The Confederate victory at Second Manassas, August 28-30, 1862, followed victories in the Valley Campaign and the Peninsula. The casualties incurred by the Army of the Potomac included 14,000 killed or wounded of 62,000 engaged, compared to about half of that for the Army of Northern Virginia. Then, on September 1, Stonewall Jackson defeated a Union cohort retreating from the battlefield at Chantilly. General Pope was relieved of command and sent to Minnesota to deal with the Sioux, and was never again involved in the Civil War. Pope would blame Fitz-John Porter for the loss, even though that wasn’t the case; Porter would be heard from again at Antietam but would go through a devastating court martial soon after. One of Pope’s generals said of him, “Suffice to say ... that more insolence, superciliousness, ignorance, and pretentiousness were never combined in one man.”
In this multi-part series, here Lloyd W Klein looks at General McClellan’s Response to Finding the Lost Order.
Read part 1 on the background here.
Major General Thomas Stonewall Jackson. Source: Public domain, unknown author, available here.
When General McClellan came into possession of Special Order No. 191, he had an accurate and timely picture of exactly where the components of the Confederate army were located and what routes they were going to be using in the next several days. He knew that the Confederate army was divided, and he knew exactly where they were. Lee had dangerously split his army into five parts, although the orders only mentioned four columns. Three columns had converged on Harpers Ferry to capture the Federal garrison there, a fourth column was near Hagerstown, and a fifth column was acting as a rear guard near Boonsboro, MD.
Why did it take so long for McClellan to respond?
This is one of the great fables of the battle. McClellan had the “slows” in many instances, but not in this one. In the week it took for Lee's army to march to Frederick, McClellan's army traveled an equal distance to redeploy on the north side of Washington. This was accomplished as he reshuffled commands, had his officers under charges reinstated, and prepared to fill out his army with untrained recruits. He really was a very good administrator.
Most traditional histories of the Antietam Campaign assert that McClellan was given Gen. Robert E. Lee’s plans in Frederick, Md. before noon on September 13. The traditional narrative states that he waited 18 hours before acting on the find. By waiting before taking advantage of this intelligence and repositioning his forces, he squandered the best opportunity in the war to defeat Lee definitively.
McClellan did not have possession of the order until later in the afternoon not earlier. The evidence indicates that Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Volunteers discovered the order shortly before noon on September 13. Following this discovery, it took an additional one to two hours for the orders to reach McClellan. It is estimated that McClellan received the orders sometime between 1:00 and 2:30 p.m. on that day.
These criticisms stem from the belief that McClellan moved too slowly and cautiously to attack Lee. They assert that when a copy of Lee’s plans fell into McClellan’s hands, the Union general wasted 18 precious hours before advancing. Politicians from the 1860s onward and countless historians have claimed he could have easily destroyed Lee’s army during the campaign and ended the war in 1862, sparing the country another two and a half years of bloody conflict.
Some historians believe that for this reason, the loss of the Special Order #191 wasn’t as decisive as history makes it out to be. That it had in fact little impact on subsequent events. I strongly disagree, in that McClellan otherwise would have had no clue where Lee was going.
A more recent re-evaluation disputes this sequence of events entirely, citing long overlooked evidence that McClellan moved quickly and there was no 18 hour delay. Gene Thorp in a 2012 article in The Washington Post cited evidence that the vanguard of Army of the Potomac was in motion all day on the 13th due to orders McClellan issued. After the war, McClellan held to the claim that he acted immediately to put his armies on the move. It is this view that we want to explore today.
The story starts out without controversy. Early in the morning of Sept. 13, most of the Union army was on the move to Frederick, Md., including McClellan, who was relocating his headquarters there from Urbana. At the conclusion of the march, a copy of Lee's orders was found in an open field. What time this "Lost Order" was found, and when McClellan received it, has been relatively unchallenged until recently. We will address this in detail tomorrow.
In "Landscape Turned Red," Stephen Sears asserts that McClellan verified before noon that the papers were legitimate, then exhibited his usual excessive caution and failed to move his army for 18 hours. To back up this theory, Sears cites a telegram that McClellan sent to Abraham Lincoln at "12 M" — which Sears says stands for meridian or noon — in which McClellan confidently informs the president that he has the plans of the enemy and that "no time shall be lost" in attacking Lee.
