The Battle of Gettysburg - Part 4: Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field

Culp's Hill is a frequently overlooked area of the Gettysburg battle and played a crucial role in the Union's victory. Situated about three-quarters of a mile south of Gettysburg, it formed the tip of a fishhook-shaped series of hills and ridges that made up the Union lines. The significance of Culp's Hill lay in its strategic location. It guarded the main Union supply line on the Baltimore Pike and protected the rear and right flank of the Union army positioned on Cemetery Ridge.

Here, Lloyd W Klein explains what happened at Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Hill, and East Cavalry Field.

If you missed it, part 1 on General Lee’s advance to Pennsylvania is here, part 2 on day 1 of the battle is here, and part 3 on day 2 of the battle is here.

Scene behind the breastworks on Culp’s Hill, morning of July 3rd 1863. By Edwin Forbes.

Cemetery and Culp’s Hills

The configuration of the Union lines, with Cemetery Hill at its center, provided a strong defensive position known as the "fishhook." This layout allowed the Union forces to benefit from interior lines, making it easier to reinforce and support different sections of the line. Cemetery Hill, situated behind the town, offered a natural defense as attacks could not be launched directly from the streets. To reach Cemetery Hill, attackers had to either capture Culp's Hill on the East or the northern section of Cemetery Ridge on the west. General Lee's strategy relied on attacking the flanks, while the Union's strategy focused on defending these hills to protect the center.

Culp's Hill itself consists of two distinct peaks, an upper hill and a lower hill, separated by a narrow saddle. The higher peak, densely covered in trees, rises to an elevation of 630 feet above sea level, while the lower peak is approximately 100 feet shorter. The eastern slope of Culp's Hill descends towards Rock Creek, while the western slope leads to a saddle with Stevens Knoll. This topography provided natural advantages for defenders, making it challenging for attackers to gain a foothold on the hill.

July 1st

Following the retreat of the Union lines on Seminary Ridge and north of the town, the troops of XI Corps regrouped at Cemetery Hill, where a 2000-man brigade and a battery of 6 guns were positioned to safeguard the withdrawal. Meanwhile, Wadsworth’s division hurried to Culp’s Hill to protect the right flank, and additional reinforcements were on their way. By 4:30 p.m., 500 troops from the 7th Indiana and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps had arrived, with Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger’s 1st Division taking up position behind Cemetery Hill. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg at 5 pm, adding 8,000 fresh troops to the Union forces, bringing their total strength to around 20,000 soldiers combined with the XI Corps. The Federals, in addition to the reinforcements, had managed to salvage most of their artillery pieces during the retreat, with almost 40 guns joining Smith’s six guns atop Cemetery Hill.

Ewell's missed opportunity to seize Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 is often regarded as a critical moment in the battle. When Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's third division arrived, he was instructed to take the hill if it was not already occupied. However, Johnson hesitated and decided against the attack, sending a small party to scout the area. This party encountered the 7th Indiana Infantry of the I Corps, leading to a skirmish that forced them to retreat. By 7 pm, Culp's Hill was well-defended, with the Iron Brigade and other units in position, making it a challenging target for the Confederates.

Pfanz concluded that Ewell had made the best decision, citing the failed probing attack at 7 pm at dusk, but was it as prepared at 5 pm? It was less well-defended; still, who would Ewell have attacked with? After the war, General Gordon wrote in his memoirs that he was ready, but his men had seen significant action.  Gordon’s brigades were scattered and 2 miles from where an attack could be made. Moreover, the 11th Corps troops on Cemetery Hill under Howard were well positioned to defend Culp’s hill, more so than Ewell was positioned to take it.

Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable Given the discretionary and inherently contradictory order he received from General Lee, General Ewell chose not to attempt the assault. The three main reasons most often given include: 1) the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, as his men had marched a great distance and were exhausted 2) the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg immediately to the north, and 3) that after the battle at Barlow’s Knoll and the attacks through the town, there had been enough casualties and mixing of lines to severely weaken command and control. He might also have realized that although he might have been able to take Culps Hill, he couldn’t hold it with a single division after a counterattack from East Cemetery Hill.

And surely that would require a general engagement. It’s possible that Ewell may have felt that it was practicable to take the hill, but did not see how he could do so without bringing on a general engagement. He only had 1 division on hand, it was getting dark, and he wasn't going to receive any backup in any attack. He wanted support and none was available.. However, Jubal Early opposed the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching the York Pike, and he sent the brigades of John B. Gordon and Brig. Gen. William "Extra Billy" Smith to block that perceived threat.  "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was within an hour of arriving on the battlefield and Early urged waiting for Johnson's division to take the hill. After Johnson's division arrived via the Chambersburg Pike, it maneuvered toward the east of town in preparation to take the hill, but a small reconnaissance party sent in advance encountered a picket line of the 7th Indiana Infantry, which opened fire and captured a Confederate officer and soldier. The remainder of the Confederates fled and attempts to seize Culp's Hill on July 1 came to an end.

Although Ewell has been blamed for not aggressively pursuing the Union line on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, which left the Union on high ground, most military authorities and historians who have looked into the matter have pretty routinely concluded that Culp's Hill would not have been easy to capture on July 1st. Some historians say that it's 20/20 hindsight that Ewell could have easily pushed the Union line from the high ground; others say he was too timid. Stephen W. Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.

But, a real conundrum exists in whether or not Lee and Ewell were talking about the same hill. Lee was on Seminary Ridge and may have been looking at East Cemetery Hill while Ewell was at the base of Culp’s Hill. It’s unclear whether Lee & Ewell had a map that showed this.

Lost Cause Reinterpretation? Although the “If practicable order” story is a central part of Gettysburg lore, appearing in many books about the Civil War — it is also greatly negative against Ewell, and perhaps purposely so. The story may have been concocted by Lee’s apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell. In truth, Lee sent no definitive orders directing Ewell to pursue the enemy when the Union lines broke in front of the town, and Ewell was not benumbed by indecision when he defeated them in the town and on Barlow’s Knoll.

It was not until after the war, and Lee’s death, that Lost Cause supporters sought to explain how the infallible general was defeated at Gettysburg. Confederate veterans like John B. Gordon, Isaac Trimble, and Randolph H. McKim insinuated in their postwar writings that it was Ewell’s timidity that had cost Lee the victory. Postwar proponents of the Lost Cause movement, assigned to Ewell's staff during the battle, criticized him bitterly to deflect any blame for losing the battle on Robert E. Lee. Part of their argument was that the Federal soldiers were demoralized by their defeat earlier in the day. McKim’s 1915 article in The Southern Historical Society Papers stated. “Here then we find still another of General Lee’s lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell, failing at a critical moment to recognize what ought to be done,” he wrote. “Had the advance on Cemetery Hill been pushed forward promptly that afternoon we now know beyond any possible question that the hill was feebly occupied and could have been easily taken, and Meade would have been forced to retreat.”

Walter H. Taylor, Lee’s former aide, also sided with the anti-Ewell faction in his memoir “Four Years With General Lee.” Taylor wrote that Ewell voiced no objection to the order he brought from Lee to take the high ground “if possible,” and that he returned to Lee under the impression Ewell would attack.

But there is another side to the story. Maj. Campbell Brown, Ewell’s stepson, and aide, observed that the “discovery that this lost us the battle is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten.” And while Taylor’s story became an important part of the controversy, Brown was adamant that he never brought such orders. In an 1885 letter to Gen. Henry Jackson Hunt, the former chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac, Brown wrote, “I say broadly that Col. Taylor’s account of this battle is utterly worthless — that he carried no such order to Gen. Ewell ... I do not impugn his veracity but his memory has been trusted and has deceived him.”

Major General Isaac Trimble, who was attached on special duty to Ewell’s command during the battle, was among those who tried to dismiss Lee’s warning. Writing for the Southern Historical Society (SHS) years after both Lee and Ewell had died, Trimble recalled his attempt to persuade Ewell to attack:

“The battle was over and we had won it handsomely. General Ewell moved about uneasily, a good deal excited, and seemed to me to be undecided about what to do next. I approached him and said: "Well, General, we have had a grand success; are you not going to follow it up and push our advantage?"

He replied that General Lee had instructed him not to bring on a general engagement without orders and that he would wait for them.

I said, "That hardly applies to the present state of things, as we have fought a hard battle already, and should secure the advantage gained". He made no rejoinder but was far from composure. I was deeply impressed with the conviction that it was a critical moment for us and made a remark to that effect.

As no movement seemed immediate, I rode off to our left, north of the town, to reconnoiter, and noticed conspicuously the wooded hill northeast of Gettysburg (Culp's), and a half mile distant, and of an elevation to command the country for miles each way, and overlooking Cemetery Hill above the town. Returning to see General Ewell, who was still under much embarrassment, I said, "General, There," pointing to Culp's Hill, "is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied, as it ought to be by us or the enemy soon. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here." He said: "Are you sure it commands the town?" [I replied,] "Certainly it does, as you can see, and it ought to be held by us at once." General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped.”

— Isaac R. Trimble, "The Battle and Campaign of Gettysburg." Southern Historical Society Papers 26 (1898).

Observers at the scene later reported that the "impatient reply" was, "When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it." They also stated that Trimble threw down his sword in disgust and stormed off.

Did this happen as it is stated? No one knows. Trimble was certainly upset that he was without a command on July 1. He would lose a leg and be captured 2 days later as he led a division in Pickett’s Charge, never to return to command. So, he certainly had plenty of scores to settle in 1898, 35 years later. Ewell never wrote or spoke about the matter in the 7 years he survived after the war.

July 2nd

On day 2, Lee’s plan was for Longstreet to attack north along Emmitsburg Turnpike to Cemetery Ridge combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp. But Longstreet's brigades of McLaw and Hood were delayed and then got tangled up at Little Round Top and Sickles in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. The attack ended at the south section of Cemetery Ridge.

An acoustic shadow at Gettysburg on Day 2 occurred when Ewell was supposed to attack Culp’s Hill when Longstreet’s artillery started firing, but he never heard it, allowing Meade to shift some of the forces on Culp’s Hill to his left flank.

Alpheus Williams led the 1st Division. Due to a mix-up in the command structure, General Williams played a prominent role because of a miscommunication between General Meade and Williams’s superior officer. This miscommunication resulted in Williams commanding the XII Corps. Meanwhile, Maj Gen Henry Slocum believed he was in command of the right wing, consisting of the 11th and 12th Corps, and considered Williams as merely the temporary corps commander of the 12th. Slocum held the Union right from Culp's Hill to across the Baltimore Pike. With Longstreet’s attack, Meade ordered relocating XII Corps from Culps Hill. Williams successfully convinced Meade to leave a single brigade on Culps Hill instead of relocating everyone, to defend the entire right flank. This suggestion ultimately saved the position when the Confederate left wing launched an attack that evening. Despite leading two days of intense fighting on the Union's extreme right, Williams did not receive any official credit, as Slocum was late turning in his report, and Meade already submitted his report to the war department.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene At about 6 pm July 2nd, Meade shifted almost the entire XII Corps from the Union right to strengthen the left flank. Culp’s Hill was weakened to defend Cemetery Ridge against Longstreet’s attack on the left. Brig Gen George S Greene was a brigade commander in the division of Maj. Gen. John W. Geary.. His lone brigade of 1,350 New Yorkers (five regiments) was left to defend a one-half-mile line on Culp's Hill when an entire Confederate division attacked. Fortunately, Greene, a civil engineer, had insisted that his troops construct strong field fortifications. These preparations proved decisive and his brigade held off multiple attacks for hours. With the shift of troops, Greene was left with 5 regiments (1350 troops) to defend ½ mile of front against an entire Confederate corps.

Maj Gen George Sears Greene, a 62-year-old with an impressive war record, found himself continually overlooked for promotion due to his age. On the morning of July 2, he insisted that his men entrench on Culp’s Hill. As a former West Point professor of mathematics and engineering, Greene approached the situation with a strategic mindset that differed from his counterparts. General John Geary and General Henry Slocum did not share Greene's belief in the importance of entrenching on Culp’s Hill, but Greene's foresight would prove crucial in the upcoming battle. Neither General John Geary, a former Mayor of San Francisco, nor General Henry Slocum thought it would matter much.Geary’s division covered the lower hill, near Spangler’s Spring, Kane’s brigade to his right; then on the upper hill was Greene’s division, then Candy’s brigade, followed by a portion of Ruger’s division.

As twilight fell, the fighting on the Union left came to a close, but the assault on the Union right flank continued. Gen. Richard Ewell's forces pressed on, with Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Confederate division launching an attack on Culp’s Hill. Greene's brigade, consisting of around 1,400 New Yorkers, faced off against Johnson's 4,700 Confederates. Greene understood the significance of holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting vital supply lines. Despite being outnumbered, Greene's men were charged with holding the extreme right flank of the Union army and protecting its supply and communication artery, the nearby Baltimore Pike. Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men were dangerously overextended since they were only able to form a single battle line, without reserves.

Johnson's Confederate forces encountered fierce resistance as they charged up the slopes of Culp’s Hill. Greene's men had constructed formidable breastworks that halted the Confederate advance. Although Gen. George "Maryland" Steuart's brigade managed to outflank the Federal right flank, Greene's strategic positioning and defensive measures proved effective. The natural obstacles provided by the hill hindered the Confederate forces' progress, showcasing Greene's tactical acumen and the importance of his decision to entrench on Culp’s Hill.

At 7 pm with darkness gathering, Ewell initiated a significant infantry attack. He deployed three brigades, consisting of approximately 4,700 soldiers, from the division led by Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson. These troops crossed Rock Creek and ascended the eastern slope of Culp's Hill. However, Greene's entrenched position played a crucial role in the outcome of the assault. It allowed for reinforcements from the I Corps and XI Corps to come to his aid from the left. Wadsworth dispatched three regiments, while Howard on Cemetery Hill sent four, totaling around 750 men. Greene issued orders to hold the position under any circumstances. Despite four subsequent attacks made in the darkness, the line to his right remained threatened but was bolstered by additional reinforcements. The assaults persisted until 11 pm and resumed the following morning.

On the far right flank of the Union army, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York faced a formidable attack. Under intense pressure, the New Yorkers were compelled to retreat and occupy a traversing trench engineered by Greene, which faced south. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, they valiantly held their ground and safeguarded the flank. Unbeknownst to Steuart's men, due to the darkness and the heroic defense of Greene's brigade, they failed to realize that they had nearly unrestricted access to the Union army's primary communication line, the Baltimore Pike, which lay only 600 yards ahead. Ireland and his men averted a potential catastrophe.

