The Greatest Trick of WWII? How Operation Fortitude Fooled Nazi Germany and Enabled the D-Day Landings

Almost anyone with even a passing interest in the Second World War knows of Operation Overlord (D-Day) and its immense importance. Yet, far fewer have heard of another great military operation that helped to ensure Overlord’s success: Operation Fortitude. Here, Nathan Richardson explains what happened in the 1944 operation to fool the Nazis and make them think that the D-Day landings would take place in Calais, France and Norway – and not in their actual location of Normandy.

A dummy British RAF aircraft in October 1943. Source: The National Archives, available here.

In 1944, the combined British and American military chiefs, along with their various allies, were intently planning an invasion of Western Europe. They all knew Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” must be breached if the Western Allies were to bring the war effectively to Nazi Germany and take the pressure off of the beleaguered Russians. Fighting in Italy had taken a terrible toll on the Allied armies. Regrettably, Italy had not turned out to be the “weak underbelly” that Churchill had thought. Though the operations in Sicily and Italy had successfully forced the fascist Mussolini out of power and switched Italy over to the Allied side, German troops barred the Allies from crossing the Alps into Europe proper. The Allies decided that they must find another invasion route into Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied generals made up of both British and American commanders and headed by General Eisenhower, determined that an amphibious assault must be made from Britain into Western Europe. Where and when were the only remaining questions. Ultimately, Normandy, France and June were the location and time decided upon. Yet, keeping this information from the Germans could very well decide the success or failure of the invasion. Churchill, though convinced of the necessity of an invasion, nevertheless greatly feared its results if it turned out to be a disaster, which it very well could have been (Keegan 164-5). 

However, Eisenhower, who held the gut-wrenching last word on when the invasion took place, went to impressive lengths to keep the Germans as much in the dark as possible. That an invasion was coming, the Germans knew for a fact—it was inevitable that the Allies would attempt to retake Occupied Europe. Indeed, Hitler had been making enormous preparations on his coastal defenses, stretching from Norway in the north, down the whole coast, all the way down the English Channel. However, this impressive length of coastline defenses was never completed, and never lived up to its propaganda—nor did it live up to the faith that Hitler placed in it (Esposito 66). Naturally, the Germans knew they must decide which areas were most likely to be assaulted, and to build their best defenses there. Deciding that the Allies must need a port to sustain an invasion, the Germans centered their heaviest weapons and fortifications at port-cities such as Cherbourg, Calais, and Antwerp (Weinberg 685).

Not illogically, the German High Command decided that the most likely invasion point was the Pas de Calais, with its port close at hand, and it being the closest point between Europe and England. Why would the Allies travel farther than necessary? Would not the Allies enjoy greater air cover from their powerful air forces the closer they were to England? Thus, the Germans centered the bulk of their divisions in the West around Calais, and there put their best forces, ready to repel at this likely invasion site (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88). However, this was exactly why the Allies knew they must not attack where the Germans expected them. Eisenhower knew he must keep the Germans from knowing the true invasion point. In order to do that, he made sure the Germans found evidence that seemed to confirm their preconceived ideas. The Germans must be convinced that Calais was the true planned site of the invasion, and that any other attack was just a diversion (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82, 88). To accomplish this trickery, the Allies employed some truly ingenious schemes.

