The 1863 Battle of Chancellorsville in the U.S. Civil War

The Battle of Chancellorsville took place April 27-May 6, 1863. It is traditionally described as Lee’s most impressive victory.  General Robert E Lee gambled on dividing his Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) several times in the face of a larger enemy and transported troops back and forth along internal lines to meet each anticipated threat. His victory turned on his audacity and his opponent’s timidity, and is almost always described from that perspective.  In this analysis, we will evaluate the command decisions General Hooker made, the choices he had, and how he contributed to his own defeat. Typically, his self-analysis that he lost confidence in himself is taken at face value, but on deeper reflection that isn’t an accurate analysis.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Battle of Chancellorsville, by Kurz and Allison, from 1889.

Hooker Takes Command

After the fiasco of the Battle of Fredericksburg and the humiliation of the Mud March, Major General Ambrose Burnside tried to purge the army of weak generals, something only Congress could do. He offered to resign from the army, but Lincoln chose to put him command of IX Corps in the Virginia Peninsula, and in March they were transferred to the Army of Ohio. Although not recognized at the time, it turned out that this was a critical aspect of the battle.

General Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac (AoP) on January 26, 1863. He was the obvious choice given his reputation as a tough and aggressive fighter. Almost immediately, two division commanders resigned (William Franklin refused to serve under Hooker; Edwin Sumner had poor health) and Daniel Butterfield became chief of staff. Hooker created the Bureau of Military Information, appointing Colonel George Sharpe to command, who utilized cavalry reconnaissance, spies, scouts and aerial balloons. Consequently, Hooker knew that Lee had covered all of the crossings of the Rappahannock.

Hooker had an excellent plan for the upcoming campaign. He designed a double envelopment of the ANV, having the cavalry cross far west, while his infantry crossed the Rappahannock and then the Rapidan rivers at Kelly’s Ford,  and then converge at  Ely’s and Germanna fords. Where the two rivers converge provided Hooker cover and opportunity. The second branch of the attack was to have General Sedgwick cross below Fredericksburg, flanking Jackson’s Corps. Thanks to Sharpe, Hooker knew that Lee was covering the fords facing north and east, and that he had to cover Richmond to his south. Therefore, Hooker sensed an opening in the west.

“My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.”  General Hooker was a very tough battlefield commander, but was he the right man for army command? This quote shows that was ready to battle directly with Lee and that he had full faith in his plan. But that was his fatal flaw.

Lee’s Divided Army

General Robert E Lee did not expect an attack except by way of Fredericksburg.  For this reason, Longstreet’s corps wasn’t involved in this battle, as they had been detached from Lee to find provisions. Most books say Lee divided his army in 3, but really, he would eventually be divided in 4 parts. Lee detached Longstreet with two divisions (Pickett’s and Hood’s) to southeastern Virginia on a foraging and supply mission and to threaten Union positions around Suffolk, Virginia.

As a result, Lee faced Hooker at Chancellorsville without Longstreet, meaning he fought the battle with only Jackson’s corps, and was well outnumbered. Had Burnside been there, in Longstreet’s absence, Lee would have been markedly outnumbered.

Battle of Chancellorsville, Situation Late 30 April 1863 and Movements since 27 April.

The Battle Begins

On April 27-28, the Union army began crossing the fords and concentrated at Chancellorsville, an obscure crossroads in the Wilderness with just a single brick mansion standing on the north side of an intersection. It was an old inn that was owned by a family named Chancellor located at the junction of 3 roads: Ely’s Ford Road, Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road.  Its location was crucial to Hooker’s plan: it was actually in Lee’s west rear.

Hooker arrived there April 30. By May 1, he had 70,000 troops at this location and there was no sign that Lee knew where he was. In fact, although Jeb Stuart had been cut off by Stoneman’s advance but had informed Lee by April 30 of this movement. And Lee knew that Sedgwick would threaten his right flank. He understood exactly the problem. With both wings of the enemy across the Rappahannock, on both his east and west flanks, Lee faced a serious dilemma.

Conventional military wisdom dictated that the outnumbered ANV retreat south and escape Hooker's trap. Lee opted to meet the Federal challenge head-on and not retreat. Lee intuited that Sedgwick was not going to be a real threat but rather a demonstration and that the real threat was in his rear. He also recognized that retreating with the enemy in his rear would create other difficulties.

Correctly deducing that Hooker's primary threat lay to the west, Lee assigned 10,000 troops under Major General Jubal A. Early to man the old Fredericksburg entrenchments. The balance of the army would turn toward the tangled Wilderness to confront Hooker's flanking column. Thus, he sent 80% of his army in the opposite direction of the front line. He didn’t think Hooker would allow Sedgwick to command the major attack force. Sedgwick’s division had lost half its men at Antietam, and he himself had been wounded 3 times. He hadn’t been in command at the battle of Fredericksburg and had just taken over for Sumner.

The Federals had encountered virtually no opposition to this point. Moreover, they could now press eastward, break clear of the Wilderness, and uncover Banks Ford downstream, thus significantly shortening the distance between their two wings. Having dropped into Lee’s rear, an aggressive attack might have caught Lee in a bad position forcing him to retreat with the Union army chasing him. But Hooker stopped and waited for Lee to attack him, ceding the initiative to Lee. 

Chancellorsville, May 1. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

Analysis

At this critical moment, Hooker decided to halt at Chancellorsville and await the arrival of additional Union troops. This fateful decision changed the battle. When General Couch protested, Hooker famously said, “"It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground." Hooker’s lack of imagination as to the various options available to his opponent, a wily old fox, would prove to be his fatal flaw.

Hooker had stopped his forward motion when Lee was caught in between his wings. Had Hooker advanced, he would have kept the initiative and limited Lee’s options.

Hooker instead set up a defensive line to his east and the high ground, Hazel Grove, to the southwest.

Here is one great example of why Lee was a great battlefield commander: his comprehension of how his enemy would analyze the situation. Dividing his army was a gamble; but the real gamble was following his intuition and not hesitating or playing it safe. His instinct about Sedgwick was brilliant.

We hear this battle usually summarized, as Hooker himself did, as a loss of self- confidence. But that isn’t really the case, as his exclamation to Couch shows. He believed either Lee must retreat, with the Union army in his rear, or attack him frontally. Hooker expected Lee to retreat, after all that was the safe thing to do and exactly what Hooker would have done. There is evidence that Hooker was looking to put himself in a position where he would be attacked, and not repeat the Fredericksburg fiasco. He himself suggested that he was concerned that all of his army be up on the battlefield before advancing, and that may also have been part of the decision. It may well also have been  that it was his first time maneuvering an entire army.

The “Surprise Attack”

The “surprise flank attack” of Stonewall Jackson using an unmapped road to attack the  rear of the AoP highlights Jackson’s military genius and of course, his ultimately mortal wounding soon thereafter is one of the great American legends. The fact is, that movement was not a surprise nor was it the mortal blow retelling suggests. In fact, his wounding occurred because Jackson understood that he hadn’t defeated a major portion of the Union army, was dangerously separated, and so was looking for an opportunity to take further advantage. On May 2, Jackson devised a daring plan that divided the numerically inferior southern army and then marched Jackson’s men far around the Union army to strike unsuspecting Union troops on their extreme right flank.

The Union army was positioned north of the Turnpike and also at Hazel Grove. Lee understood very well that his army was divided and that he is outnumbered everywhere. He knew that Hooker expected him to either retreat – and be forced to defend his rear – or attack his line. Instead, Lee looked for an alternative.

Hotchkiss’ hand drawn map of the battlefield at Chancellorsville, including the Jackson Flank Attack. Library of Congress.

It must be emphasized that Jackson didn’t actually find the road, his cartographer did. A brilliant confederate cartographer named Jedidiah Hotchkiss found the road. Stonewall Jackson had asked him to draw maps of this battlefield, and he made the discovery of a hidden road not on any maps of the time. The road that Hotchkiss found begins at an iron foundry called Catharine Furnace not far from Hazel Grove and leads south – the opposite direction – and then after a wide swing, goes north. The road then crosses the turnpike and fortuitously leads directly to the Union right flank. Investigations of a route to be used to reach the flank were made by Hotchkiss and Reverend Beverly Tucker Lacy, Jackson’s “chaplain general”. Lacy introduced Hotchkiss to the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford, who showed Hotchkiss, Jackson's cartographer, a recently constructed road through the forest that would shield marchers from the observation of Union pickets.

Stonewall Jackson knew that taking this very roundabout route would lead him to the Union right flank, but how did he know that it wasn’t covered and unentrenched? Recall that the union cavalry was off making a wide right flank maneuver, so it wasn’t around to screen the reserve corps from confederate cavalry. About midnight, Jeb Stuart told Jackson that his reconnaissance had showed that the right flank wasn’t entrenched.  Jackson dispatched Hotchkiss to explore the roads to the west. Although Hooker's left flank was firmly anchored by Meade's V Corps on the Rappahannock, and his center was strongly fortified, his right flank was "in the air." Howard's XI Corps was camped on the Orange Turnpike, extending past Wilderness Church, and was vulnerable to a flanking attack.

At dawn, Lee and Jackson studied Hotchkiss’s hastily drawn map and decided to undertake one of the biggest gambles in American military history. Jackson's corps, about 30,000 troops, would follow a series of country roads and woods paths to reach the Union right. Lee, with the remaining 14,000 infantry, would occupy a position more than three miles long and divert Hooker's attention during Jackson's dangerous trek. Lee therefore divided his small army once again: he is now in 3 parts, all of them facing larger forces.

Analysis

Hooker was expecting to be attacked frontally, but Jackson had developed a different plan. Once again we see General Lee making the right decision. Unlike Hooker, Lee knew his opponent. He judged Hooker to be a tough fighter but not the most imaginative strategist. And Lee was a clever tactician; he looked for an opportunity and here one presents itself.

We know that this is an accurate summary of events because Hotchkiss wrote a book, The Battlefields of Virginia, Chancellorsville. The famous description is from his book:

“With a map before him, General Jackson suggested an entire circuit of the right of the opposing army, and that the attack be made on its rear. Lee inquired with what force he would do this. Jackson replied, “With my whole corps, present.” Lee then asked what would be left to him with which to resist an advance of the enemy towards Fredericksburg. “The divisions of Anderson and McLaws,” said Jackson. For a moment Lee reflected on the audacity of this plan in the face of Hooker’s superior numbers. With less than forty-two thousand muskets, he was in the presence of sixty thousand. To divide his army into two parts, and place the whole Federal force between them, was extremely hazardous.”

Chancellorsville, May 2. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 2: The Flank Attack

By the morning of May 2, Hooker realized that Lee was not fooled by Sedgwick at Fredericksburg. Recognizing that he needed to modify his plan, he made two decisions.

First, he tried to bring General Reynolds and the I Corps to Chancellorsville. Hooker had a good plan for positioning Reynolds. However, he thought Reynolds was across the Rappahannock but in fact, he was still with Sedgwick. This required Reynolds to make a prolonged day march.

