Battered by wind gusts, the Avro Lancaster bucked and lurched as its crew struggled to keep the plane aligned with the signal fires set by the French Resistance fighters two thousand feet below. The “Lanc,” one of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) workhorse bombers, was a homely beast. It had four noisy propellers, a protruding snout, and a pair of ungainly tail fins. Built to drop bombs four miles above Dusseldorf and Dresden, the Lanc was ill-suited for the stealthy parachute operation it was being asked to perform in the predawn hours over Occupied France.

Here, Timothy Gay continues the story of Stewart Alsop. Part 1 is available here.

The 28-year-old Stewart Alsop as a King’s Royal Rifleman cadet in the British Army, 1942.

The instant Lt. Stewart Alsop leapt from the Lancaster, Sgt. Dick Franklin realized that Team ALEXANDER’s leader had messed up. Franklin was so rattled by his commander’s gaffe, he confessed in his memoirs a half-century later, “that I didn’t know whether to shit or go blind.”

With the RAF’s rookie jump master screeching “No!” Franklin grabbed French Lt. Richard Thouville and kept him from following Alsop through the hole. As the radio operator, Franklin knew that the Jedburgh mission could ill afford to have all three principals dumped willy-nilly atop the French countryside.

The Lanc continued to drone southward. Within a few minutes the crew had feathered its engines, which dropped its altitude by a thousand feet or more. Soon enough, the jump master was flashing a red light and hollering “Go!”

One at a time, Thouville, Franklin, and the SAS troopers all plunged through the hole. The inexperienced Canadian airmen had done a yeoman job maneuvering the Lanc close to the Maquis’ L-shaped groundfires – or so they thought at the time.

Franklin, a golf enthusiast, landed some 150 yards left of the fires, “about like my normal bad hook,” he kidded years later.

He alighted smoothly enough but stumbled after impact; fortunately, his helmet stayed put as his chest banged against the ground. Unhurt, he popped up, and began retrieving his chute. He heard shouts, dropped the chute strings, and reached for his rifle, but was relieved to see friendly French citizens waving as they ran toward him. They were members of the Resistance reception committee.

Leave your chute – we’ll take care of it later, they told Franklin. They escorted him up a slight hill toward the groundfires. As they crested the ridge, a nervous Maquisard apparently mistook Franklin’s helmet for a German coal scuttle and opened fire. Fortunately, he was a lousy shot; no one was hurt and his Sten was quickly silenced.

Trying to get his bearings, Franklin began asking questions about their location and strategic situation. To his chagrin, he sensed that Team ALEXANDER had parachuted onto the wrong Resistance stronghold.

He learned that they were in the Haute-Vienne Department, some 70-kilometers northeast of their intended target – the BERGAMOTTE Resistance cell operating close to Limoges in the Creuse Department. In truth, there were so many Maquis groups going full-tilt in southern and central France in mid-August 1944 that it was tough for an air crew to figure out which set of bonfires was the correct one!

The Maquisards assured Franklin they would look for Thouville and Alsop. They motioned toward a peculiar-looking sedan and told Franklin he would be driven to their farmhouse headquarters. Just as they were climbing in, Thouville emerged from the other side of the bonfires, “full of piss and vinegar,” Franklin recalled.

Thouville’s chute had gotten snarled in some high-tension wires. He avoided electrocution but was frustrated that it took so long to cut himself loose. It also angered him that despite his best efforts, his chute stayed wrapped around the wires – a beacon for enemy patrols, he knew from his training.

Franklin, meanwhile, was fuming about the condition of his wireless set, which had gotten banged up upon landing. To make matters worse, Alsop, their commander, was nowhere to be found.

Thouville and Franklin were bemused by the bizarre-looking car driven up by the Maquis. Like many Resistance vehicles in the summer of ’44, it was a Gazogene, an ingenious contraption that ran on fuel generated by burning charcoal in a makeshift “oven” mounted on its front or back fender.

Gazogenes were smelly and temperamental, Franklin recalled, and tended to break down at the “most inopportune times.” But the charcoal miracles were helping to make the Maquis a far more mobile and lethal fighting force than was understood by Allied intelligence in London. The SOE-OSS brass was still under the mistaken impression that the Resistance operated almost strictly on foot.

They squeezed into the car, and with “headlights blazing,” rumbled down a dirt road toward the cell’s redoubt. Thouville and Franklin were amazed that the Maquisards were so brazen. Many were sporting bleu, blanc, et rouge armbands and not even pretending to be stealthy. On top of the Sten gun erupting, there had been a lot of noisy excitement around the groundfires. The clunky Gazogene, moreover, was making a racket as it lumbered toward the farmhouse.

Clearly, the Germans had lost control of the remote areas of the Haute-VIenne, if they ever had it – another fact not appreciated by Allied intelligence in August of ’44.

Thouville and Franklin’s first order of business was to meet up with the Maquis leadership and get a rundown on logistics and enemy strength; their second was to find Alsop – if, that is, he was findable. Their best guess was that Alsop had bailed out some 10 to 15 kilometers north of their position.

When Thouville and Franklin arrived, an impromptu party with Resistance fighters of both sexes was going full-bore at the farmhouse. The two Jeds were greeted with hugs, wet kisses on both cheeks, and copious amounts of wine. To Franklin, basically a teetotaler at that point, it tasted like vinegar.

Once the leaders began their briefing, it soon became evident that Franklin’s fear was correct: ALEXANDER had indeed been dropped in the wrong spot. The local Maquis leaders had requested from London gasoline, medical supplies, and a medic to patch up their wounded – not a team of commandos.

The Resistance guys were desperate, especially, for gas to run the cars and trucks they needed to conduct surveillance and hit-and-run raids. For months, they had subsisted on gasoline stolen from German supply depots. But once the enemy’s gas supplies began to wane, so did the Maquis’. With decent amounts of gas parachuted in from Britain, the guerillas could inflict even more damage, they told the Jeds.

If Thouville and Franklin were going to inflict optimal damage on the Wehrmacht, they would need to locate their team leader – and fast. With Allied invasion forces from the Riviera landings soon pushing the enemy northward, some 30,000 additional German troops would come crashing into south-central France, many of them looking for an escape route eastward through the Belfort Gap, the flat terrain between the Vosges and Jura Mountains.

 Thouville that early morning organized a search party consisting of three Gazogene trucks-worth of Maquisards; he directed Franklin to stay at the farmhouse and tend to the radio. The three lorries with the strange ovens on their fenders lurched northward.

    *

Unlike his Jedburgh comrades Alsop and Franklin, Lt. Renè de la Touche, aka Richard Thouville, was a military professional through and through. A graduate of St. Cyr, the French West Point, he was tall and slender; his demeanor, like his posture, was ramrod straight. His large ears and elongated nose protruded out from under his British Army cap. While fighting with the Free French in North Africa in ’42 and ‘43, he had been awarded the Croix de Guerre avec Palme.

At first, Franklin and Alsop found Thouville aloof. Eventually, though, the Frenchman loosened up, betraying a wicked sense of humor. But Alsop chose him as his Jed partner because he saw him as imperturbable; his discipline, Alsop thought, would prove vital on the ground in France. Plus, Alsop understood that Thouville’s mastery of French idiom and culture, especially his grasp of the internecine politics between Gaullist and Communist Resistance cells, would be a big asset.

He was given a pseudonym by Allied officials to protect his wife and children in case he was captured. The Gestapo was notorious for carrying our reprisals against the families of French soldiers who dared to continue the fight despite France’s surrender in June 1940.

*

Norman “Dick” Franklin’s middle-class New Jersey upbringing was far removed from Stewart Alsop’s New England Brahmin background. Franklin was sharp-witted and adept with his hands, which is how he qualified for radio technician.

The bespectacled Franklin also had retained enough high school French to respond “oui” when asked if he was competent in the language. Unbeknownst to Franklin, at that moment he was being quizzed about his credentials to serve in the OSS’s super-secret Jedburgh program, then just getting underway. Franklin was a quick learner – a “whiz” at Morse code, Alsop recalled.

Courtesy of the OSS, Franklin mastered his commando skills at a variety of stateside training sites, among them the converted fairways of Congressional Country Club outside Washington, D.C., and a camp tucked astride western Maryland’s Catoctin Mountain near Shangri-La, FDR’s presidential retreat. Today, it’s called Camp David.

Like so many WWII servicemen, Franklin got married before being shipped out for combat duty. In his unpublished book, he wrote amusingly of the opportunities he had in France to enjoy the carnal freedoms triggered by La Liberación – but claims to have resisted the temptation.

*

By now, dawn wasn’t far off. Thouville and his Gazogene men drove north, combing back roads for Alsop while calling out, “Stewww-aaarrrt!!” According to Franklin’s account, they had no luck.

Worried that Alsop had been nabbed or shot, in Franklin’s recollection Thouville returned to the farmhouse, where a bash the ALEXANDER team later described as “lucullan” was still going strong. Wine and huzzahs continued to flow freely; Franklin remembered one “incomprehensible” toast after another being made to the United States of America and the imminent defeat of the Boche.

The Resistance leaders told Franklin and Thouville that they’d send another Gazogene crew out to search for Alsop while the Jeds rested. By now, the sun was peeking over the horizon, putting their leader into even deeper jeopardy.

Alsop had spent the bulk of the early morning skulking from bush to bush in what he thought was the direction the plane had continued flying, hoping to recognize a landmark or bump into a friendly farmer. As dawn approached, he found a road and concealed himself in some ferns, planning to hail a passerby if one happened along.

A while later, Alsop watched from his hiding spot as a truck slowed down. In Alsop’s memory, he faintly heard his first name being called out by someone with a French accent. He remembered thinking that it was one of two scenarios: either the Gestapo was ruthlessly efficient and had already learned the name of the Jedburgh team leader who was invading its turf – or that Thouville had somehow contacted the local Resistance and that these people were trying to rescue him.

Fortunately for Alsop, it was the latter. In Alsop’s recollection, Thouville was with the Resistance posse that early morning and helped pull him out of the woods. Franklin’s memory was that Thouville was still at the farmhouse. Either way, Alsop was surprised to see that his rescuers were wearing armbands. And he recalled being stupefied by the peculiar-looking vehicle they were driving. Once ensconced in the truck, he was delighted to learn that he was being taken to a rendezvous with his team and that a hearty meal would be served. He was famished.

While Alsop was being retrieved, one of the women at the farmhouse presented Franklin with a gift – a patch of his parachute. She was planning to use the rest of Franklin’s chute to sew clothes for Resistance families and to make U.S. and French flags, to be brandished as they routed the Germans.

Even though the sun was now up, Alsop arrived at the hideaway to plenty of “sourish wine,” as he later put it, and drunken revelry.

Alors,” Thouville needled him, nodding toward some comely female Maquisards. “Tu aimes la France?

Oui,” Alsop smirked back. “J’aime la France beaucoup.”

Franklin pulled Alsop aside and gave his boss the bad news about the radio. Not only was the transmitter badly dented, but its output tube had been damaged. The radioman wasn’t sure it could be fixed.

For all three Jeds, the lasting impression of those first few days in Occupied France was the way the Maquis operated with impunity. The Jeds had been briefed at Milton Hall that the Germans had control over most of the major towns in southwest-central France but their grip on smaller villages and the countryside had begun to wane but was still formidable.

The truth was that Team ALEXANDER’s new friends could move from village to forest hideout without having to be furtive. It was only when they crossed theRoute Nationaleor ventured through one of the larger crossroad towns that they had to exercise caution. It took Allied intelligence weeks before they understood that, in most places, theMaquis’vehicles could travel at night with headlights on – and that additional supplies of gasoline would go a long way toward expelling the Germans from the heart of France.

Alsop (left) with his French friend and fellow Jedburgh Team ALEXANDER commando, Richard Thouville.

After a few hours of sleep, the three ALEXANDER men borrowed bicycles to ride out to a high spot where they could test Franklin’s radio. When they got to the hilltop, Franklin, mortified, realized he’d forgotten his crystals. Without uttering a word, Lt. Alsop jumped on his bike and returned to the farmhouse. Alsop found the crystals and pedaled back to join his mates. Franklin expected “a good chewing out,” but Alsop never mentioned the incident, then or later.

To their surprise, the radio worked, at least for the moment. They got through to London HQ, but no message was sent in response.

They returned to the farmhouse, where they sat down with a British medical officer whose mission and identity were codenamed HAMLET. He had been secreted behind enemy lines for months.  With HAMLET pointing out enemy strongholds, Team ALEXANDER mapped out ways to work their way to the Creuse Department, the home of their targeted Resistance partners, the BERGAMOTTE cell.

The trio also met up with colleagues in Jedburgh Team LEE that day, two Frenchmen and an American commander named Charles E. Brown III. LEE had been parachuted in the previous week and was using the farmhouse as its base of operation. With HAMLET, a full complement of Maquisards, various SAS operatives, and not one but two Jedburgh teams suddenly en résidence, a remote farm in Haute-Vienne had the feel of a Hilton hotel.

The ALEXANDER men didn’t stay long. HAMLET introduced them to another British medical officer, known simply as “The Major,” who had also been hidden for months in south-central France. If Thouville was the epitome of a Frenchman, Franklin observed years later, then The Major was the embodiment of an upper crust Brit.

“[The Major] had the sort of face,” Alsop wrote decades later, “that only England could produce: Blue eyes, a thin nose, droopy blond moustache, and a ready chin, the whole ensemble expressing the sort of assured lassitude which can be nothing but English. To top it off, he wore a monocle.”

The Major and his monocle craved action. “Just ‘doctoring’ must have been a little too unexciting for him,” Franklin noted.

Perhaps too nonchalantly, The Major volunteered to serve as their guide, explaining that he had a Resistance “acquaintance” situated between Haute-Vienne and Limoges who could help steer ALEXANDER’s vehicle through dicey territory. To Franklin, it sounded like The Major was saying, in a quintessentially British way, “’Ought to be a bit of sport, what?’ sort of a thing.”

A flatbed Gazogene truck appeared out of nowhere. Alsop and his men watched, impressed, as the Maquis guys placed protective sandbags around the perimeter of the truck bed and mounted a Bren machine gun on the roof of the cab and another on its tail. Several of the SAS commandos had been wounded; they were placed on stretchers behind the sandbags.

Well after dark, they bade farewell to their farmhouse friends and set off in the truck. The Major drove, with Alsop and Thouville also jammed into the cab. Franklin joined the wounded men in lying flat in the back, concealed by the sandbags. Just in case, everyone kept their weapons at the ready, pointed in every direction.

A little way into the trek they approached a sizeable village. The Major admitted he wasn’t sure which route to take. He took the chance, Franklin remembered, of knocking on the door of a large house. An angry voice yelled from an upstairs window that he was the mayor of the town and “What the blankety-blank hell did we want in the middle of the blankety-blank night?!”

Once The Major explained the situation, the mayor pointed to the correct street and urged them to be quick: there were a lot of Sales Boches (“Dirty Germans”) in the middle of town.

The Major climbed back into the cab and gunned it. Just as they cleared the town square, heavy gunfire erupted. Nasty red tracers flashed across their tail, but Alsop ordered the crew not to return fire. After some anxious moments, they breathed easier when the Germans chose not to pursue them.

Every now and then they had to stop to reheat the oven with charcoal. But their headlights stayed on as they drove through miles of forestland. Whenever they approached a junction, The Major stopped to send a scout forward to ensure that there weren’t any Sales Boches hidden around the next bend.

The Major’s intelligence source and his knowledge of the area’s backroads proved useful. They traveled all night; just before daybreak, they found the BERGAMOTTE camp hidden on the outskirts of Bourganeuf. The Maquisards were bivouacked beneath a series of repurposed Allied silk parachute tents” that stretched from tree to tree.

 

Once they sat down with the BERGAMOTTE leadership, it was clear that the big bosses in London had been right and wrong: Right that the cell had been under repeated enemy assaults, but wrong that they’d been compromised by the Gestapo. A festive party commenced, with surprisingly good food and enough red wine to cause Franklin to repair to the woods.

The next day Alsop sent Franklin off on a reconnaissance mission to the Route Nationale in the company of several Maquisards. They were under strict orders not to fire their weapons for fear they’d betray BERGAMOTTE’s forest hideout. At one point the recon party squirreled themselves into some ferns along the roadway as one German convoy after another motored past.

When Franklin returned to camp and reported his close calls, the Jed commander realized that he’s asked Franklin to take an unacceptable risk. A Jedburgh radioman was too valuable to send on such precarious missions. Alsop never again asked Franklin to go on risky recon.

That night, under the parachute canopy, the ALEXANDER guys and everyone else were awakened by a burst of gunfire. They scrambled for their weapons, fearing that the camp was being overrun by enemy troops. But it turned out that a young Maquis sentry had fallen asleep on guard duty; he accidentally dropped his chin onto the trigger of a Sten gun. Nobody got hurt

Alsop worried that if they attempted to engage Franklin’s radio around the camp, it might tip off the Germans’ direction-finding radio trucks, which had for four years roamed Occupied Europe, ready to pounce on any Resistance cell tapping the airwaves. Each night around midnight, the team would wander toward high ground to send their messages to London. Despite repeated contacts, there were still no specific instructions from their superiors.

The team quickly sensed that BERGAMOTTE was in decent shape and didn’t need their special services. The Creuse Resistance leaders urged them to help the Maquis contingent in the Dordogne Department, some 80 kilometers to the southwest. BERGAMOTTE’s intelligence suggested that the Dordogne Resistance was camping near the village of Thieviers and supposedly having trouble getting untracked.

To get to Thieviers, Team ALEXANDER would again have to traverse part of the Haute-Vienne. At that point, they’d been underground in France for little more than a week but had already crept through practically every region of the department.

They were assigned a guide who pulled up in a beat-up Citroën that ran on alcohol – not gasoline or charcoal. Audaciously flying from its hood were French and American flags.

Off they chugged to find the Dordogne sect of the FFI, the Forces Francaise de L’Interieure. The FFI, a term that encompasses most of the French Resistance forces in WWII, fought with such reckless ferocity that Allied soldiers nicknamed them “Foolish French Idiots.”

Their guide knew all the remote roads through the woods and could pinpoint enemy camps; given all the Germans around, he had no choice but to meander down one dirt path after another in the creek-swollen Plateau de Millevaches.

Alsop watched, amazed, as the guide inched the Citroën up to safe houses and camouflaged hideaways to get the latest intelligence on the location of the Germans and their Milicien cohorts. The guide smartly avoided all the potential ambush sites as they zigged and zagged. At the end of day two, the ALEXANDER men arrived at a ramshackle chateau about halfway on their roundabout route to Thieviers; they were told that they could use the property as their temporary base.

At the estate, Alsop and company shared quarters for a day with a Communist Maquis outfit that was part of the FTP, the Franc Tireurs Partisan. Jeds heading to France had been briefed about the erratic behavior of certain left-wing Resistance cells. Many Communist guerillas flatly refused to cooperate with the FFI or take instructions from Allied intelligence. Others fought but couldn’t always be trusted.