German Spies Flipped

World War Two was a war of spies and espionage. In an age of rapidly advancing weaponry and innovative tactics, spies were absolutely essential in keeping the commanders on both sides knowledgeable of the enemy’s capabilities and plans. Yet, the Allies were able to effectively deprive the Germans of their ability for espionage, and turn any German spies into Allied agents, who would turn around and feed the Germans false information about the Allies. How was this done? The British Secret Service identified German spies and carefully evaluated them. If German spies were deemed suitable (i.e., most likely to cooperate with the Allies), they were convinced to turn ‘double-agent’, and to report to the Abwehr (the German military intelligence) exactly what the British wanted them to know. Those spies who were not deemed suitable or who did not cooperate were either executed or imprisoned. This system was known as the Double-Cross System. Thus, not only did the Allies control the German spies, but with the ability to intercept German coded radio transmissions due to British code breaking (known as ULTRA), the Allies could confirm that the Germans were receiving the information the Allies wanted them to receive, and could also confirm whether the Germans believed what they were being told (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 77). This system of turning German spies into double-agents had carefully been built up since the beginning of the war. Yet, British intelligence knew that using the Double-Cross System to the Allies’ advantage could likely only be used once, since the Germans would eventually realize they had been duped, and the Allies would never have such an opportunity again. So, the British were forced to sit by and patiently wait to use this weapon until the perfect time. That time was D-Day. Until then, the British carefully fed the Germans true and valuable information to ensure the Germans trusted and valued their agents, while also taking care not to feed them information that would be militarily damaging (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 78).

Operation Fortitude

The last thing the Allies wanted was for the Germans to realize that their spies had become compromised. The Germans must see tangible evidence that what their spies were reporting was true. Enter: Operation Fortitude. Operation Fortitude was designed to fool the Germans into believing that the Allies were attacking at Calais, France and southern Norway, which would hopefully cause the Germans to concentrate their best defensive efforts at these points - and away from Normandy (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82). 

A seaborne invasion, of course, necessitates a massive buildup of men and materials. Shipping of all sorts must be concentrated at the embarkation points. Supplies of every sort, including a massive number of vehicles, such as tanks, trucks, and jeeps. Fighter and bomber aircraft, ready to provide air support for the attackers, must be kept in readiness at airfields close to the invasion beaches. For a Normandy landing, this massive buildup must be assembled in and around ports in the south of England, at important port cities such as Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portland, and multiple others (Esposito 67). How could these preparations be kept hidden? They could not fully keep them hidden, despite the Allies’ best efforts. No amount of care and camouflage could keep German scouting planes from picking up the U.S. 4th Infantry division near Plymouth or the British 50th Armored Division west of Poole or the Canadian 3rd Infantry division near Portsmouth (Esposito 67). The location of these troops, if spotted, would show the Germans that Normandy was a more likely invasion site. Contrarily, the empty fields and ports of southeast England around Dover (the closest point between England and France), would indicate that Calais was not the target. Despite all of the Allied efforts to hide and disguise their readying of forces and to muzzle or flip the German spies, the Germans might still catch on, and the result might lead the Allies to an enormous defeat. 

Thus, the only way to keep the Germans from guessing the true invasion point, was to provide a distraction. This distraction was Operation Fortitude. Operation Fortitude was a dummy Operation, involving dummy formations of troops. In Scotland, the completely fake British “Fourth Army” was stationed, ready to assault southern Norway. In the southeast of England, the bogus First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was stationed, across from Calais, right where the Germans expected to see such an Army Group stationed (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82). To make FUSAG look like a real army group to the Germans (from far enough away at least), the Allies built poorly camouflaged dummy landing craft and fields of papier-mâché tanks. To make the tanks look more legitimate, jeeps were used to drag chains around the tanks to create “tank tracks” and to kick up dust, indicating movement. Hitler’s spies obediently reported all of these fraudulences as the real thing (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84). Fake radio traffic was also broadcast around the assembly areas for these fake armies. The British Fourth Army, which was entirely fictional (FUSAG was made up of some real units, though not all were even in England yet), knew that the Germans, due to their expertise in intercepting and decoding their enemy’s radio transmissions, were able to geographically pinpoint the location of the Fourth Army headquarters (which was Edinburgh Castle), as well as locating and identifying divisional and corps command posts (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 82-3, 85). The Allies would use the Germans’ proficiency against them with great effect. 

The already-famous General George S. Patton was placed in command of this force, giving further credence to the Army Group he supposedly led, since the Germans believed him the best Allied general. In reality, Eisenhower considered Patton more in his element when the time came for an impetuous drive across France, so Patton was given this unconventional role and saved for later (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 85). With control over the German spies in Britain, the Allies could control in large part what information the Germans received, and what they did not receive. Also, with the ability to read the German codes, the Allies could see the Germans’ react to the false reports, and could tell whether the Germans were buying it or not. Even if some information indicating Normandy as the main landing area came into German hands, this information would be buried amidst a far greater volume of reports that said the Allies were getting ready to attack Calais (Weinberg, 682).