In summary, the traditional view is:
1. McClellan had the Lost Order by noon as is proven by the telegram from him to Lincoln that is dated "12M" for Meridian.
2. McClellan waited 18 hours before moving his troops after finding the Lost Orders
The updated view is far different. Dr. Rossino contends that successive generations of authors harboring animosity towards McClellan have damaged the general's reputation. His research provides a detailed account of the actual sequence of events that transpired on September 13, extending into the early hours of September 14. Between 1:00 and 2:30 p.m., McClellan received the Lost Orders. By 3:30 p.m., he had sent a copy of these orders to Alfred Pleasonton, requesting confirmation of the marching instructions contained within. From 5:30 to 6:20 p.m., McClellan drafted orders for William Franklin, the commander of the Sixth Corps, outlining the planned assault on the South Mountain passes for the following day. Subsequently, from 6:30 to 11:00 p.m., orders were dispatched to mobilize troops en route to Frederick, particularly those under Joseph Hooker's command, while soldiers already in the vicinity continued their march through the city until after midnight. At 8:00 p.m., Pleasonton finally replied, affirming that he believed the marching orders in the Lost Orders were accurate, although McClellan had already initiated his attack plan for September 14. By midnight, Federal troops were still converging in the city as they moved westward. At 1:00 a.m. on September 14, the last regiments set up camp west of Frederick, and by 3:00 a.m., the sound of reveille signaled the army's renewed advance towards South Mountain.
In fact, McClellan responded immediately and efficiently. He continued marching his troops all day and into early the following morning. Even Franklin moved a brigade of the Sixth Corps over the Catoctins after dark on September 13. If McClellan hadn’t moved with energy, there would not have been battles for the gaps in South Mountain early the following day.
Rossino believes that the discovery of the Lost Order had several important effects:
1) It clarified for McClellan the piecemeal intelligence he had received suggesting Lee had divided his army. This prompted George the Timid to design and execute two major attacks against Confederate defenders at Crampton's and Turner's Gaps.
2) McClellan's attacks inflicted thousands of casualties on Lee's already depleted force, weakening the opponent. They also thwarted a trap Lee had laid for McClellan along the heights of Beaver Creek, 2.5 miles north of Boonsboro. Had Lee been able to fight there, McClellan would have encountered a position stronger than that taken by Lee at Sharpsburg. Largely because Lee's flanks would have been anchored against South Mountain and the heights along Lappans Road, not vulnerable as his left flank was at Sharpsburg.
3) Lee's design stymied, he fell back toward Virginia to move his portion of the army closer to that of Stonewall Jackson coming up from Harpers Ferry. This caused Lee to take position along the heights behind Antietam Creek, which looked similar in some respects to those behind Beaver Creek.
4) The reverse at South Mountain also forced Lee's army to reassemble before Lee wanted, which further reduced his effective combat strength.
5) McClellan ran for president 2 years later. This may well have been political bunko that has become American historical lore.
In short, the discovery of the Lost Orders and McClellan's use of them forced Lee to take up a less desirable position at Sharpsburg than Lee had planned to take at Beaver Creek. Furthermore, he did so with his army in a weakened state from forced marches and straggling. Lee himself referred to the position at Sharpsburg as a "bad one." These advantages make McClellan's mixed success on the field even more perplexing.
Major General William B. Franklin by Waud, Alfred R. (Alfred Rudolph),. Source: Public domain, Library of Congress, available here.
McClellan’s Pursuit
The controversy started with Stephen Sears. In "Landscape Turned Red," Sears asserts that McClellan verified before noon that the order was legitimate, then exhibited his usual excessive caution and failed to move his army for 18 hours. To back up this theory, Sears cites a telegram that McClellan sent to Abraham Lincoln at "12 M" — which Sears says stands for meridian or noon — in which McClellan confidently informs the president that he has the plans of the enemy and that "no time shall be lost" in attacking Lee.