Second, he did the math finally and realized that if most of Lee’s army is now in his front, that the Fredericksburg line must be weak. Hooker surmised that Early was vastly undermanned. He therefore ordered Sedgwick to make a full attack at Fredericksburg. Proving that Lee was right about Sedgwick all along, the attack never materialized on May 2. His attack was delayed until May 3, making all of the difference.

Reynolds was supposed to be  positioned further to the right beyond Howard to anchor that flank on the Rappahannock. The myth that Hooker didn’t know his right flank was in the air is wrong. He merely saw it as his rear.

It was also a myth that the attack was a surprise, except perhaps to General Hooker. Numerous Union forces had in fact detected Jackson’s movement, and Colonel Sharpe himself had warned Hooker that Jackson’s corps wasn’t in his front. But Hooker believed that Jackson was in retreat, not advancing on his flank.

Scouts on Hazel Grove informed Hooker that they saw and heard Jackson’s men to their west. Sharpe had deployed aerial balloons and spotted the movement. When Hooker received these reports about the Confederate movement, he thought that Lee might be starting a retreat, but he also realized that a flanking march might be in progress. He took two actions. First, he sent a message at 9:30 a.m. to the commander of the XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on his right flank: "We have good reason to suppose the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach." He did not order entrenchment and Howard never considered it.

As the morning progressed, however, Hooker grew to believe that Lee was actually withdrawing; this was the course of events Hooker most preferred. He became less concerned about his right. Instead, he ordered Third Corps to harass the tail end of Lee's "retreating" army. General Sickles advanced from Hazel Grove towards Catharine Furnace and attacked Jackson’s men in the rear guard. This movement guaranteed that Sickles could not come to Howard’s reinforcement when attacked. Jackson’s main force continued onto Brock Road where it meets the Orange Plank Road – directly into the Union right flank. Sickles informed Hooker, to no avail, that Jackson wasn’t retreating but was on the move.

Northern soldiers were caught almost completely unawares and quickly succumbed to panic and rout, resulting in one of the most striking tactical defeats of the war.

Analysis

Obviously, this was an awful judgment; it changed Hooker’s life and his reputation forever after. Most narratives say that Hooker lost his confidence; but that cannot explain his not listening to all of the reports being given. In fact, these actions demonstrate irrational overconfidence. Hooker didn’t have the imagination to plan what he would do if he were in Lees’ situation. Therefore, he could not anticipate what Lee would do. Knowing your enemy is crucial. He himself would do the safe thing, retreat, and he never considered other alternatives. This was his undoing. Lee was never, ever about the safe thing.

Lee and Jackson had made yet another gamble. They deduced that 4 conditions would apply that might make this risky plan a success: a) Jackson had to make a 12-mile march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. b) Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive. c) Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there. d) When Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.

Why didn’t the Union cavalry show Hooker where Jackson’s corps was moving? Stoneman’s cavalry was carrying out its long distance raid against the Confederate supply lines, so they weren’t there. Hooker had sent the cavalry off to cut Lee's line of supply by tearing up the railroad in Lee's rear. Unfortunately, the mission failed.

It was thought that the Wilderness woods was impenetrable and so there was temporary protection especially as the front was in the east.

Why wasn’t Howard entrenched? He perceived his position to be in the rear of the army, and thus not likely to become involved in the days fighting.

Stonewall Jackson's victory on May 2 did not result in a significant military advantage for the Army of Northern Virginia. Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and in fact were in excellent position for May 3. This is one of the least understood facets of this battle. Jackson deserves great credit for this attack, but he recognized in the moment that nothing really had been accomplished.

Chancellorsville, May 3 morning. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

May 3: Hazel Grove

Even after the May 2 surprise attack, Lee was still in a difficult position. Jackson realized that the Union army in his front remained formidable. That evening, he considered a night attack to continue the great rout his surprise attack had created, but not completed: that is why he was out there that night.  Jackson and Hill were wounded by their own men performing a reconnaissance and JEB Stuart was given temporary command of Jackson’s Corps.

By the morning of May 3, Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and Reynolds's I Corps had arrived overnight, which replaced Howard's losses. About 76,000 Union men faced 43,000 Confederate at the Chancellorsville front. The two halves of Lee's army at Chancellorsville were separated by Sickles’ III Corps, which occupied a strong position on high ground at Hazel Grove.

And, the ANV was divided all over the battlefield. Sickles’ troops at Hazel Grove were right in between. Hooker could have attacked either part of Lee’s army, moving in any direction, and destroyed it. Stuart was completely aware of this predicament. He was not in a position for a defensive battle. So instead, he prepared an attack at dawn on Hazel Grove rather than await one.

And then Hooker, who continually made the wrong decisions in this battle, then made his most disastrous decision. He ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove at the very instant when that high ground became critical to the position.

The Union position at Hazel Grove was separated from the main army position with tentative connection and support. Hooker pulled Sickles back for its survival. Hooker was thinking defensively not offensively. Hooker ordered Sickles off that high ground and instead to another area much lower called Fairview. Hooker felt he was losing and he couldn’t see the advantage of his position so he retreated to what he erroneously thought was a safe fallback position. As previously noted, Hooker was unimaginative; if you are losing, you fall back.

Stuart had been ready to fight for that ground and now it had been given to him. He took control of the high ground and blasted Sickles at Fairview, where he was a sitting duck for Stuart’s artillery.

Recognizing that his forces were divided and lower numbers, and that Hooker expected him to retreat, instead Lee launched multiple attacks against the Union position at Chancellorsville, resulting in heavy losses on both sides.  The army that ended up pulling back was Hooker's main army. Lee had taken the initiative from Hooker, who sensed he was losing – because it wasn’t going according to his plans, not because of what was happening on the field.

Analysis

At Chancellorsville, the Union army had 106,000 engaged suffering 12,000 casualties and the Confederate army of 60,000 had almost 13,000 casualties. Lee lost over 1/5 of his army in a win – obviously this casualty rate could not be sustained, and definitely not for only a minimal strategic advantage. Lee and the ANV had lost more men, but Hooker didn’t realize it.

But wait! What about Hooker being conked in the head? We often hear this as an excuse for Hooker’s poor decisions, but it is an implausible one. Hooker suffered an injury on May 3 when at 9:15 a.m. a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. This occurred during the main battle from the bombardment from Hazel Grove. He later wrote that half of the pillar "violently [struck me] ... in an erect position from my head to my feet." He suffered a concussion, which caused him to be unconscious for over an hour. He did not give up command, but General Couch reported that he was in a daze most of that day. No significant orders were made in that time period. Yet another myth is that Hooker lost the battle because of this injury, but it wasn’t true: he made poor decisions both before and afterwards.

Chancellorsville, May 3 during the day. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

Salem Church

Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to attack the morning of May 2. Sedgwick didn’t receive this order until late in the day, and even then Sedgwick was slow to take action.  But eventually he crossed the Rappahannock River on May 3. Interestingly, had he attacked on May 2, he would have found Jubal Early entirely unprepared.

On May 3 Sedgwick and Early fought the Second Battle of Fredericksburg. The idea was to move west to join forces with Hooker and trap Lee between the halves of the Union army. Sedgwick joined with Gibbons and attacked Marye’s Heights, yet again. Barksdale’s brigade again held back the Union. A truce was called to allow the Union army to clear the field of its dead and wounded.

Then finally, fortune smiled on the Union army. On May 1, Lee had given Early provisional orders to retreat in case he was defeated at Chancellorsville. Early misunderstood orders and retreated anyway. Fredericksburg was open that afternoon, but Sedgwick never knew it. That night, Lee corrected the error and Early was in place the morning of May 3.

During the attack, a halt was called for the removal of the dead and wounded. It was noticed during the truce that Barksdale’s left flank was unprotected. Sedgwick re-directed the attack, drove Barksdale off the heights, and then again past the road and Lee’s Hill. Early withdrew south and Wilcox west, holding the road from further Union advance. Early had clearly lost his position. He also sustained 700 casualties of 12000 troops, vs 1100 union casualties of 27,000 troops.

After occupying Marye's Heights on May 3, following the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Sedgwick's VI Corps marched out on the Orange Plank Road with the objective of reaching Hooker's force at Chancellorsville. He was delayed by Wilcox's brigade of Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's force during the afternoon of May 3 before halting at Salem Church. Gibbon was left to defend the town. The next morning, thinking there was only Wilcox in his front, he renewed the attack. Once again, the Union command did not anticipate that Lee would respond to events.

After receiving word of Sedgwick's breakthrough at Fredericksburg, Lee detached the division of Lafayette McLaws from the Chancellorsville lines and marched them to Salem Church. McLaws's division arrived at Wilcox's position shortly after noon, reinforced by William Mahone's brigade of Richard H. Anderson's division. he was stopped by elements of Lee's Second Corps (under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, following the wounding of Jackson) at the Battle of Salem Church, forcing his eventual retreat back over the Rappahannock.

By 11 a.m. on May 4 General Sedgwick was facing three directions; west towards Lee's main body and Salem Church, south towards Anderson's division, and East towards Early's division. When General Sedgwick heard rumors that reinforcements from Richmond had arrived he felt his situation was becoming more difficult. He already had a six mile long line held by 20,000 troops with only a bridgehead to retreat upon in failure, with more Confederates possibly arriving.  He had sustained 5,000 casualties in the fighting and he was concerned if he could hold on against the horde he felt was arriving soon. He reported his difficult situation to General Hooker and requested the main army assist him. General Hooker, however, replied not to attack unless the main army did the same.

Meanwhile, General Lee arrived at McLaws' headquarters at 11 a.m. and McLaws informed him that he did not feel strong enough to launch an attack and asked for reinforcements. There were no reinforcements coming and he had 10,000 men. Anderson was ordered to bring the other three brigades of his division and position them between McLaws and Early; he then launched additional attacks, which were also defeated.

Analysis

Both sides in this battle thought they were outnumbered. But the Union in fact had a 23,000 to 10,000 advantage. Why did Sedgwick misunderstand his situation? Sedgwick was covering a wider area so he had the illusion of fewer troops. The act is, once again, all he had to do was gather everyone together and fight one or the other divided confederate divisions. Both sides had about 5000 casualties, again a much higher rate in the Confederate army. Sedgwick was in a great position to attack.

Imagine if Hooker had just attacked Lee on May 4 after Lee sent McLaws to Salem Church? By licking his wounds instead of acting aggressively, Hooker lost the battle he could have won.

Chancellorsville, May 4-6. Source: Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com, available here.

The Retreat

After dark, Sedgwick sent Hooker a message recommending that the VI Corps retreat across the river. After Hooker sent his approval at 1 a.m., Sedgwick withdrew across two pontoon bridges at Banks' Ford, completing the retreat about 4 a.m. Hearing that Sedgwick had been repulsed, Hooker abandoned the entire campaign, recrossing the main body of the Union army on the night of May 5 into May 6 to the north bank of the Rappahannock River.