Dummy landing craft used as decoys in south-eastern England harbours in the period before D-Day, 1944.

The German Defenses Affected by Fortitude

Operation Fortitude worked so successfully that the Germans believed not only that the Pas de Calais was the main target (which Hitler and General von Rundstedt, the commander in the West, both agreed would be the case), but that the Allies actually had far greater capabilities than they actually possessed (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84, 87). From the intercepted and decoded German radio messages, the Allies could tell that the Germans figured Eisenhower had twice as many forces as he actually had (the Germans counted eighty-nine Allied divisions, rather than the forty-seven Ike actually had), and that he had four times as many landing craft, which were actually in very short supply (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 87, 83). Believing that Eisenhower had so many men and landing craft at his disposal, the Germans easily believed that Ike had enough power for diversionary assaults in addition to the main assault—which, in the end, kept the Germans from reacting swiftly and with enough force against the Normandy assault. In fact, the lie that Normandy was just a diversion for a Calais assault lasted until nearly two months after the Allied invasion, well after the beachhead had been secured and the push inland accomplished (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 100; Esposito 83). Fifteen German divisions, the bulk of the Fifteenth Army, which were the best-equipped the Germans had in France, were kept out of the fight in Normandy altogether, awaiting another threat that never came (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88, 100). The distraction caused by the bogus British Fourth Army was no less successful. Hitler was so convinced that an attack was coming that he reinforced the Norwegian garrisons, leaving them with thirteen divisions—twice as many troops as were needed for the occupation. An additional 90,000 naval and 60,000 air personnel were also left to guard Norway, along with an armored division—all of which would have served a far better purpose in Normandy (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 84).

Conclusion

In summary, Operation Fortitude, which masterfully employed the resources that the Double-Cross System provided, managed to utterly fool the Germans into believing that the main attack was coming anywhere but Normandy. It can even be said that if Operation Fortitude had not succeeded, Operation Overlord would have failed. The Allies simply did not have the means to transport enough men to France quickly enough to meet the full force of the German occupation troops in the West if Fortitude failed to hold them back (Ambrose, Ike’s Spies 88-9). Eisenhower wrote frankly in February of 1944, just months before the great invasion, that “The success or failure of coming operations depends upon whether the enemy can obtain advance information of an accurate nature” (Ambrose, D-Day 83). The success of the Normandy invasion was just the first step in the freeing of all Europe from the terror of Nazi occupation. Thus, Operation Fortitude did incalculable service in the Allied effort to rid the world of Nazism.

What do you think the significance of Operation Fortitude was? Let us know below.

References

Ambrose, Stephen Edward. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Ambrose, Stephen Edward. Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. Doubleday, 1981.

Esposito, Vincent J. The West Point Atlas of War. European Theater. Tess Press, 1995.

Keegan, John. Winston Churchill. Viking Penguin, 2002.

Weinberg, Gerhard. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1994.

World War Two: The Context to Operation Overlord and the Occupation of Omaha Beach

Operation Overlord and the D-Day landings were a huge Allied undertaking in June 1944 during World War Two that opened up the Western European Theater of Operations. Here, Robert Tremblay considers the historical context behind the operation and key considerations for the battle itself.

Robert’s previous article on Operation Overlord and the Differing Allied and Nazi Leaderships is here.

‘Into the Jaws of Death’ - U.S. Troops wading through water and Nazi gunfire on Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944, available here.

Introduction

General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the best description in “At Ease”: “Overlord was at once a singular military expedition and fearsome risk”.[1]The concept of operations for the occupation of Omaha Beach was the decisive reason for the victory of Operation Overlord in Normandy.  Operation Overlord enabled the Allies’ momentum through Western Europe in 1944 and 1945 to the occupation of Berlin.  Operation Overlord was a result of the German aggressive expansionism during WWII. Then, German aggressive expansionism within WWII was the result of factors during the interwar years.  