In summary, the traditional view is: McClellan had the Lost Order by noon, as is proven by the telegram from him to Lincoln that is dated "12M" for Meridian. Then McClellan waited 18 hours before moving his troops after finding the Lost Orders. Why? Because he had the “slows”.
Rossino has demonstrated that the original telegram received by the War Department is distinctly marked as being sent at "12 Midnight." Following the publication of Sears' book, researcher Maurice D'Aoust uncovered the original telegram receipt within the Lincoln papers housed at the Library of Congress. This document indicates that the telegram was dispatched at midnight—spelled out in full—contradicting Sears' earlier assertion by a full 12 hours.
In the contentious telegraph, McClellan informed Lincoln that "We have possession of Catoctin [Mountain]," a significant detail since the Confederates still controlled those two passes at noon. The Braddock Pass was not secured until 1 p.m., and the Jefferson Pass, located further south, was not captured until nearly sunset. This timeline serves as evidence that no message was sent at noon. Additionally, McClellan was reportedly riding through Frederick at 11 a.m., greeted by enthusiastic crowds eager to see him, which raises questions about the feasibility of receiving and relaying orders to President Lincoln in such a short timeframe. The Lost Order was not found until after the 12th Corps, of which the 27th Indiana Regiment belonged, ended its morning march. At least five accounts show that the Corps completed its march about noon, which would make it impossible for McClellan to have written and sent a telegraph that contained information about the Lost Order at the same time it was found. The commander of the unit that found the order notes that it was found after its march ended at noon and that it was carried to army staff soon thereafter.
McClellan issued orders at 3 p.m. for his cavalry chief to verify that the Lost Order was not a trick. It seems out of character for someone who is normally considered so cautious to confidently inform Lincoln of the find three hours before he tried to confirm the accuracy of its contents. From this, we can deduce that McClellan had the orders at 3 pm or sooner but after noon.
The Signal Corps reported that "in the evening" it transmitted a message from Lincoln to McClellan, and a return message from McClellan to Lincoln. The report mentions no other transmittal of information between the two men at any other time of the day.
McClellan had the vanguard of the army, Burnside's 9th Corps, on the move at 3:30 p.m. These men filled the road west to Lee's rear guard at South Mountain well into the night. Near sundown, at 6:20 p.m., he began to issue orders for the rest of his army to move, with most units instructed to be marching at sunrise. (They were roused from sleep at 3 a.m.) In the midst of this activity, at midnight, the general telegraphed the president to tell him what was going on.
By 9 a.m. on Sept. 14, the first troops had climbed South Mountain and met the Confederate rear-guard in battle. By nightfall, McClellan's army carried the heights and forced a defeated Lee to find a new defensive position along Antietam Creek. McClellan pursued the next morning and within 48 hours initiated the Battle of Antietam, which forced Lee back across the Potomac River. This seems like a pretty expeditious sequence of events, not a delay.
Additionally:
A detachment of the 9th Corps in conjunction with cavalry marched from Frederick and took the southern Catoctin pass at Jefferson before sunset.
The 6th Corps, about 12,000 men, marched from Buckeystown to the gap in the Catoctin at Jeffersonville, from the evening until at least 10 p.m. A night march beyond that point would have been risky since it was not known precisely where the Confederates were in the valley beyond.
The 1st Corps, about 10,000 men, marched to Frederick the evening of Sept. 13. to be ready for an advance on the Confederate rear-guard the following morning.
The Sept. 13 timeline that Gene Thorp and Alex Rossino detail in The Tale Untwisted is as follows:
1) The leading elements of the XII Corps reach the outskirts of Frederick City around noon.
2) Shortly thereafter, Barton Mitchell finds the packet of 2 cigars wrapped in the 2 page orders.
3) Mitchell reads the orders. His sergeant John Bloss reads the orders. Col. Silas Colgrove reads the orders. BG George H. Gordon reads the orders. Samuel Pittman reads the orders at XII Corps HQ. MG Alpheus Williams reads the orders at XII Corps HQ. Pittman attempts to scratch out a copy of the orders, but Williams stops him. All of this takes time, perhaps as long as an hour.