Hooker retreated when Sedgwick did. Some think that this was the biggest blunder of the battle.  Hooker no longer posed the original threat to attack Lee on both his flanks. He never considered that he still outnumbered Lee in each section of the battlefield. Lee's impending assault on May 6 might have failed and completely reversed the outcome of the battle.

Final Analysis

Hooker never lost any day’s battle except for Jackson’s surprise attack. Although Hooker suffered more than 17,000 casualties, those losses accounted for only 13% of his total strength. Lee's 13,000 casualties amounted to 22% of his army.

Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the response Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations.

Did he lose self-confidence as he himself said later? Sure; but the reason was that by the time he retreated to find safety, Lee had already figured out how to counter that move. Hooker was playing one step at a time strictly by the book while Lee was thinking several steps ahead and knew he had to take calculated risks.

But most importantly Lee then bet all of his chips on his judgment. He didn’t hold back in case he was wrong. Why was he so confident?  He knew his opponent, and basically, he had no other realistic chance to win. This is how winners win in making decisions.

Did the Confederate Army win the battle?  It is traditionally interpreted that way, with Hooker leaving the field in defeat. Lee did a masterful job despite Hooker stealing a march on him. But the casualties don’t bear that out. It is often called a Pyrrhic victory. But really, the only difference between Hooker at Chancellorsville and Grant at Wilderness a year later was that Grant moved forward. If Hooker moved forward, then it would have been considered a draw. But Hooker retreated because he did what was the expected, usual thing.

Meanwhile, Lee had 22% fewer soldiers to invade Pennsylvania in 1 month. The Pennsylvania campaign could well have turned out differently with that many additional men at the right moments.

The truth is that General Hooker defeated himself.  Lee didn’t so much win the battle as Hooker lost it. Hooker never considered what Lee might do, and thought Lee could not discern his plan; he underestimated his enemy and never thought about the responses Lee might make. Lee on the other hand calculated very carefully the situation of the new Union commander, understood what choices he would not make, leaving him with a window into what he would do. Hooker made plans and had only limited flexibility when that plan met obstacles and he had little ability to analyze how the enemy would respond to situations. When things went wrong, or unplanned things happened, he was unable to adapt.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/reverend-beverly-tucker-lacy

Stephen W Sears, Chancellorsville. Mariner Books, 1996.

James K Bryan II, The Chancellorsville Campaign. The History Press, Civil War Sesquicentennial Series. 2009.

James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988.

World War 2’s Burma Campaign & Gurkha Lachhiman Gurung VC

Lachhiman Gurung's story cannot be fully understood without appreciating the wider context of the Burma Campaign, one of the most demanding and least forgiving theatres of the Second World War. Fought across dense jungle, steep mountains, monsoon-soaked valleys, and primitive supply routes, the campaign pitted Allied forces against a Japanese army that had already demonstrated its ability to defeat larger, better-equipped opponents through mobility, surprise, and ferocious determination. Within this brutal environment, Gurung's stand in May 1945 represents not just individual heroism, but the culmination of years of attritional warfare in which endurance was often as decisive as firepower.

Terry Bailey explains.

An Inscription of Lachhiman Gurung VC's name on the "Memorial Gates", Constitution Hill, London. Source: Gorkha Warrior, available here.

Born in 1917 in the village of Chhimba in Nepal's Gorkha district, Lachhiman Gurung grew up in a society where military service was both an economic opportunity and a source of deep cultural pride. Gurkha soldiers had been recruited into the British Indian Army since the early nineteenth century, valued for their toughness, adaptability, and fierce regimental loyalty. Gurung enlisted in the 8th Gurkha Rifles, a regiment that had already seen extensive action in both world wars. By the time Japan entered the conflict in Southeast Asia in 1941, Gurkha units were among the most experienced light infantry forces available to the British Empire, well-suited to jungle warfare and long-range patrolling.

The Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942 had driven British and Indian forces into a humiliating retreat to India, but by 1944 the strategic balance had begun to shift. The failure of the Japanese offensives at Imphal and Kohima marked a turning point, after which Allied forces, reorganized and resupplied, began a relentless advance back into Burma. By 1945, the Japanese 15th Army and associated formations were exhausted, understrength, and increasingly isolated, yet they remained dangerous opponents. Japanese doctrine emphasized aggressive night attacks, infiltration, and the willingness of small units to fight to the death rather than withdraw. Defensive positions were often assaulted repeatedly at close quarters, with grenades, bayonets, and hand-to-hand combat playing a decisive role.

It was against this backdrop that Rifleman Lachhiman Gurung found himself holding a forward position near Taungdaw on the night of 12–13 May 1945. His battalion was engaged in clearing remaining pockets of Japanese resistance as Allied forces pushed southwards. Forward positions such as Gurung's were particularly vulnerable, often lightly manned and deliberately exposed to give early warning of enemy movement. Japanese troops, skilled at moving silently through jungle and darkness, frequently attempted to overwhelm such posts with sudden grenade attacks followed by a close assault.

During the night, a determined Japanese attack fell upon Gurung's trench, which he shared with two fellow Gurkhas. Grenades were hurled into the position in rapid succession. When one grenade landed directly among them, Gurung attempted to throw it clear, a reflexive act that likely saved the wider position even as it cost him dearly. The explosion tore off two of his fingers, shattered his right arm, and inflicted multiple wounds to his face and body. His two comrades were killed instantly. In most circumstances, such injuries would have rendered a soldier helpless, if not unconscious, but Gurung remained upright and aware, driven by a sense of duty that overrode shock and pain.

Alone in the trench and severely wounded, Gurung faced repeated Japanese assaults at extremely close range. The attacking soldiers were likely drawn from veteran infantry units accustomed to night fighting, armed with grenades, rifles, and bayonets, and prepared to press home attacks regardless of casualties. Gurung, unable to properly use his damaged arm, adapted with grim ingenuity. Using his remaining hand and his teeth, he picked up grenades and hurled them back at the attackers, while firing his weapon whenever possible. For several hours, he held his position, repelling one attack after another, despite loss of blood, exhaustion, and the knowledge that no immediate help could reach him.

By dawn, the Japanese attacks had ceased. The ground in front of Gurung's trench was strewn with enemy dead, grim evidence of the effectiveness of his solitary defense. More importantly, the position had not fallen. In the tightly interlinked defensive system of jungle warfare, the loss of a forward post could allow enemy forces to infiltrate behind the main line, threatening encirclement or collapse. Gurung's refusal to yield under such conditions almost certainly prevented further casualties among his unit and contributed directly to the success of the local operation.

The award of the Victoria Cross recognized not only the extraordinary courage displayed but also the broader military significance of Gurung's actions. His citation highlighted his "indomitable spirit" and "complete disregard for his own safety," qualities that epitomized the ideal of the Gurkha soldier. At a time when the Burma Campaign was approaching its conclusion, his story resonated strongly with Allied forces who had endured years of hardship in one of the war's harshest environments.

After surviving his wounds, Lachhiman Gurung was discharged from the army with a disability pension. He returned to Nepal, where, like many Gurkha veterans, he lived a modest life far removed from the battlefields that had defined his youth. Despite being one of the few Nepalese recipients of the Victoria Cross, he remained characteristically humble, rarely speaking about his wartime experiences unless pressed. In later years, he was honored at commemorative events and remembered with deep respect within Gurkha circles and beyond. Lachhiman Gurung died in 2004, leaving behind a legacy that stands as one of the most remarkable individual acts of bravery in the Second World War and a powerful reminder of the human endurance displayed during the long and punishing struggle for Burma.

In conclusion, Lachhiman Gurung's Victoria Cross stands not merely as an isolated testament to individual gallantry, but as a lens through which the wider human experience of the Burma Campaign can be understood. His actions on that night in May 1945 encapsulate the defining features of the conflict: the intimacy of jungle warfare, the relentless pressure exerted by an enemy unwilling to concede defeat, and the extraordinary physical and moral resilience demanded of ordinary soldiers. Gurung's stand was not fought on a grand battlefield before massed formations, but in a muddy trench, in darkness and isolation, where survival depended on instinct, courage, and an unyielding sense of responsibility to comrades and unit.

His story highlights the vital contribution of the Gurkhas to the Allied war effort in Asia. Recruited from remote hill villages and serving far from home, Gurkha soldiers endured conditions that tested the limits of human endurance, often with little public recognition at the time. Gurung's conduct exemplifies the ethos for which they were renowned: quiet professionalism, adaptability under fire, and a willingness to hold the line regardless of personal cost. In this sense, his bravery was both exceptional and representative, reflecting the collective sacrifice of thousands of Gurkha soldiers who fought and died in Burma's jungles.

Finally, Lachhiman Gurung's legacy endures because it speaks to something universal in the history of war. His courage was not rooted in ideology or personal ambition, but in loyalty, duty, and an instinctive refusal to abandon his post while others depended upon him. Decades after the guns fell silent in Burma, his story continues to remind us that the outcomes of vast campaigns are often shaped by moments of individual resolve. In remembering Lachhiman Gurung, we honor not only a single hero, but all those whose endurance and sacrifice underpinned victory in one of the Second World War's most arduous and unforgiving theatres.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

When They Repealed the 13th Amendment

Here, Paul H. Yarbrough has a unique take on slavery and America’s 13th amendment.

A February 1865 Harper's Weekly image showing celebrations in the U.S. House of Representatives after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.

There is probably nothing as unrecognized and consequently misunderstood as the concept of slavery, at least as to the presentation by modernity media and so-called historical presenters.

Slavery has been around since the beginning of man’s history and has been a force in commerce as well as crime throughout the known and explored world.

Globally different parts of the planet had a hand in the concept and exercise of slavery. Whether or not one has been involved more than the other is of little importance since most of the so-called “experts” in the modern world have little understanding beyond some sort of non-historiography, notwithstanding their histrionic comic book knowledge of it.

This brief introduction is to fend off the usual rockets launched at the American South, its people having never enslaved any people, though they had ownership of the same. The South, of course, has the biggest bullseye painted on them for being the villainous culprits of slavery.  Fraudulent bullseye or not, it is there.

“Never enslaved,” regarding the American South as stated above, means, of course, that no slave ship ever sailed from a Southern port. All slave ships were either Northern (mostly New England) or European registry. The South, in fact, purchased slaves (becoming owners) but did not enslave them.  As a matter of fact, the South ameliorated the slaves’ condition from Africa to the west by purchasing them in and for the colonies (subsequent states) rather than watch them be delivered and sold to the West Indies or Brazil where they were more than frequently worked to death.

And, of course, the South as an agrarian people needed labor.

In fact, those self-righteous Yankee slavers (I can see your giant signature, John Hancock) could do themselves a service with a political truth if they would point out within their political blather that they (Yankees), in fact, were actually non-enslavers for the most part as they purchased Africans on the west coast of Africa from Africans who had enslaved those of other tribes.  Slave traders these Yankees were, enslavers not as much, though, a bit.