Adelbert Ames, though not as famous as Chamberlain, who took over his position after his promotion, performed exceptionally well in the difficult circumstances at Gettysburg. During the intense attack led by Ewell on July 1, 1863, Ames, under the command of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, positioned his division in front of other units of the XI Corps on Barlow's Knoll. This exposed location was quickly overrun, leading to Barlow's capture and injury. Ames then took charge of the division and skillfully orchestrated a retreat through Gettysburg, eventually establishing a defensive position on Cemetery Hill. On July 2, during the second day of battle, Ames's division faced the brunt of the assault on East Cemetery Hill by Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early but managed to hold the crucial position with support from neighboring units. Ames even engaged in hand-to-hand combat at one point. Following the battle, the soldiers of the 20th Maine honored Ames by presenting him with their battle flag as a symbol of their respect.

When the XII Corps returned to the right flank late that night, Confederate forces had taken over parts of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring. Union soldiers, disoriented in the darkness, found enemy troops in the positions they had left. Gen. Williams instructed his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and await daylight. While Steuart's brigade managed to hold onto the lower heights precariously, Johnson's other two brigades were withdrawn from the hill to wait for daylight as well. Geary's troops came back to reinforce Greene, ensuring the defense of the position.

July 3rd.

The idea that the Copse was the focus was Batchelder’s incorrect and misleading attempt to bring attention to the area on the field where the attack went, not what was the real objective. Lee’s plan for both days 2 & 3 was the union center. That’s why a coordinated attack at Culp’s Hill was so necessary.

As General Lee stated in his official report, "The general plan was unchanged". The commanding position on the battlefield was Cemetery Hill. Piercing the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge was NOT the objective; Zeigler Grove was the large clump of trees in 1863, not the tiny thin saplings of the Copse. Those large trees were used for lumber many years after the battle and before John B. Bachelder's promoting and marking the high-water mark. This combined with a simultaneous pincer move on Culp's Hill by  Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson’s division from Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corp was the real plan.

At dawn, five Union batteries opened fire on Steuart's brigade in the positions they had captured and kept them pinned down for 30 minutes before an attack by two of Geary's brigades. Simultaneously, the Confederates initiated their own attack, resulting in a prolonged engagement that lasted well into the morning, marked by three unsuccessful offensives by Johnson's troops. Despite facing relentless charges from Ewell's entire corps on the night of July 2nd and throughout the following morning of July 3rd, Greene managed to maintain control of the hill, fending off repeated assaults from 4,700 Confederate soldiers and securing the upper summit.

Although Greene's contributions to the Union victory at Gettysburg were significant, his heroism is often overshadowed by other more well-known figures from the battle. As the oldest surviving Union general and West Point graduate, Greene's legacy deserves to be remembered and honored. His monument on Culps Hill serves as a reminder of his bravery and dedication to the Union cause during one of the most critical battles of the Civil War.

In addition to Greene, General John Geary also played a pivotal role in the defense of Culps Hill. His bold counterattack on July 3, 1863, helped drive the Confederates from their positions and protected the Union Army's vital supply line, the Baltimore Pike. Geary's decisive actions at Culps Hill exemplified the courage and determination of Union forces in securing a crucial victory at Gettysburg.

East Cavalry Field

A classic cavalry engagement occurred four miles east of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 3, 1863. The strategic significance of the vacant field was heightened by the presence of two important roads: the York Pike to the north and the Hanover Road to the south. Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's Union cavalry, positioned on the Hanover Road, guarded the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Recognizing the threat posed by Confederate control of the Hanover Road and the intersecting Low Dutch Road to the Union's supply line along the Baltimore Pike, Gregg was reinforced by 1,900 Michigan cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer. Together, Gregg and Custer established a defensive line at the intersection, supported by 10 artillery pieces.

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart led 5,000 Confederate cavalrymen to the northern side of the field. Contrary to previous teaching, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Stuart and Lee coordinated this assault with Pickett's Charge. Stuart's initial orders were to safeguard the flank of the Army of Northern Virginia, but he later admitted that his true intention was to launch a surprise attack on the enemy's rear. Stuart's charge was met with a countercharge by General Custer, effectively halting the assault. A subsequent charge led by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton with 2,000 mounted men was also repelled by Custer and the 7th Michigan regiment. Throughout the engagement, Gregg maintained his position. Although not strategically significant, the battle showcased the Union cavalry's growing prowess as a formidable fighting force, reminiscent of their performance at Brandy Station.

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Further Reading

·       Himmer, Robert, "New Light on Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's Conduct on the First Day at Gettysburg". Gettysburg Magazine. 43, July 2010.

·       Troy D Harman, “In Defense of Henry Slocum on July 1.”
http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay3.pdf

·       Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command. New York: Scribner's, 1968. 

·       Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – June 13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. 

·       Murray, R. L. A Perfect Storm of Lead, George Sears Greene's New York Brigade in Defense of Culp's Hill. Wolcott, NY: Benedum Books, 2000. 

·       Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. 

·       Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 

·       Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/custers-stand-east-cavalry-field

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.

Klein, Lloyd W,https://thecivilwarcenter.org/2023/07/04/general-lees-if-practicable-order-to-general-ewell-on-july-1-at-gettysburg/

US Anti-Imperialism in the Middle East: The Suez Crisis

Do you know about the time that the USA went against Israel and the Western powers in the Middle East? Here, Andrew Patterson tells us about the 1956 Suez Crisis, when the US did not support Britain, France, and Israel’s ambitions against Egypt.

A picture of Egyptian military vehicles that have been damaged in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Suez Canal Crisis was like a high-stakes poker game of global power. Imagine Egypt’s leader, Nasser, suddenly nationalizing the Suez Canal, basically a lifeline for world trade. This move freaks out London and Paris, sparking a secret buddy-up with Israel to snatch it back. Then struts in the USA, led by Eisenhower, looking to shake up the global power playlist. It was a showdown that not only reshaped the Middle East’s role in the Cold War but also turned the US into the surprise superhero for Egypt against the old-world colonial vibe. Diving into the Suez Crisis, we see the US playing the role of an unlikely hero, championing Egypt in the epic struggle to shake off colonial chains.

The Suez Canal’s a big deal—key for shipping oil and goods, and in the 1950s a colonial chess piece for way too long. Enter Egypt's bold move to nationalize it. This wasn't just about owning a canal; it was Egypt shouting from the rooftops that they were done being a pawn in the global game of thrones.

During the Cold War's peak, with the world split between capitalism and communism, the U.S. hit a fork in the road. Under Eisenhower, America ditched its old gunboat diplomacy for a surprising new look: anti-imperialism. Suddenly, the U.S. started sounding like it was rooting for the underdog, aligning its playbook with nations tired of colonial hangovers. It was a game-changer, showing the world that the U.S. was ready to mix things up and support countries carving out their own destinies.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Eisenhower's foreign policy was like walking a tightrope—with the U.S. juggling the need to curb Soviet spread while ditching the old-school, imperialist tactics of its European buddies. The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 was his way of saying, "We've got your back" to Middle Eastern countries fighting off communism, but the Suez Crisis was the real litmus test, pushing the U.S. to flex its anti-imperialist muscles sooner.

In 1956 Egypt's President Nasser Declaring the canal as Egypt’s own was a game-changing moment, throwing down the gauntlet against old colonial shadows and ushering in a fresh chapter of independence and self-rule.

Old Powers Collude

Britain, France, and Israel didn't waste any time cooking up a military response. Their plan? Israel would kick off an invasion, with British and French troops jumping in under the guise of keeping the canal open. But let's be real, their eyes were on the bigger prize: knocking Nasser off his pedestal and taking back the canal. This move was straight out of the old colonial playbook—an attempt to turn back the clock to a time when gunboat diplomacy and empire-building were the order of the day.

When Britain, France, and Israel moved on Egypt, the U.S. threw a curveball by condemning the invasion, stunning its usual pals. This was a loud and clear signal from America: the days of imperialist playbooks were done. Eisenhower and crew, sticking to their anti-imperialist guns, viewed the invasion as a potential spark for a much larger fire, possibly drawing the Soviet Union into a broader conflict that could destabilize the Cold War's delicate balance.

New Boss New Rules

Breaking with tradition, the U.S. stood firm against old friends Britain and France, plus Israel, over their joint military move. Eisenhower didn't just talk a big game; he backed it up with the threat of economic sanctions against Britain, who at the time was pretty much banking on U.S. financial aid.

In this era, the U.S. didn't just stand by; it dove into some serious diplomacy to stop the fighting. By defending Egypt's right to manage the Suez Canal, the U.S. was basically broadcasting a new rulebook to the world: national sovereignty was in, and old-school colonial aggression was out. This stance was a global announcement, especially aimed at the Soviet Union, that the U.S. had zero patience for imperialist antics, even from its best buddies.

The U.S. used the United Nations as a stage to rally global opinion. By advocating for a resolution that demanded a ceasefire and the retreat of the invaders, America emerged as a peacemaker, pushing for diplomacy over force. This move not only boosted the U.S.'s rep as a champion of international law and the UN but also showed it as a superpower ready to back smaller nations against colonial leftovers.

The crisis ended with Britain and France yielding to the pressure, mainly from the U.S., and pulling out their troops—a win for Egypt and a face-palm moment for the European duo. The landscape of global politics was forever altered. This wasn't just about who controlled a crucial waterway; it was a turning point, signaling the end of European colonial clout and the beginning of an era dominated by U.S. influence. The retreat of British and French troops, nudged along by the U.S., waved goodbye to the age of empires stretching their borders too far.

The U.S. walked away taller, having stuck to its guns on national sovereignty and a clear no to go-it-alone military moves—a big leap from the days of showing force first and asking questions later. Emerging with a reputation for valuing sovereignty and shunning solo military ventures, the U.S. marked a departure from centuries of Western might-makes-right tactics. For Egypt and Nasser, it was a clear win, boosting Nasser's standing as an anti-colonial hero and igniting nationalist passions beyond the Middle East.

The crisis also reshaped global power balances, underscoring the dwindling might of Britain and France while spotlighting the Middle East as a self-determining region, increasingly important on the world stage, often with superpower support or interference. Reflecting on the Suez Crisis, we're reminded of diplomacy's value, the importance of supporting the underdog, and the dynamic forces that mold our world. It's a narrative of transformation, confrontation, and hope for a fairer international community.

Andrew Patterson is an amateur history enthusiast who writes for https://easternchronicles.me/ , a website dedicated to Middle Eastern history, Travel writing & archeology.

For the Love of Speech – The Art of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece

As Gandalf tells us in The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers, "Perilous to us all are the devices of an art which we do not possess ourselves." Of course, Gandalf is talking about a dangerous, magical object that can communicate across space and time: a palantír stone. But the message rings true, too, about the powers of language and writing, which--like a palantír stone--can also traverse boundaries of space and time. Step into a library and you might have dialogues with thousands of the dead. 

Some of history's most dangerous and destabilizing figures were masters of the art of speech. They possessed great oratorical skills, but were devoid of a greater sense of ethics. In Plato's reckoning, a true rhetorician must unite their art of speech with philosophy. After all, if we do not possess ourselves a sense of how language can persuade us and work us over, then we will be all the more susceptible to those who might wield rhetoric against us. 

In the following excerpt, Dr. Daniel Lawrence (author of a recent book here: Amazon US | Amazon UK) goes back to the world of the ancient Greeks, where one's ability to speak well could literally be a matter of life and death. It's no wonder, given these circumstances, that an art of persuasion and various theories of language and perception emerged. Yet, as many rhetorical scholars have now documented, many different people at many different times and places developed arts and theories of writing and speech: the ancient Egyptians, the ancient Chinese, and various Indigenous peoples across the world. Wherever there is writing, language, and technology, there seems to emerge a human critique of its power. The author believes this rich tradition of critique--this art of rhetoric--is precisely what we need more of in our world today to help combat the growing dangers of digital disinformation and the unsettling, persuasive abilities of artificial intelligence. 

Oratorical skills are referenced in Homer’s Iliad. Above picture: Iliad, Book VIII, lines 245–253.

The ancient Greeks loved speeches. In the beginning of Phaedrus, one of my favorite dialogues by Plato, the titular character Phaedrus tells Socrates that he has just returned from a morning of making speeches with his friend Lysias. This would seem to be a rather funny thing in today’s world: to meet a friend for lunch, ask them how they spent their morning, and be told, “Oh, I was just over at Jane’s apartment. We were making speeches all morning.” Though this would not be a common occurrence today, the art of making speeches was close to the heart of ancient Greek culture. In a world where writing was a relatively new technology, writing tools and materials were expensive, and there was a reliance on oral tradition. Thus, speechmaking was a valued pastime. In many ways, this same desire for communication and storytelling is now fed by our media addictions: television, YouTube, film, podcasts, or binging a Netflix series. We don’t want to dismiss the important differences in our cultures, but we also shouldn’t forget just how similar humans can be across time and space.

Not all fun

But rhetoric wasn’t all fun, games, and entertainment for the ancient Greeks. The renowned classicist and scholar of rhetoric, George Kennedy, explains in his seminal A New History of Classical Rhetoric that this fascination with speeches was at least partially due to the vital, life-saving necessity of wielding language persuasively. Because there was no regular system of legal representation in ancient Greece, citizens would often be required to defend themselves in a court of law or to lay out their case against an opponent. In these early days of democratic society, your ability to speak could literally be a matter of life or death. If your neighbor accused you of stealing their goat—or worse, their horse—then you better have been able to make a compelling argument about why it wasn’t possible that you stole it as you proved your innocence. Perhaps you would make an appeal to ethos—that is, your character and credibility—and say, “I am an honest and law-abiding citizen of Athens. How could a person like me commit such a crime?” Perhaps you would make an appeal to pathos—that is, the emotions of your listeners—by pleading, “I am a father of five children and must work hard to provide for them. Would you rob these children of their father by imprisoning me based on the false claims of this greedy accuser?” Or perhaps you would appeal to the logos (or logic) of the audience and claim, “I was all day yesterday at the Theatre of Dionysus, a fact to which many of my fellow citizens can attest. How could I have been in two places at once?”

Today, we don’t take language seriously enough. The rhetorician Lloyd Bitzer wrote in his oft-cited essay (and bane of disinterested undergraduate students everywhere) “The Rhetorical Situation” that “rhetoric is a mode of altering reality,” not by physically moving material objects around, but by “the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action.” This is just an academic way of saying that speech and language can literally change the way we perceive the world, the way we think, and the way we act. And certainly, we know this to be the case. We might hear a powerful sermon and be swayed into a life of service to a god, or we might see a compelling video advertisement which, even imperceptibly or insensibly, cements an idea in our mind of which make and model of automobile we want to purchase. Language can have life-altering effects on us. We may be convinced to take a job in a new city or to vote for a particular political candidate. Gorgias, the rockstar rhetorician of ancient Greece, likened language to a kind of drug, or pharmakon. To me, that appears to be a reasonable explanation for the brainwashing and spellbinding experienced by the German population under Hitler in the early-to-mid twentieth century. But then, it’s easy to see when it’s happening to other people: “How could all those Germans have just fallen right in line with that evil man? Couldn’t they see through his lies?” No, most could not. It’s easy to see when others are being persuaded. It’s painful and difficult to observe it in ourselves. We like to believe we are immune to persuasion, but we are all persuadable.