During the interwar years, America and European countries had the inability to respond to Germany’s aggression; therefore, enabling WWII.  Further analysis shows that these countries did not respond appropriately to Germany’s mature military industrial base and its doctrine through the interwar period and the onset of WWII.  This lack of response facilitated the German aggression. Germany then used this power to be aggressive towards other European military powers. These same European military powers enabled this German aggression by not responding effectively to the earlier warning signs.  Additionally, the United States did not respond effectively either.  

Germany’s mature military industry enabled the aggressive expansionism through its occupation of Austria and Eastern Europe that led to its objective of an increased ideological legitimacy within the European region.  Germany’s military industry had the ability to produce war materials in an effective and efficient matter.  Murray & Millett stated that from a strategic perceptive, while Germany lost the War (World War I), its industrial base stayed undamaged.[2]  In the mid-1930s, Germany was dedicating a large amount of its finances to its industrial base.  Winston Churchill stated in his memoirs, that in 1936, he reported to Parliament that Germany was contributing large amount of its finances for military armaments and materials.[3]  Inability to respond to Germany’s mature military industrial base facilitated aggression from Hitler.

Thirdly, the German military inaugurated a creative combined arms military effort calledBlitzkrieg.  The Germans were able to adapt and improve their Blitzkrieg doctrine through their evolution from WWI and most recently the Polish WWII campaign. German Blitzkrieg took doctrinal lessons from World War I to the Poland invasion.[4]  There was limited response to the Blitzkrieg method from Germany’s adversarial countries. Therefore, this led to Hitler’s strategic gain and confidence, leading to the invasion and occupation of France and Western USSR.

In conclusion, Germany was able to succeed militarily in the beginning of World War II, 1939-1943, based on its mature military industrial base and doctrine during the interwar years.  This German aggressive expansionism led to the Allies needing to conduct a cross-channel invasion (Operation Overlord) in order to liberate Europe and to create an envelopment around Germany. The Battle of Omaha Beach was the main effort for Operation Overlord based on its mission.  There is no way that the Americans could have conducted Operation Overlord without the ability to secure Omaha beach.  There would be a gap between the Gold (British) and Utah (American) beach of 7,000 yards.[5]    

Situation

German Military

The German military had inadequate forces in the Normandy region to defend the Allied operation in Normandy.  Before D-Day, there were sixty divisions throughout Western Europe (France, Belgium, and Holland); however, in the immediate area of Normandy, there were only nine infantry divisions and one panzer division.[6]  The German response to the V Corps invasion was not responsive based on its intense centralized command control.  The lack of responsiveness provided ideal conditions for the German forces being chaotic and inundated during the invasion.

German naval forces were projected to harass the cross-channel invasion. Therefore, the Allied Navy placed sea mines to act as a barrier to which it would secure the approach.[7]  There was limited German air power due to the Allies already having air superiority.

Therefore, the Germans concentrated on defense.  Field Marshal Rommel recognized that the Allies were going to invade Normandy; but, he did not have an accurate time and date.  Consequently, Rommel concentrated German resources to ensure its defense. Mines were established on the Omaha battlefield.  Then, the Germans placed huge iron obstacles at the Omaha beachhead.  Next, there were huge and thick concreated fortifications on the cliffs at the end of beachhead.  In fact, Rommel stated that the defensive works would lead to fortifications and mines going five to six miles inland.[8]  The result was the Allies faced strongly protected and cleverly concealed gun replacements and pill boxes.[9]  Additionally, there were height advantages to the cliffs.  