Blame

But political affiliations in today’s modern west insist that all parties blame the American South for every aspect of slavery to the point of amending God’s authoritarian direction that the actual sin was “manstealing” and subsequent ownership became a responsibility of the owner to properly care for slaves (servants according to Christ and the Apostles).

And, as it was to be, cruelty came more on slave ships and far less on farms and plantations.

The so-called American version of slavery, often referred to as the “peculiar institution,” fared how among other racial groups throughout God’s planet? For example, the various Mongol empires swept through large swaths of Asia with slavery a common commerce and currency to use and be used.

Emigrating Mongolians immigrated to the east (to the western hemisphere) and developed ultimately, over time, a monstrously cruel slavery system among what became multitudes of American Indian tribes that easily denigrated themselves among their same race (Mongoloid) as slavers, enslavers and owners with descriptions quite uneven as to their monikers as “noble savages”. ( For a choice example by a 5-star historian, T.R. Fehrenbach’s Comanches: The History of a People is hard to put down when reading about such so-called nobility)

After the great American war between (and among) the states of Northern slavers, occasional enslavers and that modicum of slave owners, began against the states of Southern slave owners, then subsequently ending, the great fiction was and continues that the war was both a “Civil War” and a War to free the slaves in the South.  Neither was true. However, the lie remains in the teeth of the American Yankee empire’s mendacious mastication, often an outright lie, often historical disobedience.  But chew they do!

Falsehood

And the truth is that the same falsehood has prevailed via the contemporary political biosphere of two major political parties, either of which will say (and frequently do) anything for votes: The Democrats, who have mutated into 21st century Marxists and the Republican into anti-Constitutional national oligarchs—or nationalists of the anti-Jeffersonian pro-Hamiltonian stripe.

Both constantly have cried out that “we” had a civil war to end slavery.

Who the hell is WE?

Nationalists (Republicans) or Marxists (Democrats), as one famous Southerner, George Wallace, once said: “There ain’t a dime’s worth of difference.”

Subsequently, at the “War’s” conclusion the first and greatest change was the 13th amendment.  Glory, slavery had ended in the now “National State of America.”

The secessionists states of 1861 were brought back into the national fold free of slavery and/or involuntary servitude. Praise the Lord, for some. Praise the state for others.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.[1]

Celebrations, joy, parties, cheers all in the paths of a supposed cause of a new “Nation” rising above its blood-torn and raped, “Union,” abounded. The confederation of 1787 born of the 1776 secession was now the Lincoln-styled (though erroneous) “four score and seven” nation with new consolidated and gunpoint powers by a government that had ended slavery. Now, all of us–all of us– were truly free at last, free at last! Thank God (the new national government) almighty we were free at last.

However, especially for those who praised the state:

Within two generations, for the first time a constitutional amendment to repeal (though it was not called a repeal) a previous amendment was entered as an edict (states could no longer secede, so amendments became edicts) to amend the 13th amendment.   The date was February 3, 1913.

Edict

The edict? The 16th amendment.  The now-called nation (former union) government owns all labor and profit of the people and will return that amount that its edict allows via its spending managers.

Involuntary servitude not back? Wanna bet?

A war over slavery in 1861-65? Only fools believe they are free from such a victorious government then or now that make such claims. Because this government will claim anything it chooses, including by the involuntary servitude and sweat of the people’s brow, the edict that the people owe an involuntary servitude chunk of almost 40 trillion dollars to somebody else. Somebody from whom the people never voluntarily borrowed a cent.

But, if the people don’t pay “their fair share,” any number of the people can and perhaps will go to jail.

Again, with the “four score and seven” nation nonsense; although Lincoln and his Yankee soldiers said they were saving the union.

But about that 13th Amendment? What happened to it?  What do you say, Honest Abe?

“The South was right.”

But, Yankees, like maggots eating out the innards of a dead skunk, prepare, now, to reenter new soil, once again down south, ready to recycle and feast again.

Deo Vindice.

The Germans’ Conquest of America

Here, Jeb Smith provides his take on a a book about immigration to America. He looks at Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration by Harold Holzer.

Carl Schurz was the first German born US Senator and later he was the US Secretary of the Interior.

Harold Holzer is considered one of the top Lincoln scholars, a winner of many awards, including the Lincoln Prize, the Lincoln Medal of Honor, the National Humanities Medal, the Barondess/Lincoln Award, and the Lincoln Group of New York’s Richard Nelson Current Award of Achievement. From 2010 to 2016 he served as chairman of the Lincoln Bicentennial Foundation. He is a lover, great admirer, and fan of the 16th president. He has authored, edited or co-authored over 40 books on Lincoln, of which the latest is Brought Forth on This Continent: Abraham Lincoln and American Immigration, glowingly endorsed by McPherson, Foner, and the usual suspects. In this book, Holzer’s focus is on Lincoln, immigration, and its influence on politics and the military.

Holzer writes of the massive influx of immigrants from Europe in the decades leading to the Civil War “forever upending the demography, culture, and voting patterns of the nation, especially in the teeming urban centers.”[1] These groups caused “overwhelming change” and “redefined” what it is to be American.[2] Nine out of ten immigrants lived in the North! And without their votes and military effort, the North would likely not have won the war, nor would Lincoln have been elected, as he won with only 39% of the vote. Holzer wrote, “In total, half a million of the two million white men who served in the Union armed forces were born overseas.”[3]

Veterans of revolutions

Many of their leaders were veterans of the socialist, communist and democratic revolutions of 1848 in Europe. These foreign revolutionaries formed German units and named them after Lincoln. Lincoln “trusted they would fight to sustain democracy in America as courageously as they once had rebelled against monarchical oppression in Europe.”[4]

Holzer says Lincoln’s views on immigration “evolved,” like his views on slavery and race, as he began to endorse immigration, something he previously, as a Whig, was against; though he seems to have desired immigration but refrained from saying so publicly while a Whig, and was one of the first in his party to push for immigration. The Whigs and later Republicans often despised Catholic immigrants, most notably because they unanimously voted Democrat.

Lincoln seems to have used immigrants in something of the way the South used slaves, encouraging them to migrate to the U.S. to help the war effort and also on the field of battle to take bullets and save others. For these purposes, he sought to use federal funds to promote and relocate immigrants to areas useful to the war effort and to provide cheaper labor for his industrial allies. He used humans as tools for his own gain.

However, as Holzer admits, Lincoln never contemplated immigration from anywhere but Europe, never desiring Latin Americans, blacks, or Asians to come here. Holzer points out the irony of Lincoln supporting white immigrants, but at the same time attempting to deport blacks out of the country, and removing Native Americans from Minnesota to make room for white immigrants. Further he did not include “Mexican Greasers”[5] in his vision of America. What Lincoln really wanted in anti-slavery western territories was an “outlet for free white people everywhere.”[6] Yet this does not stop this top Lincoln scholar from repeatedly describing Lincoln as a fighter for equality for all!

In support of immigration

Receiving support as he did from Northern industrialists, Lincoln supported massive immigration to provide cheap labor for industry. Especially during the war, the draft was taking people from positions the North needed occupied so as to maintain its war effort; thus, immigrants filled the gaps left by soldiers. Lincoln pushed for and approved the first federal policy that encouraged immigration.

While it seems Lincoln always was personally for immigration, keeping it private for political reasons due to Whig policy, he changed his public stance on immigration for the same reason he changed his stance on other issues; political advantage. When socialist and democratic immigrants arrived, for political purposes and seeking to centralize power he advocated for immigration policies that encouraged them. The same way modern Democrats would switch if it were white conservative Christians pouring over the borders of America today.

As Holzer mentions, unlike the earlier decades of Irish, German, and Swedish immigration that were for economic reasons, or the potato famine, or religious freedom, the 48’ers were politically motivated. He wrote that the “suppressed 1848 democratic revolutions on the continent motivated thousands of liberals to flee oppression… the exodus was largely political.”[7] These immigrants began a revolution in America, starting newspapers, becoming politically active, and pushing for government education and more.

America received more immigrants in the late 1840s and 1850s than it had in its entire history before then. And a large segment of these immigrants came from failed socialist, communist, and democratic revolutions in Europe. The failed revolutions sent these politically motivated ideologues to attempt the revolution elsewhere, and they brought their radical progressive ideas with them to America. And so, naturally, sided with the centralizing powers of the North.

In 1852, with America very much under the spell of the recently-arrived Hungarian revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth, a committee of prominent Springfield citizens including Lincoln met to formalize views on the failed Hungarian and other revolts. The first clause of the agreed resolution drafted by Lincoln, stated “That it is the right of any people, sufficiently numerous for national independence, to throw off, to revolutionize, their existing form of government, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose.” A stance, Holzer points out, he later would reject during the Southern states’ secession. Perhaps because while he endorsed a liberal democratic revolution, he despised a libertarian, decentralized, aristocratic one, like the Confederacy!

Lincoln worked with and helped fund German immigrants in publishing Republican propaganda newspapers in Illinois. These German immigrants and socialists were among the most enthusiastic and dedicated supporters of Lincoln’s 1860 campaign, helping flip various states Republican, like Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Famed Republican abolitionist Horace Greeley credited German revolutionary Carl Schurz for Lincoln’s presidential election more than any other individual for his speaking and campaigning.

The influence of their radical agenda was immense; one prominent Republican complained of the “complete Dutchification (Germanization) of the Republican party.” Unlike Southerners, who saw themselves as citizens of their state, these German nationalists took the idea of a single nation with them and were now “American citizens.” And nationalism was above politics. Further, men like Schurz helped revise and provide feedback for Lincoln’s nationalistic inaugural address that caused a panic in the decentralized South.

Cause of victory?

Prominent Republicans credited the Germans and Scandinavians for Lincoln’s victory. Rewarding their efforts, Lincoln placed many of his German campaigners into governmental positions, especially foreign diplomatic positions.

Holzer said Lincoln, ever the politician, was “addicted to the newspaper.” Politics was his life, it was his interest and passion. He placed national party victory over local self-governance, and political victory above the local desires of the people in his party. It was national-level victory and party success he desired, and thought above various local distinctions, even within the party. He criticized Massachusetts Republicans for passing the state law mentioned previously since it could harm the party nationally, saying that “Massachusetts Republicans should have looked beyond their noses, and then they could not have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole Northwest.”[8]

Some information revealed that Lincoln admirers might find uncomfortable is that he was known for both his racist and sexist jokes. Interestingly, in 1859 Lincoln referred to the state of Massachusetts, which had passed a law he disapproved of, as “A sovereign and independent State.”[9] During the Civil War, Federal General Fremont abolished slavery in the area under his military command. Lincoln rescinded Fremont’s order, and further removed and replaced the general for his progressive action, upsetting many German immigrant abolitionists who turned against the president for it. Lincoln worked with the well-known brilliant but extremely racist scientist Louis Agassiz to found the National Academy of Sciences.[10] Also, Lincoln stated he would “suffer death” before interfering or allowing others to interfere with slavery in the existing slave states. Lincoln’s many equivocal statements and actions concerning black people and slavery contrast sharply with the welcome and support he showed for the influx of European whites during his lifetime. The latter is of course far more the subject of Harold Holzer’s book than is the former.