When the FTP guerillas at the chateau insisted on providing a round-the-clock bodyguard for Franklin and his radio, it aroused suspicions. The Communists clearly wanted to know what messages ALEXANDER was sending to London – and what information, if any, it was getting in return. Franklin was careful to keep the FTP fighters out of earshot that afternoon when he cranked up the radio.

After finishing his transmission on a hilltop a couple of miles from the chateau, Franklin was surprised to see an enemy plane buzzing overhead. It was a Doënier flying boat, a French relic from the ‘20s that flew so low that Franklin got a good look at its crew. The plane was a surveillance craft that bore a resemblance to Howard Hughes’ “Spruce Goose” of yore. To Franklin’s eye, the Doënier didn’t appear to have any machine guns or bombs aboard.

Still, the plane’s presence spooked Alsop and his team. It may have meant the Germans had zeroed in on ALEXANDER’s radio transmissions and were planning an attack. Alsop ordered his mates to pack up and shift to a different FFI-friendly home. It was the first of ALEXANDER’s many moves from chateau to chateau.

In the weeks to come, the trio only sporadically slept outdoors. When they bunked under a roof, it tended to be in a big country house, as Alsop enjoyed pointing out in the years to come. Some of the homes were chateaux fermes, working farms that had been abandoned or stripped bare; others were opulent mansions still occupied by gentleman farmers and wealthy families.

Some owners were patrons of the FFI, while others were sympathetic to the Milice but kept their political views quiet, at least in the presence of ALEXANDER and company. On occasion the owners asked Alsop for reimbursement; he happily obliged, tapping the stash he brought with him from London. Others refused payment, telling Alsop they were honored to help and encouraging him to use his cash elsewhere. Team ALEXANDER christened their indoor accommodations “motels.”

One of the motels they stayed in on their way to Dordogne was a dilapidated joint that lacked running water or reliable electricity. The team was forced to bathe in a nearby creek and use a garden outhouse that was separated from the main home by a six-foot-high steel picket fence.

Franklin was using the privy late one August evening when the rat-a-tat-tat of small weapons fire suddenly erupted from the other side of the property. The radioman cursed at himself for leaving his rifle and sidearm in the big house. Holding his still-unzipped pants with one hand, he vaulted over the fence and barged into the house, which was in pandemonium.

As Franklin scrambled to corral his radio, Maquisards were yelling that there were Boche in trucks attacking from a road to the west. He quickly huddled with Alsop and Thouville. They agreed that Franklin and his wireless should run east, away from the gunfire, which is what Franklin did in the company of a local farmhand who doubled as a Resistance fighter.

Franklin carried the wireless while his companion grabbed Franklin’s M-1; the two of them ran full-tilt in pitch dark for a half-mile or more, through an apple orchard and up the side of a wooded hill before they dared take a breather. The firing receded, then stopped. Things stayed quiet.

Just as they began to relax, an Allied bombing raid could be heard, softly at first, then much louder and closer. The bombers were pounding an area immediately to the east – exactly where Franklin and his aide had been heading.

Even after the bombing waned, they continued to lie still, worried that Germans might be combing through the woods to catch stragglers. Finally, they made their way back toward the house, “weapons at the ready,” Franklin remembered.

It turned out to be a long and messy false alarm. Team ALEXANDER never got the complete lowdown, but apparently Maquis sentries had fired on an enemy truck that had, in all probability, blundered down the dead-end road to the chateau. The Boche had returned fire, at least for a time, as the truck reversed course. Maquisards, as was their wont, may have expended considerable energy and ammunition firing at phantom soldiers and vehicles.

Alsop and Thouville spent the bulk of the night at the base of the chateau, their rifles cocked westward.

The Jeds again huddled when Franklin returned. There was no rest for the weary. Alsop insisted that they resume the push toward Dordogne right away.  

 

    *

Just before sunup, Team ALEXANDER moved out in a Gazogene, cautiously, because they were using the same road down which the Germans had retreated a few hours before. Progress was slow. They had to probe their way through heavily forested areas.

Each time they came to a bend or a crossroads, they got out to conduct reconnaissance to make sure there weren’t any hostile forces around. To tide them over, they had packed cheese sandwiches and wine; as they slurped le vin, they were careful not to let the bottle top smash their teeth as the car jostled around.

At one point, they came across a tree that had been deliberately chopped down by the Germans to set the stage for an ambush. But no guerillas or soldiers were evident. Not far from the felled tree, they went looking for a Maquis ally whose hut was hidden in the woods. But when they got there, there was no sign of him; the shed was riddled with bullet holes, but they didn’t find any traces of blood. Maybe the Maquisard had eluded the ambush.

On the same trip, they ran into a German tank on a windy road along a hillside. The tank was able to get off only one shot; it missed, badly. Their Gazogene found cover and slipped up the hill. The tank did not pursue them.

Franklin’s radio gave up the ghost after another few days. Whenever they encountered another Resistance cell, they’d ask if a radio were available. Miraculously, one was – an old B-2 set that must have been supplied by the SOE earlier in the war. Just as miraculously, it still worked.

After three or four days of playing cat-and-mouse on the roads of south-central France, Team ALEXANDER arrived in Dordogne along the Brive-Périgeaux corridor in the department’s northern region.

Alsop had been advised by sources along the way that the Dordogne Resistance cell would be in the woods east of Brive. But when the ALEXANDER trio arrived, they learned that the Maquis men were in the middle of assaulting the German garrison in Périgeaux, some 25 kilometers northwest.

They hustled back onto the road, expecting at any moment to bump into pissed-off Wehrmacht grenadiers or weary FFI stragglers. Instead, they motored unimpeded into Périgeaux. The firefight, brief but bloody, had ended hours earlier. After abandoning the village, most of the Germans had fled north and west, toward the safety of their Atlantic coastal bases.

Team ALEXANDER joined a raucous liberation party in the town square fronting a 300-year-old cathedral. People were weeping with joy, celebrating the end of four years of Nazi oppression. Within minutes, Alsop, Thouville, and Franklin found themselves seated in the back of a brasserie, being plied with wine and beer – and getting smothered with hugs and kisses.

There they joined in saluting the man who had orchestrated the German ouster from Périgeaux. He was the most formidable Resistance leader they would encounter. His nom de guerre was “RAC,” a colloquial French acronym that meant, Franklin was told, something on the order of “feisty Scottish dog.”

RAC was the commandant of what was called in that part of Occupied France the AS, the Armée Secreté. His reputation was so fierce that the local Resistance cell was named in his honor, La Brigade du RAC.

RAC was small in stature but large in grit. He was quiet, “not given to talk,” Alsop remembered. The Frenchman’s eyes were cold and expressionless, like a cat’s, Alsop thought.

Early in the war, as a regular officer in the French army, he was captured after the Germans overran France, but managed to escape to Alsace-Lorraine. Not long after, he was recaptured by the Gestapo but again slipped away, this time to the heartland of France, where he organized his own Resistance brigade and quickly became the Germans’ Bête Noire.

Alsop would dub him Le Chat (“The Cat”); years later he called RAC the most courageous man he’d ever known. When Team ALEXANDER first met them, the Brigade RAC consisted of about 600 men. When ALEXANDER departed a few weeks later, the brigade had nearly doubled in size and was gaining new recruits every day. RAC was “hero-worshiped” everywhere he went, Alsop observed.

Discipline in the Maquis “was a matter of the force of human personality,” Alsop wrote in a Saturday Evening Post essay a quarter-century later. “Some Resistance groups, because that force was lacking, disintegrated. Not the Brigade RAC.”

RAC and his charges that afternoon had just sent the hated enemy packing; he and his guerilla fighters were being loudly fêted.

Profane shrieking suddenly erupted in the square. RAC and the Jeds hustled outside to check on the disturbance. Several hundred German prisoners were being paraded in front of the cathedral. Villagers were lining up to hiss and spit at them.

“Every (enemy) face had the same gray pallor,” Alsop recalled. From there, ALEXANDER was told, they would be taken to the railway yard where they would be lined up against boxcars and executed.

Alsop immediately voiced opposition. These were prisoners-of-war and should be treated as such, Alsop told RAC. It was clear from their appearance that the Germans were either too old, too young, or too infirm to be frontline soldiers, the American argued.

It was at that moment that “we were then further enlightened about the character of the enemy,” Franklin recollected.

A day or two before, the Maquis had entered nearby Saint-Martin-de-Pallières, a village that the Germans had just deserted. Hanging from the balcony of virtually every house were murdered townspeople, children among them. They’d been slaughtered because the local Resistance had been so effective in harassing the enemy.

The Jed team did not know whether to believe the massacre story and were never able to corroborate it. “But the point was that the populace believed it and they were demanding an eye-for-an-eye,” Franklin wrote. Lord knows there were enough true stories of Nazi atrocities; this one sounded credible to the Jeds.

Still, Thouville and Franklin lent their support to Alsop. The aging men and young kids being jeered were hardly the type to perpetrate war crimes, they echoed.

RAC and his compadres wouldn’t budge. Vengeance had to be carried out; their countrymen were demanding it.

Alsop firmly replied that the U.S. flag would have nothing to do with mass shootings. Team ALEXANDER packed up their equipment, climbed back into the Citroën, and headed toward Brive.

“Nothing that Stewart Alsop ever did made me more proud of him than that,” Franklin recounted in his memoirs. “Though the prospect of the massacre made me feel ill, I must say that I would probably not have thought enough about it, or taken such a stand, or carried the matter so far, had not Alsop led the way. . . I was also proud of Thouville. Though I cannot speak for what his thoughts may have been, his words and actions were entirely ALEXANDRIAN.”

The team never found out if the German stragglers had indeed been executed in Périgeaux. They chose not to ask questions for fear that members of the RAC Brigade or their ardent supporters might take offense. Instead, the three Jeds recognized the value of cultivating a close working relationship with RAC and his lieutenants. RAC commanded near-universal obeisance from the local populace.

The exception, of course, were the Communist guerillas in the FTP. Alsop, as he had been instructed at Milton Hall, attempted to broker a rapprochement between RAC and the FTP. He didn’t get far. The FTP at that point in the war was obsessed with settling old scores and seizing as much private property as they could from despised ploutocrates.

“Louis, the FTP leader, ‘yessed’ us to death but when it came time to act, FTP participation was minimal or nonexistent,” Franklin remembered.

RAC and Alsop agreed that their little army’s next objective should be the liberation of Angoulême, a town some 85 kilometers northwest of Périgeaux that straddled a key roadway to the enemy’s coastal garrisons. As they eyeballed a map, RAC told Alsop that it would take several days by car for his brigade to circumnavigate all the German troops along the way. But RAC knew of some friendly chateaux fermes where they could bivouac enroute.

Early in their trek to Angoulême, ALEXANDER ran into the remnants of yet another Jedburgh team, MARK, at a country home. They learned that their friend and colleague, Lieutenant Lou Goddard of the MARK team, had been killed a few days earlier when his parachute’s static line had faltered.

Just outside Angoulême, Alsop ordered the ALEXANDER team’s car to slow down as they passed a chateau near the road. A bunch of armed FTP fighters were milling about, looking menacing. Alsop and Thouville asked for a briefing and were told that the owner of the chateau had collaborated with the enemy; they planned to execute him on the spot.

Alsop and Thouville started pressing the FTP guerillas to produce evidence that the owner was in league with the Germans. Whatever they cited must have been weak; after ALEXANDER began challenging them, the Communist guerillas “skedaddled,” Franklin recalled.  

The owner turned out to be Manouche, the Comte de Balincourt, a member of one of southwest France’s most prominent families. Had ALEXANDER not intervened, Manouche may well have been shot and his property confiscated. The grateful Manouche invited ALEXANDER to use his home as its base of operation for the assault on Angoulême.

Alsop and Thouville again ordered Franklin to stay at the house to protect the B-2. Off the two lieutenants went to help RAC plan and execute the attack. Soon enough, Franklin heard the retort of sharp gun- and mortar-fire. It sounded nasty, but in truth the Germans did not put up much of a fight before retiring toward the coast.

La Brigade du RAC benefited from a diabolical scheme that was apparently hatched in concert with clerics from the local abbey. Weeks earlier, a cache of weapons had been buried in Angoulême’s cemetery. The guns had been hidden in caskets and slipped past the Germans during funerals, then dug up by villagers when RAC’s guerillas were poised to attack. The cemetery weapons helped rout the enemy.

Thouville and Alsop watched, mesmerized, as a company of 300 Italian soldiers stationed on the periphery of town surrendered en masse, giving up all their weapons, including a coveted 20-millimeter cannon that RAC and his men could put to good use.

Manouche de Balincourt and Thouville became fast friends. For the entirety of ALEXANDER’s three-week stay in Dordogne, the Manouche made himself available to Thouville and company. He served as chauffeur, courier, chef, and scavenger, all the more remarkable since he spoke next-to-no English.

While they were bunking at the Manouche’s chateau, ALEXANDER finally received some acknowledgment from London – but it was in French, in response to a message Thouville had crafted. Their Jedburgh superiors conceded they didn’t have the “foggiest” notion as to ALEXANDER’s whereabouts or what they’d be up to – or that the team was no longer attached to BERGAMOTTE.

It flummoxed Alsop that London’s communications had been so slapdash. But once ALEXANDER figured out that there was a French speaker plugged into the other end of the radio, Alsop ordered all future messaging be done en Française. It worked – at least to a degree.

The Jedburgh high command continued to frustrate ALEXANDER; the team was incredulous that London was so sluggish in responding to their requests for additional arms and gasoline to be parachuted into Dordogne. But at least they were now getting some feedback. Since Franklin’s command of French still left something to be desired, Thouville often wrote out a script.  

Weeks later, when Alsop was recalled (briefly) to London, he had a heated confrontation with the British Jedburgh officer who was supposed to coordinating ALEXANDER’s radio liaison. Franklin claimed that Alsop threw a punch at the Brit, but details of the tête-à-tête do not appear in Alsop’s memoirs.

For the next few days, the only time Alsop, Thouville, and Franklin fired their weapons was while hunting for ducks along the River Charente, hoping that the Manouche’s kitchen staff would turn them into dinner. After they found an old double-barrel shotgun collecting dust on the Manouche’s estate, they hunted rabbits, which were plentiful on the grounds. They also watched with dismay how farmhands produced the French delicacy foi gras.

While they had some down time, one of RAC’s followers told Franklin that the Germans were so desperate – and twisted – that they had begun parachuting soldiers disguised as priests behind Allied lines in France. A group of faux clerics had been apprehended because they were wearing jackboots underneath their monastic robes, Franklin was told. Other camouflaged German paratroopers had been more effective in infiltrating Allied areas, RAC’s lieutenant claimed.

“None of it seemed a very likely story at the time,” Franklin wrote years later. “I thought the Maquis was spinning a yarn or seeing ghosts.” But that was just weeks before the depth of Nazi depravity was exposed in the Battle of the Bulge. In the bedlam of the Ardennes Forest, the Germans unleashed assassination squads dressed as American G.I.s that inflicted horrific casualties. Before he left Angoulême for good, the RAC member gave Franklin a German Lugar pistol that purportedly had been taken off one of the priest-paratroopers.

The Germans that had been stationed in the Angoulême area, meanwhile, had taken refuge in their big bases near the ports of Royan and La Rochelle. Keeping their distance, the RAC Brigade and Team ALEXANDER holed up in a small riverside chateau outside Saintes and recalibrated their strategy.

RAC’s next objective was to expel enemy soldiers and sycophants from the town of Cognac, roughly halfway to the sea from Dordogne Nord. He asked ALEXANDER to help him plan and execute the assault. Again, the Jed trio found a chateaux ferme outside town. Thouville and Alsop helped themselves to copious amounts of the famous brandy that bore the town’s name; Franklin, not surprisingly, refrained.

At one point, the locals treated them to 140-year-old cognac that had supposedly been served at Napoleon’s coronation. To be diplomatic, Franklin took a couple of sips and could barely keep it down. Thouville and Alsop, on the other hand, imbibed freely. No one got drunk, but there was much knee-slapping, Franklin remembered.

Since at that point they were using a car fueled by alcohol, the trio actually poured “cheap” cognac into the gas tank!

Thouville invited his younger brother, Philippe de la Tousche, nicknamed “Philou,” to join them along the Charente. Enemy surveillance had deteriorated so badly at that point that all Thouville had to do to contact his brother was pick up a telephone.

Philou had no trouble finding their hideout. He was slender and handsome, like his older brother, but had no military training. Philou, therefore, was of little use in ambushes or sabotage missions, so RAC and Alsop assigned him to be Franklin’s go-fer.

The enemy was dug in so deep in Royan and La Rochelle that any direct assault would be foolhardy, RAC concluded. For several days running, Alsop had Franklin and Thouville send urgent radio messages begging London to send gasoline, supplies, and weaponry to RAC and his Cognac-stationed warriors. But they received nothing, not even an explanation, Franklin remembered. By now, the Maquis had no shortage of Peugeots, Citroëns, and Renaults; what it lacked was gasoline.

The weather, moreover, was turning colder. ALEXANDER had arrived in France wearing summer uniforms; they needed overcoats and warmer clothing. If they couldn’t get supplies from London, they reasoned, maybe they could wangle them from the nearest Allied army.

So Touville and Alsop borrowed a Gazogene, a guide, and a couple of RAC’s men and traveled north of the Loire, dodging German patrols and Milliciens. After a couple of harrowing days, they bumped into the southwestern edge of the Allied advance from Normandy.

Wary G.I. sentries escorted Alsop and Thouville to their commanding officer. Their “strange” request was then relayed up the chain to a rear-echelon lieutenant colonel.

 Alsop, remembering his training as a King’s Royal Rifleman and momentarily forgetting that he was now in the U.S. Army, stamped his feet, stiffened his shoulders, brought the back of his right hand up to his forehead, and bellowed, “Lefftenant Alsop reporting, sir!”

Three decades later Alsop wrote in his delightfully piquant style, “The light colonel gave me a lynx-eyed look, taking in brother John’s ill-fitting and by this time bedraggled uniform. There had been reports of Germans being sent to France in imitation American unforms.”

“’Lootenant,’ he said, emphasizing the first syllable, ‘how come you got your bars the wrong way round?’”

“’Do I, sir? Sorry, sir,’ I said. What else was there to say?

“‘And how come you got your crossed rifles upside down?’

“’Sorry, sir,’ I said, nonplussed.

“The light colonel lifted his telephone and asked to speak to a counterintelligence unit.

“I had visions of being stood up against a wall, offered a last cigarette, and shot as a German spy.”

It took a few more calls, but counterintelligence confirmed Alsop’s bona fides as “one of those goddamn OSS screwballs!”

Despite the affirmation, Alsop and Thouville returned to Cognac empty-handed. It “violated policy,” they were told, for the U.S. Army to provide supplies or equipment to OSS commandos or Resistance cells without explicit authorization from above. The Army, moreover, didn’t have any extra winter clothing to share with Jed teams or Maquisards.

The lack of appropriate clothing would prove to be a significant factor in the slowdown of the Allies’ push into Germany, contributing to their struggles in the Battle of the Bulge that December and January. To stave off the cold, Franklin borrowed thick pants from a Frenchman and took to wearing multiple socks and a couple of shirts underneath his field jacket.