Persuasion

It’s not just language that is persuasive, though. It is the combined effects of rhetoric that persuade us. Hitler’s powers of persuasion included his mannerisms, gesticulations, the timbre and inflection of his voice, his word choice (diction), the way he constructed sentences (syntax), and his use of rhetorical techniques like allusion or antithesis. It was his use of symbolism and architecture (such as the golden eagle, standard in the grand Nazi-party rallies and the ubiquitous swastika) as well as his deft wielding of then-new technologies such as radio, film, and fast travel by airplane. As Quintilian told us, even “the mere look of a man can be persuasive.” Contemporary psychology tells us just as much. Tall people make more money over their lifetime, according to findings on a “height-salary link” that was documented in one study by Timothy A. Judge, PhD and Daniel M. Cable, PhD. In another uncomfortable set of studies, researchers found that attractive women received higher grades in college courses—an effect that diminishes when teaching is conducted remotely and online. We like to think that we’re objective, rational, and fair, but there’s a broad expanse of research that shows the opposite to be true; we’re easily persuaded and carry many deeply held biases and values within us, and these affect the way we perceive and interact with others and the world around us.

We don’t understand, fully, comprehensively, scientifically, how persuasion works. There is, at present, no satisfactory or complete picture of persuasion in the neurological, psychological, rhetorical, or sociological literature. It’s a tricky beast to pin down precisely. Persuasion is complicated. We are practically left with the same conundrum today as our ancestors faced thousands of years ago. In some sense, I am grateful for this. I have no doubt that if a universal theory of persuasion were discovered, corporations, political parties, and governments would take full advantage of the knowledge, and democracy would be in further jeopardy. Yet, even without a universal theory of persuasion, this is essentially the place we find ourselves in. Using imagery, video, hyper-targeted social media advertisements, psychographic profiling techniques, big data, modern computing power, and complex technological distribution mechanisms, persuasion and propaganda have become more powerful and more dangerous today than ever before. As I will write about later in this book, the UK firm Cambridge Analytica used weaponized social media advertising strategies to influence elections all over the world, while companies at present are spending more money on digital advertising than print, billboards, mailers, leaflets, radio, television, magazine, newspaper, and all other forms of traditional advertising combined. And they called those they targeted with the bulk of their budget “The Persuadables.” The Persuadables were a demographic of centrists Cambridge Analytica profiled as being on-the-fence and able to be pushed to vote for one candidate over another. While we don’t know the extent to which Cambridge Analytica influenced presidential results in the U.S. in 2016, we can rightly assume that companies wouldn’t be paying for such services if they didn’t yield results. Digital disinformation is a massive global undertaking, and we are the targets.

Conclusion

Now, I’m not suggesting that we return to the oral culture of the ancient Greeks and all start making speeches as a form of entertainment. (It might be fun, though.) We can’t force a cultural change like that. But what should be most shocking to us is that we have completely abandoned the one field of study that deals directly with disinformation, propaganda, and information literacy in this time of crisis, when there is more technologically advanced disinformation threatening democracy than ever be- fore in the history of humanity. The field of study that deals with these extraordinary questions of truth, credibility, disinformation, propaganda, and information literacy is the study of rhetoric. I know that teaching and learning about rhetoric can be interesting (and even fun) when done right. Furthermore, there may not be anything more powerful for a person to learn than how to speak and write effectively and persuasively. How can we live in a time like this and not teach our children about rhetoric, the field of study that could empower them to disarm disinformation, advocate for their rights and values in an increasingly polarized realm of political discourse, and be resilient to the thousands of advertisements and propagandic messages that are launched at them daily from smart phones, computer screens, and the increasing number of screens in our homes, schools, and places of work? How else to protect them from the idealogues that fill our schools, companies, and communities? Rhetoric is that secret, ancient discipline that can help us in our great time of need. We are all persuadables, and we need help.

Dr. Daniel Lawrence has a recently published book: Disinformed: A History of Humanity's Search for the Truth. It is available here: Amazon US | Amazon UK

Reclaiming the “One Nation” Tradition: What are the Lessons from the Past and Policy Options for a Future Conservative Administration?

For several months now, polls have suggested a sweeping victory for the Labour Party at the next British general election; an alarming prospect for the government and one that recently led some Conservatives to openly call for a change of leader in the hope that this will remove the likelihood of electoral armageddon and the end of 14 years of Conservative governance. Here, Vittorio Trevitt considers this in a historical context – and looks at what could happen in the future.

Benjamin Disraeli, circa 1873.

Much of the Conservative administration’s polling plight is arguably the result of the increased levels of poverty and wage stagnation that the party has presided over. Throughout its history, however, and in comparison to the current and more recent Conservative ministries, the Conservative Party has on many occasions upheld a noteworthy tradition that champions a degree of governmental action to lessen inequalities and elevate opportunity. That tradition is the One Nation brand of British Conservatism.

The origins of this tradition can be traced to the one-time Conservative leader Benjamin Disraeli, who spoke of England in a novel he composed, “Sybil,” as being made up “of two nations – one rich, one poor,” and as prime minister introduced a wide range of reforms aimed at bridging that gap. Amongst these included measures to improve the legal status of unions, improvements in living conditions and sanitation in urban areas, food safety standards, and restrictions on the working hours of women and children. The term “One Nation” came to be associated with members of the Conservative Party who believed that Conservatism should reach out to all sections of British society.

The principles of One Nation Conservatism were evident in the social policies of Disraeli’s successors, who utilised the power of the state to mitigate numerous social evils. The 1887 Truck Amendment Act broadened the range of workers protected by legislation ensuring that they be paid in coins rather than in tickets or goods that could only be used at employer-owned shops. The 1889 Cotton Cloth Factories Act regulated the degree of humidity and temperature in such establishments, while the 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act encouraged local authority public housing schemes. An Education Act of 1891 provided, as noted by one study, “grants for schools willing to abolish fees for children between three and fifteen years of age.” The 1891 Factory and Workshop Act included various provisions aimed at safeguarding labour including an expansion of sanitary regulations, and the following year a Shop Hours Regulation Act sought to limit the weekly working hours of shop assistants under the age of 18 to 74, which included times for meals. In 1897, an important Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed that, while not universal, nevertheless legally obligated employers to pay compensation to workers when accidents occurred.

Early 19th century

The early Twentieth Century also witnessed the passage of much legislation bearing the stamp of One Nation Conservatism. Arthur Balfour’s 1902-1905 administration passed legislation setting up Distress Committees to reduce the hardships suffered by those experiencing unemployment by means of supporting such individuals in finding employment. A 1923 Industrial Insurance Act offered safeguards for millions of policyholders, while the 1925 Merchant Shipping (International Labour Convention) Act provided improved rights for seamen. That same year, a permanent Food Council was set up to prevent food price profiteering, and the Lead Paint (Protection Against Poisoning) Act from the following year sought to protect paint trade workers from lead poisoning. A Mining Act introduced that same year provided for a 5% levy on royalties to help support the installation of pithead baths. For people in rural areas, the 1926 Housing (rural workers') act entitled owners of rural cottages to loans and grants for home improvements, while the 1928 Agricultural Credits Act furnished farmers with a loan system to help them in purchasing their farms.

This reforming trend would continue throughout the Thirties, in spite of the social and economic turmoil of the Great Depression. New housing laws were passed with the intention of alleviating bad housing, and in 1934 a Milk in School scheme was launched that over 2 million children benefited from. The 1936 Agriculture Act set up an unemployment insurance scheme for agricultural workers, while the 1937 National Health Insurance (Juvenile Contributors and Young Persons) Act allowed for medical treatment to be provided for juveniles the moment they entered insurable employment, instead of waiting until the full health insurance age of 16 to receive such care. Also that year, a Widows’, Orphans’ and Old Age Contributory Pensions (Voluntary Contributions) Act was passed that offered voluntary insurance to those left out of a previous scheme for beneficiaries of such benefits. The 1938 Poor Law Amendment Act provided for the payment of cash allowances to inmates aged 65 and over, while a Blind Persons Actpassed that same year reduced the old age pension eligibility age from 50 to 40 years for blind persons. Other measures included the 1939 Cancer Act, which improved facilities for the treating people with cancer, the 1937 Factory Act (which enhanced workplace safety standards), and the granting of paid holidays to about an additional 1 million workers via the 1938 Holidays with Pay Act.

Post-war period

The values of One-Nation Conservatism were also evident in many of the policies carried out by successive Conservative governments following the end of the Second World War. Although responsible for dubious decisions including the re-introduction of prescription charges (which was legislated for but never implemented under the previous Labour administration) and the 1957 Rent Act (which decontrolled rents throughout much of the private sector), they also carried out notable reforms such as a major housebuilding programme (which produced 300,000 homes per annum), grants to encourage home improvements, and new social entitlements such as a severe disablement occupational allowance for war pensioners and a home confinement grant for new mothers. A Small Farmer Scheme was also set up in 1959 to assist such farmers, with one historian asserting that, while the scheme only received a modest amount of money, the principle was novel “since it offered assistance only to those farmers whose businesses were not economic yet were capable of becoming so.” Edward Heath’s 1970-74 ministry, although maligned with justification for abolishing free milk for primary school children between the ages of 8 and 11, introduced such innovations as rent allowances, an invalidity benefit for those with severe disabilities, and the Family Income Supplement; a top-up benefit for those earning low wages. In addition, the fair rents system that the 1964-70 Labour government introduced for private tenants was extended to those in the public sector.

The 1971 Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act made oil tanker owners liable for any oil pollution they caused, while the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act of that year brought all passengers under liability insurance coverage. The 1971 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, in the words of one study, provided “that in assessing the claim of a widow neither her prospects of remarriage nor her actual remarriage would be taken into account,” while the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act provided financial support “for parties to marriage and children of family.” A comprehensiveLand Compensation Act was also passed in 1973, designed to offer compensation to individuals whose properties had been negatively impacted by road and redevelopment schemes or had been compulsorily purchased. This included special home loss payments to occupiers in addition to any entitlement to normal market value payment, advance compensation payments of up to 90% of the amount the acquiring authority estimated, a legal bar on the practice whereby compensation was lowered in cases where local councils rehoused persons in a council house and, for the first time, the right of certain business tenants to compensation for removal expenses and trade loss.

Thatcher era

In many respects, the Heath Ministry represented the swansong of One Nation Conservatism, despite having been elected on a platform calling for reduced economic state intervention. The onset of Thatcherism undeniably sounded the death-knell of the Party’s One Nation tradition as a driving force in policy-making. Margaret Thatcher’s rise to the Conservative leadership in 1975 signalled an ideological turn to the Right; one that would find substance in the numerous ministries she led from 1979 onwards. Adhering to the belief that the State should limit its role in social and economic affairs as much as possible, Thatcherism presided over de-industrialisation on a large scale together with curbs on benefit rights. Paradoxically, while average living standards rose, the percentage of Britons living in povertyalso went up. The succeeding New Labour governments, while maintaining Thatcherite economic reforms and presiding over tests for certain benefits, facilitated a steady drop in poverty during most of their time in office; a positive development arguably attributable to new social programmes like pensioner and working family tax credits. Ironically, it was measures such as these that pre-Thatcherite Conservative ministries often rolled out themselves.

To the present

Given the circumstances, it may be time for the Conservative Party to reclaim the “One Nation” mantle and adopt a more activist strategy aimed at making greater use of the state as a force for social change if it hopes to remain in office after 2024.

More can be done to stimulate the social housing sector; a move that a 2023 poll suggested would be very popularamongst Conservative voters. A long-term care insurance system like the one established in Holland under the right-of-centre De Jong cabinet in 1968 (which remains in place to this day) could alleviate the financial burden of households in providing care for elderly relatives. The adequacy of sick pay need addressing, with Britain ranking amongst the lowest in Europe in this category. In addition, income poverty can be tackled by raising the level of unemployment payments, with the UKs replacement rate far below most OECD members like Luxembourg, Iceland and Slovenia. The Conservatives could also improve the family benefits system by introducing new social programmes for families. A Recreational Allowance could assist families with paying for family activities such as going to the cinema, while a Family Holiday Allowance could help pay towards the cost of holiday activities. In education, the Conservative Party could follow the example of Jamaica’s governing centre-right Labour Party, which recently announced the goal of providing free tuition for all public university students; a move that would make Jamaica the first Caribbean nation to do so.

There is, therefore, much in the One Nation tradition that the modern day Conservative Party can learn from, while there exist a number of policy options consistent with that tradition which either the current or a future Conservative administration could introduce. Adopting a more progressive policy agenda would not only be beneficial to the Conservative Party in political terms and in keeping with its historical heritage, but by tackling disadvantage and raising levels of personal health and wellbeing, it would be beneficial to the British people as a whole.

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The Most Infamous Outlaws of the Old West

The Old West is often romanticized in American history, with images of gunslingers and outlaws roaming the frontier in search of adventure and fortune. These individuals played a significant role in shaping the history of the American West, with their actions leaving a lasting impact on the development of the region. 
 
Gunslingers were skilled marksmen who were known for their quick draw and accuracy with a firearm. These individuals were often hired as lawmen or hired guns by towns and ranchers to protect their interests and maintain order in the often lawless frontier towns. Gunslingers were also known for their dueling skills, with many settling disputes through gunfights rather than through the legal system. 

Here, Richard Bluttal considers some of the many outlaws or gunslingers of the old west. 

Charles Boles, otherwise known as "Black Bart".

BILLY THE KID

Billy the Kid, whose real name was William H. Bonney, was a legendary American outlaw and gunfighter who lived during the American Old West era. He was born in New York City in 1859 and moved to New Mexico with his family as a young boy. Billy the Kid became involved in criminal activities at a young age, including cattle rustling and other outlaw behavior.

Billy the Kid gained notoriety for his involvement in the Lincoln County War, a violent conflict in New Mexico in the late 1870s. During the war, Billy the Kid was part of a group known as the Regulators, who clashed with rival factions in the area.

After the Lincoln County War, Billy the Kid continued his life as an outlaw, evading capture by law enforcement. He was eventually captured, tried, and sentenced to hang for his crimes. However, he managed to escape from jail and remained a fugitive until he was tracked down and shot dead by Sheriff Pat Garrett in 1881.

Billy the Kid's life and exploits have been the subject of numerous books, movies, and songs, and he has become a legendary figure in American folklore and the history of the American West. 