Jeb Smith is an author and speaker whose books include Defending Dixie's Land: What Every American Should Know About The South And The Civil War written under the pen name Isaac C. Bishop,  Missing Monarchy: Correcting Misconceptions About The Middle Ages, Medieval Kingship, Democracy, And Liberty and he also authored Defending the Middle Ages: Little Known Truths About the Crusades, Inquisitions, Medieval Women, and More. Smith has written over 120 articles found in several publications.

[1] (Holzer 2)

[2] (Holzer 3)

[3] (Holzer 204)

[4] (Holzer 204)

[5] (Holzer 116)

[6] (Holzer 105)

[7] (Holzer 56)

[8] (Holzer 112)

[9] (Holzer 105)

[10] (Holzer 240, 8)

The History and Conception of the Victoria Cross

The Victoria Cross stands as one of the most revered and instantly recognizable military decorations in the world. Awarded "for most conspicuous bravery … in the presence of the enemy," it has come to symbolize the highest ideal of personal courage across the British and Commonwealth armed forces. Yet its creation was not inevitable. The medal was born out of a moment of national self-reflection, forged during a war that exposed the deficiencies of Britain's honors system and the heroism of ordinary soldiers in equal measure. Its conception, minting, and enduring legacy form one of the most compelling stories in military history.

Terry Bailey explains.

The front and back of Edward James Gibson Holland's Victoria Cross. Source: Royal Canadian Dragoons Archives and Collection, available here.

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 fundamentally reshaped Britain's approach to honoring gallantry. Prior to this conflict, no universal British award existed to recognize personal bravery on the battlefield. Instead, recognition tended to be tied to rank or social position, leaving countless acts of courage by common soldiers formally unacknowledged. The Crimean War changed this. Journalists, for the first time reporting directly from the front lines, brought stories of extraordinary heroism into Victorian homes. Reports of the Charge of the Light Brigade, the defense of the Alma, and the brutal conditions at Sevastopol stirred the public and embarrassed the government, highlighting the lack of a decoration that transcended class.

The idea for a new medal quickly took hold. Prince Albert, the Prince Consort, became one of the strongest advocates for the creation of a simple, egalitarian award. He envisioned a decoration that could be bestowed upon any serviceman—private or general—solely based on merit and bravery. Queen Victoria herself approved his vision, favoring a design that was dignified yet unpretentious. The result was a Royal Warrant issued on the 29th of January 1856, instituting a new honor: the Victoria Cross. It would be awarded sparingly and only for the most exceptional acts of valor performed in the presence of the enemy, making it a truly rare and exceptional distinction.

The first Victoria Crosses were minted in 1856, and the story of their material origin has become a key part of the medal's mystique. Tradition holds that they were made from the bronze of two Russian cannon captured during the Siege of Sevastopol. These heavy guns, relics of one of the fiercest battles of the war were transported to Woolwich, where they were broken down and melted to provide the raw material for the decoration. While later metallurgical examinations have raised questions about whether all the metal truly came from Russian guns, the symbolism of forging gallantry from captured weaponry has endured. The bronze was cast into small ingots, each used to create the distinctive cross pattée that has become synonymous with supreme bravery.

The raw material for the Victoria Cross remains a subject of fascination. A small supply of bronze, approximately 358 kilograms, has been safeguarded for more than a century and a half at the Ministry of Defence's base at Donnington. This stock is used exclusively for the casting of new medals, ensuring that each Victoria Cross shares a tangible connection to its Crimean War origins. Only a few ounces of bronze are needed for each medal, meaning the reserve is expected to last for many more generations of awards. The process of casting, finishing, and engraving each medal remains highly specialized and is carried out with deep respect for its historical lineage, preserving the continuity of tradition that began in the 1850s.

One particularly unusual feature of the first Victoria Crosses lies in their retrospective nature. Although the medal was formally instituted in 1856, the first awards recognized acts of bravery performed as far back as 1854. This meant that the earliest medals minted were created to honor deeds predating the very existence of the decoration. The inaugural investiture took place on the 26th of June 1857 in London's Hyde Park. Before a crowd of thousands, Queen Victoria herself presented sixty-two medals, many of which commemorated actions that had already become legendary in popular imagination. These first recipients set the tone for a decoration defined by humility, sacrifice, and the recognition of courage wherever it was found.

Throughout its history, the Victoria Cross has been awarded a total of 1,358 times since the medal's inception in 1856. This includes 1,355 individual recipients and three bars (second awards) for an additional act of valor. These three men, were Arthur Martin-Leake, Noel Chavasse, and Charles Upham, who all received the medal twice, earning a rare Bar for a second act of extraordinary valor. Their stories represent the pinnacle of human courage, each a testament to unwavering resolve in the face of overwhelming danger. From the trenches of the First World War, to the skies of the Second World War, to modern conflicts in the Falklands, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the medal has remained a constant, awarded sparingly to ensure its prestige and significance remain undiminished.

Today, the Victoria Cross occupies a unique place in the military culture of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations. Its design has remained almost unchanged since the first medal was cast. The obverse features a lion standing on the royal crown, above a scroll bearing the simple yet powerful inscription "For Valour." The crimson ribbon was selected by Queen Victoria herself, and its deep color has become iconic in its own right. The reverse of each medal is engraved with the name, rank, and unit of the recipient, as well as the date of the action for which it was awarded, personalizing each decoration as a permanent reminder of individual sacrifice.

The significance of the Victoria Cross extends far beyond its material form. It stands as a monument to the idea that bravery is not confined to rank, status, or background. Conceived at a time when society was rigidly hierarchical, the medal offered unprecedented recognition to ordinary soldiers whose courage would otherwise have gone unrecorded. Its survival into the twenty-first century speaks to the enduring relevance of its core principle: that exceptional valor deserves the highest honor a nation can bestow.

In tracing the history and conception of the Victoria Cross, from the battlefields of Crimea to the secure vaults of Donnington, a story is uncovered, not only of military decoration but of evolving national values. The medal remains a powerful symbol of courage, integrity, and humanity. It is a reminder that in the most desperate moments of conflict, individuals continue to demonstrate a level of bravery that transcends time, forging their place in history and inspiring generations to come.

The Victoria Cross endures because it represents far more than an award for bravery; it embodies a moral ideal that has remained remarkably constant despite profound changes in warfare, society, and the nature of conflict itself. From its origins in the aftermath of the Crimean War to its continued presence in modern campaigns, the medal has consistently affirmed that courage under fire is a universal human quality, worthy of the highest recognition regardless of rank, background, or circumstance. Its careful design, its symbolic material origins, and its deliberately restrictive criteria have ensured that the Victoria Cross has never been diminished by overuse or ceremony, but instead retains an almost sacred authority.

What ultimately distinguishes the Victoria Cross is its unbroken continuity. Each new award draws a direct line back to the first acts of valor recognized in the mid-nineteenth century, both materially through the bronze from which it is cast and philosophically through the values it represents. In an age where military technology and doctrine have evolved beyond anything its founders could have imagined, the essence of the medal remains unchanged: the recognition of selfless courage in the face of mortal danger. This continuity reinforces the Victoria Cross not as a relic of imperial history, but as a living tradition that continues to define the very highest standard of service and sacrifice.

In this sense, the Victoria Cross serves as a bridge between generations. It links the soldiers of Crimea with those of the world wars and the conflicts of the present day, uniting them in a shared narrative of extraordinary human resolve. Each recipient adds a new chapter to this story, yet none diminishes those that came before. Instead, the collective weight of these individual acts strengthens the medal's meaning, ensuring that it remains both a personal honor and a national symbol.

As long as courage is demanded in the service of others, the Victoria Cross will continue to hold its unique place in history. It stands as a quiet yet enduring testament to the capacity for bravery under the most extreme conditions, reminding society that while the circumstances of war may change, the values of courage, sacrifice, and integrity remain timeless.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

Note:

The ribbon of the Victoria Cross varies by service branch, with dark crimson traditionally used for the British Army and Royal Marines, (today Royal Marine Commandos, while a deep blue ribbon was originally designated for awards to the Royal Navy. In practice, the crimson ribbon has become standard across all branches since the First World War, reflecting the unification of service distinctions while preserving the medal's historic origins.

The Forgotten Bombers That Led the Way: America’s Vivid Assembly Ships of World War II

During the height of the air war over Europe, large groups of American heavy bombers climbed out of East Anglia almost every morning. For many people living in the region, the sound and sight of those aircraft became a familiar part of the conflict. The United States Army Air Forces depended heavily on the B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-24 Liberator for its daylight strategy, and their departures became routine. What rarely receives the same attention is the role of a handful of older bombers that helped bring order to these departures. These were the assembly ships, painted in bright and sometimes unusual colors so crews could spot them quickly against the English sky.

Richard Clements explains.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress formation. Schweinfurt, Germany - August, 17, 1943.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress formation. Schweinfurt, Germany - August 17, 1943.

The Challenge of Bringing Order to the Skies

From 1943 onward, the Eighth Air Force expanded its operations across East Anglia. Airfields were spread across Norfolk, Suffolk, and Cambridgeshire, and each one sent aircraft into the same busy morning sky. Every bomber had to find its place in a larger group, climb steadily, and keep to the timetable. Weather often interfered, and crews still adjusting to British conditions sometimes struggled to identify other aircraft in the haze.

The result was predictable. Aircraft sometimes climbed into the same airspace. Near misses were reported frequently. Several bombing missions suffered delays because the formations failed to gather quickly enough. Although ground control could guide departures, it could not solve the issue of identifying other aircraft in the air. Another solution was needed, one that crews could see without relying on radio contact or clear skies.

A Practical Innovation in a Growing Air War

The answer was the assembly ship. These were older bombers nearing the end of their combat life. Some had battle damage that made long missions impossible, while others had simply become worn. Instead of being scrapped immediately, many were converted into highly visible airborne rally points. Each bomb group had one, sometimes two, depending on operational needs.

The idea was straightforward. The assembly ship took off first and climbed into a holding pattern above its home base. Newer aircraft took off next and circled until they spotted the brightly painted machine overhead. Once enough aircraft had gathered, the assembly ship guided the formation into the correct climbing pattern and direction of travel. After completing the task, it returned to base. It did not cross the North Sea or accompany the mission toward its target.

This method saved time, reduced the risk of accidents, and helped maintain the tight formations required for mutual defense.

Color Schemes Designed to Be Impossible to Miss

The thing that makes assembly ships so memorable today is their appearance. Because they never flew into enemy territory, camouflage was unnecessary. Visibility became the priority. Groups across the Eighth Air Force began to develop their own designs, often with considerable imagination.