4) Williams' courier starts out for McClellan with the orders in hand. The streets of Frederick are crammed with marching troops and spectators.
5) The orders probably reach McClellan between 1:30 and 2:30 p.m.
6) McClellan orders a copy made and sent to Pleasonton at 3:00 p.m. with instructions to verify the order of march as best Pleasonton can.
7) Around 5:00 or so, McClellan still has not heard back from Pleasonton. He decides to issue attack order to Franklin anyway, w/o having verified the lost orders are authentic.
8 Federal troops march through Frederick to the west all day and into the night. The procession finally comes to an end around midnight.
9) Commanders rouse their troops between 2:00-3:00 a.m. to get back onto the road.
Harper’s Ferry
There were two significant engagements in the Maryland campaign before the Battle of Antietam. Both directly impacted the major battle to come. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's captured Harpers Ferry on September 12. This is important because Jackson’s Corps, a large portion of Lee's army, was absent from the Battle of South Mountain and AP Hill’s Corps was not present at the start of the Battle of Antietam, attending to the surrender of the Union garrison..
The Battle of Harpers Ferry took place over 4 days. Stonewall Jackson found Maryland Heights stoutly defended but brigades led by Barksdale and Kershaw attacked strongly, with retreat of the Union troops across the Potomac the next day. On September 14, the rest of his infantry arrived and found Loudon Heights undefended. Jackson placed his artillery on these heights while his infantry confronted the Union army on Maryland Heights. An attack on the Union left flank was threatened by AP Hill while 50 guns began a bombardment. The Union commander realized the situation was hopeless and surrendered.
Colonel Dixon Miles was the union commander at Harper’s Ferry.. At age 58 he was the oldest active colonel in the Union army; a West Point graduate, he led a division at First Manassas but was held in reserve on account that he was drunk. A court of inquiry confirmed this, but he was given command of Harpers Ferry instead of a court martial. Miles was given orders on September 5 by Maj Gen John Wool: "you will not abandon Harpers Ferry without defending it to the last extremity." Wool sent another saying "there must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it". The likelihood that the town would be attacked was appreciated by the Union leadership. Why they sent no more men to defend it isn’t clear, Why Miles kept his men in the town and not positioned on the heights isn’t comprehensible. Miles was mortally wounded in the artillery barrage.
Following his feud and threatened duel with General Longstreet after newspaper articles concerning the Battle of Glendale, AP Hill was transferred to Jackson’s command. He had performed magnificently at Second Manassas. But he clashed with Jackson during the march in Maryland, who had Hill arrested and charged him with eight counts of dereliction of duty after the campaign. For this reason, Jackson left him behind when Harper’s Ferry was captured to process the POWs.
It’s hard to see how things could have been done any faster. Had Miles positioned his troops with more thought, it would have taken even longer. Had Jackson considered this in his placement of the troops around the town? Did Lee make an error in not taking charge of this mission himself instead of giving it to an independent Jackson? Was this really worth the time it took? The answers to these questions remain unclear, but it is noteworthy to keep in mind that Lee didn’t try to take Harpers Ferry in the Gettysburg invasion. And that neither Hooker nor Meade were interested in defending the town.
The implications were enormous. Recall that Special Order 191 was written September 9 but not retrieved by Union forces until September 13. Even though the intelligence was four days old, McClellan knew that Jackson was behind schedule at Harper’s Ferry, which was surrounded but not yet taken, and that Lee’s army was divided and separated over miles of Maryland countryside. Aware that a portion of Lee’s army was now vulnerable to attack, McClellan advanced toward the South Mountain range to attack Lee’s forces there.
Maryland Campaign of the American Civil War, September 1862. Source: Hlj, available here, reproduced according to Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.
South Mountain
The Battle of South Mountain took place on September 14, 1862. It is very important to re-emphasize that the Lost Orders were given to McClellan on September 13, and a battle occurred the very next day. How slow is that?
McClellan had followed Lee’s army based on the routes identified in Special Order 191. Union forces attempted to break through South Mountain to advance toward Lee's army, which would eventually concentrate near Sharpsburg. Lee was surprised that the lethargic McClellan had caught up with him so rapidly. He did not know at that time about Special Order 191. Jackson was just wrapping up Harpers Ferry. He only had Longstreet and DH Hill to defend the passes.