    *

Members of RAC’s brigade brought to ALEXANDER rumors about a German vengeance weapon that was supposedly being tested near the seaside town of Royan. The device was known as the V-4 or, Rheinbote missile, a potentially deadly antipersonnel weapon that upon detonation would kill troops while leaving buildings essentially intact – something of a non-nuclear precursor to the neutron bomb of two generations later.

RAC’s men had learned about the V-4 from Polish slave laborers who had escaped from an enemy base. Some of the Poles said they’d been forced to help the Germans run experiments with the weapon; they were worried it was getting close to deployment.

When Alsop and Thouville passed word of yet another Nazi Vergeltungswaffe terror weapon up the chain of command, they got the impression that Allied officials, then ducking V-1 and V-2 attacks in London, were unfamiliar with it. The bosses demanded verification, but it was virtually impossible for the RAC Brigade or ALEXANDER to infiltrate the German coastal defenses.

As an alternative, Allied intelligence wanted the leader of the Polish slave laborers interrogated in liberated Paris and ordered ALEXANDER to bring him there. The man spoke little to no French and no German or English whatsoever, so he had to be questioned by a Polish speaker. Which meant that in late October ALEXANDER had no choice but to undertake another perilous cross-country trek through parts of France still occupied by the enemy. They borrowed a civilian car from RAC’s fleet and pressed Thouville’s brother Philou into serving as driver.

A couple of weeks earlier when Alsop and Thouville had traveled north of the River Loire seeking supplies, they were told there were no passable bridges. They ended up cadging a ride across the river with a military ferry.

In the interim, however, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had performed a miracle. Bombed-out bridges had been restored and temporary spans erected to handle jeeps, trucks, and tanks. When ALEXANDER and company arrived on the southern bank of the Loire at Tours, they were waved onto a temporary structure. But when they reached the opposite side, military policemen ground them to a halt.

The group’s decidedly “un-G.I.” appearance rankled Army MPs. After all, Alsop and his men were wearing a mishmash of uniforms and civilian garb, were driving a bizarre-looking civilian vehicle, had two guys in their party who didn’t speak any English (one of whom was Polish, no less!), and lacked written orders or credentials.

“They suspected we were German spies, but, just in case, they were afraid to throw us in a stockade,” Franklin recalled.

Instead, ALEXANDER was told to hang out on the north bank of the Loire for a couple of days until the Army could verify their claims. Along with scores of other Allied military personnel, they checked into a hotel that turned out to have a first-rate restaurant, a development that delighted Alsop and Thouville, both of whom had gold coins and leftover francs burning holes in their pockets.

Alsop put Franklin in charge of the Pole while they cooled their heels in Tours. It was easy duty for the radioman; for the first time in years, the Pole was sleeping in a comfortable bed and eating decent food; he was hardly a flight risk! Still, Franklin slept in the same room and never let the Pole out of his sight.

It took two-and-a-half days to iron out the Army red tape, but ALEXANDER was finally told to continue their journey to Paris. Once they completed the 250-kilometer drive, they dropped off the Pole for his V-4 interrogation – and never saw him again. They had no idea of what came of his allegations or whether Allied intelligence ever acted on them.

To this day, the V-4 remains shrouded in mystery, the subject of wild conjecture. Some scholars question whether it ever got beyond the planning or testing stages; others claim the Germans attempted to deploy it against Allied infantry in the siege at Antwerp in late ’44.

Whatever the reality, the V-4 came nowhere close to inflicting the damage wrought by its infamous cousins, the V-1 and V-2.

  *

Dick Franklin fell in love with Paris during his extended stay in the war’s last fall and winter. He took in the can-can shows at Moulin Rouge, cultivated a taste for French cuisine, explored Rive Gauche and Montmartre (where he stayed in a flat), and most of the time didn’t need to worry about whether his radio was working.

In early November ‘44, OSS ordered Franklin to return to the Cognac area to bring the RAC Brigade and other Resistance fighters up to speed with the latest radio equipment. Philou Thouville agreed to transport Franklin southwest in a motorcycle with a sidecar. A few kilometers west of Versailles in a village called Trappe, the pair survived a violent collision with an Army truck.

Both were hospitalized; Philou with a broken leg, Franklin with head and internal injuries. It took several days for word of their infirmity to reach Alsop. He rushed to the hospital and was told the military had issued an incorrect cable to Franklin’s wife Susie saying that Franklin had been killed. It was almost impossible for a G.I. in France to send a telegram back home at that point in the war, but Alsop tapped his family connections and managed to convey this message to Susie: “DISREGARD PREVIOUS CABLE. FRANKLIN FOUND. NOT DEAD. ALSOP.”

Alas, Susie had not received the original cable, so Alsop’s telegram caused confusion and no small degree of anguish. Suspicious FBI agents knocked on Susie’s door, wondering what the coded word “ALSOP” meant. Since censorship rules prevented her husband from identifying his special ops boss by name in his letters, Susie had no idea where “ALSOP” came from. After a lengthy interrogation, the FBI concluded that Susie and her mysterious cohort did not represent a threat to national security.

Franklin recovered in mid-November. ALEXANDER was sent to maritime France for one final liaison mission with the Resistance. Outside the coastal village of Les Sable d’Olonne, they were thrilled to – finally! – witness an ALEXANDER-ordered supply drop hit the ground. The parachute drop included gasoline and weapons for the Maqui, as well as British Army Issue winter clothing. Franklin at last got the jacket and scarf he’d been requesting for weeks on end.

With most of the enemy racing for the border, the Jed trio’s shooting war was pretty much over as winter approached. Alsop was ordered to London in mid-fall ’44, where he assessed the Maquis’ strengths for his OSS/SOE/Jed superiors and (again?) may have tongue-lashed ALEXANDER’s communications liaison. He was then parachuted back into southwestern France for a short-lived reunion with RAC and other Resistance leaders. But by then most Maquis organizations were heavily armed and self-sufficient.

Alsop no longer needed to bounce from farmhouse to forest hideout providing a helping hand as he had that summer and early fall. Soon enough, he rejoined his team back in Paris; he and Franklin somehow managed to scare up a turkey to celebrate a belated Thanksgiving. After a couple more weeks counseling SHAEF on the efficacy of certain French Resistance cells and Jedburgh operations, Alsop flew back to London to continue his OSS duties.

*

Tish had suffered a miscarriage in late summer but Alsop’s brief visit to London that fall had resulted in a second pregnancy. The couple had already made plans for Tish to travel across the ocean solo, move in with Stewart’s sister and brother-in-law in the Georgetown neighborhood of Washington, D.C. The only member of the Alsop family that Tish had met at that point was Stewart’s younger brother John, while he was in training with the Jeds.

Still a teenager, Tish was uprooting herself to live in a strange land surrounded by strangers. It could not have been easy, even for someone of Tish’s moxie.

*

There were Maquis activities in the winter and spring of ’45 aimed at hounding the retreating Germans and making life miserable for the enemy troops still holed up at the U-boat pens and Kriegsmarine bases on France’s Atlantic coast. But most Jeds were sent to the sidelines, recalled to Britain, or dispatched to the Pacific or Chinese-Burma-India theaters, among them John Alsop.

An exception was Richard Thouville. Thouville reentered the French Army in early ’45 but was sent back to the heartland to continue working with RAC. He stayed with RAC’s brigade almost until V-E Day in May of ’45 and continued to serve in the French Army after the war. He returned to his wife and children and stayed in touch with Alsop and Franklin over the years, exchanging letters and attending Jedburgh reunions in Europe and the U.S.

Franklin was recruited that winter by a special ops group examining the feasibility of sending paratroopers into Nazi-held territories to rescue Allied prisoners-of-war. There was great fear that POWs would be summarily executed as the Wehrmacht disintegrated and Allied troops penetrated deeper into the Reich. But Franklin and other convinced the brass that POW rescue missions – from the air – stood little chance of success. As it turned out, relatively few Allied prisoners were murdered in cold blood.

Eventually, Franklin returned to New Jersey and sought to take advantage of his expertise in intelligence and communications. In the 1950s, he accepted an offer to join the Central Intelligence Agency and stayed with the agency for the bulk of his career.

*

The pregnant Tish boarded a jam-packed freighter to travel across the Atlantic. It took her 19 days before the boat steamed past the Statue of Liberty. The Army and OSS acceded to Alsop’s request to join his wife in the States. Two weeks after Tish’s departure, Alsop got a berth on the Queen Elizabeth. Soon they were reunited, at first in New England, then in D.C.

As the decades went by, the Commandant Americain was good about staying in touch with his old KRRC and Jedburgh mates. In 1955, the Royal Couple attended a reception to honor the KRRC; Stewart and Tish traveled to London for the occasion and had their pictures taken with Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip. Five years later, there was a New York reunion of the American, Canadian, and British KRRC alums. George Thomson, Ted Ellsworth, and Tom Braden all joined Alsop in a night of storytelling and merriment. There was also at least one trip to France to retrace ALEXANDER’s steps with the RAC Brigade.

In July of 1971, Alsop was taking out the trash at his country home in Maryland when he suddenly felt tired and nauseous. He sensed something was wrong and found himself muttering the same phrase he used 27 years earlier when he prematurely bailed out of a British warplane over Occupied France: “Face it, Alsop. You’re in trouble.”

He was. Alsop had contracted acute myeloblastic leukemia, a rare cancer of the blood‐producing marrow. After a three-year battle that produced a poignant memoir, Stay of Execution, Alsop succumbed. A few weeks earlier he had written, “A dying man needs to die as a sleepy man needs to sleep, and there comes a time when it is wrong, as well as useless, to resist.”

He was tragically young – barely 60 when the end came. At the time of his diagnosis, the two youngest of his six children were only four and 11. Tish was widowed at the tender age of 48.

Stewart Alsop remains, a half-century after his passing, a pivotal figure in postwar American journalism and foreign policy. Together with his older brother (and fellow columnist) Joe, he helped forge the Georgetown Set, the elite cadre of Washington opinion leaders who sought to reverse America’s traditional isolationism and harden the country’s resolve to wage and win the Cold War.

For good or ill, the Alsop brothers and their vaunted (and often feared) Sunday night dinner/salons with Cabinet officers, Members of Congress, and presidential wannabes shaped U.S. national security policy for two generations. Tish often served as a hostess at these gatherings, usually at her brother-in-law’s Georgetown townhouse.

The Alsop brothers were writing partners from 1945 to 1957; at its zenith, their column, “Matter of Fact,” appeared in nearly 150 U.S. newspapers. Twice awarded the Overseas Press Club medal for international reporting, the Alsops had a hard-and-fast rule: never to write about a country unless they had personally visited and gotten to know its leaders.

After he broke away from his brother, Stewart Alsop’s columns for the Saturday Evening Post and later his back-of-the-magazine essays for Newsweek were among the era’s most influential commentaries. Unlike his sibling, whose hardline views became increasingly shrill and combative, Stewart addressed weighty matters in a nuanced and almost wistful tone. He abhorred heated rhetoric and ideological rigidity, whether it came from the left or right.

When 1968’s Tet offensive exposed the frailty of America’s policy in Vietnam, Stewart eventually joined Walter Cronkite and other pundits in urging an end to U.S. combat involvement, pointing out the futility of sustaining an unpopular and ineffectual war. In contrast, the elder Alsop doubled down on his conviction that victory in Southeast Asia was just around the corner – bluster that, five-plus decades later, still clouds Joe’s legacy.

Throughout their careers, both brothers remained intimately connected to the intelligence communities of the U.S. and its allies – perhaps too intimately.

Five years before his death, Stewart Alsop wrote a piece for Newsweek entitled, “Yale Revisited.” In it, he deplored the contempt with which many college-age people treated the U.S. military and other institutions. But he also volunteered: “There's something going on here our generation will never understand.”

The “fraudulent” military draft system, he argued, coupled with the deceit that undercut our presence in Vietnam, had convinced certain young people that the American system was “a gigantic fraud.” Many journalists of Alsop’s era, including his own brother, were incapable of acknowledging such uncomfortable truths.

Tish, the onetime decoding specialist, had to endure a lifetime of Alsop-ian intrigue that permeated her homes in Georgetown, Cleveland Park, and backwoods Maryland. Her daughter Elizabeth, now a noted children’s author, chronicled her bumpy childhood and her mother’s struggles with depression and substance abuse in Daughter of Spies.

Tish Hankey Alsop lived for nearly four decades after Stewart passed. She died in 2012, the mother of six, grandmother of 15, now a great-grandmother many times over. It had been 70 years since she sparked their romance by telling her future husband that his military haircut made him look like a criminal.

In the final pages of Stay of Execution Alsop wrote of his OSS heroics, “There were a few moments of fear, exhaustion, and even some danger, but for the most part those weeks in the Maquis were a lot of fun – in some ways the best fun I’ve had in my life.”

He recalled that a few weeks after he returned to the U.S. in 1945, he got a package in the mail postmarked Paris. It turned out to be a “handsome scroll” awarding him a Croix de Guerre avec Palme, Signé, Charles de Gaulle.

His old pal Thouville had written the citation: “S’est trouvé de nombreuses fois dans les situations les plus périleuses d’où il s’est toujours sorte avec une calme edifant et une volunté galvanisante les énérgies de tous ceux qui l’entourait.”

“I cannot boast that my calm is edifying nor my will galvanizing, but my situation is undoubtedly again a bit perilous,” Alsop wrote in his self-effacing way as the end approached.

“I came out of that peculiar experience all in one piece, and maybe I will again. Even if my stay of execution turns out to be a short one, I have reason to be grateful, for a happy marriage and a reasonably long, amusing, and interesting life.”

                                                                    # # #

Timothy M. Gay is the Pulitzer-nominated author of two books on World War II, two books on baseball history, and a recent biography of golfer Rory McIlroy. He has written previous WWII-related articles for the Daily Beast, USA Today, and many other publications.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

Who does not enjoy a good spy story? The Civil War, though fought on American soil, was also waged in drawing rooms, chancelleries, and counting houses across Europe. In that shadow war, few figures were more important—or more obscure—than Henry Shelton Sanford.

Lloyd W Klein explains.

Henry Shelton Sanford.

Sanford was not the kind of man one would cast as a master spy. He did not resemble the polished, worldly intelligence officer of fiction. That was precisely why he was effective. Born in Connecticut to a prosperous family whose wealth came from manufacturing brass tacks, Sanford grew up comfortably connected. One of his ancestors had served as governor of the state. He attended Trinity College and studied in Germany, though he never graduated from either. What he lacked in formal credentials he made up for in money, mobility, and social access.

At just twenty-four, Sanford entered diplomacy, appointed secretary to the American legation in St. Petersburg in 1847. A year later he moved to Frankfurt, and in 1849 to Paris, where he remained for five years, eventually rising to chargé d’affaires. In 1861 Abraham Lincoln named him minister to Belgium. His official portfolio included trade agreements, naturalization treaties, and consular arrangements such as the Scheldt Treaties of 1863, which governed customs duties and navigation rights on one of Europe’s most important commercial waterways. But Sanford’s formal responsibilities were the least important part of his job. His real assignment was counterespionage.

What made Sanford valuable was not diplomacy but deniability. He was wealthy enough not to require a salary, socially connected enough to travel freely without raising suspicion, and unburdened by the technical minutiae that tied other diplomats to their desks. Like many ministers of the era, he was assumed to be a gentleman abroad—sightseeing, attending receptions, and occasionally reporting home. That assumption was his camouflage

In reality, Sanford was one of the principal architects of the Union’s covert war in Europe. Secretary of State William H. Seward entrusted him with authority far exceeding his nominal rank. Sanford was permitted to travel freely across the Continent and into Britain. He was given access to a secret fund of roughly one million dollars—a staggering sum at the time—to finance intelligence gathering, influence, and interference. His mission was straightforward to describe and extraordinarily difficult to execute: prevent the Confederacy from acquiring ships, weapons, credit, and diplomatic recognition.

Jefferson Davis and his government understood that they could not prevail in a prolonged war without foreign assistance. The American Revolution provided the model: French intervention had transformed rebellion into victory. Confederate leaders hoped Britain or France might play a similar role in 1862. Short of recognition, they needed rifles, cannon, powder, ships, and financing—resources Europe could supply in abundance if the Union blockade could be breached.

Seward and Charles Francis Adams, the American minister in London, formed the official diplomatic front. Sanford was tasked with the unacknowledged work behind it. From Brussels, Paris, and London, he assembled a private intelligence service. In Britain, he employed a police detective who ran operatives in major ports and industrial centers. Shipyards, foundries, arms manufacturers, insurers, and brokers were watched closely for signs of Confederate activity.

Identifying Confederate agents was rarely difficult. They were Americans from the seceded states, often with unmistakable accents and known loyalties. Some were serving Confederate officers; others were businessmen acting as intermediaries. The challenge was not knowing who they were, but discovering what they were doing.

In a world without telephones or secure communications, conspiracies traveled on paper and wire. Letters moved through the post. Contracts were telegraphed. Shipping instructions passed between offices and ports. Sanford targeted all of it.

 

How Sanford Operated

Sanford’s agents bribed postal workers to copy or intercept Confederate correspondence. Telegraph clerks were paid to divert or decode messages. Clerks inside factories and shipyards were induced to hand over specifications, contracts, and delivery schedules. Couriers carried intelligence between Belgium, France, and Britain. At times, Sanford simply “borrowed” Confederate letters long enough to read them before returning them to circulation.

Through business contacts, he tracked cotton shipments, arms purchases, and financial transactions. When necessary, he quietly pressured European firms not to deal with the South. The aim was not dramatic disruption but steady suffocation.

Two Confederate operatives were of particular importance: Caleb Huse and James D. Bulloch. Huse, a West Point–trained officer and former chemistry instructor, served as the Confederacy’s principal arms buyer. Operating across Britain, Austria, Prussia, and beyond, he negotiated most of the weapons contracts that eventually supplied Southern armies. Bulloch oversaw naval procurement, including the construction of commerce raiders in British shipyards. One of them—the Alabama—would devastate U.S. merchant shipping before being sunk off Cherbourg.

Sanford tracked both men closely. He fed intelligence to Adams in London, worked to delay or derail their transactions, and ensured that Washington knew when ships were likely to sail. When formal channels failed, less formal methods were sometimes employed. As Sanford joked to Seward in one letter, “accidents are numerous in the [English] Channel, you know.”

 

Influence and the Press

Recognition of the Confederate government before 1863 was a central Southern objective. Envoys James Mason and John Slidell were dispatched to Britain and France, though their capture during the Trent Affair nearly triggered war. While Queen Victoria was personally hostile to a slaveholding republic, British politics were complicated. Liverpool merchants depended on Southern cotton. William Gladstone spoke sympathetically of Southern independence. French policy remained opportunistic.

Seward responded with another weapon: influence. His instrument was Thurlow Weed, a veteran political operative, newspaper man, and longtime ally. Weed held no diplomatic title—by design. He could move through London and Paris as a private citizen, cultivating editors, financiers, and politicians while quietly countering Confederate propaganda.

Weed arrived in Europe in late 1861. He subsidized friendly journalists, planted pro-Union stories, hosted salons and dinners, and gathered intelligence—especially regarding Confederate shipbuilding. Like Sanford, he carried funds and used them where persuasion alone was insufficient. If questioned, Seward could plausibly deny everything. Weed was merely a tourist. Sanford was merely a minister in Brussels. Adams remained the sole visible face of American diplomacy.