One aircraft might be painted bright yellow with red chevrons. Another might have wide black spots across a silver fuselage. Some had candy-striped tails. Others carried oversized geometric shapes or checkerboard patterns. A few used contrasting panels of green and white. The design language varied, but every scheme aimed at the same goal. Crews had to recognize the ship instantly, even in bad weather.

These color schemes created some of the most distinctive aircraft of the Second World War. They were not meant to impress the enemy or hide from it. They were meant for the airmen who needed to find their group quickly at dawn.

Conversions and Modifications

The aircraft chosen for this role were usually B-17s or B-24s. Each type required a fair amount of modification. Guns were removed, which reduced weight and made the aircraft easier to climb. Armor plate was often taken out for the same reason. Much of the interior was removed, along with equipment that was no longer needed. Lightening the aircraft made it easier for the assembly ship to get up early and remain overhead long enough for the rest of the group to form up.

Some groups gave their assembly ships names that embraced their unusual appearance. The 458th Bomb Group operated a B-24 known as “Spotted Cow”. Another group had “The Green Dragon”, painted in a vivid green finish with yellow markings. There were others, including “The Jolly Roger” and “Fightin’ Sam”. The names added a touch of character, but the paintwork did most of the talking.

Routine Work That Never Reached the Headlines

Assembly ships rarely appear in wartime newsreels or photographs. Their work was uneventful by design. They did not fly through flak or fighter attack. They were not part of the dramatic footage that accompanied raids on Berlin or the Ruhr. Yet their flights were essential. A large formation needed clarity and coordination. Without it, missions risked breakdown long before reaching the target.

Veterans often described the sense of relief that came with spotting the brightly colored aircraft circling above the base. In the low morning light, with engines warming and visibility uncertain, that visual cue gave crews a clear point of reference. They knew exactly where to go and how to start the long climb eastward.

Safety, Training, and an Air War Under Pressure

The arrival of assembly ships also made the morning departure routine noticeably safer. With so many aircraft circling the same patch of sky, the chance of a collision was never far from anyone’s mind. These brightly marked bombers gave crews an instant point of reference, which helped ease the congestion. They also became useful for newcomers. Pilots fresh from training in the United States often relied on them as they learned how to join and hold formation. It was an early step in understanding the discipline that large-scale operations demanded.

In addition, the system helped keep missions on schedule. The Eighth Air Force operated under strict timing. Multiple groups needed to cross the coast within narrow intervals. Delays could disrupt the larger plan. By ensuring orderly assembly at the start of each mission, these ships supported the wider strategic effort.

A Short Life and a Quiet End

When the war in Europe came to an end, most of these aircraft were taken apart or scrapped. Their bright paintwork, once an essential guide for dozens of aircrews, faded from the airfields almost overnight. Only a small number of photographs survived, tucked away in various archives and in a few private collections. They show a brief and unusual moment in the air war, when a practical need produced something unexpectedly creative.

Today, these aircraft give a modest but useful glimpse into a part of Allied operations that rarely comes up in broader accounts.

A Forgotten Chapter Worth Remembering

The story of the assembly ships shows how major military efforts depend on far more than the frontline aircraft that usually attract most of the attention in wartime histories. Yet the work done behind the scenes, whether through supporting aircraft, trial solutions, or improvised ideas, often proves just as important. The striking paint schemes on these older bombers might seem unusual today, but they grew out of the very real difficulties faced by crews trying to find one another in poor visibility. When an airman spotted one circling above the field, it was a clear sign that the day’s climb east was about to begin.

Their time in service was short, but the impression they left remains striking. Few wartime aircraft looked anything like them, and none were given the same specific job. In a campaign that relied on coordination and discipline, the assembly ships played a modest but essential part.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

References

Bowers, P. M. Boeing B 17 Flying Fortress. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995.
 Freeman, R. A. The Mighty Eighth. Arms and Armour Press, 1970.
 Johnson, R. B 24 Liberator at War. Ian Allan Publishing, 1978.
 Roeder, G. H. The Censored War. Yale University Press, 1993.
 USAAF Eighth Air Force archival photographs and formation records, East Anglia, 1943–45.

Gertrude Bell: The Mountaineer and the Four Impossibles of the Oberland

Gertrude Bell had many accomplishments. A polyglot, she translated 43 Persian poems from the collection The Divan of Hafiz (also written as Hafez) into English. She published her translations in June of 1897 alongside a study of the poems in context of Islamic Persia’s history. Much of her life leading up to 1914 was spent on archaeological digs with a focus on Byzantine architecture in Turkey and the palace at Ukhaidir in what is now Iraq. The chronicles of her travels brought her recognition. These experiences were deemed useful during World War I when she worked as an interpreter for the British in Egypt and mapped wells and paths in Arabia. Her contemporary T. E. Lawrence later acknowledged that her information had aided the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the war. After the war, she championed Faisal, a key figure during the Arab Revolt, as the first king of Iraq. For the remainder of her life, Faisal helped her establish the Iraq Museum to protect the country’s past. Perhaps less discussed, however, is her accomplished career as a mountaineer. Specifically, her 1902 crossing of the Lauteraarhorn-Schreckhorn traverse.

Michael Mirra explains.

A 1916 meeting with Ibn Saud, Percy Cox, and Gertrude Bell.

Early Climbs in the French Alps

As a daughter of the sixth-richest family in Britain, Gertrude had the privilege of traveling extensively including two world tours; one with her brother Maurice and another with her half-brother Hugh (sometimes referred to as “Hugo”). Gertrude showed an interest in mountain climbing when her family visited the Dauphiné region of the French Alps in August of 1897. It was during that trip that she climbed minor peaks like Pic de la Grave and the Bec de l’Homme.

Gertrude returned to the region in August of 1899 to climb the larger La Meije and Barre des Écrins. Early in her visit, she encountered German mountaineer Helene Kuntze who had just completed a climb of La Meije’s summit peak before her. Gertrude’s expedition, however, would cross the complete traverse. This is considered Gertrude’s first climbing season.

For the 1900 climbing season, Gertrude went to the Chamonix commune in France. It was there that she enlisted Ulrich Fuhrer as one of her guides. Ulrich and his younger brother Heinrich would become her usual guides during the 1901, 1902, and 1904 (her last) seasons. In 1900, she climbed Mont Blanc, the Grépon, and the Grand Dru.

The 1901 Season in the Swiss Alps

In 1901, Gertrude came face-to-face with the Schreckhorn in Switzerland. After reaching the top via the southeast, which is the side she referred to as seen from the Grimsel Pass, she focused on the Engelhörner range where she achieved seven first ascents, three more ascents of old peaks or saddles, and the first traverse of the Urbachthaler Engelhorn. One of the seven virgin peaks was named after her, Gertrudspitze (or Gertrude’s Peak). Her attention then turned to the unclimbed northeast face of the Finsteraarhorn and the uncompleted traverse of the Lauteraarhorn and Schreckhorn. However, she was met with bad weather and returned to England unsuccessful.

At the end of the year, Gertrude wrote the article “Concerning Mountains: Die Engelhörner” for the National Review. Her description of Switzerland is worth quoting in detail:

You need not go farther afield than the much-trodden Bernese Oberland to find new peaks and new adventures; it is unnecessary to go farther in search of Alpine beauties, for in no region of mountains is there a greater variety of gorgeous scenery. Snowfield and rock would seem here to put on their finest aspects; a master hand hollowed out the thin shell-like ridge of the Schreckhorn and raised the pinnacle of the Finsteraarhorn, spread the white carpet of the Aletsch Glacier, and planted pine and willow gentian down the eastern slopes of the Great Scheidegg. No wonder (but great cause for thankfulness) that to the pioneers of Alpine adventure the Oberland was one vast magnet, drawing them irresistibly upwards.

Despite her successes, this article was the only time that she publicly wrote about her climbs. This tells us that she did not set out on these mountain expeditions for glory. Seeking adventure was simply how she lived her life.

The First Impossible

Gertrude returned to Switzerland in 1902. She got a glimpse of fame while on the Brünig railway line when a conductor asked her if she was the Miss Bell who had climbed the Engelhörner. At Rosenlaui, she once again encountered Helene Kuntze who had recently completed several Engelhörner first ascents with Ulrich as her guide. Ulrich had rejoined Gertrude the previous day to which she felt was Helene’s displeasure.

A couple of days later, Helene climbed the big gendarme on the Vorder Wellhorn. Gertrude woke up at midnight to attempt the same climb with a 1:00 a.m. start. She was halted by a storm half an hour later and took shelter in a deserted chalet, choosing one that did not have pigs in it. More rain at dawn led to her returning to her inn at 5:00 a.m., but she was still determined.

The next day, Gertrude started for the big gendarme at 9:50 a.m. She made it to the top by 1:00 p.m. Using a sling left by Helene’s guide, a German named Gustav Hasler, she let herself down the southeast corner.

It was not long before Gertrude took her ambitions a step further. The very next morning, she returned to the Vorder Wellhorn and, while making a five minute halt to undo her rope, viewed a chamois run up the arête above her, knocking down stones as it climbed. Gertrude described the Wellhorn arête as one of four “impossibles” of the Oberland. She ascended it that day. Her expedition ended by crossing the Rosenlaui Glacier under the seracs. Two days later, while crossing the couloir between King’s Peak and the Princes, she wore climbing shoes for the first time.

The Lauteraarhorn

A few days after conquering the Vorder Wellhorn, Gertrude left Rosnelaui for the Grimsel Pass to tackle her next “impossible.” She wrote to her father describing plans for a midnight climb of the arête between the Lauteraarhorn and the Schreckhorn on an unclimbed side. These were secret plans because there were assumptions that Helene was focused on the same expedition from the other side.

Thunderstorms pushed Gertrude’s climb to a 3:00 a.m. start. After walking up the glacier for three hours, the sun rose and Gertrude noticed the light shine on the Finsteraarhorn. She reached the bottom of the Lauteraarhorn arête around 9:00 a.m. Climbing through mist and then snowfall, she reached the top around 2:15 p.m. She, Ulrich, and Heinrich put their visiting cards in a bottle that they found there.

In another letter to her father, Gertrude wrote that it was all to be done again. However, she noted that all agreed not to climb the Lauteraarhorn from the Grimsel side again. She described the arête to the summit as “made by the devil” and “one of his happiest inspirations.” The gendarmes and snow cornices made it feel as though they were never getting any closer to the end. Instead, they would attempt it from the Grindelwald side.

The Lauteraarhorn-Schreckhorn Traverse

One week later, Gertrude set off for the Lauteraarhorn again. She woke up at 10:20 p.m. and set off at 11:10 p.m. Helene went to the Schrekhorn saddle. Gertrude followed the glacier toward the Strahlegg on the southwest ridge of the Lauteraarhorn. Once again she noticed the Finsteraarhorn, this time shining in the moonlight. She put out her lantern to take in its full brilliance. Just before 2:00 a.m., she made it to the Strahlegg and faced wind coming from the Schreckfirn bergschrund on the southwest ridge of the Schreckhorn. On the way up the arête toward the summit, she felt the bitter wind whenever she turned toward the Schrekfirn side. She made it to the top of the arête at 4:10 a.m. and watched the dawn come while she ate breakfast. The Matterhorn now received her admiration in the pink sky.

