, Carol’s reign did not last much longer. In June 1940, under threat from the Soviet Union and knowing his army was no match for the Red Army, Carol was forced to surrender pieces of Romanian territory to appease Stalin. In August, further territory in Transylvania (which had been awarded after World War One) was ceded to Hungary as a result of the Second Vienna Award. This was a set of territorial disputes arbitrated by the Fascist powers of Italy and Germany with the goal of drawing Hungary into their alliance. [4] This resulted in Carol losing support from the people, and the army refused to follow his orders. Out of desperation, Carol named General Ion Antonescu as prime minister, but was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Mihail on September 6, 1940. However, Mihail immediately granted Antonescu dictatorial power, further paving the way for the Fascist regime, as Antonescu would later ally himself with the powerful Iron Guard.

Rise of the Iron Guard

Much like other European countries during the tumultuous interwar period, Romania had its own Fascist-style movement that sprang up during the 1930s. Following King Carol’s dissolution of various political parties in 1938, a new party to crop up in Romania was the Legion of the Archangel Michael led by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, whose father was the leader of the largest extreme anti-Semitic party in Romania. [5]

For several years, the Legion was just a small organization with little money or support. In 1930, the Legion founded a militia branch called the Iron Guard, which included all Legionnaires (members) between the ages of 18 and 30, and won two local by-elections, thereby gaining parliamentary representation for the first time in 1931. In the national elections of 1932, support for the Legion rose to only 2.37 percent. [5] However, the National Peasant Party, which won the election, showcased interest in obtaining the help of the Iron Guard’s Legionnaires. At the same time, Nazism was rising in Germany and Nazi contacts became more frequent in Romania, even establishing a Romanian Nazi party.

The Legion acknowledged the Romanian monarchy as an important and fundamental institution, and as a result, King Carol actively tried to reign in and exploit the Legion for his own purposes until 1937. However, realizing his efforts were futile, Carol tried to stamp out the organization - a move which also failed.

In the 1937 elections, the party finished third with 15.5% of the vote, its highest total yet. When Carol abolished all parties and declared a royal dictatorship the following year, Codreanu urged his compatriots to accept the new regime, but was arrested by the government and put to death. An internal battle for power followed his death, with the victor being Horia Sima.

Antonescu’s War Contributions

Upon taking power, Antonescu allied himself with the Iron Guard and established Romania as the authoritarian National Legionary State. However, this new state was not to last long - Antonescu and the Guard had opposing ideologies. Antonescu embodied strict order, while the Guard aligned itself with chaos, rejecting Antonescu’s social policies. This led to a rift which erupted in January 1941 when he used the army to destroy the Guard, making himself a military dictator for the remainder of the war.

By this time, the Second World War was in full swing, and Antonescu decided to ally himself with Hitler, who he had no doubt would win the conflict. He committed Romanian troops and resources to aid the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, hoping that he would be granted the territory of Transylvania after the war’s conclusion. [1] In fact, Romanian troops in the invading Axis army numbered the second highest. [6] This proved to be a disastrous move as the Soviets repelled the attack, leading to huge numbers of Romanian casualties, destroying Antonescu’s hope that Germany would win the war.

In 1941, the Iron Guard attempted (and failed) to overthrow Antonescu, forcing its leaders to flee the country. By 1943, the tide of war had turned against the Axis powers, and Romania was subjected to Allied bombings, especially its oil fields, which were vital to the war effort. The Soviets, who had recovered from the previous invasion and were now pushing their way back across Europe towards Berlin, invaded Romanian territory and the army was unable to hold them back.  Seeing his country’s plight and sensing an opportunity, Mihail gathered his supporters and launched a coup, overthrowing Antonescu's government. He proceeded to align Romania with the Allies and the Soviets, declaring war on Germany on August 23, 1944.