Sanford’s influence operations extended far beyond Britain. By 1862 his network reached Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the German states. Journalists and editors were quietly supported to produce Union-friendly coverage. Articles prepared in Washington circulated abroad as “news.” When Confederate agents planted stories of their own, Sanford’s operatives countered them with rebuttals, leaks, or alternative narratives.

Clergy were targeted as well. American ministers appealed to European priests and pastors, urging them not to grant moral legitimacy to a slaveholding republic. In Britain, Sanford’s agents worked through labor organizations, emphasizing free labor and the degradation of chattel slavery. Antislavery demonstrations were sometimes organized to appear spontaneous. On this terrain, the Confederacy was especially vulnerable.

 

None of this resembled conventional diplomacy. By any reasonable standard, Sanford violated the norms of neutrality. Had Belgium chosen to protest, it would have been within its rights to demand his recall.

 

How Secret Was It?

Weed’s presence in Europe was unofficial; he did not hold a diplomatic title. If questioned, Seward could assert that Weed was merely a private citizen traveling abroad. However, in truth, Weed operated with the backing of the State Department, private funds, and political directives, rendering him a covert envoy in all but name. His role was designed to be deniable, which was the intention: Adams could maintain a legitimate front as the 'official' representative of U.S. diplomacy, while Weed undertook the clandestine tasks of influence and propaganda.

Thurlow Weed.

Other Covert Operations

Sanford’s network extended far beyond Britain. By 1862 it reached into Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the German states. Intelligence gathering was only one part of the enterprise. The more ambitious—and more dangerous—arm of his campaign was an organized effort to shape European public opinion.

Sanford poured money into the press. Journalists and editors were quietly subsidized to produce stories favorable to the Union. At one point he even attempted to purchase a Belgian newspaper outright. Articles prepared in Washington were circulated abroad as “news.” When Confederate agents planted stories of their own, Sanford’s people countered them with rebuttals, leaks, or alternative narratives.

Clergy were targeted as well. American ministers were sent to Europe to appeal to priests and pastors, urging them not to lend moral legitimacy to a slaveholding republic. In Britain, Sanford’s agents worked through labor organizations, emphasizing the dignity of free labor and the degradation of chattel slavery. Antislavery demonstrations were sometimes organized to appear spontaneous. On this ground the Confederacy was especially vulnerable: however much cotton mattered, slavery repelled too many Europeans for Southern diplomacy to overcome.

None of this resembled conventional diplomacy. When France had attempted similar manipulation of American politics during the 1790s, it had triggered the Genet Affair and nearly wrecked relations between Paris and Washington. By any reasonable standard, Sanford was violating the norms of neutrality and the limits placed on foreign ministers. Had Belgium chosen to protest, it would have been within its rights to demand his recall.

As the Union’s military position deteriorated after the failed Peninsula Campaign, Seward feared that Britain and France might push for mediation—an outcome that would have legitimized Confederate independence. Thurlow Weed was therefore sent back across the Atlantic. His mission was to stiffen Adams’s hand by quietly lobbying elites, feeding sympathetic journalists, and using money and charm to blunt Southern influence. Weed reported that European opinion was deeply divided, and that Confederate agents were tireless in their efforts. That only confirmed the necessity of the counteroffensive Sanford was running.

 

What did President Lincoln Know About All of This?

Sanford was not a rogue operator. He worked with the knowledge of Adams and under the direction of Seward. The remaining question is how far that knowledge extended.

A letter from Sanford to Seward, dated July 4, 1861, provides an unambiguous answer. It survives in the Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.

From Henry S. Sanford to William H. Seward, July 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln papers, Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/resource/mal.1064500.

“I hope you will act on the suggestion contained in the accompanying letter to get Congress to provide you a larger Secret Service Fund.

I am determined, if it is possible, to get at the operations of these [Confederate] “commissioners” through their own papers, and the man specially occupied with that knows his business. How it will be done whether through a pretty mistress or an intelligent servant or a spying landlord is nobody’s business; but I lay great stress on getting you full official accounts of their operations here!

It will be expensive. Your £600 will not last long if this is continued for a considerable period, but I count on your increasing it as wanted.

I intend on putting an agent or two on my own account on their fellow in Paris. The official agents don’t do all I ask them to and the Chef de Police1 has promised me one of their retired agents in the political department who shall be in relations with the office but not accountable to them for what I set him at.

If you do not approve my way of proceeding tell me so frankly. I go on the doctrine that in war as in love, everything is fair that will lead to success!.”

 

This was not ambiguous. Sanford was telling the Secretary of State that he intended to use bribery, infiltration, mail theft, and sexual entrapment to penetrate Confederate operations—and that it would be expensive.

Sanford was explicitly proposing bribery, infiltration, mail theft, and sexual entrapment—and requesting additional funds to do so. Seward did not object.

Through foreign nationals, Sanford intercepted correspondence, diverted contracts, identified shipbuilders, and occasionally sabotaged vessels. These acts were illegal under local law. Sanford enjoyed diplomatic immunity; his agents did not. Corruption was intrinsic to the system.

“Sexpionage,” as later generations would call it, was hardly novel. The Civil War had its own female operatives—Rose Greenhow, Belle Boyd, Ginnie Moon—who used intimacy to extract secrets. Sanford’s casual reference to “a pretty mistress” shows he understood the same tools were available to him.

 

Implications

There is substantial evidence indicating that the United States Government engaged in covert counterespionage through a network involving bribery, as well as mail and wire fraud, utilizing foreign operatives during the Civil War. Secretary of State William H. Seward, likely with the knowledge of President Lincoln, oversaw an intelligence and covert operation in Europe. His operations were conducted through individuals such as Thurlow Weed, Charles Francis Adams, and Henry Shelton Sanford, who served as the U.S. minister to Belgium. Sanford, in particular, was responsible for managing secret surveillance, courier networks, and propaganda efforts aimed at undermining Confederate diplomacy and arms procurement in Europe. 21st Century readers are likely not particularly surprised to learn this.

Had Sanford’s network been exposed, the diplomatic consequences could have been severe. Britain and France maintained official neutrality; revelations of U.S. interference with correspondence, commerce, or the press could have triggered expulsions or demands for recall. Belgium, whose neutrality required delicate balance, might have objected strongly to its territory being used for clandestine operations.

Yet the Confederacy was engaged in its own covert diplomacy and arms procurement. Had Sanford’s actions been revealed, Washington would have argued—credibly—that it was countering Southern subversion. The risk was real, but the calculation proved correct.

If European governments were to uncover U.S. interference with private or diplomatic correspondence, it would be regarded as a significant violation of sovereignty. This could have led to the expulsion of U.S. diplomats (or at the very least, Sanford himself).

Both Britain and France maintained official neutrality. Following the Trent Affair, U.S. diplomacy was cast into doubt. Should Sanford’s bribery, espionage against Confederate agents, and the use of press propaganda have been exposed, London and Paris might have charged the U.S. with breaching their neutrality. This could have jeopardized Adams’ meticulous diplomacy in London, potentially increasing the likelihood of recognizing the Confederacy. Sanford’s host nation might have objected to the use of its territory for clandestine operations.

The damage to the Union’s moral standing could have been catastrophic for global opinion. The Lincoln administration framed the war as a moral battle against slavery and insurrection. If it were revealed that the U.S. was conducting covert influence operations—such as planting articles in newspapers, financing agents, or surveilling Confederate sympathizers—it could have undermined that moral assertion, portraying the Union as Machiavellian rather than principled. There would have been a significant risk to U.S. agents and sympathizers operating overseas. If Sanford’s informants and intermediaries were to be exposed, they could have faced arrest or expulsion. This situation would have severely hindered the U.S. capacity to monitor Confederate arms acquisitions and blockade runners.

Consequently, the immediate repercussions would have included diplomatic embarrassment and a potential loss of influence in Europe. Should the Confederates’ situation have improved, it is uncertain whether Britain’s political stance might have shifted. They were undertaking a considerable risk, and it ultimately proved beneficial.

Following the war, Union leaders minimized or overlooked Sanford’s covert involvement. The official narrative highlighted Lincoln’s moral clarity and Adams’ diplomatic resolve, rather than the obscure tactics that underpinned them. Thus, the justification was both practical at the time and discreetly suppressed afterward to maintain the Union’s image as a principled power.

 

Conclusion

Henry Shelton Sanford never commanded an army and never signed a famous treaty. His war was fought in post offices, telegraph rooms, shipyards, and newspaper offices. Through bribery, surveillance, and influence, he helped deny the Confederacy the foreign support it desperately needed. Had his activities been exposed, they might have damaged the Union’s standing abroad. That they remained secret helped preserve it.

 

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References

Primary and secondary on Henry Shelton Sanford’s covert operations, Seward’s diplomacy, and Union intelligence in Europe:

Primary Sources

  • Sanford, Henry Shelton. Papers of Henry Shelton Sanford, 1841–1891. Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
    – Contains his dispatches from Brussels, including reports on Confederate activities and his covert countermeasures.

  • U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (Annual volumes, esp. 1861–1865).
    – Includes Sanford’s and Adams’ correspondence with Seward; you can see how carefully they worded reports to obscure covert activities.

  • Charles Francis Adams. The Memoirs of Charles Francis Adams, 1835–1917.
    – Adams reflects on his role in Britain and occasionally mentions the behind-the-scenes pressures, though cautiously.

Secondary Works

  • Jones, Howard. Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
    – Excellent overview of both Union and Confederate diplomacy; details Sanford’s activities in Belgium and the broader intelligence struggle.

  • Merrill, Walter M. Seward and the Balance of Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967.
    – Classic study of Seward’s statecraft, including his reliance on shadow diplomacy and intelligence gathering.

  • Thomas, Benjamin P. & Hyman, Harold M. Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln’s Secretary of War. New York: Knopf, 1962.
    – While focused on Stanton, it provides context on the Union’s broader intelligence operations, including coordination with diplomats like Sanford.

  • Hubbell, John T. “The Northern Response to Confederate Diplomacy: The Sanford Missions.” Civil War History 13, no. 3 (1967): 201–218.
    – A focused scholarly article on Sanford’s specific covert operations in Belgium.

  • Ferris, Norman B. Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward’s Foreign Policy, 1861. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976.
    – Analyzes Seward’s readiness to bend norms and how he used covert measures to protect the Union from recognition crises.

  • Elliott, Mark R. Color-Blind Justice: Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality from the Civil War to Plessy v. Ferguson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
    – Though focused on Tourgée, it briefly discusses Union propaganda abroad and its tension with the Union’s moral message.

  • Klein, Lloyd W. George Alfred Trenholm. https://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/tag/George+Alfred+Trenholm

 

References for Weed’s Missions

·       Glyndon Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby (1947) — detailed account of his European missions.

·       Howard Jones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy (2010) — situates Weed’s role in the broader Union diplomatic and covert strategy.

·       Norman B. Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward’s Foreign Policy, 1861 (1976) — covers Weed’s involvement during the Trent Affair.

·       U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (1861–62) — includes indirect references to Weed’s activities, though sanitized.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

William Speakman stands as one of the most striking examples of individual courage in the Korean War, a conflict often overshadowed by the Second World War and the later trauma of Vietnam, yet one that produced acts of gallantry no less extraordinary. His Victoria Cross was earned during the bitter fighting of the Second Battle of Maryang-san in November 1951, when United Nations forces were locked in a relentless struggle against repeated and determined assaults by Chinese troops. Speakman's actions—charging forward under heavy fire with his pockets stuffed full of grenades—were not only physically daring but psychologically decisive, galvanizing exhausted comrades at a moment when pressure, cold, and fear threatened to overwhelm them.

Terry Bailey explains.

William Speakman-Pitt, Victoria Cross.

Born in 1927 in Altrincham, Cheshire, William Speakman grew up in a Britain shaped by economic hardship and looming global instability. His early life was unremarkable in the way that many working-class childhoods of the interwar years were, marked by austerity, discipline, and the formative experience of the Second World War on the home front. Air raids, rationing, and the omnipresence of uniformed men left a deep impression on an entire generation, instilling both resilience and a familiarity with sacrifice. Nothing in Speakman's youth suggested that he would one day perform an act of heroism that would be recognized at the highest level, yet his background fostered the quiet toughness and sense of duty that later defined his conduct.

In the post-war years, as Britain struggled to redefine itself amid imperial decline and economic strain, military service remained a steady path for many young men. Speakman enlisted in the army and joined the King's Own Scottish Borderers, a regiment with a long and distinguished history. For Speakman, as for countless others, the army offered structure, camaraderie, and purpose. By the time he was deployed to the Far East, he was a private soldier rather than an officer or senior non-commissioned leader, a fact that would later make his actions all the more remarkable. His courage was not the product of rank or expectation, but of individual resolve under extreme circumstances.

The Korean War began in June 1950 when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and launched a surprise invasion of South Korea. The rapid collapse of South Korean defenses prompted a United Nations response, spearheaded by the United States but supported by forces from across the Commonwealth and beyond. British troops, including the King's Own Scottish Borderers, soon found themselves fighting in a conflict that was as politically complex as it was militarily brutal. The initial phase of the war was highly mobile, with dramatic advances and retreats, but this fluidity changed dramatically following the intervention of Chinese "People's Volunteer Army" forces late in 1950.

The Chinese entry transformed the war. Mass infantry attacks, often conducted at night and supported by mortars and bugle calls, pushed UN forces back and shattered any illusion of a quick victory. By 1951 the conflict had settled into a grinding stalemate, with both sides contesting rugged hills and ridgelines across central Korea. These features, often barren, steep, and exposed, dominated the surrounding terrain and supply routes, making them tactically invaluable and fiercely contested. Battles were fought not for sweeping territorial gains, but for individual hills whose names were often little more than map references, yet whose possession could decide the fate of an entire sector.

The Second Battle of Maryang-san formed part of this wider struggle for dominance in the hills north of the Imjin River. Maryang-san was not a single peak but a complex of interconnected heights, heavily fortified by Chinese troops who had dug deep defensive positions into the rocky ground. The King's Own Scottish Borderers were tasked with holding these positions against determined counterattacks once they had been taken. The conditions were appalling: freezing temperatures sapped strength and concentration, while constant shelling and small-arms fire left little opportunity for rest. Sleep was scarce, nerves were frayed, and the line between endurance and collapse grew increasingly thin.

On the 4th of November 1951, Chinese forces launched a renewed assault against positions held by Speakman's platoon. Attacking in strength and using the cover of broken ground, they pressed forward with the clear intention of overwhelming the defenders. It was during this critical moment that William Speakman's extraordinary courage came to the fore. Recognizing that the attackers were closing in and that defensive fire alone might not be enough, Speakman volunteered to carry grenades forward to the most threatened areas. Stuffing his pockets with as many grenades as he could carry, he moved out into the open, fully exposed to enemy fire.

From forward positions, Speakman hurled grenade after grenade into the advancing Chinese troops, disrupting their formations and forcing them to take cover. Each throw required him to stand, aim, and expose himself anew to small-arms and mortar fire. The physical danger was immense, but so too was the psychological strain. Yet Speakman persisted, returning to resupply and then advancing again as the pressure mounted. His actions bought precious time for his platoon, blunting the momentum of the attack at a moment when it threatened to break through.

What truly set Speakman apart was not a single moment of reckless bravery, but his repeated willingness to do it again. When another Chinese attack developed from a different direction, he once more filled his pockets with grenades and advanced alone. Again he pelted the enemy at close range, his conspicuous courage visible to all around him. Inspired by his example, other soldiers followed him forward, strengthening the defense and restoring confidence along the line. In an environment where fear and exhaustion could so easily paralyze action, Speakman's initiative transformed the psychological balance of the fight.

The official citation for William Speakman's Victoria Cross captured both the physical and moral dimensions of his conduct. It highlighted not only his gallantry under fire, but also the inspirational effect his actions had on those around him. He had no obligation, by rank or formal responsibility, to expose himself in this way, yet he did so repeatedly and deliberately, fully aware of the danger. His behavior embodied the traditional ideals of the Victoria Cross: "most conspicuous bravery" and "self-sacrifice in the presence of the enemy." In the attritional warfare of Korea, where heroism often went unseen amid artillery barrages and night fighting, Speakman's actions stood out with rare clarity.

Following the war, William Speakman returned to civilian life and later adopted the surname Speakman-Pitt. Like many veterans of Korea, he carried his experiences quietly, rarely seeking public attention despite the prestige of his award. He remained closely associated with his regiment and was deeply respected within military and veterans' communities, attending commemorative events and maintaining strong bonds with former comrades. Those who knew him often remarked on his modesty and reluctance to dwell on his own heroism, a trait shared by many recipients of the Victoria Cross.

William Speakman died in 2018, closing a life that spanned post-war Britain and one of the Cold War's most intense and unforgiving conflicts. His Victoria Cross action at Maryang-san remains inseparable from the broader story of the Korean War—a war defined by harsh terrain, extreme weather, and ferocious close-quarter fighting. Yet within that wider struggle, his courage retains a distinct clarity. Armed with little more than grenades and determination, a private soldier repeatedly stepped forward when it mattered most, turning the tide of a desperate moment and inspiring others to do the same. His story endures not simply as a tale of bravery, but as a powerful reminder that leadership and resolve can emerge from any rank when circumstances demand it.

In the final reckoning, William Speakman's story illuminates both the character of the Korean War and the enduring nature of individual courage within it. His actions at Maryang-san were not isolated feats of daring divorced from their context, but a direct response to the brutal realities of hill fighting, exhaustion, and relentless enemy pressure. In a war often reduced to statistics, diplomatic stalemate, or vague Cold War abstraction, Speakman's conduct restores the human dimension: the moment when one soldier's resolve arrests collapse, steadies frightened men, and transforms desperation into resistance. His bravery demonstrates how, even in industrialized modern warfare, the outcome of a fight can hinge on personal initiative and moral courage.

Speakman's Victoria Cross also challenges narrow assumptions about leadership and heroism. He was neither an officer issuing orders nor a seasoned veteran shaped by years of combat command, but a private soldier who recognized what the situation demanded and acted without hesitation. His leadership was instinctive rather than institutional, emerging from character rather than rank. In this sense, his actions reflect the highest traditions of the British Army and the Commonwealth forces in Korea, where cohesion, mutual trust, and example often mattered more than formal authority. The inspirational effect of his conduct, men following him forward under fire, underscores how courage can be contagious when visibly demonstrated.

Beyond the battlefield, Speakman's quiet post-war life reinforces the distinction between heroism performed and heroism advertised. Like many veterans of Korea, he returned to a society that largely moved on, carrying memories of extreme violence and hardship without public recognition commensurate with their sacrifice. That Speakman bore his fame with humility only deepens the significance of his achievement, aligning personal modesty with extraordinary public honor. His life serves as a reminder that the Victoria Cross does not celebrate aggression or glory, but selflessness under the most severe conditions imaginable.