Now traversing across the mountain, Gertrude reached the saddle at 6:35 a.m. The wind was cruel. Ulrich half-suggested not going to the top of the Lauteraarhorn, but Gertrude insisted. Onto the gendarmes they went, reaching the summit at 8:50 a.m. After a second breakfast, she returned to the saddle. She then went up a tall gendarme and waited for Helene at the top, who joined her at 10:45 a.m. Together, they reached the top of a smooth arête at 11:35 a.m. From then on, there was a sharp arête, hard gendarme, and a gendarme with an overhang. Ulrich unrolled a thin rope for them to go up the overhang above a 25-30 foot drop. After Gertrude went up, she climbed to the top of a smooth face. Helene did not follow up the overhang. Instead, she went around the bottom and up the other side of the gendarme. She then followed the ordinary route back down the Lauteraarhorn and over the Strahlegg. Gertrude, however, made her descent to the saddle, reaching it at 2:00 p.m., and back across the glacier at 4:30 p.m. She reached a community used hut at 5:30 p.m. just before Helene. Both teams slept in the hut that night and Gertrude complained about Helene rolling onto her all night. The next morning, Gertrude returned to Grindelwald at 10:00 a.m. This was the first crossing of the Lauteraarhorn-Schreckhorn traverse and, according to the Alpine Journal, her most important climb.

The Finsteraarhorn

Gertrude’s attention returned to the unclimbed northeast face of the Finsteraarhorn. It is unclear in her letters if her second “impossible” was the Lauteraarhorn-Schreckhorn traverse or the Finsteraarhorn. However, the Finsteraarhorn would prove impossible for her. A storm, inability to light matches, shelterless glacier, facing unknown ground, and eventual frostbite would cause her to turn back 57 hours into the expedition. Gustav Hasler called this the “first real attempt” of the northeast face and a “most gallant and determined attack on it.” He praised her endurance and performance. Gustav and his friend Fritz Amatter successfully climbed what Gertrude could not in 1904, grabbing a rope ring left by Gertrude at her turning point as a souvenir.

In 1903, Gertrude spent some time climbing in Vancouver while on her world tour with Hugh. Her final climb was the Matterhorn the following year. The remaining two “impossibles” of the Oberland were the Jungfrau from the Jungfrauhjoch saddle (first traversed in descent by C. F. Meade, guided by Ulrich and Heinrich in 1903) and the northeast arête of the Eiger (first ascended by Yuko Maki, guided by Fritz Amatter in 1921).

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here.

Works Cited

Bell, Gertrude. A Woman in Arabia: The Writings of the Queen of the Desert, edited by Georgina Howell, Penguin, 2006.

Bell, Gertrude. “Concerning Mountains: Die Engelhörner.” Alpine Journal, vol. 41, 1929, pp. 21-34.

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 7 August, 1897. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-5-2-1-9

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 6 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-2

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 7 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-3

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 9 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-5

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 10 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-6

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 11 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-7

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 12 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-8

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 14 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/gb-2-7-4-6-10

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 15 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-11

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 16 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-12

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 17 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-13

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 24 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-20

Bell, Gertrude. “Diary entry by Gertrude Bell.” 25 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/d/GB-2-7-4-6-21

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Dame Florence Bell. 21 September, 1901. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-1-1-11-19

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Dame Florence Bell. 7 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-1-1-12-16

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Dame Florence Bell. 10 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-1-1-12-17

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Dame Florence Bell. 13 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-1-1-12-18

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Sir Hugh Bell. 8 September, 1901. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-2-1-6-8

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Sir Hugh Bell. 10 September, 1901. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-2-1-6-9

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Sir Hugh Bell. 15 September, 1901. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-2-1-6-10

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Sir Hugh Bell. 16 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-2-1-7-3

Bell, Gertrude. Letter to Sir Hugh Bell. 18 July, 1902. Gertrude Bell Archive, New Castle University. https://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/l/gb-1-1-2-1-7-4

Harding, J. G. R. “The Other Gertrude Bell.” Alpine Journal, vol. 124, 2020, pp. 168-178.

Hasler, Gustav. “The North-East Face of Finsteraarhorn.” Alpine Journal, vol 34, 1922, pp. 268-280.

Megasthenes – A Bridge Between the Classical Mediterranean World and Early Imperial India

Megasthenes, (Μεγασθένης), remains one of the most fascinating bridges between the classical Mediterranean world and early Imperial India: a Greek diplomat, ethnographer and writer who, as ambassador of Seleucus I Nicator, lived at the Mauryan court of Chandragupta and composed what became the first sustained Western account of the subcontinent. Exact details of his birth and upbringing are slim; later sources and modern scholars conventionally place his life in the fourth–third centuries BCE (often cited as born c. 350 BCE and dying c. 290 BCE), and describe him as an Ionian Greek who had served in the eastern satrapies before being dispatched to Pataliputra (modern Patna) in the decades after Alexander's campaigns.

Terry Bailey explains.

A Bust of Seleukos I Nikator, Bronze, Roman, 100BCE-100CE at the Museo Archeologico Nazionale Naples AN 5590. Source: Allan Gluck, available here.

Megasthenes' embassy must be read against the turbulent political map that emerged after Alexander: in the 320s–300s BCE the Macedonian successor states and the rising Mauryan power negotiated borders, alliances and exchanges. Seleucus I, having consolidated power in the west and east, sent envoys to the new Mauryan ruler; Megasthenes is usually identified as the Greek who represented Seleucus at Chandragupta's court, sometime around the opening years of the third century BCE (classical accounts often place the mission in or near 302–300 BCE). While Greek authors disagree about details and chronology, there is broad agreement that Megasthenes lived for a period in Pataliputra and had access to court circles and local informants.

What secured Megasthenes' long-term reputation was his written work, the Indica (Greek: Ἰνδικά) — a multi-book description of India that combined geography, ethnography, political organization, natural history and curious anecdotes. The original Indica is lost, but substantial fragments and paraphrases survive embedded in later authors such as Arrian, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus and Pliny; from those citations, scholars have been able to reconstruct large portions of his themes and claims. His account ranged from pragmatic observations, fortified layout and wooden palisades of the Mauryan capital, the scale of rivers such as the Ganges, commercial products, and administrative practices, to more exotic reports (stories of ancient invaders rendered as Dionysus or Heracles, fabulous creatures, and social arrangements unfamiliar to Greeks). The composite picture is of a careful observer who also relied on local informants and existing oral traditions, which accounts for a mix of reliable detail and mythic accretion.

Scholars and ancient critics have long debated how much of Megasthenes to trust. Arrian, the second-century CE historian who quotes Megasthenes sympathetically, treats him as an important firsthand source; by contrast, Strabo and Pliny accuse him of exaggeration and fantastical reporting. Modern historians tend to take a middle way: many of Megasthenes' topographical and administrative notes, the scale of Pataliputra, references to markets and ports, the prominence of philosophers in court life, and certain demographic or economic observations, find independent support or at least plausibility, even when his mythic or secondhand claims require skepticism. In short, Indica is invaluable as the earliest sustained ethnographic encounter between Greece and India, but it must be handled critically and compared with other evidence.

One important way Megasthenes' descriptions have been tested is by archaeological work at the site he called Palibothra (Pataliputra). Excavations in the Patna region, notably at Kumhrar, Bulandi Bagh and other spots have revealed extensive Mauryan-age remains: large wooden palisade foundations, signs of monumental timber architecture, and evidence for an unusually large and administratively complex urban center in the third century BCE. Those discoveries do not prove every specific claim in Indica, but they corroborate the broad outline of a heavily fortified, sprawling Mauryan capital whose scale and administrative character impressed foreign visitors. When combined with indigenous literary references (Buddhist and Jain texts that mention Pataliputra) the archaeological record strengthens the view that Megasthenes recorded real, observable features of Mauryan urban life.

Beyond topography and economy, Megasthenes' notes on society, his listing of social groups (sometimes translated later as "seven castes" or "classes"), his statements about the role of philosophers and the presence or absence of slavery, and his remarks about trade routes and commodities have been influential (and controversial) in modern reconstructions of early Indian institutions. Some of these formulations reflect Greek categories forcing themselves onto Indian realities; others appear to preserve local administrative distinctions that match evidence from inscriptions and later Indian sources. Thus Indica functions simultaneously as an ethnographic snapshot shaped by cross-cultural translation and as a repository of useful data that historians weigh against Indian textual traditions and material finds.

The Indica's afterlife in the classical tradition is also part of Megasthenes' achievement: later geographers and historians in the Greco-Roman world even when skeptical used his material as the baseline for European knowledge of India well into late antiquity. That transmission made Megasthenes an intellectual conduit: Mediterranean readers learned about Indian rivers, cities, products, and philosophical schools primarily through his fragments and their later epitomes. At the same time, the fragmentary preservation of Indica has posed chronic editorial problems: nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars produced reconstructions and critical editions, but disagreements persist about which quoted passages genuinely derive from Megasthenes and which were later interpolations.

What we know of Megasthenes' later life is sparse. Classical compilations usually report that he died around 290 BCE and they place his productive period, the embassy and the composition of Indica in the early third century BCE, after which his text circulated among Greek writers. There are no surviving personal letters or an archaeological "archive" that preserves Megasthenes' own voice beyond the Indica fragments; his passport into history is therefore the composite testimony of those later authors and the material traces of the Mauryan world that those fragments describe. Modern scholarship treats him as an essential, if imperfect, eyewitness: a man whose curiosity and court access opened up India to the Mediterranean imagination and whose mixed reliability reminds us how every cross-cultural encounter is a dialogue between observation, report, and interpretation.

In the end Megasthenes matters less as a flawless chronicler than as the first sustained Greek interlocutor to try to comprehend and describe a large part of the Indian subcontinent for a foreign audience. His Indica remains a foundational text for reconstructing Mauryan urbanism, trade networks and aspects of social organization; the archaeology of Pataliputra and the mirrors of indigenous literary traditions have validated many of his broad claims while also exposing the limits of any single ancient eyewitness. For historians of cross-cultural contact, Megasthenes is therefore indispensable: not because every line is true, but because his mixture of careful description, secondhand story and interpretive framing is exactly the kind of source that, when read critically, can illuminate how two great ancient worlds first began to see one another.

Megasthenes' legacy endures because his work represents one of the earliest and most ambitious attempts to translate an unfamiliar civilization into terms accessible to his own. Although filtered through the perceptions of a Greek diplomat shaped by the political tensions and intellectual categories of the Hellenistic world, the Indica remains the earliest extended window onto Mauryan India as viewed by an outsider who sought, however imperfectly, to observe rather than simply imagine. The survival of his account only in fragments and paraphrases has inevitably obscured parts of his original vision, yet what remains is striking in its breadth: geography, economy, administration, philosophy and the daily rhythms of a thriving imperial capital all find a place in Megasthenes' narrative.