Romania would spend the rest of the war fighting alongside the Allies against the Germans, waging bloody battles across Eastern Europe. Although it ended the war on the winning side, Romania lost a lot of territory as a result of the Soviets downplaying the defection of King Mihail, given that, for a majority of the war, Romania had fought against the Soviets. In post-war negotiations, the Soviet Union was given a 90% share of control over the country, which would result in its Cold War Sovietization and the rise of a Communist regime. [6]

The Holocaust

Romania’s role in the Holocaust is often forgotten. Unlike Germany or Italy, Romania was not driven by a desire for conquest, but a desire to do what was best for the national interests of the country. During the period of Antonescu’s leadership, the government ramped up its anti-Semitic laws and authorized many pogroms which killed thousands of Jews within Romanian borders. However, the Romanian government later realized that they could make a large profit from the situation by allowing European Jews transit through Romania to safer lands while charging exit fees. Abroad, Romanian anti-Semitism was showcased by the atrocities of Romanian troops massacring upwards of 260,000 Jews in southern Russia and Ukraine. [7]

One of the most infamous incidents was the Odessa Massacre in 1941, in which approximately 30,000 Jews were murdered by German and Romanian soldiers. [8] On October 16, 1941, the Red Army surrendered the city of Odessa to German and Romanian troops after two and a half months of bloody and bitter fighting. At this point, roughly 250,000 inhabitants remained in the city, including some 90,000 Jews.

Around 6.45 p.m. on October 22, a bomb (probably in place since before the city’s capture) exploded close to the Romanian headquarters, killing 67 people, including 16 Romanian and four German officers. Angered, the invaders announced that for every dead officer, 200 "Bolsheviks" must be executed, and 100 for every dead soldier.  However, there were no longer any “Bolsheviks” left in the city - they had fled long ago. Instead, the city’s Jewish population faced the retaliation of the invading armies. Between October 22 and 23, up to 30,000 people were rounded up and locked in nine empty munitions depots at the edge of the city, which were then doused in gasoline and set on fire. Similar horrifying acts of extermination took place across Ukraine over the following months and weeks.

Figures show that Romania bore responsibility for the deaths of more Jews than any other German-allied country other than Germany itself. [7] In the face of such clear destruction and hatred, the Romanian government has steadfastly maintained its innocence, blaming these acts solely on the Germans and Hungarians. As recently as 2003, the government stated that it is “unjust to link Romania to the persecution of the Jews in Europe” and that the numbers of Jews killed in Romanian-perpetrated atrocities were being inflated for the sake of media impact. [7] Romania must face the horrors of its Holocaust past and accept the role it played in one of the worst atrocities in history.

Conclusion

The question of whether Romania can truly be considered neutral is easy to answer. Despite the country’s declaration of strict neutrality at the outset of the war, the political situation within the country forced Romania into the Axis camp. Its politically Fascist ideologies, anti-Semitic policies and actions taken towards Jews, and the contribution of manpower to help the German army in its attempt to crush the Soviets meant that Romania, like Italy, was firmly a wartime ally of the Germans - even if official statements may have indicated otherwise. Romania made more contributions to the Axis war effort, both militarily and ideologically, than it did to the Allied war effort, only fighting alongside the Allies for roughly a year, and only when it was already too late to have an impact.

What do you think of Romania’s role in World War Two? Let us know below.

Now, you can read Stefan’s article on whether Portugal was neutral in World War Two here.

Sources

[1]“Greater Romania.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/place/Romania/Greater-Romania.  

[2] Mehl, Scott. “King Carol II of Romania.” Unofficial Royalty, 31 Dec. 2020, www.unofficialroyalty.com/king-carol-ii-of-romania/.

[3] “Carol II.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carol-II

[4] “Vienna Awards.” Oxford Reference, www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803115719661.

 [5] Payne, Stanley G. “Why Romania's Fascist Movement Was Unusually Morbid-Even for Fascists.” Slate Magazine, Slate, 21 Feb. 2017, slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/02/romanias-unusually-morbid-fascist-movement-blended-nationalistic-violence-with-fanatical-christian-martyrdom.html.

 [6] Chen, C. Peter. “Romania in World War II.” WW2DB, ww2db.com/country/romania.

 [7] Feldman, Oleksandr. “'Ignoring Romania's WWII Complicity – Not an Option'.” Ynetnews, Ynetnews, 27 Apr. 2012, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4142322,00.html.

 [8] Feldman, Oleksandr. “The Odessa Massacre: Remembering the 'Holocaust by Bullets': DW: 22.10.2018.” DW.COM, 2 Nov. 2011, www.dw.com/en/the-odessa-massacre-remembering-the-holocaust-by-bullets/a-45844546.

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