Concept of Operations for Operation Overlord and the Occupation of Omaha Beach 

Shaping Operations

The shaping operations consisted of Allied naval and aerial bombardment with the intent to destroy the defensive positions and works and to eliminate German forces. Their contributions were the disruption of the fortifications of the defense works.[10]The effect was to give the Germans the inability to have effective defense for their firepower.  Additionally, the bombardments impacted the defense postures beyond the beachhead by destroying mine fields and other defensive fortifications.[11]  During June 5, Allied air forces conducted over 2,200 missions and dropped over 7,600 tons of explosives.[12]  During June 6, the strategic level air forces conducted 5,309 missions to drop 10,396 tons of explosives while the tactical air force conducted another 5,276.[13]  The Naval gunfire and bombardment proved to be effective at destroying the obstacles and other defensive works.[14]

Missions

SHAFE Mission for Operation Overlord

GEN Eisenhower and Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces-Europe (SHAFE)’s mission for Operation Overlord was a multi-divisional invasion front on the territory between Ouistreham and Varreville with an urgent purpose to force project follow-on forces.[15]/[16]  SHAFE knew that the Allies had two areas of operations.  These areas of operations served two purposes for GEN Eisenhower’s strategy for the liberation of Europe.  First, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean served as a secure supply chain for sustainment for their respective fronts while simultaneously exhausting the German’s supply chain at the same time.  Then, Eastern Europe and the Southern Europe area of operations served as a flank that was designed to envelope Nazi Germany for final occupation. Therefore, SHAFE needs to open up another supply chain and force projection from a different European area of operations and flank.  This context led to GEN Eisenhower’s mission for the invasion.  Then, the occupation of Omaha Beach became the vital effort for Operation Overlord’s mission.

V Corps Mission for the Occupation of Omaha Beach

MG Gerow and the V Corp’s mission was to attack, occupy, and secure a 7,000 yard wide Omaha Beach on the northern coast of Calvados near St-Laurent.[17]  As stated before, the secure occupation of Omaha Beach was the main effort for the execution of Operation Overlord.  The other Allied beaches and the American Utah beach provided an advantageous gap (Omaha Beach) for the German defense.  The gap would create a divide in the Allied Forces that were invading Normandy Beach. The separation of Allied Forces would cause disorganized command and control with the divergence of command.  This disorganization and divergence would create conditions for a tactical success for the Germans.  Furthermore, SHAFE considered occupation of Omaha Beach as the main effort based on its impact to the overall Overlord mission and operation. V Corps would invade Omaha Beach with approximately 34,000 men and 3,306 vehicles with follow-on forces consisting of 25,117 men and 4,429 vehicles.[18]  In order to accomplish its objectives, V Corp relied and empowered 1st ID and 29th ID to perform its objectives.

Conclusion

Operation Overlord was a follow-on projection of the Allies’ force in order to finish the theater-wide envelopment of Germany for the European Theater of Operations. The Allies Operation Overlord assault was a tactical surprise to the Germans.[19]  On June 7, 1944, the Allies were 5 to 6 miles inland and on 10 June, the Allies had a sixty by twelve miles lodgment area.[20]

Allies

Operation Overlord’s successes enabled the Allies to have a port of entry through the opening of the western European Theater of Operations.  It took approximately six weeks to establish an intermediate staging base with a line of communication.[21]  This line of communication was critical to the Western European Theater of Operations for the follow-on forces.  It provided the resources needed to sustain the Allies advance to liberate Paris and the rest of France.  Then, this supply chain gave the logistical ability for the Allies to win the Battle of the Bulge and to reach their culminating point in Germany for the Battle of Berlin.  Additionally, it created opportunities of advancement for the Soviets in the Eastern European area of operations and the Allies on the Southern area of operations. 

Finally, psychologically, it created conditions for the Allies to project their forces with speed, surprise and mass through France, Luxemburg, Belgium, and eventually Germany.  Furthermore, it gave the Allies the confidence that a coalition of nations can maneuver, with combined arms, under one commander. This would have a strong impact during the final stages of the war that led to the surrender of Nazi Germany in the Battle of Berlin. Finally, it is stated that Operation Overlord was a domineering accomplishment of the Allies military judgement, technology, industry and ingenuity advanced through the war.[22]   

Germans

The occupation of Omaha Beach and Operation Overlord had a huge and adverse impact on the German industrial base.  Operation Overlord provided the final overwhelming impact to Germans lines of communication and industry.  These lines of communication and industry did not have the endurance to support the three areas of operation.  Finally, psychologically speaking, the Germans took a great blow.  In Germany, the population’s morale and confidence went down.  For example, shortly after the success at the occupation of Omaha Beach and Operation Overlord, there was a plot to assassinate Hitler.  All of these factors have a strong ripple impact on the Axis during the final stages of the war that would eventually lead to the surrender of Germany.