BLACK BART 

Black Bart, whose real name was Charles Earl Bowles, was a notorious American outlaw who operated in California and Oregon during the late 19th century. He earned the nickname "Black Bart" for his preference for wearing black clothing and his dark, bushy beard. Born in Norfolk, England in 1829, Bowles immigrated to the United States as a child with his family. He grew up in New York and eventually made his way to California during the Gold Rush of the 1850s. Bowles tried his hand at various jobs, including mining and ranching, but found little success. In the early 1870s, Bowles turned to a life of crime and began robbing stagecoaches in the remote areas of California and Oregon. He adopted the persona of "Black Bart," a mysterious and dashing outlaw who left poems at the scene of his robberies. These poems often mocked the authorities and taunted his pursuers, earning him a reputation as a gentleman bandit. Black Bart was known for his polite and non-violent approach to robbery. He never harmed his victims or used violence during his heists, preferring to rely on intimidation and his reputation as a skilled marksman. Despite his criminal activities, Black Bart was seen as a Robin Hood figure by some, as he targeted wealthy individuals and corporations rather than ordinary citizens. Over the course of his criminal career, Black Bart successfully robbed over 28 stagecoaches, amassing a considerable fortune in gold and cash. However, his luck eventually ran out when he was captured in 1883 after leaving behind a handkerchief with his laundry mark at the scene of a robbery. Black Bart was tried and convicted of robbery, but his polite demeanor and gentlemanly conduct during the trial earned him sympathy from the public and the press. He was sentenced to six years in San Quentin State Prison but was released after serving just four years due to good behavior. After his release from prison, Black Bart disappeared from the public eye and was never heard from again. The details of his later life and death remain shrouded in mystery, adding to the legend of one of the most infamous outlaws of the American West. Black Bart's story continues to captivate historians and enthusiasts of the Old West, cementing his place in American folklore as a daring and enigmatic figure. 

BELLE STARR 

Belle Starr, also known as the "Bandit Queen" or the "Queen of the Outlaws," was a notorious American outlaw who gained notoriety during the late 19th century. Born as Myra Maybelle Shirley in Carthage, Missouri in 1848, Belle Starr was raised in a respectable, middle-class family. However, she was drawn to a life of crime and adventure from a young age, influenced by her father, who was involved in various criminal activities. Belle Starr's criminal career began in her teenage years when she eloped with a man named Jim Reed, who was a known outlaw and Confederate guerrilla fighter. The couple embarked on a life of crime, robbing banks, stagecoaches, and trains across the American South. Belle Starr quickly gained a reputation for her sharpshooting skills, fearless demeanor, and flamboyant style, earning her the nickname "Bandit Queen." After Jim Reed was killed in a gunfight in 1864, Belle Starr married several more outlaws and continued her criminal activities, becoming a prominent figure in the criminal underworld of the Wild West. She was known to associate with notorious outlaws such as Jesse James and the Younger brothers, further solidifying her reputation as a dangerous and influential figure. Belle Starr's outlaw lifestyle was not without its challenges, as she faced numerous run-ins with the law and spent time in jail for her criminal activities. Despite her criminal record, Belle Starr was admired by many for her independent spirit, defiance of societal norms, and her willingness to challenge the status quo. In addition to her criminal exploits, Belle Starr was also known for her unconventional personal life. She had several husbands and lovers throughout her lifetime, including a Cherokee Indian named Sam Starr, with whom she had a son. Belle Starr's relationships were often tumultuous and marked by violence, adding to her enigmatic and mysterious persona. BelleStarr's criminal career came to an end in 1889 when she was shot and killed under mysterious circumstances near her home in Oklahoma. Her murder remains unsolved to this day, adding to the legend and mystique surrounding the "Bandit Queen." Despite her criminal activities and controversial reputation, Belle Starr remains a fascinating and complex figure in American history. She is remembered as a symbol of rebellion, independence, and defiance against societal norms, challenging traditional gender roles and expectations. Belle Starr's legacy continues to captivate historians, writers, and enthusiasts of the Old West.

JESSIE JAMES 

Jesse James was a notorious American outlaw, guerrilla, and folk hero who became a legendary figure in the history of the American West. Born on September 5, 1847, in Clay County, Missouri, Jesse James was raised in a tumultuous and violent environment that would shape his future as a criminal and outlaw. His life story is one of violence, betrayal, and rebellion against authority, making him a complex and controversial figure in American history.

Jesse James was born into a family that was deeply embroiled in the violent politics of the Civil War. His father, Robert James, was a Baptist minister who supported the Confederate cause and joined a pro-Confederate guerrilla band known as Quantrill's Raiders. This group of guerrillas carried out raids and attacks on Union soldiers and sympathizers, engaging in brutal acts of violence and retribution. Jesse James grew up in this environment of lawlessness and chaos, witnessing the horrors of war and the brutality of conflict at a young age.

After the end of the Civil War, Jesse James and his older brother Frank James continued their involvement in criminal activities, robbing banks, trains, and stagecoaches across the Midwest. They formed a gang of outlaws that included members such as Cole Younger, Jim Younger, and Clell Miller, who carried out a series of daring and audacious robberies that captured the imagination of the American public. The James-Younger gang became one of the most notorious criminal organizations of the post-Civil War era, striking fear into the hearts of law enforcement and civilians alike.

Jesse James quickly gained a reputation as a cunning and ruthless outlaw who was able to evade capture and outwit the authorities. He became a folk hero to many Americans, especially in the South, where he was seen as a symbol of resistance against the oppressive forces of Reconstruction and federal authority. Songs, ballads, and dime novels were written about Jesse James, portraying him as a Robin Hood-like figure who robbed from the rich and gave to the poor. This image of Jesse James as a romantic and chivalrous outlaw only added to his mystique and appeal to the public.

However, the reality of Jesse James' life was far more complex and troubled than the myth that surrounded him. He was involved in numerous violent confrontations with law enforcement, leading to the deaths of many innocent bystanders and officers of the law. The Pinkerton Detective Agency, a private detective agency hired by the railroads and banks to capture the James-Younger gang. 

BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID 

They were two of the most infamous outlaws of the American West, known for their daring robberies and their ability to evade capture by law enforcement. Their story has become the stuff of legend, immortalized in books, movies, and television shows. But who were Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, and what is the truth behind the myths that have been perpetuated about them?

Butch Cassidy, whose real name was Robert Leroy Parker, was born in Utah in 1866. He got his nickname "Butch" from his time working as a butcher in his youth. Cassidy was a charismatic and intelligent leader, known for his charm and his ability to recruit and lead a gang of outlaws. He was also a skilled horseman and marksman, which made him a formidable opponent for law enforcement.

The Sundance Kid, whose real name was Harry Alonzo Longabaugh, was born in Pennsylvania in 1867. He earned his nickname from his time spent in the town of Sundance, Wyoming, where he got into trouble with the law. The Sundance Kid was known for his quick wit and his sharpshooting skills, which made him a valuable member of Butch Cassidy's gang.

Together, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid formed the Wild Bunch, a gang of outlaws that carried out a series of daring bank and train robberies across the American West. Their most famous robbery was the holdup of the Union Pacific Overland Flyer train in 1900, which netted them over $50,000 in cash and valuables. The Wild Bunch became notorious for their brazen crimes and their ability to elude capture by law enforcement.

Despite their criminal activities, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid were also known for their code of honor and their loyalty to their gang members. They were known to treat civilians with respect during their robberies and were admired by many for their daring escapades. However, their criminal lifestyle eventually caught up with them, and they were forced to flee the United States to escape capture.

In 1901, Butch Cassidy, the Sundance Kid, and their companion Etta Place fled to South America, where they continued their life of crime. They settled in Argentina and then Bolivia, where they carried out a series of bank robberies and other criminal activities. However, their luck eventually ran out, and in 1908, they were surrounded by Bolivian soldiers during a botched robbery and killed.

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Who was Orde Wingate? And was he a World War 2 Military Maverick?

Military history has produced certain figures that stand out not just for their tactical brilliance, but for their unorthodox methods and unwavering commitment to their cause. Among these figures is Orde Wingate, a man whose name evokes both admiration and controversy. Wingate's life, was marked by innovation, audacity, and controversy, whose impact reverberates through the ages.

Terry Bailey explains.

Orde Wingate in 1943.

Born in 1903 in Naini Tal, India, to British Christian missionaries, Wingate's upbringing instilled in him a deep sense of duty and moral righteousness. His formative years in the diverse landscapes of Asia shaped his unconventional worldview and prepared him for the challenges he would face later in life.

Graduating from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1923, Wingate embarked on a military career that would defy convention at every turn. Wingate's early experiences in Palestine during the 1930s laid the groundwork for his unconventional approach to warfare. While serving with the British Mandatory forces, he became deeply involved in counterinsurgency operations against Arab guerrilla forces. It was here that Wingate first experimented with small, highly mobile units operating behind enemy lines—a tactic that would define his later achievements.

However, it was during the Second World War that Wingate truly left his mark on military history. Tasked with combating the Japanese advance in Southeast Asia, Wingate devised a daring plan to harass enemy supply lines and disrupt their communication networks. This plan culminated in the formation of the Chindits, special operations units composed of British, Gurkha, and Burmese soldiers trained in unconventional warfare tactics.

World War Two

The Chindits' first operation, codenamed Operation Longcloth, saw Wingate's forces penetrate deep into Japanese-held territory in Burma. Operating far beyond the reach of conventional supply lines, Wingate's men endured harsh conditions and constant enemy harassment. Despite sustaining heavy casualties, the Chindits succeeded in their primary objective of disrupting Japanese operations and bolstering Allied morale.

Wingate's unorthodox methods and uncompromising leadership style earned him both admirers and detractors within the military establishment. While some hailed him as a visionary strategist, others criticized his disregard for traditional military doctrine and his often abrasive personality. Nonetheless, Wingate's accomplishments on the battlefield spoke for themselves, and his influence continued to grow as the war progressed.

One of Wingate's most enduring legacies was his advocacy for the use of airborne forces in military operations. Recognizing the potential of airborne operations to strike deep behind enemy lines with speed and precision, Wingate lobbied tirelessly for their expansion within the Allied forces. His efforts culminated in the use of glider and other airborne based activity dedicated to conducting airborne operations in support of ground forces, specifically in Operation Thursday.

A number of traditional Generals suggested the Chindits operations had a negative effect on the Asian war effort, with some historians indicating that Wingate’s ideas were flawed in many respects, simply because the Japanese Army did not have Western-style supply lines to disrupt, and tended to ignore logistics generally.

However, the Japanese commander, Mutaguchi Renya, later stated that Operation Thursday had a significant effect on the campaign, saying "The Chindit invasion ... had a decisive effect on these operations ... they drew off the whole of 53 Division and parts of 15 Division, one regiment of which would have turned the scales at Kohima.”

Tragically, Wingate's life was cut short on March, 24 1944 when the plane a USAAF B-25 Mitchell bomber of the 1st Air Commando Group in which he was flying crashed into jungle-covered hills in the present-day state of Manipur, India killing all passengers aboard, including Wingate. His death robbed the world of one of its most innovative military minds, but his legacy lived on in the countless lives he touched and the strategies he pioneered.

Legacy

Needless to say, in the decades since his passing, Wingate's reputation has undergone a re-evaluation, with many historians recognizing his contributions to modern warfare. His emphasis on unconventional tactics, small-unit operations, and strategic mobility laid the groundwork for the special operations today, along with other charismatic military leaders such as Lt Colonel David, Stirling, SAS, Major Vladimir Peniakoff, No. 1 Demolition Squadron, PPA, Major Ralph Alger Bagnold, Long Range Desert Group, Lt Colonel Herbert George "Blondie" Hasler, Royal Marines special operations and Lt Colonel William Joseph "Wild Bill" Donovan, OSS to name a few.

Moreover, Orde Wingate’s unyielding commitment to his principles and his willingness to challenge the status quo serve as an inspiration to military leaders around the world. Orde Wingate's life serves as a testament to the power of innovation, determination, and unorthodox thinking. In an era defined by uncertainty and upheaval, his example is a reminder that true greatness lies not in conformity, but in the courage to chart a new course and pursue it relentlessly.

Reflecting on his legacy, it is important to remember that Orde Wingate was not only a military genius, but as a symbol of the indomitable human courage and personal moral standards that drove him to strive for achievement without personal consideration.

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What Happened at the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness in the US Civil War?

The first battle of the Overland Campaign, known as The Battle of the Wilderness, occurred from May 5-7, 1864. General Grant devised a strategic plan to have all Union armies attack simultaneously, preventing General Lee from transferring troops and resources between theaters as he had done in 1863.He would also have all of the eastern armies move toward Richmond: General Butler from the southeast, and General Sigel from the west. Grant recognized that President Lincoln needed concrete evidence of a victorious war in order to secure re-election, so he assured him that regardless of the battle's outcome, he would not retreat. Although only General Sherman managed to execute a successful simultaneous offensive campaign, it proved sufficient to achieve the desired outcome of Grant's plan.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Major-General Wadsworth fighting in the May 1864 Battle of the Wilderness

Situated south of the Rapidan River in Virginia, The Wilderness encompasses parts of Spotsylvania County and Orange County. Its boundaries extend to Spotsylvania Court House in the south and the Mine Run tributary of the Rapidan River in the west. This densely forested region consists of numerous trees and secondary growths, rendering visibility nearly impossible even to this day. Additionally, the dirt roads within the area were particularly treacherous when wet, making it extremely challenging to coordinate command and control as well as large troop movements.

Grant decided to to establish his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, led by Major General George G. Meade. While Grant focused on overall strategy, Meade assumed responsibility for tactical matters. The battle unfolded just a few miles west of the Chancellorsville battle site,

The Strategy

In the early months of 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in a standoff along the Rapidan River in central Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate forces, was well aware of the numerical and technological superiority of the Union army led by General Ulysses S. Grant. In order to mitigate these disadvantages, Lee strategically chose the Wilderness, a densely wooded area, as the battleground. This terrain would limit the effectiveness of Grant's artillery and provide cover for the smaller Confederate force. Lee positioned his troops behind earthworks along the Rapidan River, with the intention of bringing reinforcements from the rear if necessary. Additionally, Lee's cavalry, under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart, patrolled the surrounding countryside to gather intelligence on Grant's movements. 

Grant was fully aware of Lee's defensive strategy and his intention to defend Richmond, the Confederate capital. Rather than attempting to outmaneuver Lee, Grant devised a plan to push his army through the challenging forested terrain and into open ground as quickly as possible. His ultimate objective was to capture Richmond and bring an end to the war. Grant understood that time was of the essence and aimed to advance relentlessly until he reached his goal.

Both generals were keenly aware of each other's intentions and strategies. Lee relied on his scouts and cavalry to provide timely information about Grant's movements, while Grant aimed to swiftly maneuver his army towards Richmond. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation between the Union and Confederate forces in the heart of Virginia.

The Union Army commenced its movement from its base in Culpeper County, where it had concluded its operations at Mine Run the previous fall, and proceeded southward towards the fords of the Rapidan River. At daybreak on May 4, Union cavalry successfully crossed Germanna Ford, dispersing Confederate cavalry pickets and facilitating the construction of two pontoon bridges by Union engineers. Subsequently, General Gouverneur K. Warren's Fifth Corps crossed the ford and ventured into the thick woodland. General Lee had anticipated that General Grant would employ the Germanna and Ely Fords. Grant followed this anticipated course of action relying on speed rather than stealth. However, the advance of some Union units was slow, resulting in the creation of gaps. These occurrences provided Lee with an advantageous position at the outset.