Ultimately, William Speakman's legacy endures as both a personal testament and a wider historical symbol. His courage at Maryang-san encapsulates the intensity of the Korean War and the often-overlooked sacrifices of those who fought it. More enduring still is the lesson embedded in his story: that in moments of crisis, when fear, fatigue, and uncertainty converge, the actions of a single individual can shape events far beyond their immediate reach. In remembering Speakman, we are reminded that heroism is not confined to grand strategy or famous names, but can arise, with devastating clarity, from the determination of one soldier who refuses to yield.

 

The site has been offering a wide variety of high-quality, free history content since 2012. If you’d like to say ‘thank you’ and help us with site running costs, please consider donating here.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

In the winter of 1835, two US states (one a territory, actually) almost went to war over the city of Toledo, Ohio.

The Toledo War of 1835-36 was a bizarre and largely forgotten footnote of American history over control of the ‘Toledo Strip,’ a 468 square mile band of land between the borders of the state of Ohio and the then Michigan Territory.

Randy Griffin explains.

Former Ohio governor and US Surveyor General Edward Tiffin.

Where is Lake Michigan?

What was to become known as the Toledo War had its beginnings before the country itself.

In 1787, the Congress of the Confederation (the legislative body created from the Articles of Confederation that governed from March 1, 1781, to March 3, 1789) enacted the Northwest Ordinance.

The Northwest Ordinance specified that the Northwest Territory, the 260,000 square miles surrounding the Great Lakes, would be divided into ‘not less than three nor more than five’ states, with one of the boundaries being ‘an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan.’

The Enabling Act of 1802 gave Ohio permission to begin the process of statehood, stating that the border of the new state would be ‘an east and west line drawn through the southerly extreme of Lake Michigan, running east...until it shall intersect Lake Erie or the territorial line [with British North America], and thence with the same through Lake Erie to the Pennsylvania line aforesaid.’

Surveyor John Mitchell’s map, called the ‘Mitchell Map,’ considered the best map of the time, showed the southern extreme of Lake Michigan north of the mouth of the Detroit River. By mistakenly placing Lake Michigan’s southern tip several miles north of its true location, the Mitchell Map made it seem like the east-west line would not meet Lake Erie at all, the original border placed at the mouth of the Manumee River and Toledo in northern Ohio rather than in southern Michigan Territory.

When Ohio drew up its constitution of 1802, it was with the assumption that Congress intended that the northern Ohio boundary would be north of the Maumee River, maybe even the Detroit River. Ohio claimed most of the shoreline west of Pennsylvania, leaving future states with access to only Lakes Michigan, Huron, or Superior.

All well and good for Ohio. But when a fur trapper (whose name is lost to history) reported that Lake Michigan actually lay significantly further south than believed, Ohio delegates realized they might not only lose out on prime shore front, but could be denied the entire shoreline west of Pennsylvania.

With this in mind, the constitutional delegates hedged their bet, inserting a provision into the Ohio constitution that if the fur trapper was correct, the state’s boundary line would be adjusted to meet with Lake Erie at the ‘most northerly cape of the Miami [Maumee] Bay,’ guaranteeing that most of the southern shore of Lake Erie west of Pennsylvania would go to Ohio.

The draft constitution was sent to Congress and referred to a committee, where politicians do what politicians best (namely, kick the can down then road) deciding that since the exact whereabouts of Lake Michigan were yet to be determined the members ‘thought it unnecessary to take it [the provision], at the time, into consideration,’ and on March 1, 1803 Ohio became the 17th state, the first formed from the Northwest Ordnance.

In 1805, Congress created the Michigan Territory, again using the Northwest Ordinance’s definition to define the territory’s southern boundary, ambiguity and all. And although the Ohio legislature spent the early part of the 19th century repeatedly asking Congress to resolve the issue, differences with Ohio’s border version went unresolved for 30 years.

In 1812, Congress finally got around to approving a survey, but the War of 1812 delayed it. Only after the admission of Indiana in 1816 was the survey started. The results led Congress to move the border between the Michigan Territory and Indiana ten miles north to give Indiana access to Lake Michigan.

Former Ohio governor and US Surveyor General Edward Tiffin tapped William Harris to perform another survey, one that didn’t use the Northwest Ordinance line but the one specified in the Ohio constitution.

When the results of the Harris survey, which obviously favored Ohio’s claims, was made public, Michigan Territory Governor Cass cried foul, saying the survey favored Ohio and that it ‘is only adding strength to the strong, and making the weak still weaker.’

Of course, the Michigan Territory commissioned its own survey, led by John A. Fulton, one based on the Northwest Ordinance Line. His survey found the boundary ending just southeast of the Maumee River.

This discrepancy between the Harris and Fulton survey lines was eight miles apart at Lake Erie and five miles apart at the Indiana border, resulting in a 468-mile piece of land known as the ‘Toledo Strip.’

Taking the initiative, Michigan quietly occupied the strip, setting up a local government, infrastructure and, most importantly, collecting taxes.

By the early 1820s, Michigan had reached the 60,000 population threshold to become a state. Here politics became involved, as the Ohio Congressional delegation flexed its political muscle in Washington to block Michigan’s admission to statehood, resulting in Congress denying their right to hold a state constitutional convention in 1833 because of the Toledo Strip controversy.

In January 1835, 27-year-old Michigan Territorial Governor Stevens T. Mason (nicknamed the ‘Boy Governor’) took matters into his own hands, calling for a constitutional convention in May, regardless of what Ohio and Washington wanted.

In February 1835, Ohio began setting up a county government in the Strip, naming the county where Toledo would be as Lucas County, after Ohio governor Robert Lucas.

Michigan Territorial Governor Mason responded by signing the Pains and Penalties Act six days later. According to Michigan law, it was now a criminal offense for Ohio to perform government actions in the strip. The Ohioan offenders could be arrested and face up to a $1000 fine ($30,000 in 2024 money) and up to five years of hard labor, or both, without benefit of trial.

Governor Mason appointed Brigadier General Joseph W. Brown of the Third US Brigade to command the state militia, with orders to be ready to act against trespassers.

 

Escalation

On March 31, 1835, Ohio Governor Lucas, along with General John Bell and approximately 600 militiamen, made their to Perrysburg, Ohio, ten miles southwest of Toledo.

A few days later, Governor Mason, General Brown, and 1,000 men arrived in Toledo to stop Ohio from moving further into the area and marking the border in their favor.

By now, the border dispute had the full attention of Washington. President Jackson consulted his Attorney General Benjamin Butler, who believed that until Congress deemed otherwise, the strip was a part of the Michigan Territory.

But by now it was a political, not legal, issue.

Ohio at the time had 19 representatives and two senators, while Michigan, as a territory, had just one non-voting delegate. Then, as now, Ohio was considered a swing state, and the Democratic Party simply couldn’t afford to lose Ohio’s electoral votes.

Therefore, Jackson decided that the Toledo Strip would be part of Ohio.

Jackson sent two representatives, Richard Rush of Pennsylvania and Benjamin Chew Howard of Maryland, to Toledo to mediate the conflict and offer a compromise: another survey to mark the ‘Harris Line,’ and that the residents of the region could decide for themselves which state or territorial government they wanted to live in.

Governor Lucas reluctantly agreed and began sending his militia home. Governor Mason refused the compromise and kept his militia together and ready for conflict.

During the elections, Ohio officials found themselves harassed by Michigan officials, the residents threatened with arrest if they went along with Ohio authority.

 

Battle of Philips Corners

Two days after the April Michigan election, Ohio Governor Lucas sent out a team of surveyors led by Uri Seely of Geauga County, Jonathan Taylor of Licking County, and John Patterson of Adams County, to mark the Harris Line.

On Sunday, April 26 April 1835, Michigan General Joseph Brown and 60 militiamen surprised the survey party. In the only armed incident of the war, the militia reportedly fired shots over the surveyor’s heads. The surveyors scattered, with General Brown’s militia arresting nine, charging them with violation of the Pains and Penalties Act. The authorities brought the nine to Tecumseh, Michigan, where six paid bail for release, and two were acquitted. Only one man, who went by the name of Feltcher, who stubbornly refused to pay his bail, remained in custody.

Three of the escaped surveyors made their way back to Governor Lucas at Perrysburg, where they reported that ‘nine of our men, who did not leave the ground in time after being fired upon by the enemy, from thirty to fifty shots, were taken prisoners and carried away into Tecumseh, Michigan.

Lucas called a special session, and on June 8 passed a series of laws, including making Toledo the county seat of Lucas County, the establishment of a Court of Common Pleas, a law to prevent ‘forcible abduction’ of Ohio citizens, and $300,000 ($9.6 million in 2024) to fund it.

Michigan responded with $315,000 in funding for its militia.

We are the weaker party, it is true, but we are on the side of justice...we cannot fail to maintain our rights against the encroachments of a powerful neighboring state.

 

While the Michigan Territory spent May and June 1835 drafting its state constitution, Congress and President Jackson were still unwilling to make Michigan a state until the border issue was resolved.

In June, Governor Lucas sent US Attorney Noah Haynes Swaye, former Ohio Governor and Congressman William Allen, and David T. Disney to Washington to plead their case to Jackson.

Throughout the middle of 1835 saw lawsuits, skirmishes, arrests, and spying on both sides to keep track of the sheriffs of Wood County, Ohio, and Monroe County, Michigan.

On July 15, 1835, Monroe County Michigan Deputy Sheriff Joseph Wood made his way to Toledo to arrest either Major Benjamin Stickney or his son Two, who were aligned with Ohio’s claim on the Strip, but ended up arresting the whole family when they resisted.

During the arrest, a scuffle broke out where Two Stickney pulled out a small penknife and stabbed Marshall Wood in the arm, the first, and only, recorded incident of bloodshed in the Toledo War. Wood survived the minor injury, and Two fled into Ohio.

Mason demanded Two Stickney be handed over to Michigan, but of course Lucas refused. Mason wrote to Jackson asking for Supreme Court intervention, but Jackson declined.

Lucas again put pressure on the Ohio delegation, and they convinced the President that the hot-headed young Michigan Territorial Governor had to go.

Jackson had appointed Mason territorial secretary at age 19. When he returned to Detroit at the end of August, Mason learned Jackson had fired him.

In one of his last acts as governor, Mason sent 1,000 militia into the Toledo Strip to prevent the first session of the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, which planned to hold court on the first Monday of September 1835. But the Ohioans wisely held a midnight session and promptly left town for Ohio.

Twenty-one-year-old J. Wilkie Moore, a part of the Michigan militia, wrote that “they had a vast amount of fun,” and that farmers along the way “welcomed us enthusiastically because we were fighting for Michigan.”

In Mason’s place, Jackson appointed John S. (‘Little Jack’) Horner, who, upon his arrival in the Territory, was pelted with vegetables, burned in effigy, and generally made to feel unwelcome in his new role.

In October, Michigan held elections, approved its draft constitution, reelected Mason governor, and sent Isaac E. Crary as the first US Representative. Congress refused to accept his credentials, and he became a non-voting delegate. The two US senators chosen by the legislature in November, Lucius Lyon and John Norvell, upon their arrival in Washington, could only sit in the spectators’ seat in the Senate gallery.

 

The ‘Frostbitten Convention’

Because of slavery, the Union admitted states in pairs: one slave state and one free state. Arkansas joined the Union as a slave state in 1836. Jackson wanted Michigan to offset Arkansas and signed the bill admitting Michigan as a free state if they would give up their claim to the Toledo Strip. In return, they would grant Michigan the rest of the Upper Peninsula.

Michigan held a special convention in 1837 in Ann Arbor and flatly rejected the offer. But in reality, they had little choice.

Michigan was in a terrible financial state, spending itself almost to insolvency by the funding of their militia. The US Treasury at the time gave surplus monies to the states. Washington was ready to disperse some $400,000 ($12 million in 2024 money) to the states; but territories got nothing.

So Michigan relented and held a second convention again at Ann Arbor on December 14, 1836. Known as the ‘Frostbitten Convention,’ Michigan accepted Congress’ terms, and on January 26, 1837, Michigan was admitted as the 26th state.

 

Afterwards

At the time, the newly minted Michiganders felt themselves sorely used, losing the prime Toledo Strip for the 9,000 square miles of the Upper Peninsula, an area described by the Detroit Free Press at the time as a ‘barren wasteland of perpetual snows.’

But things have a way of working out, and it certainly did for Michigan. In the 1840s, copper was discovered on the Keweenaw Peninsula and iron found in the Central Upper Peninsula, spurring a mining boom that lasted well into the 20th century.

The borders between Michigan and Ohio changed over the years, and another survey in 1915 altered the line slightly, which both sides accepted.

In 1973, the Supreme Court, with Michigan v. Ohio, adjusted the border in Lake Erie slightly to the northeast, making Turtle Island, just outside Maumee Bay and originally solely Michigan’s, split between Michigan and Ohio.

Steven Mason was elected the first governor of Michigan in 1840. At 24, he holds the record as the youngest state governor in American history.

In 1841, he moved to New York City, where his wealthy father-in-law, Thaddeus Phelps, lived. There he tried to establish himself as a lawyer, but found little luck.

He caught pneumonia and died on January 4, 1842, at the age of 31.

Robert Lucas served as the 12th governor of Ohio from 1832 to 1836. From Ohio, he moved on to the Iowa Territory, where he was its first governor from 1838 to 1841. Here he was involved in another bloodless border dispute between the Iowa Territory and Missouri, remembered as the Honey War of 1839.

He died in Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, on February 7, 1853, and is buried there.

Two Stickney had had a sister named Indiana Stickney, named for where her father, Major Stickney, had served as an Indian Agent.

Two Stickney’s older brother, the aptly named One Stickney, died in 1883, and was buried in Forrest Cemetery that runs along part of Stickney Avenue in North Toledo, once part of the Stickney farm. Major Stickney and Two, who died in 1862 at age 52, are also buried there.

At some point, One Stickney was dug up by grave robbers, his body eventually making it to the Toledo Medical College. One or two doctors were charged with grave robbing, but not much came of it, history not remembering how it turned out.

Replacing the popular Mason put John Horner in a hard position, but he made the best of it by persuading both sides to remain calm until Congress could settle the border dispute.

After the crisis, Horner left Michigan for the Wisconsin Territory, serving as the territory's secretary from 1836 to 1837.

There he stayed, becoming one of the original settlers of present-day Ripon, Wisconsin, and establishing Ripon College in 1851.

He died on February 3, 1883, in Ripon at the age of 80, and is buried in the local Hillside Cemetery.

His home, known as the John Scott Horner House, is on the National Register of Historic Places.

It is alleged that there was one fatality of the Toledo War, that being a horse belonging to Lewis E. Bailey of Michigan. 

Much like the Toledo War, the particulars of how the horse met its end, history has forgotten. 

 

You can read more from Randy here.

Battered by wind gusts, the Avro Lancaster bucked and lurched as its crew struggled to keep the plane aligned with the signal fires set by the French Resistance fighters two thousand feet below. The “Lanc,” one of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) workhorse bombers, was a homely beast. It had four noisy propellers, a protruding snout, and a pair of ungainly tail fins. Built to drop bombs four miles above Dusseldorf and Dresden, the Lanc was ill-suited for the stealthy parachute operation it was being asked to perform in the predawn hours over Occupied France.

Timothy Gay explains the story of Stewart Alsop.

A Lancaster like this one deposited Alsop’s Jedburgh team and an SAS unit over Occupied France in August ’44. Source/Attribution: Photo: Cpl Phil Major ABIPP/MOD, available here.

Instead of its usual payload of thousand-pound bombs, the plane was carrying 18 members of two separate cloak-and-dagger outfits. A three-man team – two Americans, one Frenchman – from the ultra-secret Jedburgh program had orders to buttress BERGAMOTTE, a Maquis (Resistance) operation charged with harassing enemy movements on the roads and railways of south-central France.

During their months of training, the Jeds had been taught to mimic the Maqui’s tactical mantra: Surprise! Mitraillage! Evanouissement! (“Surprise! Kill! Vanish!”) Their goal, a Jed team leader mused years later, was to make the enemy believe it was “fighting the Invisible Man.”

After pulling off an ambush with their French partners, the Jeds learned to yell: “Foutez le camp!” Roughly translated, it meant “Scram! Let’s get the hell out of here!”

For weeks, Allied intelligence had worried that the BERGAMOTTE cell was being hounded by the German secret police, the Gestapo. Indeed, the brass feared that the Gestapo had not only seized control of BERGAMOTTE’s radio but had compromised its entire operation. The three Jeds were warned that cutthroat German agents – not to mention turncoat Frenchmen, too – might be lurking to snuff any Allied operative parachuted in from England.

“We had been given to understand,” the Jed team was to observe in its after-action report months later, “that Mission BERGAMOTTE might conceivably turn out to be the Gestapo in sheep’s clothing.”

Trust no “sheep,” the Jeds were instructed. The most innocuous-looking French villager could be a Gestapo stooge; ditto the head of the Maquis cell from the next town over.

Each Jed was given a personal cipher – an idiosyncratic phrase – to be used in emergency wireless transmissions in the all-too-likely event that they became separated, or if the mission went sideways.

Also waiting to leap out of the plane were 15 members of a coup de main (hard-hitting special forces) group, the Third French Parachute Battalion of the British Special Air Services (SAS). Once behind enemy lines, the SAS “rogue warriors,” as British historian Ben McIntyre has tabbed SAS commandos, had their own agenda of mischief and sabotage. Their chief objective was blowing up a bridge along the Route Nationale, the region’s main north-south artery, to hobble the Germans’ capacity to mobilize troops and armor.

Since the Lanc had no benches, the 18 commandos were sprawled on its floor, cramped against the cigar-shaped supply cylinders that would soon be dumped over their drop zone. An eerie blue light from a single bulb suffused the cabin.

   *

Nine full weeks after D-Day and just two days before the start of the “Champagne Campaign,” the Allies’ seaborne invasion of the Riviera, Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht had still not been ejected from France. The Lanc’s commandos were about to parachute atop thousands of trigger-happy German grenadiers and panicked Eastern European conscripts (Allied intelligence dismissively called them “Cossacks”), not to mention hundreds of members of the Milice, pro-Nazi Frenchmen who – it was now brutally clear – had backed the losing side.

The Milliciens knew that, if caught, they would pay for their treachery with their lives. They weren’t about to go down without exacting a bloodbath.

*

The Lanc’s unlikely first jumper, the 30-year-old American commander of the Jedburgh squad, had already crawled into position above the square hole carved aft of the plane’s bomb bay. His name was Stewart Johnnof Oliver Alsop. He was the scion of a Connecticut Yankee family whose ancestry could be traced to the Winthrops of Plymouth Plantation.

His facial features mirrored Hollywood matinee idol Robert Taylor’s: roguish blue eyes, an elongated patrician nose, mischievous eyebrows, and a mouth that always seemed to be suppressing a smile or a smirk. Even with a mop of brown hair hacked by military barbers, Alsop still radiated a Fitzgeraldian air of old money.

His mother, Corinne Robinson Alsop, was a niece of Theodore Roosevelt, a first cousin to First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, and a distant cousin of Eleanor’s husband, Franklin Delano Roosevelt – or as Stewart’s father, a rock-ribbed Republican, called the president, “that crazy jack in the White House!”