What do you think of the Battle of Omaha Beach? Let us know below.

[1]Dwight D. Eisenhower. At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company INC, 1967), 273..

[2]         Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War.  (Cambridge, MS and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 16-22.  

[3]Winston Churchill.  The Second World War (Condensed Version).  (London, England: Penguin Books, 1989), 94-97.

[4]Murray and Millett, Second World War, 16-22

[5]         Dwight D. Eisenhower. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force: 6 June 1944 TO 8 May 1945. Washington D.C: The Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1994, first published in 1946, 6.

[6] Ibid, 17.

[7]  Ibid. 

[8] Erwin Rommel. Rommel PapersEdited by B.H. Liddell-Hart (New York: DaCapo Press, 1988), 455.

[9]             Report of the Amphibious Operations, Invasion of Northern France, Western Task Force, United States Fleet, June 1944.s, Eisenhower Archives Website ( June 1944), 4-1.

[10]Eisenhower. Report by the Supreme Commander: 6 June 1944 TO 8 May 1945, 21, 57. 

[11]Ibid, 21, 57.

[12]Ibid, 19

[13]Ibid, 20.

[14]Ibid, 20.

[15]Ibid

[16]John J. Marr. “Designing the Victory in Europe.” Military Review July-August 2011 (2011): 64.

[17]Ibid. 

[18]Omaha Beachhead. Washington D.C: The Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1994, first published in 1945, 9.

[19]Viscount Montgomery. Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery(South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Swords Books, 2005), 257-260.

[20]Ibid

[21]Eisenhower. Report by the Supreme Commander: 6 June 1944 TO 8 May 1945, 21, 42.  

[22]Adrian R. Lewis. “Omaha Beach: Americans at War.” PhD diss. (University of Chicago, 1995), 442.

Bibliography

1.    Churchill, Winston.  The Second World War (Condensed Version). London, England:   

          Penguin Books, 1989.

2.    Eisenhower, Dwight D. At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends. Garden City, NY: Doubleday   

            and Company INC, 1967.  

3.    --. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations 

    in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force: 6 June 1944 TO 8 May 1945. Washington  

         D.C: The Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1994, first published in 1946. 

4.     Lewis, Adrian R. “Omaha Beach: Americans at War.” PhD diss., University of 

     Chicago, 1995.

5.     Marr, John J. “Designing the Victory in Europe.” Military Review July-August 2011 

          (2011): 62-68.

6.     Montgomery, Viscount. Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery.  South Yorkshire, 

         England: Pen & Swords Books, 2005.

7.     Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World 

         War. Cambridge, MS and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University   

          Press, 2000.

8.      Omaha Beachhead. Washington D.C: The Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1994, 

      first published in 1945, 9.

9.      Report of the Amphibious Operations, Invasion of Northern France, Western Task Force, 

        United States Fleet, June 1944.s, Eisenhower Archives Website ( June 1944).

10.   Rommel, Erwin. Rommel PapersEdited by B.H. Liddell-Hart. New York: DaCapo Press, 

         1988.

World War Two: Operation Overlord and the Differing Allied and Nazi Leaderships

Operation Overlord and the D-Day landings were a huge Allied undertaking in June 1944 during World War Two that opened up the Western European Theater of Operations. Here, Robert Tremblay considers the operation in the context of the differing leaderships: the Allies led by General Eisenhower and the Nazis led by Erwin Rommel.

General Eisenhower addresses American troops on June 5, 1944, the day before D-Day.