Day 1: May 5

Meade, his commander, instructed Warren to strike the Confederates first, but Warren hesitated due to concerns about attacking the impenetrable thickets. He anticipated difficulties in maintaining a battle line and believed that a piecemeal movement would negate his numerical superiority. While Warren and Meade debated the advantages of an attack along the Orange Turnpike, General Richard S. Ewell's Confederate corps halted three miles west of Wilderness Tavern and constructed formidable earthworks on the western edge of Saunders Field. Reluctantly, Warren positioned his corps astride the turnpike.

Saunders Field, a 50-acre clearing near the Orange Turnpike, stood out amidst the forested surroundings. When Ewell encountered the Union Army, his orders were to engage the enemy and impede their progress, but to avoid a full-scale battle until Longstreet's corps arrived the next day. Ewell positioned his corps across the turnpike along the higher, western edge of the field, providing his troops with a clear field of fire.

As Warren emerged from the woods and entered the field, he was met by Ewell's waiting troops who initially held the advantage. Despite heavy casualties, the Federals managed a momentary breakthrough, but Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade swiftly sealed the breach. The arrival of the Union Sixth Corps expanded the front, resulting in further casualties.

Soon after, Union Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford observed another enemy column at the William Chewning farm headed east on the Orange Plank Road toward its intersection with Brock Road. Due to the limited maneuverability in the area, the crossroads of these two main roads became the focal point of the Union's defensive line. The significance of this intersection is depicted in the accompanying photograph. The potential threat posed by the Confederates was grave, as their occupation of this area could have effectively divided Warren's corps on the turnpike from Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps, which had moved further south after passing Warren. Recognizing the urgency, Meade promptly dispatched Brig. Gen. George W. Getty's Sixth Corps division to seize control of the crossroads. Around 4:00 p.m., Getty's men launched an attack, forcefully advancing through the dense thickets and engaging in close-range combat against Gen. A.P. Hill's corps. Hancock soon arrived to provide support to Getty's forces, and the battle continued until nightfall.

The conditions under which the soldiers fought were extraordinarily challenging. Visibility was severely limited, with a range of no more than 50 feet. This made it impossible to effectively communicate and issue commands. Both sides struggled to maintain a coherent line, often breaking up into smaller groups. The dense underbrush and thorny briars caused numerous scratches to the soldiers' faces and tore their clothing. The smoke generated by gunpowder further hindered their vision, while fires ignited by exploding shells rapidly spread through the dry woods, transforming the Wilderness into a blazing inferno for all the trapped troops. The unfavorable terrain greatly hindered the progress of the two-day battle, reducing it to a series of brutal skirmishes. Additionally, fires that started in the woods proved to be particularly devastating, claiming the lives of many wounded soldiers who were unable to be rescued.

Day 2: May 6

Hancock’s Federals resumed the offensive the next morning. A.P. Hill’s tired troops were forced back, and the Confederate line seemed on the verge of collapse. At this critical juncture, Brig. Gen. John Gregg's Texas Brigade from Gen. James Longstreet's corps arrived just in the nick of time. Longstreet's timely entrance onto the battlefield prevented a potential disaster and immediately launched an attack on Hancock's corps. Two flank attacks—by Longstreet south of the Plank Road and by Gordon north of the turnpike –carried the line and forced the Union behind breastworks.

Longstreet's arrival after an arduous 28-mile march in a single day proved to be a pivotal moment for the Confederate army. His counterattack played a crucial role in saving the day. The nature of Longstreet's movement involved executing a flank attack on Hancock's left flank, utilizing an unfinished railroad bed located within a densely wooded forest. This strategic maneuver took advantage of the element of surprise, as the railroad bed was not marked on local maps. Longstreet's attack was meticulously planned and well-prepared, showcasing his tactical brilliance. By exploiting an old roadbed constructed for a defunct railroad, his forces were able to stealthily navigate through the heavily wooded area undetected, ultimately launching a powerful flanking assault.

Longstreet's men advanced along the Orange Plank Road, pursuing the Union II Corps. Within a span of two hours, their persistent assault nearly drove the II Corps from the field. Longstreet devised innovative tactics to overcome the challenging terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades using heavy skirmish lines. This approach allowed his troops to maintain a continuous barrage of fire on the enemy while simultaneously making themselves elusive targets. The effectiveness of Longstreet's flanking maneuver was evident in the words of Hancock himself, who, after the war, acknowledged the impact of Longstreet's tactics by stating, "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."

General Longstreet had returned to the ANV after being deployed the previous autumn in the Western Theater. Although he had hoped for an independent command, Despite his hopes for an independent command, his deployment in the Western Theater had not yielded the desired result. While his crucial attack at Chickamauga had showcased his military prowess, his subsequent failure to defeat Burnside at Knoxville and his ongoing disagreements with General Braxton Bragg had cast a shadow over his future prospects. General Lee had proposed that Longstreet join forces with Johnston and Beauregard for a joint offensive into Kentucky. However, Bragg, who had now assumed the role of Davis’s military advisor, swiftly rejected this proposition. Consequently, Longstreet found himself once again serving as a corps commander in Virginia.

As Lee's plan to utilize his 14,000 men as an attacking force had proven successful thus far, the next crucial step was to deliver a decisive attack. Longstreet attempted to identify the optimal location on a reconnaissance mission. However, his efforts were met with a tragic turn of events. The treacherous terrain posed numerous challenges, and it was amidst this difficult backdrop that Longstreet fell victim to friendly fire, sustaining severe wounds to his neck and shoulder. Despite being cautioned against proceeding further, his unwavering determination to strategize the winning attack propelled him forward. Tragically, this ill-fated mission resulted in the immediate death of General Micah Jenkins, who was struck in the head during the same ambush. Its an astounding coincidence that this happened just 4 miles down the road from where Stonewall Jackson was ambushed; this section of Wilderness is dark and silent, as shown in the photo.

Mahone’s 12th Virginia was returning to the Orange Plank Road when a brush fire caused them to take a different route that led them across the road in a different location than other members of their brigade. Longstreet and his staff, unknowingly, passed in the middle of Mahone’s men. In a tragic turn of events, a section of soldiers, either lying prone or kneeling, mistook the approaching figures for the enemy and opened fire. As a result, Jenkins, one of Longstreet's men, was fatally struck in the head, while two others also lost their lives.

In his memoirs, Longstreet describes the bullet as passing through his throat and right shoulder, causing his right arm to immediately go limp at his side. Despite the excruciating pain and the presence of blood in his mouth and throat, Longstreet managed to issue orders and communicate with a whispery voice. The conventional narrative suggests that the bullet entered from the front as Longstreet was riding towards his troops. However, this explanation fails to account for the long-term loss of movement in his arm and his persistent hoarseness. A more plausible explanation lies in the possibility of a nerve injury originating from his back, caused by the soldiers who were either kneeling or lying prone behind him. The bullet then passed through his throat as it exited, providing a more coherent explanation for the observed medical facts.

The coordination of attacks on the Union line along the Brock Road was hindered by Longstreet's inability to command. Despite advising Lee to continue the attack, Lee chose to delay the movement until his forces could be realigned. Unfortunately, this delay provided the Union defenders with ample time to reorganize and strengthen their position. As the Confederates moved forward through the heavy brush, their lack of cohesion became evident, and they encountered obstructions in front of the Union line. It was at this point that Hancock's experienced troops successfully halted the Confederate advance. Although the Confederates briefly gained a foothold and planted their flags on the burning works, the Union troops swiftly counterattacked and reclaimed their position.  According to General Alexander’s memoirs: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan."

On May 6th, AP Hill's corps, which had borne the brunt of the previous day's fighting, was not prepared for a repeat onslaught at dawn. Despite the advice of Generals Heth and Wilcox, Hill believed that Longstreet's presence on the field was necessary before he could continue the engagement. But Longstreet was late; when Hancock launched another attack, only Lt Col William Poague's artillery was holding the line, but it was beginning to falter. However, the entry of a Texas brigade from Longstreet's corps onto the field provided a glimmer of hope.

Knowing that a counterattack would save the day, Lee himself prepared to lead it but was stopped by the Texas men, who shouted “Lee to the rear”.

The potential destruction of AP Hill's corps might have occurred if General Ambrose Burnside had acted more swiftly upon receiving orders to advance. However, once again, Burnside failed to recognize the significance of the situation and did not launch an attack that could have altered the course of the battle.

Brig Gen John B Gordon's prominence within the Confederate command structure was solidified during this particular battle. On May 5, his brigade effectively counterattacked and repelled a Federal advance at Saunders Field. The following day, Gordon executed a highly successful flank attack, resulting in the capture of numerous Union soldiers and two Union generals. Although Gordon had initially proposed this maneuver at dawn, his superiors dismissed his suggestion. Positioned on the left flank of the Confederate line, Gordon's scouts informed him that his brigade extended well beyond the right end of the Union line. To confirm this report, Gordon personally conducted a reconnaissance. Eventually, Lee granted Gordon permission to launch his attack that afternoon. According to Gordon's memoirs, had he been authorized earlier, a flank attack could have enveloped the Union right flank. However, Generals Early and Ewell delayed due to incorrect intelligence suggesting that the Union IX Corps was reinforcing the area, and they were reluctant to engage with an outnumbered force.

The attack by Gordon gave rise to a couple of intriguing anecdotes of the war.  When a staff officer urged Grant to retreat, claiming that Lee would cut him off from the ford, Grant became angry, telling the officer that he was tired of always hearing what Lee was going to do.  He ordered the man to stop thinking about Lee and start thinking about what they were going to do.  It has also been rumored that the tough day of fighting caused Grant to become emotional that evening alone in his tent.

Day 3: May 7

Both opposing forces entrenched and awaited an attack from the other army. Having come close to breaking each other's lines the previous day, both armies seemed satisfied with adopting a defensive stance. Recognizing the futility of further assaults in the Wilderness, Grant issued orders for Meade's army to withdraw under the cover of darkness. Additionally, Grant instructed Union engineers to dismantle the pontoon bridges at Germanna Ford. Despite enduring heavy casualties over the course of two days of intense fighting, Grant made the decision not to launch another attack or retreat. Instead, he opted to swiftly proceed towards Spotsylvania Court House, effectively positioning himself between Richmond and Lee's army.

Implications

The Union army experienced nearly 18,000 casualties in the Wilderness, almost twice as many as Lee’s army. But Grant’s troops were not dispirited. Previous Union commanders, Hooker and Burnside, had chosen to retreat after sustaining significant losses in battles against Lee. Therefore, the continued advancement of Union troops brought a sense of jubilation among the Federal forces.

Who won the battle? This question is essentially unanswerable. Neither side left the battlefield in retreat. Both armies had a very high rate of casualties in just 48 hours (Union 15.0% with 17,666 (2,246 killed) of 118,00 engaged; Confederate 16.7% with 11,033 (1,477 killed) of 66,140 engaged). Tactically, it was probably a draw. Strategically, Grant was able to advance, but Lee had prevented him from reaching Richmond. Indecisive is probably the best descriptor.

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Further Reading

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/wilderness

·       Gordon C Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

·       John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904.

·       Stecker, RM BlachleyJD. Arch Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg. 2000;126(3):353-359.https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamaotolaryngology/fullarticle/404442

·       Steere  E The Wilderness Campaign.  Mechanicsburg, Pa Stackpole Books1960;

·       Longstreet  J From Manassas to Appomattox. 2nd ed. New York, NY Da Capo Press Inc, 1992.

·       Sorrel  GM Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer.  New York, NY Konecky & Konecky, 1994.

·       https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/lee-rear

General Benjamin Butler and Runaway Slaves During the US Civil War

In late May 1861, slaves began fleeing to the Union outpost of Fortress Monroe, Virginia. When arriving, they were given sanctuary by the post’s commander, Major General Benjamin Butler. Richard Bluttal explains.

General Benjamin Butler during the US Civil War.

Newly arrived at Fortress Monroe, on May 23, 1861, Butler was confronted by the arrival of three fugitive slaves from the Confederate defensive works project across Hampton Roads. Faced with the looming prospect of being shipped to North Carolina to work on fortifications, Goodheart writes “the three slaves decided to leave the Confederacy and try their luck, just across the water, with the Union.”

As Civil War Emancipation has chronicled, they were they were not the first slaves to seek sanctuary in a Union military post. Soon after Lincoln’s inauguration in early March, slaves in separate incidents had presented themselves at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Consistent with the Fugitive Slave Act the slaves in both instances had been rebuffed and turned over to local authorities. The post commanders at Sumter and Pickens took this action on their own initiative and it was accepted by the Lincoln administration, still hopeful at that point for reconciliation with the slave states.

However, by the end of May the situation was very different. Confederate forces had attacked Fort Sumter on April 12 and forced its surrender. In response, Lincoln called for volunteers to restore federal authority in the South. Lincoln’s actions led four of the remaining eight slaves in the Union to secede, including Virginia. On the same day the three slaves appeared at Fortress Monroe, May 23, the Commonwealth’s voters had ratified secession.

Taking action

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Benjamin Butler had to decide what action to take. His hand was forced by the arrival of a Confederate officer at Fortress Monroe under flag of truce demanding the slaves return. Adam Goodheart relates the encounter between Butler and the Virginian, Major John Baytop Cary.

Cary got Cary got down to business. “I am informed,” he said, “that three Negroes belonging to Colonel Mallory have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel Mallory’s agent and have charge of his property. What do you mean to do with those Negroes?”“I intend to hold them,” Butler said. “Do you mean, then, to set aside your constitutional obligation to return them?”Even the dour Butler must have found it hard to suppress a smile. This was, of course, a question he had expected. And he had prepared what he thought was a fairly clever answer.“I mean to take Virginia at her word,” he said. “I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia now claims to be.”“But you say we cannot secede,” Cary retorted, “and so you cannot consistently detain the Negroes.”“But you say you have seceded,” Butler said, “so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these Negroes as contraband of war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery and are claimed as your property.”

If anyone was qualified to devise, on short notice, a solid justification to hold slaves who had escaped Confederate custody, it was Benjamin Butler. A crafty litigator and politician from Massachusetts, Butler was a recently commissioned Major General who owed his appointment to Lincoln’s desire to solidify the support of Democrats like him that favored military action against the South. Butler would prove a dismal battlefield commander, but in this incident showed him to be a gifted administrator.