A member of the Oyster Bay Roosevelt clan, Corinne had been equally disdainful of her Hudson Valley relation. When the young FDR came to Long Island to court Eleanor, Corinne derided him in her diary as a “feather duster” and hoped Eleanor would have the good sense to dump him.

The Alsops had been Republicans since the Whig Party disintegrated in the 1850s. Stewart’s old man, Joseph Wright Alsop IV, was a perennially frustrated Grand Old Party candidate for the Connecticut governorship. Stewart’s mother, a cofounder of the Connecticut League of Republican Women, had seconded the nomination of Alf Landon, her party’s 1936 presidential nominee. Despite Corinne’s stirring oratory, Landon carried only two states against her fifth cousin. Alas, neither of them was Connecticut.

Dining room debates between the elder Alsops and their more liberal offspring often ended with Pa braying at his kids to “go back to Russia!”

Stewart’s older brother by four years, Joseph Wright Alsop V, was already a respected columnist for the New York Herald Tribune and its national syndicate. With war looming in 1941, Joe volunteered for the U.S. Navy. He was serving in Burma as staff historian for aviator Claire Lee Chenault’s American Volunteer Group (later dubbed the “Flying Tigers”) when he was dispatched, in early December ‘41, to obtain supplies in Hong Kong. He was still in the city on December 7th and 8th, those nightmarish days when the Imperial Japanese military rampaged throughout the Pacific.

Joe shrewdly disposed of his uniform, borrowed civilian clothes, and pretended he was still an active correspondent. His ruse worked, sort of. For six months, the Japanese confined him to a detention camp for foreign noncombatants.

Corinne and Joseph IV, Ma and Pa as Stewart called them in his wartime letters, were never reticent about wielding their powerful connections. They pulled out all the stops to liberate young Joe, including petitioning that crazy jack in the White House. It worked: Joe was released in mid-’42 in a repatriation exchange of prisoners.

The Alsops were unrepentant Anglophiles, not surprising given their ancestral roots in the East Midlands and their allegiance to Endicott Peabody’s thoroughly British Groton School. As journalist Robert W. Merry noted decades later, “[The Alsops] always managed to get in the company of the high and the mighty throughout the world.” If their kin didn’t invent speaking with British affectation and a locked jaw, they helped perfect it.

Being high and mighty didn’t preclude Stewart from misbehaving at Yale. He got into hot water twice, once for pilfering all four hubcaps off a cop car, the other for getting caught with a young lady in his room. The second offense prevented him from graduating with his class.

Stewart had been in uniform prior to Pearl Harbor, but until ten days before his hush-hush mission to France, that khaki had belonged to His Majesty, not Uncle Sam. He had attempted on several occasions to join the U.S. Army but suffered from what his family labeled “white coat syndrome”: whenever a doctor armed with a sphygmomanometer was around, his blood pressure invariably spiked.

High blood pressure notwithstanding, Alsop was, along with a select group of other American Ivy League alums, invited by British bigwigs in the early fall of ‘41 to enlist in the elite King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The KRRC’s North American lineage had begun as the Royal American Regiment during the French and Indian War. When the upstart colonies fought to gain independence from the Crown, the regiment’s base was switched to the Caribbean, then Canada.

Its motto was Celur et Audax (“Swift and Bold”) – watchwords that rallied its riflemen from Waterloo to the Khyber Pass as they fought through the decades to safeguard the British Empire. The King himself served as the unit’s Colonel-in-Chief. KRRC’s “home” was the Hampshire city of Winchester and its fabled 900-year-old cathedral.

Among the other Americans ushered into the KRRC in ‘42 were future political commentator (and author of the memoir Eight is Enough); Tom Braden, a Dartmouth alum; another Dartmouth grad, Ted Ellsworth, who would go on to become a highly decorated infantry officer in both the British Eighth and U.S. First armies and survive a Nazi stalag; and George Thomson, a Harvard man whose service record would end up paralleling Alsop’s: the KRRC, the British Special Air Service (SAS), the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and, ultimately, the Jedburghs.

The very social KRRC didn’t care about such trifling matters as Alsop’s blood pressure. They did care, however, that these sons of American privilege bring their white dinner jackets for evening fêtes and their hunting rifles for England’s grouse season.

It turned out that Alsop didn’t don black or white tie all that often. Having completed more than a year of training in England, he survived Tunisia’s oppressive summer heat as one of General Bernard Montgomery’s Desert Rats after the Axis forces surrendered at Bizerte.

In the fall of ’43, the KRRC moved across the Mediterranean as the Allies slogged their way up Italy’s Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts. Alsop served as an infantry platoon leader in the British Eighth Army’s push along Italy’s eastern edge. In October, his KRRC Second Battalion was in Monty’s spearhead south of the River Trigno. At one point the Trigno skirmishing grew so fierce that Alsop and his platoon were forced to take refuge in a farmhouse.

 A month later, the Second Battalion joined elements of the 8th Indian Division in leading Monty’s assault on Casa Casone, a German stronghold atop the River Sangro. It took two attempts and gruesome nighttime fighting before Casa Casone surrendered.

In December, Alsop and his fellow KRRC officer Thomson, then 25, sought transfers to the U.S. Army. But their repeated efforts were rebuffed in Tunisia and Egypt. For a time, the pair was in what Alsop described as “military limbo.”

Thanks to the connections of an English grande dame whose favor Thomson had cultivated in Cairo, the two briefly joined Britain’s hell-for-leather SAS before being transferred back to England in early ’44. Alsop and Thomson soon volunteered for the SOE, the clandestine intelligence service created by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to wreak havoc behind Nazi lines.

On August 3, 1944, Alsop was at long last granted his request to transfer to the U.S. Army. He was immediately assigned to the OSS, SOE’s American counterpart. Together, SOE and OSS had devised the Jedburgh commando program to help Resistance fighters in France and the Low Countries disrupt the Wehrmacht before, during, and after the Allies’ cross-channel invasion. Some four dozen Jedburgh missions had already jumped off to Occupied Europe by the time Alsop’s Lanc went airborne.

Alsop was still getting used to be being called “Loo-tenant” after being addressed as “Leff-tenant” for more than a year. He also had to remind himself that American soldiers saluted their superiors with a straight-edged right hand, as opposed to the British Army custom of a flat-hand-to-the-forehead, part of an elaborate ritual that included stamping both feet and emitting a full-throated “Sir!,” which, given the accents involved, often came out more like “Suh!”

In the pell-mell rush to get ready for the Jedburgh jump, there had not been time for Alsop to requisition a U.S. Army uniform, so he borrowed one from his younger – and considerably shorter and chunkier – brother John, a former military policeman then also in training as a Jedburgh commando. Stewart continued to wear his KRRC insignia, his British marksmanship medals, his Mediterranean campaign ribbons, and his SAS wings on his ill-fitting American garb – a curious decision that, a few weeks later in the wilds of France, caused enough confusion in the mind of an American lieutenant colonel to nearly get Alsop shot as an enemy spy.

The dashing 30-year-old with the impeccable pedigree was about to hit the silk wearing an outfit that made him look like an unkempt schoolboy.

                                                                      *

Little about Stewart Alsop’s breeding hinted that he’d make a kick-ass commando in a war to save the world from fascism. The Alsops may have been longtime fixtures in effete America, with tentacles that seemed to reach everywhere, but they didn’t exactly have a reputation for martial heroics.

In the 1960s, the Saturday Evening Post commissioned Stewart, then its Washington columnist, to research and write about his family heritage. He learned that Joseph Wright Alsop I, his great-great-grandfather, paid for someone to take his place in George Washington’s Continental Army. Eight decades later, that same dodge was repeated by Joseph Wright Alsop III, who managed to evade service in Abraham Lincoln’s Grand Army of the Republic by hiring a surrogate.

Indeed, as far as Stewart could tell, no forebear named Alsop had ever served as a soldier.

“It was not so much that my ancestors were cowards, though no doubt some of them were,” he wrote years later. “They just hated the idea of being in a subordinate and dependent position.”

Perhaps it was that wariness that compelled one John Alsop, a New York delegate to the Second Continental Congress in 1776, to balk at signing a little document known as the Declaration of Independence. John Alsop managed to pull a reverse “John Hancock”; in Alsop family lore, he was known as “John the Non-Signer.”

Past and future Alsops never declined opportunities to fatten their pocketbooks, however. Like so many New England colonial families, the Alsops, then living in the Connecticut seaport Middletown, made their fortune in West Indies trade. Alsop ships carried ice and other commodities south to the Caribbean, then peddled barrels of rum back home. They also dabbled in triangular trade with China and England, bringing back to the colonies coveted plate ware – and perhaps, Stewart coyly hinted in his memoirs, some opium, too.

                                                                          *

One hundred sixty-eight years, one month, and nine days after an Alsop refused to sign Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration, Stewart Alsop found himself enmeshed in a Jedburgh mission bollixed up from the get-go. When the three Jeds arrived the evening of August 12, 1944, at the RAF’s Tempsford Airfield some 50 miles northeast of London, no one was expecting them.

“It soon became apparent,” Alsop wrote in his after-action report, “that no one had the faintest notion who we were or what to do with us, and that furthermore no one was particularly interested.”

He and his Jed mates had to scramble to find their plane, which turned out to be a Lancaster planted on the runway, already revving its engines. It was crewed by Canadian airmen about to take off on their first sortie (ever!) over enemy territory. Moreover, they’d had no training in parachute operations – a pair of disquieting facts probably not shared with the Jeds as they climbed aboard.

Most of the SAS men were already jammed into the cabin. Two other sticks of SAS paratroopers were on different planes warming up at Tempsford. The three planes were supposed to fly together to execute a coordinated drop in the Limoges-Périgeux corridor of central France’s Creuse Department, a hilly region that for weeks had been besieged by a Wehrmacht offensive targeting the Resistance.

“Maquis Creuse kaput!,” German soldiers had bragged to French villagers, dragging their fingers across their throats. Far from kaput, BERGAMOTTE principals had been alerted by London to ignite their signal fires some two hours after midnight on August 13th.

Somehow, the jump master expert at pinpointing when and where special ops paratroops should be released over hostile turf failed to show up. He was replaced by a corporal, a nervous rookie unfamiliar with the RAF methodology for low-altitude drops: a sequence of flashing red and green lights accompanied by a series of commands – “Action Stations! . . . Running In! . . . Number One, Go! . . . Number Two, Go! . . .”

Poised to jump immediately after Alsop were the two other members of his Operation ALEXANDER Jedburgh team: a St. Cyr-trained lieutenant and saboteur named Renè de la Tousche, whose nom de guerre (to protect his family in the event he was captured or killed behind Nazi lines) was Richard Thouville; and a 19-year-old sergeant and radio operator from Montclair, New Jersey, named Norman “Dick” Franklin.

Each was carrying an M-I carbine, a Colt revolver, an entrenching tool to bury his parachute, a large knife, a string of grenades, a canteen, a first aid kit, an E&E (Escape and Evasion) kit with camouflaged silk maps of south-central and southwestern France, a tiny compass, a little knife that looked like a razor, a wire for garroting enemy sentries, a fishing line and hooks in case other food sources failed, a packet of amphetamines to stave off sleep, a chocolate bar, a pack of cigarettes, and a small flask of brandy.

Their pre-mission briefing a few days earlier had taken place in a glass-encased room on the highest floor of a “safe house” in London. They were perched above the surrounding buildings and could glimpse the tops of the trees in Hyde Park. In mid-meeting, Franklin spotted an airborne V-1 buzz bomb. Just after it passed overhead, its motor stopped – then the most ominous sound in London, because it meant an imminent plunge and explosion. Seconds later, the doodlebug detonated in the park.

The three of them had bonded during months of training at Milton Hall, a rambling Cambridgeshire manor that SOE and OSS had taken over for special ops prep. “Milton Hall was a fantastic Elizabethan pile, country seat of an old, aristocratic, and formerly exceedingly rich English family,” Alsop and Braden wrote after the war in their book, Sub Rosa. Among many other arduous tasks, Jed trainees were obligated to make eight practice parachute jumps and do plenty of cardiovascular work.

 On long-distance runs in the East Anglian countryside, Alsop would look around, determine that no superior officers were extant, and declare to Thouville and Franklin, his handpicked charges, that it was time to “relax-ey-vous.”

The trio would slip behind a stonewall or a hedgerow and swap stories and smokes. When Thouville reminded Alsop that “relax-ey” was not a real French verb, the American feigned outrage and snapped something like: “Well, dammit, it ought to be!”

Thouville’s métier in these sessions was an apparently bottomless cache of bawdy jokes about French clerics and their parishioners, delivered in a combination of broken English and snarky French. With each telling, Thouville’s gags got more hilarious, Franklin remembered in his unpublished memoir.

Alsop’s comrades were amused that someone with such a patrician background could be so playful and irreverent. The Connecticut Yankee would readily concede that his upbringing had made him class-conscious – and to a fault. But he took exception if anyone accused him of being pompous.

“Stuffy, yes,” Alsop would admit, impish eyes twinkling. “But pompous? Never!”

Early on, Alsop had made the mistake of telling his American KRRC buddies that his surname was properly pronounced with a soft “a,” as in “ball,” not a hard “a,” as in “pal.” Instantly, of course, he was dubbed “Al,” a screw-you moniker that stuck with him through the war. After that gaffe, he was gun-shy about discussing his famous family: It took him a half-year to own up about being related to the Roosevelts.

The three Jeds had been rehearsing their parachute drop for months, on top of every other move they would need to survive a long stretch behind enemy lines, from learning colloquial French and studying Gaullist vs. Communist Resistance politics to mastering Jiu Jitsu hand-to-hand combat and teaching Maquis fighters how to operate mortars and makeshift radios.

Alsop’s codename was “Rona.” Franklin’s was “Cork.” Thouville’s was “Leix.”

On three previous occasions in early August, Rona, Cork, and Leix had been called to an East Anglian airfield and told their operation would launch that night. Each time, the mission had, for one reason or another, been scrubbed. But the fourth time, despite the logistical challenges, they went wheels-up just after 10 p.m.

Some 90 minutes into the flight, somewhere over southern Normandy, the Lanc began to rear “like a startled horse,” Alsop remembered. “Le flak!” Thouville shouted into Alsop’s ear.

While on the front lines in Italy, Alsop had been shot attacked by rifles, machine guns, mortars, aerial bombs, and 88’s, the Germans’ deadly artillery weapon. But this was his first experience with an ack-ack assault. It felt, Alsop recalled, like a violent thunderstorm – except a lot more dangerous. Franklin, the radioman, likened flak to “someone beating a large tin pan with a wood spoon.”

Bloodred tracers appeared out of nowhere, followed by deafening explosions that seemed to happen beneath both wings. Just when they thought the Lanc was out of range, another fusillade would erupt. Amid one barrage, Alsop looked around at his fellow commandos: To a man, they were protecting their crotches.

Once the plane cleared Normandy, the flak began to recede. By then, the other two planes in the formation had scattered. The neophyte Canadians were flying solo.

A half-hour or so later, the Lanc’s airmen thought they had zeroed in on the correct Resistance bonfires in the fields southwest of the Creuse Department’s Monts de Guéret, the Drop Zone (or “Dee Zed,” in British military parlance) for both Team ALEXANDER and the SAS squad. But turbulence kept knocking the Lanc off course.

One minute the crew would have the L-shaped fires in sight; the next they would disappear. Wrestling with the controls, the pilots took a couple of passes over what they surmised was the Dee Zed.

The rookie jump master got more nervous with each pass. Before leaving British airspace, the Jeds had tried to teach the “Action Stations!” progression to him. But now it seemed too complicated.

“Look, chaps,” Alsop remembered the corporal yelling above the din. “I’ve never done this before, and I don’t want to get it wrong!”

The dispatcher hollered to Alsop that he would flash a single red light – and that as soon as Alsop saw it, he should drop through the hole. Alsop nodded and shouted for Thouville and Franklin to get ready.

Thouville bleated, “J’ai une trouille noire,” into Alsop’s ear. Yeah, I’m a little black hole, too, Alsop chuckled.

Alsop tried hard to remember what he’d learned in those eight practice jumps: “Hold straight, head on chest, legs together, pull the webs, don’t reach out for the ground. . .”

As they’d been taught, Thouville wrapped his legs around Alsop’s neck and shoulders; Franklin did the same to Thouville’s. The SAS guys crept closer to the hole.

*

His legs dangling out of the Lanc, Alsop’s thoughts surely drifted to the bride he’d left behind in London. He had been married, for all of 54 days, to a beguiling Yorkshire lass 12 years his junior named Patricia “Tish” Hankey.

They had met two years earlier, in August 1942, when Alsop and his smooth-talking KRRC pal Thomson had somehow wangled invitations to a soiree being held at the Yorkshire estate of England’s Premier Baron, the nobleman at the top of the peerage pyramid. To their delight, they discovered that real American-style martinis – not the watered-down British imitations – were being served at the party. Even better, a pair of attractive young Englishwomen were swilling the gin-and-vermouth with abandon. Even better yet, the women appeared to be returning the Americans’ glances.

Thomson deftly handled the introductions. The taller of the two girls informed Alsop, whose hair had just been buzzed by a KRRC barber, that he “looked like a criminal,” which Alsop viewed as an encouraging flirtation.

With their lipstick, rouge, and martini-guzzling, the women appeared to be in their early twenties. They weren’t.

The belle Thomson was eyeing turned out to be the baron’s 18-year-old daughter, Bee. Tish, the object of Alsop’s attention, was only 16, an unsettling fact that Alsop discovered only after he finagled a midnight kiss in the garden – or so he claimed in his memoirs. Alas, their embrace was witnessed by the Premier Baron himself, who promptly ratted them out to his wife, who in turn blew the whistle to Tish’s parents.

The baron’s censure got their romance off to a rocky start. Despite her parents’ disapproval and Alsop’s prolonged absence in the Mediterranean, they pined for one another. When Alsop resurfaced in Britain in early ‘44, they were determined to get married.

Still, it took Alsop months to convince Tish’s stodgy father and her devoutly Catholic mother to let their daughter wed a considerably older Protestant Yank. Despite his lofty American relations, Alsop was a man of (relatively) humble means. In prewar New York, he had earned a modest salary editing books for Doubleday.

The deliberations with Tish’s father turned testy, but Alsop was smitten; he refused to take “no” for an answer. Her father relented, but only after making Alsop jump through hoops to guarantee his daughter some measure of financial security should he perish in France. With the cross-Channel invasion then going full throttle, “Alsop, S., Lt., KIA” was a distinct possibility. The Hankeys had already lost a son (by coincidence, he had also served in the KRRC) to Hitler’s Afrika Korpsin Libya; they didn’t want their daughter widowed while still a teen.

Tish and Stewart nevertheless took their vows exactly two weeks after D-Day in a side altar at St. Mary’s Catholic Chapel in Chelsea. The main altar had not recovered from the bomb damage it suffered four years earlier during the Blitz, a blast that killed 19 locals sheltering in its crypt that night.