Although the Confederate troops ultimately had to retreat, they put up a strong resistance and delayed the Union's progress, giving Lee valuable time to reposition his forces.. While Union forces were able to gain control of the mountain, they could not stop Lee from regrouping. Confederate defenses delayed McClellan's advance enough for Lee to concentrate the remainder of his army at Sharpsburg, setting the stage for the Battle of Antietam three days later.
During the Battle of South Mountain, engagements took place at various passes and gaps within the South Mountain range. The passes and gaps of South Mountain, particularly Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap, and Crampton's Gap, offered natural defensive positions. Lee was using South Mountain as a screen, but McClellan had pursued faster than was anticipated. With Jackson at Harpers Ferry, Lee fell back along the roads that led mainly to the northern gaps.
The Union forces, commanded by General George B. McClellan, aimed to seize control of the mountain passes and break through the Confederate defensive positions. In the battle, Union army attacked at 3 gaps.
Longstreet was atop South Mountain at Turner’s Gap, the northernmost pass. Lee ordered Longstreet back to the mountain from around Hagerstown after he heard cannon fire on the morning of September 14. Given that Lee and Longstreet knew only about the main gap that carried the National Road over the mountain, it made sense for Longstreet to join D.H. Hill there.
DH Hill had been the rear guard and naturally came to these 2 passes. Hill situated his headquarters at the stone house that sits in the middle of Turner’s Gap. Longstreet joined him there later and used the same house for his headquarters.
The first fighting broke out at Fox’s Gap, about one mile south of Turner’s Gap.
Fox's Gap: Located just south of Turner's Gap, Fox's Gap saw intense fighting between Confederate forces commanded by General Samuel Garland and Union troops led by General Jesse Reno. The Union forces eventually managed to seize control of this pass. Federal troops with Jesse Reno’s Ninth Corps attacked Confederates under Sam Garland there. That fight gradually went against the Confederates as the Federals forced them back. A single 5,000-man Confederate division under D.H. Hill protected Fox’s and Turner’s Gaps at South Mountain. Early on September 14, Union Gen. Jacob D. Cox’s Kanawha Division of the Union IX Corps launched an attack against Samuel Garland’s brigade at Fox’s Gap. Cox’s 3,000 Ohioans overran Garland’s North Carolinians, driving the Southerners from behind a stone wall and mortally wounding Garland. However, by nightfall, Confederate soldiers still held the western edge of Fox’s Gap.
By nightfall, Reno’s men controlled the gap and the Old Sharpsburg Road running through it.
Turner's Gap: This was the northernmost and most heavily defended pass. Confederate forces, under the command of General D.H. Hill, held strong defensive positions on the slopes of Turner's Gap, while Union troops, led by General Joseph Hooker, made determined efforts to dislodge them. Turner’s Gap saw heavy fighting. A brigade of men under the command of John Gibbon attacked the gap late in the day on September 14, but darkness fell before that attack could carry the gap (see #5). At Turner’s Gap, Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s I Corps arrived on the steep mountainside near Frostown, and divisions under George G. Meade and John P. Hatch made relentless charges on the gap’s northern edge. After a brutal firefight along a cornfield fence, Hatch broke through the Rebel line. Only the timely arrival of reinforcements from Longstreet prevented the Confederate line from collapsing. By nightfall, the Confederates still maintained control of Turner’s Gap.
Lee never intended to defend the gaps in South Mountain. His decision to do so was primarily influenced by two factors: Jackson had not yet compelled the surrender of Harpers Ferry, and McClellan launched his attack sooner than Lee anticipated. If Jackson had completed his mission by September 14, Lee would likely have instructed his troops in Maryland, positioned near Harpers Ferry, to cross into Virginia and regroup with the rest of the army to the west of South Mountain. Additionally, Lee would have repositioned D.H. Hill to the elevated terrain north of Boonsboro at Beaver Creek, which was the site where he intended to engage in a decisive confrontation with McClellan’s forces, rather than at South Mountain.