By declaring the three slaves “contraband of war,” Benjamin Butler did not challenge their status as property and by extension call into question of slavery’s legality. At this stage of the conflict, most political leaders in the North were eager to depict the developing conflict merely as a rebellion against legitimate government authority which had nothing to do with slavery. However, officers on the ground like Butler quickly realized the slaves were a significant military asset to the Confederacy, acting not only as laborers, teamsters, and in other support roles for the army, but also by keeping southern agriculture functioning allowing a much larger portion of the white male population to be available for military service than might otherwise have been the case. Hence, as property being used in support of a rebellion against the government, Butler’s “contraband of war” formulation legally justified the seizure of the slaves without immediately undermining their status as property. The Lincoln administration quickly acquiesced to Butler’s policy and Congress gave it the force of law in early August through the Confiscation Act of 1861.

Impact

What neither Butler nor leaders in Washington, D.C., reckoned on was the slaves’ response to his contraband policy. Soon other slaves began seeking sanctuary with Union forces, over 500 at Fortress Monroe alone by June 1861. The northern press soon dubbed these escaped slaves as “contraband,” a name initially resisted by some black leaders and abolitionists, but which even they eventually accepted.

But if the episode at Fortress Monroe demonstrated anything it was the fierce determination of the slaves to be free. A few slaves seeking sanctuary quickly became hundreds and then even more. As Adam Goodheart writes:

Within weeks Within weeks after the first contrabands’ arrival at Fort Monroe, slaves were reported flocking to the Union lines just about anywhere there were Union lines: in Northern Virginia, on the Mississippi, in Florida. It is unclear how many of these escapees knew of Butler’s decision, but probably quite a few did. Edward Pierce, a Union soldier who worked closely with the contrabands, marveled at “the mysterious spiritual telegraph which runs through the slave population,” though he most likely exaggerated just a bit when he continued, “Proclaim an edict of emancipation in the hearing of a single slave on the Potomac, and in a few days it will be known by his brethren on the gulf.”Within little more than a year, the stream of a few hundred contrabands at Fort Monroe became a river of tens — probably even hundreds — of thousands. They “flocked in vast numbers — an army in themselves — to the camps of the Yankees,” a Union chaplain wrote. “The arrival among us of these hordes was like the oncoming of cities.”

Undermining slavery

So the arrival of Union forces in a locality in the South, or even the prospect of their arrival, quickly began to undermine the institution of slavery, as slaves now had a place to escape from slavery with little fear of recapture. Yet without the initiative of the slaves this situation likely would have never arisen. Certainly, the slaves could not gain freedom on their own, but they determinedly pried at the tiniest fissure in the slave system made by the arrival of northern troops and the peculiar institution began to crumble under the weight of countless individual slaves fleeing it.

As Adam Goodheart relates, Lincoln administration policy about the contrabands quickly began to lag behind the reality on the ground. So much so, that the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which was announced in September 1862, in many ways was merely playing catch up. Goodheart ends his story with an anecdote that captures that situation well. He writes:

On the On the September day of Lincoln’s edict, a Union colonel ran into William Seward, the president’s canny secretary of state, on the street in Washington and took the opportunity to congratulate him on the administration’s epochal act.Seward snorted. “Yes,” he said, “we have let off a puff of wind over an accomplished fact.”“What do you mean, Mr. Seward?” the officer asked.“I mean,” the secretary replied, “that the Emancipation Proclamation was uttered in the first gun fired at Sumter, and we have been the last to hear it.”

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What if Martin Luther King Jr. had not been Assassinated?

Many figures throughout history stand as beacons of hope, courage, and change. Among them, Martin Luther King Jr. shines as a luminary of the Civil Rights Movement, whose vision of equality and justice resonates across generations.

However, his life was abruptly cut short by an assassin's bullet on April 4, 1968. Yet, what if that tragic event had never occurred? What if Martin Luther King Jr. had lived to see his dreams fully realized?

Terry Bailey considers.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. at the Civil Rights March on Washington, D.C. in August 1963.

This speculative exploration delves into the alternate reality where his assassination never happened, pondering the impact on civil rights, social justice, and the course of American history.

In a world where Martin Luther King Jr. survives, the struggle for civil rights would undoubtedly continue, albeit with a different trajectory. King's leadership and moral authority would have provided ongoing inspiration and guidance to activists and advocates. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act, might have faced less resistance and achieved broader implementation under King's advocacy.

His unwavering commitment to nonviolent protest and civil disobedience could have continued to shape the tactics and strategies employed by movements for racial equality. However, King's continued presence would not have necessarily ensured a smooth process and progress.

The Civil Rights Movement was a complex tapestry of diverse voices and ideologies, and internal tensions were already emerging before his death. Disputes over strategy, goals, and priorities probably would have intensified in the absence of a unifying figure like King. Nevertheless, his ability to bridge divides and rally support across racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines could have helped navigate these challenges and keep the movement focused on its core principles.

Beyond civil rights

Without the abrupt end to his life, Martin Luther King Jr. would have had the opportunity to further refine and expand his message beyond civil rights. Already, he had begun to address issues of economic inequality, advocating for economic justice and the eradication of poverty. In the years following 1968, King might have intensified his efforts to address systemic injustices that perpetuated economic disparities among racial minorities.

His vision of a "Beloved Community," where all people live in harmony and mutual respect, might have inspired broader movements for social change. Issues such as environmental justice, LGBTQ+ rights, and global peace could have found resonance within King's moral framework, broadening the scope of his influence and legacy.

The political landscape of the United States would have been significantly influenced by King's continued presence. His moral authority and charismatic leadership could have propelled him into a more prominent political role, whether as an elected official or as a trusted advisor to policymakers. King's advocacy for voting rights and political participation might have led to increased voter turnout among marginalized communities, reshaping electoral dynamics and empowering historically disenfranchised groups.

Moreover, King's influence could have extended beyond domestic affairs to shape America's foreign policy and international relations. His commitment to nonviolence and diplomacy might have influenced the nation's approach to conflicts abroad, fostering a more humanitarian and cooperative stance on issues of global significance.

Activism

In a world where Martin Luther King Jr. survived, his legacy would have continued to inspire generations to come. His speeches, writings, and actions would remain touchstones of moral courage and social activism, studied and celebrated in schools, universities, and communities worldwide.

The annual observance of Martin Luther King Jr. Day, (officially the Birthday of Martin Luther King Jr. the federal holiday in the United States observed on the third Monday of January each year), might have taken on even greater significance, serving as a call to action for social justice and equality.

However, the passage of time might also have obscured some aspects of King's legacy, as historical figures are often subject to reinterpretation and selective memory. Controversies and criticisms that arose during his lifetime might have resurfaced or evolved in unforeseen ways, challenging the prevailing narratives. Yet, amidst the complexities and ambiguities of history, Martin Luther King Jr.'s enduring impact on American society and beyond would remain undeniable.

Conclusion

The hypothetical scenario of Martin Luther King Jr. surviving his assassination invites reflection on the enduring significance of his life and legacy. While we can never know with certainty what might have transpired in such an alternate reality, we can draw inspiration from his example and continue the work of building a more just and equitable world.

As we commemorate his achievements and honor his memory, let us also recommit ourselves to the unfinished work of realizing his dream. For in the words of Martin Luther King Jr. himself, "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."

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The Modern Greek State: 1950–1974 – The Road to Dictatorship and Retreat

On March 25, 2021, the Modern Greek State celebrated the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence, which ultimately led to its establishment. It is thus an excellent opportunity to reconsider some of the main events of Greek history over these 200 years and how they shaped the character of modern Greece.

This series of articles on the history of modern Greece started when the country was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the War of Independence. This article starts by looking at what happened as the Greek Civil War ended and the 1950s emerged, and ends by looking at the years of dictatorship – and the loss of part of Cyprus. Thomas P. Papageorgiou explains.

You can read part 1 on ‘a bad start’ 1827-1862 here, part 2 on ‘bankruptcy and defeat’ 1863-1897 here, part 3 on ‘glory days’ 1898-1913 here, part 4 on ‘Greeks divided’ 1914-22 here, part 5 on the issues of clientelism here, and part 6 on World War2 and a new divide here.

The leaders of the 1967 Greek military coup d'état. They are Stylianos Pattakos, Georgios Papadopoulos, and Nikolaos Makarezos. Source: Available here.

I Introduction: Power pillars after the civil war

Throughout the civil war and after that Greek remained a parliamentary democracy. To a certain extend and especially during the years of the fighting this was because of the need of the Americans and the British to appear to the public as supporters of a democratic regime that faced an imminent communist threat. Three very general political groupings could be distinguished that corresponded to right-center-left wings: The Right wing of the political spectrum was covered by the traditional anti-Venizelism, loyal to the throne and anti-communist. The Center had its historical roots in the Venizelist space that distinguished it form the right and was opposed to the communist left. The Left included non-communist components but was dominated by the Communist Party. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 17-22)

The latter was declared illegal, as post war Greece was an anti-communist cold war democracy pursuing the political and social exclusion of the Left, and thousands of its former partisans were imprisoned on remote Greek islands or excluded from state jobs. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Nevertheless, Greece never reached Stalinist Russia and there was much more freedom in the country compared to Franco’s Spain or Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, the Left had the opportunity to participate in the political arena with the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera – EDA), a party whose control from the communists was an open secret, achieving good elections results. Furthermore, clientelism and the powerful and ubiquitous networks of the Greek family were always present and managed to mitigate the effects of political and social exclusion. It was not unusual then for leftists to be recruited into the public sector, from which they were officially excluded, through family political networks. (Kalyvas, 2020 (3rd Edition), pp. 169-170) (Heneage, 2021, p. 206)  

Within this framework there were also extra-parliamentary pillars of power. First, there was the palace and the king. The role of king George II was reconfirmed with the referendum of 1946, (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) but he died soon after in April 1947 and was replaced by his son Paul. The palace would try to shape the political scenery according to its likings. This led the king to consecutive ruptures with all political wings and, from time to time, with the Army. (Rizas, 2008, p. 24)

The Army was the winner of the civil war and foremost agent of anti-communism. Although in the past the officers looked for political patronage with only some autonomous action (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), by 1949 the Army was a well-organized and well-equipped mechanism with war experience and confidence. It felt a kind of detachment and contempt for parliamentarism, although the stance of individual officers against the palace, on foreign policy issues and on certain parties and politicians varied. In any case, the real possibilities of the political establishment to control the military apparatus were small. (Rizas, 2008, p. 25) 

Finally, there was the American factor. For Washington, Greece had critical geopolitical interest as part of the ‘northern frieze’, together with Turkey and Iran, that would prevent soviet access to warm waters in the Near and Middle East. Thus, they favored a political establishment consistent with this end. The political parties in Greece on the other hand, although with gradations among them and except for the communist Left, favored the integration to the US sphere of influence as a deterrent to the ‘threat from the North’, where traditional enemies, like Bulgaria, now joined the communist bloc. As they lacked the means for the country’s recovery, essential for their survival, and the retention of sufficient military force, American help was essential. The fragmentation of the political forces facilitated further the American intervention, but occasionally the latter faced strong political movements. Thus, the USA was neither the all-powerful factor that steadily and unimpededly shaped the scene at will, as a popular narrative of part of the historiography and political-journalistic literature claims, but nor the non-participating observer of Greek politics, without interests and perceptions, as they claimed from time to time in Washington. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 32-34)

II The way to dictatorship

Attempts for reconciliation (1949 – 1952)

It is only natural that the Greeks should look for reconciliation amongst the rivaling parties after the end of the civil war. The Americans wanted the ratification of the end of the war and the reconciliation of the main political factions to come through the people’s vote. A new, more representative parliament, compared to that running the country during the civil war, was necessary. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172) In fact, it was time for the struggle to become political and mostly economical with significant means for the necessary reconstruction arising from bold cuts in military spending. (Rizas, 2008, p. 64) American influence was ensured as foreign aid at the time covered 90,6 % of the deficit in the balance of foreign payments, 80,7 % of public spending for the reconstruction and 56,7 % of the Greek fiscal deficit. (Rizas, 2008, p. 119) Thus, the elections took place on the 5th of March 1950 using the electoral system of proportional representation.

The elections showed a clear lead for the Center – Left parties. This adds to the controversy over their decision to abstain from the 1946 elections, after which the civil war entered its most lethal phase. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Charged with the mission of implementing a policy that would seek to overcome the consequences of the civil war and emphasize on reconstruction and income redistribution, they failed to stand up to the occasion yet again though. Their division into several groups spreading from the Center – Left to the Center – Right (Nikolaos Plastiras, Georgios Papandreou and Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios, were leading the most important ones), hostile to one another, rendered cooperation difficult in matters such as that of general amnesty and the policy of leniency towards those exiled, imprisoned (including death row inmates) or prosecuted as communists. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 172)

Things were further perplexed by international developments at that time. The Korean War (25th June 1950) completely changed the perceptions and priorities of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 75) The Marshall plan was to expire in 1952 (Rizas, 2008, p. 60) and American support was reduced from 250 million dollars in 1950-51 to mere 84 million in 1952-53. At the same time there was no talk anymore for a cut in military spending that took 10 % of the national income in 1951. (Rizas, 2008, p. 123) This led to a complete revision of an ambitious 4 year program elaborated in 1948 aiming at the exploitation of the national water and mineral resources for electrification, which was a prerequisite for the country’s industrialization as a means of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The Americans were not favoring industrialization anymore suggesting alternatives for economic growth, like tourism. This created resentment in political circles and the public opinion, which perceived the American policy as imposing colonial terms on the Greek economy. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 120 - 121) In fact, the most famous monography on the development of Greek heavy industry at the time came from the communist Dimitris Batsis. (Batsis, 1977 (11th Edition)) Its author, together with 3 more members of the communist party (Nikos Beloyiannis, Ilias Argyriadis and Nikos Kaloumenos), were executed as spies in March 1952, as the anti-communist vigilance intensified again. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 174)

In a nutshell, the Cold War climate after 1950 imposed that the development effort would have to be undertaken and paid for with mostly Greek resources, making the stabilization of the economy by any possible means, while at the same time maintaining a high level of military forces and spending, paramount. (Rizas, 2008, p. 120 ) Thus, the Centrist governments implemented a strict stabilization program, which cost them electoral losses and paved the way for the ascent of the conservative Right to power. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 125 - 129)

The conservative Right to power (1952 – 1963)

Alexandros Papagos

The dominant figure of the Right was field marshal Alexandros Papagos. Coming from the high Athenian society, he was Chief of the Army General Staff at the beginning of the Greco-Italian war of 1940 and later assumed the rank of major General of the Army. He was arrested during the occupation and sent to a concentration camp in Germany until 1945. The military stalemate of 1948, during the civil war, was the reason for the return to his duties as commander in chief. In this capacity he managed to close the war against the communists victoriously and received the title of field marshal in October 1949 at the age of 66. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 60 - 61)