Introduction

During General Eisenhower’s message to the Allied Forces, the day of June 6, 1944, he communicated intent and insight to the forces by stating they are “about to embark upon the Great Crusade”.[1]  General (GEN) Eisenhower’s engaged and responsive decision making, through his experience and leadership attributes, accounted for the success in defeating Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the Germans in Operation Overlord.  Operation Overlord became the catalyst for the future Allied victory in the European Theater of Operations for WWII.  Operation Overlord was to open-up a third war front through Western Europe, within the European Theater of Operations, in order serve as a theater opening for a line communication to liberate Western Europe. Then, the Allied forces would have the ability to create an envelopment of Nazi Germany, leading to their occupation and surrender.  The mission consisted of a multinational invasion using air power, sea power, and land power.  Operation Overlord forces comprised of 5,000 landing vessels (security provided from 700 naval boats) transporting 175,000 (numbers vary) from five multi-lateral divisions with three Allied airborne divisions by 1,000 personnel transport aircraft and gliders, which were supported by 4,000 fighter and bomber airplanes.[2]  Operational Overlord consisted of soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines coming from seven nations coming together for a common cause.[3]  

Root Cause Analysis for Operation Overlord

The root cause for the execution of Operation Overlord and the occupation of Omaha Beach was a result from three critical factors.  The first factor was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) decisions to formally support the “Europe First” policy over the Pacific campaign.  The reason is that the Americans and the British made a mutual judgement that Germany was rapidly becoming a bigger risk than Japan and the Allies needed to concentrate first on Europe.  FDR and Churchill’s objective was to destroy Hitler’s aggression across Europe and North Africa.  The Americans and the British used the “Europe First” policy as an advantage for development of its readiness through the Southern European and North African campaign.  FDR used military, as an instrument of power to reach a political objective of legitimizing the “Europe First” policy.  This policy led to the planning and preparation for Operation Overlord.  

The second critical factor was the concept of operations development amongst the Allied leaders for Operation Overlord.  The Allied leaders initially discussed the concept of operations in May 1943 at the Trident Conference.  During the conference, the senior Allied leaders discussed the organization, training, and equipment for the U.S. Military and Allied Forces going into Great Britain.[4]  Then, at the Quadrant Conference in August 1943, the Allied military leaders discussed the concept of Operation Overlord.[5]   This stated three conditions that needed to be met before the execution of Operation Overlord.  The first condition was that there needed to be exhaustion in the German military resources before the Allies executed D-Day.  The second condition was that the Allies needed to strain the German resources though the depletion of their logistical base by sustaining two areas of operations within the war.  The third condition was that the Allied forces were to use opportunities to advance their readiness through mission-related experiences.   

The last factor was the selection of GEN Dwight Eisenhower.  FDR officially designated GEN Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander on his weekly address. Before he did the address, FDR told GEN Eisenhower “Well, Ike, you are going to command Overlord”.[6][7]  GEN Eisenhower took all responsibility for Operation Overlord.  After his appointment of responsibilities, GEN Eisenhower empowered the Allied forces with loyalty and conviction so they could plan and prepare for this complex operation.  He stated that he had “full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle”.[8]  

Conflicting Personalities of Generalship

The German and American generalship was the decisive reason as to whom would be victorious in Normandy.  There were conflicting personalities operating within different forms of nationalism and ideology.  Soldiers witnessed GEN Eisenhower being an engaged general based on wanting to know each soldier’s emotions before the invasion.  For example, during Operation Overlord, this is where the famous picture was taken in front of the 101st ABN DIV Soldiers before they did their jump behind enemy lines.[9]  Additionally, once he provided the decision for Overlord, he was as anxious for the soldiers as the general officers and the division commanders as it was the soldiers that put the plans into action.[10]GEN Eisenhower had the personal courage to take all of the responsibility of any failure.  For example, with respect to Operation Overlord, GEN Eisenhower wrote a letter claiming all responsibility if the Normandy Invasion was a failure.[11]  Now, he was able to lead an organizational culture with full freedom and empowerment. GEN Eisenhower made it clear with Churchill and FDR that he needed the responsibility and empowerment to be able to make and execute decisions and actions freely.  This generalship and climate was all the way down to the lieutenant and sergeant.  These lieutenants and sergeants had the empowerment to decide and execute the tactical decisions and actions required for all operations to become a success.  