Both the wedding ceremony and their reception in a top-floor suite at The Ritz (a boozy affair underwritten by Stewart’s brother-in-law, Percy Chubb, of the Connecticut insurance family) were interrupted by V-1 rocket attacks. At one point, the revelers raced up a stairwell to The Ritz’s rooftop to watch buzz bombs zoom over Piccadilly. Fortunately for the Jedburgh program and future Alsop progeny, the doodlebugs missed Mayfair – at least that day.

Allied intelligence, of course, forbade Stewart from sharing details of his mission to France – or even acknowledging the existence of the Jedburgh program. Tish, therefore, knew little of her new husband’s special ops background.

Intrigue and subterfuge, however, cut both ways. For a year-and-a-half prior to their wedding, Tish had worked sub rosa at wartime London’s spy central, the art deco structure at 55 Broadway SW1 in the heart of Westminster. Her building shared secrets with its dingy cousin across the street, 54 Broadway, the headquarters of Britain’s spy chief Stewart Menzies and scores of espionage and sabotage specialists, all plotting the destruction of Hitler’s Reich.

Tish had been, since the day she turned a precocious 17 (!), a naval decoding analyst for MI5, Britain’s counterintelligence agency. In early April 1944, her 13th month on the job, she received a message from the Home Fleet that the methodically planned Operation TUNGSTEN had succeeded: in a sneak attack off the Norwegian coast, Germany’s über-battleship Tirpitz had been decimated by British carrier planes.

The news triggered jubilation on both sides of Broadway, at 10 Downing Street, at Whitehall’s cabinet offices, at Bletchley Park’s codebreaking station, and at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in South London’s Bushy Park.

When Tish, then barely 18, raced up several flights of stairs to share the news with her friend Bee, a fellow MI5 decoder, the two of them jumped up and down, then danced a little jig.

Tish and her new husband didn’t completely fess up about their respective derring-do until after the war. No wonder their daughter, writer Elizabeth Winthrop Alsop, called her 2022 memoir, Daughter of Spies.

Just days before obtaining his long-awaited commission in the U.S. Army, Alsop had gotten news that he’d earned an elevation to captain in the British Army. The transfer came with a catch: if he wanted to join the Yanks, he’d have to accept a demotion in rank back to lieutenant. But pay in the U.S. Army dwarfed the Brits. Alsop would make a lot more as a Yank lieutenant than as a Tommy captain. He took the transfer.

Tish helped her new spouse pin his American lieutenant’s bars on the shoulder pads of his borrowed uniform. When Franklin saw them, he chortled and informed his boss that the bars were turned the wrong way.

There was another secret that Tish may have been keeping from Stewart in the second week of August 1944: she was already pregnant.

*

More anxious minutes passed inside the Lanc. Alsop remained fixated on reacting to the dispatcher’s signal. The plane continued to fight the wind.

Alsop, Thouville, and Franklin couldn’t be certain, but it felt like the Lanc was flying in aimless circles. They worried that every German soldier and hostile mercenary in a 30-mile radius was now on full alert. If the commandos didn’t jump soon, the crew would have no choice but to head back to England. Given the enemy’s ack-ack guns, flying over the Normandy battlefield after daybreak would have been in Alsop’s reckoning, “suicide.”

Suddenly, a light flashed inside the plane. Alsop didn’t hesitate or double-check with the jump master. He wriggled through the hole and pushed hard with both hands. Off he plummeted into a moonlit French night.

As soon as his chute jolted open, he knew he’d made a mistake; the plane was flying too high and too fast. To avoid detection, Allied commandos had been trained to jump at 800 feet from a stalled-out aircraft; the Lanc, Alsop sensed, was flying at a height at least double the desired altitude. It was traveling so fast, moreover, that Alsop could feel thewhoosh from the prop wash – not the way a jump from a semi-static craft was supposed to feel.

Alsop looked up. The parachutes of Thouville and Franklin were nowhere to be seen.

He later learned that the jump master had flipped on his flashlight to fish out a cigarette. Alsop mistook the corporal’s nicotine fix for the “Go!” signal; the American had leapt out of the plane way too early. The horrified dispatcher restrained Alsop’s comrades from following their commander out the hole.

Hurtling toward the ground, Alsop craned his neck in three directions but couldn’t see the Resistance reception committee signal fires. A mission fraught with danger had suddenly gotten even more perilous.

Alsop could hear dogs barking – probably not the best omen, he remembered thinking. “Even before I hit the ground, I realized that I had been a damn fool,” he was to write.

Seconds later, he thudded into the edge of a wooded area. His chute got tangled in a small tree. It turned out to be fortuitous; he found himself hanging just inches off the ground.

He slithered out of his harness and touched French soil for the first time in the war. While behind German lines over the next three months, Alsop and his men would collude with merciless Maquis leaders; hector enemy convoys; help liberate a host of villages; throttle the Wehrmacht’s capacity to move; bivouac in the woods some nights and bunk in lavish chateaus on others; patch up differences (at least temporarily) between rival Resistance leaders; watch in amazement as French fighters and clerics unearthed rifles that had been hidden months earlier in cemetery graves; hear wild stories about German paratroopers trying to infiltrate Allied and Resistance strongholds while disguised as French priests; uncover a supposed Nazi superweapon unknown to Allied intelligence; and be toasted as heroes almost everywhere they went.

Maquisards came to respect Alsop so much they nicknamed him the “Commandant Americain.” Somehow, the Commandant and his two Jed subordinates lived to tell their tale.

But with his parachute snared in a tree, Alsop’s first moments as a guerilla fighter did not get off to an auspicious start. He frantically tried – and failed – to free his chute from the tree. The mission had barely begun, and he’d already managed to mess up two core Jedburgh rules: Never leave your men behind and never leave your chute exposed.

He snuck behind a big bush, lit a cupped cigarette, took a tug on his brandy, and surveyed the situation. His next moves were not readily apparent; there were no good options.

Squinting through the moonlight, he could make out what he thought was a hamlet not far down a dirt road. His best chance of survival, he decided, would be to sneak into town, knock on a door, and pray that its occupants were friendly to the Allied cause and not peeved about being rousted out of bed in the middle of the night by a Yank officer with an uneven grasp of French.

He stubbed out his cigarette and began inching down the path, his head on a swivel. All the sudden, the dog yapping started up again, but this time louder and more conspicuous.

“Keee-riiist!” he recalled thinking. “How could the German army not hear that?!”

Alsop retreated to the same bush, took a big swig from his flask, and lit another smoke. At this rate, the pack would be gone before sunup. So would his brandy.

Three decades later, he wrote, “I was entirely alone in Occupied France. I was in [an] American army uniform. I had no idea where I was.”

“Face it, Alsop,” he muttered aloud. “You’re in trouble.”

 

Timothy M. Gay is the Pulitzer-nominated author of two books on World War II, two books on baseball history, and a recent biography of golfer Rory McIlroy. He has written previous WWII-related articles for the Daily Beast, USA Today, and many other publications.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

The American Civil War still fascinates the public mind for its timeless reminder of when our politics were truly at their nadir. Despite some contemporary warnings about a national separation, fortunately no such moment has come to pass since the cannons ceased and the muskets were put down in 1865. Intense vitriol and hatred over the state of this country is something no specific to the war period. Whether it be 1860, 1828, or the 1800 election that saw friends become bitter rivals in outgoing President John Adams and incoming President Thomas Jefferson cease communicate for several years, national politics endures as a nasty business.

Yet, in our memory of the Civil War and its causes, we tend to let the latter fall by the wayside, consequently forgetting how unique those divisions were in the 1850s, culminating in southern secession in December 1860 after President Abraham Lincoln’s victory. Slavery was the cause as evidenced by the declarations from the southern states[i], but how many grasp slavery as the sectional issue that it was? Where does sectionalism fit into our memory? Without a more holistic understanding of the war through the sectional crisis that preceded it, we let more simplistic interpretations of why it started take over.

Sam Short explains.

John C. Breckinridge in 1860 by Jules-Émile Saintin


Defining Sectionalism

What is sectionalism and why is the period preceding the war defined as the Sectional Crisis? To answer that question, it is important first to define a section. As Professor Richard Bensel puts it, a section is a, “major geographic region.”[1] In this context, the sections that fought would be the North and South. Sectionalism, then, is the unique culture and economic tendencies emerging in those regions that create a politics of their own. A sectional politics does not have a national vision – one for the country as a whole – in mind, but whatever agenda best serves this cluster of states. The Civil War is a war between North and South, but just as accurately, a war of sections. It was not so simple as to say Republicans  and Democrats fought with the former looking to limit slavery’s spread and the latter seeking to keep it.

 

The Sectionally Divided Democrats

The Democrats themselves were divided over the issue of slavery. In 1860, Southern Democrats did not feel enough assurance was given by candidate and Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas that their institution would be defended. They opted to nominate their own candidate, Vice President John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky. The electoral map speaks to this division with the southern states going for him.[2] When looking at a breakdown of the popular vote, the University of Richmond does not record a single vote for Douglas in the southern state of Texas.[3]

Looking further back, divisions among Democrats over slavery preceded the Sectional Crisis as is exemplified by the Wilmot Proviso. Democratic Pennsylvania Representative David Wilmot introduced a proviso to President James K Polk’s $2 million appropriations bill allocating funds to negotiations with Mexico. This was August 8, 1846 during the Mexican-American War. In that proviso, Wilmot proposed,

as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.[4]

 

This was effectively Northern Democrats telling their southern colleagues they would not tow a line for slavery only for the sake of party unity.[5] Democrats did not have a pro or anti-slavery platform. They struggled to unify under one position towards the issue.

 

Geography and Politics

To be sure, from its inception, the Republican Party was northern-based. Multiple southern states did not cast a single vote for their candidate John C Fremont in the party’s first national election, the Election of 1856.[6] The North was not entirely Republican, but the Republicans were – almost – entirely in the North. In the modern era, parties have their strongholds. Democrats do better in New England, other coastal areas, and urban centers while Republicans capture the South and Midwest. Geography does correlate to politics on the electoral map and that observation largely holds true in our elections, but the question during the sectional crisis was not one of partisanship, but of sectional allegiances. For Southern Democrats, never mind where their northern brethren were heading, as they assessed the situation, they needed to make their own way.

An emphasis on the sectional dimension of this conflict dispels later assertions that the Democratic Party was the party of slavery. Southern Democrats supported it, but sectional divisions fly in the face of an argument for party unity. Studying sectionalism leaves us with a complex web of geopolitically motivated behaviors and allegiances that historians strive to make sense of in forming a metanarrative for the war’s causes. Studies are made more complicated when considering examples out of the South that push back against the conclusion of consensus being for slavery and against Lincoln. How are we to regard President Andrew Johnson, who, as a congressman from Tennessee – and Democrat –, was the only senator from a seceding state to remain in the Union? This is a man who historians studying his life have admitted it is hard to arrive at any definitive statements about when looking at his character.[7] More broadly, estimates say 100,000 men living in the Confederate states served the Union during the war.[8] Among them, Virginia-born Union General George Thomas, a slave owner before the war, alienated his family who refused to speak to him for fighting against the South.[9]

In history or contemporary politics, neat and tidy conclusions about politics, allegiances, or where one falls of the political spectrum for their views on divisive issues are few and far between. If we are to understand political history, we must understand in our analyses that single-dimension modes of thought with the left against the right or Democrats against Republicans runs the risk of obfuscating more intricate fissures that account for, in the case of the Civil War, sectionalism. In its only through the study sectional divisions that we see the clearer picture.

 

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[i] See “Avalon Project - Confederate States of America -   Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina From the Federal Union,” n.d. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp.

[1] Richard F. Bensel “Sectional Stress & Ideology in the United States House of Representatives.” Polity 14, no. 4 (1982): 657–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/3234469.

[2] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1860.

[3] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1860/TX.

[4] “Wilmot Proviso, 1846,” 1846. https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1846WilmotProviso.pdf.

[5] David Wilmot et al., “Wilmot Proviso,” n.d., https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mex-war/wilmot-proviso.pdf.

[6] “Electing the President,” n.d. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/electingthepresident/popular/map/1856.

[7] Rable, George C. “Anatomy of a Unionist: Andrew Johnson in Tne [sic] Secession Crisis.” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1973): 332–54.

[8] Carole E. Scott, “Southerner Vs. Southerner: Union Supporters Below the Mason-Dixon Line - Warfare History Network,” July 12, 2022, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/southerner-vs-southerner-union-supporters-below-the-mason-dixon-line/.

[9] Christopher J. Einolf,  “George Thomas,” June 2012, https://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/assets/files/pdf/ECWCTOPICThomasGeorgeHEssay.pdf.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain stands as one of the most compelling figures of the American Civil War, not because he was a professional soldier forged in a lifetime of military service, but because he was an intellectual and educator who rose to extraordinary leadership when history demanded it. Born on the 8th of September, 1828 in Brewer, Maine, Chamberlain grew up in a deeply religious and disciplined household. His father, a stern militia officer and shipbuilder, instilled in him a sense of duty and moral responsibility, while his mother encouraged learning and faith. Chamberlain excelled academically, displaying a gift for languages and scholarship that would define his early life. He attended Bowdoin College, where he studied theology and the classics, eventually becoming fluent in multiple ancient and modern languages. By the late 1850s, he was a professor of rhetoric at Bowdoin, seemingly destined for a quiet life of scholarship rather than war.

Terry Bailey explains.

Joshua Chamberlain.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 profoundly unsettled Chamberlain. Though opposed to slavery and deeply committed to the Union, he initially remained at Bowdoin, torn between his academic responsibilities and what he saw as a moral obligation to serve. In 1862, he resolved the conflict decisively. Despite lacking formal military training, he requested a leave of absence to join the army, telling Bowdoin's president that the war represented a struggle for the soul of the nation. He was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry, a regiment composed largely of lumbermen and farmers, many of whom were older and physically tougher than their scholarly officer. Chamberlain won their respect not through bluster or harsh discipline, but through fairness, shared hardship, and a willingness to listen, qualities that would later prove critical under fire.

By the summer of 1863, Chamberlain had risen to command the 20th Maine, and his regiment found itself marching into history at Gettysburg. On the 2nd of July, 1863, the second day of the battle, the Union Army hastily extended its left flank to anchor on a rocky hill known as Little Round Top. The position was vital; if Confederate forces seized it, they could roll up the Union line and potentially decide the battle in their favor. The 20th Maine was placed at the extreme left of the Union position, with orders that could not have been clearer or more ominous: "Hold this ground at all hazards." There would be no reinforcements. If the regiment broke, the Union flank would collapse.

Throughout the afternoon, Chamberlain's men endured repeated assaults by the 15th Alabama and other Confederate units under Colonel William C. Oates. The fighting was close, chaotic, and brutal, conducted over boulders and through dense woods in sweltering heat. Each Confederate attack pushed closer to breaking the Union line, and Chamberlain was forced to stretch his regiment dangerously thin, bending his line back like a door hinge to prevent being flanked. Ammunition ran dangerously low. Men collapsed from exhaustion and heat. Chamberlain himself was everywhere along the line, steadying his soldiers, issuing calm orders, and absorbing the terror of combat without losing command of the situation.

As the final Confederate assault loomed, Chamberlain faced a grim reality. His regiment was nearly out of ammunition, and another attack would almost certainly overwhelm them. In that moment, he made one of the most audacious tactical decisions of the war. Rather than waiting passively to be overrun, Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge. With a sweeping wheel to the left, the 20th Maine surged downhill, shouting and driving their bayonets into stunned Confederate troops who expected no such move from an exhausted and depleted enemy. The sudden offensive shattered the momentum of the Confederate attack. Many Southern soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured, and the rest fled. Little Round Top was held, the Union flank was saved, and the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg and arguably the war itself tilted decisively in favor of the Union.

Chamberlain's actions at Gettysburg would later earn him the Congressional Medal of Honor, awarded in 1893. The citation recognized his "daring heroism and great tenacity" in holding Little Round Top against overwhelming odds. Yet the significance of his conduct lay not only in bravery, but in leadership and judgment under extreme pressure. Chamberlain demonstrated an intuitive understanding of morale, terrain, and timing, proving that decisive leadership could compensate for material disadvantage. His conduct became a textbook example of initiative at the tactical level, studied by soldiers long after the war. Chamberlain's wartime service did not end at Gettysburg, and the war would exact a terrible physical toll on him. He was promoted to brigadier general and continued to serve with distinction in the Overland Campaign of 1864. At the Battle of Petersburg, he was shot through the hip and groin, a wound so severe that he was expected to die. Grant promoted him on the battlefield as a final honor, but Chamberlain survived after months of agony and recovery. He returned to duty despite chronic pain and lasting disability, embodying the same determination that had defined his stand on Little Round Top.

In one of the war's most symbolic moments, Chamberlain played a prominent role at its conclusion. On the 12th of April, 1865, he was selected to command the Union troops receiving the formal surrender of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. In a gesture of reconciliation rather than triumph, Chamberlain ordered his men to salute the defeated Confederates as they laid down their arms. The act reflected his belief that the war had been fought to preserve the Union, not to humiliate the South, and it earned respect from former enemies, including Confederate General John B. Gordon.

After the war, Chamberlain returned to civilian life but never escaped the shadow of his service. He became president of Bowdoin College, guiding the institution through a period of reform and expansion, and later served four terms as governor of Maine. His postwar years were marked by public service, writing, and continued reflection on the meaning of the war. He authored several books and essays, offering thoughtful and often philosophical interpretations of the conflict and its moral dimensions. Though plagued by pain from his wartime wounds for the rest of his life, he remained active and engaged well into old age. Joshua Chamberlain died in 1914, one of the last prominent Civil War generals, and was the final veteran to die from wounds received in that conflict. His legacy endures not merely because of a single dramatic charge, but because his life embodied the idea of citizen-soldiership at its finest. A scholar who became a warrior, a leader who combined compassion with resolve, Chamberlain's stand at Little Round Top remains a powerful reminder of how individual courage and judgment can shape the course of history at its most critical moments.

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's life and legacy ultimately transcend the dramatic moments for which he is most famous. His story is not merely one of battlefield heroism, but of moral conviction carried into action, of intellect fused with courage, and of leadership rooted in principle rather than ambition. At Little Round Top, Chamberlain did more than save a tactical position; he exemplified the capacity of an ordinary citizen to rise to extraordinary responsibility when the fate of a nation hung in the balance. His decisions were shaped not by rigid military doctrine, but by empathy for his men, clarity of purpose, and a profound sense of duty to something larger than himself.

What distinguishes Chamberlain from many of his contemporaries is the continuity between his wartime conduct and his postwar life. The values that guided him in combat—discipline tempered by humanity, firmness balanced with reconciliation—were the same values he carried into education, politics, and public service. His salute to the defeated Confederates at Appomattox symbolized his belief that the war's true victory lay not in vengeance, but in the restoration of a fractured nation. This act, quiet yet powerful, reflected a deeper understanding of what lasting peace required and underscored his lifelong commitment to unity and moral responsibility.

Chamberlain's enduring significance lies in the way his life challenges simple definitions of heroism. He was not born a soldier, nor did he seek glory, yet he became one of the war's most respected leaders through resolve, adaptability, and an unwavering ethical compass. His physical suffering after the war, borne without bitterness, further reinforces the depth of his character. Even as his wounds shaped his final decades, he continued to serve, teach, write, and reflect, determined that the sacrifices of the Civil War should be understood and remembered with honesty and purpose.