Papagos’ profile obviously matched the political climate of the time as he was surely anti-communist and further posed as an alternative to a political establishment in crisis. (Rizas, 2008, p. 93) Nevertheless, a dictatorship was not an option for Washington. The Americans would not object though, if Papagos ran for office and was elected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 79) To this end he had to resign from his post, which he did in May 1951. His resignation caused reactions in the Army and members of the Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatkon - IDEA), a secret military organization, which, according to its Constitution, ‘should establish a dictatorship if the political leaders were unable to protect the country’s national interests, namely to contain communism’, (Arvanitopoulos, 1991, p. 99)(Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 208-209) occupied the General Staff building, the radio station and other places in Athens. The movement ended within a day by the intervention of Papagos, which proves that at the time of his resignation he was in full control of the armed forces. (Rizas, 2008, p. 83) (Tsoucalas, 2020, σ. 209) Furthermore, characteristic of the Army’s power and independence was the fact that grace was granted to those involved in the movement and the matter was closed there. (Rizas, 2008, p. 90) This came to the dismay of the palace as the king particularly disliked the fact that Papagos was not willing to go into politics under his tutelage. (Rizas, 2008, p. 82) He even tried to bring the Army under his influence after Papagos’ resignation, but this met the opposition of the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 84, 85, 95, 99 - 100)

Nevertheless, one thing on which there was a consensus within the power establishment at that time, with the exceptions of the Left, was the need to join a collective security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 112) The difference was that for the Center this was perceived as an opportunity to deter the threat from the communist countries in the north with reduced military spending (Rizas, 2008, p. 122), whereas Papagos believed that Greece could ensure its inclusion in the allied planning only if it maintained a significant military capability. (Rizas, 2008, p. 109) In any case, Greece’s participation in the Korean War, in response to the United Nations appeal for assistance, (Wikipedia, 2023) was included in this context, and the country finally joined the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), together with Turkey, in February 1952. (Rizas, 2008, p. 117) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 213-214)

Papagos’ party, the ‘Greek Rally’, came to power a few months later in November, winning 49.2 % of the votes and 247 out of 300 seats in the parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 130) His predominance was facilitated by the fact that the elections were in this case conducted using a majoritarian electoral system. In fact, the changes of the electoral system in a way to facilitate the formation of strong one-party governments away from collaboration is a characteristic of the parliamentary system of Modern Greece that remains to this day. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 200) This tactic obviously reinforces the phenomena of division and the client state. The result of EDA (9,6 %) confirmed the existence of a hard core of communists, but the party was left out of parliament. (Rizas, 2008, p. 131)

This did not go unnoticed by Papagos, who established a bureaucracy of ‘national security’ imbued with anticommunism, whose activity would normally remain opaque. The Central Intelligence Service (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion – KYP) was established in May 1953. (Rizas, 2008, p. 132) He also completed Greece’s integration into the Atlantic security system with the bilateral Greek – American agreement on granting military bases to the USA in October 1953. While the agreement is linked to NATO’s strategy, the operation of the bases was controlled exclusively by the Americans. (Rizas, 2008, p. 162) Further concessions to the Americans included the use of the Greek road and rail network by the American armed forces, low fees and tax exemption for the American activities, and the granting of US military and civilian personnel the right of separate jurisdiction. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 216)

Papagos’ government made an opening to Europe as well, in view also of the reluctance of the Americans to finance the Greek development program, as we saw before. The outstanding pre-war public debt, whose settlement was not allowed by Greek public finances, resulted in the creation of the European credit mechanism. The Greek government submitted specific projects to foreign governments, which they undertook to finance indirectly or directly, often in the form of export guarantees. From now on, West Germany will become Greece’s most important economic partner. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163)

In the field of foreign policy, the minister of foreign affairs Stefanopoulos signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey in February 1953 followed by a military agreement in August 1954. The Balkan Pact was perceived as a way for the Western allies to bring Yugoslavia into their sphere of influence in case of Soviet aggression. (Wikipedia, 2023)The undertaking was short-lived though after Tito’s reconciliation with post-Stalinist Soviet Union and the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 163) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 216-217) The latter arose after an unofficial referendum on the island in 1950 that called for a unification with Greece (Wikipedia, 2023). Nevertheless, whereas previous governments avoided raising the issue as there were other priorities, e.g. joining NATO, and British opposition was fierce, (Rizas, 2008, p. 166) Papagos worked more intensively on it. As we have seen, Great Britain obtained Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire and by 1950 the island was ruled by the British for almost 70 years. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 217-218) (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021)

For Papagos and most of the Greeks unification with Cyprus was a matter characterized by strong emotional and psychological charge. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167) Although the catastrophe of the Asia Minor Campaign practically put an end to Greece’s concept of the ‘Great Idea’ for expansion to its ancient territories (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023), here we find remnants of exactly this concept. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Facing fierce British opposition on a bilateral level, Papagos tried to internationalize the issue by appealing to the United Nations in August 1954. The appeal was fruitless as it also met the American reaction. (Rizas, 2008, p. 168) The Americans had made it clear to Athens, that Greece had to devote itself to its economic and social reconstruction and political stabilization and that its general situation did not allow for redemptive adventures. (Rizas, 2008, p. 166)They also considered the need to safeguard Cyprus’ strategic advantages for Britain, that was now on retreat from the Middle East and Suez, and the Western security system. (Rizas, 2008, p. 167)

The next step for Athens was to recourse to armed action. This started on the 1st of April 1955 by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA) led by the Greek Cypriot colonel of the Greek Army Georgios Grivas. (Wikipedia, 2023) The British responded to the increased Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure by bringing Greece’s arch-rival into the game. In August 1955 they convened a tripartite conference in London with the participation of Turkey. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 220-221) (Rizas, 2008, p. 169)

Turkey was opposing Cyprus’ unification with Greece for strategic reasons. It did not want the completion of a chain of islands enclosing the Turkish coast from the northern Aegean to the south. To this end it used the Turkish Cypriot minority that made up 18 % of the island’s population. The Turkish position does not accept minority status for the Turkish Cypriots and considers that their presence should be equal in the management of the affairs of the island. In fact, in 1955-56 Ankara went through a maximalist phase requiring either the continuation of the British rule or the return of the island to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 167 - 168) Thus, the tripartite conference failed completely, because of the unbridgeable approaches of the participants. To make things worse for the Greeks, the Greek minority in Constantinople suffered a pogrom because of the tension. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 221) (Wikipedia, 2023)

The US and British stance on the Cyprus issue caused the dissatisfaction of the Greek public opinion, including that of the Right press. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 222) The Left saw an opportunity to cause a rift in pro-Atlantic perceptions and in the nexus of international and internal arrangements of the post-civil war era. (Rizas, 2008, p. 165) Stalin’s death in 1953 brought about a change in the rigid and dogmatic practises of the Communist Party, which would now seek cooperation with the Center-Left and Center parties on the basis of a joint effort to oust the ‘Greek Rally’ from the government. Indeed, in the municipal elections of November 1954 the joint candidates of the Center-Left and the Left clearly prevailed in the three largest cities, Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus, and showed good results in a number of other municipalities as well. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 139 - 140)

The most significant development after the municipal elections of 1954 was Papagos’ illness (he eventually died in October 1955), that created the need for his succession to the leadership of the ‘Greek Rally’ and the premiership. The case as it developed is simultaneously indicative of the structural weakness and opacity of the Greek political and party system. As there is no stable party structure and institutionalized process of intra-party functioning and leadership succession, due to the political culture and tradition that structures party organization around persons, the natural eclipse of the leading figure allows informal processes to fill the gap, in which extra-parliamentarian factors have a prominent role. (Rizas, 2008, p. 156) The result of such processes including  the extra-parliamentarian power pillars described in section I as well as interest networks formed by politicians and businessmen (see next section) resulted in Konstantinos Karamanlis taking over as prime minister. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209-212)

Konstantinos Karamanlis

Konstantinos Karamanlis is the founder of one of the few families that ruled over modern Greece (other famous ones include those of Trikoupis, Venizelos, Papandreou and Mitsotakis) significantly reducing the inclusiveness of the Greek political institutions. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021) He was the minister of public works in the Papagos’ administration and his rise through the ranks of the Greek politics was quick after World War II . (Wikipedia, 2023) Karamanlis had the support of the palace (Rizas, 2008, p. 145) (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 209, 232) and king Paul gave him the mandate to form a government on the 5th of October 1955. (Rizas, 2008, p. 160) For the Americans, that after Papagos’ death turned to the king, who had the institutional capacity to be a factor of anti-communism continuity (Rizas, 2008, p. 152), this was a welcome development. The Left was on the rise again (see above) and the Americans were interested in the retainment of the Right in power (Rizas, 2008, p. 145), although the armed forces constituted a backup security force for the political and social establishment in case of exhaustion of the parliamentary means. (Rizas, 2008, p. 172) The British embassy was in agreement. (Rizas, 2008, p. 144)

This foreign consent was interpreted by the opposition press as the result of Karamanlis’ unpopular opinion referring to the need for a compromise solution to the Cyprus issue. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) The fact was that there was a revision of the British strategic needs in Cyprus. London had concluded that to fulfill British commitments in the Middle East it was sufficient to maintain military bases in Cyprus rather than rule over the entire island. (Rizas, 2008, p. 241)The British made it clear that the Cyprus issue now depended very much on Turkish perceptions and sensitivities, which had to be taken into account as a priority, if the Western powers did not want to alienate a necessary ally in the critical region of the Middle East. (Rizas, 2008, p. 239)

Eventually, the idea of unification with Greece was given up and Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on the 16th of August 1960. The organization of the new state was based on the London and Zurich agreements of February 1959. (Wikipedia, 2022) These were met with displeasure in Greece, also by a portion of the officers corps, as the position of the Turkish – Cypriots was strengthened and the new state would operate under international and constitutional restrictions that contradicted the right of the majority to direct Cypriot affairs as they wished. In fact, the content of the agreements was considered roughly equivalent to national concession, abandoning the ideal of the union. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 233, 244) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 225) The leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou pointed out that with the London and Zurich agreements it was the first time that Turkey was returning to territory it had lost after the establishment of the modern Greek state. (Rizas, 2008, p. 245) Greece was on the retreat.

Karamanlis’ attempt to put the Cyrpus issue ‘on the self’ was done in order to manage to deal with the financial problems as a priority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 155) In fact, as minister of public works he had already won the admiration of the US Embassy for the efficiency with which he built road infrastructure and administered American aid programs. (Wikipedia, 2023) Furthermore, his premiership initiated the beginning of a period, that extended well into the 1970s, in which GDP grew nearly 7 % a year and per capita income trebled. It wasn’t far short of the German postwar miracle. (Heneage, 2021, p. 204) Karamanlis’ administration also pursued the association with the European Economic Community and the relevant agreement was signed in Athens in July 1961. (Rizas, 2008, p. 248)

Nevertheless, the Greek economic development of the 1950s and 1960s was based on foreign support (also in the form of tourism), that did not favor the industrialization of the country, (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 184) shipping and state intervention. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 190-191) (Rizas, 2008, p. 257) Favorable arrangements with Greek and foreign businessmen repeatedly provoked discussions of ‘colonial-style’ contracts, while the state’s capabilities (i) in selecting ‘partners’ to lease state-owned enterprises or (ii) to lend to commercial and industrial activities from state-controlled banks are such that they have certainly created networks of public and private interests (Rizas, 2008, pp. 258 - 259)starting a tradition that continues to this day. In fact, the Governor of the Bank of Greece at that time Xenophon Zolotas criticized the mentality of the Greek ‘entrepreneur class’ and the failure of the banking system to work against this mentality aiming at the hoarding of profits or the acquisition of consumer goods rather than the use of these profits for productive investments. (Rizas, 2008, p. 260) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 188)    

It is then not inexplicable that from 1951 to 1963 405 thousand Greeks left the country in search for better luck elsewhere. Actually, the annual remittances to their families back home reached 173 million dollars in 1963  contributing also to the country’s development. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 191) By 1980 immigration would exceed 1 million, that is about a quarter of Greece’s active workforce. (Eleftheratos, 2015, p. 182) (Heneage, 2021, p. 204)Thus, the country continued to foster non-inclusive political and financial institutions, as discussed also previously (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2021), which according to Acemoglu and Robinson are characteristic of a failed state. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013)

Karamanlis and the Right was also accused, not unjustly, of authoritarianism and oppression. After his appointment as a prime minister he reorganized the ‘Greek Rally’ as ‘National Radical Union’ (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi -ERE), that concluded the transformation of the old anti-Venizelist faction to a conservative party of the post-war era, (Rizas, 2008, p. 174) and asked for the affirmation of the king’s choice through the public vote in February 1956. This was the first time that the Greek women were granted with voting rights. (Rizas, 2008, p. 179) He won only thanks to a carefully chosen electoral system that gave him 165 seats in the parliament with 47,4 % of the votes against the Center-Left alliance that gathered 48,1 % but only 132 seats. This immediately raised issues of political legitimation for the government. (Rizas, 2008, p. 181) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233) Karamanlis’ position was nevertheless strengthened with another round of elections in May 1958, (Rizas, 2008, p. 204) but the result reserved the unpleasant surprise of EDA becoming the largest opposition party. (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 233)Karamanlis then responded with the intensification of police action against the Left, arrests and deportations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 206) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 234) When a third round of elections came in the autumn 1961 the leader of the Center Georgios Papandreou accused Karamanlis that he used the oppressive state mechanism set up by the Right during its rule, the army and paramilitary organizations against all rival parties and ERE’s victory was seen as the product of force and fraud. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 201-207) (Kostis, 2018, p. 333) He called the people to an ‘unyielding struggle’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 239-242) that managed to mobilize the electoral base of the Center as well as wider social strata, especially since the demand for new elections was linked to other political, economic and social issues such as the Cyprus issue, unemployment, poverty and immigration described above. (Rizas, 2008, p. 269) The tension culminated with the assassination of EDA MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May 1963 by a right-wing extremist organization under conditions that made even Karamanlis wonder ‘Who in God’s name is running this country?’. The truth is that Karamanlis’ relations with the other power pillars of section I were worsening after 1961 and especially the palace, that was also targeted by the ‘unyielding struggle’, was looking for a way out of the crisis. Karamanlis was replaced as prime minister by another king’s man, Panagiotis Pipinelis, but it became obvious that the only way to relief the tensions was free elections.  These took place in November 1963 and Papandreou’s ‘Centre Union’ (Enosi Kentrou – EK) removed Karamanlis’ ERE from the government. The twelve-year rule of the Right had ended. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 242-245)

The short-lived government of the Center (1963 – 1965)

The Center won, but the majority in Parliament was small (42% of the votes and 138 seats against ERE’s 39.4% and 132 seats) (Rizas, 2008, p. 284) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 245) and the reaction of the, much closer to the Right, Army to the result of the elections unknown. Thus, Papandreou avoided extensive interventions in the latter at this phase and sought new elections, to obtain an independent majority in the Parliament. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 285, 292) Indeed, the Army remained in the barracks and Centre Union won an overwhelming majority of 52,7% of the votes and 171 seats (out of 300 in total) in the elections of February 1964. (Rizas, 2008, p. 293) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 247)

Significant changes in the social stratification of the country had occurred since the last government of the Center. The economic conditions described above did not cause only external but internal immigration as well. Whereas in 1958 the ratio of rural to urban income per capita was just over half (220 to 437 dollars), by 1964 it was significantly less (282 to 621). (Rizas, 2008, p. 295) No wonder then that the rural dwellers sought for a better fortune in the cities. The urban population increased from 37.7% in 1951 to 43% ten years later with another 13% living in semi-urban areas. 62.7% of this increase was absorbed by the city of Athens. By 1961 Greece’s capital had a population bigger than the total urban population of the rest of the country and was established as the most important center of the socio – economic life. It absorbed more than 50% of those working in the industry, received 80% of the country’s imports, paid 75% of the direct and 65% of the indirect taxation, the income of its population was 40% higher than the average national income, bought more than 50% of the daily newspaper sheets, had the highest amount of hospital beds, 85% of qualified doctors and housed the bulk of those working in the public sector. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 181 - 182) This dominance of Athens remains to this day.