Referencing the Germans’ generalship, it was the total contrary.  Hitler and his Generals micromanaged down to the lieutenant and sergeant.  For example, during the invasion, the German Commanding Generals had to seek authorization from Hitler to get a Panzer Division from the reserve.  The German Generals could not wake Hitler until noon, while the first land forces started to come aboard around 0600 hrs on June 6, 1944 and Airborne operations came the night prior.[12]  Once the German Generals received clearance, the Panzer division could not start moving until night so that they could be under darkness for concealment.[13]  Therefore, this Panzer Division did not arrive until 0930 hrs June 7, after a 75-mile march.[14]  The impact was drastic for not having the Panzer division in an expeditious matter of time.  Guderian stated in his memoirs that the best opportunity for a counterattack on the British airborne forces was lost due to not receiving orders from higher command.[15]   Furthermore, to make matters worse, Rommel was not at Normandy.  Hitler gave Rommel the operational command of securing the Atlantic and Normandy front, but Rommel was far away and tried to get to Normandy. However, since the Allies had air superiority, Rommel could not fly and had to drive.[16]  The result was multiple blunders that led to German failures and Allied successes during the invasion.  

Conclusion

In conclusion, historical analysis substantiates that American Forces were successful in accomplishing their objectives in Operation Overlord. This was done through their maneuvers that resulted in the opening up of – and eventual envelopment of – the Western European Theater of Operations. Operation Overlord had lasting impacts within World War II.  Therefore, one of the main conclusions from Murray and Millet’s analysis was that World War II was one of the biggest destroyers of human life and material that we have encountered in world history.[17] The amount of human life lost to Operation Overlord (and especially at the Battle of Omaha Beach) was and is still unthinkable.  Then, with the amount of money and material destroyed, that loss was even greater.  The Overlord Allied casualties totaled 60,771 with 8,975 killed in action.[18]  Historians believe that Hitler wanted to conquer the world at any cost.  Hitler and the Nazis proved this point on many occasions.  For example, Hitler and his Nazis committed unthinkable acts within the Holocaust, Polish and French Campaigns, and several other Eastern European campaigns.  The Allies needed to hold the Nazis accountable and so defeat them. The process of defeating the Nazis came at a very high cost, with the destruction of material and human lives. The means were the destruction of the Nazis and ends were eliminating their evil from the world. Therefore, it is my belief that the ends outweighed the means.  In conclusion, GEN Eisenhower summarized that “Operation Overlord was at once a singular military expedition and fearsome risk”.[19]

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[1]Dwight Eisenhower. Message from General Dwight Eisenhower to the Allied Forces, Eisenhower Archives Website (6 June 1944).

[2]John J. Marr. “Designing the Victory in Europe.” Military Review July-August 2011 (2011): 64.

[3]John J. Marr. “Designing the Victory in Europe.”, 64.

[4]Max Hastings. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 21.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Dwight D. Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe  (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company INC, 1952), 211

[7]Dwight Eisenhower. The Eisenhower Diaries.Edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1981), 107.

[8]Ibid

[9]Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe, 251-252.

[10]Dwight D. Eisenhower.At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company INC, 1967), 271-275.

[11]Stephen Ambrose. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches(London: Simon Schuster, 1994), 190.  

[12]Ibid, 567-575.  

[13] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War.  (Cambridge, MS and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 412.   

[14]Rommel, Rommel Papers, 483.

[15]Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader.  (New York: Dell, 1989), 184.

[16]Ambrose. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches, 567-575.  

[17]Murray and Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 554-557.   

[18]Dwight D Eisenhower.  In Review.(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company INC, 1969), 69.  

[19]Dwight D Eisenhower. At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, 273.