In the final measure, Joshua Chamberlain represents the highest ideals of citizen leadership. His stand at Little Round Top remains a defining moment in American history, but it gains its full meaning only when viewed within the broader arc of his life, a life devoted to learning, service, reconciliation, and moral courage. Through his actions in war and peace alike, Chamberlain left a legacy that speaks not only to the past, but to the enduring power of individual conscience and leadership in shaping the course of history.

 

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Notes:

The wounds Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain received during the Civil War had a profound and lasting impact on his health, shaping the remainder of his life and ultimately contributing to his death. On the 18th of June 1864, during the Battle of Petersburg, Chamberlain was struck by a Minie ball that passed through his right hip and groin, exiting near the bladder and urethra. The injury was considered mortal at the time; blood loss was severe, infection was likely, and the medical practices of the era offered little hope of recovery. He survived only through extraordinary resilience and prolonged medical care, but the damage inflicted by the wound could never be fully healed.

In the years that followed, Chamberlain endured chronic pain, recurring infections, and serious urological complications as a direct result of the injury. The wound left him with long-term damage to his urinary system, including fistulas and strictures that caused frequent obstruction, inflammation, and bleeding. These conditions required repeated medical interventions throughout his life and often left him weak, feverish, and exhausted. Periods of relative health were frequently interrupted by painful relapses, making daily activity unpredictable and physically taxing. Despite this, Chamberlain persisted in public life, masking the severity of his condition behind an outward appearance of energy and resolve.

As he aged, the cumulative effects of the wound worsened. Recurrent infections increasingly taxed his immune system, while chronic inflammation and impaired urinary function led to progressive organ stress. By the early twentieth century, his body was less able to recover from the complications that had plagued him since the war. In 1914, nearly fifty years after being wounded, Chamberlain succumbed to complications directly linked to his Petersburg injury, making him the last Civil War veteran to die from wounds sustained in that conflict. His death served as a stark reminder that the suffering of war often extends far beyond the battlefield, lingering silently for decades after the guns have fallen silent.

Chamberlain's long struggle with his wounds adds a deeper dimension to his legacy. His postwar achievements in education, governance, and public life were accomplished not in spite of discomfort, but in the midst of persistent physical suffering. That he continued to serve with dignity and determination, even as his health steadily declined, underscores the extraordinary endurance that defined him as both a soldier and a citizen. His life stands as a testament to the hidden, lifelong costs of war and the resilience required to bear them.

The promise of a better life pledged by advertisements created after mid-1800s events in the United States such as the Homestead Act of 1862 – which offered 160 acres of government-owned land in the Midwest and West for free with the possibility of eventually owning the land outright – did not always become the reality. 

Those who took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the act to head to the largely rural Midwest and West faced multiple, likely unexpected obstacles, making survival much more difficult than many of them probably imagined. How did those who made the trek survive? Janel Miller offers some answers in this short piece. 

American Progress by John Gast, 1872. In the image settlers are moving west, guided and protected by Columbia.

The saying “Necessity is the mother of invention” is attributed to Plato in 380 B.C. However, it was just as relevant after 1862 when many left their homes in the East to pursue the promise of a better life in the West. 

These settlers faced dry and arid conditions that were previously unknown to them. They responded by using newly developed windmills, irrigation systems and drought-resistant crops. Others found ways to enhance existing techniques, such as manufacturing plows with steel and assembling grain into easy-to-transport bundles.  

Still other settlers aggressively sought to have the railroad, then in its infancy, come through their town. Those who succeeded in this endeavor gained easier access to food, animals and other goods necessary to endure.

In addition, many settlers worked with their peers to establish organizations, such as Granges, that succeeded in adding agriculture into school curricula, establishing rural mail delivery and the parcel post system.

 

In Context

The time period covered by this essay has long since passed, but there are still people who desire rural living.  The reasons newer generations cite for leaving urban life for a more rural one include a desire for recreational areas and a more affordable cost of living.

Most parts of the United States today offer their residents luxuries such as cell phones, computers and vehicles that the settlers of the American West could likely never have imagined. All the more reason those living today should be in awe of how settlers found ways to survive when they moved to the Midwest and the West.

 

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References

Griffin, Sean. Chnm.gmu.edu. “What Brought Settlers to the Midwest?” https://chnm.gmu.edu/tah-loudoun/blog/lessons/what-brought-settlers-to-the-midwest/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Library of Congress Editors. Loc.gov. “Rural Life in the Late 19th Century | Rise of Industrial America. https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/rural-life-in-late-19th-century/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Writing Explained Editors. Writingexplained.com. “Necessity is the Mother of Invention.” https://writingexplained.org/idiom-dictionary/necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Friedman, Jordan. History.com. “The Rugged Trades that Drew Settlers to the American West.” https://www.history.com/articles/settler-jobs-american-west-mining-ranching-trapping. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Slatta, Richard W. Chass.ncsu.edu. “Western Frontier Life in America.” https://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/slatta/cowboys/essays/front_life2.htm#. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Friedman, Jordan. History.com. “The Rugged Trades that Drew Settlers to the American West.” https://www.history.com/articles/settler-jobs-american-west-mining-ranching-trapping. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Library of Congress Editors. Loc.gov. “Rural Life in the Late 19th Century | Rise of Industrial America. https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/rural-life-in-late-19th-century/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Gulliver, Katrina. Daily.jstor.org. “The Gift of the Grange.” https://daily.jstor.org/the-gift-of-the-grange/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Cromartie, John. USDA.gov. “Net Migration Spurs Renewed Growth in Rural Areas of the United States.” https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2024/february/net-migration-spurs-renewed-growth-in-rural-areas-of-the-united-states. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Farberov, Snejana. NYpost.com “Why Young Adults Are Moving to Small Towns at the Highest Rate in a Decade.” https://nypost.com/2025/03/14/real-estate/young-adults-are-moving-to-small-towns-at-the-highest-rate-in-a-decade/. Accessed January 17, 2026.  

Hughes, Keagan. WAVY.com. “Young Adults Leaving Hampton Roads for Rural Areas Amid Rising Costs.” https://www.wavy.com/news/local-news/young-adults-leaving-hampton-roads-for-rural-areas-amid-rising-costs/. Accessed January 17, 2026.

Posted
AuthorGeorge Levrier-Jones

One of the most groundbreaking events of the late nineteenth century was the establishment of the world’s first modern system of social security in Imperial Germany, with the state taking responsibility for safeguarding workers from everyday risks such as incapacity and old age.

Here, Vittorio Trevitt considers the roots of such a social welfare system.

Distributing Alms to the Poor, Abbey of Port-Royal des Champs.

Although the emergence of modern social welfare was product of both altruism and political expediency, with the creation of public entitlements such as retirement pensions, invalidity benefits, and accident and sickness insurance seen partly as a way of drawing support away from the political Left, it nevertheless began a positive trend that continues to the present day. While highly industrialised nation-states for several decades now, including Andorra, Liechtensteinand Monaco, have built up and maintained comprehensive income maintenance systems, many developing nations such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Maldives in Asia, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone in sub-Saharan Africa, and Panama and Suriname in the Americas have relatively recently embarked upon measures to broaden the coverage of and/or introduce new social security benefits. But welfare services in some form or another have existed long before the German reforms of the Nineteenth Century, with both individuals and state organisations offering support to those less able to help themselves. This common act of compassion is one of the more positive aspects of humanity and is a long-established part of the human tradition; one that has existed since the days of antiquity.

 

Byzantine Empire

A notable example of ancient welfare can be found in the Byzantine Empire. For much of its existence, a vast multitudeof social services were provided by the state, church and private citizens, amongst which included homes for the elderly,widows, and those unable to participate in the labour force, institutions for travellers and abandoned children, hostels for sick indigent individuals, orphanages, and (in the imperial capital) the granting of free bread. The emphasis placed on welfare was strongly influenced by the Christian teaching of agape (love) together with the philanthropic traditions of Greek society, with examples of social assistance in ancient Athens such as daily allowances for the handicapped and pensions for war orphans. Although the Byzantine Empire no longer exists, one can argue that its welfarist traditions live on today in the charitable works of Vatican City and Christian churches throughout the world.

 

Religious leaders

Similar initiatives influenced by religious teaching were also carried out by early Islamic leaders, including the creation of social aid for the poor (such as payments to minors and those without work) regardless of their religion, together with the care of abandoned children and assistance during times of famine. A levy was also established known as the Zakat that has helped underprivileged people in many nations like Afghanistan since its inception. Religious doctrine shaped welfare provisions in Cambodia during the reign of King Javarman VII who (influenced by Buddhism) presided over the inauguration of a nationwide system of public health facilities while ensuring that those living in poverty were provided with sustenance. In the Ottoman Empire (which included several modern states such as North Macedonia, Palestine, Montenegro, Albania, and a section of Croatia), prosperous members of different religious groups used their wealth for benevolent purposes such as the building of eating establishments for the impoverished. Morocco under the Merenid dynasty was no exception, with those in need attended to by organised charity. In Judaism, assisting the underprivileged has long been viewed as a religious duty, as characterised by a welfare tradition known as Tzedakah. This not only involves providing direct cash assistance to a deprived individual, but also helping to lift them out of poverty. One scholar from the 12th century drew up a comprehensive code of what forms this aid should take, amongst which includes taking on a person experiencing hardship as a partner or helping them find an occupation.

 

Asia

In Mesopotamia, temples provided succour to the poor, while under the guidance of Khosrow I the Sasanian Empire developed numerous schemes aimed at helping senior and impoverished citizens. In Ancient China, there were many instances of state-sponsored aid being provided such as the granting of food and allowances. In India, the establishment of free health care became a hallmark of the Gupta era, while many welfare programmes were put into operation under the Mauryan state. In pre-colonial Vietnam, direct relief such as medications and tents was granted by government representatives, while in Ancient Mongolia direct food assistance in crisis situations became a duty of the state. In Bhutan, a system has long operated known as Kidu in which the monarch comes to people’s aid to ensure that their needs are met. In pre-industrial Japan, there were many examples of people in authority undertaking philanthropic works such as help for blind persons, lodgings for beggars and for artisans lacking employment, and repairs in dwellings inhabited by people living with leprosy.

 

Americas & Africa

In the Americas, the Aztecs and Incas embarked upon their own welfarist initiatives aimed at uplifting the poor, while in Africa the Mutapa became known for providing public relief to physically handicapped persons. In pre-colonial Zimbabwe, an intriguing system was set up in which chiefs put aside plots of land for community cultivation, with produce kept in granaries for emergencies. Prior to the arrival of colonialism, an altruistic practice was introduced in Rwandaknown as Umuganda in which help was given to less fortunate members of the community (such as the elderly and disabled) including travel to health providers and the construction of dwellings. During the age of the Mali Empire (which included contemporary countries like Gambia, Senegal and Chad), a progressive charter laying out numerous rights and rules was drawn up, one of which was an obligation to assist the impoverished. Additionally, in the Kongo Kingdom (which is believed to have included portions of what became Gabon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the provision of welfare is said to have been a responsibility of those in authority.

 

Social conscience

Although deeply unequal societies, a social conscience nevertheless existed in the major world powers of Ancient Egypt and Ancient Rome. In the former, care for the poor was both enshrined in law and put into practice, with assistance given to the aged by way of housing, employment and medical attention. During the age of the latter, multiple social programmes were launched to support underprivileged people, amongst which included aid to widows, financial and educational support for children, free clothing for soldiers, loans to farmers of moderate means, and grants of land to poverty-stricken inhabitants of urban areas. One of the largest of these was the ‘grain dole;’ a dietary allowance that benefited hundreds of thousands during its existence. Recipients were allocated a fixed amount of wheat (believed to be sufficient for the needs of an individual), and in later years the allowance was expanded to include certain other foodstuffs. It was also an integral part of the unofficial platform of the Populares; political figures who presented themselves as representing the interests of ordinary citizens in contrast to their opposite numbers, the Optimates. In addition, workers’ guilds were set up which provided several categories of assistance to their members and relatives.

Not all societies throughout history, however, have had the infrastructure to set up formal networks of welfare. In the African continent, there has long existed a tradition whereby extended families, chiefs and villages have acted as informal safety nets; supporting members of the community when the need arises. In West Africa, this type of welfare found its expression in nations like Togo, Benin, Niger, and Liberia, in East Africa in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, to the north in Mauritania, Sudan and South Sudan, and further south in Malawi, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Botswana. In the Pacific, a system has long existed in countries like the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea known as Wantok in which members of a clan or tribe look out for one another’s wellbeing not only through helping members find work, but in granting monetary support as well. A similar system has long operated in Fiji called Kerekere, in which those who need help in different situations seek it from neighbours and extended family members, while the Bubuti system in Kiribati provides that households share what they have with those in straightened circumstances. This kind of indirect support is also seen in neighbouring Samoa as an integral part of that island’s identity, and is an established practice in other Pacific nations such as Palau, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.

 

In context

This is not say that informal safety nets are an effective substitute for modern social insurance programmes. Their failure in effectively ameliorating conditions for AIDS orphans in Africa attests to this. Nevertheless, they have been credited for preventing severe hardship in the Pacific, and stand out as a laudable example of kindness and ingenuity. Also, whilst one should not view imperial rule as an ideal form of governance, the emphasis placed on welfare by the aforementioned empires of old was a positive attribute that is commendable.

The provision of social welfare, therefore, is an aspect of human history that has long-established roots. At a time when our world has undergone a tremendous amount of technological progress, social security remains a privilege and not a right for much of humanity. We should learn from the examples of ancient empires, non-industrial societies and the social aspects of religious teaching not only in remembering where social welfare came from, but in shaping its future as well for the betterment of the entire human race.

 

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Jack Cornwell was born on the 8th of January, 1900 in Leyton, then part of Essex, into a working-class family for whom life offered few comforts and little security. He grew up in modest surroundings and attended local schools, where he was remembered as a quiet, unassuming boy rather than an exceptional student or natural adventurer. Like many boys of his generation, Cornwell was drawn to the Royal Navy by a mixture of patriotism, the promise of steady pay, and the romance of the sea. At just fifteen years old he enlisted as a Boy Seaman in 1915, undergoing training at HMS Impregnable before being posted to active service at an age when most of his contemporaries were still in school.

Terry Bailey explains.

The image of Jack Cornwell as used by the press at the time of his death. It is now thought to show a younger brother.

In early 1916 Cornwell was assigned to HMS Chester, a newly commissioned light cruiser of the Royal Navy's 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron. As a Boy First Class, his duties included serving as a sight setter and loader on one of the ship's 5.5-inch guns, a demanding role that required discipline, precision, and physical stamina. Despite his youth, Cornwell adapted quickly to the routines of naval life and the responsibilities of combat readiness. By the end of May 1916, Chester was operating in the North Sea as part of the British Grand Fleet, soon to be drawn into the largest naval engagement of the First World War.

The Battle of Jutland, fought between the 31st of May and the 1st of June 1916, was the long-anticipated clash between Britain's Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and the German High Seas Fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer. Both sides sought to gain decisive control of the North Sea, a strategic prize that would shape the course of the war. The British aimed to maintain their naval blockade of Germany, while the Germans hoped to weaken British sea power by isolating and destroying portions of the Grand Fleet. The battle unfolded amid confusion, smoke, poor visibility, and rapidly shifting tactical situations, with dozens of capital ships and cruisers exchanging fire over vast distances.

HMS Chester became engaged during the early phases of the battle when she encountered a group of German light cruisers. Outgunned and exposed, Chester came under intense and accurate enemy fire. Several German shells struck the ship, causing heavy casualties among the gun crews. One shell burst close to Cornwell's gun position, killing or disabling nearly the entire crew and inflicting severe wounds on Cornwell himself. He suffered multiple injuries to his chest and legs, wounds that would ultimately prove fatal. Despite his pain and loss of blood, Cornwell refused to leave his post. Standing alone amid the wreckage, he continued to load and aim the gun, awaiting orders and prepared to fire if commanded.

Cornwell remained at his station until the fighting subsided and Chester withdrew from the action. Only then was he discovered by officers, still upright beside the gun, gravely wounded but steadfast in his duty. He was taken to the hospital upon the ship's return to port, but his injuries were too severe. Jack Cornwell died on the 2nd of June 1916, just over a day after the battle, at the age of sixteen. His conduct, marked by extraordinary courage, discipline, and devotion to duty in the face of overwhelming danger, was soon reported to the Admiralty.

In recognition of his actions, Cornwell was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest award for gallantry in the British and Commonwealth armed forces. The citation emphasized that he "remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders," despite being mortally wounded. His youth made his bravery all the more striking, and his story resonated deeply with a nation exhausted by war and loss. Cornwell was given a hero's funeral in London, attended by thousands, and his grave became a site of public remembrance.

The Battle of Jutland itself remains a subject of debate among historians. Tactically, the German Navy could claim a measure of success, having sunk more British ships and inflicted heavier immediate losses. However, strategically, the battle was a clear victory for Britain. The Royal Navy retained command of the sea, and the German High Seas Fleet, though not destroyed, was effectively contained. After Jutland, the German fleet rarely ventured out in strength again, conceding naval dominance to Britain and ensuring that the blockade of Germany remained intact for the remainder of the war.

Jack Cornwell's legacy endures as one of the most powerful symbols of youthful courage in British military history. He was not a seasoned warrior or a decorated officer, but a teenage sailor who, when tested under the most extreme conditions, displayed unwavering resolve and selflessness. His story embodies the quiet heroism of ordinary individuals caught in extraordinary circumstances. It serves as a reminder that courage is not measured by age or rank, but by the willingness to stand fast in the face of fear and duty.

Jack Cornwell's story endures not because it is dramatic in the conventional sense of battlefield heroics, but because of its profound simplicity. In the chaos and terror of Jutland—the smoke-filled decks, the thunder of naval guns, and the sudden loss of comrades around him, Cornwell did not perform a single spectacular act meant to turn the tide of battle. Instead, he did something far rarer and more revealing: he stayed. Mortally wounded, isolated, and fully aware of the danger, he remained at his post, embodying the quiet discipline and sense of duty instilled in him by the Royal Navy and embraced by him as a personal moral code. His courage was not impulsive or reckless, but calm, steadfast, and deeply human.

In a war often remembered for its industrial scale and impersonal slaughter, Cornwell's actions restore the individual to the center of history. He reminds us that the outcome of great events, whether a vast naval engagement like Jutland or the broader struggle of the First World War is shaped not only by admirals, strategies, and fleets, but by the conduct of ordinary men and boys placed in extraordinary circumstances. His youth, far from diminishing his heroism, underscores it, revealing how responsibility and bravery were borne by those scarcely beyond childhood during the conflict.

More than a century later, Jack Cornwell remains a symbol rather than a statistic, a name that speaks to sacrifice without bitterness and courage without bravado. His Victoria Cross represents not only gallantry under fire, but also the enduring values of duty, resilience, and selflessness in the face of overwhelming odds. In remembering Cornwell, we honor not just one young sailor, but an entire generation whose quiet endurance helped shape the course of history, and whose sacrifices continue to resonate long after the guns of Jutland fell silent.

 

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