It was here that the iron Brigade made its name. This was the brigade that was part of General John Gibbon’s division of I Corps, composed of 5 Midwestern regiments: 2nd Wisconsin, 6th Wisconsin, 7th Wisconsin, 19th Indiana and later joined by the 24th Michigan. They wore distinctive black Hardee hats, which were regulation dress hats (unlike the more common kepis). These black hats made them instantly recognizable on the battlefield—and helped them stand out even more due to their discipline and performance. They fought a fierce uphill battle against Confederate forces under D.H. Hill, taking heavy fire from wooded ridges and stone walls. They helped push the Confederates off the ridge by late evening, though at a steep cost. General McClellan exclaimed, “They must be made of iron!” and the nickname “Iron Brigade” stuck.
The Battle of Crampton’s Gap is typically overlooked by Civil War enthusiasts as merely a prelude. In fact, Antietam happened precisely because of this battle. Fighting at the third gap, Crampton’s Gap, near Burkittsville, located five miles south of Turner’s Gap, proved to be the most decisive, as McClellan had intended it to be. Around 1,500 Confederate troops there attempted to hold off the entire Union Sixth Corps of around 13,000 men. Franklin began his attack very late in the afternoon on September 14, which was a mistake on his part. If anyone on the Federal side dawdled during the campaign, it was William B. Franklin. Nevertheless, he had the gap in hand by nightfall and had pushed men into Pleasant Valley beyond it. McClellan ordered Franklin to attack the Confederates where he found them, but Franklin believed he was outnumbered 2-1 and declined to do so on the morning of September 15.
McClellan ordered Maj. Gen. William Franklin and his VI Corps to set out for Burkittsville from his camp at Buckeystown 9/14 at daybreak, with instructions to drive through Crampton's Gap and attack McLaws' rear. Although he sent the order immediately, by allowing Franklin to wait until morning to depart, his order resulted in a delay of nearly 11 hours. When the Federals reached Burkittsville around noon, the Confederate artillery opened up. In Burkittsville, while under artillery fire, Franklin assembled his troops into three columns. At 3 p.m., after a delay of nearly 3 hours, the VI Corps finally began its assault. The reason for the delay has never been ascertained, but it would prove costly.
The Confederate force consisted of one battery of artillery, three regiments of infantry under Brig. Gen. William Mahone, one brigade under Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, and a small cavalry detachment under Col. Thomas T. Munford. After the report of a very large number of camp fires indicating a much larger Union force than anticipated, General Lee recognized the threat this posed to his split forces, so the order was sent down to General Cobb to ..."hold the gap if it cost the life of every man in my command".
Only about one thousand Confederates defended Crampton's Gap, the southernmost of the South Mountain passes. At around 4:00 p.m., Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum's division charged into the gap and dislodged the Confederates from the protection of a stone fence. The arrival of four regiments under Gen. Howell Cobb did little to stem the Union tide. Reinforced by a brigade of Vermonters, the Federals made a second attack and drove the remaining Confederates down the western slope of South Mountain, leaving the VI Corps in possession of Crampton's.
The Union attack broke the makeshift rebel line, but not until 6 pm, too late for a follow-up attack. This gave Lee a chance to salvage his army.
Crampton's Gap: Situated south of Fox's Gap, Crampton's Gap was the southernmost pass where significant fighting occurred. Union troops, led by General William B. Franklin, engaged Confederate defenders commanded by General Howell Cobb. The Union forces successfully captured Crampton's Gap, further pressuring the Confederate positions. When Crampton’s Gap was taken, the other gaps were indefensible. The map shows that the roads behind South Mountain were such that once one gap fell, the rest were in danger of being encircled. Once any gap is in Union hands, a road connects it to all of the roads behind the mountain, and so Hill and Longstreet can be surrounded. Turner’s and Fox’s Gap were held by the Confederates at the end of the day but had to be abandoned. By sunrise on September 15, the Confederates had completely withdrawn.
There are 2 roads leading west from Frederick; one goes to the north gaps to Hagerstown and one goes south toward Williamsport. Lee left the southern gap exposed, likely due to limitations on manpower and supplies.
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