Taken together with archaeological discoveries at Pataliputra and the testimony of Buddhist and Jain traditions, his observations gain depth and credibility, allowing modern historians to reconstruct with greater confidence the scale, sophistication and cosmopolitan nature of early Mauryan society. At the same time, the tensions within his work, the blend of sober description with mythic elements, and the temptation to map Greek concepts onto Indian realities serve as a reminder of the challenges inherent in any cross-cultural encounter. Megasthenes was neither a naïve recorder of wonders nor a wholly reliable scientific observer; instead, he was a pioneer navigating the uncertain ground between cultures, translating what he saw and heard into the intellectual language of his own world.

For that reason, Megasthenes stands as a crucial figure in the history of ancient knowledge. His Indica-shaped Greco-Roman conceptions of India for centuries, influenced later geographers and historians, and continues to serve today as an indispensable, if occasionally problematic—foundation for understanding the Mauryan Empire at its height. His work invites individuals to read critically, compare sources, and recognize the interpretive layers that accompany any ancient report. Yet it also invites admiration: for his curiosity, his willingness to engage deeply with a foreign court, and his attempt to make sense of a vibrant society undergoing rapid political and cultural transformation. Ultimately, Megasthenes' significance lies not only in the information he preserves, but in the very act of cultural translation he undertook, a reminder that the earliest bridges between civilizations were built as much by storytellers and observers as by diplomats and kings.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

The 1858 Lincoln-Douglas Debates

The Lincoln-Douglas Debates were a series of 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln of the Republican Party and Stephen Douglas of the Democratic Party. Laureen Vernon explains.

An 1958 postage stamp commemorating the debates. 

Now, as in then there can be but one supreme issue, that between right and wrong. In our country there are no ruling classes. The right to direct public affairs, according to his might and influence and conscious belongs to the humblest as well as the greatest… But it is times of danger, crucial moments, which bring into action the high moral quality of the citizenship of America. The people are always true. They are always right, and I have the abiding faith that they will remain so Robert Todd, Lincoln, speaking at the Galesburg, celebration 1896. (A, 314)

The weather was so extremely dusty due to the preceding drought that the streets resemble the vast smoke houses because of the dust picked up by the thousands of spectators, economic recession, deflated land values brought railroad construction to a halt as Illinois Central and Michigan Central Railroad; and reduced the money supply of the banknotes from $215 million to $115 million. Money grew suddenly so scarce with us that a man possessing $10 in coins or in notes of a solvent bank might call himself a capitalist, Carl Scharz, a German, immigrant (a,XI) When considering the series of 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln of the Republican Party and Stephen Douglas of the Democratic Party I think of civility and decorum. In reality the discussions were quite the opposite. They both used a lot of sarcasm did a lot of name calling to the degree that it most likely would be unable to be aired on network television. Until 1913, senators were elected not by popular vote, but by the General Assembly made up of their Representatives. Lincoln and Douglas were trying to win the votes of the State Legislator of the two chambers of the Illinois General Assembly. This was the first time debates were held between Senate candidates (B).

Debates

Originally, Lincoln proposed a series of 50 debates. Douglas agreed to 7 “joint discussions” because there were nine congressional districts in Illinois (B).    He was frustrated that in the two districts he already spoke in, Lincoln would arrive two days after he left and defend his views. This left Douglas unable to rebuke. With crowds ranging from 1,000 to 20,000 spectators, it was a huge media story. Two rival newspapers in the Chicago area hired shorthand stenographers to capture every word of the candidate’s debates. From the articles published, Lincoln prepared scrapbooks that he had published by an Ohio printer to assist in his later bid for the Presidency of the United States.

While their primary focus was on slavery, they also debated popular sovereignty, the implication of the Dred Scott decision, the morality of enslavement, and the potential of a fractured union. Douglas chose to speak first in four of the seven debates. He was allowed sixty minutes to present his point with the challenger being (Lincoln) given a ninety-minute response followed by thirty-minute rejoinder by the first candidate. Douglas argued his belief that residents should decide if the state is free or not (Popular Sovereignty), and that the Supreme Court ruled in the Dred Scott case the slaves aren't people and could be brought into a free state and remain slaves. He was worried about the possibility of a fractured union.  However, he believed that Popular Sovereignty would solve that.

Slavery

Lincoln argued against slavery on moral grounds. He avoided stating that the races are equal, he just argued that slavery shouldn't be expanded into new territories. If the territory already had slaves, they would be able to keep them. He felt that the Dred Scott decision had critical implications on the expansion of slavery, and he too was concerned about the division of the union, but felt only keeping slavery where it existed while not expanding into new territories would solve it. He spoke of the “eternal struggle’ between right and wrong when speaking of slavery, he mentioned “two principles that stood face to face since the beginning of time. The one of the common rights of humanity and the other the divine right of kings.” Lincoln used the house divided metaphor as early as 1843. He shared the biblical phrase “a house divided cannot stand” as a warning to unify the members of his political party.  The names of parties are the same, but their principals and positions have flipped in the last one hundred fifty years.

As the debates drew to a close, an observer noted that Douglas had lost his voice when Lincoln's voice and spirit were intact.  Lincoln won the popular vote, but lost the vote in in the General Assembly, Lincoln was confident even though he had lost because he had won the popular vote. Lincoln had gained notoriety and used the debates to help propel him into the White House. Lincoln and Douglas had disagreed for many years. However, Douglas supported Lincoln during the war.

Did you find that piece interesting? If so, join us for free by clicking here. 

References

A.  Lincoln and Douglas, the debates, define America, Allen C.  Guelza, Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, 2008

B. The Lincoln Douglas debate of 1858, nps.gov, February 16, 2017, https://www.nps.gov/liho/learn/historyculture/debates.htm

C.  Lincoln Douglas Debates, britannica.com, October 27, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/event/Lincoln-Douglas-debates

The Significance of the 1777 Battle of Fort Mercer in the American Revolutionary War

Called upon to surrender the Delaware River fortification of Fort Mercer, Patriot Colonel Christopher Greene responded, “We ask no quarter and will give none.”  Pointing to the American ramparts, Hessian Colonel Carl von Donop of the besieging force made a bold proclamation of his own declaring, “Either that will be Fort Donop or I will be dead.”  On October 22nd, 1777, both commanders would make good on their stirring words.

Here, James F. Byrne Jr look at the 1777 Battle of Fort Mercer in the American Revolutionary War.

Patriot Colonel Christopher Green. Painting by James Sullivan Lincoln.

Following the defeat of the Continental Army at Brandywine, the British occupied Philadelphia.  British General Sir William Howe controlled the American capital, but not the supply route needed to support his large force.  Howe needed the Delaware River to move supplies.  Unfortunately for his plans, the Patriots controlled a section of the river four miles south of the capital with two forts and a small fleet.  Howe’s operations to clear the river resulted in a strategic victory, but not before his forces suffered a humiliating tactical disaster in one of the most lopsided American victories of the Revolutionary War.

Patriot defenses at Red Bank (a strategic bend in the river) consisted of Fort Mercer on the New Jersey shore and Fort Mifflin located on a nearby island.  Fort Mifflin boasted 28 guns mounted in a log palisade.  Fort Mercer consisted of earthen ramparts supporting 14 guns and manned by 400 Continentals under the command of Colonel Greene. 

An eclectic but formidable naval squadron of sloops, schooners and row galleys protected the forts.  The squadron also overwatched significant obstacles consisting of iron tipped timbers anchored to the river bottom.

Howe elected to launch a joint naval and land assault to clear his riverine supply line.

Two thousand Hessians under the command of Colonel von Donop would seize Fort Mercer.  Von Donop had the misfortune to be in charge of the Hessian garrisons in New Jersey when Washington crossed the Delaware and captured the outpost at Trenton.  He eagerly viewed the coming assault as an opportunity to reburnish his tarnished reputation.

Offense

On October 22nd the British offense commenced.  A fleet which included six ocean going vessels made its way up the Delaware and ran into shallow waters, underwater obstacles, and a hornet’s nest of small, maneuverable, Patriot warships.  Two of the British behemoths ran aground and were destroyed the next day. 

Simultaneously with the Royal Navy’s fiasco, the Hessians entered the fray.  Approaching Fort Mercer from the Jersey shore von Donop launched an assault after only a cursory reconnaissance.  Colonel Greene, a veteran of both Bunker Hill and Quebec, was well served by his scouts and knew of the Hessian advance.  He withdrew his men from the outer walls into an internal redoubt protected by a ditch and extensive abatis (sharpened, felled trees).  Observing the abandoned outer positions, von Donop assumed the Americans were withdrawing and launched an immediate attack.

The Hessian scaled the abandoned outer parapets and found themselves blocked by extensive abatis, a wide ditch, and American artillery and infantry positioned along the main walls of the fort.  The Hessians lacked the tools to cut through the abatis or cross the ditch and milled around helplessly while the Americans poured fire into their ranks.  Perhaps the final straw, ships of the American squadron moved into position to join in the bloodletting.  In less than 30 minutes the Hessians retreated, having suffering 700 casualties.  American losses were less than 40.

Context

Three weeks later, the British deployed additional artillery, infantry, and warships around Red Bank, leading the Americans to scuttle their fleet, destroy their fortifications, and withdraw.  Their logistic waterway secured British supply vessels reached Philadelphia on November 26th.  The British (now well supplied) spent the winter of 1777-78 in the relative comfort of Philadelphia.  However, it had taken seven weeks to clear the American defenses from the Delaware and required the commitment of much of the British force.  While Howe orchestrated this operation, Washington was able to rest and resupply his bedraggled army in relative peace, and move into austere but safe winter quarters at Valley Forge. 

As for the commanders who fought at Fort Mercer, they were remarkably prescient.  Colonel Greene’s brilliant defense ensured he had no need to seek quarter.  As for Colonel von Donop, he was not able to grace Fort Mercer with his name, but he did indeed fall while leading the assault, and subsequently died of his wounds.

Lessons Learned

Combined Arms do not Guarantee Victory – The British assault included overwhelming artillery, infantry, and naval forces, and failed overwhelmingly.

Don’t Forget Nothing – The Hessians lacked the tools needed to breech Patriot obstacles and suffered accordingly.

Weapons Deployed Must Meet Tactical Requirements  - Large British warships were unable to adapt to river conditions or the highly maneuverable Patriot squadron.

Obstacles Covered by Fire may be Insurmountable -  Patriot fires converted their obstacle belt into a death trap.

Deception is a Combat Multiplier – Patriot withdrawal from the outer defenses led to the Hessian ill-planned, disastrous assault.

Know What You are up Against – Inadequate reconnaissance resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the Hessian attack. 

Courage is Necessary but not Sufficient -  von Donop led his troops from the front, but his leadership skills did not match his bravery.

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.