Papandreou increased the agricultural subsidies from 2.6 to 4.4% of the state budget, (Rizas, 2008, p. 297) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 250) but this could do little to reverse the fact that Greece had also entered the stage of mass urban societies when the spirit of the 1960s was spreading through the western world. (Wikipedia, 2023)Combined with an ongoing economic boom, under the name ‘Trente Glorieuses’ in France (Wikipedia, 2023) or ‘Miracolo Economico’ in Italy (Wikipedia, 2023), this drove the demand for increased consumption and services through an income redistribution. Thus, Greece could not remain unaffected. (Rizas, 2008, p. 299) 

Indeed, EK raised the daily wages, pensions, instituted vacations pay equal to ½ of the monthly salary and generally aimed at boosting the demand as a driver of accelerating economic growth. The result was that the increase in consumption exceeded the productive capacity of the domestic industry. In 1965, for the first time the value of industrial output exceeded the value of agricultural output. Thus, the Greek bourgeoisie also had every reason to be satisfied with the economic policy of EK during this period. Protective tariffs were in place, the credit process was simplified, prices were kept at stable heights and economic growth reached 8%. Business was going well, and profits were high. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 250 - 251) (Rizas, 2008, pp. 297 - 298)

The liberal, redistributive, and developmental spirit of the time was also present in Papandreou’s highly popular educational reform. He increased the time of compulsory education from six to nine years and established messes in elementary schools and scholarships for high schools to facilitate the access of children from the weaker social classes to them. To this end, the vernacular was also established as an equal language with the so called ‘clean’ (kathareuousa), that was based on the ancient Greek language and was mostly used by the elitist social strata. Ancient texts were also now to be taught translated in high school. The tuition and examination fees in higher education were abolished and a new university was established in Patras. Plans for two more in Epirus and Crete were laid. Finally, the Pedagogical Institute was also created, responsible for applied educational research, the creation of syllabi and the renewal of textbooks. (Rizas, 2008, σσ. 301 - 303) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 252)    

In foreign policy, once again, the Cyprus issue was dominant. Here Athens did not have the control of the developments and Papandreou was particularly worried about the unbound and uncontrolled initiatives of the Greek-Cypriot leader and first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 312) The latter announced in December 1963 his intention to proceed with a unilateral revision of the constitution in order to limit the extensive veto rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. (Rizas, 2008, p. 307) (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 226) This caused tensions and armed conflicts between the two communities that culminated to the dispatch of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to the island in spring 1964. This marked the consolidation of a situation rather favourable to the Greek-Cypriot side, which in the meantime prevailed in 95% of the island’s territory and had under its full control the state apparatus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 310) Nevertheless, the bombardment, in August 1964, of Greek-Cypriot positions on the islands by the Turkish Air Force, following an attack on a Turkish-Cypriot village by the Greeks, indicated that Turkey was not going to give up its ambitions on the islands easily. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 227)

Apart from appealing to the UN, several alternatives to solve the crisis were also brought forward by the Americans and NATO going as far as the partition of the island between the two communities. The rejection of these plans by the Greek government were interpreted as the result of the influence of the prime minister’s son Andreas Papandreou. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 313 - 317)

Andreas Papandreou was an economist and former university professor in the USA. Nevertheless, he represented a more radical left wing within EK. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) This was met with scepticism by the Americans, especially after J. F. Kennedy’s assassination and the assumption of the presidency by Lyndon Johnson that marked a shift in American policy from the need for liberal openness to more traditional notions credible from the point of view of Cold War strategy. (Rizas, 2008, p. 358) Andreas was also perceived as an obstacle for the personal ambitions of many EK politicians that hoped to succeed his aged father. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 253) Some of these, like Konstantinos Mitsotakis (the father of today’s prime minister), had also strong reservations about the economic policy, as they considered that the capacity for further benefits of any kind had been exhausted, and the prime minister’s handlings regarding the Cyprus issue that created tension in the Greco-American relations. (Rizas, 2008, p. 345)

Thus, in spring 1965 started a sequence of events that led to the eviction of Papandreou from the premiership and are often treated as the product of conspiracy by the American factor in collaboration with the palace, where the new king Constantine II had succeeded his father Paul that died in 1964, and defectors within EK. In May, the existence of an officers’ organization under the name ASPIDA (shield) became public. (Rizas, 2008, p. 337) Its aim, according to the indictment, was the establishment of a Nasser-style dictatorship. Politicians were also, supposedly, involved among which was Andreas Papandreou. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 260) The government perceived the accusations as an attempt of the Right to purge the army of pro-government officers and contrary to his original stance Georgios Papandreou now decided to intervene. (Rizas, 2008, p. 339) His proposals, among which was to take over the ministry of national defence himself, were rejected by the king though. The prime minister felt obliged to resign. Before even submitting his resignation in writing, the king had already appointed a new government supported by ERE and dissidents (defectors) of the EK. By July 1965 Georgios Papandreou was ousted, and his son faced charges of high treason. (Tsoucalas, 2020, p. 261)     

The colonels come to power (1965 – 1967)

The 25 years old king Constantine had overestimated his powers. The dismissal of Papandreou was in direct opposition to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The attempt to form a government with defectors from EK was met with disdain by the Greek people. After two years of the more liberal Papandreou government the latter would now express its dismay in a dynamic way. For weeks, hundreds of thousand of people would demonstrate against the methods of the defectors and the palace. (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 263 - 265)

Furthermore, the departure of the defectors from EK strengthened its more radical wing and Andreas Papandreou, who declared that: ‘The Nation’s infrastructure, transport and communication, the credit system and education must be owned by the state. In general, heavy industry should be state-owned and light industry private. There is a primary need to make efforts to limit or even eliminate heavy consumption and the import of luxury goods. It is necessary to stop the granting of monopoly privileges which help the entry of foreign capital.’ (Tsoucalas, 2020, pp. 268 - 269)Advocating national sovereignty, he also appeared skeptical of NATO and Greece’s integration into the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 391) The king was not spared from accusations of practices that exceeded the limits of constitutional monarchy and at the same time Andreas Papandreou was raising the issue of perceived American interference in Greece’s internal affairs. Finally, he argued that a fairer distribution of the national income was necessary by attacking the wealthier classes. (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) Greece’s elites had every reason to feel worried.

The army was also worried. The parliament did not lift Papandreou’s immunity for the case of ASPIDA and it was obvious that his father would give up his original stance of non-intervention in the army after that. In fact, there was a group of mid and low-level officers established in 1956 already, that exercised pressure on the respective military leadership for a coup, whenever it appeared that the Left and Center would get a majority in the parliament. The leader of this group was colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. (Rizas, 2008, p. 388)

Thus, in the 22 months that followed Georgios Papandreou’s eviction from office the Greek people remained agitated, EK strong in the electorate, Andreas Papandreou’s rhetoric radical, Greece’s elites and the Americans consequently worried and the king also feeling threatened, as his interventions had caused a revival of the issue of choice between monarchy and democracy, (Rizas, 2008, p. 393) was avoiding calling elections using government schemes supported by the Right and defectors from EK. Obviously, the margins for a parliamentary solution to the dispute had become very narrow. On the 21st of April 1967 colonel Georgios Papadopoulos’ group made their move: Dictatorship.   

III Dictatorship

In his book on the many military interventions in the Greek politics between 1916 and 1936 Thanos Veremis distinguishes them in two categories: 1) The one refers to those interventions that gained national importance and were supported by a large portion of the public. 2) The second refers to those that aimed only to serve private interests or were an expression of discontent of a military faction. (Veremis, 2018, p. 280) Thus, if we were to follow the same distinction, then the military coup of 1967 belongs to the second category.  

Veremis further interprets the people’s tolerance to these regimes as disappointment from and consequently discontent for the political establishment. (Veremis, 2018, p. 279) Nevertheless, tolerance is by no means acceptance. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the repressive mechanisms of the 1967 junta cannot be ignored. The center-left and left-wing resistance organizations established immediately after the coup were quickly neutralized, and the protagonists were in many cases brutalized and tortured. The same is true for the democratic officers of the army (Rizas, 2008, p. 442)

The junta was also ad odds with the king. After all the coup did not come from the high ranking officers of the latter’s entourage, as discussed previously, and as the junta was aiming at the establishment of a permanent regime confrontation with Constantine II was inevitable. (Rizas, 2008, p. 434) In fact, on the 13th of December 1967 the king carried out a counter coup, but once again junta’s reaction was swift and Constantine found himself in exile.

There was also a wide spread belief in a large part of the population, that fed anti-Americanism for many years, that the political question could not be solved by the Greeks themselves, but by the sovereign will of the Americans, who were held responsible for imposing and maintaining the dictatorship. (Rizas, 2008, p. 443) The truth is that for Henry Kissinger, the American national security advisor, the nature of the regime was not an issue for Washington (Rizas, 2008, p. 453) as long as it identified itself with NATO and the western world and Greece remained an ally of the West in the Cold War. (Rizas, 2008, p. 432) The junta did.

Junta’s doings in the financial sector have often been the subject of controversy. During the 2010 economic crisis, for example, when the country found itself at the brink of bankruptcy and a tough program of austerity and heavy taxation was imposed on its people, public discontent against the parties working within the parliamentary system of government gave fertile ground for references to junta’s well-organized economy, which avoided thriftlessness and empowered needy social groups such as farmers. Researchers like D. Eleftheratos showed that this was a myth and stressed the devastating effects of junta’s policies on the Greek economy. (Eleftheratos, 2015)

Thus, the international oil crisis of October 1973 challenged the sustainability of the Greek model of financial growth (Rizas, 2008, pp. 351-352) and as the passing of time inevitably led to a relaxation of the police measures popular discontent was more readily expressed. Universities in particular became a permanent hotbed. (Rizas, 2008, p. 444)The revolt of the Polytechnic University in Athens in November 1973 was violently suppressed, but a group of fiercely nationalist and anti-communist officers already worried that Papadopoulos was becoming too moderate. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 446-447) The internal conflicts of the junta culminated to a coup within the coup on the 25th of November 1973, when brigadier Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos and assumed the leadership of the military regime. (Rizas, 2008, p. 474)

The final blow for the junta came a few months later during another crisis in Cyprus. It was mentioned in the previous section already that even Georgios Papandreou, whose funeral in November 1968 marked one of the first massive demonstrations against the military regime, had trouble dealing with the policies of the president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios. In fact, the dispatch of an army division to Cyprus by Papandreou in 1964, apart from the increase of the Greek deterrent power on the island, was also interpreted as an attempt to increase control over Makarios. (Rizas, 2008, p. 313) Nevertheless, the latter’s initiatives to bring Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement (Wikipedia, 2024), to side with the Arabs during the Six-Day War (Rizas, 2008, p. 480) (Wikipedia, 2024) or to order weapons from Czechoslovakia for the Cypriot armed forces (Rizas, 2008, p. 481) indicate clearly the structural divergence between the political system in Cyprus and the military regime in Greece.

Indeed, the junta worked towards the unification of Cyprus with Greece, but Makarios opposed the idea as Cyprus would then be subject to a dictatorship and, furthermore, the proposal included territorial concessions to Turkey (Rizas, 2008, p. 479), in accordance with American demands that Athens should consider the Turkish views in Cyprus. (Rizas, 2008, p. 482) This does not mean that an agreement with Turkey was reached. On the contrary, when the junta tried, unsuccessfully, to impose its views to the Turkish side at the end of 1967, the issue culminated to a Greco-Turkish crisis that eventually forced the junta to withdraw the Greek army division from the island. (Rizas, 2008, pp. 480-481) Later, in March 1970, the junta attempted to murder Makarios and eventually Ioannidis to overthrow him with a coup on the 15th of July 1974. Under the treaty of Guarantee (Wikipedia, 2024), this was the excuse that the Turks needed to justify their invasion in Cyprus 5 days later, that led to the division of the island that lasts to this day. On the 24th of July Karamanlis, in self-exile in Paris after losing the premiership in 1963 (see above), returned to Greece to form a government. The junta had fallen. 

IV Conclusion

What we have seen in this series of articles so far is that modern Greece, since its foundation, was always able to move forward. Despite the difficulties, thanks to some capable leaders, favored also by coincidence and luck, it managed to continuously develop and expand.

Thus, at the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Greece was again a completely different country. The population had largely withdrawn from the countryside and lived in two large cities, Athens, and Thessaloniki. Financially, the rural-urban gap had narrowed, and per capita income had tripled since 1964. There was an extensive service sector, whereas the industry had developed to such an extent that about 40% of exports were industrial goods. It was thus an urbanized country, with a relatively industrialized economy that in parallel to the established relation with the USA was now pursuing admission to the European Economic Community. (Rizas, 2008, p. 490)

Nevertheless, much of all these was done through networks of public and private interests in a way that did not allow for the exploitation of the country’s full potential for the benefit of all its people. Many sought their luck abroad or became trapped in a clientelism system sponsored by exclusive political institutions. What changed after 1974 was the influence of the army. In many cases in the past the collaboration between politicians and military officers for the seizure of power resulted in mild punishments for the latter after army interventions into politics. (Papageorgiou, History is Now Magazine, 2023) Although after junta’s fall in 1974 many of its collaborators were treated mildly and were even cared for by businessmen favored by the military regime (Eleftheratos, 2015, pp. 313-322) the leading officers were now sentenced to life in prison. Indeed, after 1974 the political establishment managed to eliminate the role of the army in the political developments in Greece. Nevertheless, it remains, to a significant extend, a ‘family business’ (after 1974, 6 prime ministers came from the Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis families, for example).   

It was a matter of time then before Greece started to pay the toll for its exclusive political and financial institutions. As we saw, Georgios Papandreou’s remarks for the Cyprus issue, that the London and Zurich agreements marked, for the first time, the return of Turkey to a territory it had lost after the establishment of modern Greece, could be interpreted as an indication that Greece was going on the retreat. The invasion of the island and occupation of its north-eastern part by the Turks in July 1974 made it official. 

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